Congressional Record Weekly Update

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1A) Yucca Mountain Site Approved
Jeff Trandahl, Clerk of the House reports that on June 12, 2002 he presented to the President of the United States, for his approval, the following bills.

Number and Title
H.J. Res 87. Approving the site at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, for the development of a repository for the disposal of high-level radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel, pursuant to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982.

H.R. 2362. To establish the Benjamin Franklin Tercentenary Commission.

H.R. 3871. To provide for an independent investigation of Forest Service firefighter deaths that are caused by wildfire entrapment or burnover.

1B) North Korea
Mr. BROWNBACK. I want to address the body quickly and briefly but importantly on what is happening in North Korea and to North Korean refugees coming out of that country.

   Prior to the July 4th recess, my colleagues, Senator KENNEDY and Senator ALLEN, and I brought to light the plight of North Korean refugees in a hearing before the Immigration Subcommittee. The hearing capped a month of activity that involved the passage of resolution on North Korean refugees in both the House and the Seante. Both resolutions strongly urged the Chinese government not to repatriate North Korean refugees back to North Korea. The House version passed by 406 to 0 and our resolution passed by unanimous consent on June 19, 2002.

   At our hearing, we heard some very moving testimony from Ms. Lee Soon-Ok, a North Korean defector who suffered more than five years in a prison camp. We also heard from Ms. Helie Lee, a Korean American writer whose memoir, In the Absence of the Sun, movingly highlighted a largely hidden and painful secret shared by hundreds of thousands of Korean Americans and millions of Koreans--more than 50 years of separation among family members and loved ones since the outbreak of the Korean War. Few other country and its people has suffered as much.

   In addition, Mr. President, I urged Secretary Powell in both a formal consultation and by correspondence on the need of our Department of State to allow the processing of North Korean refugees together with the Chinese government and the Beijing office of the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees.

   The plight of North Korean refugees, of course, is merely a symptom of a far more pressing issue--how to deal with one of the most repressive and totalitarian states in the world, the isolated country of North Korea ruled by one man, Kim Jong-il.

   Although news regarding the efforts of many in the NGO community and countless others working in North East China have been slowly filtering into the West, the true nature of the North Korean regime is largely hidden and inaccessible.

   It was not until the showing of a dramatic video of five members of the Han-mee family being forcibly removed from the Japanese consulate in Beijing that the world began to pay attention. Since then, several other asylum bids have drawn the attention of mainstream media, including the horrifying story of baby-killings in North Korean prison camps reported in the New York Times and based on the testimony of Ms. Soon Ok Lee, who, as I indicated before, testified at our hearing.

   In June 2002, ABC Nightime broadcast a three-part documentary of the North Korean refugee in China by Ms. Kim Jung-eun whose schedule did not permit her to testify before our committee. I was told by ABC News staff that thousands of Americans have responded to the broadcast with e-mails in disbelief and in rage against the North Korean regime. I understand that the three programs drew high response from viewers.

   It is estimated that between 2 to 3 million people died of starvation and persecution in North Korea from 1995 through 1998 and that up to up to 300,000 North Korean refugees in China are living a precarious and dangerous life, hiding by day, begging by night, in an effort to avoid being captured and repatriated back to North Korea by Chinese and North Korean agents brazenly operating inside China

   Of the 300,000 refugees, only 518 refugees successfully defected to South Korea this year through June 2002, many of them by taking refuge at foreign missions in Beijing and in Shenyang, China.

   These actions by the Chinese are simply unacceptable, not only to basic principles and tenets of international human rights, but also by the fact that China is a signatory of the International Refugees Convention. Hundreds of South Korean, Japanese and western NGO's are working inside China to help the refugees, risking their lives and capture by the Chinese police. A German doctor who also testified before our committee worked in North Korea for a year and a half but was evicted by the North Korean regime for disclosing the tragedies of the NK people. People like him and others on the ground in China and Korea have been some of the most vocal and active in their effort to make the whole world aware of the conditions in North Korea and China. Many NGO's have taken care of refugee families full-time with their own money.

   I've met with many of these people, all of whom are now effectively shut down from operating in China. And what they tell me over and over is that they simply cannot not ignore what they saw. All of them said to me that they could not look away and ignore the refugees, many of whom were too scared to even beg for help.

   These NGO's from South Korea, Japan, the U.S., France, and Germany, first reported the tragedy of the North Koreans to the outside world. These NGOs who are in the best position to know report that food aid from South Korea, the U.S., and Japan, simply are not reaching the dying people. As I mentioned in a previous statement, I believe it is absolutely necessary to condition stringent monitoring of the delivery of food aid by NGOs in an effort to determine that they are being distributed appropriately. Much of this aid is apparently being diverted to feed the million-plus North Korean army and to reward the elites and the inner circle around Kim Jong-il in Pyongyang. For this reason, many well-respected NGOs, including Doctors Without Borders have withdrawn from North Korea.

   More troubling is that these NGO's have confirmed reports of more than a dozen prison camps in North Korea, where the prisoners are starved, forced to work at hard labor, and tortured to death.

   Aside from the troubling refugee issue, we cannot forget that North Korea is a threat to regional and global security. North Korea continues its procurement of materials and components for its ballistic missile programs from foreign sources, especially through North Korean firms based in China. In addition, North Korea has become a ``secondary supplier'' of missile technology and expertise to several countries in the Middle East, South Asia and North Africa. The CIA's 2001 report assesses that North Korea is capable of producing and delivering via missile warheads or other munitions a variety of chemical agents and possibly some biological.

   Furthermore, North Korea refuses to carry out its obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, NPT and the 1994 Agreed Framework. Initial IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency, inspections and intelligence reports in the early 1990s triggered concerns regarding a clandestine nuclear weapons program. U.S. and foreign intelligence have concluded that the DPRK government of North Korea probably has sufficient plutonium for 1 to 5 nuclear weapons. Despite its obligations under the NPT and the Agreed Framework, North Korea continues to refuse inspections.

   So while it would be reason enough to continue our pressure on North Korea and China for the humanitarian violations alone, there are also the pressing security threats that the current North Korean government poses to U.S. interests which must be dealt with. While refugee and nuclear weapons issues will necessitate very different responses--the thing they share in common is the alarms they raise about ignoring the North Korean problem in all its complexity.

   While I am mindful of the diplomatic sensitivities regarding the need to reach out to the North Korean regime, there comes a time when we have to confront the truth and tell the truth. Moreover, reconciliation efforts have yet to yield any results. There was

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   As the naval skirmish last month and the continuing problems with the North Korean refugees show, the North Korean issue has simply worsened. It's time for the North Korean regime to immediately allow international monitoring of food aid into the country and to work with the international NGO community to alleviate the suffering of its people. That may at least stem the tide of refugees crossing over into China and being prey to human traffickers and other difficulties faced by refugees. But more fundamentally, the North regime itself must begin to change itself and join the rest of the world in giving hope and freedom to its people.

   The U.S. can not afford to give into the slow-walking of reforms in North Korea. For our own security, for the stability of the region and for the sake of basic human rights--North Korea must remain a top policy focus for U.S. foreign policy. We must keep clear and constant pressure on NK and neighboring countries to bring new leadership into being. This is a daunting task, but one that we can not afford to shirk.

   We have significant refugee flight taking place out of North Korea. We have had hearings in the Senate Immigration Committee on this particular topic. We have a humanitarian crisis, probably the largest in the world, that is taking place. We estimate that there are between 2 to 3 million people who have died of starvation and persecution in North Korea from 1995 to 1998, in a 3-year time period--2 to 3 million people. Nobody knows for sure because outside observers are not allowed.

   This Nation is the most repressive, closed regime in the world today. The world community is feeding those who are left in North Korea. The United States and a number of other donating countries are feeding about half of the population in North Korea. Much of the food aid we are giving North Korea is not getting out to where it is needed. It is still held by the leadership in that country.

   We estimate that some 300,000 North Korean refugees are living in China today in a precarious and dangerous lifestyle. They are hiding by day and begging by night, trying to keep from being caught and sent back into North Korea, which is what China does. If they catch people from North Korea, they treat them as economic migrants and ship them back into starvation, refugee camps, persecution, and probably death.

   Of the 300,000 refugees in China, only 518 refugees have successfully defected, gotten out of China and into South Korea or into another third country--that is this year, through June of 2002. Many of them have done it by taking refugee status at foreign missions in Beijing and Shenyang, China. They have rushed embassies in those communities, gotten inside, asked for political asylum, it has been granted, and they passed to South Korea, generally through a third country--many times through the Philippines. I say only 518 this year. If you look at the history since the Korean conflict has ended--now 50 years ago--there have been only several thousand who have defected from North Korea into South Korea. Generally, each year, it has been a trickle--maybe in the teens.

   The North Korean regime has been able to keep people in a dogmatic system, saying this regime is the best in the world and saying they are being fed by the President and the leadership. Now that trickle is beginning to really move. They believe it may be up to a thousand; there may be a thousand or more defecting this year alone, which is a massive number considering the history.

   Mr. President, the issue I want to bring to light is the role of China and the importance of China in allowing these people to live. If China will allow these people to pass through, or if China will allow the U.N. Commission, or the High Commission on Refugees to establish a processing center to determine if these are people who need to be allowed to pass into third countries, thousands if not millions of people will not have to live in North Korea. If China does not, you are going to see thousands, possibly millions more, die of starvation, persecution, and other causes.

   China has a choice. They will choose what the status is going to be, whether these people will live or die. They need to be confronted directly and asked to let these people live, to let them pass through. Let them pass through to Mongolia, to South Korea, to other places; but don't send them back. If they don't want to have them stay in China, allow some place for them to go through, such as a refugee center. But, China, make the choice. It is your responsibility and their blood that will be on your call as to what you determine you are going to do in this particular situation.

   North Korea is a country that is difficult for us or anybody else in the world to influence. China is the only country in the world that has some influence on North Korea. So it is going to be their choice as to whether these people will live or die.

   North Korea needs to change its regime. I don't need to remind Members of the Senate of the other problems we have with North Korea. They are a supplier of weapons. North Korea has become a secondary supplier of missile technology and expertise to several countries in the Middle East, South Asia, and North Africa. The CIA's 2001 report assesses that North Korea is capable of producing and delivering via missile warheads, or other munitions, a variety of chemical agents and possibly some biological agents as well.

   Mr. President, I draw this to the attention of my colleagues because we need to allow refugees to pass and come into the United States as well. We will be bringing this issue up again in front of this body. I hope we will put pressure on China, which doesn't have a good human rights record, so that they can act to save people's lives--if they will only allow these people to pass through.

   Mr. President, I yield the floor.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oregon is recognized.

1C) Transportation of Nuclear Waste Has Impressive Safety Record
Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, this Member commends to his colleagues the following editorial from the July 15, 2002, Omaha World-Herald. The editorial offers insightful comments on the issue of transporting nuclear waste and highlights the impressive safety record of shipments which have been made over the years. For instance, 3,000 shipments of high-level waste have been safely completed over the past three decades. The containers for the waste have been subjected to numerous tests to ensure their strength and durability even in the most extreme circumstances.

Unfortunately, many opponents of the Yucca Mountain site have tried to use emotional scare tactics about the transportation of nuclear waste in hopes of derailing the entire project. However, as the editorial makes clear, central depository would greatly enhance safety.

Now that the Senate has voted to allow the construction of a national high-level nuclear waste storage facility at Yucca Mountain, Department of Energy officials will have to confront a key issue: Transportation.

Officials expect up to 77,000 tons of dangerous radioactive material such as spent nuclear plant fuel rods to be transported to the remote Nevada desert for indefinite storage. That waste will come from all 39 states, encompassing 131 sites, that currently store the material in mostly above-ground facilities. The sites include not only nuclear power plants but also military weapons facilities and research institutions.

The waste will travel by truck and rail. It will have to pass through some of the nation's most populous areas. Some will come through the Midlands, on its Interstate highways and its many rail lines. The government has projected that as many as 100 truck or rail accidents might occur over the 25-year life of the project.

The question of safety is key.

Opponents of the project tried to attack transport of the waste before the Senate decision because methods and routes had not yet been specified. But they were premature. It's only now, as DOE applies for a license for the facility from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, that such issues can be addressed.

Many critics of Yucca Mountain, by the way, aren't necessarily being open about their motives. Some may honestly believe approval of the site is potentially dangerous. Others, however, are simply anti-nuclear . They realize that without a disposal site, nuclear power in this country will likely die--``choking on its own waste,'' as one senator put it.

When critics raise their objections, they will have to overcome this fact; In the past 30 years, about 3,000 shipments of high-level waste have traveled around the United States safely. Not without accidents--trucks and trains are always vulnerable to accidents--but without any radiation leaks.

The Nuclear Energy Institute says that the waste transport containers used thus far, with their multiple layers of lead and other shielding, are built to withstand severe accidents. They have been tested: hit by a locomotive traveling at 60 miles per hour, driven into a concrete wall at 80 miles an hour, burned, submerged. They have withstood the worst flung at them without failure, whether in testing or in actual transportation-accident situations.

The presence of so many above-ground storage facilities for nuclear waste, in so many locations, near so many people--160 million by one estimate--amounts to an open invitation to accidents or terrorism. The chilling security uncertainties alone should predispose Americans toward a central, safe waste site.

Getting the waste materials there is a technical problem, not a reason to kill the construction of Yucca Mountain. If current methods of transportation aren't adequate--and such assertions are still far from proved--then federal officials and nuclear plant operators should find other ways to protect the shipments.

A single national repository is the only reasonable way to go. If Yucca Mountain is as desirable a site as its supporters say, then questions about transportation of the waste should not hold it back.

2A) US-China Security Review Commission Annual Report
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, the U.S.-China Security Review Commission on Monday released its first annual report, as directed by the Congress in its authorizing statute, P.L. 106-398, October 30, 2000. It is a broad-ranging analysis, with major recommendations for consideration. I will ask unanimous consent that the Executive Summary be printed in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks.

   The report is extensive, thorough, and disturbing in many respects. It paints a detailed portrait of a China determined to: acquire a vast array of high technology; broaden and deepen its industrial base; expand its research and development capabilities; and attract substantial amounts of American and other foreign investment. China is on the move. But, it is worthwhile to note that China pays for much of its progress through a highly imbalanced trade relationship with the U.S. Last year the U.S. trade deficit with China exceeded $80 billion U.S. dollars.

   One could simply say that the Chinese are intent on entering the modern era, and on building a strong nation state, financed by aggressively exporting goods to the U.S. But, Mr. President, there are some very troubling aspects of the U.S./Chinese relationship.

   The Commission found that U.S. policy toward China has been and is alarmingly fragmented. It lacks consistency and depth. U.S. policy toward China has often been driven solely by commercial interests, specific human rights issues, or by a particular military crisis, rather than by a comprehensive examination of all the issues which impact upon this relationship. Furthermore, over the last 30 years U.S. policy toward China has been dominated by strong Executive branch personalities and compulsive secrecy. There seems to be little sustainable consensus on the long-term national interests of the U.S. vis a vis China.

   The Report makes numerous recommendations designed to elicit a more comprehensive understanding of China by U.S. policy makers and by the general public. These include rebuilding the Library of Congress' China collection, new language and area studies programs, new efforts at open source collection by the intelligence community, and an upgrading of the Federal Broadcast Information Service. The fact is that we as a nation know far too little about China, and we need a better level of effort in this regard.

   There is new information and analysis in the Commission's report regarding Chinese access to U.S. capital markets, and a renewed call for more effective consultations and consensus-building between the President and Congress on Taiwan policy. The report also recommends new tools which should be employed to encourage the Chinese to comply with their commitments--in proliferation practices, prison labor agreements, intellectual property agreements enforcement, and most importantly, with their far-reaching obligations under the WTO.

   The report calls for increased scrutiny of corporate activities in China, and a new corporate reporting system to reveal what investment, R&D and technology is being sent to China. Transparency, disclosure and corporate accountability should be required of U.S. firms' operations in China, and are certainly of much interest to American shareholders and investors.

   I am pleased that the Report is a strong bipartisan effort, a broad consensus of nearly all the Commissioners, who approved it by a vote of 11-1. It is both an educational report and an action document. Each chapter highlights findings and makes recommendations for action which flow from those findings. The executive summery gives the key 21 recommendations, but additional valuable proposals are found at the end of each chapter.

   Some of the Report's key findings about the U.S.-China relationship include:

   The U.S.-China bilateral relationship is poorly coordinated and lacks a sustainable consensus among elected officials in Congress and the Executive branch;

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   China's leaders see the United States as a declining power with important military vulnerabilities that can be exploited;

   There are serious differences in perceptions each country holds of the other and a potential for misunderstandings that are compounded by the lack of bilateral institutions for confidence-building and crisis-management;

   There is plausible evidence that the burgeoning trade deficit with China will worsen despite China's entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO);

   The U.S. may be developing a reliance on Chinese imports that could in time undermine the U.S. defense industrial base;

   The U.S. lacks adequate institutional mechanisms to monitor national security concerns involving Chinese and other foreign entities seeking to raise capital in the U.S. debt and equity markets;

   China provides technology and components for weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems to terrorist sponsoring states, presenting an increasing threat to U.S. security interests, in the Middle East and Asia in particular.

   Radical changes in China's economic fortunes have been fueled by U.S. investors and multinational firms, and have come with severe sacrifices in the form of lost American manufacturing jobs.

   Mr. President, there is much to recommend in this Report, and many recommendations which may be of interest to my colleagues.

   I congratulate the Chairman and all of the commissioners who authored this fine report, as well as the staff members of the Commission who worked tirelessly on this important endeavor.

   Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the executive summary be printed in the RECORD.

   There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

   Executive Summary

   Relations between the United States and China during the last half-century have not always been smooth. The two countries have sharply contrasting worldviews, competing geo-strategic interests, and opposing political systems. More recently, bilateral ties have centered on rapidly growing economic interactions that have muted political differences. For the moment, these relations have not softened China's egregious behavior on human rights nor changed its strategic perceptions that the U.S. is its principal obstacle to growing regional influence. No one can reliably predict whether relations between the U.S. and China will remain contentious or grow into a cooperative relationship molded by either converging ideologies or respect for ideological differences, compatible regional interests, and a mutually beneficial economic relationship.

   However the relationship develops, it will have a profound impact on the course of the twenty-first century. The policies pursued today by both China and the United States will affect future relations. The Congress created the U.S.-China Security Review Commission to assess ``the national security implications and impact of the bilateral trade and economic relationship between the United States and the People's Republic of China'' and to report its conclusions annually to the Congress. It specifically directed the Commission to focus on our deepening economic, trade, and financial linkages with China. The Congress wanted the Commission to evaluate whether our economic policies with China harm or help United States national security and, based on that assessment, to make recommendations in those areas that will improve our nation's interests.

   National security has come to include military, economic and political relationships. At any time, one of these concerns may dominate. They interact with one another and affect our overall security and well-being. Neglect of any one element will diminish our overall security as a nation. The United States must be attentive to the strength and readiness of our military forces, the health of our economy, and the vibrancy of our political relationships.

   The Congress also asked the Commission to include in its Report ``a full analysis, along with conclusions and recommendations for legislative and administrative actions.'' This is the Commission's first Report. In keeping with the Congressional mandate, this Report provides a comprehensive analysis of the Commission's year-long review of U.S.-China relations, the principal findings that emerged from that investigation, and the recommendations or measures the Commission believes should be implemented to help safeguard our national security in the years ahead. This initial Report provides a baseline against which to measure and assess year-to-year changes in the relationship.

   MAIN THEMES

   Our relationship with China is one of the most important bilateral relationships for our nation. If if is not handled properly, it can cause significant economic and security problems for our country. China is emerging as a global economic and military power, and the United States has played, and continues to play a major role in China's development.

   China's foreign trade has skyrocketed over the past twenty years (from approximately $20 billion in the late 1970s to $475 billion in 2000). Our trade deficit with China has grown at a sharp rate, from $11.5 billion in 1990 to $85 billion in 2000. Foreign investment--with America a leading investor--grew apace. This trade and investment has helped to strengthen China both economically and militarily.

   America's policy of economic engagement with China rests on a belief that the transition to a free market economy and the development of the rule of law in China's business sector would likely lead to more political and social openness and even democracy. This belief, along with the desire to expand American commercial interests, drove U.S. support for China's entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO). Many also believe that a more prosperous China will be a more peaceful country, especially if it is fully integrated into the Pacific and world economies.

   But these are hypotheses, and many leading experts are convinced that certain aspects of our policy of engagement have been a mistake. They argue that the PRC faces enormous economic and social problems, that its leaders are intractably antidemocratic, that they are hostile to the U.S. and its prominent role in Asia, and that we are strengthening a country that could challenge us economically, politically and military.

   The Commission does not believe that anyone can confidently forecast the future of China and the U.S.-China relationship, and contends that while we may work and hope for the best, our policymakers should prepare for all contingencies.

   Over the past twenty years, China has created a more market-based economy and allowed more social and economic freedom. Chinese participation in international security and economic regimes has grown. On the other hand, China has made little progress toward granting its citizens political and religious freedom, and protecting human and labor rights. In fact, the government has notably increased its repression of some religious practices, including its brutal campaign against the Alum Gong.

   Chinese leaders have repeatedly stressed to their Communist Party support and the Chinese people that they have no desire to repeat in China the political and economic collapse that took place in the former Soviet Union. They seek to maintain and strengthen the Communist Party's political and social control while permitting freer economic activity. They consistently limit the freedom of the Chinese people to obtain and exchange information, practice their religious faith, to publicly express their convictions, and to join freely organized labor unions. Chinese leaders frequently use nationalistic themes to rally support for their actions, including crack downs on dissenters.

   China is thus embarked on a highly questionable effort--to open its economy but not its political system--the outcome of which will influence the destinies of many countries, including our own. If the economy fails, or if the Chinese people demand full freedom instead of merely a taste of it, then the leaders will have to choose between reasserting central control and granting greater political and social freedom, with a consequent weakening of their own authority. On the other hand, if China becomes rich but not free, the United States may face a wealthy, powerful nation that could be hostile toward our democratic values, to us, and in direct competition with us for influence in Asia and beyond.

   American policymakers must take these scenarios seriously, and to that end the Commission has established benchmarks against which to measure future change. There are important areas in which Chinese policy runs directly counter to U.S. national security interests, such as not controlling exports that contribute to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, its close relations with terrorist-sponsoring states like Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Sudan and North Korea, its expanding long-range missile forces, its threatening policies toward Taiwan, and its pursuit of both asymmetric warfare capabilities and modern military technology that could menace American military forces.

   China's leaders view the United States as a partner of convenience, useful for its capital technology, know-how and market. They often describe the United States as China's long-term competitor for regional and global military and economic influence. Much rhetoric and a considerable volume of official writings support this hypothesis. The recent empirical study of Chinese newspapers' coverage of the U.S., conducted by University of Maryland scholars for the Commission, found a divided perspective: articles in these newspapers, which we believe generally represent the views of the leadership, are consistently positive on trade and investment matters and applaud Sino-U.S. cooperation in these areas. In contrast, their coverage of U.S. foreign policy is largely negative and frequently depicts the U.S., as hegemonic and unilateralist.

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   In time we will learn whether China is to become a responsible world power or an aggressive, wealthy dictatorship, and whether the Communist Party maintains its monopoly of political power or shares it with the Chinese people. We will also learn whether the Chinese economy flourishes or stumbles and collapses under the burden of state-owned industries, a weak banking system, enormous debt, wide-scale corruption, social dislocation, and the new challenges of international competition brought about by its WTO entry.

   Current U.S. policies and laws fail to adequately monitor the transfers of economic resources and security-related technologies to China, considering the substantial uncertainties and challenges to U.S. national interests in this relationship. This Report attempts to begin to address these uncertainties, trends, and challenges in a systematic manner. It proceeds on the premise that far more prudence must be displayed and far better understanding developed on the part of the Congress on the full extent of this relationship and its impact on U.S. interests. In addition, too little attention has been devoted to the adverse impact of recent Chinese economic strength on our Asian allies and friends. The Commission believes the U.S. must develop a better understanding of the vulnerabilities and needs of our Asian allies and friends, and must carefully construct policies to protect and nurture those relationships.

   SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

   The Commission has identified its key findings and recommendations with each chapter in this Report. The Commission developed more than forty recommendations that are listed with each of the ten chapters. We have prepared a separate classified report providing additional details and recommendations. Here, we highlight and summarize those recommendations we believe are the highest priority and which we recommend for immediate action. A more extended analysis is contained in each of the Report's ten chapters.

   CONFLICTING NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES

   The United States Government is poorly organized to manage our increasingly complex relationship with China. We are not adequately informed about developments within China and about their leaders' perceptions of the U.S., and we dedicate insufficient resources to understand China. Because Chinese strategic thinking and analysis of military planning differ markedly from our own, our incomplete understanding enhances the possibilities for miscalculation, misunderstanding, and potential conflict.

   Recommendation 1: The U.S. Government should expand its collection, translation and analysis of open source Chinese-language materials, and make them available to the larger community. Despite two studies advocating an improved collection of Chinese materials at the Library of Congress, its collection is nearly unusable and shameful. Congress should provide funds to implement recommendations already submitted by the two previous studies. In addition, the Commission recommends increased funding for Chinese language training and area studies programs, similar to the program in the National Defense Education Act of 1958, and incentives for post-secondary graduates to participate in government services. The relevant executive branch agencies should report annually to the Congress on steps taken to rectify this situation.

   Recommendation 2: The U.S. should develop a comprehensive inventory of official government-to-government and U.S. Government-funded programs with China. The President should designate an executive branch agency to coordinate the compilation of a database of all such cooperative programs. The database should include a full description of each program, its achievements to date, and the benefits to the U.S. and should be prepared annually in both classified and unclassified forms. The Commission further recommends that the executive branch prepare a biannual report, beginning in 2004, on the cooperative Science and Technology (S&T) programs with China patterned on the report submitted to Congress in May 2002 at the request of Senator Robert C. Byrd. The President should establish a working group to set standards for S&T transfers, monitor the programs, and coordinate with the intelligence agencies.

   Recommendation 3: The Commission recommends that Congress encourage the Department of Defense to renew efforts to develop military-to-military confidence building measures (CBMs) within the context of a strategic dialogue with China and based strictly on the principles of reciprocity, transparency, consistency, and mutual benefit.

   MANAGING U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC RELATIONS (TRADE AND INVESTMENT)

   The United States has played a major role in China's rise as an economic power. We are China's largest export market and a key investor in its economy. Fueled by China's virtually inexhaustible supply of low-cost labor and large inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI), the U.S. trade deficit with China has grown at a furious pace--from $11.5 billion in 1990 to $85 billion in 2000. The U.S. trade deficit with China is not only our largest deficit in absolute terms but also the most unbalanced trading relationship the U.S. maintains. U.S. trade with China is only 5 percent of total U.S. trade with the world but our trade deficit with China is 19 percent of the total U.S. trade deficit. U.S. exports to China are only 2 percent of total U.S. exports to the world, while we import over 40 percent of China's exports.

   Foreign direct investment has helped China leapfrog forward both economically and technologically. These developments have provided China with large dollar reserves, advanced technologies, and greater R&D capacity, each of which has helped make China an important world manufacturing center and a growing center of R&D, which are contributing to its military-industrial modernization. U.S. companies have difficulty competing with Chinese based companies, in large part, because the cost of labor in China is depressed through low wages and denial of worker rights. Essentially, Chinese workers do not have the ability to negotiate their wages. Attracted in part by the low wages in China, a growing number of U.S. manufacturers are now operating in China, many of whom are utilizing China as an ``export platform'' to compete in U.S. and global markets.

   China's large trade surplus with the United States, the inflow of U.S. private investment into China, and China's access to U.S. capital markets each contributes, directly or indirectly, to China's economic growth and military modernization.

   Recommendation 4: The Commission recommends the creation of a federally mandated corporate reporting system that would gather appropriate data to provide a more comprehensive understanding of the U.S. trade and investment relationship with China. The reporting system should include reports from U.S. companies doing business in China on their initial investment, any transfers of technology, offset or R&D cooperation associated with any investment, and the impact on job relocation and production capacity from the United States or U.S. firms overseas resulting from any investment in China.

   Recommendation 5: The Commission recommends that the U.S. make full and active use of various trade tools including special safeguards provisions in the WTO to gain full compliance by China with its World Trade Organization (WTO) accession agreement.

   CHINA'S WTO MEMBERSHIP: CONFLICTING GOALS

   The U.S. and China hold differing goals for China's membership in the WTO. (The Chinese saying for this situation is: ``same bed, different dreams''). China's leadership sought WTO membership to further the nation's economic reform and growth through export production and the accumulation of foreign investment, capital, and technology in order to become a world power. U.S. support for China's WTO membership was intended to enhance market access for U.S. goods and services, and also to promote internal economic, political and civil reforms, including a more open society.

   China has instituted legal reforms to supervise foreign direct investment (FDI), financial markets and private businesses in order to stimulate trade and investment and fulfill the country's WTO commitments. The development of a commercial rule of law in China faces numerous obstacles, including the lack of an independent judiciary and trained judges, local protectionism, and widespread corruption. Despite some advances in commercial legal reforms, China remains grossly deficient in granting its citizens civil and political freedoms, and makes widespread use of prison labor.

   Recommendation 6: The Commission recommends that Congress renew the Super 301 provision of U.S. trade law and request the Administration to identify and report on other tools that would be most effective in opening China's market to U.S. exports if China fails to comply with its WTO commitments. In examining these tools, priority should be given to those industry sectors where China expects rapid economic growth in exports to the U.S. market.

   Recommendation 7: Congress should authorize and appropriate additional funds to strengthen the Commerce Department's support for commercial rule of la reform in China, including intellectual property rights and WTO implementation assistance, and to strengthen the Department of State's promotion of capacity-building programs in the rule of law, administrative reform, judicial reform and related areas.

   Recommendation 8: The U.S. should improve enforcement against imports of Chinese goods made from prison labor by shifting the burden of proof to U.S. importers and by more stringent requirements relating to visits to Chines facilities suspected of producing and exporting prison-made goods to the United States. (Note: The Commission made recommendations to Congress on this issue in a May 2002 letter).

   Recommendation 9: The Commission recommends that Congress request the annual Trade Promotion Coordination Committee (TPCC) report prepared by the Department of Commerce include an assessment of China's progress in compliance with its WTO commitments, recommendations on initiatives to facilitate compliance, and a survey of market access attained by key U.S. industry sectors in China, including agriculture. The report should include comparisons of U.S. market access in those key industry sectors with those gained by the European union and Japan.

   Recommendation 10: The Commission recommends that Congress urge the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) to request WTO consultations on China's noncompliance with its obligations under the Trade-related Aspects

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   Recommendation 11: Congress mandated the Commission to evaluate and make recommendations on invoking Article XXI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), relating to security exceptions from GATT obligations. The Commission believes that the steel industry is a possible candidate for using Article XXI. If the Administration's current safeguard measures prove ineffective, the Commission recommends that Congress consider using Article XXI to ensure the survival of the U.S. steel industry.

   ACCESSING U.S. CAPITAL MARKETS

   Chinese firms raising capital or trading their securities in U.S. markets have almost exclusively been large state-owned enterprises, some of which have ties to China's military and intelligence services. There is a growing concern that some of these firms may be assisting in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction of ballistic missile delivery systems. The U.S. lacks adequate institutional mechanisms to monitor national security concerns raised by certain Chinese and other foreign entities accessing the U.S. debt and equity markets. We also lack sufficient disclosure requirements to inform the investing public of the potential risks associated with investing in such entities.

   Recommendation 12: The Commission recommends that foreign entities seeking to raise capital or trade their securities in U.S. markets be required to disclose information to investors regarding their business activities in countries subject to U.S. economic sanctions.

   Recommendation 13: The Commission recommends that the Treasury Department, in coordination with other relevant agencies, assess whether China or any other country associated with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or ballistic-missile delivery systems are accessing U.S. capital markets and make this information available to the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC). state public pension plans, and U.S. investors. Entities sanctioned by the Department of State for such activities should be denied access to U.S. markets.

   PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

   China fails to control the export of dual-use items that contribute to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. China is a leading international source of missile-related technologies. Its proliferation activities with terrorist-sponsoring and other states, despite commitments to the U.S. to ease such activities, present serious problems for U.S. national security interests, particularly in the Middle East and Asia.

   Recommendation 14: The Commission recommends that the President be provided an extensive range of options to penalize foreign countries for violating commitments or agreements on proliferation involving weapons of mass destruction and technologies and delivery systems relating to them. All current statutes dealing with proliferation should be amended to include a separate authorization for the President to implement economic and other sanctions against offending countries, including quantitative and qualitative export and import restrictions, restricting access to U.S. capital markets, controlling technology transfers, and limiting U.S. direct investment.

   Recommendation 15: The United States should work with the United Nations Security Council and other appropriate inter-governmental organizations to formulate a framework for effective multilateral action to counter proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. Member states found in violation of the agreed framework should be subject to international sanctions.

   Recommendation 16: The United States should continue to prohibit satellite launch cooperation with China until it puts into place an effective export-control system consistent with its November 2000 commitment to the U.S. to restrict proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and associated technologies to other countries and entities.

   CROSS-STRAIT AND REGIONAL RELATIONS

   Cross-strait relations are a major potential flashpoint in U.S.-China relations. Economic and people-to-people interactions between Taiwan and the Mainland have increased dramatically in recent years, raising prospects that such interactions could help ameliorate cross-strait political tensions. At the same time, China is enhancing its capability to carry out an attack across the Taiwan Strait with special operations, air, navy and missile forces. It continues to deploy short- and intermediate-range missiles opposite Taiwan and although the threat of an immediate attack appears to be low, this buildup appears designed to forestall pro-independence political movements in Taiwan and help bring about an eventual end to the Island's continued separate status.

   China's economic integration with its neighbors in East Asia raises the prospects of an Asian economic area dominated or significantly influenced by China. The U.S. has an interest in China's integration in Asia if it gives all parties a stake in avoiding hostilities. Nonetheless, U.S. influence in the area could wane to a degree, particularly on economic and trade matters.

   Recommendation 17: The Commission recommends that the Department of Defense continue its substantive military dialogue with Taiwan and conduct exchanges on issues ranging from threat analysis, doctrine, and force planning.

   Recommendation 18: The Commission recommends making permanent those provisions in the fiscal years 2001 and 2002 Foreign Operations Appropriations Acts providing for executive branch briefings to the Congress on regular discussions between the administration and the government on Taiwan pertaining to U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.

   Recommendation 19: The Commission believes that the Congress should encourage the Administration to initiate consultations with other Asian countries to assess and make recommendations on the impact of the ``hollowing out'' phenomenon with respect to China on regional economies and on U.S. economic relations with the region.

   CHINA'S MILITARY ECONOMY

   China's official defense spending has expanded by more than one-third in the past two years. The Commission estimates that China's official defense budget represents about one-third of its actual spending level. Its ability to increase defense spending in the face of competing priorities is supported by its rapid economic growth. China has the largest standing army in the world and ranks second in actual aggregate spending. The military's role in China's economy has been reduced in recent years, but the military derives extensive financial and technological benefits from the growth and modernization of the domestic economy, which is designed to serve it.

   Recommendation 20: The Commission recommends that the Secretary of Defense prepare a biannual report on critical elements of the U.S. defense industrial base that are becoming dependent on Chinese imports or Chinese-owned companies. The Department of Defense should also update its acquisition guidelines and develop information from defense contractors on any dependency for critical parts of essential U.S. weapons systems.

   TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS AND MILITARY ACQUISITIONS

   China has a well-established policy and program to acquire advanced technologies for its industrial development, military capabilities and intelligence services. Over the next ten years, China intends to acquire an industrial capability to build advanced conventional and strategic weapons systems. Current U.S. policies do not adequately consider the impact of the transfers of commercial and security-related technologies to China.

   Recommendation 21: The Commission recommends that the Department of Defense and the FBI jointly assess China's targeting of sensitive U.S. weapons-related technologies, the means employed to gain access to these technologies and the steps that have been and should be taken to deny access and acquisition. This assessment should include an annual report on Chinese companies and Chinese PLA-affiliated companies operating in the United States. Such reports are mandated by statute but have never been provided to Congress.

   The Commission cannot forecast with certainty the future course of U.S.-China relations. Nor can we predict with any confidence how China and Chinese society will develop in the next ten to twenty years. We do know that China now ranks among our most important and most troubling bilateral relationships and believe that China's importance to the United States will increase in the years ahead. As its economy and military grow and its influence expands, China's actions will carry increased importance for the American people and for our national interests.

   For this reason, the Commission believes that there is a pressing need to fully understand the increasingly complex economic, political and military challenges posed by China's drive toward modernity. To gain such comprehension will require the allocation of more resources and the elevation of China in our foreign and national security priorities. The Commission hopes that U.S.-China relations will develop in a positive direction but we must urge that this outcome, though preferred, may not happen. The U.S. must, therefore, be prepared for all possible contingencies.

2B) Supplemental Appropriations for Recovery from Terrorism
That the entire amount is designated by the Congress as an emergency requirement pursuant to section 251(b)(2)(A) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, as amended: Provided further, That funds made available under this heading in this Act and in Public Law 107-117 may be used to fund measures and activities undertaken by the Secretary of the Army, acting through the Chief of Engineers, to protect and secure any infrastructure owned or operated by, or on behalf of, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, including administrative buildings and facilities; and, in addition, $32,000,000, to remain available until expended: Provided, That using the funds appropriated herein, the Secretary of the Army, acting through the Chief of Engineers, is directed to repair, restore, and clean-up Corps' projects and facilities and dredge navigation channels, restore and clean out area streams, provide emergency streambank protection, restore other crucial public infrastructure (including sewer and water facilities), document flood impacts and undertake other flood recovery efforts deemed necessary and advisable by the Chief of Engineers: Provided further, That $10,000,000 of the

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   DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

   Bureau of Reclamation

   WATER AND RELATED RESOURCES

    For an additional amount for ``Water and Related Resources'', $7,000,000, to remain available until expended: Provided, That $3,000,000 is for the drilling of emergency wells in Santa Fe, New Mexico: Provided further, That $4,000,000 is to be used for the lease of up to 38,000 acre-feet of emergency water for the Rio Grande in New Mexico, in compliance with the existing biological opinion.

   DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

   ENERGY PROGRAMS

   Science

    For an additional amount for ``Science'' for emergency expenses necessary to support safeguards and security activities, $24,000,000: Provided, That the entire amount shall be available only to the extent an official budget request that includes designation of the entire amount of the request as an emergency requirement as defined in the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, as amended, is transmitted by the President to the Congress: Provided further, That the entire amount is designated by the Congress as an emergency requirement pursuant to section 251(b)(2)(A) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, as amended.

   ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES

   National Nuclear Security Administration

   WEAPONS ACTIVITIES

   (INCLUDING RESCISSION)

    For an additional amount for ``Weapons Activities'' for emergency expenses, $158,050,000: Provided, That $138,650,000 shall be available only to the extent that an official budget request for $138,650,000 that includes designation of the entire amount of the request as an emergency requirement as defined in the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, as amended, is transmitted by the President to the Congress: Provided further, That the entire amount is designated by the Congress as an emergency requirement pursuant to section 251(b)(2)(A) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, as amended.

    Of the funds appropriated under this heading in Public Law 107-66 and prior Energy and Water Development Appropriations Acts, $14,460,000 of unexpended balances are rescinded.

   DEFENSE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION

    For an additional amount for ``Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation'' for emergency activities necessary to support the safeguarding of nuclear material, $100,000,000, to remain available until December 31, 2002.

   OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR

    For an additional amount for ``Office of the Administrator'' for emergency expenses, $1,750,000: Provided, That the entire amount is designated by the Congress as an emergency requirement pursuant to section 251(b)(2)(A) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, as amended: Provided further, That the entire amount shall be available only to the extent an official budget request that includes designation of the entire amount of the request as an emergency requirement as defined in the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, as amended, is transmitted by the President to the Congress.

   ENVIRONMENTAL AND OTHER DEFENSE ACTIVITIES

   Defense Environmental Restoration and Waste Management

   (INCLUDING RESCISSION)

    For an additional amount for ``Defense Environmental Restoration and Waste Management'' for emergency expenses necessary to support safeguards and security activities, $56,000,000: Provided, That the entire amount shall be available only to the extent an official budget request that includes designation of the entire amount of the request as an emergency requirement as defined in the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, as amended, is transmitted by the President to the Congress: Provided further, That the entire amount is designated by the Congress as an emergency requirement pursuant to section 251(b)(2)(A) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, as amended.

    Of the funds appropriated under this heading in Public Law 107-66 and prior Energy and Water Development Appropriations Acts, $15,540,000 of unexpended balances are rescinded.

   Defense Facilities Closure Projects

    For an additional amount for ``Defense Facilities Closure Projects'' for emergency expenses necessary to support safeguards and security activities, $14,000,000: Provided, That the entire amount shall be available only to the extent an official budget request that includes designation of the entire amount of the request as an emergency requirement as defined in the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, as amended, is transmitted by the President to the Congress: Provided further, That the entire amount is designated by the Congress as an emergency requirement pursuant to section 251(b)(2)(A) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, as amended.

   Other Defense Activities

    For an additional amount for ``Other Defense Activities'' for emergency expenses necessary to support energy security and assurance activities, $7,000,000: Provided, That the entire amount is designated by the Congress as an emergency requirement pursuant to section 251(b)(2)(A) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, as amended.

   GENERAL PROVISIONS--THIS CHAPTER

    SEC. 501. The amounts invested by the non-Federal interests in the biomass project at Winona, Mississippi, before the date of enactment of this Act shall constitute full satisfaction of the cost-sharing requirement under section 3002 of the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (42 U.S.C. 13542).

    SEC. 502. Section 1 of Public Law 105-204 (112 Stat. 681) is amended--

    (1) in subsection (b), by striking ``until the date'' and all that follows and inserting ``until the date that is 30 days after the date on which the Secretary of Energy awards a contract under subsection (c), and no such amounts shall be available for any purpose except to implement the contract.''; and

    (2) by striking subsection (c) and inserting the following:

    ``(c) CONTRACTING REQUIREMENTS.--

    ``(1) IN GENERAL.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law (except section 1341 of title 31, United States Code), the Secretary of Energy shall--

    ``(A) not later than 10 days after the date of enactment of this paragraph, request offerors whose proposals in response to Request for Proposals No. DE-RP05-010R22717 (`Acquisition of Facilities and Services for Depleted Uranium Hexalfluoride (DUF6) Conversion Project') were included in the competitive range as of January 15, 2002, to confirm or reinstate the offers in accordance with this paragraph, with a deadline for offerors to deliver reinstatement or confirmation to the Secretary of Energy not later than 20 days after the date of enactment of this paragraph; and

    ``(B) not later than 30 days after the date of enactment of this paragraph, select for award of a contract the best value of proposals confirmed or reinstated under subparagraph (A), and award a contract for the scope of work stated in the Request for Proposals, including the design, construction, and operation of--

    ``(i) a facility described in subsection (a) on the site of the gaseous diffusion plant at Paducah, Kentucky; and

    ``(ii) a facility described in subsection (a) on the site of the gaseous diffusion plant at Portsmouth, Ohio.

    ``(2) CONTRACT TERMS.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law (except section 1341 of title 31, United States Code) the Secretary of Energy shall negotiate with the awardee to modify the contract awarded under paragraph (1) to--

    ``(A) require, as a mandatory item, that groundbreaking for construction occur not later than July 31, 2004, and that construction proceed expeditiously thereafter;

    ``(B) include as an item of performance the transportation, conversion, and disposition of depleted uranium contained in cylinders located at the Oak Ridge K-25 uranium enrichment facility located in the East Tennessee Technology Park at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, consistent with environmental agreements between the State of Tennessee and the Secretary of Energy; and

    ``(C) specify that the contractor shall not proceed to perform any part of the contract unless sufficient funds have been appropriated, in advance, specifically to pay for that part of the contract.

    ``(3) CERTIFICATION OF GROUNDBREAKING.--Not later than 5 days after the date of groundbreaking for each facility, the Secretary of Energy shall submit to Congress a certification that groundbreaking has occurred.

    ``(d) FUNDING.--

    ``(1) IN GENERAL.--For purposes of carrying out this section, the Secretary of Energy may use any available appropriations (including transferred unobligated balances).

    ``(2) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.--There are authorized to be appropriated, in addition to any funds made available under paragraph (1), such sums as are necessary to carry out this section.''.

   CHAPTER 6

   BILATERAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

   Funds Appropriated to the President

   UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

   CHILD SURVIVAL AND HEALTH PROGRAMS FUND

    For an additional amount for ``Child Survival and Health Programs Fund'' for emergency expenses for activities related to combating HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria, $200,000,000, to remain available until June 30, 2003: Provided, That such activities should include maternal health and related assistance in communities heavily impacted by HIV/AIDS: Provided further, That additional assistance should be provided to prevent transmission of HIV/AIDS from mother to child: Provided further, That of the funds appropriated under this heading in this Act, not less than $100,000,000 should be made available for a further United States contribution to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria: Provided further, That the cumulative amount of United States contributions to the Global Fund may not exceed the total resources provided by other donors and available for use by the Global Fund as of December 31, 2002: Provided further, That of the funds appropriated under this heading, up to $6,000,000 may be transferred to and merged with funds appropriated by this Act under the heading ``Operating Expenses of the United States Agency for International Development'' for costs directly related to international health: Provided further, That funds appropriated by

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   INTERNATIONAL DISASTER ASSISTANCE

    For an additional amount for ``International Disaster Assistance'' for emergency expenses for activities related to combating international terrorism, including repairing homes of Afghan citizens that were damaged as a result of military operations, $134,000,000, to remain available until September 30, 2003.

    In addition, for an additional amount for ``International Disaster Assistance'' for assistance for the West Bank and Gaza, $50,000,000, to remain available until September 30, 2003: Provided, That none of the funds appropriated by this Act may be obligated or expended with respect to providing funds to the Palestinian Authority: Provided further, That the entire amount provided under this heading in this Act is designated by the Congress as an emergency requirement pursuant to section 251(b)(2)(A) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, as amended: Provided further, That $144,000,000 shall be available only to the extent an official budget request, that includes designation of $144,000,000, including $50,000,000 for the West Bank and Gaza, as an emergency requirement as defined in the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, as amended, is transmitted by the President to the Congress.

   OPERATING EXPENSES OF THE UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

    For an additional amount for ``Operating Expenses of the United States Agency for International Development'' for emergency expenses for activities related to combating international terrorism, $7,000,000, to remain available until September 30, 2003: Provided, That the entire amount is designated by the Congress as an emergency requirement pursuant to section 251(b)(2)(A) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, as amended.

   Other Bilateral Economic Assistance

   ECONOMIC SUPPORT FUND

    For an additional amount for ``Economic Support Fund'' for emergency expenses for activities related to combating international terrorism, $665,000,000, to remain available until June 30, 2003: Provided, That of the funds appropriated by this paragraph that are made available for assistance for Pakistan, $1,000,000 should be made available for programs and activities which support the development of independent media in Pakistan: Provided further, That of the funds appropriated by this paragraph, $10,000,000 should be made available for the establishment of a pilot academic year international youth exchange program for secondary school students from countries with significant Muslim populations: Provided further, That funds made available pursuant to the previous proviso shall not be available for a country in which a similar academic year youth exchange program is currently funded by the United States: Provided further, That of the funds appropriated by this paragraph, $200,000,000 shall be made available for assistance for Israel, all or a portion of which may be transferred to, and merged with, funds appropriated by this Act under the heading ``NONPROLIFERATION, ANTI-TERRORISM, DEMINING AND RELATED PROGRAMS'' for defensive, non-lethal anti-terrorism assistance in accordance with the provisions of chapter 8 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961: Provided further, That the entire amount is designated by the Congress as an emergency requirement pursuant to section 251(b)(2)(A) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, as amended: Provided further, That $200,000,000 shall be available only to the extent an official budget request, that includes designation of $200,000,000 for Israel as an emergency requirement as defined in the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, as amended, is transmitted by the President to the Congress: Provided further, That funds appropriated under this heading, and funds appropriated under this heading in prior Acts that are made available for the purposes of this paragraph, may be made available notwithstanding section 512 of Public Law 107-115 or any similar provision of law: Provided further, That the Secretary of State shall inform the Committees on Appropriations at least 15 days prior to the obligation of funds appropriated by this paragraph.

   ASSISTANCE FOR THE INDEPENDENT STATES OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION

    For an additional amount for ``Assistance for the Independent States of the Former Soviet Union'' for emergency expenses for activities related to combating international terrorism, $110,000,000, to remain available until June 30, 2003: Provided, That the entire amount is designated by the Congress as an emergency requirement pursuant to section 251(b)(2)(A) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, as amended: Provided further, That the Secretary of State shall inform the Committees on Appropriations at least 15 days prior to the obligation of funds appropriated by this paragraph.

   Department of State

3A) India's Hegemonic Ambitions in South Asia
Mr. TOWNS. Mr. Speaker, we are all hoping that war can be avoided in South Asia. A war there would take an enormous toll in human lives and in damage to land and the fragile economies of India and Pakistan. The biggest losers, clearly, would be the Islamic people of Kashmir and Sikhs of Punjab, Khalistan.

Unfortunately, some of the media accounts of this conflict have been very one-sided. You would think after reading a lot of the papers and watching a lot of TV news that India is absolutely blameless in this conflict. That is not true. As the Wall Street Journal pointed out on June 4, it is India's hegemonic ambitions, as much as anything, that have brought this crisis to a head.

Mr. Speaker, at the time that India was partitioned, the Hindu maharajah of Kashmir, despite a majority Muslim population, acceded to India . That accession has always been disputed and India promised the United Nations in 1948 that it would settle the issue with a free and fair plebiscite on Kashmir's status. As we all know, the plebiscite has never been held. Instead, India has tried to reinforce its rule there with over 700,000 troops. According to columnist Tony Blankley in the January 2, Washington Times, meanwhile, India supports cross-border terrorism in the Pakistani province of Sindh. Indian officials have said that everyone who lives in India must either be Hindu or subservient to Hindus, and they have called for the incorporation of Pakistan into ``Akand Bharat''--Greater India .

In January, Home Minister L.K. Advani admitted that once Kashmir is free from India rule, it will bring about the breakup of India . India is a multinational state and history shows that such states always unravel eventually. We all hope that it won't take a war to do it. No one wants another Yugoslavia in South Asia, but there are 17 freedom movements within India . Unless India takes steps to resolve these issues peacefully and democratically, a violent solution becomes much more likely. As the former Majority Leader of the other chamber, Senator George Mitchell, said, ``The essence of democracy is self-determination.'' It is true in the Middle East and it is true in South Asia.

The Sikh Nation in Punjab, Khalistan also seeks its freedom by peaceful, democratic, nonviolent means, as does predominantly Christian Nagaland, to name just a couple of examples. The Sikhs declared the independence of Khalistan on October 7, 1987. They ruled Punjab prior to the British conquest of the submcommittee and no Sikh representative has signed the Indian constitution.

India claims that these freedom movements have little or no support. Well, if that is true, and if India is ``the world's largest democracy,'' as it claims, then why would it not hold a plebiscite on the stauts of Kashmir, of Nagaland, of Khalistan? Wouldn't that be the democratic way to resolve these issues without a violent solution?

Until that day comes, Mr. Speaker, we should support self-determination. We should declare our support for a plebiscite in Khalistan, in Kashmir, in Nagaland, and wherever they are seeking freedom. We should stop aid to India until all people in the subcontinent live in freedom and peace. These measures will help bring the glow of freedom to everyone in that troubled, dangerous region.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to place the Wall Street Journal article into the RECORD at this time.

Western worry over Kashmir has focused on Pakistan's willingness to control terrorists slipping over the border with India , and rightly so. But that shouldn't allow U.S. policy to overlook India's equal obligation to prevent a full-scale war from breaking out in Southwest Asia.

That obligation has come into focus with today's Asian security conference in Kazakstan. Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and President Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan will both be on hand, and everyone has been urging a bilateral meeting on the sidelines. But so far Mr. Vajpayee has ruled out any dialogue until Pakistan presents evidence that it is acting against the Kashmiri terrorist groups crossing the U.N. line of control to attack Indian targets.

This is shortsighted, not least for India , because it allows Mr. Musharraf to take the moral high ground by offering to talk ``anywhere and at any level.'' On Saturday the Pakistani leader also went on CNN to offer an implied assurance that he wouldn't resort to nuclear weapons, as something no sane individual would do. This went some way toward matching India's no-first-use policy and could be considered a confidence-building measure, however hard it would be for any leader to stick to such a pledge were national survival at stake.

India's refusal even to talk also raises question about just what that regional powerhouse hopes to achieve out of this Kashmir crisis. If it really wants terrorists to be stopped, some cooperation with Pakistan would seem to be in order. We hope India isn't looking for a pretext to intervene militarily, on grounds that it knows that it would win (as it surely would) and that this would prevent the emergence of a moderate and modernizing Pakistan.

This question is one the mind of U.S. leaders who ask Indian officials what they think war would accomplish, only to get no clear answer. India is by far the dominant power in Southwest Asia, and it likes it that way. Some in India may fear Mr. Musharraf less because he has tolerated terrorists than because he has made a strategic choice to ally his country with the U.S. If he succeeds, Pakistan could become stronger as a regional competitor and a model for India's own Muslim population of 150 million.

The danger here is that if India uses Kashmir to humiliate Pakistan, Mr. Musharraf probably wouldn't survive, whether or not fighting escalates into full-scale war. That wouldn't do much to control terrorism, either in India or anywhere else. It would also send a terrible signal to Middle Eastern leaders about what happens when you join up with America. All of this is above and beyond the immediate damage to the cause of rounding up al Qaeda on the Afghan-Pak border, or of restoring security inside Afghanistan.

No one doubts that Mr. Musharraf has to be pressed to control Kashmiri militants, as President Bush has done with increasing vigor. The Pakistani ruler was the architect of an incursion into Indian-controlled Kashmir at Kargil two years ago, and his military has sometimes provided mortar fire to cover people crossing the line of control.

But at least in the past couple of weeks that seems to have changed, as Pakistani security forces have begun restraining militants and breaking their communications links with terrorists already behind Indian lines. In any case, the line of control is so long and wild that no government can stop all incursions. More broadly, Mr. Musharraf has already taken more steps to reform Pakistani society than any recent government. U.S. officials say he has taken notable steps to clean up his intelligence service and that he has even begun to reform the madrassa schools that are the source of so much Islamic radicalism. (The problem is that Saudi Arabia hasn't stopped funding them.)

The Pakistani leader has done all this at considerable personal and strategic risk, and it is in the U.S. and (we would argue) Indian interests that he process continue and succeed. He deserves time to show he is not another Yasser Arafat, who has a 20-year record of duplicity.

As it works to defuse the Kashmir crisis, the U.S. has to press Mr. Musharraf to stop as many terror incursions into India as possible. But it also must work to dissuade India from using Kashmir as an excuse to humiliate Pakistan, a vital U.S. ally. The U.S. has a long-term interest in good relations with India , a sister democracy and Asian counterweight to China. But self-restraint over Kashmir is a test of how muchIndia really wants that kind of U.S. relationship.

3B) Resolution Calling for Use of Force Against Iraq
S.J. Res. 41. A joint resolution calling for Congress to consider and vote on a resolution for the use of force by the United States Armed Forces against Iraq before such force is deployed; to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

   Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I sought recognition to introduce a joint resolution on behalf of Senator Harkin and myself calling upon the Congress to consider, vote on, and enact a joint resolution authorizing the use of force by the U.S. Armed Forces against Iraq before such force is used.

   This resolution takes no position as to whether the use of force should be authorized or it should not be authorized, but goes to the essential authority of the Congress under the Constitution to declare war.

   The President's powers as Commander in Chief are reserved for an emergency where Congress does not have an opportunity to deliberate and decide. It is obvious that concerning the current situation with Iraq, there is ample time for a resolution of the issue by the Congress.

   There have been repeated statements by the administration relating to military action against Saddam Hussein. It is known that Saddam has weapons of mass destruction, such as chemicals which he used against the Kurds, and there exists evidence of biological

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   The President of the United States, in his State of the Union speech, identified Iraq, along with Iran and North Korea, as the ``axis of evil.'' Secretary of State Powell in congressional testimony then testified that the United States was not going to go to war against either Iran or North Korea, raising the inference that war against Iraq by negative implication was a distinct possibility.

   There have been repeated requests for regime change by the administration. In lieu of the limited time, I will not enumerate them, although they are set forth in some detail in my prepared statement.

   On February 13, 2002, I spoke on the floor calling for hearings by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and/or the Senate Armed Services Committee, and by letters dated February 14, 2002, and March 12, 2002, wrote to the respective chairmen of those committees. I am glad to note that Senator Biden, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, has called for a September hearing on the Iraq issue.

   The power of the Congress on the declaration of war has been eroded very materially, with the President taking unilateral action in Korea, Vietnam, Grenada, Lebanon, Panama, Somalia, and Kosovo. But in a situation where there is ample time for the Congress to deliberate and decide, the Congress should assert its constitutional authority.

   Among the many issues regarding the separation of powers, none is more important than this basic power to declare war and the separate power which the President has as Commander in Chief which sometimes conflict, but not in the situation such as the one at hand where we have time to deliberate and decide.

   Earlier this month, I conducted some 19 town meetings across my State of Pennsylvania and found a great deal of citizen concern. People are unaware of the details and would like to know more.

   In my February 13, 2002 floor speech, I enumerated a number of issues which are worth repeating. First, hearings would identify with greater precision what Saddam has by way of weapons of mass destruction.

   Secondly, we would get into the details as to what Saddam and Iraq have done by way of thwarting the United Nations from conducting inspections. Earlier this year, I met with Secretary General Kofi Annan to get a firsthand briefing and to press the U.N. to do everything it could to get those inspections.

   Another issue which I think needs to be subjected to analysis and hearings and national debate is what the cost would be of toppling Saddam, including the cost in casualties.

   Fourth, what will happen after a regime change? What will happen if, as and when Saddam goes?

   There is also the critical issue as to what we may expect from Saddam by way of reprisal or by way of anticipatory action. We know that Saddam Hussein is ruthless. We have seen him use chemicals against his own people, the Kurds. We have his statement just yesterday on the 24th anniversary of the July revolution when Saddam came into power. It is a belligerent, bellicose statement.

   I had an opportunity to meet with Saddam Hussein in January of 1990 at a meeting with Senator Richard Shelby. There is no doubt in my mind, from that contact--a meeting of about an hour and a quarter--that we are dealing with someone who has a mindset and a determination, having invaded Kuwait, having acted against the Kurds, that should give us every reason to be concerned about what he may do in light of the administration's repeated statements about a regime change; a concern if there is action by the United States against Iraq that there may be retaliation against Israel or others in the Mideast.

   Consideration by the Congress also would be very helpful in addressing the concerns which the international community has expressed on the unilateralism of President Bush and President Bush's administration. We have had instances of that: the International Criminal Court, Kyoto, the U.N.-Bosnia peacekeeping force, and others which I have enumerated in greater detail in the written statement which I will include at the conclusion of these remarks.

   If there are Members of the Senate and House who come forward and support the President--people in this body with extensive experience in the field over many years, respected international reputations--I think that would give credence to a position that the President may wish to take and would allay some of the concerns internationally on unilateralism, and perhaps persuade some of our allies that this is the right course of conduct.

   In considering what to do about Saddam, we have the example fresh in our mind of al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden. We have learned that 20/20 hindsight always being very good that we should have acted against bin Laden before September 11. We had ample warning and ample cause to do so. Bin Laden was under indictment for killing Americans in Mogadishu in 1993. Bin Laden was under indictment for the East Africa Embassy bombings in 1998. We knew he was involved in the U.S.S. Cole terrorism. He had made pronouncements about a worldwide jihad. The United States and the United Nations made demands on the Taliban to turn over bin Laden, which were refused. So we had a right

   under international law to proceed against bin Laden.

   There is obviously great concern about Saddam Hussein or what the future may hold if he goes unchecked. But these are all complicated issues. There ought to be full hearings. The American people ought to be informed. We have learned from the bitter experience of Vietnam what happens when there is military action where the American people are not supportive and the Congress is not supportive.

   Obviously, in a representative democracy, the matter first comes to the Congress. There is the precedent of President George H.W. Bush in 1991, when the Congress authorized a resolution for the use of force. I know the Presiding Officer remembers it well, as do I. It was a historic debate, and has been so characterized by the media and other commentators. President Bush, in 1990, had originally said he did not need congressional authorization. Then Senator Harkin took the floor on January 3, 1991, during a swearing-in ceremony, and procedurally the course that then followed, without going into great detail now, was that we had the debate on January 10, 11, and 12 and voted 52 to 47 in this body authorizing the use of force to repel Iraq from Kuwait. So that precedent is with us.

   There is no doubt that Congress is reluctant to step into the breach and to take a position. I urged in 1998 that the Congress authorize the use of force before President Clinton moved in with the missile attacks against Iraq in December of 1998. My written statement goes into detail as to what I have done on this issue going back to 1983, when I conducted a debate with Senator Charles Percy on the question of Korea and Vietnam being a war, and the questioning of Justice Souter in 1990 on whether Korea was a war. There has been a reluctance on the part of Congress to step forward. If we do nothing and it all works out, everything is fine, the Congress is happy. If the President acts unilaterally and is wrong, he gets the blame and we do not get the blame.

   I believe we have a responsibility to step forward. We have a responsibility institutionally under the Constitution to declare war, and we have a responsibility to acquaint the American people as to what is involved, and I think a responsibility to have this debate, to tell our European allies what our reasons are for what we may do.

   If there is to be military action against Saddam and Iraq, there is no doubt it would be much stronger with a congressional resolution, which implicitly carries the support of the American people. I think the hearings which I have called for and the debate on the resolution will do a great deal to inform the American people and the people of the world as to what we are up to, and whatever justification it is we have.

   I understand that my distinguished colleague, Senator Harkin, will be a cosponsor of this resolution.

   Repeated statements from the administration carry the strong suggestion that President Bush intends to take military action to change the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq. There

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   On February 13, 2002, in a Senate floor statement, I urged that the Senate Armed Services and/or Senate Foreign Relations Committee hold hearings as much as possible in public with some necessarily in closed sessions, to determine:

   (1) The specifics on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction;

   (2) Precisely what happened on the United Nations efforts to conduct inspections in Iraq and Iraq's refusals;

   (3) What type of a military action would be necessary to topple Saddam, including estimates of U.S. casualties;

   (4) What is anticipated in a change in regime in Iraq including Saddam's prospective replacement.

   Congressional Record, S730-731, February 13, 2002.

   On April 4, 2002, I met with United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan urging the UN to press Iraq to submit to wide-open, including surprise inspections, to determine the facts on Iraq's possession and efforts to create weapons of mass destruction. Meetings between UN officials and Iraqi representatives on May 1 and 3, 2002 produced no results. Subsequent meetings between UN officials and Iraqi representatives in early July produced no results.

   A ranking U.S. intelligence official advised that wide-open and surprise inspections in Iraq could provide reasonable assurances as to what Iraq has by way of possessing and/or developing weapons of mass destruction.

   Presidents have acted unilaterally in the past half century in initiating military actions in Korea, Vietnam, Grenada, Lebanon, Panama, Somalia and Kosovo. In some of those situations where there was not time for the Congress to deliberate and decide on a declaration of war or an authorization for the use of force, it was appropriate for the President to utilize his authority as Commander-in-Chief in an emergency. There is now ample time for the Congress to hold hearings, deliberate and take whatever action Congress deems appropriate regarding Iraq.

   There is a need for the American public to understand the issues involved in the use of military force against Iraq. There has been some public discussion, but relatively little. Congressional hearings would stimulate a national dialogue on the nation's op-ed pages, radio and television talk shows and in town halls across the country. I am glad to see that Senator Joseph R. Biden, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, has announced his committee will hold hearings on Iraq in September.

   In 19 town meetings, which I conducted across the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania this month, I heard considerable public concern and confusion over the President's intentions as to Iraq. Public support, reflected through the elected members of the House and Senate, is indispensable to successfully carry out an extensive military action. The United States learned a better lesson in Vietnam that a war cannot be successfully fought without public and congressional support.

   Consideration by the Congress on these key issues would provide a basis for international understanding of our position and perhaps even support in some quarters. There is a world view that President Bush too often acts unilaterally on critical international issues such as the International Criminal Court, the UN/Bosnia peacekeeping force, the Kyoto Protocol, ABM Treaty withdrawal, and the Biological Weapons Convention. If congressional consideration was followed by the authorization for the use of force supported by thoughtful and experienced members of the House and Senate, the international community might well be reassured that the U.S. military action was not the decision of just one man, even though he is the President of the United States.

   There is solid precedent for President George W. Bush to request congressional authority for the use of force against Iraq, just as President George H.W. Bush did in January, 1991. On December 21, 1990, and as late as January 9, 1991, President Bush was quoted as saying a congressional authorization was not necessary. See Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, January 14, 1991. Vol. 27, No. 2, pp. 24-25. Many Senators, including Claiborne Pell of Rhode Island, Richard Lugar of Indiana, Tom Harkin of Iowa, Edward M. Kennedy of Massachusetts, Joseph R. Biden, Jr. of Delaware, Brock Adams of Washington and I sought to force debate on a resolution that would require congressional authorization for the use of force against Iraq. Congressional Record, S 48, January 4, 1991; Congressional Record, S119-120, January 10, 1991; see also New York Times, October 18, 1990, page A1, ``Senators Demand Role in Approving Any Move on Iraq;'' Washington Post, January 4, 1991, page A19, ``Canceling Recess, Lawmakers Prepare to Debate War Powers.''

   On January 3, 1991, the date that Senators who were elected and re-elected the previous November took the oath of office, Senator Harkin successfully sought Senate debate and a vote on a use-of-force resolution. Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell scheduled Senate floor action for consideration of a resolution for the use of force on January 10, 1991. Following a Senate debate which was characterized as ``historical'' by the Washington Post, the Senate authorized the use of force against Iraq by a vote of 52 to 47. Congressional Record, S1018-1019, January 12, 1991. Similarly, the House of Representatives passed such a resolution by a vote of 250 to 183. Congressional Record, H1139-1140, January 12, 1991.

   With the repeated public commentary on the President's plans to use force against Iraq, there has been public concern about what Saddam Hussein might do in anticipation or retaliation. Saddam is well known for his ruthlessness and his disdain for life by use of chemicals against his own people, the Kurds. Saddam is widely reported to have stockpiles of biological weapons. In a struggle for his own survival, why should we expect Saddam Hussein to refrain from using every weapon at his disposal against an announced attacker? A lengthy article in the New York Times on July 6, 2002 concerning U.S. plans for widespread inoculation for smallpox carried the implicit suggestion of a concern for a bioterrorism attack.

   Consideration by Congress on a resolution for the use of force against Saddam would not impact on any potential element of surprise because there is no element of surprise left. The news media has been full of notice to Saddam of potential U.S. plans such as: The New York Times February 16, 2002, edition which quoted Vice President Cheney as saying, ``The President is determined to press on and stop Iraq ...... from continuing to develop weapons of mass destruction'' and intends to use ``the means at our disposal--including military, diplomatic and intelligence to address these concerns'';

   The Los Angeles Times on May 5, 2002, reported that the defense Intelligence Agency has produced an operational support study on Iraq including maps and data on geography, roads, refineries, communication facilities, security organizations and military deployments;

   The Washington Post reported on May 24, 2002, General Tommy R. Franks, Commander of the U.S. Central Command, has briefed the President concerning troop levels necessary to invade Iraq and oust Saddam Hussein;

   The New York Times on July 5, 2002, reported on an American military document calling for air, land and sea based forces to attack Iraq and topple Saddam Hussein;

   The New York Times on July 9, 2002, quoted President Bush as saying on Iraq: ``It's the stated policy of this government to have regime change and it hasn't changed. And we'll use all tools at our disposal to do so.''

   In considering a pre-emptive strike against Iraq, we should consider--not that it is determinative--the consequences of not acting against al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden before September 11, 2001. We had reason in that situation to anticipate a terrorist attack and we had rights under international law to move against bin Laden and al-Qaeda in a pre-emptive strike before September 11, 2001.

   Prior to September 11, Osama bin Laden was under U.S. indictment for killing Americans in Mogadishu in 1993. He was further under U.S. indictment for the attacks against American embassies in 1998. He was known to have been involved in the terrorist attack of the USS Cole. Osama bin Laden

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   When the Taliban in control in Afghanistan refused to turn over bin Laden to the United States after demands by the United States and the United Nations, the United States had rights under international law to use military force against al-Qaeda and bin Laden.

   With congressional hearings as a start, the American people should be informed about Iraq's threat and all our efforts to deal with this threat short of use of military force. We should do our utmost to organize an international coalition against Iraq, which President George Bush did in 1991,

   specifying as much of the evidence as possible in public congressional hearings in order to create American and worldwide public support for appropriate action. Such public hearings would be supplemented by classified information given to the leaders of the prospective coalition.

   Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution provides that ``Congress has the authority to declare war.'' Article 2 Section 2 of the United States Constitution provides that the President ``shall be commander in chief of the army and navy of the United States. .....''

   In the past half century, there has been a consistent and considerable erosion of Congress' constitutional authority to declare war with a concomitant expansion of the President's powers as Commander-in-Chief. My concerns about the erosion of congressional authority to declare war first arose in 1951 when I was called to active duty in the United States Air Force after having received in R.O.T.C. commission as a second lieutenant upon graduation from the University of Pennsylvania. I was glad to serve state-side from July 29, 1951 to July 31, 1953 as a special agent in the Office of Special Investigations, noting that President Truman had acted on his authority as Commander-in-Chief to order a ``police action'' without congressional authorization.

   Early in my Senate career, I participated extensively in floor debate on the War Powers Resolution concerning U.S. military action in Lebanon. On September 27, 1983, I questioned Senator Charles H. Percy, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, as to whether Korea and Vietnam were wars. Senator Percy stated that both Korea and Vietnam were wars even though undeclared. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, S. 12995, September 27, 1983.

   In 1983, I prepared a legal document for a declaratory judgment action to take to the Supreme Court of the United States on the issue of the constitutionality of the War Powers Act and seeking a judicial determination of the respective authority of the President as Commander-in-Chief and the Congress to declare war. It was my thought that if the Congress and the President asked the Court to take jurisdiction and decide this issue, the Court might do so although even with such a joint request, the Supreme Court might be unwilling to be involved in the so-called ``political thicket''. The Reagan Administration was unwilling to join in such a request and congressional leaders were reluctant to do so although no final determination was made since the issue was rendered moot by the Reagan Administration's declination. Understandably, the parties preferred to leave the issue ambiguous with a resolution on a case-by-case basis in the political process without a finite judicial determination.

   I pursued my inquiries by questioning Supreme Court nominees as to whether Korea was a war. In confirmation hearings for Justice David Souter on September 14, 1990, I questioned him as to whether Korea was a war, whether the Presidents exceeded their constitutional authority in military action in Korea and Vietnam and whether the War Powers Act was unconstitutional in violating presidential powers as Commander-in-Chief. Justice Souter declined to express an opinion stating, in effect, that there was no law to guide him in answering these questions. See Hearings Before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess., on the Nomination of David H. Souter to be Associate of the Supreme Court of the United States.

   In the Fall of 1990 and in early January 1991, I joined other senators in successfully taking the position that the President needed congressional authorization for the use of military force against Iraq and the enforcement of UN Security Council Resolution 678. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, S. 405-490, January 10, 1991.

   I took up this question again on September 13, 1994, taking the position that the President did not have the constitutional authority to order an invasion of Haiti without prior congressional authorization. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, S. 12760, September 13, 1994.

   On June 5, 1995, I introduced S. Res. 128, which stated it was the sense of the Senate that no U.S. military personnel should be introduced into combat or potential combat situations in Bosnia without clearly defined objectives and sufficient resources to achieve those objectives. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, S. 7703, June 5, 1995. That resolution noted that there was ample time for Congress to deliberate and decide that matter, stating that such a decision was a matter for the Congress and that there should be no further erosion of that authority by the Executive Branch.

   On November 1, 1995, noting the military action in Somalia without congressional authority and the military action in Haiti without congressional authority, I urge the President to follow the precedent of the Gulf war and seek congressional approval for incursions into Bosnia since there was ample opportunity for Congress to consider and decide the issue. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, S. 31102, November 1, 1995.

   On September 17, 1996, I spoke on the Senate floor on the use of force with missile strikes against Iraq on September 3, 1996, noting that this was another example where the President did not seek congressional authorization or even consultation in advance of that military action. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, S. 10624-10625, September 17, 1996.

   When there was speculation about additional military action against Iraq in early 1998, I spoke on the Senate floor on February 12, 1998, noting that an air attack or a missile attack constituted acts of war which required congressional authority. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, S. 791-792, February 12, 1998. The President then ordered missile strikes against Iraq in December 1998 without seeking congressional authority.

   On February 23, 1999, during Senate debate on the President's use of force in Kosovo, I noted my concern that air strikes constituted acts of war which required authorization by Congress. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, S. 1771-1773, February 23, 1999. I again noted the continuing erosion of constitutional authority and the need for Congress to debate, deliberate and decide these issues when there was ample time to do so. I noted the tendency on the part of Congress to sit back and avoid such tough decisions. If things go wrong, there is always the President to blame. If things go right, we have not impeded Presidential action.

   On March 23, 1999, the Senate voted 58 to 41 to authorize air strikes in Kosovo after the President's request for such congressional action. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, S. 3118, March 23, 1999. I voted in favor of air strikes even though I had concerns about the President's reliance on the ``humanitarian catastrophe'' which was a departure from recognized U.S. policy to use force where there was a vital U.S. national security interest. The House deadlocked 213 to 213 on the same vote to authorize force. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, H. 2451-2452, April 28, 1999.

   On May 24, 1999, I proposed an amendment to S. 1059--the Department of Defense Authorization bill--calling on the President to ``seek approval from Congress prior to the introduction of ground troops from the United States Armed Forces in connection with the present operations against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or funding for that operation will not be authorized.'' CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, S. 5809-5811, May 25, 1999.

   While supporting air strikes proposed by the President against the former Yugloslavia, I opposed any open-ended authorization, such as S.J. Res. 20, which would have ``authorized [the President] to use all necessary force and other means in concert with

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   There is an understandable reluctance on the part of Members of the House and Senate to challenge a President, especially a popular President, on his actions as Commander-in-Chief to protect U.S. national interests. The constitutional issues on separation of powers and the respective authority of the Congress vis-a-vis the President are obviously important. Of even greater importance, however, is the value of a united front with the President backed by congressional authorization and American public opinion on an issue where most, if not virtually all, of the international community is in opposition.

   If the Congress sits back and does nothing and the President is right, then there is public approval. If the President turns out to be wrong, then it is his responsibility without blame being attached to the Congress. There is an added element that the President may, and probably does, know more than the Congress. Hearings, in closed session, could address that discrepancy in knowledge.

   The current issue of Iraq is another chapter, albeit a very important chapter, in the ongoing effort to define congressional and Presidential authority on the critical constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. In the present case, there is ample time for Congress to deliberate and decide. With the stakes so high, Congress should assert its constitutional authority to make this critical decision.

4A) Congress Must Play a Role in Possible Iraq Attack
Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, it is worth considering the headlines regarding Iraq in the last week. From United Press International: ``U.S. Plans Massive Invasion of Iraq.'' From Associated Press: ``U.S. Says Iraq Would Target Troops.'' From United Press: ``According to officials who spoke to UPI, three dates are being discussed as possible times to launch the attack. The first would be before the November elections.'' And from Associated Press: ``U.S. worries Iraq's chemical , biological weapons would target invading American troops in Israel.''

There has been discussion of a quarter of a million of our men and women being sent to Iraq. The discussion is in the media, it is not on the floor of this House. The New York Times editorial says as follows: ``Congressional leaders, including top Democrats, have rushed to voice approval for the popular notion of getting rid of Mr. Hussein. They have not, however, lived up to their responsibility for demanding a full public disclosure about how to pursue this attractive goal with maximum chances of success and minimum risk to American forces' interest and alliances. Discussion of these issues is possible without giving away legitimate military secrets.''

War with Iraq, if it comes, is still many months away. What is urgently needed now is informed and serious debate, and attention to article I, section 8 of the Constitution, which requires Congress has a role.

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