Congressional Record Weekly Update

Return to the Congressional Report Weekly.

1A) External Regulation of Nuclear Safety
Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to introduce a bill that provides for the external regulation of nuclear safety and occupational safety and health at the Department of Energy civilian laboratories. This bill, which draws from the work of my friends and colleagues Congressman TIM ROEMER, Congressman KEN CALVERT and former Congressman TOM BLILEY, would push the Department of Energy to take a step that virtually everyone agrees is overdue: get the Department of Energy out of the business of regulating itself in the areas of nuclear and worker safety.

Discussion of external regulation at the labs is an old idea. It received an official boost in 1993 when then Secretary of Energy Hazel O'Leary announced that she would seek to implement external regulation of worker safety. Then, in 1994, legislation was introduced forcing DOE to stop self regulating their nuclear facilities. DOE responded to these legislative initiatives by launching advisory groups to lay out a path to external regulation. In 1996, DOE embraced a ten-year plan to implement external regulation.

For many outside of the Department, this ten-year plan appeared too cautious. However, to those in the Department, it appeared too ambitious. In 1997, then Secretary Pena decided to take a step away from that commitment and run a 2-year pilot program to determine the costs and benefits of external regulation. With the end of that pilot program, Secretary Pena's successor, Secretary Richardson, decided that external regulation would be unworkable.

Curiously, the two participating regulatory agencies involved in the pilot came to a very different conclusion. Both the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) concluded the pilot to have been successful. I was the ranking member on the Energy Subcommittee of the Science Committee when the pilot was completed and we had an elaborate hearing on this issue. I came away convinced that while there were some questions about implementation, the overwhelming evidence was that external regulation would provide more safety to workers and communities near labs while allowing the labs themselves to focus more on the science and technology.

It is for this reason that laboratory managers also favor external regulation. They believe that external regulation would free up overhead costs involved in self-regulation and allow them to redirect resources towards doing more science. From the labs' perspectives DOE is an inconstant regulator with changes in standards, reporting requirements, and interventions. The NRC and OSHA are both professional regulatory bodies that provide a clearer regulatory regime with significant cost savings to those subject to their regulatory guidance.

Recently, the Energy and Water Appropriations Subcommittee here in the House has taken a leading role in pushing the Department towards external regulation. Yet, the Department continues to resist external regulation. Just yesterday, the Energy Subcommittee of Science held a hearing in which the Director of the Office of Science said they are moving towards another study of external regulation. They are planning an elaborate study involving OSHA and NRC with preliminary results due next year. After nine years of studying this issue, we already know that external regulation is the right answer; yet, DOE insists that another study is needed.

There is a consensus everywhere outside of DOE that the labs should be subject to external regulation. GAO holds that position. The Labs hold that position. The potential regulators hold that position. I believe the workers, the communities near the labs and the taxpayers all deserve to see this happen sooner rather than later. As a Member of the Science Committee--an authorizing Committee of jurisdiction--this bill is intended as another signal to DOE that foot-dragging and endless studies will not satisfy this Congress.

2A) Arms Control
Mr. KYL. Madam President, I thank the distinguished assistant majority leader and would note that Senator Specter also wanted to address the Senate, but since he is not here, I will go ahead with my remarks.

Mr. KYL. Madam President, on June 13 the United States officially withdrew from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile, ABM, Treaty, closing a chapter in U.S.-Soviet relations, and beginning another with Russia. The lapsing of the ABM Treaty, combined with the Senate's defeat of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1999 and the signing of a new type of nuclear reduction treaty with Russia in May, represent a fundamental shift in the way the United States approaches strategic security. We have moved away from reliance on traditional arms control treaties toward a reliance on our own capabilities--namely missile defenses and a credible nuclear deterrent.

Proponents of the ABM Treaty were convinced that it was the ``cornerstone of strategic stability,'' and that U.S. withdrawal would damage the improving U.S.-Russia relationship, spark a new arms race, and even lead, as one of my colleagues remarked, to ``Cold War II.'' Those predictions were wrong. Yet some still cling to the notion that arms control is the key elements in U.S. national security.

Over the past 6 months, I have addressed the Senate on the strategic justification for U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, the question of how much a missile defense system will cost, and the President's constitutional authority to exercise the right of withdrawal without legislative consent. And, today, in response to those who continue to believe in the utopian aims of traditional arms control agreements, I rise to address the President's decision to abrogate the ABM Treaty, this time

[Page: S7458]  GPO's PDF

in the broader context of the utility of such measures as a means to protect U.S. security interests.

The past 10 years have completely changes the Cold War strategic environment that gave rise to the ABM Treaty and other traditional arms limitation and arms reduction agreements. First, the United States and Russia have moved beyond enmity toward a more cooperative relationship. Second, the threats we face today are far more numerous and complex than those we faced during the Cold War.

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has become one of our most pressing national security challenges. As many as three dozen countries now have or are developing ballistic missiles. Used by once between 1945 and 1980, such weapons have become an increasingly common component in regional conflicts. In fact, thousands of shorter range missiles have been used in at least six conflicts since 1980. And, as a recent National Intelligence Estimate NIE, on foreign ballistic missile developments warned, ``The probability that a missile with a weapon of mass destruction will be used against U.S. forces or U.S. interests is higher today than during most of the Cold War, and it will continue to grow as the capabilities of potential adversaries mature.''

Iran, for example, continues to place much emphasis on its missile activities. According to the recent NIE, that country's ``longstanding commitment to its ballistic missile program ..... is unlikely to diminish.'' In early May, Tehran conducted a successful test of its 1,300 km-range Shahab-3 missile--capable of reaching Israel, as well as U.S. troops deployed in the Middle East and South Asia--and some press reports indicate that Iran is now set to begin domestic production of the missile. Additionally, on May 7, the Associated Press, citing an administration official, reported that Iran is continuing development of a longer-range missile, the Shahab-4. With an estimated range of 2,000 km, the Shabab-4 will be able to reach well into Europe.

North Korea's missile programs are also of great concern. That country has extended its moratorium of testing its intercontinental-range Taepo Dong missiles until 2003; however, its surprise August 1998 test flight over Japan of the Taepo Dong 1 missile should serve as a clear indication of its intent to develop missiles with intercontinental ranges. Indeed, Pyongyang is continuing its development of the longer-range Taepo Dong 2 missile, capable of reaching parts of the United States with a nuclear weapon-sized payload. According to the NIE:

The Taepo Dong 2 in a two-stage ballistic missile configuration could deliver a several-hundred kg payload up to 10,000 km--sufficient to strike Alaska, Hawaii, and parts of the continental United States. If the North uses a third stage similar to the one used on the Taepo Dong 1 in 1998 in a ballistic missile configuration, then the Taepo Dong 2 could deliver a several hundred kg payload up to 15,000 km--sufficient to strike all of North America.

In Iraq, Saddam Hussein continues to obstruct the international verification of commitments made to the United Nations, and still fails to comply with arms control agreements he accepted at the end of the gulf war. The recent NIE concluded that, ``Despite U.N. resolutions limiting the range of Iraq's missiles to 150 km, Baghdad has been able to maintain the infrastructure and expertise to develop longer range missile systems.'' And Iraq's ability to surprise us in the past with the scale of its missile, nuclear , chemical, and biological programs should serve as a warning. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld recently discussed Baghdad's weapons of mass destruction capabilities, stating:

They have them, and they continue to develop them, and they have weaponized chemical weapons. They've had an active program to develop nuclear weapons. It's also clear that they are actively developing biological weapons. I don't know what other kinds of weapons fall under the rubric of weapons of mass destruction, but if there are more, I suspect they're working on them, as well.

China presents an even more complex case. While not a member of the axis of evil, that country's exceedingly belligerent attitude toward the United States and our longstanding, democratic ally Taiwan requires a clear-eyed approach to our relationship with the communist government in Beijing. China currently has about 20 intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of reaching the United States, and is in the midst of a long-running modernization program to expand the size of its strategic nuclear arsenal and to develop road-mobile and submarine-launched ICBMs. According to the NIE, by 2015, ``Chinese ballistic missile forces will increase several-fold.'' Additionally, by that time, ``Most of China's strategic missile force will be mobile.'' As Secretary Rumsfeld stated on September 6 in reference to China's strategic missile modernization and buildup, ``It is a long pattern that reflects a seriousness of purpose about the People's Republic of China with respect to their defense establishment.''

President Bush's fresh approach to strategic security with Russia--called the ``New Strategic Framework''--takes into account these changed circumstances. The President's framework entails unilateral reductions in offensive nuclear weapons and the development and deployment of defensive systems to deter and protect against missile attacks. President Bush outlined this approach before his election, and upon taking office, immediately began to develop a plan for action.

The central component of that framework is the development of missile defenses, critical to which is U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty which totally prohibits deployment of a national missile defense. Indeed, our withdrawal represents a fundamental shift away from reliance on consensual vulnerability, perpetuated by arms control treaties, and a move toward prudent defensive measures.

The ABM Treaty was a classic example of arms control--promising much more than it was ever able to deliver. The theory was that by ensuring mutual vulnerability to nuclear missile attack, the incentive to build increasing numbers of offensive forces would be removed. History proved that theory wrong. Between the treaty's signing in 1972 and 1987, the Soviet Union's inventory of strategic nuclear warheads grew from around 2,000 to about 10,000; and the U.S. arsenal grew from around 3,700 to 8,000. In fact, strategic nuclear forces expanded not just quantitatively, but also qualitatively. The decade following the ABM Treaty's signing witnessed the introduction into the Soviet arsenal of entire generations of new long-range missiles, not just in contradiction of the intent of the ABM Treaty, but in contravention of the accompanying SALT I accord as well. Clearly, deliberate vulnerability did not promote arms control; rather, it fueled the arms race.

It is important to reiterate the history of the ABM Treaty because those who purport that it was the ``cornerstone of strategic stability'' seem to misunderstand the original impetus for it. The truth is that the United States gave up the right to field defensive systems because the Nixon administration was faced, in 1971, with a Congress that refused to fund more than two of the original 12 sites that the Administration had proposed in 1969. This, in addition to a rapid Soviet offensive buildup, caused the Nixon administration to acquiesce in the negotiation of the ABM Treaty, to be coupled with the SALT agreement. And I should note that, two years after the ABM Treaty was negotiated, it was amended to limit to one the number of sites allowed because Congress did not even continue to fund the second site.

Thus, making necessity a virtue, political theorists embraced the notion that, in order to deter a nuclear attack, the threatened response had to be the murder of millions of innocent civilians. President Reagan once referred to this philosophy, named Mutual Assured Destruction, as ``a sad commentary on the human condition.'' And, in my view, its acronym ``M-A-D'' describes it well.

It is debatable whether that theory explains the absence of a nuclear exchange in the second half of the 20th century. Whatever the case, this idea certainly seems mad today, when we have friendly relations with Russia, and are confronted with an entirely different set of threats. It simply does not make sense to remain deliberately vulnerable to the increasing threat of a ballistic missile attack, especially when alternatives, such as missile defenses, now exist.

Surely a sign of the changed times, President Bush returned from Russia in May having signed a new treaty under which both sides intend to reduce strategic warheads to 1,700-2,200. Just three pages long, this treaty

[Page: S7459]  GPO's PDF

merely states what both sides intend to do. There are no interim limits, no sub-limits, or verification schemes. More importantly, the treaty simply affirms what the United States had already decided were its strategic requirements--President Bush announced that we were unilaterally going to this level of warheads last November. This is important enough to repeat: this treaty memorialized what President Bush determined were our strategic requirements. Thus, this treaty is a complete break with the arms control orthodoxy of the past, which made each side's limitations or reductions dependent on the other, required difficult verification and enforcement provisions, and artificially pre-determined our strategic levels.

Recognizing that we no longer live in a bipolar world, we must shift our attention to the threat to our security from a number of rogue states that already have, or are seeking to obtain, weapons of mass destruction capabilities. Despite the existence of a plethora of multilateral arms control agreements, the threat to the United States and its allies from chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons has not been limited. The fundamental flaw of such measures lies in the fact that they focus on weapons, rather than on the real problem: the dangerous regimes that possess them. And whether they've signed these treaties or not, the rogue regimes cannot be trusted to comply.

Historians have traced that flawed approach back to the Catholic Church's attempt to ban the crossbow--the terrible new weapon of the 1100s--in 1139. That endeavor proved as ineffective as the arms control efforts that followed in later centuries. Perhaps there is no better example of this futility than the attempts after World War I to outlaw war altogether. The 1928 Kellog-Briand Pact, to which the Senate provided its advice and consent on January 25, 1929 by a vote of 85 to 1, was signed by all of the major countries. It renounced war as ``an instrument of national policy.'' It also paved the way for other arms control treaties and negotiations that left the Western democracies unprepared to fight and unable to deter World War II, a mere decade later.

Indeed, in looking back at the arms control efforts of the 1920s and 1930s, Walter Lippman, the celebrated historian who championed the agreements when they were signed, wrote that, ``The disarmament movement was, as the event has shown, tragically successful in disarming the nations that believed in disarmament. The net effect was to dissolve the alliance among the victors of the first World War, and to reduce them to almost disastrous impotence on the eve of the second World War.''

Mr. Lippman's assessment offers an important lesson. Arms control works best where it is needed least--among honorable, morally upstanding nations. It does not work where it is needed most--against rogue nations. Countries that act clandestinely and in bad faith will simply ignore the legal requirements of arms control agreements when it suits their interests. Moreover, morally-upstanding nations depending upon these agreements for security and stability have often lacked the will to respond forcefully to violations. Even when evidence is clear, there are almost always overriding diplomatic reasons for overlooking or treading lightly on the violating parties.

The international community's response to Iraq's use of chemical weapons is a prime example. When that country used chemical weapons against Iran in the 1980's in violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol banning the use of such weapons, the U.N. Security Council passed a resolution calling for both sides in the conflict to exercise restraint. After Saddam Hussein again used chemical weapons--this time against his own Kurdish population--the Security Council again passed a resolution of condemnation that failed even to mention the use of chemical weapons. International resolve was so weak that when the United States proposed a resolution at the U.N. Human Rights Commission in 1989 condemning Iraq's use of those weapons against the Kurds, the initiative was defeated by a vote of 17 to 13.

Unwilling to enforce the existing Geneva Protocol when Iraq had, without dispute, violated its terms, the international community, in an effort to demonstrate its commitment to arms control, agreed upon a new ban on the possession of chemical weapons. Yet possession is inherently harder to verify than already-banned use. This new ban--the Chemical Weapons Convention, CWC-- unrealistically aims to control states that are confident that they can violate its terms without detection and without punishment. And while the United States is destroying its chemical deterrent under the requirements of the CWC, chemical weapons programs in other states that have signed the treaty--like Iran--have not been curbed. Still others, like Iraq, North Korea, Libya, and Syria have not even joined the convention.

There is no moral equivalence between Western democracies and rogue regimes like those in place in Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. Yet arms control treaties like the Biological Weapons Convention BWC and the CWC assume that all participants operate with the same objectives in mind. They place under one umbrella--under a unitary set of constraints--states that are certain to comply and those that are certain to cheat. And therein lies their failure to serve any meaningful purpose. As Richard Perle, former Assistant Secretary of Defense, stated in a 1999 speech, ``The failure to distinguish guns in the hands of cops and guns in the hands of robbers is not just a practical absurdity, it is a profound moral failure.''

Other arms control efforts like the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty NPT, while more realistic in terms of their objectives, have also had questionable success. Under the terms of the NPT, the five declared nuclear weapons states--the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, France, and China--agreed ``not in any way to assist'' any nonweapons state to acquire nuclear weapons. Other parties to the treaty agree not to develop nuclear weapons and to allow the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA to inspect their nuclear facilities.

Just a brief examination of the records of parties to the treaty illustrates that its objectives are not supported equally by all.

The United States intelligence community suspects that Russia and China, despite their NPT obligations, may be providing assistance to the nuclear weapons programs of certain states.

North Korea--despite the optimism of some that the 1994 Agreed Framework would curb that country's nuclear weapons program--continues to evade certain IAEA inspections needed to ensure that country is in full compliance with the NPT and the Framework. And yet, the United States continues to support the Agreed Framework with U.S. taxpayer dollars.

The U.S. intelligence community suspects that Russian nuclear -related assistance to Iran--ostensibly for Tehran's civilian nuclear program may, indeed, be contributing to Iran's nuclear ambitions.

And the full extent of Iraq's covert nuclear programs, after years without inspections, is not fully known. In fact, even when inspectors were in the country, Saddam made use of information provided by Iraqi IAEA inspectors to evade detection.

It is clear that multilateral arms control agreements have not delivered on their promise to make the world a safer place. As such, prudence demands that we take steps to ensure the safety of the American people--this will involve a combination of defense and deterrence.

Though the ABM Treaty was bilateral agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, President Bush's decision to withdraw the United States was, in fact, necessitated by our need to deal with other states that are developing ballistic missiles. Deterrence is simply inadequate in dealing with rogue dictators. To depend on nuclear deterrence alone with a dictator like Saddam Hussein, for instance--a man who used chemical weapons against his own people--would be to place American lives in the hands of a madman. As Winston Churchill warned in his 1955 ``Balance of Terror'' speech, ``The deterrent does not cover the case of lunatics or dictators in the mood of Hitler when he found himself in his final dugout.''

The alternative--which will be permitted now that we have withdrawn from the ABM Treaty--is to develop and deploy missile defenses. A missile

[Page: S7460]  GPO's PDF

defense system will give us more flexible options in a crisis. First, defenses against missiles will help the United States to avoid nuclear blackmail, intended to freeze us into inaction by the very threat of a missile attack. Imagine the impact on our decision to go to war against Saddam Hussein in 1991 had he been able to threaten the United States or our allies with nuclear missiles. Additionally, missile defense will reduce the incentive for ballistic missile proliferation by de-valuing offensive missiles. Finally, missile defenses, in a worst-case scenario, will save American lives.

The development of missile defenses and the end of the superpower rivalry does not obviate the need for traditional deterrence, however. As the world's remaining superpower, we need to maintain maximum flexibility and the ability to play the ultimate trump card if need be. Deterrence and defenses--with neither, of course, being 100 percent fail-safe--will be mutually reinforcing. The prudence of maintaining a nuclear deterrent was shown during the Gulf War when we hinted that we might draw on that capability if Iraq attacked allied troops with chemical or biological agents. As then-Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney warned during a visit to the Middle East on December 23, 1991: ``Were Saddam Hussein foolish enough to use weapons of mass destruction, the U.S. response would be absolutely overwhelming, and it would be devastating.'' Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz acknowledged several years later that Iraq did not attack the forces of the U.S.-led coalition with chemical weapons because such warnings were interpreted as meaning nuclear retaliation.

Of course, with the end of the U.S.-Soviet standoff, we can maintain our deterrent at lower levels--thus President Bush's decision to unilaterally reduce our arsenal. But lower levels require greater attention to the safety and reliability of our remaining arsenal. This will, I believe, require renewed testing of that arsenal at some point.

Thankfully, this body defeated the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, CTBT--which would have obligated the United States to give up for all time the option of testing our nuclear weapons--in October 1999. The Bush administration has made it clear that it strongly opposes the treaty. While it has no plans to do so, the administration has retained the option of nuclear testing to assure the safety and reliability of our nuclear arsenal. It is also moving to improve the test readiness posture. As Assistant Secretary of Defense J.D. Crouch stated during a briefing on the Nuclear Posture Review, NPR, the ``NPR does state ..... that we need to improve our readiness posture to test from its current two to three year period to something substantially better.'' I am pleased that the House version of the Defense authorization bill contains a provision that requires the Department of Energy to reduce to one year the time between the Presidential decision to conduct a nuclear test and the test itself, and I hope that the Senate will ultimately choose to include such a provision, as well.

The threats to the United States today are more complex and difficult to predict than those we faced during the cold war. Recognizing their inherent limitations, it is therefore time to move beyond traditional arms control treaties as a means to protect American lives from these threats. President Bush has committed to do just that. He has set the United States on a course that unequivocally places faith not in traditional arms control, but in the time-honored philosophy that led to the West's victory without war over the Soviet Empire: Peace through strength. As a result, we will be able to pursue the development of missile defenses and maintain a credible nuclear deterrent. These demonstrations of strength, coupled, of course, with the maintenance of robust conventional capabilities--not more pieces of paper--are what will keep this nation secure.

President Bush's overall security strategy rightly focuses on the root of the problem--the dangerous regimes that possess the weapons. As Margaret Thatcher once stated, ``..... the fundamental risk to peace is not the existence of weapons of particular types. It is the disposition on the part of some states to impose change on others by resorting to force.'' The heart of the matter is that our strategy should seek to change the regimes themselves, whether through military, diplomatic, or economic means. The United States has made clear its intention to pursue that objective, and I have no doubt that our efforts will lead to success.

2B) National Defense Authorization, Missile Defense
Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, I rise to address the subject of our Nation's security needs in the context of the Defense appropriations bill presently before the Senate.

I believe we must provide the best possible training, equipment, and preparation for our military forces, so they can effectively carry out whatever peacekeeping, humanitarian, war-fighting, or other missions they are given. They deserve the targeted pay raises of 4.1-6.5 percent, the incentive pay for difficult-to-fill assignments, and the reduced out-of-pocket housing costs from the current 11.3 percent to 7.5 percent contained in this bill. The bill would also fully fund active and reserve end strengths, including an additional 724 positions for the Army National Guard, which will hopefully ease the current burden on our over-stretched men and women in uniform. For many years running, those in our armed forces have been suffering from a declining quality of life, despite rising military Pentagon budgets. The pressing needs of our dedicated men and women in uniform, and those of their families, must be addressed as they continue to be mobilized in the war against terrorism. This bill goes far in addressing those needs, and I will vote for it today.

I am also supporting the bill because it contains two important amendments that I offered. The first would bar any funds in this bill from being used to enter defense contracts with U.S. companies who incorporate overseas to avoid U.S. taxes.

Former U.S. companies who have renounced their citizenship currently hold at least $2 billion worth of contracts with the Federal Government. I do not believe that companies who aren't willing to pay their fair share of taxes should be able to hold these contracts. U.S. companies, who play by the rules, who pay their fair share of taxes, should not be forced to compete with bad actors who can undercut their bids because of a tax loophole.

In the last couple of years a number of prominent U.S. corporations, using creative paperwork, have transformed themselves into Bermuda corporations purely to avoid paying their share of U.S. taxes. These new Bermuda companies are basically shell corporations: they have no staff, no offices, and no business activity in Bermuda. They exist for the sole purpose of shielding income from the IRS.

U.S. tax law contains many provisions designed to expose such creative accounting and to require U.S. companies that are foreign in name only to pay the same taxes as other domestic corporations. But these bad corporate former-citizens exploit a specific loophole in current law so that the company is treated as foreign for tax purposes, and therefore pays no U.S. taxes on its foreign income.

The loophole gives tens of millions of dollars in tax breaks to major multinational companies with significant non-U.S. business. It also puts other U.S. companies unwilling or unable to use this loophole at a competitive disadvantage. No American company should be penalized staying put while others renounce U.S. ``citizenship'' for a tax break.

Well, the problem with all this is that when these companies don't pay their fair share, the rest of American tax payers and businesses are stuck with the bill. I think I can safely say that very few of the small businesses that I visit in Detroit Lakes, MN, or Mankato, in Minneapolis, or Duluth can avail themselves of the Bermuda Triangle.

They can't afford the big name tax lawyers and accountants to show them how to do their books Enron-style but they probably wouldn't want to anyway if it meant renouncing their citizenship. So the price they pay for their good citizenship is a higher tax bill.

My amendment closes this loophole. We all make sacrifices in a time of war, the only sacrifice this amendment asks of Federal contractors is that they pay their fair share of taxes like everybody else.

The bill also contains a second amendment which would significantly improve the Department's response to domestic violence. I was deeply concerned to hear about the four domestic

[Page: S7806]

violence homicides that occurred over the past six weeks at Fort Bragg in North Carolina. But these incidents, while unusual in that they are clustered within such a short time, are not unique. The military reports 207 domestic violence homicides since 1995.

My amendment, which is based on the recommendations of the Department's Defense Task Force on Domestic Violence, would ensure that funds are available to establish an impartial, multi-disciplinary Domestic Violence Fatality Review Team at the Military Community and Family Policy Office. It would also help the Department ensure that there are victim's advocates at every military installation to provide confidential support and guidance exclusively to victims, by providing $10 million for this purpose. Finally, the amendment would require that the Secretary report to Congress on progress in implementing the recommendations of the Task Force.

In the introduction to its first report, the Task Force wrote, ``Domestic Violence is an offense against the institutional values of the Military Services of the United States of America. It is an affront to human dignity, degrades the overall readiness of our armed forces, and will not be tolerated in the Department of Defense.'' I do not think anyone who has followed the recent events in North Carolina would disagree.

I also believe the bill addresses some of the serious flaws in the process by which the Defense Department summarily terminated the Crusader Artillery system. I strongly believe in fair, transparent, and informed government-decision making processes, which did not occur in the case of the Crusader. Three Defense secretaries, three Army secretaries, and three Army chiefs of staff, as well as numerous administration officials, testified in support of the Crusader. Yet within a few weeks of this testimony, the Secretary of Defense abruptly terminated the Crusader. The decision was made without consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, without consultation with the Army, and without consultation with members of Congress. The Defense Authorization bill then required the Army Chief of Staff and Secretary of Defense to conduct a serious study of the best way to provide for the Army's need for indirect fire support. At the same time, it provided the Secretary of Defense, following the study, a full range of options. These include termination to continued funding of Crusader, to funding alternative systems to meet battlefield requirements. That report having been completed, the bill before us expresses concern about the way the termination was proposed, and instructs the Army to move forward with a follow-on contract immediately to leverage the Crusader technology to field a lighter, more mobile cannon in 2008. This is good news for the workers and officials at the United Defense Industries plant in Minnesota, whose advanced skills and expertise will be necessary for the success of this new cannon.

I also have concerns about the bill, especially about its missile defense provisions. The Defense Authorization bill reported out by the Armed Services Committee would have cut total funding for missile defense from $7.6 billion to $6.8 billion. Unfortunately, the Senate adopted an amendment to restore the entire $814 million, with the President given the option of spending funds on either missile defense programs or on counter-terrorism. This bill retains this change. I would have preferred that the cut be restored, and if not, that the President at least be required to use the funds solely for counter-terrorism.

I've long been a critic of Ballistic Missile Defense, BMD, and I still have strong reservations about the feasibility, cost and rationale for such a system. When I addressed missile defense on the Senate floor on September 25, just 2 weeks after terrorists destroyed the World Trade Center, I argued that pressing ahead on BMD would make the U.S. less rather than more secure. Instead, I suggested the Senate give homeland defense the high priority it deserves by transferring funds to it from missile defense programs. But the administration obviously didn't agree and approved only $26 million.

In conclusion, I believe in maintaining a strong national defense. We face a number of credible threats in the world today, including terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We must make sure we carefully identify the threats we face and tailor our defense spending to meet them. We could do a better job of that than this bill does, and I hope that as we move to conference, the committee will make every effort to transfer funds from relatively low-priority programs to those designed to meet the urgent and immediate anti-terrorism and defense of our forces.

2C) Defense Appropriations Act of 2003 Vote
Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, in a few moments, Senators will be called upon to cast their votes on the Defense appropriations bill. At this moment, I wish to express my gratitude to the Senator from Alaska for his cooperation in moving this bill through the Senate.

This is a massive spending bill totaling more than $355 billion. With the cooperation of Senator Stevens and his Republican colleagues, we were able to work through the issues of this bill with comity and a minimum of controversy. The defense of our Nation is too important to be a matter of partisan politics. My friend, Senator Stevens, knows that and follows that in all of his actions, and so I thank him and his staff for all their hard work: His chief assistant, Mr. Steve Cortese, and Ms. Sid Ashworth, Mr. Kraig Siracuse, Ms. Alycia Farrell, and Ms. Nicole Royal.

Finally, Mr. President, I wish to acknowledge the hard work of my staff. They put in very long hours year round but especially as we seek to act on the annual appropriations bill. I express my deep gratitude to them as well: Mr. Charles Houy, Mr. David Morrison, Ms. Susan Hogan, Ms. Mazie Mattson, Mr. Tom Hawkins, Ms. Lesley Kalen, Ms. Menda Fife, and Ms. Betsy Schmid.

[Page: S7807]

Mr. President, finally I say to all my colleagues, this is a very good bill, and I urge all Senators to vote for it.

I am prepared to yield back the remainder of my time.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield me a minute?

Mr. INOUYE. I am pleased to yield.

Mr. BYRD. I thank the Senator. Mr. President, Scriptures say:

Seest thou a man diligent in his business? he shall stand before kings. .....

These two Senators are diligent in their business. They are experienced legislative craftsmen, and they have studied this subject for many years. In defense of our country, they have traveled all over the globe searching for answers to questions, searching for solutions to problems, and coming back to the Senate and applying their experience, their knowledge to the problems at hand. The Senate is in their debt.

I personally thank them for the good work they have done on this bill, the good work they always do. The Nation is in their debt. I thank them both.

Mr. INOUYE. I thank my chairman.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. STEVENS. I yield back my time.

Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I yield back the remainder of our time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time is yielded back. Under the previous order, the committee-reported substitute is agreed to.

The committee amendment in the nature of a substitute, as amended, was agreed to.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on the engrossment of the amendments and third reading of the bill.

The amendments were ordered to be engrossed, and the bill to be read a third time.

The bill was read the third time.

Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?

There appears to be a sufficient second.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is, Shall the bill, H.R. 5010, as amended, pass? The clerk will call the roll.

The senior assistant bill clerk called the roll.

Mr. REID. I announce that the Senator from Hawaii (Mr. AKAKA) is necessarily absent.

Mr. NICKLES. I announce that the Senator from North Carolina (Mr. HELMS) is necessarily absent.

I further announce that if present and voting the Senator from North Carolina (Mr. HELMS) would vote ``yea''.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. CARPER). Are there any other Senators in the Chamber desiring to vote?

The result was announced--yeas 95, nays 3, as follows:

Allard

Allen

Baucus

Bayh

Bennett

Biden

Bingaman

Bond

Boxer

Breaux

Brownback

Bunning

Burns

Byrd

Campbell

Cantwell

Carnahan

Carper

Chafee

Cleland

Clinton

Cochran

Collins

Conrad

Corzine

Craig

Crapo

Daschle

Dayton

DeWine

Dodd

Domenici

Dorgan

Durbin

Edwards

Ensign

Enzi

Feinstein

Fitzgerald

Frist

Graham

Gramm

Grassley

Gregg

Hagel

Harkin

Hatch

Hollings

Hutchinson

Hutchison

Inhofe

Inouye

Jeffords

Johnson

Kennedy

Kerry

Kohl

Kyl

Landrieu

Leahy

Levin

Lieberman

Lincoln

Lott

Lugar

McConnell

Mikulski

Miller

Murkowski

Murray

Nelson (FL)

Nelson (NE)

Nickles

Reed

Reid

Roberts

Rockefeller

Santorum

Sarbanes

Schumer

Sessions

Shelby

Smith (NH)

Smith (OR)

Snowe

Specter

Stabenow

Stevens

Thomas

Thompson

Thurmond

Torricelli

Warner

Wellstone

Wyden

Feingold

McCain

Voinovich

Akaka

Helms

The bill (H.R. 5010), as amended, was passed, as follows:

Mr. BOND. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote and I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate insists on its amendments and requests a conference with the House on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses.

The Presiding Officer appointed Mr. INOUYE, Mr. HOLLINGS, Mr. BYRD, Mr. LEAHY, Mr. HARKIN, Mr. DORGAN, Mr. DURBIN, Mr. REID, Mrs. FEINSTEIN, Mr. KOHL, Mr. STEVENS, Mr. COCHRAN, Mr. SPECTER, Mr. DOMENICI, Mr. BOND, Mr. MCCONNELL, Mr. SHELBY, Mr. GREGG, and Mrs. HUTCHISON conferees on the part of the Senate.

3A) Congress Must Authorize Use of Force Against Iraq
Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, on behalf of Senator Leahy and myself, I rise today to submit a concurrent resolution. This resolution is aimed to deal with a great deal of the speculation we read about in the public press as to whether there is an intent of the administration for use of force against Iraq.

We all know that use of force requires a specific statutory authorization or declaration of war under article I, section 8, clause 11 of the Constitution of the United States. I believe the issue is not a question of whether or not Iraq is a rogue state. It is. It is also not a question of whether Saddam Hussein is a brutal dictator. He is.

The question, however, is what is the best policy for the United States and how to address these issues, and if we are to use force, that we do so only after full debate and consideration of all of the options and with a united Government and with the specific statutory authorization of the Congress.

Under the Constitution, only the Congress can declare war, and I offer this resolution because of the growing sense, both within the United States and abroad, that the Bush administration is poised to launch a major military offensive against the Nation of Iraq.

Thus far, the administration has submitted no evidence of any Iraqi connection to 9/11 to this Congress, and the resolution authorizing the use of force against al-Qaida is specifically worded so that hard evidence of such a connection is needed to justify military action.

Conclusive proof that Saddam Hussein is, indeed, harboring weapons of mass destruction, that he is providing shelter for al Qaida terrorist cells, or that he is in any way linked to the attacks of September 11 would quickly galvanize support for military action. As of now, however, no such evidence has been substantiated.

At this time, moreover, I know of no formal support for a full-scale military action from any other nation. I know of no formal grant to fly over or landing rights which would be granted by any nation in connection with any invasion plan.

As far as I know at this point, the United States would be alone, unilaterally taking action. To take action without support from our allies or the United Nations would clearly identify the United States as an aggressor and may well prompt a series of potentially catastrophic actions.

Both Turkey and Jordan, two of our most loyal and longstanding allies in the region, have been open about their concern about United States unilateral action at this time, making clear their opposition. They have also pinpointed that the present crisis between the Israelis and the Palestinians should be the world's primary focus in the Middle East.

Until the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is stabilized, until more than a semblance of security and stability has returned to Israel and Palestine, a massive invasion against Iraq could expose the Israeli people to possible missile strikes from Baghdad.

We should also remain focused and stay the course in our war on terror.

[Page: S7588]  GPO's PDF

The government of Hamid Karzai in Afghanistan is increasingly unstable. There are serious questions and concerns about security throughout Afghanistan. The warlords are restless and asserting power, and previously dissipated Taliban elements are returning to Afghanistan. The situation remains volatile.

The stabilization of Afghanistan, its successful transition to a democratic government, and its restoration of its war-torn economy should remain a top priority for all of us. I believe it would be a tragic mistake if the United States turns its attention and effort from Afghanistan before the new Afghan Government is stabilized and security in the country is improved.

I, for one, strongly believe that Iraq should promptly agree to the return of the United Nations weapons inspectors it expelled in 1998. If the government of Saddam Hussein has nothing to hide, something it continues to claim, then now is the time to prove it to the entire world.

Iraq's refusal to cooperate is tacit admission of deception and of the pursuit and stockpiling of chemical, biological, and, yes, admission that the rumors of his pressing ahead to develop nuclear warheads are, in fact, true.

Last week, at a meeting in Vienna, United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan told an Iraqi delegation in no uncertain terms that the Iraqi Government must allow U.N. inspectors back in or there was no point to continue discussions and negotiations.

There was no response from the Iraqi delegation, who simply left Vienna and returned to Baghdad. I understand that Saddam Hussein is a brutal dictator who during a 34-year reign of terror has systematically eliminated all internal opposition, even including members of his own family. He has ruthlessly persecuted Iraq's Kurdish minority. He has used chemical weapons against the Kurds and his own people. He has initiated a decade-long war against Iran, at the cost of nearly 2 million casualties. He has financially supported Palestinian terrorists and he has invaded Kuwait, prompting the United States to launch Operation Desert Storm.

In the history of our Nation, we have never attacked another country, except in response to an attack on our own shores, our people or our national interests. Until and unless the administration is prepared to come forward to offer its rationale, to submit its evidence to the American people, and to allow Congress to vote to authorize the use of force, an attack on Iraq, I believe, is both unwise and ill timed.

Unwise because it would certainly encourage an unprecedented response by Saddam Hussein, most likely targeted against Israel. Unwise because until the administration has thought through the who, the what, and the how of the regime that will take power in Iraq after Saddam Hussein is disposed of, any military action may well have unintended and undesirable consequences.

One cannot overemphasize how important the nature of the next Iraqi regime is to the future of the Middle East. It will require that the United States engage in nation building, something this administration has been reluctant to do. Call it what you will, but in the wake of toppling Saddam Hussein our commitment to Iraq must not be brief or perfunctory. This, I believe, is ill timed because of the unfinished business in Afghanistan, the continuing threat of al-Qaida, and the fact that at least two-thirds of the al-Qaida leadership, including Osama bin Laden, remain at large.

The war against terror has not yet been won. We should stay the course. So before rushing precipitously forward in an attack on Iraq, I urge the Bush administration to work with allies and the United Nations to develop a multilateral approach to compel Iraq to live up to its obligations under Security Council Resolution 687.

Should Iraq be unwilling to live up to its obligations and the President determines that there is just cause for military action against Iraq, I urge him to come before this Congress, to come before the American people, to make his case and let us in turn discharge our constitutional duty to debate and vote on the authorization of the use of force. The many thousands of our sons and daughters who will bear the brunt of such an operation, some of whom will surely pay the highest price, deserve no less.

I ask unanimous consent that the concurrent resolution be printed in the RECORD.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN (for herself and Mr. LEAHY) submitted the following concurrent resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations:

Expressing the sense of Congress that the United States should not use force against Iraq, outside of the existing Rules of Engagement, without specific statutory authorization or a declaration of war under Article I, Section 8, Clause 11 of the Constitution of the United States.

   Whereas, in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 (1991), Iraq--

    (1) agreed to destroy, remove, or render harmless all chemical and biological weapons and stocks of agents and all related subsystems and components and all research, development, support, and manufacturing facilities related thereto;

    (2) agreed to destroy, remove, or render harmless all ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometers, and related major parts and production facilities;

    (3) agreed not to acquire or develop any weapons, nuclear-weapons-usable material, nuclear -related subsystems or components, or nuclear-related research, development, support, or manufacturing facilities; and

    (4) agreed to permit immediate on-site inspection of Iraq's biological, chemical, and missile capabilities, and assist the International Atomic Energy Agency in carrying out the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless of all nuclear-related items and in developing a plan for ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance;

   Whereas the regime of Saddam Hussein consistently refused to comply with United Nations Special Commission weapons inspectors in Iraq between 1991 and 1998 by denying them access to crucial sites and documents;

   Whereas on October 31, 1998, Iraq banned the United Nations weapons inspectors despite its agreement and obligation to comply with United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 (1991);

   Whereas Congress declared in Public Law 105-235 that ``the Government of Iraq is in material and unacceptable breach of its international obligations, and therefore the President is urged to take appropriate action, in accordance with the Constitution and relevant laws of the United States, to bring Iraq into compliance with its international obligations'';

   Whereas, in his State of the Union Address on January 29, 2002, the President of the United States stated that the ``Iraqi regime has plotted to develop anthrax, and nerve gas, and nuclear weapons for over a decade'';

   Whereas it is believed that Iraq continues in its efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction, in violation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 (1991) and subsequent resolutions, and that the regime of Saddam Hussein has used weapons of mass destruction against its own people;

   Whereas the development of weapons of mass destruction by Iraq is a threat to the United States, and its friends and allies in the Middle East;

   Whereas Public Law 107-40 authorizes the President to use United States Armed Forces against ``those nations, organizations or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons in order to prevent any future acts on international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations, or persons'';

   Whereas no such evidence has been forthcoming linking Iraq to the September 11, 2001 attacks; and

   Whereas Article I, Section 8, Clause 11 of the Constitution of the United States confers upon Congress the sole power to declare war: Now, therefore, be it

    Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That (a) it is the sense of Congress that--

    (1) the United States and the United Nations Security Council should insist on a complete program of inspection and monitoring to prevent the development of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq;

    (2) Iraq should allow the United Nations weapons inspectors ``immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access to any and all areas, facilities, equipment, records and means of transportation which they wish to inspect'' as required by United Nations Security Council Resolution 707 of August 15, 1991, and United Nations Security Council Resolution 1284 of December 17, 1999; and

    (3) the United States should not use force against Iraq without specific statutory authorization or a declaration of war under Article I, Section 8, Clause 11 of the Constitution of the United States, except as provided in subsection (b).

    (b) Subsection (a)(3) does not apply to any use of force in compliance with the existing Rules of Engagement (ROE) used by coalition forces to exercise the right of self-defense or under the National Security Act of 1947.

3C) Protecting Seaports to Enhance U.S. Security
By Mrs. FEINSTEIN (for herself, Mr. KYL, Mrs. HUTCHISON, and Ms. SNOWE):

S. 2895. A bill to enhance the security of the United States by protecting seaports, and for other purposes; to the Committee, Science, and Transportation.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the Comprehensive Seaport and Container Security Act of 2002 to protect against terrorist attacks on or through our Nation's seaports. I would like to thank Senators Kyl, Hutchison, and Snowe for joining me in sponsoring this bill.

Currently, our seaports are the gaping hole in our Nation's defense against terrorism. Of the over 18 million shipping containers that enter our ports each year, 6 million come from overseas. However, only 1 or 2 percent of these containers are inspected, and inspections almost invariably occur after the containers arrive in the United States.

The problem is that single container could contain 60,000 pounds of explosives, 10 to 15 times the amount in the Ryder truck used to blow up the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma city, and a single container ship can carry as many as 8,000 containers at one time. Containers could easily be exploited to detonate a bomb that would destroy a bridge, seaport, or other critical infrastructure, causing mass destruction and killing thousands.

Worse, a suitcase-sized nuclear device or radiological ``dirty bomb'' could also be installed in a container and shipped to the United States. The odds that the container would never be inspected. And, even if the container was inspected, it would be too late. The weapon would already be in the United States--most likely near a major population center.

There is no doubt in my mind that terrorists are seeking to exploit vulnerabilities at our seaports right now.

For example, a recent article in the Bangkok Post notes that ``Al-Qaeda is among international terrorist organizations responsible for an increase in piracy against ships carrying radioactive materials through the Malacca Straits....... The terrorist groups' main aims were to obtain substances such as uranium and plutonium oxide for use in so-called dirty bombs.''

In addition, any attack on or through a seaport could have devastating economic consequences. Every year U.S. ports handle over 800 million tons of cargo valued at approximately $600 billion.

Excluding trade with Mexico and Canada, America's ports handle 95 percent of U.S. trade. Two of the busiest ports in the world are in my home State of California: Los Angeles/Long Beach and at Oakland.

We cannot inspect every container coming into the United States, but we can do a better job devoting our attention to cargo that could put our national security at risk. The legislation we introduce today will ensure that we devote the limited resources we do have to inspect cargo in the most efficient and effective manner. It will allow us to reduce the size of the haystack to make it easier to find the needle.

Since September 11th, the Federal Government has taken steps to secure our airports and our borders, however, we still have not adopted a blueprint for helping protect America's 361 seaports. While the Senate passed S. 1214, a bill written by Senator Hollings last December, and the House has also passed a port security bill, conference negotiations are still ongoing.

I hope the conferees will adopt the provisions in this bill before they complete their work in conference because I believe that this bill is the only legislation that thoroughly addresses the issue of port security from the point cargo is loaded in a foreign country to its arrival on land in the United States.

We have known for a long time that America's ports needed an extensive security strategy and upgrade. In the fall of 2000, a comprehensive report was issued by the Interagency Commission on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports. I testified before the commission and I believe its report makes a number of sensible suggestions on how we can improve security and fight crime at seaports.

Before the September 11 terrorist attacks, S. 1214 was drafted to try to implement many of the commission's recommendations. Before the bill passed the Senate in December 2001, the sponsors made some additional changes to help prevent a terrorist attack. However, I believe that there is much more Congress can do to prevent terrorists from launching a terrorist attack through our seaports.

The legislation I am introducing today will complement the Hollings bill and the seaport security legislation passed by the House. Together, I believe the provisions in these three bills will erect a formidable security barrier at our seaports.

I believe that Al Qaeda is planning to attack the United States again soon and that it may well try to do so through a U.S. seaport. Indeed, the Al Qaeda training manual specifically mentions seaports as a point of vulnerability in our security.

In addition, we know that Al Qaeda has succeeded in attacking American interests at and through seaports in the past. Let me mention some examples.

In June, the FBI issued a warning for Americans to be on the lookout for suspicious people wanting training in scuba diving or trying to rent underwater gear. Law enforcement officials fear that Al Qaeda operatives could try to blow up ships at anchor or other waterfront targets.

In May the FBI received reports that Al Qaeda terrorists may be making their way toward Southern California from a Middle Eastern port via merchant ships. Catalina Island--22 miles off the coast of Los Angles, was mentioned as a possible destination for about 40 Al Qaeda terrorists.

In October 2001, Italian authorities found an Egyptian man suspected for having ties to Al Qaeda in a container bound for Canada. He had false identifications, maps of airports, a computer, a satellite phones, cameras, and plenty of cash on hand.

[Page: S7961]

In October 2000, Al Qaeda operatives successfully carried out a deadly bombing attack against the U.S.S. Cole in the port of Yemen.

In 1998, Al Qaeda bombed the American Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Evidence suggests that the explosives the terrorists used were shipped to them by sea. And the investigation of the embassy bombings concluded that Bin Laden has close financial tries to various shipping companies.

I believe that this legislation would go far to make the United States less vulnerable to a terrorist attack. The main provisions will: 1. Establish a risk profiling plan for the Customs Service to focus their limited inspection capabilities on high-risk cargo and containers, and 2. Push U.S. security scrutiny beyond our Nation's borders to monitor and inspect cargo and containers before they arrive near America's shores.

These provisions complement and extend a strategy Customs Commissioner Robert C. Bonner is already in the process of implementing. To prevent a weapon of mass destruction from getting to the U.S. in the first place, Customs has entered into formal agreements with a handful of foreign governments to station U.S. inspectors at ports overseas to profile high risk cargo and target suspicious shipments for inspection.

The Comprehensive Seaport and Container Security Act will also: Designate an official at each U.S. port as the primary authority responsible for security. This will enable all parties involved in business at a port to understand who has final say on all security matters.

Require the FBI to collect and make available data relating to crime at and affecting seaports. With more data, law enforcement agencies will be able to better identify patterns and weaknesses at particular ports.

Require ports to provide space to Customs so that the agency is able to use its non-intrusive inspection technology. In many cases, Customs has to keep this technology outside the port and bring it in every day, which prevents some of the best inspection technology, which is not portable, from being used.

Give Customs responsibility of licensing and overseeing regulated intermediaries in the international trade process, these intermediaries handle over 80 percent of all cargo in international trade. Currently, the U.S. Federal Maritime Commission oversees most of these intermediaries, but Customs will have more resources to oversee this regulation.

Require shippers bound for U.S. ports to transmit their cargo manifests with more detailed information at least 24 hours prior to departing from a foreign port.

Impose steep monetary sanctions for failure to comply with information filing requirements, including filing incorrect information, the current penalty is only a maximum of $1000 or $5000, depending on the offense. The Seaport Commission found that about half of the information on ship manifests was inaccurate.

Require all port employees to have biometric smart identification cards.

Restrict private vehicle access to ports.

Prohibit guns and explosives at ports, except when authorized.

Mandate that radiation detection pagers be issued to each inspector.

Requires the Transportation Security Administration to set standards to ensure each port has a secure port perimeter, secure parking facilities, controlled points of access into the port, sufficient lighting, buildings with secure doors and windows and an alarm.

Require all ports to keep sensitive information on the port secure and protected. Such information would include, but not be limited to maps, blueprints, and information on the Internet.

Require the use of high security seals on all containers coming into the U.S.

Require that each container to be transported through U.S. ports receive a universal transaction number that could be used to track container movement from origin to destination. Require shippers to have similar universal numbers.

Require all empty containers destined for U.S. ports to be secured.

Fund pilot programs to develop high-tech seals and sensors, including those that would provide real-time evidence of container tampering to a monitor at a terminal.

I believe that Congress should act quickly on this legislation. This bill could very well prevent the arrival or detonation of a nuclear ``suitcase bomb'' or radiological ``dirty bomb'' at a U.S. seaport-an attack that could bring U.S. seaborne commerce to a grinding halt, leaving our economy and national security in shambles.

In closing, I want to thank staff at the Customs Service, Transportation Security Administration, Coast Guard, and various ports for their helpful comments on this legislation. I also want to thank a ``working group'' of experts I assembled for their suggestions regarding the bill. These experts included former government officials, industry executives, and security consultants.

I also want to thank Senator Hollings and the other members of the Commerce Committee for the work they have done on the port security issue. I have spoken to Senator Hollings about the bill I am introducing today, and my staff is working with his staff and with the staff of other conferees to come up with comprehensive seaport security legislation.

I hope that the legislation ultimately adopted by the conference includes the Comprehensive Seaport and Container Security Act of 2002. I would urge the conferees to work quickly to draft a final bill that we can send to the President's desk before September 11.

Mr President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

S. 2895

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the ``Comprehensive Seaport and Container Security Act of 2002''.

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

In this Act:

(1) CAPTAIN-OF-THE-PORT.--The term ``Captain-of-the-Port'' means the United States Coast Guard's Captain-of-the-Port.

(2) COMMON CARRIER.--The term ``common carrier'' means any person that holds itself out to the general public to provide transportation by water, land, or air of merchandise, whether or not the person actually operates the vessel, vehicle, or aircraft by which the transportation is provided, between a port or place and a port or place in the United States.

(3) CONTAINER.--The term ``container'' means a container which is used or designed for use for the international transportation of merchandise by vessel, vehicle, or aircraft.

(4) MANUFACTURER.--The term ``manufacturer'' means a person who fabricates or assembles merchandise for sale in commerce.

(5) MERCHANDISE.--The term ``merchandise'' has the meaning given that term in section 401 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1401).

(6) OCEAN TRANSPORTATION INTERMEDIARY.--The term ``ocean transportation intermediary'' has the meaning given that term in section 515.2 of title 46, Code of Federal Regulations, on the date of enactment of this Act.

(7) SHIPMENT.--The term ``shipment'' means cargo traveling in international commerce under a bill of lading.

(8) SHIPPER.--The term ``shipper'' means--

(A) a cargo owner;

(B) the person for whose account the ocean transportation is provided;

(C) the person to whom delivery of the merchandise is to be made; or

(D) a common carrier that accepts responsibility for payment of all charges applicable under a tariff or service contract.

(9) UNITED STATES SEAPORT.--The term ``United States seaport'' means a place in the United States on a waterway with shoreside facilities for the intermodal transfer of cargo containers that are used in international trade.

(10) VESSEL.--The term ``vessel'' has the meaning given that term in section 401 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1401).

SEC. 101. DESIGNATED SECURITY AUTHORITY.

(a) IN GENERAL.--Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Under Secretary of Transportation for Security, after consultation with the Director of the Office of Homeland Security, shall designate a Director of the Port who will be the primary authority responsible for security at each United States seaport to--

(1) coordinate security at such seaport; and

(2) be the point of contact on seaport security issues for civilian and commercial port entities at such seaport.

(b) DELEGATION.--A Director of the Port may delegate the responsibilities described in subsection (a) to the Captain-of-the-Port.

[Page: S7962]

SEC. 102. FBI CRIME DATA COLLECTION.

Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall implement a data collection system to compile data related to crimes at or affecting United States seaports. Such data collection system shall be designed to-

(1) identify patterns of criminal activity at particular seaports; and

(2) allow law enforcement authorities, including the designated law enforcement authority for each seaport described in section 101, to retrieve reliable data regarding such crimes.

SEC. 103. CUSTOMS SERVICE FACILITIES.

(a) OPERATIONAL SPACE IN SEAPORTS.--Each entity that owns or operates a United States seaport that receives cargo from a foreign country, whether governmental, quasi-governmental, or private, shall allow the use of permanent suitable office and inspection space within the seaport by United States Customs Service officers at no cost to the Customs Service.

(b) INSPECTION TECHNOLOGY.--The Commissioner of Customs shall maintain permanent inspection facilities that utilize available inspection technology in the space provided at each United States seaport pursuant to subsection (a).

SEC. 104. REGULATION OF OCEAN TRANSPORT INTERMEDIARIES.

(a) TRANSFER OF AUTHORITY.--The responsibility to license, and revoke or suspend a license, as an ocean transportation intermediary of a person who carries on or wishes to carry on the business of providing intermediary services is transferred from the Federal Maritime Commission to the Commissioner of Customs.

(b) RULEMAKING AUTHORITY.--Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, the Commissioner of Customs shall issue final regulations to carry out the requirements of subsection (a). Such regulations shall require that ocean transportation intermediaries assist the Commissioner of Customs in collecting data that can be used to prevent terrorist attacks in the United States.

(c) INTERIM RULES.--The Commissioner of Customs shall enforce the regulations in part 515 of title 46, Code of Federal Regulations, as in effect on the date of enactment of this Act, until the final regulations required by subsection (b) are issued, except that any reference to the Federal Maritime Commission in such regulations shall be deemed to be a reference to the Commissioner of Customs.

(d) CONTINUING EFFECT OF LEGAL DOCUMENTS.--All orders, determinations, rules, regulations, permits, agreements, grants, contracts, certificates, licenses, registrations, privileges, and other administrative actions relating to ocean transportation intermediary--

(1) which have been issued, made, granted, or allowed to become effective by the President, any Federal agency or official thereof, or by a court of competent jurisdiction, in the performance of functions which are transferred under subsection (a), and

(2) which are in effect at the time this Act takes effect, or were final before the effective date of this Act and are to become effective on or after the effective date of this Act,

shall continue in effect according to their terms until modified, terminated, superseded, set aside, or revoked in accordance with law by the President, the head of the Federal agency to which such functions are transferred under this Act or other authorized official, a court of competent jurisdiction, or by operation of law.

(e) PROCEEDINGS NOT AFFECTED.--

(1) IN GENERAL.--The provisions of this Act shall not affect any proceedings, including notices of proposed rule making, or any application for any license, permit, certificate, or financial assistance pending on the effective date of this Act before the Federal Maritime Commission with respect to functions transferred by this Act, but such proceedings or applications, to the extent that they relate to functions transferred, shall be continued. Orders shall be issued in such proceedings, appeals shall be taken therefrom, and payments shall be made under such orders, as if this Act had not been enacted, and orders issued in any such proceedings shall continue in effect until modified, terminated, superseded, or revoked by the head of the Federal agency to which such functions are transferred by this Act, by a court of competent jurisdiction, or by operation of law. Nothing in this subsection prohibits the discontinuance or modification of any such proceeding under the same terms and conditions and to the same extent that such proceeding could have been discontinued or modified if this Act had not been enacted.

(2) REGULATIONS.--The Commissioner of Customs is authorized to issue regulations providing for the orderly transfer of proceedings continued under paragraph (1).

SEC. 201. INSPECTION OF MERCHANDISE AT FOREIGN FACILITIES.

Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Commissioner of Customs, in consultation with the Under Secretary of Transportation for Security, shall submit to Congress a plan to--

(1) station inspectors from the Customs Service, other Federal agencies, or the private sector at the foreign facilities of manufacturers or common carriers to profile and inspect merchandise and the containers or other means by which such merchandise is transported as they are prepared for shipment on a vessel that will arrive at any port or place in the United States;

(2) develop procedures to ensure the security of merchandise inspected as described in paragraph (1) until it reaches the United States; and

(3) permit merchandise inspected as described in paragraph (1) to receive expedited inspection upon arrival in the United States.

SEC. 202. MANIFEST REQUIREMENTS.

Section 431(b) of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1431(b)) is amended--

(1) by striking ``Any manifest'' and inserting the following:

``(1) IN GENERAL.--Any manifest''; and

(2) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs:

``(2) REQUIRED INFORMATION.--

``(A) REQUIREMENT.--In addition to any other requirement under this section, the pilot, master, operator, or owner (or the authorized agent of such owner or operator) of every vessel required to make entry or obtain clearance under the customs laws of the United States shall, not later than 24 hours prior to departing from any foreign port or place for a port or place in the United States, transmit electronically the cargo manifest information described in subparagraph (B) in such manner and form as the Secretary shall prescribe. The Secretary shall ensure the electronic information is maintained securely, and is available only to individuals with Federal Government security responsibilities.

``(B) CONTENT.--The cargo manifest required by subparagraph (A) shall consist of the following information--

``(i) The port of arrival and departure.

``(ii) The carrier code assigned to the shipper.

``(iii) The flight, voyage, or trip number.

``(iv) The date of scheduled arrival and departure.

``(v) A request for a permit to proceed to the destination, if such permit is required.

``(vi) The numbers and quantities from the carrier's master air waybill, bills of lading, or ocean bills of lading.

``(vii) The first port of lading of the cargo and the city in which the carrier took receipt of the cargo.

``(viii) A description and weight of the cargo (including the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States number under which the cargo is classified) or, for a sealed container, the shipper's declared description and weight of the cargo.

``(ix) The shipper's name and address, or an identification number, from all air waybills and bills of lading.

``(x) The consignee's name and address, or an identification number, from all air waybills and bills of lading.

``(xi) Notice of any discrepancy between actual boarded quantities and air waybill or bills of lading quantities, except that a carrier is not required by this clause to verify boarded quantities of cargo in sealed containers.

``(xii) Transfer or transit information for the cargo while it has been under the control of the carrier.

``(xiii) The location of the warehouse or other facility where the cargo was stored while under the control of the carrier.

``(xiv) The name and address, or identification number of the carrier's customer including the forwarder, nonvessel operating common carrier, and consolidator.

``(xv) The conveyance name, national flag, and tail number, vessel number, or train number.

``(xvi) Country of origin and ultimate destination.

``(xvii) Carrier's reference number including the booking or bill number.

``(xviii) Shipper's commercial invoice number and purchase order number.

``(xix) Information regarding any hazardous material contained in the cargo.

``(xx) License information including the license code, license number, or exemption code.

``(xxi) Container number for containerized shipments.

``(xxii) Certification of any empty containers.

``(xxiii) Any additional information that the Secretary by regulation determines is reasonably necessary to ensure aviation, maritime, and surface transportation safety pursuant to those laws enforced and administered by the Customs Service.''.

SEC. 203. PENALTIES FOR INACCURATE MANIFEST.

(a) FALSITY OR LACK OF MANIFEST.--Section 584 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1584) is amended--

(1) in subsection (a)(1)--

(A) by striking ``$1,000'' each place it appears and inserting ``$50,000''; and

(B) by striking ``$10,000'' and inserting ``$50,000''; and

(2) by adding at the end the following new subsection:

``(c) CRIMINAL PENALTIES.--Any person who ships or prepares for shipment any merchandise bound for the United States who intentionally provides inaccurate or false information, whether inside or outside the United States, with respect to such merchandise for the purpose of introducing such merchandise into the United States in violation of the customs laws of the United States, is liable, upon conviction of a violation of this subsection, for a fine of not more than $50,000 or imprisonment for 1 year, or both; except that if the importation of such merchandise into the United States is prohibited, such person

[Page: S7963]

is liable for an additional fine of not more than $50,000 or imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or both.''.

(b) PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE ARRIVAL, REPORTING, ENTRY, AND CLEARANCE REQUIREMENTS.--Subsections (b) and (c) of section 436 of Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1436 (b) and (c)) are amended to read as follows:

``(b) CIVIL PENALTY.--Any master, person in charge of a vessel, vehicle, or aircraft pilot who commits any violation listed in subsection (a) is liable for a civil penalty of $25,000 for the first violation, and $50,000 for each subsequent violation, and any conveyance used in connection with any such violation is subject to seizure and forfeiture.

``(c) CRIMINAL PENALTY.--In addition to being liable for a civil penalty under subsection (b), any master, person in charge of a vessel, vehicle, or aircraft pilot who intentionally commits or causes another to commit any violation listed in subsection (a) is, upon conviction, liable for a fine of not more than $50,000 or imprisonment for 1 year, or both; except that if the conveyance has, or is discovered to have had, on board any merchandise (other than sea stores or the equivalent for conveyances other than vessels) the importation of which into the United States is prohibited, such individual is liable for an additional fine of not more than $50,000 or imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or both.''.

SEC. 204. SHIPMENT PROFILING PLAN.

(a) IN GENERAL.--The Commissioner of Customs, after consultation with the Director of the Office of Homeland Security and the Under Secretary of Transportation for Security, shall develop a shipment profiling plan to track containers and shipments of merchandise that will be imported into the United States for the purpose of identifying any shipment that is a threat to the security of the United States before such shipment is transported to a United States seaport.

(b) INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS.--The shipment profiling plan described in subsection (a) shall at a minimum--

(1) require common carriers, shippers, and ocean transportation intermediaries to provide appropriate information regarding each shipment of merchandise, including the information required under section 431(b) of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1431(b)) as amended by this Act, to the Commissioner of Customs; and

(2) require shippers to use a standard international bill of lading for each shipment that includes-

(A) the weight of the cargo;

(B) the value of the cargo;

(C) the vessel name;

(D) the voyage number;

(E) a description of each container;

(F) a description of the nature, type, and contents of the shipment;

(G) the code number from Harmonized Tariff Schedule;

(H) the port of destination;

(I) the final destination of the cargo;

(J) the means of conveyance of the cargo;

(K) the origin of the cargo;

(L) the name of the precarriage deliverer or agent;

(M) the port at which the cargo was loaded;

(N) the name of formatting agent;

(O) the bill of lading number;

(P) the name of the shipper;

(Q) the name of the consignee;

(R) the universal transaction number or carrier code assigned to the shipper by the Commissioner of Customs; and

(S) any additional information that the Commissioner of Customs by regulation determines is reasonably necessary to ensure seaport safety.

(c) CREATION OF PROFILE.--The Commissioner of Customs shall combine the information described in subsection (b) with other law enforcement and national security information that the Commissioner believes will assist in locating containers and shipments that could pose a threat to the security of the United States to create a profile of every container and every shipment within the container that will enter the United States.

(d) CARGO SCREENING.--

(1) IN GENERAL.--Customs Service officers shall review the profile of a shipment that a shipper desires to transport into the United States to determine if the shipment or the container in which it is carried should be subjected to additional inspection by the Customs Service. In making that determination, the Customs Service officers shall consider in addition to any other relevant factors--

(A) whether the shipper has regularly shipped cargo to the United States in the past; and

(B) the specificity of the description of the shipment's contents.

(2) NOTIFICATION.--The Commissioner of Customs shall notify the shipper and the person in charge of the vessel on which a shipment is located if the shipment will be subject to additional inspection as described in paragraph (1).

(e) CONSISTENCY WITH THE AUTOMATED COMMERCIAL ENVIRONMENT PROJECT.--The Commissioner of Customs shall ensure that the automated commercial environment project developed pursuant to section 411 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1411) is compatible with the shipment profile plan described under this section.

SEC. 301. SEAPORT SECURITY CARDS.

(a) REQUIREMENT FOR CARDS.--Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, a covered individual described in subsection (b) shall not be permitted to enter a United States seaport unless the covered individual holds a seaport security card as described in this section.

(b) COVERED INDIVIDUAL.--A ``covered individual'' means an individual who is regularly employed at a United States seaport or who is employed by a common carrier that transports merchandise to or from a United States seaport.

(c) ISSUANCE.--

(1) IN GENERAL.--The Under Secretary of Transportation for Security shall issue a seaport security card under this section to a covered individual unless the Under Secretary determines that the individual--

(A) poses a terrorism security risk;

(B) poses a security risk under section 5103a of title 49, United States Code;

(C) has been convicted of a violation of chapter 27 of title 18, United States Code; or

(D) has not provided sufficient information to allow the Under Secretary to make the determinations described in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C).

(2) DETERMINATION OF TERRORISM SECURITY RISK.--The Under Secretary shall determine that a person poses a terrorism security risk under paragraph (1)(A) if the individual--

(A) has been convicted of a felony that the Under Secretary believes could be a terrorism security risk to the United States;

(B) may be denied admission to the United States or removed from the United States under the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.); or

(C) otherwise poses a terrorism security risk to the United States.

(3) CONSIDERATIONS.--In making a determination under paragraph (2), the Under Secretary shall give consideration to the circumstances of any disqualifying act or offense, restitution made by the individual, Federal and State mitigation remedies, and other factors from which it may be concluded that the individual does not pose a terrorism security risk sufficient to warrant denial of the card.

(d) APPEALS.--The Under Secretary of Transportation for Security shall establish an appeals process under this section for individuals found to be ineligible for a seaport security card that includes notice and an opportunity for a hearing.

(e) DATA ON CARD.--The seaport identification cards required by subsection (a) shall--

(1) be tamper resistant; and

(2) contain--

(A) the number of the individual's commercial driver's license issued under chapter 313 of title 49, United States Code, if any;

(B) the State-issued vehicle registration number of any vehicle that the individual desires to bring into the seaport, if any;

(C) the work permit number issued to the individual, if any;

(D) a unique biometric identifier to identify the license holder; and

(E) a safety rating assigned to the individual by the Under Secretary of Transportation for Security.

SEC. 302. SEAPORT SECURITY REQUIREMENTS.

(a) REQUIREMENT.--Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Under Secretary of Transportation for Security, after consultation with the Commissioner of Customs, shall issue final regulations setting forth minimum security requirements including security performance standards at United States seaports. The regulations shall--

(1) limit private vehicle access to United States seaports to vehicles that are registered at the seaport and display a seaport registration pass;

(2) prohibit individuals, other than law enforcement officers, from carrying firearms or explosives inside a United States seaport without written authorization from the Director of the Port described in section 101(a) or, if authority is delegated under section 101(b), the Captain-of-the-Port;

(3) prohibit individuals from physically accessing a United States seaport without a seaport specific access pass;

(4) require that Customs Service officers, and other appropriate law enforcement officers, at United States seaports be provided and utilize personal radiation detection pagers to increase the ability of the Customs Service to accurately detect radioactive materials that could be used to commit terrorist acts in the United States;

(5) require that each United States seaport maintain--

(A) a secure perimeter;

(B) secure parking facilities;

(C) monitored or locked access points;

(D) sufficient lighting; and

(E) secure buildings within the seaport; and

(6) include any additional security requirement that the Under Secretary determines is reasonably necessary to ensure seaport security.

(b) LIMITATION.--Except as provided in subsection (c), any United States seaport that does not meet the minimum security requirements described in subsection (a) is prohibited from--

(1) handling, storing, stowing, loading, discharging, or transporting dangerous cargo; and

(2) transferring passengers to or from a passenger vessel that--

(A) weighs more than 100 gross tons;

(B) carries more than 12 passengers for hire; and

(C) has a planned voyage of more than 24 hours, part of which is on the high seas.

[Page: S7964]

(c) EXCEPTION.--The Under Secretary of Transportation for Security may waive 1 or more of the minimum requirements described in subsection (a) for a United States seaport if the Secretary determines that it is not appropriate for such seaport to implement the requirement.

SEC. 303. SECURING SENSITIVE INFORMATION.

(a) REQUIREMENT.--Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Director of the Port described in section 101(a) or, if authority is delegated under section 101(b), the Captain-of-the-Port of each United States seaport shall secure and protect all sensitive information, including information that is currently available to the public, related to the seaport.

(b) SENSITIVE INFORMATION.--In this section, the term ``sensitive information'' means-

(1) maps of the seaport;

(2) blueprints of structures located within the seaport; and

(3) any other information related to the security of the seaport that the Director of the Port described in section 101(a) or, if authority is delegated under section 101(b), the Captain-of-the-Port determines is appropriate to secure and protect.

SEC. 304. CONTAINER SECURITY.

(a) CONTAINER SEALS.--

(1) APPROVAL.--Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Under Secretary of Transportation for Security and the Commissioner of Customs shall jointly approve minimum standards for high security container seals that--

(A) meet or exceed the American Society for Testing Materials Level D seals;

(B) permit each seal to have a unique identification number; and

(C) contain an electronic tag that can be read electronically at a seaport.

(2) REQUIREMENT FOR USE.--Within 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Under Secretary of Transportation for Security shall deny entry by a vessel into the United States if the containers carried by the vessel are not sealed with a high security container seal approved under paragraph (1).

(b) IDENTIFICATION NUMBER.--

(1) REQUIREMENT.--A shipment that is shipped to or from the United States either directly or via a foreign port shall have a designated universal transaction number.

(2) TRACKING.--The person responsible for the security of a container shall record the universal transaction number assigned to the shipment under subparagraph (1), as well as any seal identification number on the container, at every port of entry and point at which the container is transferred from one conveyance to another conveyance.

(c) PILOT PROGRAM.--

(1) GRANTS.--The Under Secretary of Transportation for Security is authorized to award grants to eligible entities to develop improved seals for cargo containers that are able to--

(A) immediately detect tampering with the seal;

(B) immediately detect tampering with the walls, ceiling, or floor of the container that indicates a person is attempting to improperly access the container; and

(C) transmit information regarding tampering with the seal, walls, ceiling, or floor of the container in real time to the appropriate authorities at a remote location.

(2) APPLICATION.--Each eligible entity desiring a grant under this subsection shall submit an application to the Under Secretary at such time, in such manner, and accompanied by such information as the Under Secretary may reasonably require.

(3) ELIGIBLE ENTITY.--In this subsection, the term ``eligible entity'' means any national laboratory, nonprofit private organization, institution of higher education, or other entity that the Under Secretary determines is eligible to receive a grant authorized by paragraph (1).

(d) EMPTY CONTAINERS.--

(1) CERTIFICATION.--The Commissioner of Customs shall issue regulations that set out requirements for certification of empty containers that will be shipped to or from the United States either directly or via a foreign port. Such regulations shall require that an empty container--

(A) be inspected and certified as empty prior to being loaded onto a vessel for transportation to a United States seaport; and

(B) be sealed with a high security container seal approved under subsection (a)(1) to enhance the security of United States seaports.

3D) VA Emergency Preparedness Research, Education and Bioterrorism Act of 2002
Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Veterans Affairs Committee be discharged from further consideration of H.R. 3253 and the Senate proceed to its immediate consideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the bill by title.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

A bill (H.R. 3253) to amend title 38, United States Code, to provide for the establishment within the Department of Veterans Affairs of improved emergency medical preparedness, research, and education programs to combat terrorism , and for other purposes.

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the bill.

Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Mr. President, as Chairman of the Committee on Veterans Affairs, I urge the Senate to pass this legislation that would help VA--and our entire Nation--prepare for the potential medical consequences of another terrorist attack.

As Congress seeks ways to avert the threats posed by biological, chemical, radiological, and other potential terrorist weapons, we must make certain that we use our existing national resources as efficiently as possible. I thank Ranking Member SPECTER and his staff for their efforts in helping to ensure that VA--the Nation's largest integrated healthcare system--is prepared for the role that it can and must play during emergencies.

The pending measure is an omnibus bill that would improve VA's ability to fulfill its responsibilities to veterans, its staff, and communities during disasters, and would also address VA nonprofit research corporation activities.

``The Department of Veterans Affairs Emergency Preparedness Act,'' as reported, which I will refer to as the ``Committee bill,'' acknowledges VA's role in offering health care and support to individuals affected by disasters, and would give VA staff the tools that they need to continue serving veterans during emergencies.

The committee bill would establish four medical emergency preparedness research centers within the Department of Veterans Affairs health care system. VA researchers possess expertise in the long-term health consequences of biological, chemical, and radiological exposures, and sustain an unparalleled clinical management research program. The centers authorized by this legislation would make the most of these resources to learn how best to manage--or prevent--the mass casualties that might arise from the use of terrorist weapons.

The committee bill also includes provisions requested by the Administration that would create an office, directed by an Assistant Secretary, to coordinate preparedness strategies within VA and with other Federal, State, and local agencies. I strongly believe that this new office represents an essential step in helping VA improve emergency preparedness while maintaining its primary mission of caring for the Nation's veterans.

Another emergency preparedness provision within the committee bill would create no new responsibilities or missions for VA, but would authorize VA's enormous contribution to public safety and emergency preparedness. In 1982, Congress charged VA to care for active duty military casualties during a conflict or disaster. Since then, VA has taken a much larger share of the Federal responsibility for public health during emergencies, supporting mass care as part of the Federal Response Plan for disasters and serving as a cornerstone of the National Disaster Medical System.

VA has responded to every major domestic disaster of the last two decades with personnel, supplies and medications, facilities, and--when necessary--direct patient care for overwhelmed communities. VA health care providers who care for disaster victims serve not only as part of the Federal response to emergencies, but as part of the communities in which they live. The committee bill would acknowledge VA's emergency response missions by authorizing VA to provide medical treatment for individuals affected by or responding to disasters.

The committee bill also makes changes in law affecting VA's nonprofit research corporations. The first allows employees of nonprofit VA research and education corporations assigned to approved VA research, education, or training projects to be considered VA employees for purposes of the Federal Tort Claims Act. The other provision clarifies that VA Medical Centers may enter into contracts or other forms of agreements with nonprofit research corporations to provide services to facilitate VA-approved research and education projects. These changes would further VA's research and education missions.

In conclusion, I urge my colleagues to support these research and emergency preparedness enhancements for VA. This bipartisan commitment to our Nation's veterans and VA represents a small investment with potentially enormous rewards.

I ask unanimous consent that a summary of the bill be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Sumamry of S. 2132: The Department of Veterans Affairs Emergency Preparedness Act of 2002

MEDICAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS CENTERS IN THE VETERANS HEALTH ADMINISTRATION

Authorizes VA to establish four centers for medical emergency preparedness within existing VA medical centers.

Directs centers to carry out research on the medical management of injuries or illnesses arising from the use of chemical, biological, radiological, or incendiary or other explosive weapons or devices in coordination with national strategies for homeland security.

Allows centers to provide medical consequence management education and training to VA health care professionals, and to non-VA providers at the Secretary's discretion.

Authorizes VA to provide laboratory, epidemiological, medical, or other assistance to Federal, State, and local health care entities by request during a national emergency.

REORGANIZATION OF VA PREPAREDNESS FUNCTIONS

Increases the number of authorized assistant secretaries from six to seven, and adds ``operations, preparedness, security, and law enforcement'' to their authorized functions.

Increases the number of authorized deputy assistant secretaries from 18 to 20.

AUTHORIZING VA TO PROVIDE MEDICAL CARE DURING DISASTERS

Authorizes VA to furnish medical care to individuals--regardless of enrollment status--affected by a major disaster or presidentially declared emergency, or following activation of the National Disaster Medical System.

Allows VA to provide care to individuals affected by disasters before any other group except service-connected veterans and active-duty military casualties, and would allow VA to be reimbursed for care provided to employees of other Federal agencies.

VA NONPROFIT RESEARCH CORPORATION ACTIVITIES

Authorizes VA to contract with VA nonprofit research corporations in order to conduct VA-approved research, training, or education.

Allows employees of nonprofit VA research and education corporations assigned to approved VA research, education, or training projects to be considered VA employees for purposes of Federal Tort Claims Act.

Removes the sunset date of December 31, 2003, currently established in 38 USCS §7638, for authority to establish nonprofit VA research and education corporations.

Mr. REID. Mr. President, I understand Senator Rockefeller has a substitute amendment at the desk which is the text of S. 2132 and has been reported by the Veterans Subcommittee. I ask unanimous consent that the substitute amendment be agreed to, the bill, as amended, be read three times, passed, the motion to reconsider be laid on the table; that the title amendment be agreed to; and that any statements relating thereto be printed in the RECORD, with no intervening action or debate.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The amendment (No. 4469) was agreed to.

(The text of the amendment is printed in today's RECORD under ``Text of Amendments.'')

The bill (H.R. 3253), as amended, was read the third time and passed.

(The bill will be printed in a future edition of the RECORD.)

The title amendment (No. 4470) was agreed to, as follows:

``A Bill to amend title 38, United States Code, to enhance the emergency preparedness of the Department of Veterans Affairs, and for other purposes.''.

3E) Iraq
Mr. HAGEL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD a statement on Iraq that I gave before the Foreign Relations Committee.

There being no objection, the material was order to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Mr. HAGEL. I would like to congratulate the Chairman and the Ranking Member for holding these timely hearings on Iraq . I agree with my colleagues that we need a national dialogue on what steps we should take to deal with the threat posed by Saddam Hussein's Iraq . Americans need to be informed about the complexities and consequences of our policies in Iraq .

I look forward to listening to and learning from the distinguished witnesses before us today about the nature and urgency of the threat we face from Iraq , including their evaluations of what the best policy options may be for meeting this threat; the prospects for a democratic transition after Saddam Hussein; and what the implications of our policies in Iraq may be for the stability of the Middle East and our security interests there.

Much of the debate by those advocating regime change through military means have so far focused on the easy questions. Is Saddam Hussein a ruthless tyrant who brutally oppresses his own people, and who possesses weapons of mass destruction that have the potential to threaten us, his neighbors and our allies, including and especially Israel? Yes. Do most Iraqis yearn for democratic change in Iraq ? Yes, they do. Can Saddam be rehabilitated? No, he cannot.

In my opinion, complicated and relevant questions remain to be answered before making a case for war, and here is where these hearings will play an important role. What is the nature, and urgency, of the threat that Saddam Hussein poses to the United States and Iraq's neighbors? What do we know about Iraq's programs of weapons of mass destruction? There have been no weapons inspectors in Iraq since December 1998. Is Iraq involved in terrorist planning and activities against the United States and US allies in the Middle East and elsewhere?

What can we expect after Saddam Hussein in Iraq ? What do we know about the capabilities of the opposition to Saddam inside Iraq ? While we support a unified and democratic opposition to Saddam Hussein, the arbiters of power in a post-Saddam Iraq will likely be those who reside inside, not outside, the country. And these individuals and groups we do not know. Who are they? And where are they? These are the Iraqis we need to understand, engage, and eventually do business with.

What will be the future of Iraqi Kurdistan in a post-Saddam Iraq ?

[Page: S7865]  GPO's PDF

How do we accomplish regime change in Iraq given the complexities and challenges of the current regional environment? The deep Israeli-Palestinian conflict continues; our relations with Syria are proper though strained; we have no relationship with Iran; Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Jordan have warned us about dangerous unintended consequences if we take unilateral military action against Iraq ; and Afghanistan remains a piece of very difficult unfinished business, an unpredictable but critical investment for the United States and our allies.

I can think of no historical case where the United States succeeded in an enterprise of such gravity and complexity as regime change in Iraq without the support of a regional and international coalition. We have a lot of work to do on the diplomatic track. Not just for military operations against Iraq , should that day come, but for the day after, when the interests and intrigues of outside powers could undermine the fragility of an Iraqi government in transition, whoever governs in Iraq after Saddam Hussein.

An American military operation in Iraq could require a commitment in Iraq that could last for years and extend well beyond the day of Saddam's departure. The American people need to understand the political, economic, and military magnitude and risks that would be inevitable if we invaded Iraq .

There was no such national dialogue or undertaking before we went into Vietnam. There were many very smart, well intentioned professionals, intellectuals, and strategists who assured us of a US victory in Vietnam at an acceptable cost. Well, eleven years, 58,000 dead, and the most humiliating defeat in our nation's history later we abandoned South Vietnam to the Communists.

Let me conclude by saying that I support regime change and a democratic transition in Iraq . That's easy. The Iraqi people have suffered too long, and our security and interests will never be assured with Saddam Hussein in power. The tough questions are when, how, with whom, and at what cost. I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses over the next two days on these critical questions.

4A) Defense Appropriations Act of 2003, Lugar Amendment
AMENDMENT NO. 4435

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.

The bill clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Indiana [Mr. LUGAR], for himself, Mr. Biden, Mr. Domenici, Mr. Hagel, Mr. Graham, Mr. Levin, Mr. Dodd, and Mr. McCain, proposes an amendment numbered 4435:

On page 223, between lines 20 and 21, insert the following:

SEC. 8124. Section 1305 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (Public Law 106-65; 22 U.S.C. 5952 note) is amended--

(1) by inserting ``(a) LIMITATION.--'' before ``No fiscal year''; and

(2) by adding at the end the following new subsection:

``(b) WAIVER.--(1) The limitation in subsection (a) shall not apply to funds appropriated for Cooperative Threat Reduction programs for a fiscal year if the President submits to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate a written certification that the waiver of the limitation in such fiscal year is important to the national security of the United States.

``(2) A certification under paragraph (1) for fiscal year 2003 shall cover funds appropriated for Cooperative Threat Reduction programs for that fiscal year and for fiscal years 2000, 2001, and 2002.

``(3) A certification under paragraph (1) shall include a full and complete justification for the waiver of the limitation in subsection (a) for the fiscal year covered by the certification.''.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana is recognized.

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, during the Memorial Day recess, it was the privilege of this Senator to travel again with my colleague and partner, Senator Sam Nunn, and with Representative John Spratt and Representative Christopher Shays to a number of sites in Russia. One of particular interest to us was the chemical weapons facility at Shchuch'ye, which is approximately 1,200 miles east of Moscow. That particular installation has been a part of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program insofar as the United States has worked cooperatively with Russia to put extensive fencing and various other security around what amounts to 1.9 million weapon shells--that is, chemical weapon shells--filled with nerve gas, saran, and VX.

I had visited the sites 18 months before, and this was a return to envision precisely these 85-millimeter shells, these small shells that you can put in a small suitcase. Indeed, I have an illustration of this, Mr. President.

Here is the small suitcase, and here is the Senator from Indiana, and a Russian major took the picture.

As we discuss proliferation, this intersection between terrorists and weapons of mass destruction, envision, if you will, that there are 1.9 million more of these 85-millimeter shells. The Russians on the site estimate if one shell was put into a stadium of 100,000 people, everybody would die. It has that degree of efficacy and it has this degree of portability.

This is why the United States takes seriously the penning up of the chemical weapons of Russia. Russia has declared 40,000 metric tons. One-seventh of them are at Shchuch'ye, in this condition. Also at Shchuch'ye is our greatest hope in working with the Russians to destroy the chemical weapons. They are in the process of building a plant that will require U.S. money to complete. The German Bundesbank has appropriated money this year for this plant, and so has Great Britain, Canada, and Norway, in modest amounts, to join us.

The Russian Duma has appropriated substantially more money for this purpose. Why? Because Russia and the United States and many other nations ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention. We did so 5 years ago. The Russians did so a short time thereafter. It is a 10-year treaty. We are almost at halftime and not the first pound of chemical weapons has, in fact, been destroyed because there was not the money, not the technical organization, until at least this present point.

Mr. President, when I came back from Russia, Senator Biden, the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, and I were asked to come to the White House to visit with the President and the Vice President, Condoleezza Rice, and Andrew Card. Six of us sat there and talked about the new treaty between the United States and Russia, on which we have had testimony at some of our committee hearings. The point made by the President, Secretary Powell, and Secretary Rumsfeld is that we have a turn

[Page: S7703]

of the road with Russia. We are not naive with regard to all of the problems with Russia, but the President is asking for ratification of this new treaty that would substantially reduce nuclear warheads in the next 10 years.

I took the opportunity to point out to the President of the United States that it is one thing to ratify a treaty, and to negotiate one to begin with, and it is quite another to see actual results from the treaty. We are working in this country to reduce our chemical weapons, and we hope to do so in the 10 years. We have pledged to do so under the treaty. The Russians have a whole lot more of them. My point is that there has not been a reduction there. In this case, it is not a lack of good will, it is a lack of money, lack of technical support.

In the midst of all of this, the dilemma for President Bush--and he raised this during our face-to-face meeting--is: What can I do about it? With the other Nunn-Lugar programs, the Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs, the President could certify that the conditions imposed by Congress on the Nunn-Lugar Act are being met. In the past 10 years, such certification has come each year. This year, it did not.

Ms. Rice and the Vice President advised the President that the administration has sought authorization to waive the certification requirement so that the money could be spent. In effect, no new programs under cooperative threat reduction have occurred for 10 months of this fiscal year due to lack of certification and lack of waiver.

Now, in the supplemental appropriations bill we passed the other evening, as this becomes law--at least for the last 2 months of this year--our Government can actively move to destroy weapons of mass destruction with new contracts--nuclear, chemical, and biological--for 2 months. In a conference now on the authorization of the Defense Department, there is a debate as to how long a waiver might last. The President has asked for permanent authority, and the Senate has offered that in its bill. The House has offered, as I understand it, a 3-year time for the President to waive this certification. But when we come to chemical weapons, the President apparently has no ability to waive anything, or to certify anything.

An additional six requirements are posed, and they have not been met, in the judgment at least of those in the administration who were involved in these deliberations. So as a result, nothing is happening with regard to American money or the destruction of these weapons.

Following my meeting with the President, I wrote a letter to Condoleezza Rice, and I stated everything that I have indicated in these remarks today. I appreciate the fact that she has responded and indicated to me that:

The President has repeatedly emphasized the importance of cooperative threat reduction in his strategy to reduce and prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, delivery means, and the materials and technology to develop them. Because of the program's value to the nation's security, the President has asked the Congress to grant him permanent authority to waive CTR certification requirements if he determines that is in the national interest. We strongly support the waiver provision of the Senate version of the FY2003 Defense Reauthorization bill, and have urged the conferees to adopt it.

Our serious concerns about Russian chemical and biological weapons activities make it difficult for the Secretary of State to certify Russia as eligible for CTR assistance. Waiver authority will enable the Administration both to pursue essential CTR weapons reduction and nonproliferation projects, and to work with Russia to resolve our concerns about its chemical and biological weapons activities.

Parenthetically, I might say that one of the concerns is the four installations, allegedly with biological weapons or preparations for them, in Russia to which none of us have had access.

It is my hope in the coming recess to enter two of these and at least clear away whatever may be the dilemmas of those two situations and maybe in the fullness of time to make the other two.

I have been permitted to go into a number of biological situations, in addition to the full gamut of the chemical ones, largely because there is a sense of cooperative threat reduction.

The Russians themselves appreciate that if there are accidents, theft, or a breakdown of the system, Russians will be killed first and in large numbers. This is a grim and serious business which ought not be a part of parliamentary byplay and that has been the dilemma this year.

Condoleezza Rice continues:

Similarly, we welcome your proposal of a waiver of the legislative conditions on CTR assistance to construct a nerve agent destruction facility at Shchuch'ye. As you point out, the small, transportable munitions at Shchuch'ye pose a real proliferation risk. The President underscored the importance of assistance to Russian chemical weapons destruction in his December speech at the Citadel and most recently in the G8 Leaders announcement of Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction.

We have been working hard with Russia to meet the legislative conditions on the Shchuch'ye project, and have made considerable progress. Nevertheless, it may be difficult to assess with confidence that the information we have from Russia on its chemical weapons stockpile is full and accurate. At a minimum, the information-gathering process will be very time-consuming, but the proliferation threat gives us no time to delay. Indeed, the Administration concluded after its thorough review of nonproliferation assistance to Russia that the destruction project at Shchuch'ye should be accelerated.

Therefore, the Administration has urged the conferees to the FY2003 Defense Authorization bill to provide the President the authority to waive the conditions on CTR chemical weapons destruction assistance, if he determines that to do so is in the national interest.

Given this letter, Mr. President, I have offered the amendment that is at the desk. It achieves that objective of giving the President waiver authority that he does not have with regard to these chemical weapons. In due course, the conference committee and the armed services will come to a decision as to whether the request by the President for permanent waiver authority on all Nunn-Lugar programs is to be granted to the President.

In a commonsense way, I pray that will be the case. I cannot imagine that it is in the national interest for us to deliberately, having authorized money for Nunn-Lugar, having appropriated money for the Nunn-Lugar program, to have it all tied up in terms of new projects for 10 months.

My point to the President has been: Mr. President, that could very well be the fate of a nuclear treaty with regard to warheads. Why do we believe that somehow that might be exempt because, clearly, American money is going to be involved if we are to make progress in seeing those warheads reduced.

The Russians may want to reduce the warheads to 2,200 or 1,700 or whatever figure is in their national interest, but they clearly do not have the means to do so.

Some Americans, perhaps even Members of this body, may say: Well, that is the Russian's problem; they made their bed; let them sleep in it. But it is our problem because those warheads are aimed at us. The nerve gas at Shchuch'ye will not be aimed at us if it is destroyed, and it can be destroyed during this historical window of opportunity.

Therefore, I earnestly ask for support of the Senate in adopting this amendment so it is absolutely clear that the President has the authority to give the waivers so that we may move ahead on something I think is vital not only to our national interest but in the war against terrorism is imperative. My feeling always has been if the Senate had any idea of this general problem, there would be a speedy resolution.

The purpose of my speech tonight is to make sure this Senate does understand and makes a commitment to destroy these weapons as rapidly as possible, given the storage and given the destruction facility.

I add finally that for those who are at all wondering how they destroy the stockpile, this is the weapon in the suitcase. It would be taken down to a vacuum space. Two holes would be drilled in the bottom of the weapon. The material would be drained out and put in a chemical formulation which finally renders that toxic material without consequence. This has to happen 1.9 million times. It will take 6 years if we begin now.

I hope it will begin now. My plea is for immediate action on the amendment which I hope will be favorable.

[Page: S7704]

I ask unanimous consent that a letter addressed to Dr. Rice dated July 12, 2002, and her response to me dated July 30, 2002, be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,

Washington, DC, July 12, 2002.
Dr. CONDOLEEZZA RICE,
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs,
The White House, Washington, DC.

DEAR DR. RICE: We write out of great concern over the current status of various projects in the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program at the Department of Defense. Final disposition has yet to be reached on an Administration request for permanent annual waiver authority relative to legislatively-imposed conditions requiring certification by the Executive branch in order to permit elements of the program to go forward. That will remain dependent on the outcome of a conference between the two houses of Congress on the FY 2003 Defense Authorization bill.

Despite the Administration's difficulties in attempting to secure permanent waiver authority from the Congress in order to proceed with the overall Nunn-Lugar/CTR program, we are encouraged that the Administration has continued to seek the waiver to the certification requirements. The same cannot be said with respect to the Administration's approach to the Nunn-Lugar/CTR chemical weapons elimination project in Russia. Congressional conditions--above and beyond those that apply to CTR in general--continue to stymie and delay construction of a chemical weapons destruction facility at Shchuchye, Russia, that is decidedly in the national security interests of the United States. A swift solution to the current stalemate is only possible with strong Administration leadership.

The project at Shchuchye was reviewed by the Administration as part of its non-proliferation program review last year. In a Fact Sheet released December 27, 2001, the White House stated that: ``The Department of Defense will seek to accelerate the Cooperative Threat Reduction project to construct a chemical weapons destruction facility at Shchuchye, to enable its earlier completion at no increased expense. We welcome the contributions that friends and allies have made to this project thus far, and will work for their enhancement.'' Unfortunately, little progress has been made in this direction.

Several of us recently visited Shchuchye and have come to the conclusion that the U.S. needs to move forward expeditiously if we are to eliminate this critical proliferation threat. The depot houses nearly 2,000,000 modern ground-launched chemical weapons. These artillery shells and SCUD missile warheads are in excellent working condition and many are small and easily transportable and could be deadly in the hands of terrorists, religious sects, or para-military units. We were told by our Russian hosts that the weapons stored at Shchuchye could kill the world's population some twenty times over. The size and lethality of the weapons at Shchuchye are clearly a direct proliferation threat to the American people.

Last year, the House of Representatives attached six conditions to the Shchuchye project. Of the original six conditions, four can be met but two continue to be problematic. The remaining conditions require the Secretary of Defense to certify that the information provided by Russia on the size of its chemical weapons stockpile is full and accurate and that Russia has developed a practical plan for destroying its stockpile of nerve agents. We share the goals associated with these conditions, but these same concerns prompted the Administration to seek a waiver to the larger certification requirements required under the Nunn-Lugar program. Unfortunately, without a similar White House request for a waiver at Shchuchye, it is unlikely that the Pentagon will be able to begin construction of a facility to destroy these weapons in the foreseeable future.

We urge the Administration to weigh in with conferees to the FY 2003 Defense Authorization bill to include a national security waiver of congressionally-imposed conditions on the spending of funds authorized for chemical weapons elimination under the Nunn-Lugar program. As the war on terrorism continues we must ensure that terrorists do not intersect with weapons of mass destruction. Failure to begin destruction of the chemical weapons arsenal at Shchuchye would leave these dangerous, highly portable weapons in an unsafe and insecure location and vulnerable to proliferation. Construction could start tomorrow if Congress were to embrace the proper policy prescription.

The Administration's plans to speed up implementation of this important Nunn-Lugar project cannot coexist with the current Congressional conditions on the program. We urge you to provide vitally needed leadership to permit the Pentagon to begin dismantlement efforts. Without strong White House leadership we fear that progress will again be stymied and U.S. national security interests will suffer.

We look forward to discussing this with you in the near future.

Sincerely,
Richard G. Lugar, U.S. Senator; Joseph R. Biden Jr., U.S. Senator; Chris Shays, U.S. Representative; John Spratt, U.S. Representative; Pete Domenici, U.S. Senator; Jeff Bingaman, U.S. Senator; Ellen Taushcher, U.S. Representative; Bob Graham, U.S. Senator; Chuck Hagel, U.S. Senator; Vic Snyder, U.S. Representative.

--

THE WHITE HOUSE,

Washington, July 30, 2002.
Hon. RICHARD G. LUGAR,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

DEAR SENATOR LUGAR: Thank you for your letter on the Department of Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program.

The President has repeatedly emphasized the importance of CTR in his strategy to reduce and prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, delivery means, and the materials and technology to develop them. Because of the program's value to the nation's security, the President has asked the Congress to grant him permanent authority to waive CTR certification requirements if he determines that is in the national interest. We strongly support the waiver provision in the Senate version of the FY2003 Defense Authorization bill, and have urged the conferees to adopt it.

Our serious concerns about Russian chemical and biological weapons activities make it difficult for the Secretary of State to certify Russia as eligible for CTR assistance. Waiver authority will enable the Administration both to pursue essential CTR weapons reduction and nonproliferation projects, and to work with Russia to resolve our concerns about its chemical and biological weapons activities.

Similarly, we welcome your proposal for a waiver of the legislative conditions on CTR assistance to construct a nerve agent destruction facility at Shchuch'ye. As you point out, the small, transportable munitions at Shchuch'ye pose a real proliferation risk. The President underscored the importance of assistance to Russian chemical weapons destruction in his December speech at the Citadel and most recently in the G8 Leaders announcement of the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction.

We have been working hard with Russia to meet the legislative conditions on the Shchuch'ye project, and have made considerable progress. Nevertheless, it may be difficult to assess with confidence that the information we have from Russia on its chemical weapons stockpile is full and accurate. At a minimum, the information-gathering process will be very time-consuming, but the proliferation threat gives us no time to delay. Indeed, the Administration concluded after its thorough review of nonproliferation assistance to Russia that the destruction project at Shchuch'ye should be accelerated.

Therefore, the Administration has urged the conferees to the FY2003 Defense Authorization bill to provide the President the authority to waive the conditions on CTR chemical weapons destruction assistance, if he determines that to do so is in the national interest.

Sincerely,

Condoleezza Rice,
Assistance to the President for National Security Affairs.

--

U.S. Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) Holds Hearing On Nuclear Treaty With Russia, July 25, 2002, Senate Armed Services Committee, Washington, DC

LEVIN: My final question. Secretary Rumsfeld, the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program is coming to a halt because of the inability to make the necessary certifications. The Senate bill that's in conference contains the legislative authority that the administration requested which is permanent authority for the president to grant an annual wavier of the prerequisites in the Freedom Support Act and the Cooperative Threat Reduction Act. The House bill contains authority to grant waivers for three years. I assume that you support the administration positions relative to permanent authority, and so, I won't ask you that. But if you disagree with it, perhaps in your answer to the question I'm going to ask you, you could let me know that, too. But here's the issue. The permanent authority requested by the administration to grant annual waivers of the prerequisites to Implementation of the Cooperative Threats Reduction Program does not include an ability to waive the special prerequisites for the Russian chemical weapons destruction program being carried out under the CTR program. President Bush said that not only did he support this important effort to destroy the Russian chemical weapons destruction program, he actually wanted to accelerate it. But there's no authority to waive those special prerequisites for the chemical destruction, then that program is going to be shut down. Will you be asking for waiver authority for the special prerequisites for the Russian chemical weapons destruction program?

RUMSFELD: The administration either has or will be asking for that waiver authority with respect to the chemical weapon destruction program----

LEVIN: Do you support that request?

RUMSFELD: Indeed, I do.

LEVIN: Thank you. General, you support that, too?

MYERS: Yes sir.

LEVIN: Thank you very much.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. CORZINE). The Senator from Connecticut.

[Page: S7705]

Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to be added as a cosponsor to the amendment of the distinguished Senator.

Mr. LUGAR. I will be delighted.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I commend my colleague from Indiana and thank him and our former colleague, Senator Nunn, whom he has mentioned on several occasions during his remarks this evening. These two individuals have made a significant contribution to the improved environment in which the world finds itself today, with all of its problems. Had it not been for the efforts of Senator Nunn and Senator Lugar over the years, we would not find ourselves in the position we are today to significantly reduce the kinds of threats the Senator from Indiana just highlighted in his remarks.

I am confident this amendment will be overwhelmingly supported. It should be. My cosponsorship is not a gratuitous act, but I want to be identified with the substance of his remarks and, more importantly, the substance of this amendment.

We had some testimony this morning, in fact, before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in talking about Iraq. These are very fine hearings that the chairman of the committee, Senator Biden, and Senator Lugar have cosponsored to give us a wonderful opportunity to consider what options we have with regard to Iraq.

I do not want to dwell on that except to point out that Ambassador Butler this morning, when talking about various options and what we ought to consider and specifically talking about the issue of containment and whether we have exhausted the containment approach, questioned himself as to whether we had. But he said one thing we need to do, if anything at all, is to work more closely with Russia because they could play a very important role.

What the Senator from Indiana is doing, not only with this amendment in the short term, is creating at least the possibility of that cooperation which may be essential in the months and years ahead.

It is a staggering statistic. I do not know if my colleagues were listening carefully. Over the next 6 years, I presume working 5 or 6 days a week, 10- or 12-hour days--that is how long it will take to eliminate this incredible risk. The idea that we would be prohibited from doing so because we deny the President waiver authority because of an existing parliamentary situation or treaties that require some prior action I think would be a great missed opportunity.

I commend the Senator from Indiana immensely for his efforts in this regard, and I thank Senator Nunn as well for his previous work here and his continuing work. I wish to associate myself in this effort. This may be one of the most important things we will do in this bill, and I commend the Senator for offering the amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from Connecticut for his cosponsorship.

Cosponsoring this amendment are the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Mr. Biden; Mr. Domenici; Mr. Hagel; Mr. Graham; Mr. Levin, chairman of the Armed Services Committee; Mr. Dodd; and I am pleased to add my colleague from Arizona, Mr. McCain.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The Senator from Hawaii.

Mr. INOUYE. We are prepared to accept this amendment and take it to conference.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate on the amendment?

If not, the question is on agreeing to amendment No. 4435.

The amendment (No. 4435) was agreed to.

4B) Defense Appropriations Act of 2003 - Chem/Bio Amendments
AMENDMENT NO. 4403
Purpose: To make available from amounts available to the Navy for research, development, test, and evaluation $4,000,000 for Marine Corps program wide support (PE0605873M) for chemical and biological consequence management for continuing biological and chemical decontamination technology research for the United States Marine Corps Systems Command on a biological decontamination technology that uses electro-chemically activated solution (ECASOL)

On page 223, between lines 20 and 21, insert the following:

SEC. 8124. (a) Of the amount appropriated by title IV under the heading ``RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION, NAVY'', up to $4,000,000 may be available for Marine Corps program wide support for chemical and biological consequence management for continuing biological and chemical decontamination technology research for the United States Marine Corps Systems Command on a biological decontamination technology that uses electro-chemically activated solution (ECASOL).

(b) The amount available under subsection (a) for the program element and purpose set forth in that subsection is in addition to any other amounts available under this Act for that program element and purpose.

AMENDMENT NO. 4410
Purpose: To make available from amounts available for the Navy for research, development, test, and evaluation $8,00,000 for the Integrated Biological Warfare Technology Platform.

On page 223, between lines 20 and 21, insert the following:

SEC. 8124. Of the amount appropriated by title IV under the heading ``RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION, NAVY'', up to $8,000,000 may be available for the Integrated Biological Warfare Technology Platform.

AMENDMENT NO. 4425
Purpose: To make available from amounts available for the Navy for research, development, test, and evaluation $5,000,000 for the Integrated Chemical Biological Warfare Agent Detector Chip

On page 223, between lines 20 and 21, insert the following:

SEC. 8124. Of the amount appropriated by title IV under the heading ``RESEARCH,         DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION, NAVY'', up to $5,000,000 may be available for the Integrated Chemical Biological Warfare Agent Detector Chip.

4C) Global Pathogen Surveillance Act of 2002
Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the consideration of Calendar No. 388, S. 2487.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the bill by title.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

A bill (S. 2487) to provide for global pathogen surveillance and response.

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the bill.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I am extremely pleased that the Senate today is taking up S. 2487, the ``Global Pathogen Surveillance Act of 2002.'' This bill authorizes $150 million over the next two fiscal years to provide assistance to developing nations to improve global disease surveillance to help prevent and contain both biological weapons attacks and naturally occurring infectious disease outbreaks around the world.

This bill is the result of a joint effort by Senator Helms and I to act on key lessons learned during an important hearing the Foreign Relations Committee held last September on the

[Page: S8023]  GPO's PDF

threat of bioterrorism and emerging infectious diseases. I am also proud that Senators KENNEDY and FRIST, the Chairman and Ranking Member of the Public Health Subcommittee of the Senate Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee, are original cosponsors of this bill.

Senator Helms and I recognize all too well that biological weapons are a global threat with no respect for borders. A terrorist group could launch a biological weapons attack in Mexico in the expectation that the epidemic would quickly spread to the United States. A rogue state might experiment with new disease strains in another country, intending later to release them here. A biological weapons threat need not begin in the United States to reach our shores.

For that reason, our response to the biological weapons threat cannot be limited to the United States alone. Global disease surveillance, a systematic approach to tracking disease outbreaks as they occur and evolve around the world, is essential to any real international response.

This country is making enormous advances on the domestic front in bioterrorism defense. Mr. President, $3 billion has been appropriated for this purpose in FY 2002, including $1.1 billion to improve State and local public health infrastructure. Delaware's share will include $6.7 million from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to improve the public health infrastructure and $548,000 to improve hospital readiness in my State.

Earlier this year, the President signed into law a comprehensive bioterrorism bill drafted last fall following the anthrax attacks via the U.S. postal system. Those attacks, which killed five individuals and infected more than 20 people, highlighted our domestic vulnerabilities to a biological weapons attack. We need to further strengthen our nation's public health system, improve federal public health laboratories, and fund the necessary research and procurement for vaccines and treatments to respond better to future bioterrorist attacks. As an original cosponsor of the ``Kennedy-Frist'' bill in the Senate, I know the implementation of this new law will help achieve many of those objectives.

Nevertheless, any effective response to the challenge of biological weapons must also have an international component. Limiting our response to U.S. territory would be shortsighted and doomed to failure. A dangerous pathogen released on another continent can quickly spread to the United States in a matter of days, if not hours. This is the dark side of globalization. International trade, travel, and migration patterns offer unlimited opportunities for pathogens to spread across national borders and to move from one continent to another. Moreover, an overseas epidemic could give us our first warning of a new disease strain that was developed by a country or by terrorists for use as a biological weapon, or that could be used by others for that purpose.

How does disease surveillance fit into all of this? A biological weapons attack succeeds partly through the element of surprise. A cluster of flu-like symptoms in a city or region may be dismissed by individual physicians as just the flu when in fact it may be anthrax, plague, or another biological weapon. Armed with the knowledge,

however, that a biological weapons attack has in fact occurred, doctors and nurses can examine their patients in a different light and, in many cases, effectively treat infected individuals.

Disease surveillance, a comprehensive reporting system to quickly identify and communicate abnormal patterns of symptoms and illnesses, can quickly alert doctors across a region that a suspicious disease outbreak has occurred. Epidemiological specialists can then investigate and combat the outbreak. And if it is a new disease or strain, we can begin to develop treatments that much earlier.

A good surveillance system requires trained epidemiological personnel, adequate laboratory tools for quick diagnosis, and communications equipment to circulate information. Even in the United States today, many states and localities rely on old-fashioned pencil and paper methods of tracking disease patterns. Thankfully, we are addressing those domestic deficiencies through the new bioterrorism law and substantially increased appropriations.

For example, in Delaware, we are developing the first, comprehensive, state-wide electronic reporting system for infectious diseases. This system will be used as a prototype for other states, and will enable much earlier detection of infectious disease outbreaks, both natural and bioterrorist. My congressional colleagues from Delaware and I have been working for over 2 years to get this project up and running, and we were successful in obtaining $2.6 million in funding for this project over the past 2 years. I and my colleagues have requested $1.4 million for additional funding in FY 2003, and we are extremely optimistic that this funding will be forthcoming.

It is vitally important that we extend these initiatives into the international arena. However, as many developing countries are way behind us in terms of public health resources, laboratories, personnel, and communications, these countries will need help just to get to the starting point we have already reached in this country.

An effective disease surveillance system is beneficial even in the absence of biological weapons attacks. Bubonic plague is bubonic plague, whether it is deliberately engineered or naturally occurring. Just as disease surveillance can help contain a biological weapons attack, it can also help contain a naturally occurring outbreak of infectious disease. According to the World Health Organization, 30 new infectious diseases have emerged over the past 30 years; between 1996 and 2001 alone, more than 800 infectious disease outbreaks occurred around the world, on every continent. With better surveillance, we can do a better job of mitigating the consequences of these disease outbreaks.

According to a report by the National Intelligence Council, developing nations in Africa and Asia have established only rudimentary systems, if any at all, for disease surveillance, response, and prevention. The World Health Organization reports that more than sixty percent of laboratory equipment in developing countries is either outdated or nonfunctioning.

This lack of preparedness can lead to tragic results. In August 1994 in Surat, a city in western India, a surge of complaints on flea infestation and a growing rat population was followed by a cluster of reports on patients exhibiting the symptoms of pneumonic plague. However, authorities were unable to connect the dots until the plague had spread to seven states across India, ultimately killing 56 people and costing the Indian economy $600 million. Had the Indian authorities employed better surveillance tools, they may well have contained the epidemic, limited the loss of life, and surely avoided the panic that led to economically disastrous embargoes on trade and travel. An outbreak of pneumonic plague in India this February was detected more quickly and contained with only a few deaths--and no costly panic.

Developing nations are the weak links in any comprehensive global disease surveillance network. Unless we take action to shore up their capabilities to detect and contain disease outbreaks, we leave the entire world vulnerable to a deliberate biological weapons attack or a virulent natural epidemic.

It is for these reasons that Senator Helms and I have worked together to craft the Global Pathogen Surveillance Act of 2002. This bill authorizes $150 million in FY 2003 and FY 2004 to strengthen the disease surveillance capabilities of developing nations. First, the bill seeks to ensure in developing nations a greater number of personnel trained in basic epidemiological techniques. It offers enhanced in-country training for medical and laboratory personnel and the opportunity for select personnel to come to the United States to receive training in our Centers for Disease Control laboratories and Master of Public Health programs in American universities.

Second, the bill provides assistance to developing nations to acquire basic laboratory equipment, including items as mundane as microscopes, to facilitate the quick diagnosis of pathogens.

Third, the bill enables developing nations to obtain communications equipment and information technology to

[Page: S8024]  GPO's PDF

quickly transmit data on disease patterns and pathogen diagnoses, both inside a nation and to regional organizations and the WHO. Again, we are not talking about fancy high-tech equipment, but basics like fax machines and Internet-equipped computers.

Finally, the bill gives preference to countries that agree to let experts from the United States or international organizations promptly investigate any suspicious disease outbreaks.

If this bill becomes law, the Global Pathogen Surveillance Act of 2002 will go a long way in ensuring that developing nations acquire the basic disease surveillance capabilities to link up effectively with the WHO's global network. This bill offers an inexpensive and common sense solution to a problem of global proportions--the dual threat of biological weapons and naturally occurring infectious diseases. The funding authorized is only a tiny fraction of what we will spend domestically on bioterrorism defenses, but this investment will pay enormous dividends in terms of our national security.

In addition Senator Helms and I have introduced a managers' amendment, which I expect will be adopted. This amendment, drafted in response to specific suggestions by executive branch departments and agencies as well as nongovernmental organizations, addresses two important objectives.

First, it ensures that priority in the provision of assistance to developing countries under the authority of this bill will be given those nations which agree to provide early notification of disease outbreaks. In the past, too many nations have sought to limit the release of information on disease outbreaks out of fear for the likely impact on their trade and tourism. In today's world, where an epidemic could be the first signs of a biological weapons attack, that type of reticence by national governments is simply unacceptable.

The amendment also stipulates that priority in assistance under this bill be assigned to those countries which agree to share with the United States data collected through its pathogen suveillance networks. Our epidemiological experts at the Centers for Disease Control and other U.S. departments and agencies are among the best in the world in analyzing such data. We should strive to create an international framework where multilateral organizations, national governments, and even private groups can examine aggregrate data on disease characteristics and symptom reports to help detect emerging patterns and provide early warning on alarming developments. In short, the more information shared under pathogen surveillance, the better protected the world is against surprise bioterrorist attacks and rapid natural epidemics.

Second, the managers' amendment makes the necessary changes to take into account the need for the quick transmission of data collected through pathogen surveillance networks to appropriately respond to local conditions. In the United States and other advanced industrial nations, disease surveillance may well operate most efficiently through Internet-based communications. In some developing countries, however, the cost of introducing new Internet links and computer equipment may be prohibitive. In those cases, leveraging existing telephone-based networks may prove a more cost-effective method in quickly relaying information such as patient reports. Under certain conditions, mobile phones may even prove a reliable tool. The managers' amendment will provide for such flexibility.

In conclusion, the fundamental premise of the Global Pathogen Surveillance Act of 2002 is that we cannot leave the rest of the world to fend for itself in combating biological weapons and infectious diseases if we are to ensure America's security. Indeed, this bill can serve as a key contribution to strengthening our homeland security. I urge the Senate to pass S. 2487 and the related managers' amendment today.

• [Begin Insert]

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, the anthrax attacks against the Senate and the news media this past fall demanded that we recognize how vulnerable America is to bioterroism. The murderous and cowardly perpetrators of this terrorism must be brought to justice, but we must also prepare ourselves for other attacks in the future.

I am proud to have worked with Senator BIDEN in co-authoring the Global Pathogen Surveillance Act of 2002, S. 2487, and I am pleased that a bipartisan effort has led to its consideration today.

This bill recognizes that bioterrorism is a transnational threat and that the defense of the U.S. homeland is not an isolated activity. Rather, our homeland defense requires a comprehensive international strategy. A recent National Intelligence Estimate concluded that the prospect of a bioterrorist attack against U.S. civilian and military personnel will continue to grow as states and terrorist groups continue to acquire biological warfare capabilities. This same report warns that emerging and reemerging infectious diseases that originate overseas threaten Americans not only here in the United States, but also our military personnel stationed overseas participating in humanitarian and peacekeeping operations.

On September 5, 2001, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held a hearing on ``The Threat of Bioterrorism and the Spread of Infectious Diseases.'' The compelling testimony of several expert witnesses, along with the assessments of the intelligence community, prompted Senator BIDEN and I to undertake this important legislation with the goal of combating bioterrorism, and ultimately enhancing U.S. national security. In order to enhance U.S. efforts to combat bioterrorism, it is critical that we address the glaring gap that exists in the capabilities of developing countries to conduct pathogen surveillance and monitoring.

This legislation authorizes the President a total of $150 million dollars over the next 2 years to fund pathogen surveillance and response activities through the Department of State, in consultation with the Department of Health and Human Services and the Department of Defense. Several provisions are designed to address shortfalls in public health education and training, including short-term public health training courses in epidemiology for public health professionals from eligible developing countries. The President is authorized to provide assistance for the purchase and maintenance of public health laboratory and communications equipment. In addition, the heads of appropriate Federal agencies are authorized to make available a greater number of U.S. government public health personnel U.S. missions abroad, international health organizations, and regional health networks.

All of the provisions of S. 2487 are directed towards enabling developing countries to acquire basic disease surveillance and monitoring capabilities to effectively contribute to community, local, regional, and global surveillance networks.

In order to ensure that the United States has all of the requisite tools at its disposal to protect U.S. civilians and military personnel against intentional or naturally occurring disease outbreaks, priority for assistance under S. 2487 will be for countries that provide early notification of disease outbreaks and pathogen surveillance data to appropriate U.S. departments

and agencies. There is a critical need for transparency and information sharing of pathogen surveillance data so that the United States can utilize a comprehensive toolkit to combat bioterrorism. It is my expectation that developing countries receiving assistance under this Act will make a steadfast commitment to improving their pathogen surveillance and monitoring efforts.

I am particularly proud of the provisions of S. 2487 that address the glaring need for syndrome surveillance--the recording of symptoms (patient complaints) and signs (derived from physical examination) combined with simple geographic locators--to track the emergence of a disease in a population. Provisions on syndrome surveillance address the need to narrow the existing technology gap in syndrome surveillance capabilities and real-time information dissemination to public health officials. Current disease reporting is paper-based and ineffective in transmitting important information to public health officials in developing countries where one doctor often cares for hundreds of patients. Thus, S. 2487 authorizes the President to provide assistance to eligible developing countries to purchase simple computer technology, including touch-screens and low-speed Internet connections for use by physicians in health clinics.

[Page: S8025]  GPO's PDF

Let me close with the astute words of Dr. Alan P. Zelicoff, Senior Scientist, Sandia National Laboratory, as stated during his testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee in a March 2002, on the threat posed by chemical and biological weapons. Dr. Zelicoff has spent a considerable amount of his distinguished career developing technology and solutions to assist the medical and public health communities identify natural and deliberate disease outbreaks. According to Dr. Zelicoff,

When all is said and done, should would-be perpetrators of bioterror know that the effects of their attack would be blunted if not eliminated, they might well re-think their strategy in the first place. A multi-national cadre of clinicians and nurses, exchanging up-to-the-minute information is our single best defense, and we have the resource--now--to so equip them. All that is required is a policy shift emphasizing and strengthening this lynchpin capability.

While we are supportive of the public health benefits of this Act, we should not lose sight of the intent of this legislation--to combat bioterrorism and enhance U.S. national security. I look forward to working with the Bush administration and members of Congress to secure funding for these invaluable activities directed towards global pathogen surveillance and monitoring.

Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Biden amendment at the desk be agreed to; that the bill, as amended, be read a third time and passed; that the motion to reconsider be laid upon the table; and that any statement relating to the bill be printed in the RECORD.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The amendment (No. 4468) was agreed to, as follows:

AMENDMENT NO. 4468

On page 3, line 1, insert ``, including data sharing with appropriate United States departments and agencies,'' after ``countries''.

On page 5, strike lines 9 through 14, and insert the following:

(1) To enhance the capability and cooperation of the international community, including the World Health Organization and individual countries, through enhanced pathogen surveillance and appropriate data sharing, to detect, identify, and contain infectious disease outbreaks, whether the cause of those outbreaks is intentional human action or natural in origin.

On page 5, line 17, insert ``, and other electronic'' after ``Internet-based''.

On page 6, line 5, strike ``including'' and all that follows through ``mechanisms,'' on line 7, and insert the following: ``including, as appropriate, relevant computer equipment, Internet connectivity mechanisms, and telephone-based applications,''.

On page 9, line 15, insert before the period the following: ``, provide early notification of disease outbreaks, and provide pathogen surveillance data to appropriate United States departments and agencies''.

On page 17, line 12, insert ``(and information technology)'' after ``Equipment''.

The bill (S. 2487), as amended, was read the third time and passed.

(The bill will be printed in a future edition of the RECORD.)

4D) Defense Appropriations Act of 2003 - Chem/Bio Defense Inititatives
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I rise today to discuss the very important issue of chemical and biological research. The threat of a chemical and biological attack is no longer an emerging threat: it is very real, and it affects not only our nation, but our allies as well. The risks associated with chemical and biological weapons are growing, and our capacity to assess, counter, and deter these threats needs to be addressed. That is why it is critical to see continued investments made in diagnostic tools for biowarfare-inflicted agents, chemical and biological detection devices, and sensors to ensure the safety of food and water supply.

Mr. STEVENS. I agree with the distinguished Senator from Maine that this research area needs a robust investment to ensure that promising technologies are not only explored, but that the technologies are transitioned to the field and operationally deployed.

Ms. COLLINS. I thank the distinguished Ranking Member for his leadership on Defense issues. And I am very pleased to see that the Defense Appropriations bill places a high priority on addressing the chemical and biological weapons threat that we face and provides additional funding beyond the President's request for a number of high priority research programs.

As the Senator knows, I have been actively supporting vigorous research efforts in this area since my first days in the Senate because the threat from these weapons is serious and it is growing day by day. I am pleased to see that the Committee is recommending to the Senate that a chem-bio defense initiatives fund be established with an initial funding increment of $25 million. The Committee has listed a number of technology initiatives for consideration, but is providing the Secretary of Defense with the discretion to allocate the funds.

It seems logical to ensure that the most promising, maturing technologies are seen through to their completion, particularly if the technology shows a high potential to yield benefits in defending our troops, Nation, and our global interests. Is it the Committee's intent to ensure that such on-going programs that are nearing completion receive a priority for consideration of these funds?

Mr. STEVENS. The Senator from Maine is correct that this fund has been established for the distinct purpose of improving our military's ability to respond to chemical and biological warfare threats. It is the intent of this committee to see that the funds provided are wisely spent. I would say to the Senator from Maine that a program that has been supported by this committee in the past and is nearing completion should be appropriately considered for funding to ensure that the technologies are funded to completion, provided the technologies will enhance our ability to protect or deter a chemical and biological attack. To withhold funding for a promising, multi-year program just as it is achieving documented results would, in my view, be wasteful.

Ms. COLLINS. I thank the Senator for his illuminating words. If the distinguished ranking member would indulge me further, I would like to call to his attention a research initiative regarding food safety and security that is on the Committee's list of projects eligible for funding. This initiative is one that holds great potential to protect our military from a chemical or biological threat. Does the Senator from Alaska share my view that this kind of a program ought to be a priority for the chemical and biological defense initiative fund?

Mr. STEVENS. I believe that threats to the food supply are very serious and they need to be addressed both in terms of protecting our deployed troops and also in terms of homeland security. We need to find a way to ensure that the food supply for our deployed troops is safe, just as we need to protect America's food supply. I definitely support a research initiative in this area.

Ms. COLLINS. Again, I thank the ranking member for his forthrightness, his knowledge and his determination to keep America strong. I also thank him for his continued leadership on defense and defense related issues. I believe that the Appropriations Committee deserves the thanks of the American people for the leadership the committee has shown in defending our nation from the threat of chemical and biological weapons. The chairman and ranking member are dedicated to America's defense and the committee staff have done outstanding work on this bill.

4E) Defense Appropriations Act of 2003 - Rapid Response Sensor Networking
Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. Chairman, I rise with my colleague from Florida, Senator NELSON, to engage in a colloquy with Senator INOUYE, the Chairman of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee.

Senator NELSON and I rise to note the critical importance of the Rapid Response Sensor Networking for Multiple Applications. The project will bring together the new concept of Impromptu Wireless Network Technology and emerging new sensors for use in detection and quantification of high priority biological and chemical materials in several nationally important settings--most significantly, for real time detection and response to biological and chemical materials which threaten public health and safety, environmental integrity or industrial processes. I yield to Senator NELSON for a few words about this important program.

Mr. NELSON. I thank the Senator for yielding. New sensors are being developed at the University of North Florida which use polymer membrane and dye combinations to create analytical sensors based on photo induced charge movements. These sensors can be combined into relatively inexpensive easily produced families of sensors which will be able to respond to a range of targeted analytes appropriate to a particular area of risk or interest. This makes possible and readily usable real time field-based sample preparation and analysis--it will process data and deliver it via wireless communication to create real time models of sensor responses and measurements which are combined in GIS applications and other decision making tools to enable real time highly effective responses. The applications of this approach are highly varied, and include: a wide range of environmental monitoring strategies; early warning applications to protect food, water, and other systems from bioterrorism attacks; and monitoring of industrial processes.

Mr. GRAHAM. Yes, Senator NELSON that is correct. The University of North Florida has requested $750,000 for this important, new project and I request conference report language to identify this program to be eligible for funding from the Chem-Bio Defense Initiatives Fund.

Mr. INOUYE. I appreciate hearing about both Senators support of this program. I will review your request and will work to include language in the conference report.

Return to the Congressional Report Weekly.