Congressional Record Weekly Update

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1A) The Case Against Saddam Has Been Made
Mr. WILSON of South Carolina. Mr. Speaker, I am a newcomer to Congress. I have been here only 8 months. I also have the distinction of being the only Member who is a member of the National Guard still drilling. At this time I have had, of course, my first August recess.

During the August recess, the issue that came up the most was the issue already discussed, and that is the danger of Iraq. We now have a bloodthirsty dictator who has access to chemical, nuclear , and biological weapons; he has the ability with ballistic missiles to send them against American allies and against American troops that are stationed throughout the Middle East.

Mr. Speaker, I believe that we should put our faith in the President, the intelligence agencies that we have, the wonderful military that we have, and the civilian military officials that we have before us. We need to understand there was a vote on September 14, 2001, right here in Congress, almost unanimously, to provide for military action against those who harbor or support terrorists, and the intent of that was to stop future terrorist attacks on the United States.

America has been attacked, and we are under threat. This is not a speculation as to the future; it has occurred. It will occur again if we do not take action to defend our civilian citizens.

1B) Success at Vinca
Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I rise to remind my colleagues that an important milestone in our progress toward reducing the risks of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction took place about 2 weeks ago.

   Events like September 11 would have been far worse if terrorists had access to weapons of mass destruction. Since September 11, appreciation of this threat has increased dramatically. Many of us have spoken on the need to rein in the forces of international terrorism and any possibility that they may gain the use of such weapons.

   The milestone to which I refer is the successful removal of enough weapons-grade uranium from the Vinca Institute of Nuclear Sciences near Belgrade, Yugoslavia to make more than two nuclear bombs. This removal was accomplished through coordination among government and private groups, including contributions from Yugoslavia and Russia, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the Nuclear Threat Initiative.

   I especially salute the contributions made by the Nuclear Threat Initiative, headed by Ted Turner and our former colleague Senator Sam Nunn. This episode represents another critical effort from the NTI. I'm very honored to serve on the Board of the NTI, along with Senator LUGAR. There will always be aspects of international efforts that are difficult to handle through government channels, where the private resources of the NTL may be vital.

   But even as we congratulate ourselves over this victory, we need to recognize that it is very small in the overall scale of the problem. Estimates are that weapons-grade uranium exists at over 350 sites in over 50 countries. Some of these have very small quantities, but many of these locations have enough material for one or more bombs. Some of these sites include research reactors, provided by either the United States or the Soviet Union, fueled by highly enriched uranium which could be diverted for weapons use.

   And we also need to examine why it required such complex coordination to accomplish this work and explore how Congress can simplify the process in the future. This part of the puzzle has a much simpler solution, because the tools to accomplish this are now part of the Senate-House conference on the Armed Services authorizing legislation.

   Let me briefly explain why the Vinca operation required so much coordination. The Yugoslavian government very logically required that any Vinca solution address both fresh fuel and spent fuel from their research reactor. The fresh fuel was highly enriched uranium, and our government was able to assist because it represented a proliferation threat for weapons of mass destruction. That cooperation is authorized through the 1991 Nunn-Lugar and the 1996 Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Legislation.

   But the spent fuel at Vinca, which is not useful for making a nuclear weapon, could pose both an environmental concern as well as a dirty bomb threat, depending on its level of radioactivity. The former represents work that is clearly beyond the authorization of our Government's nonproliferation mission and the latter represents work that is not authorized.

   Now since September 11, there have been volumes of testimony on the threat posed by highly radioactive materials and their potential use as dirty bombs. But today, despite these concerns, there are no statutes which address the government's authority to offer help to other countries regarding dirty bomb threats.

   I am pleased to note that the Domenici-Biden amendment to the Senate Armed Services legislation provides authorizations to enlarge the ability of the government to step into such situations. With final passage of that amendment in the Armed Services legislation, we can provide important new tools to our government.

   Under that amendment, programs to address dirty bomb issues are specifically authorized, including assistance to any country requesting our aid. And of equal importance, programs to broaden our ability to address fissile material issues around the world, not just associated with the former Soviet Union, are authorized along with new approaches to speed up the conversion of highly enriched uranium to material unusable for weapons.

   Even with this amendment, I am sure there will be many opportunities for private groups, like the NTI, to step in and plug gaps in Government programs. But with this amendment, we will vastly simplify future operations at the hundreds of remaining sites.

   The Domenici-Biden amendment enjoyed broad support in the Senate, and I appreciate that Senators LUGAR, LANDRIEU, HAGEL, CARNAHAN, MURKOWSKI, BINGAMAN, and LINCOLN joined us in introducing it.

   It is my hope that the success at Vinca, along with the sobering realization that we need to repeat this success hundreds of times to fully address the threat of proliferation of materials suitable for nuclear bombs, will encourage the Conferees from both the House and the Senate to ensure that provisions of the Domenici-Biden amendment are in the Armed Services authorization bill that will eventually emerge from Conference.

1C) Letter to President Bush Regarding Iraq
Mr. Speaker, I, too, just returned from a month in my district, and spent a good deal of time traveling the district and talking with my constituents. I have a district that in fact voted in the majority for George Bush, and yet, I found, widely traveling my district, talking to diverse groups of constituents, a lot more questions than certainty about the President's position on Iraq. In fact, there is a great deal of misgiving in my district, as I believe there is abroad in the land.

   The gentleman who preceded me made an eloquent case on a number of points, and I will not repeat those but I will emphasize a few others.

   I am today sending a letter, along with 17 other Members of Congress, to the President. We are pleased that the President has now recognized the constitutional authority of the Congress to declare war and about the fact that he will come to Congress for approval for a war against Iraq.

   At this point, I would venture and hope that Congress would not be willing to grant such approval to the President, given the lack of specificity and the many questions that need to be answered.

   Among the questions that need to be answered are the following:

   What is the threat posed by Saddam Hussein to the United States? UNSCOM said they destroyed 90 to 95 percent of their weapons of mass destruction. Is there convincing evidence of renewed production of chemical and biological weapons? Is there evidence that Iraq has successfully produced a nuclear weapon? Is there evidence Iraq has produced a reliable delivery system for weapons of mass destruction?

   Are there new developments that mean Iraq poses an imminent threat to the United States, and therefore requires immediate attention? A year ago, the administration did not seem to think that. What has changed in that intervening time? If not, would a policy of enforcing no-fly zones, vigorous weapons inspections, military sanctions be effective in containing and/or reducing the perceived threat, given the success of such strategies over the last decade?

   Is there any convincing evidence that Iraq planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, or harbored such organizations or persons? That would give some authority to act without a specific grant from Congress, but the administration has not made that case.

   Is there convincing evidence that Iraq has shared its knowledge of biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons, or the weapons themselves, with other nations or terrorist organizations? How does the threat of Iraq doing so compare with the threat posed by Iran, Pakistan, China, North Korea, or a number of other nations that are known to possess weapons of mass destruction, some of whom are known to be sharing and selling such information?

   How does the administration intend to assure Iraq does not become balkanized? This was the problem that was confronted by Colin Powell and the father of President Bush when they decided not to go to Baghdad, as they said at the time.

   Will Iraq become balkanized? If it does, what happens with Turkey? What happens with the Kurds wanting their own nation? What happens with the Shi'as in Iran? What happens with the long-term prospects for the governance of Iraq itself?

   I witnessed a Republican Senator saying we were going to rule Iraq. The United States of America is going to rule Iraq alone, without allies? Has anybody really thought about what that would mean?

   What are the potential disruptions to the United States economy? We have some problems here at home. I have a lot of unemployed people in my district, the highest unemployment rate in the Nation in my State.

   What are the potential economic disruptions that might come from a war with Iraq? Would it lead to a disruption of oil supplies? Would it drive up the price of oil dramatically, as it did in the last Gulf War? How much would such a war cost the United States of America and its taxpayers? What are the risks to our troops? What are the risks in terms of a long-term occupation?

   We have not yet resolved the situation or stabilized the situation in Afghanistan, which is a country that had no discernible military, no weapons of mass destruction. They did harbor terrorists. It was a rogue regime. But yet, the United States of America, with a substantial number of allies around the world, has yet to bring settled conditions to that country. Yet, we are about to depart for a much larger nation who has not been involved, as far as has been revealed to Congress or the people of the United States, in the attacks upon our country, has not posed a credible threat to the United States or our allies. However, we are off on another adventure.

   Is this left-over business from George Bush's father's administration? It seems like a number of the most hawkish people in his administration are people who served in his father's administration, who still regret the fact that they did not pursue the war to an end then, and they want to revisit the issue.

   Many questions need to be answered before this Congress should extend authority to the President to wage a war against Iraq, the first preemptive war in the history of the United States of America.

1D) Support for Force in Iraq
Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, as we contemplate military action against Iraq, I wish to bring to the attention of my colleagues the rationalization, in the opinion of the junior Senator from Alaska, of the circumstances surrounding the risk to allow Saddam Hussein to continue to develop weapons of mass destruction. It is no secret that over an extended period of time, Saddam Hussein and Iraq have been developing this capability. It not only includes chemical weapons and biological weapons, but a delivery system. Clearly, we have seen as a consequence of the Persian Gulf war the capability of a delivery system reaching Israel. In addition to that, we have every reason to believe he is developing his nuclear capability.

   The question to which we have to relate is, of course, the obligation as to how to thwart this exposure from the standpoint of the United States' role as not only the peacekeeper of the world but the recognition that if the United States does not do it, it probably will not be done.

   I bring that reference up to simply highlight a comparison. Had we known in advance of 9/11 the contemplated exposure--not only to the United States, but the peace of the world, as we knew the world prior to that time and the recognition that a number of aircraft was going to be used as weapons and the consequences associated with the aircraft that went into the World Trade Center in New York, the Pentagon, and, of course, the exposure in Washington and other areas of the United States associated with the activities at that time--we would have taken some action, Mr. President.

   There is no question about it because we knew the ramifications of not taking such action.

   What I am saying is we have a dilemma in the sense of a recognized concentration of weapons of mass destruction being controlled by an individual who is not only uncontrollable but one who has, over an extended period of time, initiated actions such as we have seen during the Persian Gulf war where he saw fit to invade Kuwait with the intention of going into Saudi Arabia with the objective of controlling the wealth of the oil provinces of that part of the world. That was his objective, make no mistake about it.

   If he could have prevailed in Kuwait and gone into Saudi Arabia, he would have controlled a good portion of Mideast oil and, hence, the wealth and cashflows of the area.

   The consequences of that, as we see Saddam Hussein again amassing this threat as a consequence of his development of weapons of mass destruction, brings us to the evaluation of what action we should take. Is it inevitable that sooner or later Saddam Hussein will use these weapons of mass destruction, and against whom?

   We have had an opportunity to observe a pattern of Saddam Hussein in the time since the Persian Gulf war. If one can perhaps simplify it, we have initiated a no-fly zone over Iraq since about 1992. In initiating that no-fly zone, we have taken out some of his targets. He has attempted to shoot some of our aircraft down that are patrolling the area.

   There is another inconsistency that stands out even more openly, and that is the realization that during this time we have been buying oil from Saddam Hussein, hundreds of thousands of barrels a day. In September of 2001, we set a record by importing nearly 1.2 million barrels of oil per day from Saddam.

   It is almost as if we would take his oil, put it in our airplanes, and go take out his targets. That is rather ironic. I think it is rather inconsistent, and it shows certainly an inconsistency in our foreign policy.

   What does he do with the money he receives from the United States? Why, he takes care of his Republican Guard, the group that keeps him alive, and develops more weapons of mass destruction and perhaps aims them at our ally Israel. Maybe that is an oversimplification of foreign policy. Nevertheless, that is what has been going on over a period of time. So we have become, to some extent, perhaps a partner because we are providing Saddam Hussein indirectly, through the purchase of his oil, with a cashflow that allows him to develop his weapons of mass destruction.

   Others might say that is inconsistent logic because someone else would buy his oil if the United States did not. I am not going to pursue that, other than to state a fact: We are buying hundreds of thousands of barrels of oil from Saddam Hussein. He is developing weapons of mass destruction. Where does he get the money? A portion of it comes from oil sales to the United States.

   So as we contemplate our decision on initiating an action against Saddam Hussein, we have to look back to the circumstances surrounding 9/11 where, had we known that the threat was what it turned out to be, we would have initiated an action. We did not know. We did not initiate an action.

   We can criticize our security. We can criticize the CIA and the other intelligence agencies for inadequate information. Nevertheless, the fact remains, we did not know. Had we known, we would have taken action.

   In the case of Saddam Hussein, clearly we know he is

   developing weapons of mass destruction. So the point is, should we take action? If we do not, who will? What is the actual threat? We do not know, but it is clearly a choice. We are giving Saddam Hussein a choice of either surrender--in other words, open up your country to the U.N. inspectors--or be prepared for the ultimate alternative, and that is basically to be subjected to a conflict that could go on for some time.

   I see my good friend, the senior Senator from West Virginia, is seeking recognition. I will conclude with one reference: That we need to consider again the obligation that the energy conferees have. The conference is in order. The issues are being discussed. There is an issue, and it is the issue of opening up ANWR that is within the authority of the conference to bring back to the Senate for action. As the President well knows, the House has included ANWR in its bill and the issue is before the conference.

   At a time when we are contemplating an action against Saddam Hussein, which certainly would result in an upheaval in the Mideast, it is imperative each Member recognize his or her obligation to address this with some finality. It simply makes sense to authorize the opening of this area so we can reduce our dependence on Mideast oil, particularly the sources we currently get our oil from, including Iraq and Saddam Hussein.

   There is going to be an invitation by the conference to invite Members to ANWR, to Kaktovik, on September 13. Members should avail themselves of the opportunity to see for themselves that it could be opened up safely.

   I yield the floor.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia.

   Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from Alaska for his comments. There will come a time when the Senate should debate this question.

   I compliment the distinguished Senator from Alaska on his concerns with respect to Saddam Hussein. I believe he said we have every reason to believe Saddam Hussein has developed a nuclear capability. I hope I am not misquoting the Senator.

   In the days ahead, we will want to know what the evidence is. I do not intend to get into any long debate at this point about the matter because we have a bill before us with a pending amendment. We need to get on with that, but no Senator is seeking recognition at this point.

   Perhaps Saddam Hussein has developed such a nuclear capability. When the able Senator says we have every reason to believe he has, that is not quite the point. Where is the evidence?

   Of course, it is to be expected that some people in this country will assign unpatriotic reasons for the asking of questions by Senators. We have a right to ask questions, we have a duty to ask questions, because we are living in a very perilous time.

   The war drums are beating all around us. I want to listen to what is said. I want to listen to what the President has to say. I want to listen to what he is going to say at the United Nations. I hope the United Nations will respond. I am not saying we in the Congress have to have authorization by the United Nations. Authorization is contained right here in this little book I hold in my hand, the Constitution of the United States. This Congress has the power to declare war.

   I, for one, am not going to hang my vote on an authorization by the U.N. for us in this Congress to do thus and so. We should know what the United Nations has to say. I think the United Nations should take a position. If the straits are as dire as we hear, then the United Nations ought to be concerned. And the United Nations ought to give the world the benefit of its opinion. I am glad the President is going to the United Nations.

   I am breaking our own rules here. I ask unanimous consent, although the Pastore rule may not have run its course, I may speak on a different subject.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

   Mr. BYRD. The United Nations, I think, has a duty to let the world know where it stands and what its opinion is. If this country is going to eventually go into a difficult situation, as may confront us, if war is declared by this legislative branch, or if war is approved, authorized, by this legislative branch, then we in the United States should not have to go it alone.

   But when we say we have every right to believe that Saddam Hussein has developednuclear capability, well, we have every right in our minds to think perhaps he has, and we can easily convince ourselves, but is that enough? Where is the evidence?

   I, for one, intend to ask questions as we go along. It is not unpatriotic to ask questions. I intend to ask questions. I have a right to ask questions. Where is the evidence? We might think about that as we go along.

1E) More Questions than Answers on War with Iraq
Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Madam President, I rise today to express my growing concern that we may shortly be faced with a decision to unilaterally invade another nation-state, and that is the State of Iraq. This concern has been heightened by the news of today's assassination attempt of Afghan President Hamid Karzai in Kandahar. Earlier on, a car bomb exploded in central Kabul, killing at least 22 people.

   This event, in my view, underscores the point that our primary focus must remain on our immediate war on terrorism being waged in troubled Afghanistan, where our soldiers are on the front line. As a matter of fact, preliminary reports indicate it was Americans who took down the attempted assassins.

   While I welcome President Bush's recent statement indicating he will seek congressional approval of such a use of force, I believe any action in Iraq at this time, without allied support, without United Nations support, and without a compelling case for just cause, would be both morally wrong and politically mistaken.

   I just returned from a trip to Europe. As part of my role as chairman of the Appropriations Subcommittee on Military Construction, I toured U.S. military bases and met with a variety of individuals. They included members of the intelligence community, the military, and the International Atomic Energy Agency.

   I was shocked at how dramatically perceptions in Europe have shifted since September 11 toward our country. All of the sympathy and concern we received in the wake of the terrorist attacks has apparently vanished, replaced by the sense that the United States is becoming an arrogant and aggressive power, a nation that simply gives orders, a nation that neither listens nor hears.

   When I was in Europe, much attention was given to the absence of Presidential participation at the Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg. And this, on top of our rejection of the Kyoto treaty, our casting of aspersions on international accords such as the International Criminal Court, the Anti-Ballistic Missile and Landmine treaties, has led to a growing belief, right or wrong, that the United States is using its power in an increasingly unilateral and somewhat arrogant manner.

   Above all, there is our approach to Iraq and our perceived readiness to invade that nation unilaterally.

   I believe we have to ask many critical questions, most of which are unanswered.

   Questions about the ongoing war on terrorism. How do we stay the course, root out terrorism and, at the same time, initiate war with a nation-state which, to this day, remains unconnected to 9/11.

   Questions about the extent of Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction and about who will get to them first.

   Questions about going it alone in Iraq.

   Questions about casualties and cost.

   Questions about collateral human damage--civilians killed in the short term and in the long run.

   Questions about the future of Iraq, about whether we can honestly expect a democracy to be created out of a nation consumed by tribal factionalism.

   And questions about what the long-term impact might be on the Arab world, on the Middle East. What if Iraq attacks Israel? What will we do, and what will the world do?

   Present United States policy toward Iraq stands in stark

   contrast to how we conducted Operation Desert Storm just over a decade ago. Then, the first Bush administration spent several months building a broad-based coalition that included 30 nations, including many in the Islamic world. It sought and received resolutions supporting the use of force against Iraq from the United States Congress and the United Nations Security Council, and American and international public opinion stood firmly behind such action. Today, no nation is firmly allied with the United States on this issue.

   At the very least, I believe we should launch a major diplomatic effort with the United Nations, our allies, and our Arab friends, with the goal of delivering an ultimatum to Saddam Hussein: Either open up or go down.

   If he does not comply with this demand, it will give the United States added moral and diplomatic strength to any future effort. It will help unite the world community behind us.

   Additionally, I am very concerned that the United States stay the course on our war against terrorism. To date, there is no direct connection between Saddam Hussein's Iraq and the 9/11 attacks that has been substantiated.

   This means staying the course in our war against terrorism, part of which exists in Afghanistan. The government of Hamid Karzai is fragile at best. Today should show that. During its first 6 months in power, two Cabinet officials have been assassinated. Today, President Karzai himself barely escaped an assassination attempt, and a major act of terrorism has killed many in central Kabul. The Karzai government must have security and stability, or it will perish and so will democracy.

   Additionally, we know the Taliban and al-Qaida lurk in the remote mountains, waiting for an opportune moment to come back. If Afghanistan cannot be stabilized, if its streets and homes cannot be made secure, and if its first democratic government cannot survive, this will be a very serious setback.

   Afghanistan is our beachhead in the war on terror. We cannot lose it, or we lose the war on terror. We must put al-Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah, and a host of other terrorist groups out of business before they can strike out again at America and our interests.

   That is why concentrating on this war--the critical war against terrorism--is so important.

   An attack on Iraq at this time would only deflect from this war, by diverting attention and forces away from bringing to justice the perpetrators of 9/11. Can we afford to do this?

   If there is an imminent threat to the United States or to our interests, then we must act. At this moment, however, I do not believe such a threat exists. No one doubts that Iraq has chemical or biological weapons and the means to deliver them. They have used them on at least three occasions, but they have not used them in the last 10 years, and I believe they know what will happen if they do use them.

   What is less clear, however, is the status of Iraq's nuclear weapons capability. In 1981, Israel destroyed the Osiraq reactor provided by France. While Iraq continues to seek to develop nuclear capability, there is no evidence I have found that Iraq is nuclear capable today. So there is no imminent threat.

   Secretary Rumsfeld has claimed that if we wait for Iraq to develop nuclear weapons, then it will be too late. He is right. The key is to find a way to stop Iraqi nuclear ambition, and stop it now, which is why opening Iraq's borders to a search and destroy mission for weapons of mass destruction, conducted by our allies, our friends in the Arab world, and the United Nations, is critical.

   I believe this requires renewed diplomatic efforts on our part, with the United Nations, with our allies, and with friendly Arab nations. We must stop Iraq from becoming nuclear capable. And the world in turn must respond. Otherwise, an attack becomes the only alternative.

   As Gen. Wesley Clark recently stated:

   In the war on terrorism, alliances are not an obstacle to victory. They're the key to it.

   By acting unilaterally, the United States not only runs the risk of isolating these long-standing allies, but also of solidifying the entire Arab world sharply against us. This may not result in any direct or traditional military response against the United States, but what about a personal jihad throughout this country--a jihad of bombs and other terrorist acts carried out throughout the world?

   There are people out there eminently capable and able to finance doing just that.

   With the Israeli-Palestinian conflict not yet under control, a United States attack on Iraq would certainly fuel the fire of Islamic fanaticism, uniting the Arab world against the West and Israel. The consequences could be unprecedented and beyond our present comprehension.

   The Israeli-Palestinian situation should be our highest priority. This conflict must be resolved. The United States must use its influence and leadership here, with the Israelis, the Palestinians, and the surrounding Arab world. Here, too, we must stay the course.

   At the same time, there is some troubling evidence today of the preparation of a second front in southern Lebanon to attack Israel in the event we attack Iraq. Ambassador Dennis Ross recently told me of thousands--he mentioned 10,000--extended-range Katyusha rockets that have been moved through Syria from Iran and into southern Lebanon, for an attack on Israel. He said they had been extended so that they could hit at the major Israeli industrial zone north of Haifa. I believe this has been confirmed.

   In the face of all of this, assume we do attack Iraq. Consider that we mobilize 250,000 to 300,000 soldiers, our aircraft carriers, our B-52s, our 117s. This will not be

   another Desert Storm where exposed Iraqi troops are routed in the open desert, overwhelmed by American airpower.

   This war will be waged in Baghdad, in Tikrit, and in other cities. It will be waged from house to house and palace to palace, from street to street and school to school and hospital to hospital.

   We will certainly kill many Iraqis, and how many of our own will be killed? And will we stay the course once the body bags start coming back to Dover? Will Americans stand up and say, ``More''? I think not.

   Then there are the thousands of innocent Iraqi civilians civilians already brutalized by the last 12 years--who will become casualties in this war.

   America has never been an aggressor nation unless attacked, as we were at Pearl Harbor and on September 11, or our interests and our allies were attacked. We have never initiated a major invasion against another nation-state, which leads to the question of whether a preemptive war is the morally right, legally right, or the politically right way for the United States to proceed.

   Lastly, there is the immensely complicated question of the Iraqi nation Saddam Hussein now has and what will happen if he is overthrown. Have we really thought out our options here? Have we taken into account the deep tribal factionalism and divisions, the bitter and often bloody rivalries among the Shia majority, the ruling Sunni minority, and the Kurds, that lie at the very root of Iraq? Will we protect the Kurds from possible genocide? How long will we stay to secure a new government? And who would replace Saddam Hussein?

   Let's be realistic. A democracy is not likely to emerge. One must look closely at the history of Iraq to draw such a conclusion, and I have.

   Madam President, I would like to quote from the recently published book, ``The Reckoning: Iraq and the Legacy of Saddam Hussein'' by Sandra Mackey. She writes:

   When [Saddam Hussein] finally loses his grip on power either politically or physically, he will leave Iraq much as it was when the British created it--torn by tribalism and uncertain in its identity. It is this Iraq that threatens to inflict its communal grievances, its decades of non-cooperation, and its festering suspicions and entrenched hatreds on the Persian Gulf, the lifeline of our global economy.

   In light of such conditions, is the United States ready to be an occupational force? It could take many years for the seeds of a stable pluralist society to flourish in Iraq. Are we really ready to spend a generation there?

   Given what is at stake here--American lives, American prestige, and America's respect for the rule of law--we find ourselves at a critical crossroad.

   Again, according to Sandra Mackey:

   ..... the time is fast approaching when the United States, for a series of perilous reasons, will be forced to look beyond Hussein to Iraq itself. That is when all Americans will pay the price for what has been a long night of ignorance about the land between the rivers.

   In closing, I am very happy to see that President Bush will now seek congressional approval regarding military action. So this debate has just begun.

   I look forward to working with my colleagues in the Congress to ensure we not only ask the questions but see that the answers are moral, see that they are legal, see that they are befitting the greatest democracy on Earth, and see whether they are worth, for the first time, the United States of America making a unilateral attack on another nation-state.

   I yield the floor, and I suggest the absence of a quorum.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Edwards.) The clerk will call the roll.

   The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

   Mrs. CARNAHAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

1F) The Menace of Iraq
Mr. SPECTER. Madam President, I have sought recognition to discuss the present grave concern in the United States, and for that matter, around the world, about the menace posed by Saddam Hussein and Iraq.

   I am pleased to note that the President has announced his intention to come to Congress to seek authorization before there is any military action taken by the United States as to Iraq. Senator Harkin and I had introduced a resolution back in July asking that congressional authority be obtained before any military action. The President, as Commander in Chief, under the Constitution certainly has the authority to act in times of emergency. When there is time for discussion, deliberation, debate, and decision, then under the Constitution, it is the authority of the Congress to act.

   The events are moving very fast. There have been briefings of Members of the Congress by the Administration and there is a great concern, which I have personally noted in my State, Pennsylvania, on a series of town meetings across the State. Everywhere I traveled there was concern as to what action would be taken as to Iraq.

   There was no doubt that the United States has learned a very bitter lesson from 9/11; we should have taken preemptive action against Osama bin Laden and al-Qaida. We had evidence against civilians in Mogadishu in 1993, and embassy bombings in 1993. In all of those events, bin Laden was under indictment. We knew about his involvement in the USS Cole and his proclamation for a worldwide jihad; preemptive action should have been taken.

   Taking preemptive action against a nation-state would be a change in policy for the United States. It is my view that we ought to exhaust every alternative before turning to that alternative--economic sanctions, inspections, diplomacy.

   We have seen a number of people very close to President Bush and to the first President Bush, come out and caution against action. We have seen General Brent Scowcroft, the national security adviser to President George Herbert Walker Bush, come out and raise a great many concerns about taking action without support from our allies. We have seen former Secretary of State James Baker raise an issue about going to the United Nations for inspections, which I think is a very sound point.

   It is my hope that President Bush will go to the United Nations and will press to have inspections of Iraq proceed. The obligation for Iraq to submit to those inspections is an obligation which runs to the United Nations. Iraq's commitments to the UN have been flouted.

   Former Secretary of State Baker makes the cogent suggestion that the United Nations ought to be called upon to take military action to enforce those inspection rights, if Saddam Hussein does not acquiesce.

   Certainly, if Saddam Hussein continues to stiff the UN, to thumb his nose at the UN, and thumb his nose at the international community, then there will be a stronger basis for the United States to act, if we decide that our national interests compel us to do so.

   There is an obvious difficulty in communicating to the American people all that President Bush and the intelligence agencies know about the threat posed by Iraq and posed by Saddam Hussein. There is a problem, as we have seen from our experience, in telling the Congress, even in closed session, even in top secret briefings, where that information, regrettably, is disclosed to the press. Leaks in Washington are epidemic. However, if the Congress is to discharge its duty to pass on the question of what is tantamount to a declaration of war, a resolution authorizing the use of force, we have to know the basis on which we are acting.

   There have been strong suggestions that there is very substantial evidence pointing to a clear and present danger now. We do know Saddam has chemical weapons. We do know he has used them on his own people, the Kurds. We do know he has used them in the Iran-Iraq war. There is substantial evidence about weapons of mass destruction and biological weapons. As best we know, Saddam Hussein does not yet have nuclear weapons, but how long it would take him to develop them is a question.

   For the Congress to act, we really have to have this information, and the President has intimated, really suggested, that more information will be coming to the Congress. So far, I do not think we have seen the indicators of a clear and present danger, but that is something which will have to be taken up.

   This is an issue which is now, obviously, on the front burner. There are indications that the President will seek a vote by the Congress before we adjourn. So it is a matter which will require very intensive consideration and analysis. However, it is my hope that when the President makes his speech at the United Nations next week, he will call on the UN to enforce the UN's inspection rights.

   Recently, Senator Shelby and I made a trip to Africa. Included in that trip was a visit to the Sudan. I had attempted to go there in the past and was advised against it because of the civil war, which has been raging in that country. We talked to U.S. intelligence personnel in the Sudan and found that they have worked out an arrangement with the Government of Sudan to make surprise inspections of weapons manufacturing locations and also on laboratories--going in with no notice, breaking locks, and taking photographs. They have concluded that, as to the installations they had identified and inspected, they were satisfied that there were no weapons of mass destruction being pursued by the Government of Sudan.

   That could be a model to go after as to inspections in Iraq. Of course, it still leaves open the possibility that there are some locations about which we do not know. It leaves open the possibility that some of the weapons of mass destruction could be transported, could be moved around. However, I think it would be a very significant step. Then, if Saddam and Iraq refused to honor their commitments, it would put us on the high ground to take action in our own national interest.

   I yield the floor. In the absence of any other Senator seeking recognition, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER (Ms. CANTWELL). The clerk will call the roll.

   The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

   Mr. REID. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

   Mr. REID. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the time for debate on the Interior appropriations be extended for 10 minutes.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

1G) The Price of War
Mr. PAUL. Mr. Speaker, Thomas Jefferson spoke for the founders and all our early Presidents when he stated, ``Peace, commerce and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none, which is one of the essential principles of our government.''

   The question is, whatever happened to this principle and should it be restored? We find the 20th century was wracked with war; peace was turned asunder and our liberties steadily eroded. Foreign alliances and meddling in the internal affairs of other nations became commonplace. On many occasions, involvement in military action occurred through U.N. resolutions or a Presidential executive order, despite

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   Since World War II, nearly 100,000 deaths and over a quarter million wounded, not counting the many thousands claimed to have been affected by Agent Orange and the Persian Gulf War Syndrome, have all occurred without a declaration of war and without a clearcut victory. The entire 20th century was indeed costly with over 600,000 killed in battle and an additional million wounded.

   If liberty had been truly enhanced during that time, less could be said about the imperfections of the policy. The evidence, however, is clear that we as a people are less free and the prosperity we still enjoy may be more illusionary than many realize.

   The innocent victims who have suffered at the hands of our militarism abroad are rarely considered by our government; yet, they may well be a major factor in this hatred now being directed toward America. It is not currently popular to question corporate or banking influence over the foreign policy that replaced that of Washington and Jefferson. Questioning foreign government influence on our policies, although known about for years, is not acceptable in the politically correct environment in which we live.

   There is little doubt that our role in the world dramatically changed in the 20th century, inexorably evolving from that of strict noninterventionism to that of sole superpower with the assumption that we were destined to be the world's policeman.

   By the end of the 20th century, in fact, this occurred. We have totally forgotten that for well over 100 years we followed the advice of the founders by meticulously avoiding overseas conflict. Instead, we now find ourselves in charge of an American hegemony spread to the four corners of the Earth.

   As the 21st century begins, there is not a country in the world that does not depend upon the U.S. for protections or fears her wrath if they refuse to do her bidding. As the 20th century progressed, American taxpayers were required to finance with great sacrifice financially and freedom-wise the buying of loyalty through foreign aid and intimidation of those others who did not cooperate.

   The question, though, remains, has this change been beneficial to freedom and prosperity here at home and has it promoted peace and trade throughout the world? Those who justify our interventionist policies abroad argue that the violation of the rule of law is not a problem considering the benefits we receive from maintaining the American empire, but has this really taken into consideration the cost in lives lost, the damage to long-term prosperity as well as the dollar cost and freedoms we have lost?

   What about the future? Has this policy of foreign intervention set the stage for radically changing America and the world in ways not yet seen? Were the founders completely off track because they lived in different times, or was the foreign policy they advised based on an essential principle of lasting value? Choosing the wrong answer to this question could very well be deadly to the grand experiment in liberty begun in 1776.

   The transition from nonintervention to our current role as world arbiter in all conflicts was insidious and fortuitous. In the early part of the 20th century, the collapse of the British Empire left a vacuum which was steadily filled by a U.S. presence around the world. In the latter part of the century, the results of World War II and the collapse of the Soviet system propelled us into our current role.

   Throughout most of the 20th century it was our competition with the Soviets that prompted our ever-expanded presence around the world. We are where we are today almost by default, but does that justify its being in our best interests?

   Disregarding for the moment the moral and constitutional arguments against foreign intervention, a strong case can be made against it for other reasons. It is clear that one intervention begets another. The first problem is rarely solved and the new ones are created.

   Indeed, in foreign affairs a slippery slope does exist.

   In recent years, we too often slipped into war through the back door with the purpose rarely defined or understood and the need for victory ignored. A restrained effort of intervention frequently explodes into something that we do not foresee. Policies end up doing the opposite of their intended purpose with unintended consequences resulting.

   The result then is that the action taken turns out to be actually detrimental to our national security interest; yet no effort is made to challenge the fundamental principle behind our foreign policy. It is this failure to adhere to a set of principles that has allowed us to slip into this role and, if unchallenged, could well undo the liberties we all cherish.

   Throughout history, there has always been a great temptation for rulers to spread their influence and pursue empire over liberty. Resisting this temptation to power rarely has been achieved. There always seems to be a natural inclination to yield to this historic human passion. Could it be that progress and civilization and promoting freedom require ignoring this impulse to control others, as the founders of this great Nation advised?

   Historically, the driving force behind world domination is usually an effort to control wealth. The Europeans were searching for gold when they came to the Americas. Now it is our turn to seek control over the black gold which drives much of what we do today in foreign affairs.

   Competing with a power like the Soviet Union prompted our involvement in areas of the world where the struggle for the balance of power was the sole motivating force. The foreign policy of the 20th century replaced the policy endorsed by our early Presidents and permitted our steadily growing involvement overseas in an effort to control the world's commercial interests with a special emphasis on oil.

   Our influence in the Middle East evolved out of concern for the newly created State of Israel in 1947 and to securing control over the flow of oil in that region. Israel's needs and Arab oil have influenced our foreign policy for more than half a century. In the 1950s, the CIA installed the Shah in Iran. It was not until the hostage crisis of the late 1970s that the unintended consequence occurred. This generated the Iranian hatred of America and led to the takeover by the reactionary Khomeini and the Islamic fundamentalists and caused greater regional instability than we anticipated.

   Our meddling in the internal affairs of Iran was of no benefit to us and set the stage for our failed policy in dealing with Iraq. We allied ourselves in the 1980s with Iraq in its war with Iran and assisted Saddam Hussein in his rise to power. As recent reports reconfirm, we did nothing to stop Hussein's development of chemical and biological weapons and at least indirectly assisted in their development. Now, as a consequence of that needless intervention, we are planning a risky war to remove him from power; and as usual, the probable result of such an effort would be something that our government does not anticipate like a takeover by someone much worse. As bad as Hussein is, he is an enemy of the al-Qaeda and someone new well may be a close ally of the Islamic radicals.

   Although our puppet dictatorship in Saudi Arabia has lasted for many decades, it is becoming shakier every day. The Saudi people are not exactly friendly towards us, and our military presence on their holy soil is greatly resented. This contributes to the radical fundamentalist hatred directed toward us. Another unfavorable consequence to America, such as a regime change not to our liking, could soon occur in Saudi Arabia. It is not merely a coincidence that 15 of the 9-11 terrorists are Saudis.

   The Persian Gulf War fought, without a declaration of war, is in reality still going on. It looks like that 9-11 may well have been a battle in that war perpetrated by fanatical guerrillas. It indicates how seriously flawed our foreign policy is.

   In the 1980s we got involved in the Soviet-Afghanistan war and actually sided with the forces of Osama bin Laden, helping him gain power. This obviously was an alliance of no benefit to the United States, and it has come back to haunt us.

   Our policy for years was to encourage Saudi Arabia to oppose communism by financing and promoting Islamic fundamentalism. Surely the shortcomings of that policy are evident to everyone.

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   Clinton's bombing of Sudan and Afghanistan on the eve of his indictment over Monica Lewinsky shattered a Taliban plan to expel Osama bin Laden from Afghanistan. Clinton's bombing of Baghdad on the eve of his impeachment hardly won any converts to our cause or reassured the Muslim people of the Middle Eastern countries of a U.S. balanced policy. The continued bombing of Iraq over these past 12 years, along with the deadly sanctions, resulted in hundreds of thousands of needless Iraqi civilian deaths, has not been beneficial to our security and has been used as one of the excuses for recruiting the fanatics ready to sacrifice their lives and demonstrating their hatred toward us.

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   Essentially all Muslims see our policy in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as being openly favorable toward Israel and in opposition to the Palestinians. It is for this reason they hold us responsible for Palestinian deaths since all the Israeli weapons are from the United States. Since the Palestinians do not even have an army, and most have to live in refugee camps, one should understand at least why the animosity builds, even if our pro-Israeli position can be explained.

   There is no end in site. Since 9-11, our involvement in the Middle East and in Saudi Arabia has grown significantly. Though we can badger those countries whose leaders depend on us to keep them in power to stay loyal to the United States, the common people of the region become more alienated. Our cozy relationship with the Russians may not be as long-lasting as our current administration hopes. Considering the $40 billion trade deal recently made between Russia and Saddam Hussein, it is more than a bit ironic that we find the Russians now promoting free trade as a solution to a difficult situation while we are promoting war.

   This continuous escalation of our involvement overseas has been widespread. We have been in Korea for more than 50 years. We have promised to never back away from the China-Taiwan conflict over territorial disputes. Fifty-seven years after World War II we still find our military spread throughout Europe and Asia. And now the debate ranges over whether our national security requires that we, for the first time, escalate this policy of intervention to include anticipatory self-defense and preemptive war.

   If our interventions of the 20th century led to needless deaths and unwon wars and continuous unintended consequences, imagine what this new doctrine is about to unleash on the world. Our policy has prompted us to announce that our CIA will assassinate Saddam Hussein whenever it gets the chance, and that the government of Iraq is to be replaced. Evidence now has surfaced that the United Nations inspection teams in the 1990s definitely included American CIA agents who were collecting information on how to undermine the Iraqi government and continue with their routine bombing missions.

   Why should there be a question of why Saddam Hussein might not readily accept U.N. inspectors without some type of assurances? Does anybody doubt that control of Iraqi oil supplies, second only to Saudi Arabia, is the real reason U.S. policy is belligerent toward Saddam Hussein? If it is merely to remove dictators around the world, this is the beginning of an endless task.

   In the transition from the original American foreign policy of peace, trade and neutrality to that of world policemen, we have sacrificed our sovereignty to world government organizations such as the U.N., the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO. To further confuse and undermine our position, we currently have embarked on a policy of unilateralism within these world organizations. This means we accept the principle of globalized government when it pleases us, but when it does not, we should ignore it for our own interest's sake.

   Acting in our own interest is to be applauded, but what we are getting is not a good alternative to one-world government. We do not get our sovereignty back, yet we continue to subject ourselves to great potential financial burden and loss of liberty as we shift from a national government with constitutional protection of rights to an international government where our citizens' rights are threatened by treaties we have not even ratified, like the Kyoto and the international criminal court treaties.

   We cannot depend on controlling the world government at some later date, even if that seems to be what we are able to do now. The unilateralist approach of domination over the world's leaders, and arbitrary ignoring of certain mandates, something we can do with impunity because of our intimidating power, serves only to further undermine our prestige and acceptability throughout the world. And this includes the Muslim countries as well as our European friends. This merely sets the stage for both our enemies and current friends to act in concert against our interest when the time comes. This is especially true if we become financially strapped and our dollar is sharply weakened and we are in a much more vulnerable bargaining position.

   Unilateralism within a globalist approach to government is the worst of all choices. It ignores national sovereignty, dignifies one-world government, and places us in the position of demanding dictatorial powers over the world community. Demanding the right to set all policy and exclude ourselves from jurisdictional restraints sows the seeds of future discontent and hostility. The downside is we get all the bills, risk the lives of our people without cause, and make ourselves the target for every event that goes badly. We get blamed for the unintended consequences not foreseen and become the target of the terrorists that evolve from the radicalized fringes.

   Long-term foreign interventionism does not serve our interest. Tinkering on the edges with current policy will not help. An announced policy of support for globalist government, assuming the financial and military role of world policemen, maintaining an American world empire while flaunting unilateralism, is a recipe for disaster. U.S. unilateralism is a far cry from the nonintervention that the Founders advised.

   The term foreign policy does not exist in the Constitution. All members of the Federal Government have sworn to uphold the Constitution and should do only those things that are clearly authorized. Careful reading of the Constitution reveals Congress has a lot more responsibility than does the President in dealing with foreign affairs. The President is the Commander-in-Chief, but cannot declare war or finance military action without explicit congressional approval. A good starting point would be for all of us in the Congress to assume the responsibility given us to make sure the executive branch does not usurp any authority explicitly given to the Congress.

   A proper foreign policy of nonintervention is built

   on friendship with other nations, free trade and maximum travel, maximizing the exchanges of goods and services and ideas. Nations that trade with each other are definitely less likely to fight against each other. Unnecessary bellicosity and jingoism is detrimental to peace and prosperity and incites unnecessary confrontation. And yet today that is about all we hear coming from the politicians and the media pundits who are so anxious for this war against Iraq.

   Avoiding entangling alliances and meddling in the internal affairs of other nations is crucial, no matter how many special interests demand otherwise. The entangling alliances we should avoid include the complex alliances in the U.N., the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO. One-world government goals are anathema to the nonintervention and free trade. The temptation to settle disputes and install better governments abroad is fraught with great danger and many uncertainties.

   Protecting our national sovereignty and guaranteeing constitutional protection of our citizens' rights are crucial. Respecting the sovereignty of other nations, even when we are in disagreement with some of their policies, is also necessary. Changing others then becomes a job of persuasion and example, not force and intimidation, just as it is in trying to improve the personal behavior of our fellow citizens here at home.

   Defending our country from outside attack is legitimate and is of the highest priority. Protecting individual liberties should be our goal. This does not mean, however, that our troops follow

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   While foreign visitors should be welcome, no tax-supported services should be provided. Citizenship should be given with caution and not automatically by merely stepping over a national boundary for the purpose of giving birth.

   A successful and prosperous society comes from such a policy and is impossible without a sound free-market economy, one not controlled by a central bank. Avoiding trade wars, devaluations, inflations, deflations, and disruption of free trade with protectionist legislation are impossible under a system of international trade dependent on fluctuating fiat currencies controlled by world central banks and influenced by powerful financial interests. Instability in trade is one of the prime causes of creating conditions leading to war.

   The basic moral principle underpinning a noninterventionist foreign policy is that of rejecting the initiation of force against others. It is based on nonviolence and friendship unless attacked, with determination for self-defense while avoiding confrontation, even when we disagree with the way other countries run their affairs. It simply means that we should mind our own business and not be influenced by the special interests that have an axe to grind or benefits to gain by controlling other foreign policy. Manipulating our country into conflicts that are none of our business and of no security interest provides no benefits to us, while exposing us to great risk financially and militarily.

   Our troops would be brought home under such conditions, systematically and soon. Being in Europe and Japan for over 50 years is long enough. The failure of Vietnam resulted in no occupation and a more westernized country now doing business with the United States. There is no evidence that the military approach in Vietnam was superior to that of trade and friendship. The lack of trade and sanctions have not served us well in Cuba or in the Middle East. The mission for our Coast Guard would change if our foreign policy became noninterventionist. They, too, would come home, protect our coast, and stop being the enforcers of bureaucratic laws that either should not exist or should be a State function.

   All foreign aid would be discontinued. Most evidence shows this money rarely helps the poor but instead solidifies power in the hands of dictators. There is no moral argument that can justify taxing poor people in this country to help rich people in poor countries. Much of the foreign aid, when spent, is channeled back to weapons manufacturers and other special interests in the United States who are the strong promoters of these foreign aid expenditures, yet it is all done in the name of humanitarian causes.

   A foreign policy for peace and freedom would prompt us to give ample notice, and then we would promptly leave the international organizations that have entangled us for over a half a century. U.S. membership in world government was hardly what the Founders envisioned when writing the Constitution.

   The principle of mark and reprisal would be revived, and specific problems, such as terrorist threats, would be dealt with on a contract basis, incorporating private resources to more accurately target our enemies and reduce the chances of needless and endless war. This would help prevent a continual expansion of a conflict into areas not relating to any immediate threat. By narrowing the target, there is less opportunity for special interests to manipulate our foreign policy to serve the financial needs of the oil and military weapons industries.

   The Logan Act would be repealed, thus allowing maximum freedom of our citizens to volunteer to support their war of choice. This would help diminish the enthusiasm for wars the proponents have used to justify our world policies and diminish the perceived need for a military draft.

   If we followed a constitutional policy of nonintervention, we would never have to entertain the aggressive notion of preemptive war based on speculation of what a country might do at some future date. Political pressure by other countries to alter our foreign policy for their benefit would never be a consideration. Commercial interests of our citizens investing overseas could not expect our armies to follow them and to protect their profits.

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   A noninterventionist foreign policy would not condone subsidies to our corporations through programs like the Export-Import Bank and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation. These programs guarantee against losses while the risk takers want our military to protect their investments from political threats. This current flawed policy removes the tough decisions of when to invest in foreign countries and diminishes the pressure on those particular countries to clean up their political acts in order to entice foreign capital to move into their country. Today's foreign policy encourages bad investments. Ironically this is all done in the name of free trade and capitalism, but it does more to export jobs and businesses than promote free trade. Yet when it fails, capitalism and freedom are blamed.

   A noninterventionist foreign policy would go a long way toward preventing 9/11 type attacks upon us. The Department of Homeland Security would be unnecessary and the military, along with less bureaucracy in our intelligence-gathering agencies, could instead provide the security the new department is supposed to provide. A renewed respect for gun ownership and responsibility for defending one's property would provide additional protection against potential terrorists.

   There are many reasons why a policy for peace is superior to a policy of war. The principle that we do not have the moral authority to forcibly change government in foreign lands just because we do not approve of their shortcomings should be our strongest argument. But rarely today is a moral argument in politics worth much.

   The practical argument against it because of its record of failure should certainly prompt all thoughtful people to reconsider what we have been doing for the past many decades.

   We should all be aware that war is a failure of relationships between foreign powers. Since this is such a serious matter, our American tradition as established by the founders made certain that the executive is subservient to the more democratically responsive legislative branch on the issue of war. Therefore, no war is ever to be the prerogative of a President through his unconstitutional use of executive orders, nor should it ever be something where the legal authority comes from an international body such as NATO or the United Nations. Up until 50 years ago, this had been the American tradition.

   Nonintervention prevents the unexpected and unintended consequences that inevitably result from well-intended meddling in the affairs of others.

   Countries like Switzerland and Sweden, who promote neutrality and nonintervention, have benefited for the most part by remaining secure and free of war over the centuries. Nonintervention consumes a lot less of the Nation's wealth. With less wars, the higher the standard of living for all citizens. But this, of course, is not attractive to the military-industrial complex which enjoys a higher standard of living at the expense of the taxpayer when a policy of intervention and constant war preparation is carried out.

   Wisdom, morality and the Constitution are very unlikely to invade the minds of the policymakers that control our foreign affairs. We have institutionalized foreign intervention over the past 100 years by the teachings of all our major universities and the propaganda that the media spews out. The powerful influence over our policy, both domestic and foreign, is not soon going to go away.

   I am convinced, though, that eventually restraint in our interventions overseas will be guided by a more reasonable constitutional policy. Economic reality will dictate it. Although political pressure in times of severe economic downturn and domestic strife encourages planned distractions overseas, these adventures always cause economic harm due to the economic costs. When the particular country or empire involved overreaches, as we are currently doing, national bankruptcy and a severely weakened currency call the whole process to a halt.

   The Soviet system, armed with an aggressive plan to spread its empire

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   Maintaining an overseas empire is incompatible with the American tradition of liberty and prosperity. The financial drain and the antagonism that it causes with our enemies, and even our friends, will finally force the American people to reject the policy outright. There will be no choice. Gorbachev just walked away and Yeltsin walked in, with barely a ripple. A nonviolent revolution of unbelievable historic magnitude occurred and the Cold War ended. We are not immune from such a similar change.

   This Soviet collapse ushered in the age of unparalleled American dominance over the entire world and along with it allowed the new expanded hot war between the West and the Muslim East. All the hostility directed toward the West built up over the centuries between the two factions is now directed toward the United States. We are now the only power capable of paying for and literally controlling the Middle East and its cherished wealth, and we have not hesitated. Iraq, with its oil and water and agricultural land, is a prime target of our desire to further expand our dominion. The battle is growing ever so tense with our acceptance and desire to control the Caspian Sea oil riches. But Russia, now licking its wounds and once again accumulating wealth, will not sit idly by and watch the American empire engulf this region. When time runs out for us, we can be sure Russia will once again be ready to fight for control of all those resources in countries adjacent to her borders. And expect the same from China and India. And who knows, maybe one day even Japan will return to the ancient art of using force to occupy the cherished territories in their region of the world.

   The most we can hope for will be, once the errors of our ways are acknowledged and we can no longer afford our militarism, we will reestablish the moral principle that underpins the policy of ``peace, commerce and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none.'' Our modern-day war hawks represent neither this American principle nor do they understand how the love of liberty drove the founders in their great battle against tyranny.

   We must prepare for the day when our financial bankruptcy and the failure of our effort at world domination are apparent. The solution to such a crisis can be easily found in our Constitution and in our traditions. But ultimately, the love of liberty can only come from a change in the hearts and minds of the people and with an answered prayer for the blessings of divine intervention.

2A)

2B)

3A) War Should Not Be First Instrument of Foreign Policy
Mr. DOGGETT. Mr. Speaker, overshadowing all of our hopes and dreams for our families and for our country is the daily talk of war. This Administration's apparent intent to launch a go-it-alone invasion of another country is unprecedented in American history, it is unprecedented in ignoring the warnings of military experts, it is unprecedented in rejecting the advice of our allies and, most importantly, unprecedented in the dangers posed for the safety of American families everywhere.

At one time ``regime change'' was the now-abandoned goal of our foreign policy toward an island 90 miles off our shores. Immediate success is even less certain for a regime on the other side of the world through a means uniformly rejected at present by the countries of the region. Of course, Saddam Hussein is a menace, as was Libya's Muammer Qaddafi, as was Josef Stalin. But able policymakers of both parties found ways to contain such threats without starting what could become another world war.

Mr. President, unite our country and the world to eliminate weapons of mass destruction ; do not divide us by making war the first instrument of your foreign policy.

3B) Weapons of Mass Destruction Civic Support Act of 2002
S. 2908. A bill to require the Secretary of Defense to establish at least one Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Team in each State, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Armed Services.

   Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, today, I am introducing the Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Act of 2002. This bill would require the Secretary of Defense to establish at least one Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Team, WMD-CST, in each State by September 30, 2003. The cost of establishing, training, equipping, and operating these new teams would be paid for from existing fiscal year 2003 resources, thus requiring no additional spending.

   I am pleased to be joined in this effort by Senators LEAHY, LIEBERMAN, KOHL, REID of Nevada, SARBANES, TORRICELLI, and JEFFORDS.

   WMD-CSTs are comprised of 22 full-time National Guard personnel who are specially trained and equipped to deploy and assess suspected nuclear, chemical, biological, or other threats

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   The emerging chemical, biological, and other threats of the 21st century present new challenges to our military and to local first responders. The WMD-CSTs play a vital role in assisting local first responders in investigating and combating these new threats. The September 11 terrorist attacks emphasize the need to have full-time WMD-CSTs in each State. As the events of that day so clearly and tragically demonstrated, local first responders are on the front lines of combating terrorism and responding to other large-scale incidents. As we rethink the security needs of our country, we should support the creation of an additional 23 full-time WMD-CSTs as soon as possible. Establishing these additional full-time teams will improve the overall capability of Wisconsin and the other 18 States with part-time teams to prepare for and respond to potential threats in the future.

   According to the National Guard Bureau, WMD-CSTs performed 694 operational missions between September 11, 2001, and August 26, 2002. These missions fall into three categories: ``response,'' ``standby,'' and ``assist.''

   Response missions occur when a team is deployed to sample a suspected or known hazardous substance. Since September 11, WMD-CSTs have deployed on 151 response missions, most of which were to investigate reports of suspicious white powder in the wake of the anthrax attacks of last fall. Other response missions included reports of the presence of unknown liquids or of suspicious pieces of mail.

   There have been 74 standby missions during this same time frame. On these missions, WMD-CSTs deploy to provide expertise to a specific community for the visit of a dignitary such as the President or a Governor, or for a large-scale event. In the past year, WMD-CSTs have been on standby for events including the Major League Baseball All-Star Game in Milwaukee, the 2002 Winter Olympics and Paralympics in Salt Lake City, the World Series, the Super Bowl, and Mardi Gras.

   Assist missions give WMD-CST members the opportunity to use their technical expertise to assist or provide advice to local first responders or other organizations and to participate in conferences and other events that focus on how to respond to attacks. In the past year, CSTs have performed 469 assist missions in support of local, State, and Federal agencies including law enforcement, hospitals, health departments, state emergency management agencies, the American Red Cross, the Coast Guard, the Secret Service, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug Enforcement Agency, and the United States Navy.

   As I noted earlier, a WMD-CST was deployed to be on standby during this year's baseball All-Star game, which took place in my home State. Because Wisconsin has only a part-time WMD-CST, the Minnesota team was deployed on a standby mission to Milwaukee for this event. The members of Wisconsin's part-time WMD-CST also participated in this deployment. According to the Wisconsin National Guard, if Wisconsin had a full-time team, deployment of the Minnesota team would not have been necessary.

   In light of the tragic events of September 11, the presence of at least one WMD-CST in each State is all the more imperative. These terrorist attacks, and the subsequent mobilization of tens of thousands of National Guardsmen and Reservists, also underscore the need to provide adequate resources for and to ensure full-time manning of the National Guard. As we move to establish at least one 22-member WMD-CST in each State, I call on the Pentagon to allocate the necessary resources to ensure adequate National Guard personnel end-strengths to provide for full-time manning and for the additional personnel necessary for these new teams.

   I am pleased that this bill is supported by the Wisconsin National Guard and by the National Guard Association of the United States.

   I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the RECORD.

   There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

   SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Team Act of 2002''.

   SEC. 2. ESTABLISHMENT OF AT LEAST ONE WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION CIVIL SUPPORT TEAM IN EACH STATE.

    (a) REQUIREMENT.--The Secretary of Defense shall ensure that there is established, by not later than September 30, 2003, at least one Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Team in each State.

    (b) DEFINITIONS.--In this section:

    (1) The term ``Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Team'' means a team that--

    (A) provides support for emergency preparedness programs to prepare for or to respond to any emergency involving the use of a weapon of mass destruction (as defined in section 1403 of the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 2302)); and

    (B) is composed of members of National Guard who are performing duties as members of the team under the authority of subsection (c) of section 12310 of title 10, United States Code, while serving on active duty as described in subsection (a) of such section or on full-time National Guard duty under section 502(f) of title 32, United States Code.

    (2) The term ``State'' includes the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and Guam.

    (c) FUNDING.--The costs of establishing Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams to comply with the requirement in subsection (a), and the costs of training and equipping the teams established to comply with such requirement, may be paid (to the extent properly allocable on the bases of purpose and period of availability) out of funds authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2003 for purposes as follows:

    (1) For the Army, for--

    (A) military personnel;

    (B) operation and maintenance;

    (C) other procurement; or

    (D) military construction.

    (2) For the Air Force for military personnel.

    (3) For the Department of Defense for the chemical and biological defense program.

   By Mr. SMITH of Oregon:

&

4A) Directorate of Science and Technology
SEC. 135. DIRECTORATE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY.

    (a) PURPOSE.--The purpose of this section is to establish a Directorate of Science and Technology that will support the mission of the Department and the directorates of the Department by--

    (1) establishing, funding, managing, and supporting research, development, demonstration, testing, and evaluation activities to meet national homeland security needs and objectives;

    (2) setting national research and development goals and priorities pursuant to the mission of the Department, and developing strategies and policies in furtherance of such goals and priorities;

    (3) coordinating and collaborating with other Federal departments and agencies, and State, local, academic, and private sector entities, to advance the research and development agenda of the Department;

    (4) advising the Secretary on all scientific and technical matters relevant to homeland security; and

    (5) facilitating the transfer and deployment of technologies that will serve to enhance homeland security goals.

    (b) DEFINITIONS.--In this section:

    (1) COUNCIL.--The term ``Council'' means the Homeland Security Science and Technology Council established under this section.

    (2) FUND.--The term ``Fund'' means the Acceleration Fund for Research and Development of Homeland Security Technologies established under this section.

    (3) HOMELAND SECURITY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT.--The term ``homeland security research and development'' means research and development applicable to the detection of, prevention of, protection against, response to, and recovery from homeland security threats, particularly acts of terrorism.

    (4) OSTP.--The term ``OSTP'' means the Office of Science and Technology Policy.

    (5) SARPA.--The term ``SARPA'' means the Security Advanced Research Projects Agency established under this section.

    (6) TECHNOLOGY ROADMAP.--The term ``technology roadmap'' means a plan or framework in which goals, priorities, and milestones for desired future technological capabilities and functions are established, and research and development alternatives or means for achieving those goals, priorities, and milestones are identified and analyzed in order to guide decisions on resource allocation and investments.

    (7) UNDER SECRETARY.--The term ``Under Secretary'' means the Under Secretary for Science and Technology.

    (c) DIRECTORATE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY.--

    (1) ESTABLISHMENT.--There is established a Directorate of Science and Technology within the Department.

    (2) UNDER SECRETARY.--There shall be an Under Secretary for Science and Technology, who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The principal responsibility of the Under Secretary shall be to effectively and efficiently carry out the purposes of the Directorate of Science and Technology under subsection (a). In addition, the Under Secretary shall undertake the following activities in furtherance of such purposes:

    (A) Coordinating with the OSTP, the Office, and other appropriate entities in developing and executing the research and development agenda of the Department.

    (B) Developing a technology roadmap that shall be updated biannually for achieving technological goals relevant to homeland security needs.

    (C) Instituting mechanisms to promote, facilitate, and expedite the transfer and deployment of technologies relevant to homeland security needs, including dual-use capabilities.

    (D) Assisting the Secretary and the Director of OSTP to ensure that science and technology priorities are clearly reflected and considered in the Strategy developed under title III.

    (E) Establishing mechanisms for the sharing and dissemination of key homeland security research and technology developments and opportunities with appropriate Federal, State, local, and private sector entities.

    (F) Establishing, in coordination with the Under Secretary for Critical Infrastructure Protection and the Under Secretary for Emergency Preparedness and Response and relevant programs under their direction, a National Emergency Technology Guard, comprised of teams of volunteers with expertise in relevant areas of science and technology, to assist local communities in responding to and recovering from emergency contingencies requiring specialized scientific and technical capabilities. In carrying out this responsibility, the Under Secretary shall establish and manage a database of National Emergency Technology Guard volunteers, and prescribe procedures for organizing, certifying, mobilizing, and deploying National Emergency Technology Guard teams.

    (G) Chairing the Working Group established under section 108 of the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-188).

    (H) Assisting the Secretary in developing the Strategy for Countermeasure Research described under subsection (k).

    (I) Assisting the Secretary and acting on behalf of the Secretary in contracting with, commissioning, or establishing federally funded research and development centers determined useful and appropriate by the Secretary for the purpose of providing the Department with independent analysis and support.

    (J) Assisting the Secretary and acting on behalf of the Secretary in entering into joint sponsorship agreements with the Department of Energy regarding the use of the national laboratories or sites.

    (K) Assisting and supporting the Secretary, in coordination with other Directorates and entities outside the Department, in conducting appropriate risk analysis and risk management activities consistent with the mission and functions of the Directorate.

    (L) Carrying out other appropriate activities as directed by the Secretary.

    (3) RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT-RELATED AUTHORITIES.--The Secretary shall exercise the following authorities relating to the research, development, testing, and evaluation activities of the Directorate of Science and Technology:

    (A) With respect to research and development expenditures under this section, the authority (subject to the same limitations and conditions) as the Secretary of Defense may exercise under section 2371 of title 10, United States Code (except for subsections (b) and (f)), for a period of 5 years beginning on the date of enactment of this Act. Competitive, merit-based selection procedures shall be used for the selection of projects and participants for transactions entered into under the authority of this paragraph. The annual report required under subsection (h) of such section, as applied to the Secretary by this subparagraph, shall--

    (i) be submitted to the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the Senate, the Committee on Government Reform of the House of Representatives, the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives; and

    (ii) report on other transactions entered into under subparagraph (B).

    (B) Authority to carry out prototype projects in accordance with the requirements and conditions provided for carrying out prototype projects under section 845 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 (Public Law 103-160), for a period of 5 years beginning on the date of enactment of this Act. In applying the authorities of such section 845, subsection (c) of that section shall apply with respect to prototype projects under this paragraph, and the Secretary shall perform the functions of the Secretary of Defense under subsection (d) of that section. Competitive, merit-based selection procedures shall be used for the selection of projects and participants for transactions entered into under the authority of this paragraph.

    (C) In hiring personnel to assist in research, development, testing, and evaluation activities within the Directorate of Science and Technology, the authority to exercise the personnel hiring and management authorities described in section 1101 of the

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    (D) With respect to such research, development, testing, and evaluation responsibilities under this section (except as provided in subparagraph (E)) as the Secretary may elect to carry out through agencies other than the Department (under agreements with their respective heads), the Secretary may transfer funds to such heads. Of the funds authorized to be appropriated under subsection (d)(4) for the Fund, not less than 10 percent of such funds for each fiscal year through 2005 shall be authorized only for the Under Secretary, through joint agreement with the Commandant of the Coast Guard, to carry out research and development of improved ports, waterways, and coastal security surveillance and perimeter protection capabilities for the purpose of minimizing the possibility that Coast Guard cutters, aircraft, helicopters, and personnel will be diverted from non-homeland security missions to the ports, waterways, and coastal security mission.

    (E) The Secretary may carry out human health biodefense-related biological, biomedical, and infectious disease research and development (including vaccine research and development) in collaboration with the Secretary of Health and Human Services. Research supported by funding appropriated to the National Institutes of Health for bioterrorism research and related facilities development shall be conducted through the National Institutes of Health under joint strategic prioritization agreements between the Secretary and the Secretary of Health and Human Services. The Secretary shall have the authority to establish general research priorities, which shall be embodied in the joint strategic prioritization agreements with the Secretary of Health and Human Services. The specific scientific research agenda to implement agreements under this subparagraph shall be developed by the Secretary of Health and Human Services, who shall consult the Secretary to ensure that the agreements conform with homeland security priorities. All research programs established under those agreements shall be managed and awarded by the Director of the National Institutes of Health consistent with those agreements. The Secretary may transfer funds to the Department of Health and Human Services in connection with those agreements.

    (d) ACCELERATION FUND.--

    (1) ESTABLISHMENT.--There is established an Acceleration Fund to support research and development of technologies relevant to homeland security.

    (2) FUNCTION.--The Fund shall be used to stimulate and support research and development projects selected by SARPA under subsection (f), and to facilitate the rapid transfer of research and technology derived from such projects.

    (3) RECIPIENTS.--Fund monies may be made available through grants, contracts, cooperative agreements, and other transactions under subsection (c)(3) (A) and (B) to--

    (A) public sector entities, including Federal, State, or local entities;

    (B) private sector entities, including corporations, partnerships, or individuals; and

    (C) other nongovernmental entities, including universities, federally funded research and development centers, and other academic or research institutions.

    (4) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.--There are authorized to be appropriated $200,000,000 for the Fund for fiscal year 2003, and such sums as are necessary in subsequent fiscal years.

    (e) SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COUNCIL.--

    (1) ESTABLISHMENT.--There is established the Homeland Security Science and Technology Council within the Directorate of Science and Technology. The Under Secretary shall chair the Council and have the authority to convene meetings. At the discretion of the Under Secretary and the Director of OSTP, the Council may be constituted as a subcommittee of the National Science and Technology Council.

    (2) COMPOSITION.--The Council shall be composed of the following:

    (A) Senior research and development officials representing agencies engaged in research and development relevant to homeland security and combating terrorism needs. Each representative shall be appointed by the head of the representative's respective agency with the advice and consent of the Under Secretary.

    (B) The Director of SARPA and other appropriate officials within the Department.

    (C) The Director of the OSTP and other senior officials of the Executive Office of the President as designated by the President.

    (3) RESPONSIBILITIES.--The Council shall--

    (A) provide the Under Secretary with recommendations on priorities and strategies, including those related to funding and portfolio management, for homeland security research and development;

    (B) facilitate effective coordination and communication among agencies, other entities of the Federal Government, and entities in the private sector and academia, with respect to the conduct of research and development related to homeland security;

    (C) recommend specific technology areas for which the Fund and other research and development resources shall be used, among other things, to rapidly transition homeland security research and development into deployed technology and reduce identified homeland security vulnerabilities;

    (D) assist and advise the Under Secretary in developing the technology roadmap referred to under subsection (c)(2)(B); and

    (E) perform other appropriate activities as directed by the Under Secretary.

    (4) ADVISORY PANEL.--The Under Secretary may establish an advisory panel consisting of representatives from industry, academia, and other non-Federal entities to advise and support the Council.

    (5) WORKING GROUPS.--At the discretion of the Under Secretary, the Council may establish working groups in specific homeland security areas consisting of individuals with relevant expertise in each articulated area. Working groups established for bioterrorism and public health-related research shall be fully coordinated with the Working Group established under section 108 of the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-188).

    (f) SECURITY ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY.--

    (1) ESTABLISHMENT.--There is established the Security Advanced Research Projects Agency within the Directorate of Science and Technology.

    (2) RESPONSIBILITIES.--SARPA shall--

    (A) undertake and stimulate basic and applied research and development, leverage existing research and development, and accelerate the transition and deployment of technologies that will serve to enhance homeland defense;

    (B) identify, fund, develop, and transition high-risk, high-payoff homeland security research and development opportunities that--

    (i) may lie outside the purview or capabilities of the existing Federal agencies; and

    (ii) emphasize revolutionary rather than evolutionary or incremental advances;

    (C) provide selected projects with single or multiyear funding, and require such projects to provide interim progress reports, no less often than annually;

    (D) administer the Acceleration Fund to carry out the purposes of this paragraph;

    (E) advise the Secretary and Under Secretary on funding priorities under subsection (c)(3)(E); and

    (F) perform other appropriate activities as directed by the Under Secretary.

    (g) OFFICE OF RISK ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT.--

    (1) ESTABLISHMENT.--There is established an Office of Risk Analysis and Assessment within the Directorate of Science and Technology.

    (2) FUNCTIONS.--The Office of Risk Analysis and Assessment shall assist the Secretary, the Under Secretary, and other Directorates with respect to their risk analysis and risk management activities by providing scientific or technical support for such activities. Such support shall include, as appropriate--

    (A) identification and characterization of homeland security threats;

    (B) evaluation and delineation of the risk of these threats;

    (C) pinpointing of vulnerabilities or linked vulnerabilities to these threats;

    (D) determination of criticality of possible threats;

    (E) analysis of possible technologies, research, and protocols to mitigate or eliminate threats, vulnerabilities, and criticalities;

    (F) evaluation of the effectiveness of various forms of risk communication; and

    (G) other appropriate activities as directed by the Secretary.

    (3) METHODS.--In performing the activities described under paragraph (2), the Office of Risk Analysis and Assessment may support or conduct, or commission from federally funded research and development centers or other entities, work involving modeling, statistical analyses, field tests and exercises (including red teaming), testbed development, development of standards and metrics.

    (h) OFFICE FOR TECHNOLOGY EVALUATION AND TRANSITION.--

    (1) ESTABLISHMENT.--There is established an Office for Technology Evaluation and Transition within the Directorate of Science and Technology.

    (2) FUNCTION.--The Office for Technology Evaluation and Transition shall, with respect to technologies relevant to homeland security needs--

    (A) serve as the principal, national point-of-contact and clearinghouse for receiving and processing proposals or inquiries regarding such technologies;

    (B) identify and evaluate promising new technologies;

    (C) undertake testing and evaluation of, and assist in transitioning, such technologies into deployable, fielded systems;

    (D) consult with and advise agencies regarding the development, acquisition, and deployment of such technologies;

    (E) coordinate with SARPA to accelerate the transition of technologies developed by SARPA and ensure transition paths for such technologies; and

    (F) perform other appropriate activities as directed by the Under Secretary.

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    (3) TECHNICAL SUPPORT WORKING GROUP.--The functions described under this subsection may be carried out through, or in coordination with, or through an entity established by the Secretary and modeled after, the Technical Support Working Group (organized under the April, 1982, National Security Decision Directive Numbered 30) that provides an interagency forum to coordinate research and development of technologies for combating terrorism.

    (i) OFFICE OF LABORATORY RESEARCH.--

    (1) ESTABLISHMENT.--There is established an Office of Laboratory Research within the Directorate of Science and Technology.

    (2) RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT FUNCTIONS TRANSFERRED.--There shall be transferred to the Department, to be administered by the Under Secretary, the functions, personnel, assets, and liabilities of the following programs and activities:

    (A) Within the Department of Energy (but not including programs and activities relating to the strategic nuclear defense posture of the United States) the following:

    (i) The chemical and biological national security and supporting programs and activities supporting domestic response of the nonproliferation and verification research and development program.

    (ii) The nuclear smuggling programs and activities, and other programs and activities directly related to homeland security, within the proliferation detection program of the nonproliferation and verification research and development program, except that the programs and activities described in this clause may be designated by the President either for transfer to the Department or for joint operation by the Secretary and the Secretary of Energy.

    (iii) The nuclear assessment program and activities of the assessment, detection, and cooperation program of the international materials protection and cooperation program.

    (iv) The Environmental Measurements Laboratory.

    (B) Within the Department of Defense, the National Bio-Weapons Defense Analysis Center established under section 161.

    (3) RESPONSIBILITIES.--The Office of Laboratory Research shall--

    (A) supervise the activities of the entities transferred under this subsection;

    (B) administer the disbursement and undertake oversight of research and development funds transferred from the Department to other agencies outside of the Department, including funds transferred to the Department of Health and Human Services consistent with subsection (c)(3)(E);

    (C) establish and direct new research and development facilities as the Secretary determines appropriate;

    (D) include a science advisor to the Under Secretary on research priorities related to biological and chemical weapons, with supporting scientific staff, who shall advise on and support research priorities with respect to--

    (i) research on countermeasures for biological weapons, including research on the development of drugs, devices, and biologics; and

    (ii) research on biological and chemical threat agents; and

    (E) other appropriate activities as directed by the Under Secretary.

    (j) OFFICE FOR NATIONAL LABORATORIES.--

    (1) ESTABLISHMENT.--There is established within the Directorate of Science and Technology an Office for National Laboratories, which shall be responsible for the coordination and utilization of the Department of Energy national laboratories and sites in a manner to create a networked laboratory system for the purpose of supporting the missions of the Department.

    (2) JOINT SPONSORSHIP ARRANGEMENTS.--

    (A) NATIONAL LABORATORIES.--The Department may be a joint sponsor, under a multiple agency sponsorship arrangement with the Department of Energy, of 1 or more Department of Energy national laboratories in the performance of work on behalf of the Department.

    (B) DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY SITE.--The Department may be a joint sponsor of Department of Energy sites in the performance of work as if such sites were federally funded research and development centers and the work were performed under a multiple agency sponsorship arrangement with the Department.

    (C) PRIMARY SPONSOR.--The Department of Energy shall be the primary sponsor under a multiple agency sponsorship arrangement entered into under subparagraph (A) or (B).

    (D) CONDITIONS.--A joint sponsorship arrangement under this subsection shall--

    (i) provide for the direct funding and management by the Department of the work being carried out on behalf of the Department; and

    (ii) include procedures for addressing the coordination of resources and tasks to minimize conflicts between work undertaken on behalf of either Department.

    (E) LEAD AGENT AND FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION.--

    (i) LEAD AGENT.--The Secretary of Energy shall act as the lead agent in coordinating the formation and performance of a joint sponsorship agreement between the Department and a Department of Energy national laboratory or site for work on homeland security.

    (ii) COMPLIANCE WITH FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION.--Any work performed by a national laboratory or site under this section shall comply with the policy on the use of federally funded research and development centers under section 35.017 of the Federal Acquisition Regulation.

    (F) FUNDING.--The Department shall provide funds for work at the Department of Energy national laboratories or sites, as the case may be, under this section under the same terms and conditions as apply to the primary sponsor of such national laboratory under section 303(b)(1)(C) of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 (41 U.S.C. 253 (b)(1)(C)) or of such site to the extent such section applies to such site as a federally funded research and development center by reason of subparagraph (B).

    (3) OTHER ARRANGEMENTS.--The Office for National Laboratories may enter into other arrangements with Department of Energy national laboratories or sites to carry out work to support the missions of the Department under applicable law, except that the Department of Energy may not charge or apply administrative fees for work on behalf of the Department.

    (4) TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER.--The Office for National Laboratories may exercise the authorities in section 12 of the Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980 (15 U.S.C. 3710a) to permit the Director of a Department of Energy national laboratory to enter into cooperative research and development agreements, or to negotiate licensing agreements, pertaining to work supported by the Department at the Department of Energy national laboratory.

    (5) ASSISTANCE IN ESTABLISHING DEPARTMENT.--At the request of the Under Secretary, the Department of Energy shall provide for the temporary appointment or assignment of employees of Department of Energy national laboratories or sites to the Department for purposes of assisting in the establishment or organization of the technical programs of the Department through an agreement that includes provisions for minimizing conflicts between work assignments of such personnel.

    (k) STRATEGY FOR COUNTERMEASURE RESEARCH.--

    (1) IN GENERAL.--The Secretary, acting through the Under Secretary for Science and Technology, shall develop a comprehensive, long-term strategy and plan for engaging non-Federal entities, particularly including private, for-profit entities, in the research, development, and production of homeland security countermeasures for biological, chemical, and radiological weapons.

    (2) TIMEFRAME.--The strategy and plan under this subsection, together with recommendations for the enactment of supporting or enabling legislation, shall be submitted to the Congress within 270 days after the date of enactment of this Act.

    (3) COORDINATION.--In developing the strategy and plan under this subsection, the Secretary shall consult with--

    (A) other agencies with expertise in research, development, and production of countermeasures;

    (B) private, for-profit entities and entrepreneurs with appropriate expertise and technology regarding countermeasures;

    (C) investors that fund such entities;

    (D) nonprofit research universities and institutions;

    (E) public health and other interested private sector and government entities; and

    (F) governments allied with the United States in the war on terrorism.

    (4) PURPOSE.--The strategy and plan under this subsection shall evaluate proposals to assure that--

    (A) research on countermeasures by non-Federal entities leads to the expeditious development and production of countermeasures that may be procured and deployed in the homeland security interests of the United States;

    (B) capital is available to fund the expenses associated with such research, development, and production, including Government grants and contracts and appropriate capital formation tax incentives that apply to non-Federal entities with and without tax liability;

    (C) the terms for procurement of such countermeasures are defined in advance so that such entities may accurately and reliably assess the potential countermeasures market and the potential rate of return;

    (D) appropriate intellectual property, risk protection, and Government approval standards are applicable to such countermeasures;

    (E) Government-funded research is conducted and prioritized so that such research complements, and does not unnecessarily duplicate, research by non-Federal entities and that such Government-funded research is made available, transferred, and licensed on commercially reasonable terms to such entities for development; and

    (F) universities and research institutions play a vital role as partners in research and development and technology transfer, with appropriate progress benchmarks for such activities, with for-profit entities.

    (5) REPORTING.--The Secretary shall report periodically to the Congress on the status of non-Federal entity countermeasure research, development, and production, and submit additional recommendations for legislation as needed.

    (l) CLASSIFICATION OF RESEARCH.--

    (1) IN GENERAL.--To the greatest extent practicable, research conducted or supported by the Department shall be unclassified.

    (2) CLASSIFICATION AND REVIEW.--The Under Secretary shall--

    (A)(i) decide whether classification is appropriate before the award of a research

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    (ii) if the decision under clause (i) is one of classification, control the research results through standard classification procedures; and

    (B) periodically review all classified research grants, contracts, cooperative agreements, and other transactions issued by the Department to determine whether classification is still necessary.

    (3) RESTRICTIONS.--No restrictions shall be placed upon the conduct or reporting of federally funded fundamental research that has not received national security classification, except as provided under applicable provisions of law.

    (m) OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY.--The National Science and Technology Policy, Organization, and Priorities Act is amended--

    (1) in section 204(b)(1) (42 U.S.C. 6613(b)(1)), by inserting ``homeland security,'' after ``national security,''; and

    (2) in section 208(a)(1) (42 U.S.C. 6617(a)(1)), by inserting ``the National Office for Combating Terrorism,'' after ``National Security Council,''.

   SEC. 136. DIRECTORATE OF IMMIGRATION AFFAIRS.

    The Directorate of Immigration Affairs shall be established and shall carry out all functions of that Directorate in accordance with division B of this Act.

4B) National Bio-Weapons Defense Analysis Center
SEC. 161. NATIONAL BIO-WEAPONS DEFENSE ANALYSIS CENTER.
(a) ESTABLISHMENT.--There is established within the Department of Defense a National Bio-Weapons Defense Analysis Center (in this section referred to as the ``Center'').
(b) MISSION.--The mission of the Center is to develop countermeasures to potential attacks by terrorists using biological or chemical weapons that are weapons of mass destruction (as defined under section 1403 of the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 2302(1))) and conduct research and analysis concerning such weapons.

4C) Statement of Justification Regarding Australia Group
To the Congress of the United States:

Consistent with the resolution of advice and consent to ratification of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, adopted by the Senate of the United States on April 24, 1997, I hereby certify pursuant to Condition 7(C)(i), Effectiveness of the Australia Group, that:
Australia Group members continue to maintain equally effective or more comprehensive controls over the export of: toxic chemicals and their precursors; dual-use processing equipment; human, animal, and plant pathogens and toxins with potential biological weapons applications; and dual-use biological equipment, as that afforded by the Australia Group as of April 25, 1997; and

The Australia Group remains a viable mechanism for limiting the spread of chemical and biological weapons--related materials and technology, and the effectiveness of the Australia Group has not been undermined by changes in membership, lack of compliance with common export controls and nonproliferation measures, or the weakening of common controls and nonproliferation measures, in force as of April 25, 1997.

The factors underlying this certification are described in the enclosed statement of justification.

George W. Bush.
The White House, September 4, 2002.

5A) Homeland Security Act of 2002
SA 4471. Mr. LIEBERMAN submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill H.R. 5005, to establish the Department of Homeland Security, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

    Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following:

   SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``National Homeland Security and Combating Terrorism Act of 2002''.

   SEC. 2. ORGANIZATION OF ACT INTO DIVISIONS; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

    (a) DIVISIONS.--This Act is organized into 3 divisions as follows:

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    (1) Division A--National Homeland Security and Combating Terrorism.

    (2) Division B--Immigration Reform, Accountability, and Security Enhancement Act of 2002.

    (3) Division C--Federal Workforce Improvement.

    (b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.--The table of contents for this Act is as follows:

   Sec..1..Short title.

   Sec..2..Organization of Act into divisions; table of contents.

   DIVISION A--NATIONAL HOMELAND SECURITY AND COMBATING TERRORISM

   Sec..100..Definitions.

   TITLE I--DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

   Subtitle A--Establishment of the Department of Homeland Security

   Sec..101..Establishment of the Department of Homeland Security.

   Sec..102..Secretary of Homeland Security.

   Sec..103..Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security.

   Sec..104..Under Secretary for Management.

   Sec..105..Assistant Secretaries.

   Sec..106..Inspector General.

   Sec..107..Chief Financial Officer.

   Sec..108..Chief Information Officer.

   Sec..109..General Counsel.

   Sec..110..Civil Rights Officer.

   Sec..111..Privacy Officer.

   Sec..112..Chief Human Capital Officer.

   Sec..113..Office of International Affairs.

   Sec..114..Executive Schedule positions.

   Subtitle B--Establishment of Directorates and Offices

   Sec..131..Directorate of Border and Transportation Protection.

   Sec..132..Directorate of Intelligence.

   Sec..133..Directorate of Critical Infrastructure Protection.

   Sec..134..Directorate of Emergency Preparedness and Response.

   Sec..135..Directorate of Science and Technology.

   Sec..136..Directorate of Immigration Affairs.

   Sec..137..Office for State and Local Government Coordination.

   Sec..138..United States Secret Service.

   Sec..139..Border Coordination Working Group.

   Sec..140..Executive Schedule positions.

   Subtitle C--National Emergency Preparedness Enhancement

   Sec..151..Short title.

   Sec..152..Preparedness information and education.

   Sec..153..Pilot program.

   Sec..154..Designation of National Emergency Preparedness Week.

   Subtitle D--Miscellaneous Provisions

   Sec..161..National Bio-Weapons Defense Analysis Center.

   Sec..162..Review of food safety.

   Sec..163..Exchange of employees between agencies and State or local governments.

   Sec..164..Whistleblower protection for Federal employees who are airport security screeners.

   Sec..165..Whistleblower protection for certain airport employees.

   Sec..166..Bioterrorism preparedness and response division.

   Sec..167..Coordination with the Department of Health and Human Services under the Public Health Service Act.

   Sec..168..Rail security enhancements.

   Sec..169..Grants for firefighting personnel.

   Sec..170..Review of transportation security enhancements.

   Sec..171..Interoperability of information systems.

   Sec..172..Extension of customs user fees.

   Subtitle E--Transition Provisions

   Sec..181..Definitions.

   Sec..182..Transfer of agencies.

   Sec..183..Transitional authorities.

   Sec..184..Incidental transfers and transfer of related functions.

   Sec..185..Implementation progress reports and legislative recommendations.

   Sec..186..Transfer and allocation.

   Sec..187..Savings provisions.

   Sec..188..Transition plan.

   Sec..189..Use of appropriated funds.

   Subtitle F--Administrative Provisions

   Sec..191..Reorganizations and delegations.

   Sec..192..Reporting requirements.

   Sec..193..Environmental protection, safety, and health requirements.

   Sec..194..Labor standards.

   Sec..195..Procurement of temporary and intermittent services.

   Sec..196..Preserving non-homeland security mission performance.

   Sec..197..Future Years Homeland Security Program.

   Sec..198..Protection of voluntarily furnished confidential information.

   Sec..199..Authorization of appropriations.

   TITLE II--NATIONAL OFFICE FOR COMBATING TERRORISM

   Sec..201..National Office for Combating Terrorism.

   Sec..202..Funding for Strategy programs and activities.

   TITLE III--NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COMBATING TERRORISM AND THE HOMELAND SECURITY RESPONSE

   Sec..301..Strategy.

   Sec..302..Management guidance for Strategy implementation.

   Sec..303..National Combating Terrorism Strategy Panel.

   TITLE IV--LAW ENFORCEMENT POWERS OF INSPECTOR GENERAL AGENTS

   Sec..401..Law enforcement powers of Inspector General agents.

   TITLE V--FEDERAL EMERGENCY PROCUREMENT FLEXIBILITY

   Subtitle A--Temporary Flexibility for Certain Procurements

   Sec..501..Definition.

   Sec..502..Procurements for defense against or recovery from terrorism or nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological attack.

   Sec..503..Increased simplified acquisition threshold for procurements in support of humanitarian or peacekeeping operations or contingency operations.

   Sec..504..Increased micro-purchase threshold for certain procurements.

   Sec..505..Application of certain commercial items authorities to certain procurements.

   Sec..506..Use of streamlined procedures.

   Sec..507..Review and report by Comptroller General.

   Subtitle B--Other Matters

   Sec..511..Identification of new entrants into the Federal marketplace.

   TITLE VI--EFFECTIVE DATE

   Sec..601..Effective date.

   DIVISION B--IMMIGRATION REFORM, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND SECURITY ENHANCEMENT ACT OF 2002

   Sec..1001..Short title.

   Sec..1002..Definitions.

   TITLE XI--DIRECTORATE OF IMMIGRATION AFFAIRS

   Subtitle A--Organization

   Sec..1101..Abolition of INS.

   Sec..1102..Establishment of Directorate of Immigration Affairs.

   Sec..1103..Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Immigration Affairs.

   Sec..1104..Bureau of Immigration Services.

   Sec..1105..Bureau of Enforcement and Border Affairs.

   Sec..1106..Office of the Ombudsman within the Directorate.

   Sec..1107..Office of Immigration Statistics within the Directorate.

   Sec..1108..Clerical amendments.

   Subtitle B--Transition Provisions

   Sec..1111..Transfer of functions.

   Sec..1112..Transfer of personnel and other resources.

   Sec..1113..Determinations with respect to functions and resources.

   Sec..1114..Delegation and reservation of functions.

   Sec..1115..Allocation of personnel and other resources.

   Sec..1116..Savings provisions.

   Sec..1117..Interim service of the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization.

   Sec..1118..Executive Office for Immigration Review authorities not affected.

   Sec..1119..Other authorities not affected.

   Sec..1120..Transition funding.

   Subtitle C--Miscellaneous Provisions

   Sec..1121..Funding adjudication and naturalization services.

   Sec..1122..Application of Internet-based technologies.

   Sec..1123..Alternatives to detention of asylum seekers.

   Subtitle D--Effective Date

   Sec..1131..Effective date.

   TITLE XII--UNACCOMPANIED ALIEN CHILD PROTECTION

   Sec..1201..Short title.

   Sec..1202..Definitions.

   Subtitle A--Structural Changes

   Sec..1211..Responsibilities of the Office of Refugee Resettlement with respect to unaccompanied alien children.

   Sec..1212..Establishment of interagency task force on unaccompanied alien children.

   Sec..1213..Transition provisions.

   Sec..1214..Effective date.

   Subtitle B--Custody, Release, Family Reunification, and Detention

   Sec..1221..Procedures when encountering unaccompanied alien children.

   Sec..1222..Family reunification for unaccompanied alien children with relatives in the United States.

   Sec..1223..Appropriate conditions for detention of unaccompanied alien children.

   Sec..1224..Repatriated unaccompanied alien children.

   Sec..1225..Establishing the age of an unaccompanied alien child.

   Sec..1226..Effective date.

   Subtitle C--Access by Unaccompanied Alien Children to Guardians Ad Litem and Counsel

   Sec..1231..Right of unaccompanied alien children to guardians ad litem.

   Sec..1232..Right of unaccompanied alien children to counsel.

   Sec..1233..Effective date; applicability.

   Subtitle D--Strengthening Policies for Permanent Protection of Alien Children

   Sec..1241..Special immigrant juvenile visa.

   Sec..1242..Training for officials and certain private parties who come into contact with unaccompanied alien children.

   Sec..1243..Effective date.

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   Subtitle E--Children Refugee and Asylum Seekers

   Sec..1251..Guidelines for children's asylum claims.

   Sec..1252..Unaccompanied refugee children.

   Subtitle F--Authorization of Appropriations

   Sec..1261..Authorization of appropriations.

   TITLE XIII--AGENCY FOR IMMIGRATION HEARINGS AND APPEALS

   Subtitle A--Structure and Function

   Sec..1301..Establishment.

   Sec..1302..Director of the Agency.

   Sec..1303..Board of Immigration Appeals.

   Sec..1304..Chief Immigration Judge.

   Sec..1305..Chief Administrative Hearing Officer.

   Sec..1306..Removal of Judges.

   Sec..1307..Authorization of appropriations.

   Subtitle B--Transfer of Functions and Savings Provisions

   Sec..1311..Transition provisions.

   Subtitle C--Effective Date

   Sec..1321..Effective date.

   DIVISION C--FEDERAL WORKFORCE IMPROVEMENT

   TITLE XXI--CHIEF HUMAN CAPITAL OFFICERS

   Sec..2101..Short title.

   Sec..2102..Agency Chief Human Capital Officers.

   Sec..2103..Chief Human Capital Officers Council.

   Sec..2104..Strategic Human Capital Management.

   Sec..2105..Effective date.

   TITLE XXII--REFORMS RELATING TO FEDERAL HUMAN CAPITAL MANAGEMENT

   Sec..2201..Inclusion of agency human capital strategic planning in performance plans and program performance reports.

   Sec..2202..Reform of the competitive service hiring process.

   Sec..2203..Permanent extension, revision, and expansion of authorities for use of voluntary separation incentive pay and voluntary early retirement.

   Sec..2204..Student volunteer transit subsidy.

   TITLE XXIII--REFORMS RELATING TO THE SENIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICE

   Sec..2301..Repeal of recertification requirements of senior executives.

   Sec..2302..Adjustment of limitation on total annual compensation.

   TITLE XXIV--ACADEMIC TRAINING

   Sec..2401..Academic training.

   Sec..2402..Modifications to National Security Education Program.

   Sec..2403..Compensatory time off for travel.

   SEC. 100. DEFINITIONS.

    Unless the context clearly indicates otherwise, the following shall apply for purposes of this division:

    (1) AGENCY.--Except for purposes of subtitle E of title I, the term ``agency''--

    (A) means--

    (i) an Executive agency as defined under section 105 of title 5, United States Code;

    (ii) a military department as defined under section 102 of title 5, United States Code;

    (iii) the United States Postal Service; and

    (B) does not include the General Accounting Office.

    (2) ASSETS.--The term ``assets'' includes contracts, facilities, property, records, unobligated or unexpended balances of appropriations, and other funds or resources (other than personnel).

    (3) DIRECTOR.--The term ``Director'' means the Director of the National Office for Combating Terrorism.

    (4) DEPARTMENT.--The term ``Department'' means the Department of Homeland Security established under title I.

    (5) ENTERPRISE ARCHITECTURE.--The term ``enterprise architecture''--

    (A) means--

    (i) a strategic information asset base, which defines the mission;

    (ii) the information necessary to perform the mission;

    (iii) the technologies necessary to perform the mission; and

    (iv) the transitional processes for implementing new technologies in response to changing mission needs; and

    (B) includes--

    (i) a baseline architecture;

    (ii) a target architecture; and

    (iii) a sequencing plan.

    (6) FEDERAL TERRORISM PREVENTION AND RESPONSE AGENCY.--The term ``Federal terrorism prevention and response agency'' means any Federal department or agency charged under the Strategy with responsibilities for carrying out the Strategy.

    (7) FUNCTIONS.--The term ``functions'' includes authorities, powers, rights, privileges, immunities, programs, projects, activities, duties, responsibilities, and obligations.

    (8) HOMELAND.--The term ``homeland'' means the United States, in a geographic sense.

    (9) LOCAL GOVERNMENT.--The term ``local government'' has the meaning given under section 102(6) of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Public Law 93-288).

    (10) OFFICE.--The term ``Office'' means the National Office for Combating Terrorism established under title II.

    (11) PERSONNEL.--The term ``personnel'' means officers and employees.

    (12) RISK ANALYSIS AND RISK MANAGEMENT.--The term ``risk analysis and risk management'' means the assessment, analysis, management, mitigation, and communication of homeland security threats, vulnerabilities, criticalities, and risks.

    (13) SECRETARY.--The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary of Homeland Security.

    (14) STRATEGY.--The term ``Strategy'' means the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism and the Homeland Security Response developed under this division.

    (15) UNITED STATES.--The term ``United States'', when used in a geographic sense, means any State (within the meaning of section 102(4) of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Public Law 93-288)), any possession of the United States, and any waters within the jurisdiction of the United States.

   SEC. 101. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY.

    (a) IN GENERAL.--There is established the Department of National Homeland Security.

    (b) EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT.--Section 101 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:

    ``The Department of Homeland Security.''.

    (c) MISSION OF DEPARTMENT.--

    (1) HOMELAND SECURITY.--The mission of the Department is to--

    (A) promote homeland security, particularly with regard to terrorism;

    (B) prevent terrorist attacks or other homeland threats within the United States;

    (C) reduce the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism, natural disasters, and other homeland threats; and

    (D) minimize the damage, and assist in the recovery, from terrorist attacks or other natural or man-made crises that occur within the United States.

    (2) OTHER MISSIONS.--The Department shall be responsible for carrying out the other functions, and promoting the other missions, of entities transferred to the Department as provided by law.

    (d) SEAL.--The Secretary shall procure a proper seal, with such suitable inscriptions and devices as the President shall approve. This seal, to be known as the official seal of the Department of Homeland Security, shall be kept and used to verify official documents, under such rules and regulations as the Secretary may prescribe. Judicial notice shall be taken of the seal.

   SEC. 102. SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY.

    (a) IN GENERAL.--The Secretary of Homeland Security shall be the head of the Department. The Secretary shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.

    (b) RESPONSIBILITIES.--The responsibilities of the Secretary shall be the following:

    (1) To develop policies, goals, objectives, priorities, and plans for the United States for the promotion of homeland security, particularly with regard to terrorism.

    (2) To administer, carry out, and promote the other established missions of the entities transferred to the Department.

    (3) To develop, with the Director, a comprehensive strategy for combating terrorism and the homeland security response in accordance with title III.

    (4) To advise the Director on the development of a comprehensive annual budget for programs and activities under the Strategy, and have the responsibility for budget recommendations relating to border and transportation security, critical infrastructure protection, emergency preparedness and response, science and technology promotion related to homeland security, and Federal support for State and local activities.

    (5) To plan, coordinate, and integrate those Federal Government activities relating to border and transportation security, critical infrastructure protection, all-hazards emergency preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation.

    (6) To serve as a national focal point to analyze all information available to the United States related to threats of terrorism and other homeland threats.

    (7) To establish and manage a comprehensive risk analysis and risk management program that directs and coordinates the supporting risk analysis and risk management activities of the Directorates and ensures coordination with entities outside the Department engaged in such activities.

    (8) To identify and promote key scientific and technological advances that will enhance homeland security.

    (9) To include, as appropriate, State and local governments and other entities in the full range of activities undertaken by the Department to promote homeland security, including--

    (A) providing State and local government personnel, agencies, and authorities, with appropriate intelligence information, including warnings, regarding threats posed by terrorism in a timely and secure manner;

    (B) facilitating efforts by State and local law enforcement and other officials to assist in the collection and dissemination of intelligence information and to provide information to the Department, and other agencies, in a timely and secure manner;

    (C) coordinating with State, regional, and local government personnel, agencies, and authorities and, as appropriate, with the private sector, other entities, and the public, to

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    (D) consulting State and local governments, and other entities as appropriate, in developing the Strategy under title III; and

    (E) systematically identifying and removing obstacles to developing effective partnerships between the Department, other agencies, and State, regional, and local government personnel, agencies, and authorities, the private sector, other entities, and the public to secure the homeland.

    (10)(A) To consult and coordinate with the Secretary of Defense and the governors of the several States regarding integration of the United States military, including the National Guard, into all aspects of the Strategy and its implementation, including detection, prevention, protection, response, and recovery.

    (B) To consult and coordinate with the Secretary of Defense and make recommendations concerning organizational structure, equipment, and positioning of military assets determined critical to executing the Strategy.

    (C) To consult and coordinate with the Secretary of Defense regarding the training of personnel to respond to terrorist attacks involving chemical or biological agents.

    (11) To seek to ensure effective day-to-day coordination of homeland security operations, and establish effective mechanisms for such coordination, among the elements constituting the Department and with other involved and affected Federal, State, and local departments and agencies.

    (12) To administer the Homeland Security Advisory System, exercising primary responsibility for public threat advisories, and (in coordination with other agencies) providing specific warning information to State and local government personnel, agencies and authorities, the private sector, other entities, and the public, and advice about appropriate protective actions and countermeasures.

    (13) To conduct exercise and training programs for employees of the Department and other involved agencies, and establish effective command and control procedures for the full range of potential contingencies regarding United States homeland security, including contingencies that require the substantial support of military assets.

    (14) To annually review, update, and amend the Federal response plan for homeland security and emergency preparedness with regard to terrorism and other manmade and natural disasters.

    (15) To direct the acquisition and management of all of the information resources of the Department, including communications resources.

    (16) To endeavor to make the information technology systems of the Department, including communications systems, effective, efficient, secure, and appropriately interoperable.

    (17) In furtherance of paragraph (16), to oversee and ensure the development and implementation of an enterprise architecture for Department-wide information technology, with timetables for implementation.

    (18) As the Secretary considers necessary, to oversee and ensure the development and implementation of updated versions of the enterprise architecture under paragraph (17).

    (19) To report to Congress on the development and implementation of the enterprise architecture under paragraph (17) in--

    (A) each implementation progress report required under section 185; and

    (B) each biennial report required under section 192(b).

    (c) VISA ISSUANCE BY THE SECRETARY.--

    (1) DEFINITION.--In this subsection, the term ``consular officer'' has the meaning given that term under section 101(a)(9) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(9)).

    (2) IN GENERAL.--Notwithstanding section 104(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1104(a)) or any other provision of law, and except as provided under paragraph (3), the Secretary--

    (A) shall be vested exclusively with all authorities to issue regulations with respect to, administer, and enforce the provisions of such Act, and of all other immigration and nationality laws, relating to the functions of consular officers of the United States in connection with the granting or refusal of visas, which authorities shall be exercised through the Secretary of State, except that the Secretary shall not have authority to alter or reverse the decision of a consular officer to refuse a visa to an alien; and

    (B)(i) may delegate in whole or part the authority under subparagraph (A) to the Secretary of State; and

    (ii) shall have authority to confer or impose upon any officer or employee of the United States, with the consent of the head of the executive agency under whose jurisdiction such officer or employee is serving, any of the functions specified in subparagraph (A).

    (3) AUTHORITY OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE.--

    (A) IN GENERAL.--The Secretary of State may direct a consular officer to refuse a visa to an alien if the Secretary of State considers such refusal necessary or advisable in the foreign policy or security interests of the United States.

    (B) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.--Nothing in this subsection shall be construed as affecting the authorities of the Secretary of State under the following provisions of law:

    (i) Section 101(a)(15)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(15)(A)).

    (ii) Section 212(a)(3)(B)(i)(IV)(bb) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(IV)(bb)).

    (iii) Section 212(a)(3)(B)(i)(VI) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(VI)).

    (iv) Section 212(a)(3)(B)(vi)(II) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182 (a)(3)(B)(vi)(II)).

    (v) Section 212(a)(3)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(C)).

    (vi) Section 212(a)(10)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(10)(C)).

    (vii) Section 212(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(f)).

    (viii) Section 219(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189(a)).

    (ix) Section 237(a)(4)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(4)(C)).

    (x) Section 104 of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (22 U.S.C. 6034).

    (xi) Section 616 of the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1999 (Public Law 105-277).

    (xii) Section 103(f) of the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998 (112 Stat. 2681-865).

    (xiii) Section 801 of the Admiral James W. Nance and Meg Donovan Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2002 and 2001 (113 Stat. 1501A-468).

    (xiv) Section 568 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2002 (Public Law 107-115).

    (xv) Section 51 of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2723).

    (xvi) Section 204(d)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1154) (as it will take effect upon the entry into force of the Convention on Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect to Inter-Country Adoption).

    (4) CONSULAR OFFICERS AND CHIEFS OF MISSIONS.--Nothing in this subsection may be construed to alter or affect--

    (A) the employment status of consular officers as employees of the Department of State; or

    (B) the authority of a chief of mission under section 207 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (22 U.S.C. 3927).

    (5) ASSIGNMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY EMPLOYEES TO DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS.--

    (A) IN GENERAL.--The Secretary is authorized to assign employees of the Department to diplomatic and consular posts abroad to perform the following functions:

    (i) Provide expert advice to consular officers regarding specific security threats relating to the adjudication of individual visa applications or classes of applications.

    (ii) Review any such applications, either on the initiative of the employee of the Department or upon request by a consular officer or other person charged with adjudicating such applications.

    (iii) Conduct investigations with respect to matters under the jurisdiction of the Secretary.

    (B) PERMANENT ASSIGNMENT; PARTICIPATION IN TERRORIST LOOKOUT COMMITTEE.--When appropriate, employees of the Department assigned to perform functions described in subparagraph (A) may be assigned permanently to overseas diplomatic or consular posts with country-specific or regional responsibility. If the Secretary so directs, any such employee, when present at an overseas post, shall participate in the terrorist lookout committee established under section 304 of the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 (8 U.S.C. 1733).

    (C) TRAINING AND HIRING.--

    (i) IN GENERAL.--The Secretary shall ensure that any employees of the Department assigned to perform functions described under subparagraph (A) and, as appropriate, consular officers, shall be provided all necessary training to enable them to carry out such functions, including training in foreign languages, in conditions in the particular country where each employee is assigned, and in other appropriate areas of study.

    (ii) FOREIGN LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY.--Before assigning employees of the Department to perform the functions described under subparagraph (A), the Secretary shall promulgate regulations establishing foreign language proficiency requirements for employees of the Department performing the functions described under subparagraph (A) and providing that preference shall be given to individuals who meet such requirements in hiring employees for the performance of such functions.

    (iii) USE OF CENTER.--The Secretary is authorized to use the National Foreign Affairs Training Center, on a reimbursable basis, to obtain the training described in clause (i).

    (6) REPORT.--Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary and the Secretary of State shall submit to Congress--

    (A) a report on the implementation of this subsection; and

    (B) any legislative proposals necessary to further the objectives of this subsection.

    (7) EFFECTIVE DATE.--This subsection shall take effect on the earlier of--

    (A) the date on which the President publishes notice in the Federal Register that the President has submitted a report to Congress setting forth a memorandum of understanding between the Secretary and the Secretary of State governing the implementation of this section; or

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    (B) the date occurring 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act.

    (d) MEMBERSHIP ON THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL.--Section 101(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402(a)) is amended in the fourth sentence by striking paragraphs (5), (6), and (7) and inserting the following:

    ``(5) the Secretary of Homeland Security; and

    ``(6) each Secretary or Under Secretary of such other executive department, or of a military department, as the President shall designate.''.

   SEC. 103. DEPUTY SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY.

    (a) IN GENERAL.--There shall be in the Department a Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security, who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.

    (b) RESPONSIBILITIES.--The Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security shall--

    (1) assist the Secretary in the administration and operations of the Department;

    (2) perform such responsibilities as the Secretary shall prescribe; and

    (3) act as the Secretary during the absence or disability of the Secretary or in the event of a vacancy in the office of the Secretary.

   SEC. 104. UNDER SECRETARY FOR MANAGEMENT.

    (a) IN GENERAL.--There shall be in the Department an Under Secretary for Management, who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.

    (b) RESPONSIBILITIES.--The Under Secretary for Management shall report to the Secretary, who may assign to the Under Secretary such functions related to the management and administration of the Department as the Secretary may prescribe, including--

    (1) the budget, appropriations, expenditures of funds, accounting, and finance;

    (2) procurement;

    (3) human resources and personnel;

    (4) information technology and communications systems;

    (5) facilities, property, equipment, and other material resources;

    (6) security for personnel, information technology and communications systems, facilities, property, equipment, and other material resources; and

    (7) identification and tracking of performance measures relating to the responsibilities of the Department.

   SEC. 105. ASSISTANT SECRETARIES.

    (a) IN GENERAL.--There shall be in the Department not more than 5 Assistant Secretaries (not including the 2 Assistant Secretaries appointed under division B), each of whom shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.

    (b) RESPONSIBILITIES.--

    (1) IN GENERAL.--Whenever the President submits the name of an individual to the Senate for confirmation as an Assistant Secretary under this section, the President shall describe the general responsibilities that such appointee will exercise upon taking office.

    (2) ASSIGNMENT.--Subject to paragraph (1), the Secretary shall assign to each Assistant Secretary such functions as the Secretary considers appropriate.

   SEC. 106. INSPECTOR GENERAL.

    (a) IN GENERAL.--There shall be in the Department an Inspector General. The Inspector General and the Office of Inspector General shall be subject to the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.).

    (b) ESTABLISHMENT.--Section 11 of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended--

    (1) in paragraph (1), by inserting ``Homeland Security,'' after ``Health and Human Services,''; and

    (2) in paragraph (2), by inserting ``Homeland Security,'' after ``Health and Human Services,''.

    (c) REVIEW OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY.--The Inspector General shall designate 1 official who shall--

    (1) review information and receive complaints alleging abuses of civil rights and civil liberties by employees and officials of the Department;

    (2) publicize, through the Internet, radio, television, and newspaper advertisements--

    (A) information on the responsibilities and functions of the official; and

    (B) instructions on how to contact the official; and

    (3) on a semi-annual basis, submit to Congress, for referral to the appropriate committee or committees, a report--

    (A) describing the implementation of this subsection;

    (B) detailing any civil rights abuses under paragraph (1); and

    (C) accounting for the expenditure of funds to carry out this subsection.

    (d) ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY.--The Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended--

    (1) by redesignating section 8I as section 8J; and

    (2) by inserting after section 8H the following:

   SPECIAL PROVISIONS CONCERNING THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

    ``SEC. 8I. (a)(1) Notwithstanding the last 2 sentences of section 3(a), the Inspector General of the Department of Homeland Security (in this section referred to as the ``Inspector General'') shall be under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Homeland Security (in this section referred to as the ``Secretary'') with respect to audits or investigations, or the issuance of subpoenas, which require access to sensitive information concerning--

    ``(A) intelligence or counterintelligence matters;

    ``(B) ongoing criminal investigations or proceedings;

    ``(C) undercover operations;

    ``(D) the identity of confidential sources, including protected witnesses;

    ``(E) other matters the disclosure of which would constitute a serious threat to the protection of any person or property authorized protection by--

    ``(i) section 3056 of title 18, United States Code;

    ``(ii) section 202 of title 3, United States Code; or

    ``(iii) any provision of the Presidential Protection Assistance Act of 1976 (18 U.S.C. 3056 note); or

    ``(F) other matters the disclosure of which would constitute a serious threat to national security.

    ``(2) With respect to the information described under paragraph (1), the Secretary may prohibit the Inspector General from carrying out or completing any audit or investigation, or from issuing any subpoena, after such Inspector General has decided to initiate, carry out, or complete such audit or investigation or to issue such subpoena, if the Secretary determines that such prohibition is necessary to--

    ``(A) prevent the disclosure of any information described under paragraph (1);

    ``(B) preserve the national security; or

    ``(C) prevent significant impairment to the national interests of the United States.

    ``(3) If the Secretary exercises any power under paragraph (1) or (2), the Secretary shall notify the Inspector General in writing (appropriately classified, if necessary) within 7 calendar days stating the reasons for such exercise. Within 30 days after receipt of any such notice, the Inspector General shall transmit a copy of such notice, together with such comments concerning the exercise of such power as the Inspector General considers appropriate, to--

    ``(A) the President of the Senate;

    ``(B) the Speaker of the House of Representatives;

    ``(C) the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the Senate;

    ``(D) the Committee on Government Reform of the House of Representatives; and

    ``(E) other appropriate committees or subcommittees of Congress.

    ``(b)(1) In carrying out the duties and responsibilities under this Act, the Inspector General shall have oversight responsibility for the internal investigations and audits performed by any other office performing internal investigatory or audit functions in any subdivision of the Department of Homeland Security.

    ``(2) The head of each other office described under paragraph (1) shall promptly report to the Inspector General the significant activities being carried out by such office.

    ``(3) Notwithstanding paragraphs (1) and (2), the Inspector General may initiate, conduct, and supervise such audits and investigations in the Department (including in any subdivision referred to in paragraph (1)) as the Inspector General considers appropriate.

    ``(4) If the Inspector General initiates an audit or investigation under paragraph (3) concerning a subdivision referred to in paragraph (1), the Inspector General may provide the head of the other office performing internal investigatory or audit functions in the subdivision with written notice that the Inspector General has initiated such an audit or investigation. If the Inspector General issues such a notice, no other audit or investigation shall be initiated into the matter under audit or investigation by the Inspector General, and any other audit or investigation of such matter shall cease.

    ``(c) Any report required to be transmitted by the Secretary to the appropriate committees or subcommittees of Congress under section 5(d) shall also be transmitted, within the 7-day period specified under that subsection, to--

    ``(1) the President of the Senate;

    ``(2) the Speaker of the House of Representatives;

    ``(3) the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the Senate; and

    ``(4) the Committee on Government Reform of the House of Representatives.''.

    (e) TECHNICAL AND CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.--The Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. appendix) is amended--

    (1) in section 4(b), by striking ``8F'' each place it appears and inserting ``8G''; and

    (2) in section 8J (as redesignated by subsection (c)(1)), by striking ``or 8H'' and inserting ``, 8H, or 8I''.''

   SEC. 107. CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER.

    (a) IN GENERAL.--There shall be in the Department a Chief Financial Officer, who shall be appointed or designated in the manner prescribed under section 901(a)(1) of title 31, United States Code.

    (b) ESTABLISHMENT.--Section 901(b)(1) of title 31, United States Code, is amended--

    (1) by redesignating subparagraphs (G) through (P) as subparagraphs (H) through (Q), respectively; and

    (2) by inserting after subparagraph (F) the following:

    ``(G) The Department of Homeland Security.''.

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   SEC. 108. CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER.

    (a) IN GENERAL.--There shall be in the Department a Chief Information Officer, who shall be designated in the manner prescribed under section 3506(a)(2)(A) of title 44, United States Code.

    (b) RESPONSIBILITIES.--The Chief Information Officer shall assist the Secretary with Department-wide information resources management and perform those duties prescribed by law for chief information officers of agencies.

   SEC. 109. GENERAL COUNSEL.

    (a) IN GENERAL.--There shall be in the Department a General Counsel, who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.

    (b) RESPONSIBILITIES.--The General Counsel shall--

    (1) serve as the chief legal officer of the Department;

    (2) provide legal assistance to the Secretary concerning the programs and policies of the Department; and

    (3) advise and assist the Secretary in carrying out the responsibilities under section 102(b).

   SEC. 110. CIVIL RIGHTS OFFICER.

    (a) IN GENERAL.--There shall be in the Department a Civil Rights Officer, who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.

    (b) RESPONSIBILITIES.--The Civil Rights Officer shall be responsible for--

    (1) ensuring compliance with all civil rights and related laws and regulations applicable to Department employees and participants in Department programs;

    (2) coordinating administration of all civil rights and related laws and regulations within the Department for Department employees and participants in Department programs;

    (3) assisting the Secretary, directorates, and offices with the development and implementation of policies and procedures that ensure that civil rights considerations are appropriately incorporated and implemented in Department programs and activities;

    (4) overseeing compliance with statutory and constitutional requirements related to the civil rights of individuals affected by the programs and activities of the Department; and

    (5) notifying the Inspector General of any matter that, in the opinion of the Civil Rights Officer, warrants further investigation.

   SEC. 111. PRIVACY OFFICER.

    (a) IN GENERAL.--There shall be in the Department a Privacy Officer, who shall be appointed by the Secretary.

    (b) RESPONSIBILITIES.--The Privacy Officer shall--

    (1) oversee compliance with section 552a of title 5, United States Code (commonly referred to as the Privacy Act of 1974) and all other applicable laws relating to the privacy of personal information;

    (2) assist the Secretary, directorates, and offices with the development and implementation of policies and procedures that ensure that--

    (A) privacy considerations and safeguards are appropriately incorporated and implemented in Department programs and activities; and

    (B) any information received by the Department is used or disclosed in a manner that minimizes the risk of harm to individuals from the inappropriate disclosure or use of such materials;

    (3) assist Department personnel with the preparation of privacy impact assessments when required by law or considered appropriate by the Secretary; and

    (4) notify the Inspector General of any matter that, in the opinion of the Privacy Officer, warrants further investigation.

   SEC. 112. CHIEF HUMAN CAPITAL OFFICER.

    (a) IN GENERAL.--The Secretary shall appoint or designate a Chief Human Capital Officer, who shall--

    (1) advise and assist the Secretary and other officers of the Department in ensuring that the workforce of the Department has the necessary skills and training, and that the recruitment and retention policies of the Department allow the Department to attract and retain a highly qualified workforce, in accordance with all applicable laws and requirements, to enable the Department to achieve its missions;

    (2) oversee the implementation of the laws, rules and regulations of the President and the Office of Personnel Management governing the civil service within the Department; and

    (3) advise and assist the Secretary in planning and reporting under the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (including the amendments made by that Act), with respect to the human capital resources and needs of the Department for achieving the plans and goals of the Department.

    (b) RESPONSIBILITIES.--The responsibilities of the Chief Human Capital Officer shall include--

    (1) setting the workforce development strategy of the Department;

    (2) assessing workforce characteristics and future needs based on the mission and strategic plan of the Department;

    (3) aligning the human resources policies and programs of the Department with organization mission, strategic goals, and performance outcomes;

    (4) developing and advocating a culture of continuous learning to attract and retain employees with superior abilities;

    (5) identifying best practices and benchmarking studies;

    (6) applying methods for measuring intellectual capital and identifying links of that capital to organizational performance and growth; and

    (7) providing employee training and professional development.

   SEC. 113. OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS.

    (a) ESTABLISHMENT.--There is established within the Office of the Secretary, an Office of International Affairs. The Office shall be headed by a Director who shall be appointed by the Secretary.

    (b) RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE DIRECTOR.--The Director shall have the following responsibilities:

    (1) To promote information and education exchange with foreign nations in order to promote sharing of best practices and technologies relating to homeland security. Such information exchange shall include--

    (A) joint research and development on countermeasures;

    (B) joint training exercises of first responders; and

    (C) exchange of expertise on terrorism prevention, response, and crisis management.

    (2) To identify areas for homeland security information and training exchange.

    (3) To plan and undertake international conferences, exchange programs, and training activities.

    (4) To manage activities under this section and other international activities within the Department in consultation with the Department of State and other relevant Federal officials.

    (5) To initially concentrate on fostering cooperation with countries that are already highly focused on homeland security issues and that have demonstrated the capability for fruitful cooperation with the United States in the area of counterterrorism.

   SEC. 114. EXECUTIVE SCHEDULE POSITIONS.

    (a) EXECUTIVE SCHEDULE LEVEL I POSITION.--Section 5312 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:

    ``Secretary of Homeland Security.''.

    (b) EXECUTIVE SCHEDULE LEVEL II POSITION.--Section 5313 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:

    ``Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security.''.

    (c) EXECUTIVE SCHEDULE LEVEL III POSITION.--Section 5314 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:

    ``Under Secretary for Management, Department of Homeland Security.''.

    (d) EXECUTIVE SCHEDULE LEVEL IV POSITIONS.--Section 5315 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:

    ``Assistant Secretaries of Homeland Security (5).

    ``Inspector General, Department of Homeland Security.

    ``Chief Financial Officer, Department of Homeland Security.

    ``Chief Information Officer, Department of Homeland Security.

    ``General Counsel, Department of Homeland Security.''.

   SEC. 131. DIRECTORATE OF BORDER AND TRANSPORTATION PROTECTION.

    (a) ESTABLISHMENT.--

    (1) DIRECTORATE.--There is established within the Department the Directorate of Border and Transportation Protection.

    (2) UNDER SECRETARY.--There shall be an Under Secretary for Border and Transportation, who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.

    (b) RESPONSIBILITIES.--The Directorate of Border and Transportation Protection shall be responsible for the following:

    (1) Securing the borders, territorial waters, ports, terminals, waterways and air, land (including rail), and sea transportation systems of the United States, including coordinating governmental activities at ports of entry.

    (2) Receiving and providing relevant intelligence on threats of terrorism and other homeland threats.

    (3) Administering, carrying out, and promoting other established missions of the entities transferred to the Directorate.

    (4) Using intelligence from the Directorate of Intelligence and other Federal intelligence organizations under section 132(a)(1)(B) to establish inspection priorities to identify products, including agriculture and livestock, and other goods imported from suspect locations recognized by the intelligence community as having terrorist activities, unusual human health or agriculture disease outbreaks, or harboring terrorists.

    (5) Providing agency-specific training for agents and analysts within the Department, other agencies, and State and local agencies and international entities that have established partnerships with the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center.

    (6) Assisting and supporting the Secretary, in coordination with other Directorates and entities outside the Department, in conducting appropriate risk analysis and risk management activities consistent with the mission and functions of the Directorate.

    (7) Performing such other duties as assigned by the Secretary.

    (c) TRANSFER OF AUTHORITIES, FUNCTIONS, PERSONNEL, AND ASSETS TO THE DEPARTMENT.--Except as provided under subsection

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    (1) The United States Customs Service, which shall be maintained as a distinct entity within the Department.

    (2) The United States Coast Guard, which shall be maintained as a distinct entity within the Department.

    (3) The Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service of the Department of Agriculture, that portion of which administers laws relating to agricultural quarantine inspections at points of entry.

    (4) The Transportation Security Administration of the Department of Transportation.

    (5) The Federal Law Enforcement Training Center of the Department of the Treasury.

    (d) EXERCISE OF CUSTOMS REVENUE AUTHORITY.--

    (1) IN GENERAL.--

    (A) AUTHORITIES NOT TRANSFERRED.--Notwithstanding subsection (c), authority that was vested in the Secretary of the Treasury by law to issue regulations related to customs revenue functions before the effective date of this section under the provisions of law set forth under paragraph (2) shall not be transferred to the Secretary by reason of this Act. The Secretary of the Treasury, with the concurrence of the Secretary, shall exercise this authority. The Commissioner of Customs is authorized to engage in activities to develop and support the issuance of the regulations described in this paragraph. The Secretary shall be responsible for the implementation and enforcement of regulations issued under this section.

    (B) REPORT.--Not later than 60 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Treasury shall submit a report to the Committee on Finance of the Senate and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives of proposed conforming amendments to the statutes set forth under paragraph (2) in order to determine the appropriate allocation of legal authorities described under this subsection. The Secretary of the Treasury shall also identify those authorities vested in the Secretary of the Treasury that are exercised by the Commissioner of Customs on or before the effective date of this section.

    (C) LIABILITY.--Neither the Secretary of the Treasury nor the Department of the Treasury shall be liable for or named in any legal action concerning the implementation and enforcement of regulations issued under this paragraph on or after the date on which the United States Customs Service is transferred under this division.

    (2) APPLICABLE LAWS.--The provisions of law referred to under paragraph (1) are those sections of the following statutes that relate to customs revenue functions:

    (A) The Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1304 et seq.).

    (B) Section 249 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (19 U.S.C. 3).

    (C) Section 2 of the Act of March 4, 1923 (19 U.S.C. 6).

    (D) Section 13031 of the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (19 U.S.C. 58c).

    (E) Section 251 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (19 U.S.C. 66).

    (F) Section 1 of the Act of June 26, 1930 (19 U.S.C. 68).

    (G) The Foreign Trade Zones Act (19 U.S.C. 81a et seq.).

    (H) Section 1 of the Act of March 2, 1911 (19 U.S.C. 198).

    (I) The Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2101 et seq.).

    (J) The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (19 U.S.C. 2502 et seq.).

    (K) The North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act (19 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.).

    (L) The Uruguay Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.).

    (M) The Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (19 U.S.C. 2701 et seq.).

    (N) The Andean Trade Preference Act (19 U.S.C. 3201 et seq.).

    (O) The African Growth and Opportunity Act (19 U.S.C. 3701 et seq.).

    (P) Any other provision of law vesting customs revenue functions in the Secretary of the Treasury.

    (3) DEFINITION OF CUSTOMS REVENUE FUNCTIONS.--In this subsection, the term ``customs revenue functions'' means--

    (A) assessing, collecting, and refunding duties (including any special duties), excise taxes, fees, and any liquidated damages or penalties due on imported merchandise, including classifying and valuing merchandise and the procedures for ``entry'' as that term is defined in the United States Customs laws;

    (B) administering section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 and provisions relating to import quotas and the marking of imported merchandise, and providing Customs Recordations for copyrights, patents, and trademarks;

    (C) collecting accurate import data for compilation of international trade statistics; and

    (D) administering reciprocal trade agreements and trade preference legislation.

    (e) PRESERVING COAST GUARD MISSION PERFORMANCE.--

    (1) DEFINITIONS.--In this subsection:

    (A) NON-HOMELAND SECURITY MISSIONS.--The term ``non-homeland security missions'' means the following missions of the Coast Guard:

    (i) Marine safety.

    (ii) Search and rescue.

    (iii) Aids to navigation.

    (iv) Living marine resources (fisheries law enforcement).

    (v) Marine environmental protection.

    (vi) Ice operations.

    (B) HOMELAND SECURITY MISSIONS.--The term ``homeland security missions'' means the following missions of the Coast Guard:

    (i) Ports, waterways and coastal security.

    (ii) Drug interdiction.

    (iii) Migrant interdiction.

    (iv) Defense readiness.

    (v) Other law enforcement.

    (2) MAINTENANCE OF STATUS OF FUNCTIONS AND ASSETS.--Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the authorities, functions, assets, organizational structure, units, personnel, and non-homeland security missions of the Coast Guard shall be maintained intact and without reduction after the transfer of the Coast Guard to the Department, except as specified in subsequent Acts.

    (3) CERTAIN TRANSFERS PROHIBITED.--None of the missions, functions, personnel, and assets (including for purposes of this subsection ships, aircraft, helicopters, and vehicles) of the Coast Guard may be transferred to the operational control of, or diverted to the principal and continuing use of, any other organization, unit, or entity of the Department.

    (4) CHANGES TO NON-HOMELAND SECURITY MISSIONS.--

    (A) PROHIBITION.--The Secretary may not make any substantial or significant change to any of the non-homeland security missions of the Coast Guard, or to the capabilities of the Coast Guard to carry out each of the non-homeland security missions, without the prior approval of Congress as expressed in a subsequent Act.

    (B) WAIVER.--The President may waive the restrictions under subparagraph (A) for a period of not to exceed 90 days upon a declaration and certification by the President to Congress that a clear, compelling, and immediate state of national emergency exists that justifies such a waiver. A certification under this paragraph shall include a detailed justification for the declaration and certification, including the reasons and specific information that demonstrate that the Nation and the Coast Guard cannot respond effectively to the national emergency if the restrictions under subparagraph (A) are not waived.

    (5) ANNUAL REVIEW.--

    (A) IN GENERAL.--The Inspector General of the Department shall conduct an annual review that shall assess thoroughly the performance by the Coast Guard of all missions of the Coast Guard (including non-homeland security missions and homeland security missions) with a particular emphasis on examining the non-homeland security missions.

    (B) REPORT.--The report under this paragraph shall be submitted not later than March 1 of each year to--

    (i) the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the Senate;

    (ii) the Committee on Government Reform of the House of Representatives;

    (iii) the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Representatives;

    (iv) the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate; and

    (v) the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure of the House of Representatives.

    (6) DIRECT REPORTING TO SECRETARY.--Upon the transfer of the Coast Guard to the Department, the Commandant shall report directly to the Secretary without being required to report through any other official of the Department.

    (7) OPERATION AS A SERVICE IN THE NAVY.--None of the conditions and restrictions in this subsection shall apply when the Coast Guard operates as a service in the Navy under section 3 of title 14, United States Code.

   SEC. 132. DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE.

    (a) ESTABLISHMENT.--

    (1) DIRECTORATE.--

    (A) IN GENERAL.--There is established a Directorate of Intelligence which shall serve as a national-level focal point for information available to the United States Government relating to the plans, intentions, and capabilities of terrorists and terrorist organizations for the purpose of supporting the mission of the Department.

    (B) SUPPORT TO DIRECTORATE.--The Directorate of Intelligence shall communicate, coordinate, and cooperate with--

    (i) the Federal Bureau of Investigation;

    (ii) the intelligence community, as defined under section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a), including the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, the National Intelligence Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State; and

    (iii) other agencies or entities, including those within the Department, as determined by the Secretary.

    (C) INFORMATION ON INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM.--

    (i) DEFINITIONS.--In this subparagraph, the terms ``foreign intelligence'' and ``counterintelligence'' shall have the meaning given those terms in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a).

    (ii) PROVISION OF INFORMATION TO COUNTERTERRORIST CENTER.--In order to ensure that the Secretary is provided with appropriate analytical products, assessments,

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    (iii) ANALYSIS OF INFORMATION.--The Director of Central Intelligence shall ensure the analysis by the Counterterrorist Center of all intelligence and other information provided the Counterterrorist Center under clause (ii).

    (iv) ANALYSIS OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE.--The Counterterrorist Center shall have primary responsibility for the analysis of foreign intelligence relating to international terrorism.

    (2) UNDER SECRETARY.--There shall be an Under Secretary for Intelligence who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.

    (b) RESPONSIBILITIES.--The Directorate of Intelligence shall be responsible for the following:

    (1)(A) Receiving and analyzing law enforcement and other information from agencies of the United States Government, State and local government agencies (including law enforcement agencies), and private sector entities, and fusing such information and analysis with analytical products, assessments, and warnings concerning foreign intelligence from the Director of Central Intelligence's Counterterrorist Center in order to--

    (i) identify and assess the nature and scope of threats to the homeland; and

    (ii) detect and identify threats of terrorism against the United States and other threats to homeland security.

    (B) Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to prohibit the Directorate from conducting supplemental analysis of foreign intelligence relating to threats of terrorism against the United States and other threats to homeland security.

    (2) Ensuring timely and efficient access by the Directorate to--

    (A) information from agencies described under subsection (a)(1)(B), State and local governments, local law enforcement and intelligence agencies, private sector entities; and

    (B) open source information.

    (3) Representing the Department in procedures to establish requirements and priorities in the collection of national intelligence for purposes of the provision to the executive branch under section 103 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3) of national intelligence relating to foreign terrorist threats to the homeland.

    (4) Consulting with the Attorney General or the designees of the Attorney General, and other officials of the United States Government to establish overall collection priorities and strategies for information, including law enforcement information, relating to domestic threats, such as terrorism, to the homeland.

    (5) Disseminating information to the Directorate of Critical Infrastructure Protection, the agencies described under subsection (a)(1)(B), State and local governments, local law enforcement and intelligence agencies, and private sector entities to assist in the deterrence, prevention, preemption, and response to threats of terrorism against the United States and other threats to homeland security.

    (6) Establishing and utilizing, in conjunction with the Chief Information Officer of the Department and the appropriate officers of the agencies described under subsection (a)(1)(B), a secure communications and information technology infrastructure, and advanced analytical tools, to carry out the mission of the Directorate.

    (7) Developing, in conjunction with the Chief Information Officer of the Department and appropriate officers of the agencies described under subsection (a)(1)(B), appropriate software, hardware, and other information technology, and security and formatting protocols, to ensure that Federal Government databases and information technology systems containing information relevant to terrorist threats, and other threats against the United States, are--

    (A) compatible with the secure communications and information technology infrastructure referred to under paragraph (6); and

    (B) comply with Federal laws concerning privacy and the prevention of unauthorized disclosure.

    (8) Ensuring, in conjunction with the Director of Central Intelligence and the Attorney General, that all material received by the Department is protected against unauthorized disclosure and is utilized by the Department only in the course and for the purpose of fulfillment of official duties, and is transmitted, retained, handled, and disseminated consistent with--

    (A) the authority of the Director of Central Intelligence to protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure under the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) and related procedures; or

    (B) as appropriate, similar authorities of the Attorney General concerning sensitive law enforcement information, and the privacy interests of United States persons as defined under section 101 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801).

    (9) Providing, through the Secretary, to the appropriate law enforcement or intelligence agency, information and analysis relating to threats.

    (10) Coordinating, or where appropriate providing, training and other support as necessary to providers of information to the Department, or consumers of information from the Department, to allow such providers or consumers to identify and share intelligence information revealed in their ordinary duties or utilize information received from the Department, including training and support under section 908 of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 (Public Law 107-56).

    (11) Reviewing, analyzing, and making recommendations through the Secretary for improvements in the policies and procedures governing the sharing of law enforcement, intelligence, and other information relating to threats of terrorism against the United States and other threats to homeland security within the United States Government and between the United States Government and State and local governments, local law enforcement and intelligence agencies, and private sector entities.

    (12) Assisting and supporting the Secretary, in coordination with other Directorates and entities outside the Department, in conducting appropriate risk analysis and risk management activities consistent with the mission and functions of the Directorate.

    (13) Performing other related and appropriate duties as assigned by the Secretary.

    (c) ACCESS TO INFORMATION.--

    (1) IN GENERAL.--Unless otherwise directed by the President, the Secretary shall have access to, and United States Government agencies shall provide, all reports, assessments, analytical information, and information, including unevaluated intelligence, relating to the plans, intentions, capabilities, and activities of terrorists and terrorist organizations, and to other areas of responsibility as described in this division, that may be collected, possessed, or prepared, by any other United States Government agency.

    (2) ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.--As the President may further provide, the Secretary shall receive additional information requested by the Secretary from the agencies described under subsection (a)(1)(B).

    (3) OBTAINING INFORMATION.--All information shall be provided to the Secretary consistent with the requirements of subsection (b)(8), unless otherwise determined by the President.

    (4) COOPERATIVE ARRANGEMENTS.--The Secretary may enter into cooperative arrangements with agencies described under subsection (a)(1)(B) to share material on a regular or routine basis, including arrangements involving broad categories of material, and regardless of whether the Secretary has entered into any such cooperative arrangement, all agencies described under subsection (a)(1)(B) shall promptly provide information under this subsection.

    (d) AUTHORIZATION TO SHARE LAW ENFORCEMENT INFORMATION.--The Secretary shall be deemed to be a Federal law enforcement, intelligence, protective, national defense, or national security official for purposes of information sharing provisions of--

    (1) section 203(d) of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 (Public Law 107-56);

    (2) section 2517(6) of title 18, United States Code; and

    (3) rule 6(e)(3)(C) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.

    (e) ADDITIONAL RISK ANALYSIS AND RISK MANAGEMENT RESPONSIBILITIES.--The Under Secretary for Intelligence shall, in coordination with the Office of Risk Analysis and Assessment in the Directorate of Science and Technology, be responsible for--

    (1) developing analysis concerning the means and methods terrorists might employ to exploit vulnerabilities in the homeland security infrastructure;

    (2) supporting experiments, tests, and inspections to identify weaknesses in homeland defenses;

    (3) developing countersurveillance techniques to prevent attacks;

    (4) conducting risk assessments to determine the risk posed by specific kinds of terrorist attacks, the probability of successful attacks, and the feasibility of specific countermeasures.

    (f) MANAGEMENT AND STAFFING.--

    (1) IN GENERAL.--The Directorate of Intelligence shall be staffed, in part, by analysts as requested by the Secretary and assigned by the agencies described under subsection (a)(1)(B). The analysts shall be assigned by reimbursable detail for periods as determined necessary by the Secretary in conjunction with the head of the assigning agency. No such detail may be undertaken without the consent of the assigning agency.

    (2) EMPLOYEES ASSIGNED WITHIN DEPARTMENT.--The Secretary may assign employees of the Department by reimbursable detail to the Directorate.

    (3) SERVICE AS FACTOR FOR SELECTION.--The President, or the designee of the President, shall prescribe regulations to provide that service described under paragraph (1) or (2), or service by employees within the Directorate, shall be considered a positive factor for selection to positions of greater authority within all agencies described under subsection (a)(1)(B).

    (4) PERSONNEL SECURITY STANDARDS.--The employment of personnel in the Directorate shall be in accordance with such personnel security standards for access to classified information and intelligence as the Secretary, in conjunction with the Director of Central

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    (5) PERFORMANCE EVALUATION.--The Secretary shall evaluate the performance of all personnel detailed to the Directorate, or delegate such responsibility to the Under Secretary for Intelligence.

    (g) INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.--Those portions of the Directorate of Intelligence under subsection (b)(1), and the intelligence-related components of agencies transferred by this division to the Department, including the United States Coast Guard, shall be--

    (1) considered to be part of the United States intelligence community within the meaning of section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a); and

    (2) for budgetary purposes, within the National Foreign Intelligence Program.

   SEC. 133. DIRECTORATE OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION.

    (a) ESTABLISHMENT.--

    (1) DIRECTORATE.--There is established within the Department the Directorate of Critical Infrastructure Protection.

    (2) UNDER SECRETARY.--There shall be an Under Secretary for Critical Infrastructure Protection, who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.

    (b) RESPONSIBILITIES.--The Directorate of Critical Infrastructure Protection shall be responsible for the following:

    (1) Receiving relevant intelligence from the Directorate of Intelligence, law enforcement information, and other information in order to comprehensively assess the vulnerabilities of the key resources and critical infrastructures in the United States.

    (2) Integrating relevant information, intelligence analysis, and vulnerability assessments (whether such information, analyses, or assessments are provided by the Department or others) to identify priorities and support protective measures by the Department, by other agencies, by State and local government personnel, agencies, and authorities, by the private sector, and by other entities, to protect the key resources and critical infrastructures in the United States.

    (3) As part of the Strategy, developing a comprehensive national plan for securing the key resources and critical infrastructure in the United States.

    (4) Assisting and supporting the Secretary, in coordination with other Directorates and entities outside the Department, in conducting appropriate risk analysis and risk management activities consistent with the mission and functions of the Directorate. This shall include, in coordination with the Office of Risk Analysis and Assessment in the Directorate of Science and Technology, establishing procedures, mechanisms, or units for the purpose of utilizing intelligence to identify vulnerabilities and protective measures in--

    (A) public health infrastructure;

    (B) food and water storage, production and distribution;

    (C) commerce systems, including banking and finance;

    (D) energy systems, including electric power and oil and gas production and storage;

    (E) transportation systems, including pipelines;

    (F) information and communication systems;

    (G) continuity of government services; and

    (H) other systems or facilities the destruction or disruption of which could cause substantial harm to health, safety, property, or the environment.

    (5) Enhancing the sharing of information regarding cyber security and physical security of the United States, developing appropriate security standards, tracking vulnerabilities, proposing improved risk management policies, and delineating the roles of various Government agencies in preventing, defending, and recovering from attacks.

    (6) Acting as the Critical Information Technology, Assurance, and Security Officer of the Department and assuming the responsibilities carried out by the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office and the National Infrastructure Protection Center before the effective date of this division.

    (7) Coordinating the activities of the Information Sharing and Analysis Centers to share information, between the public and private sectors, on threats, vulnerabilities, individual incidents, and privacy issues regarding homeland security.

    (8) Working closely with the Department of State on cyber security issues with respect to international bodies and coordinating with appropriate agencies in helping to establish cyber security policy, standards, and enforcement mechanisms.

    (9) Establishing the necessary organizational structure within the Directorate to provide leadership and focus on both cyber security and physical security, and ensuring the maintenance of a nucleus of cyber security and physical security experts within the United States Government.

    (10) Performing such other duties as assigned by the Secretary.

    (c) TRANSFER OF AUTHORITIES, FUNCTIONS, PERSONNEL, AND ASSETS TO THE DEPARTMENT.--The authorities, functions, personnel, and assets of the following entities are transferred to the Department:

    (1) The Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office of the Department of Commerce.

    (2) The National Infrastructure Protection Center of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (other than the Computer Investigations and Operations Section).

    (3) The National Communications System of the Department of Defense.

    (4) The Computer Security Division of the National Institute of Standards and Technology of the Department of Commerce.

    (5) The National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center of the Department of Energy.

    (6) The Federal Computer Incident Response Center of the General Services Administration.

    (7) The Energy Security and Assurance Program of the Department of Energy.

    (8) The Federal Protective Service of the General Services Administration.

   SEC. 134. DIRECTORATE OF EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE.

    (a) ESTABLISHMENT.--

    (1) DIRECTORATE.--There is established within the Department the Directorate of Emergency Preparedness and Response.

    (2) UNDER SECRETARY.--There shall be an Under Secretary for Emergency Preparedness and Response, who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.

    (b) RESPONSIBILITIES.--The Directorate of Emergency Preparedness and Response shall be responsible for the following:

    (1) Carrying out all emergency preparedness and response activities carried out by the Federal Emergency Management Agency before the effective date of this division.

    (2) Assuming the responsibilities carried out by the National Domestic Preparedness Office before the effective date of this division.

    (3) Organizing and training local entities to respond to emergencies and providing State and local authorities with equipment for detection, protection, and decontamination in an emergency involving weapons of mass destruction.

    (4) Overseeing Federal, State, and local emergency preparedness training and exercise programs in keeping with intelligence estimates and providing a single staff for Federal assistance for any emergency, including emergencies caused by natural disasters, manmade accidents, human or agricultural health emergencies, or terrorist attacks.

    (5) Creating a National Crisis Action Center to act as the focal point for--

    (A) monitoring emergencies;

    (B) notifying affected agencies and State and local governments; and

    (C) coordinating Federal support for State and local governments and the private sector in crises.

    (6) Managing and updating the Federal response plan to ensure the appropriate integration of operational activities of the Department of Defense, the National Guard, and other agencies, to respond to acts of terrorism and other disasters.

    (7) Coordinating activities among private sector entities, including entities within the medical community, and animal health and plant disease communities, with respect to recovery, consequence management, and planning for continuity of services.

    (8) Developing and managing a single response system for national incidents in coordination with all appropriate agencies.

    (9) Coordinating with other agencies necessary to carry out the functions of the Office of Emergency Preparedness.

    (10) Collaborating with, and transferring funds to, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention or other agencies for administration of the Strategic National Stockpile transferred under subsection (c)(5).

    (11) Consulting with the Under Secretary for Science and Technology, Secretary of Agriculture, and the Director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in establishing and updating the list of potential threat agents or toxins relating to the functions of the Select Agent Registration Program transferred under subsection (c)(6).

    (12) Developing a plan to address the interface of medical informatics and the medical response to terrorism that address--

    (A) standards for interoperability;

    (B) real-time data collection;

    (C) ease of use for health care providers;

    (D) epidemiological surveillance of disease outbreaks in human health and agriculture;

    (E) integration of telemedicine networks and standards;

    (F) patient confidentiality; and

    (G) other topics pertinent to the mission of the Department.

    (13) Activate and coordinate the operations of the National Disaster Medical System as defined under section 102 of the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-188).

    (14) Assisting and supporting the Secretary, in coordination with other Directorates and entities outside the Department, in conducting appropriate risk analysis and risk management activities consistent with the mission and functions of the Directorate.

    (15) Performing such other duties as assigned by the Secretary.

    (c) TRANSFER OF AUTHORITIES, FUNCTIONS, PERSONNEL, AND ASSETS TO THE DEPARTMENT.--The authorities, functions, personnel, and assets of the following entities are transferred to the Department:

    (1) The Federal Emergency Management Agency, the 10 regional offices of which shall be maintained and strengthened by the Department, which shall be maintained as a distinct entity within the Department.

    (2) The National Office of Domestic Preparedness of the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice.

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    (3) The Office of Domestic Preparedness of the Department of Justice.

    (4) The Office of Emergency Preparedness within the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Public Health Emergency Preparedness of the Department of Health and Human Services, including--

    (A) the Noble Training Center;

    (B) the Metropolitan Medical Response System;

    (C) the Department of Health and Human Services component of the National Disaster Medical System;

    (D) the Disaster Medical Assistance Teams, the Veterinary Medical Assistance Teams, and the Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Teams;

    (E) the special events response; and

    (F) the citizen preparedness programs.

    (5) The Strategic National Stockpile of the Department of Health and Human Services including all functions and assets under sections 121 and 127 of the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-188).

    (6) The functions of the Select Agent Registration Program of the Department of Health and Human Services and the United States Department of Agriculture, including all functions of the Secretary of Health and Human Services and the Secretary of Agriculture under sections 201 through 221 of the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-188).

    (d) APPOINTMENT AS UNDER SECRETARY AND DIRECTOR.--

    (1) IN GENERAL.--An individual may serve as both the Under Secretary for Emergency Preparedness and Response and the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency if appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to each office.

    (2) PAY.--Nothing in paragraph (1) shall be construed to authorize an individual appointed to both positions to receive pay at a rate of pay in excess of the rate of pay payable for the position to which the higher rate of pay applies.

    (e) REPORT.--Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, the Under Secretary for Emergency Preparedness and Response shall submit a report to Congress on the status of a national medical informatics system and an agricultural disease surveillance system, and the capacity of such systems to meet the goals under subsection (b)(12) in responding to a terrorist attack.

   SEC. 135. DIRECTORATE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY.

    (a) PURPOSE.--The purpose of this section is to establish a Directorate of Science and Technology that will support the mission of the Department and the directorates of the Department by--

    (1) establishing, funding, managing, and supporting research, development, demonstration, testing, and evaluation activities to meet national homeland security needs and objectives;

    (2) setting national research and development goals and priorities pursuant to the mission of the Department, and developing strategies and policies in furtherance of such goals and priorities;

    (3) coordinating and collaborating with other Federal departments and agencies, and State, local, academic, and private sector entities, to advance the research and development agenda of the Department;

    (4) advising the Secretary on all scientific and technical matters relevant to homeland security; and

    (5) facilitating the transfer and deployment of technologies that will serve to enhance homeland security goals.

    (b) DEFINITIONS.--In this section:

    (1) COUNCIL.--The term ``Council'' means the Homeland Security Science and Technology Council established under this section.

    (2) FUND.--The term ``Fund'' means the Acceleration Fund for Research and Development of Homeland Security Technologies established under this section.

    (3) HOMELAND SECURITY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT.--The term ``homeland security research and development'' means research and development applicable to the detection of, prevention of, protection against, response to, and recovery from homeland security threats, particularly acts of terrorism.

    (4) OSTP.--The term ``OSTP'' means the Office of Science and Technology Policy.

    (5) SARPA.--The term ``SARPA'' means the Security Advanced Research Projects Agency established under this section.

    (6) TECHNOLOGY ROADMAP.--The term ``technology roadmap'' means a plan or framework in which goals, priorities, and milestones for desired future technological capabilities and functions are established, and research and development alternatives or means for achieving those goals, priorities, and milestones are identified and analyzed in order to guide decisions on resource allocation and investments.

    (7) UNDER SECRETARY.--The term ``Under Secretary'' means the Under Secretary for Science and Technology.

    (c) DIRECTORATE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY.--

    (1) ESTABLISHMENT.--There is established a Directorate of Science and Technology within the Department.

    (2) UNDER SECRETARY.--There shall be an Under Secretary for Science and Technology, who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The principal responsibility of the Under Secretary shall be to effectively and efficiently carry out the purposes of the Directorate of Science and Technology under subsection (a). In addition, the Under Secretary shall undertake the following activities in furtherance of such purposes:

    (A) Coordinating with the OSTP, the Office, and other appropriate entities in developing and executing the research and development agenda of the Department.

    (B) Developing a technology roadmap that shall be updated biannually for achieving technological goals relevant to homeland security needs.

    (C) Instituting mechanisms to promote, facilitate, and expedite the transfer and deployment of technologies relevant to homeland security needs, including dual-use capabilities.

    (D) Assisting the Secretary and the Director of OSTP to ensure that science and technology priorities are clearly reflected and considered in the Strategy developed under title III.

    (E) Establishing mechanisms for the sharing and dissemination of key homeland security research and technology developments and opportunities with appropriate Federal, State, local, and private sector entities.

    (F) Establishing, in coordination with the Under Secretary for Critical Infrastructure Protection and the Under Secretary for Emergency Preparedness and Response and relevant programs under their direction, a National Emergency Technology Guard, comprised of teams of volunteers with expertise in relevant areas of science and technology, to assist local communities in responding to and recovering from emergency contingencies requiring specialized scientific and technical capabilities. In carrying out this responsibility, the Under Secretary shall establish and manage a database of National Emergency Technology Guard volunteers, and prescribe procedures for organizing, certifying, mobilizing, and deploying National Emergency Technology Guard teams.

    (G) Chairing the Working Group established under section 108 of the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-188).

    (H) Assisting the Secretary in developing the Strategy for Countermeasure Research described under subsection (k).

    (I) Assisting the Secretary and acting on behalf of the Secretary in contracting with, commissioning, or establishing federally funded research and development centers determined useful and appropriate by the Secretary for the purpose of providing the Department with independent analysis and support.

    (J) Assisting the Secretary and acting on behalf of the Secretary in entering into joint sponsorship agreements with the Department of Energy regarding the use of the national laboratories or sites.

    (K) Assisting and supporting the Secretary, in coordination with other Directorates and entities outside the Department, in conducting appropriate risk analysis and risk management activities consistent with the mission and functions of the Directorate.

    (L) Carrying out other appropriate activities as directed by the Secretary.

    (3) RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT-RELATED AUTHORITIES.--The Secretary shall exercise the following authorities relating to the research, development, testing, and evaluation activities of the Directorate of Science and Technology:

    (A) With respect to research and development expenditures under this section, the authority (subject to the same limitations and conditions) as the Secretary of Defense may exercise under section 2371 of title 10, United States Code (except for subsections (b) and (f)), for a period of 5 years beginning on the date of enactment of this Act. Competitive, merit-based selection procedures shall be used for the selection of projects and participants for transactions entered into under the authority of this paragraph. The annual report required under subsection (h) of such section, as applied to the Secretary by this subparagraph, shall--

    (i) be submitted to the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the Senate, the Committee on Government Reform of the House of Representatives, the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives; and

    (ii) report on other transactions entered into under subparagraph (B).

    (B) Authority to carry out prototype projects in accordance with the requirements and conditions provided for carrying out prototype projects under section 845 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 (Public Law 103-160), for a period of 5 years beginning on the date of enactment of this Act. In applying the authorities of such section 845, subsection (c) of that section shall apply with respect to prototype projects under this paragraph, and the Secretary shall perform the functions of the Secretary of Defense under subsection (d) of that section. Competitive, merit-based selection procedures shall be used for the selection of projects and participants for transactions entered into under the authority of this paragraph.

    (C) In hiring personnel to assist in research, development, testing, and evaluation activities within the Directorate of Science and Technology, the authority to exercise the personnel hiring and management authorities described in section 1101 of the

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    (D) With respect to such research, development, testing, and evaluation responsibilities under this section (except as provided in subparagraph (E)) as the Secretary may elect to carry out through agencies other than the Department (under agreements with their respective heads), the Secretary may transfer funds to such heads. Of the funds authorized to be appropriated under subsection (d)(4) for the Fund, not less than 10 percent of such funds for each fiscal year through 2005 shall be authorized only for the Under Secretary, through joint agreement with the Commandant of the Coast Guard, to carry out research and development of improved ports, waterways, and coastal security surveillance and perimeter protection capabilities for the purpose of minimizing the possibility that Coast Guard cutters, aircraft, helicopters, and personnel will be diverted from non-homeland security missions to the ports, waterways, and coastal security mission.

    (E) The Secretary may carry out human health biodefense-related biological, biomedical, and infectious disease research and development (including vaccine research and development) in collaboration with the Secretary of Health and Human Services. Research supported by funding appropriated to the National Institutes of Health for bioterrorism research and related facilities development shall be conducted through the National Institutes of Health under joint strategic prioritization agreements between the Secretary and the Secretary of Health and Human Services. The Secretary shall have the authority to establish general research priorities, which shall be embodied in the joint strategic prioritization agreements with the Secretary of Health and Human Services. The specific scientific research agenda to implement agreements under this subparagraph shall be developed by the Secretary of Health and Human Services, who shall consult the Secretary to ensure that the agreements conform with homeland security priorities. All research programs established under those agreements shall be managed and awarded by the Director of the National Institutes of Health consistent with those agreements. The Secretary may transfer funds to the Department of Health and Human Services in connection with those agreements.

    (d) ACCELERATION FUND.--

    (1) ESTABLISHMENT.--There is established an Acceleration Fund to support research and development of technologies relevant to homeland security.

    (2) FUNCTION.--The Fund shall be used to stimulate and support research and development projects selected by SARPA under subsection (f), and to facilitate the rapid transfer of research and technology derived from such projects.

    (3) RECIPIENTS.--Fund monies may be made available through grants, contracts, cooperative agreements, and other transactions under subsection (c)(3) (A) and (B) to--

    (A) public sector entities, including Federal, State, or local entities;

    (B) private sector entities, including corporations, partnerships, or individuals; and

    (C) other nongovernmental entities, including universities, federally funded research and development centers, and other academic or research institutions.

    (4) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.--There are authorized to be appropriated $200,000,000 for the Fund for fiscal year 2003, and such sums as are necessary in subsequent fiscal years.

    (e) SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COUNCIL.--

    (1) ESTABLISHMENT.--There is established the Homeland Security Science and Technology Council within the Directorate of Science and Technology. The Under Secretary shall chair the Council and have the authority to convene meetings. At the discretion of the Under Secretary and the Director of OSTP, the Council may be constituted as a subcommittee of the National Science and Technology Council.

    (2) COMPOSITION.--The Council shall be composed of the following:

    (A) Senior research and development officials representing agencies engaged in research and development relevant to homeland security and combating terrorism needs. Each representative shall be appointed by the head of the representative's respective agency with the advice and consent of the Under Secretary.

    (B) The Director of SARPA and other appropriate officials within the Department.

    (C) The Director of the OSTP and other senior officials of the Executive Office of the President as designated by the President.

    (3) RESPONSIBILITIES.--The Council shall--

    (A) provide the Under Secretary with recommendations on priorities and strategies, including those related to funding and portfolio management, for homeland security research and development;

    (B) facilitate effective coordination and communication among agencies, other entities of the Federal Government, and entities in the private sector and academia, with respect to the conduct of research and development related to homeland security;

    (C) recommend specific technology areas for which the Fund and other research and development resources shall be used, among other things, to rapidly transition homeland security research and development into deployed technology and reduce identified homeland security vulnerabilities;

    (D) assist and advise the Under Secretary in developing the technology roadmap referred to under subsection (c)(2)(B); and

    (E) perform other appropriate activities as directed by the Under Secretary.

    (4) ADVISORY PANEL.--The Under Secretary may establish an advisory panel consisting of representatives from industry, academia, and other non-Federal entities to advise and support the Council.

    (5) WORKING GROUPS.--At the discretion of the Under Secretary, the Council may establish working groups in specific homeland security areas consisting of individuals with relevant expertise in each articulated area. Working groups established for bioterrorism and public health-related research shall be fully coordinated with the Working Group established under section 108 of the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-188).

    (f) SECURITY ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY.--

    (1) ESTABLISHMENT.--There is established the Security Advanced Research Projects Agency within the Directorate of Science and Technology.

    (2) RESPONSIBILITIES.--SARPA shall--

    (A) undertake and stimulate basic and applied research and development, leverage existing research and development, and accelerate the transition and deployment of technologies that will serve to enhance homeland defense;

    (B) identify, fund, develop, and transition high-risk, high-payoff homeland security research and development opportunities that--

    (i) may lie outside the purview or capabilities of the existing Federal agencies; and

    (ii) emphasize revolutionary rather than evolutionary or incremental advances;

    (C) provide selected projects with single or multiyear funding, and require such projects to provide interim progress reports, no less often than annually;

    (D) administer the Acceleration Fund to carry out the purposes of this paragraph;

    (E) advise the Secretary and Under Secretary on funding priorities under subsection (c)(3)(E); and

    (F) perform other appropriate activities as directed by the Under Secretary.

    (g) OFFICE OF RISK ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT.--

    (1) ESTABLISHMENT.--There is established an Office of Risk Analysis and Assessment within the Directorate of Science and Technology.

    (2) FUNCTIONS.--The Office of Risk Analysis and Assessment shall assist the Secretary, the Under Secretary, and other Directorates with respect to their risk analysis and risk management activities by providing scientific or technical support for such activities. Such support shall include, as appropriate--

    (A) identification and characterization of homeland security threats;

    (B) evaluation and delineation of the risk of these threats;

    (C) pinpointing of vulnerabilities or linked vulnerabilities to these threats;

    (D) determination of criticality of possible threats;

    (E) analysis of possible technologies, research, and protocols to mitigate or eliminate threats, vulnerabilities, and criticalities;

    (F) evaluation of the effectiveness of various forms of risk communication; and

    (G) other appropriate activities as directed by the Secretary.

    (3) METHODS.--In performing the activities described under paragraph (2), the Office of Risk Analysis and Assessment may support or conduct, or commission from federally funded research and development centers or other entities, work involving modeling, statistical analyses, field tests and exercises (including red teaming), testbed development, development of standards and metrics.

    (h) OFFICE FOR TECHNOLOGY EVALUATION AND TRANSITION.--

    (1) ESTABLISHMENT.--There is established an Office for Technology Evaluation and Transition within the Directorate of Science and Technology.

    (2) FUNCTION.--The Office for Technology Evaluation and Transition shall, with respect to technologies relevant to homeland security needs--

    (A) serve as the principal, national point-of-contact and clearinghouse for receiving and processing proposals or inquiries regarding such technologies;

    (B) identify and evaluate promising new technologies;

    (C) undertake testing and evaluation of, and assist in transitioning, such technologies into deployable, fielded systems;

    (D) consult with and advise agencies regarding the development, acquisition, and deployment of such technologies;

    (E) coordinate with SARPA to accelerate the transition of technologies developed by SARPA and ensure transition paths for such technologies; and

    (F) perform other appropriate activities as directed by the Under Secretary.

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    (3) TECHNICAL SUPPORT WORKING GROUP.--The functions described under this subsection may be carried out through, or in coordination with, or through an entity established by the Secretary and modeled after, the Technical Support Working Group (organized under the April, 1982, National Security Decision Directive Numbered 30) that provides an interagency forum to coordinate research and development of technologies for combating terrorism.

    (i) OFFICE OF LABORATORY RESEARCH.--

    (1) ESTABLISHMENT.--There is established an Office of Laboratory Research within the Directorate of Science and Technology.

    (2) RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT FUNCTIONS TRANSFERRED.--There shall be transferred to the Department, to be administered by the Under Secretary, the functions, personnel, assets, and liabilities of the following programs and activities:

    (A) Within the Department of Energy (but not including programs and activities relating to the strategic nuclear defense posture of the United States) the following:

    (i) The chemical and biological national security and supporting programs and activities supporting domestic response of the nonproliferation and verification research and development program.

    (ii) The nuclear smuggling programs and activities, and other programs and activities directly related to homeland security, within the proliferation detection program of the nonproliferation and verification research and development program, except that the programs and activities described in this clause may be designated by the President either for transfer to the Department or for joint operation by the Secretary and the Secretary of Energy.

    (iii) The nuclear assessment program and activities of the assessment, detection, and cooperation program of the international materials protection and cooperation program.

    (iv) The Environmental Measurements Laboratory.

    (B) Within the Department of Defense, the National Bio-Weapons Defense Analysis Center established under section 161.

    (3) RESPONSIBILITIES.--The Office of Laboratory Research shall--

    (A) supervise the activities of the entities transferred under this subsection;

    (B) administer the disbursement and undertake oversight of research and development funds transferred from the Department to other agencies outside of the Department, including funds transferred to the Department of Health and Human Services consistent with subsection (c)(3)(E);

    (C) establish and direct new research and development facilities as the Secretary determines appropriate;

    (D) include a science advisor to the Under Secretary on research priorities related to biological and chemical weapons, with supporting scientific staff, who shall advise on and support research priorities with respect to--

    (i) research on countermeasures for biological weapons, including research on the development of drugs, devices, and biologics; and

    (ii) research on biological and chemical threat agents; and

    (E) other appropriate activities as directed by the Under Secretary.

    (j) OFFICE FOR NATIONAL LABORATORIES.--

    (1) ESTABLISHMENT.--There is established within the Directorate of Science and Technology an Office for National Laboratories, which shall be responsible for the coordination and utilization of the Department of Energy national laboratories and sites in a manner to create a networked laboratory system for the purpose of supporting the missions of the Department.

    (2) JOINT SPONSORSHIP ARRANGEMENTS.--

    (A) NATIONAL LABORATORIES.--The Department may be a joint sponsor, under a multiple agency sponsorship arrangement with the Department of Energy, of 1 or more Department of Energy national laboratories in the performance of work on behalf of the Department.

    (B) DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY SITE.--The Department may be a joint sponsor of Department of Energy sites in the performance of work as if such sites were federally funded research and development centers and the work were performed under a multiple agency sponsorship arrangement with the Department.

    (C) PRIMARY SPONSOR.--The Department of Energy shall be the primary sponsor under a multiple agency sponsorship arrangement entered into under subparagraph (A) or (B).

    (D) CONDITIONS.--A joint sponsorship arrangement under this subsection shall--

    (i) provide for the direct funding and management by the Department of the work being carried out on behalf of the Department; and

    (ii) include procedures for addressing the coordination of resources and tasks to minimize conflicts between work undertaken on behalf of either Department.

    (E) LEAD AGENT AND FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION.--

    (i) LEAD AGENT.--The Secretary of Energy shall act as the lead agent in coordinating the formation and performance of a joint sponsorship agreement between the Department and a Department of Energy national laboratory or site for work on homeland security.

    (ii) COMPLIANCE WITH FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION.--Any work performed by a national laboratory or site under this section shall comply with the policy on the use of federally funded research and development centers under section 35.017 of the Federal Acquisition Regulation.

    (F) FUNDING.--The Department shall provide funds for work at the Department of Energy national laboratories or sites, as the case may be, under this section under the same terms and conditions as apply to the primary sponsor of such national laboratory under section 303(b)(1)(C) of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 (41 U.S.C. 253 (b)(1)(C)) or of such site to the extent such section applies to such site as a federally funded research and development center by reason of subparagraph (B).

    (3) OTHER ARRANGEMENTS.--The Office for National Laboratories may enter into other arrangements with Department of Energy national laboratories or sites to carry out work to support the missions of the Department under applicable law, except that the Department of Energy may not charge or apply administrative fees for work on behalf of the Department.

    (4) TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER.--The Office for National Laboratories may exercise the authorities in section 12 of the Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980 (15 U.S.C. 3710a) to permit the Director of a Department of Energy national laboratory to enter into cooperative research and development agreements, or to negotiate licensing agreements, pertaining to work supported by the Department at the Department of Energy national laboratory.

    (5) ASSISTANCE IN ESTABLISHING DEPARTMENT.--At the request of the Under Secretary, the Department of Energy shall provide for the temporary appointment or assignment of employees of Department of Energy national laboratories or sites to the Department for purposes of assisting in the establishment or organization of the technical programs of the Department through an agreement that includes provisions for minimizing conflicts between work assignments of such personnel.

    (k) STRATEGY FOR COUNTERMEASURE RESEARCH.--

    (1) IN GENERAL.--The Secretary, acting through the Under Secretary for Science and Technology, shall develop a comprehensive, long-term strategy and plan for engaging non-Federal entities, particularly including private, for-profit entities, in the research, development, and production of homeland security countermeasures for biological, chemical, and radiological weapons.

    (2) TIMEFRAME.--The strategy and plan under this subsection, together with recommendations for the enactment of supporting or enabling legislation, shall be submitted to the Congress within 270 days after the date of enactment of this Act.

    (3) COORDINATION.--In developing the strategy and plan under this subsection, the Secretary shall consult with--

    (A) other agencies with expertise in research, development, and production of countermeasures;

    (B) private, for-profit entities and entrepreneurs with appropriate expertise and technology regarding countermeasures;

    (C) investors that fund such entities;

    (D) nonprofit research universities and institutions;

    (E) public health and other interested private sector and government entities; and

    (F) governments allied with the United States in the war on terrorism.

    (4) PURPOSE.--The strategy and plan under this subsection shall evaluate proposals to assure that--

    (A) research on countermeasures by non-Federal entities leads to the expeditious development and production of countermeasures that may be procured and deployed in the homeland security interests of the United States;

    (B) capital is available to fund the expenses associated with such research, development, and production, including Government grants and contracts and appropriate capital formation tax incentives that apply to non-Federal entities with and without tax liability;

    (C) the terms for procurement of such countermeasures are defined in advance so that such entities may accurately and reliably assess the potential countermeasures market and the potential rate of return;

    (D) appropriate intellectual property, risk protection, and Government approval standards are applicable to such countermeasures;

    (E) Government-funded research is conducted and prioritized so that such research complements, and does not unnecessarily duplicate, research by non-Federal entities and that such Government-funded research is made available, transferred, and licensed on commercially reasonable terms to such entities for development; and

    (F) universities and research institutions play a vital role as partners in research and development and technology transfer, with appropriate progress benchmarks for such activities, with for-profit entities.

    (5) REPORTING.--The Secretary shall report periodically to the Congress on the status of non-Federal entity countermeasure research, development, and production, and submit additional recommendations for legislation as needed.

    (l) CLASSIFICATION OF RESEARCH.--

    (1) IN GENERAL.--To the greatest extent practicable, research conducted or supported by the Department shall be unclassified.

    (2) CLASSIFICATION AND REVIEW.--The Under Secretary shall--

    (A)(i) decide whether classification is appropriate before the award of a research

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    (ii) if the decision under clause (i) is one of classification, control the research results through standard classification procedures; and

    (B) periodically review all classified research grants, contracts, cooperative agreements, and other transactions issued by the Department to determine whether classification is still necessary.

    (3) RESTRICTIONS.--No restrictions shall be placed upon the conduct or reporting of federally funded fundamental research that has not received national security classification, except as provided under applicable provisions of law.

    (m) OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY.--The National Science and Technology Policy, Organization, and Priorities Act is amended--

    (1) in section 204(b)(1) (42 U.S.C. 6613(b)(1)), by inserting ``homeland security,'' after ``national security,''; and

    (2) in section 208(a)(1) (42 U.S.C. 6617(a)(1)), by inserting ``the National Office for Combating Terrorism,'' after ``National Security Council,''.

   SEC. 136. DIRECTORATE OF IMMIGRATION AFFAIRS.

    The Directorate of Immigration Affairs shall be established and shall carry out all functions of that Directorate in accordance with division B of this Act.

   SEC. 137. OFFICE FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT COORDINATION.

    (a) ESTABLISHMENT.--There is established within the Office of the Secretary the Office for State and Local Government Coordination, to oversee and coordinate departmental programs for and relationships with State and local governments.

    (b) RESPONSIBILITIES.--The Office established under subsection (a) shall--

    (1) coordinate the activities of the Department relating to State and local government;

    (2) assess, and advocate for, the resources needed by State and local government to implement the national strategy for combating terrorism;

    (3) provide State and local government with regular information, research, and technical support to assist local efforts at securing the homeland; and

    (4) develop a process for receiving meaningful input from State and local government to assist the development of the national strategy for combating terrorism and other homeland security activities.

    (c) HOMELAND SECURITY LIAISON OFFICERS.--

    (1) CHIEF HOMELAND SECURITY LIAISON OFFICER.--

    (A) APPOINTMENT.--The Secretary shall appoint a Chief Homeland Security Liaison Officer to coordinate the activities of the Homeland Security Liaison Officers, designated under paragraph (2).

    (B) ANNUAL REPORT.--The Chief Homeland Security Liaison Officer shall prepare an annual report, that contains--

    (i) a description of the State and local priorities in each of the 50 States based on discovered needs of first responder organizations, including law enforcement agencies, fire and rescue agencies, medical providers, emergency service providers, and relief agencies;

    (ii) a needs assessment that identifies homeland security functions in which the Federal role is duplicative of the State or local role, and recommendations to decrease or eliminate inefficiencies between the Federal Government and State and local entities;

    (iii) recommendations to Congress regarding the creation, expansion, or elimination of any program to assist State and local entities to carry out their respective functions under the Department; and

    (iv) proposals to increase the coordination of Department priorities within each State and between the States.

    (2) HOMELAND SECURITY LIAISON OFFICERS.--

    (A) DESIGNATION.--The Secretary shall designate in each State not less than 1 employee of the Department to--

    (i) serve as the Homeland Security Liaison Officer in that State; and

    (ii) provide coordination between the Department and State and local first responders, including--

    (I) law enforcement agencies;

    (II) fire and rescue agencies;

    (III) medical providers;

    (IV) emergency service providers; and

    (V) relief agencies.

    (B) DUTIES.--Each Homeland Security Liaison Officer designated under subparagraph (A) shall--

    (i) ensure coordination between the Department and--

    (I) State, local, and community-based law enforcement;

    (II) fire and rescue agencies; and

    (III) medical and emergency relief organizations;

    (ii) identify State and local areas requiring additional information, training, resources, and security;

    (iii) provide training, information, and education regarding homeland security for State and local entities;

    (iv) identify homeland security functions in which the Federal role is duplicative of the State or local role, and recommend ways to decrease or eliminate inefficiencies;

    (v) assist State and local entities in priority setting based on discovered needs of first responder organizations, including law enforcement agencies, fire and rescue agencies, medical providers, emergency service providers, and relief agencies;

    (vi) assist the Department to identify and implement State and local homeland security objectives in an efficient and productive manner; and

    (vii) serve as a liaison to the Department in representing State and local priorities and concerns regarding homeland security.

    (d) FEDERAL INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE ON FIRST RESPONDERS.--

    (1) IN GENERAL.--There is established an Interagency Committee on First Responders, that shall--

    (A) ensure coordination among the Federal agencies involved with--

    (i) State, local, and community-based law enforcement;

    (ii) fire and rescue operations; and

    (iii) medical and emergency relief services;

    (B) identify community-based law enforcement, fire and rescue, and medical and emergency relief services needs;

    (C) recommend new or expanded grant programs to improve community-based law enforcement, fire and rescue, and medical and emergency relief services;

    (D) identify ways to streamline the process through which Federal agencies support community-based law enforcement, fire and rescue, and medical and emergency relief services; and

    (E) assist in priority setting based on discovered needs.

    (2) MEMBERSHIP.--The Interagency Committee on First Responders shall be composed of--

    (A) the Chief Homeland Security Liaison Officer of the Department;

    (B) a representative of the Health Resources and Services Administration of the Department of Health and Human Services;

    (C) a representative of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention of the Department of Health and Human Services;

    (D) a representative of the Federal Emergency Management Agency of the Department;

    (E) a representative of the United States Coast Guard of the Department;

    (F) a representative of the Department of Defense;

    (G) a representative of the Office of Domestic Preparedness of the Department;

    (H) a representative of the Directorate of Immigration Affairs of the Department;

    (I) a representative of the Transportation Security Agency of the Department;

    (J) a representative of the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice; and

    (K) representatives of any other Federal agency identified by the President as having a significant role in the purposes of the Interagency Committee on First Responders.

    (3) ADMINISTRATION.--The Department shall provide administrative support to the Interagency Committee on First Responders and the Advisory Council, which shall include--

    (A) scheduling meetings;

    (B) preparing agenda;

    (C) maintaining minutes and records;

    (D) producing reports; and

    (E) reimbursing Advisory Council members.

    (4) LEADERSHIP.--The members of the Interagency Committee on First Responders shall select annually a chairperson.

    (5) MEETINGS.--The Interagency Committee on First Responders shall meet--

    (A) at the call of the Chief Homeland Security Liaison Officer of the Department; or

    (B) not less frequently than once every 3 months.

    (e) ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR THE FEDERAL INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE ON FIRST RESPONDERS.--

    (1) ESTABLISHMENT.--There is established an Advisory Council for the Federal Interagency Committee on First Responders (in this section referred to as the ``Advisory Council'').

    (2) MEMBERSHIP.--

    (A) IN GENERAL.--The Advisory Council shall be composed of not more than 13 members, selected by the Interagency Committee on First Responders.

    (B) REPRESENTATION.--The Interagency Committee on First Responders shall ensure that the membership of the Advisory Council represents--

    (i) the law enforcement community;

    (ii) fire and rescue organizations;

    (iii) medical and emergency relief services; and

    (iv) both urban and rural communities.

    (3) CHAIRPERSON.--The Advisory Council shall select annually a chairperson from among its members.

    (4) COMPENSATION OF MEMBERS.--The members of the Advisory Council shall serve without compensation, but shall be eligible for reimbursement of necessary expenses connected with their service to the Advisory Council.

    (5) MEETINGS.--The Advisory Council shall meet with the Interagency Committee on First Responders not less frequently than once every 3 months.

   SEC. 138. UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE.

    There are transferred to the Department the authorities, functions, personnel, and assets of the United States Secret Service, which shall be maintained as a distinct entity within the Department.

   SEC. 139. BORDER COORDINATION WORKING GROUP.

    (a) DEFINITIONS.--In this section:

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    (1) BORDER SECURITY FUNCTIONS.--The term ``border security functions'' means the securing of the borders, territorial waters, ports, terminals, waterways, and air, land, and sea transportation systems of the United States.

    (2) RELEVANT AGENCIES.--The term ``relevant agencies'' means any department or agency of the United States that the President determines to be relevant to performing border security functions.

    (b) ESTABLISHMENT.--The Secretary shall establish a border security working group (in this section referred to as the ``Working Group''), composed of the Secretary or the designee of the Secretary, the Under Secretary for Border and Transportation Protection, and the Under Secretary for Immigration Affairs.

    (c) FUNCTIONS.--The Working Group shall meet not less frequently than once every 3 months and shall--

    (1) with respect to border security functions, develop coordinated budget requests, allocations of appropriations, staffing requirements, communication, use of equipment, transportation, facilities, and other infrastructure;

    (2) coordinate joint and cross-training programs for personnel performing border security functions;

    (3) monitor, evaluate and make improvements in the coverage and geographic distribution of border security programs and personnel;

    (4) develop and implement policies and technologies to ensure the speedy, orderly, and efficient flow of lawful traffic, travel and commerce, and enhanced scrutiny for high-risk traffic, travel, and commerce; and

    (5) identify systemic problems in coordination encountered by border security agencies and programs and propose administrative, regulatory, or statutory changes to mitigate such problems.

    (d) RELEVANT AGENCIES.--The Secretary shall consult representatives of relevant agencies with respect to deliberations under subsection (c), and may include representatives of such agencies in Working Group deliberations, as appropriate.

   SEC. 140. EXECUTIVE SCHEDULE POSITIONS.

    Section 5314 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:

    ``Under Secretary for Border and Transportation, Department of Homeland Security.

    ``Under Secretary for Critical Infrastructure Protection, Department of Homeland Security.

    ``Under Secretary for Emergency Preparedness and Response, Department of Homeland Security.

    ``Under Secretary for Immigration, Department of Homeland Security.

    ``Under Secretary for Intelligence, Department of Homeland Security.

    ``Under Secretary for Science and Technology, Department of Homeland Security.''.

   SEC. 151. SHORT TITLE.

    This subtitle may be cited as the ``National Emergency Preparedness Enhancement Act of 2002''.

   SEC. 152. PREPAREDNESS INFORMATION AND EDUCATION.

    (a) ESTABLISHMENT OF CLEARINGHOUSE.--There is established in the Department a National Clearinghouse on Emergency Preparedness (referred to in this section as the ``Clearinghouse''). The Clearinghouse shall be headed by a Director.

    (b) CONSULTATION.--The Clearinghouse shall consult with such heads of agencies, such task forces appointed by Federal officers or employees, and such representatives of the private sector, as appropriate, to collect information on emergency preparedness, including information relevant to the Strategy.

    (c) DUTIES.--

    (1) DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION.--The Clearinghouse shall ensure efficient dissemination of accurate emergency preparedness information.

    (2) CENTER.--The Clearinghouse shall establish a one-stop center for emergency preparedness information, which shall include a website, with links to other relevant Federal websites, a telephone number, and staff, through which information shall be made available on--

    (A) ways in which States, political subdivisions, and private entities can access Federal grants;

    (B) emergency preparedness education and awareness tools that businesses, schools, and the general public can use; and

    (C) other information as appropriate.

    (3) PUBLIC AWARENESS CAMPAIGN.--The Clearinghouse shall develop a public awareness campaign. The campaign shall be ongoing, and shall include an annual theme to be implemented during the National Emergency Preparedness Week established under section 154. The Clearinghouse shall work with heads of agencies to coordinate public service announcements and other information-sharing tools utilizing a wide range of media.

    (4) BEST PRACTICES INFORMATION.--The Clearinghouse shall compile and disseminate information on best practices for emergency preparedness identified by the Secretary and the heads of other agencies.

   SEC. 153. PILOT PROGRAM.

    (a) EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ENHANCEMENT PILOT PROGRAM.--The Department shall award grants to private entities to pay for the Federal share of the cost of improving emergency preparedness, and educating employees and other individuals using the entities' facilities about emergency preparedness.

    (b) USE OF FUNDS.--An entity that receives a grant under this subsection may use the funds made available through the grant to--

    (1) develop evacuation plans and drills;

    (2) plan additional or improved security measures, with an emphasis on innovative technologies or practices;

    (3) deploy innovative emergency preparedness technologies; or

    (4) educate employees and customers about the development and planning activities described in paragraphs (1) and (2) in innovative ways.

    (c) FEDERAL SHARE.--The Federal share of the cost described in subsection (a) shall be 50 percent, up to a maximum of $250,000 per grant recipient.

    (d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.--There are authorized to be appropriated $5,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2003 through 2005 to carry out this section.

   SEC. 154. DESIGNATION OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS WEEK.

    (a) NATIONAL WEEK.--

    (1) DESIGNATION.--Each week that includes September 11 is ``National Emergency Preparedness Week''.

    (2) PROCLAMATION.--The President is requested every year to issue a proclamation calling on the people of the United States (including State and local governments and the private sector) to observe the week with appropriate activities and programs.

    (b) FEDERAL AGENCY ACTIVITIES.--In conjunction with National Emergency Preparedness Week, the head of each agency, as appropriate, shall coordinate with the Department to inform and educate the private sector and the general public about emergency preparedness activities, resources, and tools, giving a high priority to emergency preparedness efforts designed to address terrorist attacks.

   SEC. 161. NATIONAL BIO-WEAPONS DEFENSE ANALYSIS CENTER.

    (a) ESTABLISHMENT.--There is established within the Department of Defense a National Bio-Weapons Defense Analysis Center (in this section referred to as the ``Center'').

    (b) MISSION.--The mission of the Center is to develop countermeasures to potential attacks by terrorists using biological or chemical weapons that are weapons of mass destruction (as defined under section 1403 of the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 2302(1))) and conduct research and analysis concerning such weapons.

   SEC. 162. REVIEW OF FOOD SAFETY.

    (a) REVIEW OF FOOD SAFETY LAWS AND FOOD SAFETY ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE.--The Secretary shall enter into an agreement with and provide funding to the National Academy of Sciences to conduct a detailed, comprehensive study which shall--

    (1) review all Federal statutes and regulations affecting the safety and security of the food supply to determine the effectiveness of the statutes and regulations at protecting the food supply from deliberate contamination; and

    (2) review the organizational structure of Federal food safety oversight to determine the efficiency and effectiveness of the organizational structure at protecting the food supply from deliberate contamination.

    (b) REPORT.--

    (1) IN GENERAL.--Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, the National Academy of Sciences shall prepare and submit to the President, the Secretary, and Congress a comprehensive report containing--

    (A) the findings and conclusions derived from the reviews conducted under subsection (a); and

    (B) specific recommendations for improving--

    (i) the effectiveness and efficiency of Federal food safety and security statutes and regulations; and

    (ii) the organizational structure of Federal food safety oversight.

    (2) CONTENTS.--In conjunction with the recommendations under paragraph (1), the report under paragraph (1) shall address--

    (A) the effectiveness with which Federal food safety statutes and regulations protect public health and ensure the food supply remains free from contamination;

    (B) the shortfalls, redundancies, and inconsistencies in Federal food safety statutes and regulations;

    (C) the application of resources among Federal food safety oversight agencies;

    (D) the effectiveness and efficiency of the organizational structure of Federal food safety oversight;

    (E) the shortfalls, redundancies, and inconsistencies of the organizational structure of Federal food safety oversight; and

    (F) the merits of a unified, central organizational structure of Federal food safety oversight.

    (c) RESPONSE OF THE SECRETARY.--Not later than 90 days after the date on which the report under this section is submitted to the Secretary, the Secretary shall provide to the President and Congress the response of the Department to the recommendations of the report and recommendations of the Department to further protect the food supply from contamination.

   SEC. 163. EXCHANGE OF EMPLOYEES BETWEEN AGENCIES AND STATE OR LOCAL GOVERNMENTS.

    (a) FINDINGS.--Congress finds that--

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    (1) information sharing between Federal, State, and local agencies is vital to securing the homeland against terrorist attacks;

    (2) Federal, State, and local employees working cooperatively can learn from one another and resolve complex issues;

    (3) Federal, State, and local employees have specialized knowledge that should be consistently shared between and among agencies at all levels of government; and

    (4) providing training and other support, such as staffing, to the appropriate Federal, State, and local agencies can enhance the ability of an agency to analyze and assess threats against the homeland, develop appropriate responses, and inform the United States public.

    (b) EXCHANGE OF EMPLOYEES.--

    (1) IN GENERAL.--The Secretary may provide for the exchange of employees of the Department and State and local agencies in accordance with subchapter VI of chapter 33 of title 5, United States Code.

    (2) CONDITIONS.--With respect to exchanges described under this subsection, the Secretary shall ensure that--

    (A) any assigned employee shall have appropriate training or experience to perform the work required by the assignment; and

    (B) any assignment occurs under conditions that appropriately safeguard classified and other sensitive information.

   SEC. 164. WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION FOR FEDERAL EMPLOYEES WHO ARE AIRPORT SECURITY SCREENERS.

    Section 111(d) of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (Public Law 107-71; 115 Stat. 620; 49 U.S.C. 44935 note) is amended--

    (1) by striking ``(d) SCREENER PERSONNEL.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law,'' and inserting the following:

    ``(d) SCREENER PERSONNEL.--

    ``(1) IN GENERAL.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law (except as provided under paragraph (2)),''; and

    (2) by adding at the end the following:

    ``(2) WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION.--

    ``(A) DEFINITION.--In this paragraph, the term ``security screener'' means--

    ``(i) any Federal employee hired as a security screener under subsection (e) of section 44935 of title 49, United States Code; or

    ``(ii) an applicant for the position of a security screener under that subsection.

    ``(B) IN GENERAL.--Notwithstanding paragraph (1)--

    ``(i) section 2302(b)(8) of title 5, United States Code, shall apply with respect to any security screener; and

    ``(ii) chapters 12, 23, and 75 of that title shall apply with respect to a security screener to the extent necessary to implement clause (i).

    ``(C) COVERED POSITION.--The President may not exclude the position of security screener as a covered position under section 2302(a)(2)(B)(ii) of title 5, United States Code, to the extent that such exclusion would prevent the implementation of subparagraph (B) of this paragraph.''.

   SEC. 165. WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION FOR CERTAIN AIRPORT EMPLOYEES.

    (a) IN GENERAL.--Section 42121(a) of title 49, United States Code, is amended--

    (1) by striking ``(a) DISCRIMINATION AGAINST AIRLINE EMPLOYEES.--No air carrier or contractor or subcontractor of an air carrier'' and inserting the following:

    ``(a) DISCRIMINATION AGAINST EMPLOYEES.--

    ``(1) IN GENERAL.--No air carrier, contractor, subcontractor, or employer described under paragraph (2)'';

    (2) by redesignating paragraphs (1) through (4) as subparagraphs (A) through (D), respectively; and

    (3) by adding at the end the following:

    ``(2) APPLICABLE EMPLOYERS.--Paragraph (1) shall apply to--

    ``(A) an air carrier or contractor or subcontractor of an air carrier;

    ``(B) an employer of airport security screening personnel, other than the Federal Government, including a State or municipal government, or an airport authority, or a contractor of such government or airport authority; or

    ``(C) an employer of private screening personnel described in section 44919 or 44920 of this title.''.

    (b) TECHNICAL AND CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.--Section 42121(b)(2)(B) of title 49, United States Code, is amended--

    (1) in clause (i), by striking ``paragraphs (1) through (4) of subsection (a)'' and inserting ``subparagraphs (A) through (D) of subsection (a)(1)''; and

    (2) in clause (iii), by striking ``paragraphs (1) through (4) of subsection (a)'' and inserting ``subparagraphs (A) through (D) of subsection (a)(1)''.

   SEC. 166. BIOTERRORISM PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE DIVISION.

    Section 319D of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 2472-4) is amended--

    (1) by redesignating subsection (c) as subsection (d); and

    (2) by inserting after subsection (b), the following:

    ``(c) BIOTERRORISM PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE DIVISION.--

    ``(1) ESTABLISHMENT.--There is established within the Office of the Director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention a Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Division (in this subsection referred to as the `Division').

    ``(2) MISSION.--The Division shall have the following primary missions:

    ``(A) To lead and coordinate the activities and responsibilities of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention with respect to countering bioterrorism.

    ``(B) To coordinate and facilitate the interaction of Centers for Disease Control and Prevention personnel with personnel from the Department of Homeland Security and, in so doing, serve as a major contact point for 2-way communications between the jurisdictions of homeland security and public health.

    ``(C) To train and employ a cadre of public health personnel who are dedicated full-time to the countering of bioterrorism.

    ``(3) RESPONSIBILITIES.--In carrying out the mission under paragraph (2), the Division shall assume the responsibilities of and budget authority for the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention with respect to the following programs:

    ``(A) The Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Program.

    ``(B) The Strategic National Stockpile.

    ``(C) Such other programs and responsibilities as may be assigned to the Division by the Director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

    ``(4) DIRECTOR.--There shall be in the Division a Director, who shall be appointed by the Director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, in consultation with the Secretary of Health and Human Services and the Secretary of Homeland Security.

    ``(5) STAFFING.--Under agreements reached between the Director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the Secretary of Homeland Security--

    ``(A) the Division may be staffed, in part, by personnel assigned from the Department of Homeland Security by the Secretary of Homeland Security; and

    ``(B) the Director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention may assign some personnel from the Division to the Department of Homeland Security.''.

   SEC. 167. COORDINATION WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES UNDER THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE ACT.

    (a) IN GENERAL.--The annual Federal response plan developed by the Secretary under sections 102(b)(14) and 134(b)(7) shall be consistent with section 319 of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 247d).

    (b) DISCLOSURES AMONG RELEVANT AGENCIES.--

    (1) IN GENERAL.--Full disclosure among relevant agencies shall be made in accordance with this subsection.

    (2) PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY.--During the period in which the Secretary of Health and Human Services has declared the existence of a public health emergency under section 319(a) of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 247d(a)), the Secretary of Health and Human Services shall keep relevant agencies, including the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, fully and currently informed.

    (3) POTENTIAL PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY.--In cases involving, or potentially involving, a public health emergency, but in which no determination of an emergency by the Secretary of Health and Human Services under section 319(a) of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 247d(a)), has been made, all relevant agencies, including the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, shall keep the Secretary of Health and Human Services and the Director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention fully and currently informed.

   SEC. 168. RAIL SECURITY ENHANCEMENTS.

    (a) IN GENERAL.--There are authorized to be appropriated to the Department, for the benefit of Amtrak, for the 2-year period beginning on the date of enactment of this Act--

    (1) $375,000,000 for grants to finance the cost of enhancements to the security and safety of Amtrak rail passenger service;

    (2) $778,000,000 for grants for life safety improvements to 6 New York Amtrak tunnels built in 1910, the Baltimore and Potomac Amtrak tunnel built in 1872, and the Washington, D.C. Union Station Amtrak tunnels built in 1904 under the Supreme Court and House and Senate Office Buildings; and

    (3) $55,000,000 for the emergency repair, and returning to service of Amtrak passenger cars and locomotives.

    (b) AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS.--Amounts appropriated under subsection (a) shall remain available until expended.

    (c) COORDINATION WITH EXISTING LAW.--Amounts made available to Amtrak under this section shall not be considered to be Federal assistance for purposes of part C of subtitle V of title 49, United States Code.

   SEC. 169. GRANTS FOR FIREFIGHTING PERSONNEL.

    (a) Section 33 of the Federal Fire Prevention and Control Act of 1974 (15 U.S.C. 2229) is amended--

    (1) by redesignating subsections (c), (d), and (e) as subsections (d), (e), and (f), respectively;

    (2) by inserting after subsection (b) the following:

    ``(c) PERSONNEL GRANTS.--

    ``(1) EXCLUSION.--Grants awarded under subsection (b) to hire `employees engaged in fire protection', as that term is defined in section 3 of the Fair Labor Standards Act (29 U.S.C. 203), shall not be subject to paragraphs (10) or (11) of subsection (b).

    ``(2) DURATION.--Grants awarded under paragraph (1) shall be for a 3-year period.

    ``(3) MAXIMUM AMOUNT.--The total amount of grants awarded under paragraph (1) shall not exceed $100,000 per firefighter, indexed for inflation, over the 3-year grant period.

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    ``(4) FEDERAL SHARE.--

    ``(A) IN GENERAL.--Notwithstanding subsection (b)(6), the Federal share of a grant under paragraph (1) shall not exceed 75 percent of the total salary and benefits cost for additional firefighters hired.

    ``(B) WAIVER.--The Director may waive the 25 percent non-Federal match under subparagraph (A) for a jurisdiction of 50,000 or fewer residents or in cases of extreme hardship.

    ``(5) APPLICATION.--In addition to the information under subsection (b)(5), an application for a grant under paragraph (1), shall include--

    ``(A) an explanation for the need for Federal assistance; and

    ``(B) specific plans for obtaining necessary support to retain the position following the conclusion of Federal support.

    ``(6) MAINTENANCE OF EFFORT.--Grants awarded under paragraph (1) shall only be used to pay the salaries and benefits of additional firefighting personnel, and shall not be used to supplant funding allocated for personnel from State and local sources.''; and

    (3) in subsection (f) (as redesignated by paragraph (1)), by adding at the end the following:

    ``(3) $1,000,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2003 and 2004, to be used only for grants under subsection (c).''.

   SEC. 170. REVIEW OF TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ENHANCEMENTS.

    (a) REVIEW OF TRANSPORTATION VULNERABILITIES AND FEDERAL TRANSPORTATION SECURITY EFFORTS.--The Comptroller General shall conduct a detailed, comprehensive study which shall--

    (1) review all available intelligence on terrorist threats against aviation, seaport, rail and transit facilities;

    (2) review all available information on vulnerabilities at aviation, seaport, rail and transit facilities; and

    (3) review the steps taken by agencies since September 11, 2001, to improve aviation, seaport, rail, and transit security to determine their effectiveness at protecting passengers and transportation infrastructure from terrorist attack.

    (b) REPORT.--Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General shall prepare and submit to Congress and the Secretary a comprehensive report containing--

    (1) the findings and conclusions from the reviews conducted under subsection (a); and

    (2) proposed steps to improve any deficiencies found in aviation, seaport, rail, and transit security including, to the extent possible, the cost of implementing the steps.

    (c) RESPONSE OF THE SECRETARY.--Not later than 90 days after the date on which the report under this section is submitted to the Secretary, the Secretary shall provide to the President and Congress--

    (1) the response of the Department to the recommendations of the report; and

    (2) recommendations of the Department to further protect passengers and transportation infrastructure from terrorist attack.

   SEC. 171. INTEROPERABILITY OF INFORMATION SYSTEMS.

    (a) IN GENERAL.--The Director of the Office of Management and Budget, in consultation with the Secretary and affected entities, shall develop--

    (1) a comprehensive enterprise architecture for information systems, including communications systems, to achieve interoperability between and among information systems of agencies with responsibility for homeland security; and

    (2) a plan to achieve interoperability between and among information systems, including communications systems, of agencies with responsibility for homeland security and those of State and local agencies with responsibility for homeland security.

    (b) TIMETABLES.--The Director of the Office of Management and Budget, in consultation with the Secretary and affected entities, shall establish timetables for development and implementation of the enterprise architecture and plan referred to in subsection (a).

    (c) IMPLEMENTATION.--The Director of the Office of Management and Budget, in consultation with the Secretary and acting under the responsibilities of the Director under law (including the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996), shall ensure the implementation of the enterprise architecture developed under subsection (a)(1), and shall coordinate, oversee, and evaluate the management and acquisition of information technology by agencies with responsibility for homeland security to ensure interoperability consistent with the enterprise architecture developed under subsection (a)(1).

    (d) AGENCY COOPERATION.--The head of each agency with responsibility for homeland security shall fully cooperate with the Director of the Office of Management and Budget in the development of a comprehensive enterprise architecture for information systems and in the management and acquisition of information technology consistent with the comprehensive enterprise architecture developed under subsection (a)(1).

    (e) CONTENT.--The enterprise architecture developed under subsection (a)(1), and the information systems managed and acquired under the enterprise architecture, shall possess the characteristics of--

    (1) rapid deployment;

    (2) a highly secure environment, providing data access only to authorized users; and

    (3) the capability for continuous system upgrades to benefit from advances in technology while preserving the integrity of stored data.

    (f) UPDATED VERSIONS.--The Director of the Office of Management and Budget, in consultation with the Secretary, shall oversee and ensure the development of updated versions of the enterprise architecture and plan developed under subsection (a), as necessary.

    (g) REPORT.--The Director of the Office of Management and Budget, in consultation with the Secretary, shall annually report to Congress on the development and implementation of the enterprise architecture and plan referred to under subsection (a).

    (h) CONSULTATION.--The Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall consult with information systems management experts in the public and private sectors, in the development and implementation of the enterprise architecture and plan referred to under subsection (a).

    (i) PRINCIPAL OFFICER.--The Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall designate, with the approval of the President, a principal officer in the Office of Management and Budget whose primary responsibility shall be to carry out the duties of the Director under this section.

   SEC. 172. EXTENSION OF CUSTOMS USER FEES.

    Section 13031(j)(3) of the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (19 U.S.C. 58c(j)(3)) is amended by striking ``September 30, 2003'' and inserting ``March 31, 2004''.

   SEC. 181. DEFINITIONS.

    In this subtitle:

    (1) AGENCY.--The term ``agency'' includes any entity, organizational unit, or function transferred or to be transferred under this title.

    (2) TRANSITION PERIOD.--The term ``transition period'' means the 1-year period beginning on the effective date of this division.

   SEC. 182. TRANSFER OF AGENCIES.

    The transfer of an agency to the Department, as authorized by this title, shall occur when the President so directs, but in no event later than the end of the transition period.

   SEC. 183. TRANSITIONAL AUTHORITIES.

    (a) PROVISION OF ASSISTANCE BY OFFICIALS.--Until an agency is transferred to the Department, any official having authority over, or functions relating to, the agency immediately before the effective date of this division shall provide to the Secretary such assistance, including the use of personnel and assets, as the Secretary may reasonably request in preparing for the transfer and integration of the agency into the Department.

    (b) SERVICES AND PERSONNEL.--During the transition period, upon the request of the Secretary, the head of any agency (as defined under section 2) may, on a reimbursable basis, provide services and detail personnel to assist with the transition.

    (c) ACTING OFFICIALS.--

    (1) DESIGNATION.--During the transition period, pending the nomination and advice and consent of the Senate to the appointment of an officer required by this division to be appointed by and with such advice and consent, the President may designate any officer whose appointment was required to be made by and with such advice and consent, and who continues as such an officer, to act in such office until the office is filled as provided in this division.

    (2) COMPENSATION.--While serving as an acting officer under paragraph (1), the officer shall receive compensation at the higher of the rate provided--

    (A) under this division for the office in which that officer acts; or

    (B) for the office held at the time of designation.

    (3) PERIOD OF SERVICE.--The person serving as an acting officer under paragraph (1) may serve in the office for the periods described under section 3346 of title 5, United States Code, as if the office became vacant on the effective date of this division.

    (d) EXCEPTION TO ADVICE AND CONSENT REQUIREMENT.--Nothing in this Act shall be construed to require the advice and consent of the Senate to the appointment by the President to a position in the Department of any officer--

    (1) whose agency is transferred to the Department under this Act;

    (2) whose appointment was by and with the advice and consent of the Senate;

    (3) who is proposed to serve in a directorate or office of the Department that is similar to the transferred agency in which the officer served; and

    (4) whose authority and responsibilities following such transfer would be equivalent to those performed prior to such transfer.

   SEC. 184. INCIDENTAL TRANSFERS AND TRANSFER OF RELATED FUNCTIONS.

    (a) INCIDENTAL TRANSFERS.--The Director of the Office of Management and Budget, in consultation with the Secretary, shall make such additional incidental dispositions of personnel, assets, and liabilities held, used, arising from, available, or to be made available, in connection with the functions transferred by this title, as the Director determines necessary to accomplish the purposes of this title.

    (b) ADJUDICATORY OR REVIEW FUNCTIONS.--

    (1) IN GENERAL.--At the time an agency is transferred to the Department, the President may also transfer to the Department any agency established to carry out or support adjudicatory or review functions in relation to the transferred agency.

    (2) EXCEPTION.--The President may not transfer the Executive Office of Immigration

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    (c) TRANSFER OF RELATED FUNCTIONS.--The transfer, under this title, of an agency that is a subdivision of a department before such transfer shall include the transfer to the Secretary of any function relating to such agency that, on the date before the transfer, was exercised by the head of the department from which such agency is transferred.

    (d) REFERENCES.--A reference in any other Federal law, Executive order, rule, regulation, delegation of authority, or other document pertaining to an agency transferred under this title that refers to the head of the department from which such agency is transferred is deemed to refer to the Secretary.

   SEC. 185. IMPLEMENTATION PROGRESS REPORTS AND LEGISLATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS.

    (a) IN GENERAL.--In consultation with the President and in accordance with this section, the Secretary shall prepare implementation progress reports and submit such reports to--

    (1) the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives for referral to the appropriate committees; and

    (2) the Comptroller General of the United States.

    (b) REPORT FREQUENCY.--

    (1) INITIAL REPORT.--As soon as practicable, and not later than 6 months after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit the first implementation progress report.

    (2) SEMIANNUAL REPORTS.--Following the submission of the report under paragraph (1), the Secretary shall submit additional implementation progress reports not less frequently than once every 6 months until all transfers to the Department under this title have been completed.

    (3) FINAL REPORT.--Not later than 6 months after all transfers to the Department under this title have been completed, the Secretary shall submit a final implementation progress report.

    (c) CONTENTS.--

    (1) IN GENERAL.--Each implementation progress report shall report on the progress made in implementing titles I, II, III, and XI, including fulfillment of the functions transferred under this Act, and shall include all of the information specified under paragraph (2) that the Secretary has gathered as of the date of submission. Information contained in an earlier report may be referenced, rather than set out in full, in a subsequent report. The final implementation progress report shall include any required information not yet provided.

    (2) SPECIFICATIONS.--Each implementation progress report shall contain, to the extent available--

    (A) with respect to the transfer and incorporation of entities, organizational units, and functions--

    (i) the actions needed to transfer and incorporate entities, organizational units, and functions into the Department;

    (ii) a projected schedule, with milestones, for completing the various phases of the transition;

    (iii) a progress report on taking those actions and meeting the schedule;

    (iv) the organizational structure of the Department, including a listing of the respective directorates, the field offices of the Department, and the executive positions that will be filled by political appointees or career executives;

    (v) the location of Department headquarters, including a timeframe for relocating to the new location, an estimate of cost for the relocation, and information about which elements of the various agencies will be located at headquarters;

    (vi) unexpended funds and assets, liabilities, and personnel that will be transferred, and the proposed allocations and disposition within the Department; and

    (vii) the costs of implementing the transition;

    (B) with respect to human capital planning--

    (i) a description of the workforce planning undertaken for the Department, including the preparation of an inventory of skills and competencies available to the Department, to identify any gaps, and to plan for the training, recruitment, and retention policies necessary to attract and retain a workforce to meet the needs of the Department;

    (ii) the past and anticipated future record of the Department with respect to recruitment and retention of personnel;

    (iii) plans or progress reports on the utilization by the Department of existing personnel flexibility, provided by law or through regulations of the President and the Office of Personnel Management, to achieve the human capital needs of the Department;

    (iv) any inequitable disparities in pay or other terms and conditions of employment among employees within the Department resulting from the consolidation under this division of functions, entities, and personnel previously covered by disparate personnel systems; and

    (v) efforts to address the disparities under clause (iv) using existing personnel flexibility;

    (C) with respect to information technology--

    (i) an assessment of the existing and planned information systems of the Department; and

    (ii) a report on the development and implementation of enterprise architecture and of the plan to achieve interoperability;

    (D) with respect to programmatic implementation--

    (i) the progress in implementing the programmatic responsibilities of this division;

    (ii) the progress in implementing the mission of each entity, organizational unit, and function transferred to the Department;

    (iii) recommendations of any other governmental entities, organizational units, or functions that need to be incorporated into the Department in order for the Department to function effectively; and

    (iv) recommendations of any entities, organizational units, or functions not related to homeland security transferred to the Department that need to be transferred from the Department or terminated for the Department to function effectively.

    (d) LEGISLATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS.--

    (1) INCLUSION IN REPORT.--The Secretary, after consultation with the appropriate committees of Congress, shall include in the report under this section, recommendations for legislation that the Secretary determines is necessary to--

    (A) facilitate the integration of transferred entities, organizational units, and functions into the Department;

    (B) reorganize agencies, executive positions, and the assignment of functions within the Department;

    (C) address any inequitable disparities in pay or other terms and conditions of employment among employees within the Department resulting from the consolidation of agencies, functions, and personnel previously covered by disparate personnel systems;

    (D) enable the Secretary to engage in procurement essential to the mission of the Department;

    (E) otherwise help further the mission of the Department; and

    (F) make technical and conforming amendments to existing law to reflect the changes made by titles I, II, III, and XI.

    (2) SEPARATE SUBMISSION OF PROPOSED LEGISLATION.--The Secretary may submit the proposed legislation under paragraph (1) to Congress before submitting the balance of the report under this section.

   SEC. 186. TRANSFER AND ALLOCATION.

    Except as otherwise provided in this title, the personnel employed in connection with, and the assets, liabilities, contracts, property, records, and unexpended balance of appropriations, authorizations, allocations, and other funds employed, held, used, arising from, available to, or to be made available in connection with the agencies transferred under this title, shall be transferred to the Secretary for appropriate allocation, subject to the approval of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget and to section 1531 of title 31, United States Code. Unexpended funds transferred under this subsection shall be used only for the purposes for which the funds were originally authorized and appropriated.

   SEC. 187. SAVINGS PROVISIONS.

    (a) CONTINUING EFFECT OF LEGAL DOCUMENTS.--All orders, determinations, rules, regulations, permits, agreements, grants, contracts, recognitions of labor organizations, collective bargaining agreements, certificates, licenses, registrations, privileges, and other administrative actions--

    (1) which have been issued, made, granted, or allowed to become effective by the President, any Federal agency or official thereof, or by a court of competent jurisdiction, in the performance of functions which are transferred under this title; and

    (2) which are in effect at the time this division takes effect, or were final before the effective date of this division and are to become effective on or after the effective date of this division,

   shall, to the extent related to such functions, continue in effect according to their terms until modified, terminated, superseded, set aside, or revoked in accordance with law by the President, the Secretary or other authorized official, or a court of competent jurisdiction, or by operation of law.

    (b) PROCEEDINGS NOT AFFECTED.--The provisions of this title shall not affect any proceedings, including notices of proposed rulemaking, or any application for any license, permit, certificate, or financial assistance pending before an agency at the time this title takes effect, with respect to functions transferred by this title but such proceedings and applications shall continue. Orders shall be issued in such proceedings, appeals shall be taken therefrom, and payments shall be made pursuant to such orders, as if this title had not been enacted, and orders issued in any such proceedings shall continue in effect until modified, terminated, superseded, or revoked by a duly authorized official, by a court of competent jurisdiction, or by operation of law. Nothing in this subsection shall be deemed to prohibit the discontinuance or modification of any such proceeding under the same terms and conditions and to the same extent that such proceeding could have been discontinued or modified if this title had not been enacted.

    (c) SUITS NOT AFFECTED.--The provisions of this title shall not affect suits commenced before the effective date of this division, and in all such suits, proceedings shall be had, appeals taken, and judgments rendered in the same manner and with the same effect as if this title had not been enacted.

    (d) NONABATEMENT OF ACTIONS.--No suit, action, or other proceeding commenced by or against an agency, or by or against any individual in the official capacity of such individual as an officer of an agency, shall abate by reason of the enactment of this title.

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    (e) ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS RELATING TO PROMULGATION OF REGULATIONS.--Any administrative action relating to the preparation or promulgation of a regulation by an agency relating to a function transferred under this title may be continued by the Department with the same effect as if this title had not been enacted.

    (f) EMPLOYMENT AND PERSONNEL.--

    (1) EMPLOYEE RIGHTS.--

    (A) TRANSFERRED AGENCIES.--The Department, or a subdivision of the Department, that includes an entity or organizational unit, or subdivision thereof, transferred under this Act, or performs functions transferred under this Act shall not be excluded from coverage of chapter 71 of title 5, United States Code, as a result of any order issued under section 7103(b)(1) of title 5, United States Code, after July 19, 2002.

    (B) TRANSFERRED EMPLOYEES.--An employee transferred to the Department under this Act, who was in an appropriate unit under section 7112 of title 5, United States Code, prior to the transfer, shall not be excluded from a unit under subsection (b)(6) of that section unless--

    (i) the primary job duty of the employee is materially changed after the transfer; and

    (ii) the primary job duty of the employee after such change consists of intelligence, counterintelligence, or investigative duties directly related to the investigation of terrorism, if it is clearly demonstrated that membership in a unit and coverage under chapter 71 of title 5, United States Code, cannot be applied in a manner that would not have a substantial adverse effect on national security.

    (C) TRANSFERRED FUNCTIONS.--An employee of the Department who is primarily engaged in carrying out a function transferred to the Department under this Act or a function substantially similar to a function so transferred shall not be excluded from a unit under section 7112(b)(6) of title 5, United States Code, unless the function prior to the transfer was performed by an employee excluded from a unit under that section.

    (D) OTHER AGENCIES, EMPLOYEES, AND FUNCTIONS.--

    (i) EXCLUSION OF SUBDIVISION.--Subject to paragraph (A), a subdivision of the Department shall not be excluded from coverage under chapter 71 of title 5, United States Code, under section 7103(b)(1) of that title unless--

    (I) the subdivision has, as a primary function, intelligence, counterintelligence, or investigative duties directly related to terrorism investigation; and

    (II) the provisions of that chapter cannot be applied to that subdivision in a manner consistent with national security requirements and considerations.

    (ii) EXCLUSION OF EMPLOYEE.--Subject to subparagraphs (B) and (C), an employee of the Department shall not be excluded from a unit under section 7112(b)(6) of title 5, United States Code, unless the primary job duty of the employee consists of intelligence, counterintelligence, or investigative duties directly related to terrorism investigation, if it is clearly demonstrated that membership in a unit and coverage under chapter 71 of title 5, United States Code, cannot be applied in a manner that would not have a substantial adverse effect on national security.

    (E) PRIOR EXCLUSION.--Subparagraphs (A) through (D) shall not apply to any entity or organizational unit, or subdivision thereof, transferred to the Department under this Act that, on July 19, 2002, was excluded from coverage under chapter 71 of title 5, United States Code, under section 7103(b)(1) of that title.

    (2) TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT.--The transfer of an employee to the Department under this Act shall not alter the terms and conditions of employment, including compensation, of any employee so transferred.

    (3) CONDITIONS AND CRITERIA FOR APPOINTMENT.--Any qualifications, conditions, or criteria required by law for appointments to a position in an agency, or subdivision thereof, transferred to the Department under this title, including a requirement that an appointment be made by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall continue to apply with respect to any appointment to the position made after such transfer to the Department has occurred.

    (4) WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION.--The President may not exclude any position transferred to the Department as a covered position under section 2302(a)(2)(B)(ii) of title 5, United States Code, to the extent that such exclusion subject to that authority was not made before the date of enactment of this Act.

    (g) NO EFFECT ON INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITIES.--The transfer of authorities, functions, personnel, and assets of elements of the United States Government under this title, or the assumption of authorities and functions by the Department under this title, shall not be construed, in cases where such authorities, functions, personnel, and assets are engaged in intelligence activities as defined in the National Security Act of 1947, as affecting the authorities of the Director of Central Intelligence, the Secretary of Defense, or the heads of departments and agencies within the intelligence community.

   SEC. 188. TRANSITION PLAN.

    (a) IN GENERAL.--Not later than September 15, 2002, the President shall submit to Congress a transition plan as set forth in subsection (b).

    (b) CONTENTS.--

    (1) IN GENERAL.--The transition plan under subsection (a) shall include a detailed--

    (A) plan for the transition to the Department and implementation of titles I, II, and III and division B; and

    (B) proposal for the financing of those operations and needs of the Department that do not represent solely the continuation of functions for which appropriations already are available.

    (2) FINANCING PROPOSAL.--The financing proposal under paragraph (1)(B) may consist of any combination of specific appropriations transfers, specific reprogrammings, and new specific appropriations as the President considers advisable.

   SEC. 189. USE OF APPROPRIATED FUNDS.

    (a) APPLICABILITY OF THIS SECTION.--Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act or any other law, this section shall apply to the use of any funds, disposal of property, and acceptance, use, and disposal of gifts, or donations of services or property, of, for, or by the Department, including any agencies, entities, or other organizations transferred to the Department under this Act, the Office, and the National Combating Terrorism Strategy Panel.

    (b) USE OF TRANSFERRED FUNDS.--Except as may be provided in an appropriations Act in accordance with subsection (d), balances of appropriations and any other funds or assets transferred under this Act--

    (1) shall be available only for the purposes for which they were originally available;

    (2) shall remain subject to the same conditions and limitations provided by the law originally appropriating or otherwise making available the amount, including limitations and notification requirements related to the reprogramming of appropriated funds; and

    (3) shall not be used to fund any new position established under this Act.

    (c) NOTIFICATION REGARDING TRANSFERS.--The President shall notify Congress not less than 15 days before any transfer of appropriations balances, other funds, or assets under this Act.

    (d) ADDITIONAL USES OF FUNDS DURING TRANSITION.--Subject to subsection (c), amounts transferred to, or otherwise made available to, the Department may be used during the transition period for purposes in addition to those for which they were originally available (including by transfer among accounts of the Department), but only to the extent such transfer or use is specifically permitted in advance in an appropriations Act and only under the conditions and for the purposes specified in such appropriations Act.

    (e) DISPOSAL OF PROPERTY.--

    (1) STRICT COMPLIANCE.--If specifically authorized to dispose of real property in this or any other Act, the Secretary shall exercise this authority in strict compliance with section 204 of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 (40 U.S.C. 485).

    (2) DEPOSIT OF PROCEEDS.--The Secretary shall deposit the proceeds of any exercise of property disposal authority into the miscellaneous receipts of the Treasury in accordance with section 3302(b) of title 31, United States Code.

    (f) GIFTS.--Gifts or donations of services or property of or for the Department, the Office, or the National Combating Terrorism Strategy Panel may not be accepted, used, or disposed of unless specifically permitted in advance in an appropriations Act and only under the conditions and for the purposes specified in such appropriations Act.

    (g) BUDGET REQUEST.--Under section 1105 of title 31, United States Code, the President shall submit to Congress a detailed budget request for the Department for fiscal year 2004.

   SEC. 191. REORGANIZATIONS AND DELEGATIONS.

    (a) REORGANIZATION AUTHORITY.--

    (1) IN GENERAL.--The Secretary may, as necessary and appropriate--

    (A) allocate, or reallocate, functions among officers of the Department; and

    (B) establish, consolidate, alter, or discontinue organizational entities within the Department.

    (2) LIMITATION.--Paragraph (1) does not apply to--

    (A) any office, bureau, unit, or other entity established by law and transferred to the Department;

    (B) any function vested by law in an entity referred to in subparagraph (A) or vested by law in an officer of such an entity; or

    (C) the alteration of the assignment or delegation of functions assigned by this Act to any officer or organizational entity of the Department.

    (b) DELEGATION AUTHORITY.--

    (1) SECRETARY.--The Secretary may--

    (A) delegate any of the functions of the Secretary; and

    (B) authorize successive redelegations of functions of the Secretary to other officers and employees of the Department.

    (2) OFFICERS.--An officer of the Department may--

    (A) delegate any function assigned to the officer by law; and

    (B) authorize successive redelegations of functions assigned to the officer by law to other officers and employees of the Department.

    (3) LIMITATIONS.--

    (A) INTERUNIT DELEGATION.--Any function assigned by this title to an organizational unit of the Department or to the head of an organizational unit of the Department may not be delegated to an officer or employee outside of that unit.

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    (B) FUNCTIONS.--Any function vested by law in an entity established by law and transferred to the Department or vested by law in an officer of such an entity may not be delegated to an officer or employee outside of that entity.

   SEC. 192. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.

    (a) ANNUAL EVALUATIONS.--The Comptroller General of the United States shall monitor and evaluate the implementation of titles I, II, III, and XI. Not later than 15 months after the effective date of this division, and every year thereafter for the succeeding 5 years, the Comptroller General shall submit a report to Congress containing--

    (1) an evaluation of the implementation progress reports submitted to Congress and the Comptroller General by the Secretary under section 185;

    (2) the findings and conclusions of the Comptroller General of the United States resulting from the monitoring and evaluation conducted under this subsection, including evaluations of how successfully the Department is meeting--

    (A) the homeland security missions of the Department; and

    (B) the other missions of the Department; and

    (3) any recommendations for legislation or administrative action the Comptroller General considers appropriate.

    (b) BIENNIAL REPORTS.--Every 2 years the Secretary shall submit to Congress--

    (1) a report assessing the resources and requirements of executive agencies relating to border security and emergency preparedness issues; and

    (2) a report certifying the preparedness of the United States to prevent, protect against, and respond to natural disasters, cyber attacks, and incidents involving weapons of mass destruction.

    (c) POINT OF ENTRY MANAGEMENT REPORT.--Not later than 1 year after the effective date of this division, the Secretary shall submit to Congress a report outlining proposed steps to consolidate management authority for Federal operations at key points of entry into the United States.

    (d) COMBATING TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY.--Not later than 270 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary and the Director shall--

    (1) in consultation with the head of each department or agency affected by titles I, II, III, and XI, develop definitions of the terms ``combating terrorism'' and ``homeland security'' for purposes of those titles and shall consider such definitions in determining the mission of the Department and Office; and

    (2) submit a report to Congress on such definitions.

    (e) RESULTS-BASED MANAGEMENT.--

    (1) STRATEGIC PLAN.--

    (A) IN GENERAL.--Not later than September 30, 2003, consistent with the requirements of section 306 of title 5, United States Code, the Secretary, in consultation with Congress, shall prepare and submit to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget and to Congress a strategic plan for the program activities of the Department.

    (B) PERIOD; REVISIONS.--The strategic plan shall cover a period of not less than 5 years from the fiscal year in which it is submitted and it shall be updated and revised at least every 3 years.

    (C) CONTENTS.--The strategic plan shall describe the planned results for the non-homeland security related activities of the Department and the homeland security related activities of the Department.

    (2) PERFORMANCE PLAN.--

    (A) IN GENERAL.--In accordance with section 1115 of title 31, United States Code, the Secretary shall prepare an annual performance plan covering each program activity set forth in the budget of the Department.

    (B) CONTENTS.--The performance plan shall include--

    (i) the goals to be achieved during the year;

    (ii) strategies and resources required to meet the goals; and

    (iii) the means used to verify and validate measured values.

    (C) SCOPE.--The performance plan should describe the planned results for the non-homeland security related activities of the Department and the homeland security related activities of the Department.

    (3) PERFORMANCE REPORT.--

    (A) IN GENERAL.--In accordance with section 1116 of title 31, United States Code, the Secretary shall prepare and submit to the President and Congress an annual report on program performance for each fiscal year.

    (B) CONTENTS.--The performance report shall include the actual results achieved during the year compared to the goals expressed in the performance plan for that year.

   SEC. 193. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, SAFETY, AND HEALTH REQUIREMENTS.

    The Secretary shall--

    (1) ensure that the Department complies with all applicable environmental, safety, and health statutes and requirements; and

    (2) develop procedures for meeting such requirements.

   SEC. 194. LABOR STANDARDS.

    (a) IN GENERAL.--All laborers and mechanics employed by contractors or subcontractors in the performance of construction work financed in whole or in part with assistance received under this Act shall be paid wages at rates not less than those prevailing on similar construction in the locality as determined by the Secretary of Labor in accordance with the Davis-Bacon Act (40 U.S.C. 276a et seq.).

    (b) SECRETARY OF LABOR.--The Secretary of Labor shall have, with respect to the enforcement of labor standards under subsection (a), the authority and functions set forth in Reorganization Plan Number 14 of 1950 (5 U.S.C. App.) and section 2 of the Act of June 13, 1934 (48 Stat. 948, chapter 482; 40 U.S.C. 276c).

   SEC. 195. PROCUREMENT OF TEMPORARY AND INTERMITTENT SERVICES.

    The Secretary may--

    (1) procure the temporary or intermittent services of experts or consultants (or organizations thereof) in accordance with section 3109(b) of title 5, United States Code; and

    (2) whenever necessary due to an urgent homeland security need, procure temporary (not to exceed 1 year) or intermittent personal services, including the services of experts or consultants (or organizations thereof), without regard to the pay limitations of such section 3109.

   SEC. 196. PRESERVING NON-HOMELAND SECURITY MISSION PERFORMANCE.

    (a) IN GENERAL.--For each entity transferred into the Department that has non-homeland security functions, the respective Under Secretary in charge, in conjunction with the head of such entity, shall report to the Secretary, the Comptroller General, and the appropriate committees of Congress on the performance of the entity in all of its missions, with a particular emphasis on examining the continued level of performance of the non-homeland security missions.

    (b) CONTENTS.--The report referred to in subsection (a) shall--

    (1) to the greatest extent possible, provide an inventory of the non-homeland security functions of the entity and identify the capabilities of the entity with respect to those functions, including--

    (A) the number of employees who carry out those functions;

    (B) the budget for those functions; and

    (C) the flexibilities, personnel or otherwise, currently used to carry out those functions;

    (2) contain information related to the roles, responsibilities, missions, organizational structure, capabilities, personnel assets, and annual budgets, specifically with respect to the capabilities of the entity to accomplish its non-homeland security missions without any diminishment; and

    (3) contain information regarding whether any changes are required to the roles, responsibilities, missions, organizational structure, modernization programs, projects, activities, recruitment and retention programs, and annual fiscal resources to enable the entity to accomplish its non-homeland security missions without diminishment.

    (c) TIMING.--Each Under Secretary shall provide the report referred to in subsection (a) annually, for the 5 years following the transfer of the entity to the Department.

   SEC. 197. FUTURE YEARS HOMELAND SECURITY PROGRAM.

    (a) IN GENERAL.--Each budget request submitted to Congress for the Department under section 1105 of title 31, United States Code, and each budget request submitted to Congress for the National Terrorism Prevention and Response Program shall be accompanied by a Future Years Homeland Security Program.

    (b) CONTENTS.--The Future Years Homeland Security Program under subsection (a) shall be structured, and include the same type of information and level of detail, as the Future Years Defense Program submitted to Congress by the Department of Defense under section 221 of title 10, United States Code.

    (c) EFFECTIVE DATE.--This section shall take effect with respect to the preparation and submission of the fiscal year 2005 budget request for the Department and the fiscal year 2005 budget request for the National Terrorism Prevention and Response Program, and for any subsequent fiscal year.

   SEC. 198. PROTECTION OF VOLUNTARILY FURNISHED CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION.

    (a) DEFINITIONS.--In this section:

    (1) CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE.--The term ``critical infrastructure'' has the meaning given that term in section 1016(e) of the USA PATRIOT ACT of 2001 (42 U.S.C. 5195(e)).

    (2) FURNISHED VOLUNTARILY.--

    (A) DEFINITION.--The term ``furnished voluntarily'' means a submission of a record that--

    (i) is made to the Department in the absence of authority of the Department requiring that record to be submitted; and

    (ii) is not submitted or used to satisfy any legal requirement or obligation or to obtain any grant, permit, benefit (such as agency forbearance, loans, or reduction or modifications of agency penalties or rulings), or other approval from the Government.

    (B) BENEFIT.--In this paragraph, the term ``benefit'' does not include any warning, alert, or other risk analysis by the Department.

    (b) IN GENERAL.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a record pertaining to the vulnerability of and threats to critical infrastructure (such as attacks, response, and recovery efforts) that is furnished voluntarily to the Department shall not be made available under section 552 of title 5, United States Code, if--

    (1) the provider would not customarily make the record available to the public; and

    (2) the record is designated and certified by the provider, in a manner specified by the Department, as confidential and not customarily made available to the public.

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    (c) RECORDS SHARED WITH OTHER AGENCIES.--

    (1) IN GENERAL.--

    (A) RESPONSE TO REQUEST.--An agency in receipt of a record that was furnished voluntarily to the Department and subsequently shared with the agency shall, upon receipt of a request under section 552 of title 5, United States Code, for the record--

    (i) not make the record available; and

    (ii) refer the request to the Department for processing and response in accordance with this section.

    (B) SEGREGABLE PORTION OF RECORD.--Any reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be provided to the person requesting the record after deletion of any portion which is exempt under this section.

    (2) DISCLOSURE OF INDEPENDENTLY FURNISHED RECORDS.--Notwithstanding paragraph (1), nothing in this section shall prohibit an agency from making available under section 552 of title 5, United States Code, any record that the agency receives independently of the Department, regardless of whether or not the Department has a similar or identical record.

    (d) WITHDRAWAL OF CONFIDENTIAL DESIGNATION.--The provider of a record that is furnished voluntarily to the Department under subsection (b) may at any time withdraw, in a manner specified by the Department, the confidential designation.

    (e) PROCEDURES.--The Secretary shall prescribe procedures for--

    (1) the acknowledgement of receipt of records furnished voluntarily;

    (2) the designation, certification, and marking of records furnished voluntarily as confidential and not customarily made available to the public;

    (3) the care and storage of records furnished voluntarily;

    (4) the protection and maintenance of the confidentiality of records furnished voluntarily; and

    (5) the withdrawal of the confidential designation of records under subsection (d).

    (f) EFFECT ON STATE AND LOCAL LAW.--Nothing in this section shall be construed as preempting or otherwise modifying State or local law concerning the disclosure of any information that a State or local government receives independently of the Department.

    (g) REPORT.--

    (1) REQUIREMENT.--Not later than 18 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General of the United States shall submit to the committees of Congress specified in paragraph (2) a report on the implementation and use of this section, including--

    (A) the number of persons in the private sector, and the number of State and local agencies, that furnished voluntarily records to the Department under this section;

    (B) the number of requests for access to records granted or denied under this section; and

    (C) such recommendations as the Comptroller General considers appropriate regarding improvements in the collection and analysis of sensitive information held by persons in the private sector, or by State and local agencies, relating to vulnerabilities of and threats to critical infrastructure, including the response to such vulnerabilities and threats.

    (2) COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.--The committees of Congress specified in this paragraph are--

    (A) the Committees on the Judiciary and Governmental Affairs of the Senate; and

    (B) the Committees on the Judiciary and Government Reform and Oversight of the House of Representatives.

    (3) FORM.--The report shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

   SEC. 199. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

    There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to--

    (1) enable the Secretary to administer and manage the Department; and

    (2) carry out the functions of the Department other than those transferred to the Department under this Act.

   SEC. 201. NATIONAL OFFICE FOR COMBATING TERRORISM.

    (a) ESTABLISHMENT.--There is established within the Executive Office of the President the National Office for Combating Terrorism.

    (b) OFFICERS.--

    (1) DIRECTOR.--The head of the Office shall be the Director of the National Office for Combating Terrorism, who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.

    (2) EXECUTIVE SCHEDULE LEVEL I POSITION.--Section 5312 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:

    ``Director of the National Office for Combating Terrorism.''.

    (3) OTHER OFFICERS.--The President shall assign to the Office such other officers as the President, in consultation with the Director, considers appropriate to discharge the responsibilities of the Office.

    (c) RESPONSIBILITIES.--Subject to the direction and control of the President, the responsibilities of the Office shall include the following:

    (1) To develop national objectives and policies for combating terrorism.

    (2) To ensure that relevant agencies and entities conduct appropriate risk analysis and risk management activities and provide pertinent information derived such activities to the Office, and to review and integrate such information into the development of the Strategy.

    (3) To direct and review the development of a comprehensive national assessment of terrorist threats and vulnerabilities to those threats, which shall be--

    (A) conducted by the heads of relevant agencies, the National Security Advisor, the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, and other involved White House entities; and

    (B) used in preparation of the Strategy.

    (4) To develop, with the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Strategy under title III.

    (5) To coordinate, oversee, and evaluate the implementation and execution of the Strategy by agencies with responsibilities for combating terrorism under the Strategy, particularly those involving military, intelligence, law enforcement, diplomatic, and scientific and technological assets.

    (6) To work with agencies, including the Environmental Protection Agency, to ensure that appropriate actions are taken to address vulnerabilities identified by the Directorate of Critical Infrastructure Protection within the Department.

    (7)(A) To coordinate, with the advice of the Secretary, the development of a comprehensive annual budget for the programs and activities under the Strategy, including the budgets of the military departments and agencies within the National Foreign Intelligence Program relating to international terrorism, but excluding military programs, projects, or activities relating to force protection.

    (B) To have the lead responsibility for budget recommendations relating to military, intelligence, law enforcement, and diplomatic assets in support of the Strategy.

    (8) To exercise funding authority for Federal terrorism prevention and response agencies in accordance with section 202.

    (9) To serve as an advisor to the National Security Council.

    (10) To work with the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to ensure that--

    (A) the Director of the National Office for Combating Terrorism receives the relevant information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation related to terrorism; and

    (B) such information is made available to the appropriate agencies and to State and local law enforcement officials.

    (d) RESOURCES.--In consultation with the Director, the President shall assign or allocate to the Office such resources, including funds, personnel, and other resources, as the President considers appropriate and that are available to the President under appropriations Acts for fiscal year 2002 and fiscal year 2003 in the ``Office of Administration'' appropriations account or the ``Office of Homeland Security'' appropriations account. Any transfer or reprogramming of funds made under this section shall be subject to the reprogramming procedures in the Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act, 2002 (Public Law 107-67).

    (e) OVERSIGHT BY CONGRESS.--The establishment of the Office within the Executive Office of the President shall not be construed as affecting access by Congress, or any committee of Congress, to--

    (1) any information, document, record, or paper in the possession of the Office or any study conducted by or at the direction of the Director; or

    (2) any personnel of the Office.

   SEC. 202. FUNDING FOR STRATEGY PROGRAMS AND ACTIVITIES.

    (a) BUDGET REVIEW.--In consultation with the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Secretary, and the heads of other agencies, the National Security Advisor, the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, and other involved White House entities, the Director shall--

    (1) identify programs that contribute to the Strategy; and

    (2) in the development of the budget submitted by the President to Congress under section 1105 of title 31, United States Code, review and provide advice to the heads of agencies on the amount and use of funding for programs identified under paragraph (1).

    (b) SUBMITTAL OF PROPOSED BUDGETS TO THE DIRECTOR.--

    (1) IN GENERAL.--The head of each Federal terrorism prevention and response agency shall submit to the Director each year the proposed budget of that agency for the fiscal year beginning in that year for programs and activities of that agency under the Strategy during that fiscal year.

    (2) DATE FOR SUBMISSION.--The proposed budget of an agency for a fiscal year under paragraph (1) shall be submitted to the Director--

    (A) not later than the date on which the agency completes the collection of information for purposes of the submission by the President of a budget to Congress for that fiscal year under section 1105 of title 31, United States Code; and

    (B) before that information is submitted to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget for such purposes.

    (3) FORMAT.--In consultation with the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director shall specify the format for the submittal of proposed budgets under paragraph (1).

    (c) REVIEW OF PROPOSED BUDGETS.--

    (1) IN GENERAL.--The Director shall review each proposed budget submitted to the Director under subsection (b).

    (2) INADEQUATE FUNDING DETERMINATION.--If the Director determines under paragraph

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    (A) a notice in writing of the determination; and

    (B) a statement of the proposed funding, and any specific initiatives, that would (as determined by the Director) permit the implementation by the agency during the fiscal year of the goals of the Strategy applicable to the agency during the fiscal year.

    (3) ADEQUATE FUNDING DETERMINATION.--If the Director determines under paragraph (1) that the proposed budget of an agency for a fiscal year under subsection (b) is adequate to permit the implementation by the agency during the fiscal year of the goals of the Strategy applicable to the agency during the fiscal year, the Director shall submit to the head of the agency a notice in writing of that determination.

    (4) MAINTENANCE OF RECORDS.--The Director shall maintain a record of--

    (A) each notice submitted under paragraph (2), including any statement accompanying such notice; and

    (B) each notice submitted under paragraph (3).

    (d) AGENCY RESPONSE TO REVIEW OF PROPOSED BUDGETS.--

    (1) INCORPORATION OF PROPOSED FUNDING.--The head of a Federal terrorism prevention and response agency that receives a notice under subsection (c)(2) with respect to the proposed budget of the agency for a fiscal year shall incorporate the proposed funding, and any initiatives, set forth in the statement accompanying the notice into the information submitted to the Office of Management and Budget in support of the proposed budget for the agency for the fiscal year under section 1105 of title 31, United States Code.

    (2) ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.--The head of each agency described under paragraph (1) for a fiscal year shall include as an appendix to the information submitted to the Office of Management and Budget under that paragraph for the fiscal year the following:

    (A) A summary of any modifications in the proposed budget of such agency for the fiscal year under paragraph (1).

    (B) An assessment of the effect of such modifications on the capacity of such agency to perform its responsibilities during the fiscal year other than its responsibilities under the Strategy.

    (3) SUBMISSION TO CONGRESS.--

    (A) IN GENERAL.--Subject to subparagraph (B), the head of each agency described under paragraph (1) for a fiscal year shall submit to Congress a copy of the appendix submitted to the Office of Management and Budget for the fiscal year under paragraph (2) at the same time the budget of the President for the fiscal year is submitted to Congress under section 1105 of title 31, United States Code.

    (B) ELEMENTS WITHIN INTELLIGENCE PROGRAMS.--In the submission of the copy of the appendix to Congress under subparagraph (A), those elements of the appendix which are within the National Foreign Intelligence Program shall be submitted to--

    (i) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate;

    (ii) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives;

    (iii) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

    (iv) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

    (e) SUBMITTAL OF REVISED PROPOSED BUDGETS.--

    (1) IN GENERAL.--At the same time the head of a Federal terrorism prevention and response agency submits its proposed budget for a fiscal year to the Office of Management and Budget for purposes of the submission by the President of a budget to Congress for the fiscal year under section 1105 of title 31, United States Code, the head of the agency shall submit a copy of the proposed budget to the Director.

    (2) REVIEW AND DECERTIFICATION AUTHORITY.--The Director of the National Office for Combating Terrorism--

    (A) shall review each proposed budget submitted under paragraph (1); and

    (B) in the case of a proposed budget for a fiscal year to which subsection (c)(2) applies in the fiscal year, if the Director determines as a result of the review that the proposed budget does not include the proposed funding, and any initiatives, set forth in the notice under that subsection with respect to the proposed budget--

    (i) may decertify the proposed budget; and

    (ii) with respect to any proposed budget so decertified, shall submit to Congress--

    (I) a notice of the decertification;

    (II) a copy of the notice submitted to the agency concerned for the fiscal year under subsection (c)(2)(B); and

    (III) the budget recommendations made under this section.

    (f) NATIONAL TERRORISM PREVENTION AND RESPONSE PROGRAM BUDGET.--

    (1) IN GENERAL.--For each fiscal year, following the submittal of proposed budgets to the Director under subsection (b), the Director shall, in consultation with the Secretary and the head of each Federal terrorism prevention and response agency concerned--

    (A) develop a consolidated proposed budget for such fiscal year for all programs and activities under the Strategy for such fiscal year; and

    (B) subject to paragraph (2), submit the consolidated proposed budget to the President and to Congress.

    (2) ELEMENTS WITHIN INTELLIGENCE PROGRAMS.--In the submission of the consolidated proposed budget to Congress under paragraph (1)(B), those elements of the budget which are within the National Foreign Intelligence Program shall be submitted to--

    (A) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate;

    (B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives;

    (C) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

    (D) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

    (3) DESIGNATION OF CONSOLIDATED PROPOSED BUDGET.--The consolidated proposed budget for a fiscal year under this subsection shall be known as the National Terrorism Prevention and Response Program Budget for the fiscal year.

    (g) REPROGRAMMING AND TRANSFER REQUESTS.--

    (1) APPROVAL BY THE DIRECTOR.--The head of a Federal terrorism prevention and response agency may not submit to Congress a request for the reprogramming or transfer of any funds specified in the National Terrorism Prevention and Response Program Budget for programs or activities of the agency under the Strategy for a fiscal year in excess of $5,000,000 without the approval of the Director.

    (2) APPROVAL BY THE PRESIDENT.--The President may, upon the request of the head of the agency concerned, permit the submittal to Congress of a request previously disapproved by the Director under paragraph (1) if the President determines that the submittal of the request to Congress will further the purposes of the Strategy.

   SEC. 301. STRATEGY.

    (a) DEVELOPMENT.--The Secretary and the Director shall develop the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism and Homeland Security Response for detection, prevention, protection, response, and recovery to counter terrorist threats, including threat, vulnerability, and risk assessment and analysis, and the plans, policies, training, exercises, evaluation, and interagency cooperation that address each such action relating to such threats.

    (b) RESPONSIBILITIES.--

    (1) RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE SECRETARY.--The Secretary shall have responsibility for portions of the Strategy addressing border security, critical infrastructure protection, emergency preparation and response, and integrating State and local efforts with activities of the Federal Government.

    (2) RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE DIRECTOR.--The Director shall have overall responsibility for development of the Strategy, and particularly for those portions of the Strategy addressing intelligence, military assets, law enforcement, and diplomacy.

    (c) CONTENTS.--The contents of the Strategy shall include--

    (1) a comprehensive statement of mission, goals, objectives, desired end-state, priorities and responsibilities;

    (2) policies and procedures to maximize the collection, translation, analysis, exploitation, and dissemination of information relating to combating terrorism and the homeland security response throughout the Federal Government and with State and local authorities;

    (3) plans for countering chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosives, and cyber threats;

    (4) plans for integrating the capabilities and assets of the United States military into all aspects of the Strategy;

    (5) plans for improving the resources of, coordination among, and effectiveness of health and medical sectors for detecting and responding to terrorist attacks on the homeland;

    (6) specific measures to enhance cooperative efforts between the public and private sectors in protecting against terrorist attacks;

    (7) a review of measures needed to enhance transportation security with respect to potential terrorist attacks;

    (8) plans for identifying, prioritizing, and meeting research and development objectives to support homeland security needs; and

    (9) other critical areas.

    (d) COOPERATION.--At the request of the Secretary or Director, departments and agencies shall provide necessary information or planning documents relating to the Strategy.

    (e) INTERAGENCY COUNCIL.--

    (1) ESTABLISHMENT.--There is established the National Combating Terrorism and Homeland Security Response Council to assist with preparation and implementation of the Strategy.

    (2) MEMBERSHIP.--The members of the Council shall be the heads of the Federal terrorism prevention and response agencies or their designees. The Secretary and Director shall designate such agencies.

    (3) CO-CHAIRS AND MEETINGS.--The Secretary and Director shall co-chair the Council, which shall meet at their direction.

    (f) SUBMISSION TO CONGRESS.--Not later than December 1, 2003, and each year thereafter in which a President is inaugurated, the Secretary and the Director shall submit the Strategy to Congress.

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    (g) UPDATING.--Not later than December 1, 2005, and on December 1, of every 2 years thereafter, the Secretary and the Director shall submit to Congress an updated version of the Strategy.

    (h) PROGRESS REPORTS.--Not later than December 1, 2004, and on December 1, of each year thereafter, the Secretary and the Director may submit to Congress a report that--

    (1) describes the progress on implementation of the Strategy; and

    (2) provides recommendations for improvement of the Strategy and the implementation of the Strategy.

   SEC. 302. MANAGEMENT GUIDANCE FOR STRATEGY IMPLEMENTATION.

    (a) IN GENERAL.--In consultation with the Director and the Secretary, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall provide management guidance for agencies to successfully implement and execute the Strategy.

    (b) OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET REPORT.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the submission of the Strategy referred to under section 301, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall--

    (1) submit to Congress a report describing agency progress under subsection (a); and

    (2) provide a copy of the report to the Comptroller General of the United States.

    (c) GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE REPORT.--Not later than 90 days after the receipt of the report required under subsection (b), the Comptroller General of the United States shall submit a report to the Governmental Affairs Committee of the Senate, the Government Reform Committee of the House of Representatives, the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives, evaluating--

    (1) the management guidance identified under subsection (a); and

    (2) Federal agency performance in implementing and executing the Strategy.

   SEC. 303. NATIONAL COMBATING TERRORISM STRATEGY PANEL.

    (a) ESTABLISHMENT.--The Secretary and the Director shall establish a nonpartisan, independent panel to be known as the National Combating Terrorism Strategy Panel (in this section referred to as the ``Panel'').

    (b) MEMBERSHIP.--

    (1) APPOINTMENT.--The Panel shall be composed of a chairperson and 8 other individuals appointed by the Secretary and the Director, in consultation with the chairman and ranking member of the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the chairman and ranking member of the Committee on Government Reform of the House of Representatives, from among individuals in the private sector who are recognized experts in matters relating to combating terrorism and the homeland security of the United States.

    (2) TERMS.--

    (A) IN GENERAL.--An individual shall be appointed to the Panel for an 18-month term.

    (B) TERM PERIODS.--Terms on the Panel shall not be continuous. All terms shall be for the 18-month period which begins 12 months before each date a report is required to be submitted under subsection (l)(2)(A).

    (C) MULTIPLE TERMS.--An individual may serve more than 1 term.

    (c) DUTIES.--The Panel shall--

    (1) conduct and submit to the Secretary the assessment of the Strategy; and

    (2) conduct the independent, alternative assessment of homeland security measures required under this section.

    (d) ALTERNATIVE ASSESSMENT.--The Panel shall submit to the Secretary an independent assessment of the optimal policies and programs to combat terrorism, including homeland security measures. As part of the assessment, the Panel shall, to the extent practicable, estimate the funding required by fiscal year to achieve these optimal approaches.

    (e) INFORMATION FROM FEDERAL AGENCIES.--

    (1) IN GENERAL.--Subject to paragraph (2), the Panel may secure directly from any agency such information as the Panel considers necessary to carry out this section. Upon request of the Chairperson, the head of such department or agency shall furnish such information to the Panel.

    (2) INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION.--The provision of information under this paragraph related to intelligence shall be provided in accordance with procedures established by the Director of Central Intelligence and in accordance with section 103(d)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(d)(3)).

    (f) COMPENSATION OF MEMBERS.--Each member of the Panel shall be compensated at a rate equal to the daily equivalent of the annual rate of basic pay prescribed for level IV of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of title 5, United States Code, for each day (including travel time) during which such member is engaged in the performance of the duties of the Panel.

    (g) TRAVEL EXPENSES.--The members of the Panel shall be allowed travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, at rates authorized for employees of agencies under subchapter I of chapter 57 of title 5, United States Code, while away from their homes or regular places of business in the performance of services for the Panel.

    (h) STAFF.--

    (1) IN GENERAL.--The Chairperson of the Panel may, without regard to the civil service laws and regulations, appoint and terminate an executive director and such other additional personnel as may be necessary to enable the Panel to perform its duties. The employment of an executive director shall be subject to confirmation by the Panel.

    (2) COMPENSATION.--The Chairperson of the Panel may fix the compensation of the executive director and other personnel without regard to chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of title 5, United States Code, relating to classification of positions and General Schedule pay rates, except that the rate of pay for the executive director and other personnel may not exceed the rate payable for level V of the Executive Schedule under section 5316 of such title.

    (3) PERSONNEL AS FEDERAL EMPLOYEES.--

    (A) IN GENERAL.--The executive director and any personnel of the Panel who are employees shall be employees under section 2105 of title 5, United States Code, for purposes of chapters 63, 81, 83, 84, 85, 87, 89, and 90 of that title.

    (B) MEMBERS OF PANEL.--Subparagraph (A) shall not be construed to apply to members of the Panel.

    (4) REDUCTION OF STAFF.--During periods that members are not serving terms on the Panel, the executive director shall reduce the number and hours of employees to the minimum necessary to--

    (A) provide effective continuity of the Panel; and

    (B) minimize personnel costs of the Panel.

    (i) DETAIL OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES.--Any Federal Government employee may be detailed to the Panel without reimbursement, and such detail shall be without interruption or loss of civil service status or privilege.

    (j) ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISIONS.--

    (1) USE OF MAIL AND PRINTING.--The Panel may use the United States mails and obtain printing and binding services in the same manner and under the same conditions as other agencies.

    (2) SUPPORT SERVICES.--The Secretary shall furnish the Panel any administrative and support services requested by the Panel.

    (3) GIFTS.--The Panel may accept, use, and dispose of gifts or donations of services or property.

    (k) PAYMENT OF PANEL EXPENSES.--The compensation, travel expenses, and per diem allowances of members and employees of the Panel shall be paid out of funds available to the Department for the payment of compensation, travel allowances, and per diem allowances, respectively, of civilian employees of the Department. The other expenses of the Panel shall be paid out of funds available to the Department for the payment of similar expenses incurred by the Department.

    (l) REPORTS.--

    (1) PRELIMINARY REPORT.--

    (A) REPORT TO SECRETARY.--Not later than July 1, 2004, the Panel shall submit to the Secretary and the Director a preliminary report setting forth the activities and the findings and recommendations of the Panel under subsection (d), including any recommendations for legislation that the Panel considers appropriate.

    (B) REPORT TO CONGRESS.--Not later than 30 days after the submission of the report under subparagraph (A), the Secretary and the Director shall submit to the committees referred to under subsection (b), and the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Representatives, a copy of that report with the comments of the Secretary on the report.

    (2) QUADRENNIAL REPORTS.--

    (A) REPORTS TO SECRETARY.--Not later than December 1, 2004, and not later than December 1 every 4 years thereafter, the Panel shall submit to the Secretary and the Director a report setting forth the activities and the findings and recommendations of the Panel under subsection (d), including any recommendations for legislation that the Panel considers appropriate.

    (B) REPORTS TO CONGRESS.--Not later than 60 days after each report is submitted under subparagraph (A), the Secretary shall submit to the committees referred to under subsection (b), and the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Representatives, a copy of the report with the comments of the Secretary and the Director on the report.

   SEC. 401. LAW ENFORCEMENT POWERS OF INSPECTOR GENERAL AGENTS.

    (a) IN GENERAL.--Section 6 of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended by adding at the end the following:

    ``(e)(1) In addition to the authority otherwise provided by this Act, each Inspector General appointed under section 3, any Assistant Inspector General for Investigations under such an Inspector General, and any special agent supervised by such an Assistant Inspector General may be authorized by the Attorney General to--

    ``(A) carry a firearm while engaged in official duties as authorized under this Act or other statute, or as expressly authorized by the Attorney General;

    ``(B) make an arrest without a warrant while engaged in official duties as authorized under this Act or other statute, or as expressly authorized by the Attorney General, for any offense against the United States committed in the presence of such Inspector General, Assistant Inspector General, or agent, or for any felony cognizable under the laws of the United States if such Inspector General, Assistant Inspector General, or agent has reasonable grounds to believe that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing such felony; and

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    ``(C) seek and execute warrants for arrest, search of a premises, or seizure of evidence issued under the authority of the United States upon probable cause to believe that a violation has been committed.

    ``(2) The Attorney General may authorize exercise of the powers under this subsection only upon an initial determination that--

    ``(A) the affected Office of Inspector General is significantly hampered in the performance of responsibilities established by this Act as a result of the lack of such powers;

    ``(B) available assistance from other law enforcement agencies is insufficient to meet the need for such powers; and

    ``(C) adequate internal safeguards and management procedures exist to ensure proper exercise of such powers.

    ``(3) The Inspector General offices of the Department of Commerce, Department of Education, Department of Energy, Department of Health and Human Services, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Housing and Urban Development, Department of the Interior, Department of Justice, Department of Labor, Department of State, Department of Transportation, Department of the Treasury, Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency for International Development, Environmental Protection Agency, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Emergency Management Agency, General Services Administration, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Personnel Management, Railroad Retirement Board, Small Business Administration, Social Security Administration, and the Tennessee Valley Authority are exempt from the requirement of paragraph (2) of an initial determination of eligibility by the Attorney General.

    ``(4) The Attorney General shall promulgate, and revise as appropriate, guidelines which shall govern the exercise of the law enforcement powers established under paragraph (1).

    ``(5) Powers authorized for an Office of Inspector General under paragraph (1) shall be rescinded or suspended upon a determination by the Attorney General that any of the requirements under paragraph (2) is no longer satisfied or that the exercise of authorized powers by that Office of Inspector General has not complied with the guidelines promulgated by the Attorney General under paragraph (4).

    ``(6) A determination by the Attorney General under paragraph (2) or (5) shall not be reviewable in or by any court.

    ``(7) To ensure the proper exercise of the law enforcement powers authorized by this subsection, the Offices of Inspector General described under paragraph (3) shall, not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this subsection, collectively enter into a memorandum of understanding to establish an external review process for ensuring that adequate internal safeguards and management procedures continue to exist within each Office and within any Office that later receives an authorization under paragraph (2). The review process shall be established in consultation with the Attorney General, who shall be provided with a copy of the memorandum of understanding that establishes the review process. Under the review process, the exercise of the law enforcement powers by each Office of Inspector General shall be reviewed periodically by another Office of Inspector General or by a committee of Inspectors General. The results of each review shall be communicated in writing to the applicable Inspector General and to the Attorney General.

    ``(8) No provision of this subsection shall limit the exercise of law enforcement powers established under any other statutory authority, including United States Marshals Service special deputation.''.

    (b) PROMULGATION OF INITIAL GUIDELINES.--

    (1) DEFINITION.--In this subsection, the term ``memoranda of understanding'' means the agreements between the Department of Justice and the Inspector General offices described under section 6(e)(3) of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App) (as added by subsection (a) of this section) that--

    (A) are in effect on the date of enactment of this Act; and

    (B) authorize such offices to exercise authority that is the same or similar to the authority under section 6(e)(1) of such Act.

    (2) IN GENERAL.--Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Attorney General shall promulgate guidelines under section 6(e)(4) of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App) (as added by subsection (a) of this section) applicable to the Inspector General offices described under section 6(e)(3) of that Act.

    (3) MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS.--The guidelines promulgated under this subsection shall include, at a minimum, the operational and training requirements in the memoranda of understanding.

    (4) NO LAPSE OF AUTHORITY.--The memoranda of understanding in effect on the date of enactment of this Act shall remain in effect until the guidelines promulgated under this subsection take effect.

    (c) EFFECTIVE DATES.--

    (1) IN GENERAL.--Subsection (a) shall take effect 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act.

    (2) INITIAL GUIDELINES.--Subsection (b) shall take effect on the date of enactment of this Act.

   SEC. 501. DEFINITION.

    In this title, the term ``executive agency'' has the meaning given that term under section 4(1) of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act (41 U.S.C. 403(1)).

   SEC. 502. PROCUREMENTS FOR DEFENSE AGAINST OR RECOVERY FROM TERRORISM OR NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, CHEMICAL, OR RADIOLOGICAL ATTACK.

    The authorities provided in this subtitle apply to any procurement of property or services by or for an executive agency that, as determined by the head of the executive agency, are to be used to facilitate defense against or recovery from terrorism or nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological attack, but only if a solicitation of offers for the procurement is issued during the 1-year period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act.

   SEC. 503. INCREASED SIMPLIFIED ACQUISITION THRESHOLD FOR PROCUREMENTS IN SUPPORT OF HUMANITARIAN OR PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS OR CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS.

    (a) TEMPORARY THRESHOLD AMOUNTS.--For a procurement referred to in section 502 that is carried out in support of a humanitarian or peacekeeping operation or a contingency operation, the simplified acquisition threshold definitions shall be applied as if the amount determined under the exception provided for such an operation in those definitions were--

    (1) in the case of a contract to be awarded and performed, or purchase to be made, inside the United States, $250,000; or

    (2) in the case of a contract to be awarded and performed, or purchase to be made, outside the United States, $500,000.

    (b) SIMPLIFIED ACQUISITION THRESHOLD DEFINITIONS.--In this section, the term ``simplified acquisition threshold definitions'' means the following:

    (1) Section 4(11) of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act (41 U.S.C. 403(11)).

    (2) Section 309(d) of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 (41 U.S.C. 259(d)).

    (3) Section 2302(7) of title 10, United States Code.

    (c) SMALL BUSINESS RESERVE.--For a procurement carried out pursuant to subsection (a), section 15(j) of the Small Business Act (15 U.S.C. 644(j)) shall be applied as if the maximum anticipated value identified therein is equal to the amounts referred to in subsection (a).

   SEC. 504. INCREASED MICRO-PURCHASE THRESHOLD FOR CERTAIN PROCUREMENTS.

    In the administration of section 32 of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act (41 U.S.C. 428) with respect to a procurement referred to in section 502, the amount specified in subsections (c), (d), and (f) of such section 32 shall be deemed to be $10,000.

   SEC. 505. APPLICATION OF CERTAIN COMMERCIAL ITEMS AUTHORITIES TO CERTAIN PROCUREMENTS.

    (a) AUTHORITY.--

    (1) IN GENERAL.--The head of an executive agency may apply the provisions of law listed in paragraph (2) to a procurement referred to in section 502 without regard to whether the property or services are commercial items.

    (2) COMMERCIAL ITEM LAWS.--The provisions of law referred to in paragraph (1) are as follows:

    (A) Sections 31 and 34 of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act (41 U.S.C. 427, 430).

    (B) Section 2304(g) of title 10, United States Code.

    (C) Section 303(g) of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 (41 U.S.C. 253(g)).

    (b) INAPPLICABILITY OF LIMITATION ON USE OF SIMPLIFIED ACQUISITION PROCEDURES.--

    (1) IN GENERAL.--The $5,000,000 limitation provided in section 31(a)(2) of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act (41 U.S.C. 427(a)(2)), section 2304(g)(1)(B) of title 10, United States Code, and section 303(g)(1)(B) of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 (41 U.S.C. 253(g)(1)(B)) shall not apply to purchases of property or services to which any of the provisions of law referred to in subsection (a) are applied under the authority of this section.

    (2) OMB GUIDANCE.--The Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall issue guidance and procedures for the use of simplified acquisition procedures for a purchase of property or services in excess of $5,000,000 under the authority of this section.

    (c) CONTINUATION OF AUTHORITY FOR SIMPLIFIED PURCHASE PROCEDURES.--Authority under a provision of law referred to in subsection (a)(2) that expires under section 4202(e) of the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 (divisions D and E of Public Law 104-106; 10 U.S.C. 2304 note) shall, notwithstanding such section, continue to apply for use by the head of an executive agency as provided in subsections (a) and (b).

   SEC. 506. USE OF STREAMLINED PROCEDURES.

    (a) REQUIRED USE.--The head of an executive agency shall, when appropriate, use streamlined acquisition authorities and procedures authorized by law for a procurement referred to in section 502, including authorities and procedures that are provided under the following provisions of law:

    (1) FEDERAL PROPERTY AND ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES ACT OF 1949.--In title III of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949:

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    (A) Paragraphs (1), (2), (6), and (7) of subsection (c) of section 303 (41 U.S.C. 253), relating to use of procedures other than competitive procedures under certain circumstances (subject to subsection (e) of such section).

    (B) Section 303J (41 U.S.C. 253j), relating to orders under task and delivery order contracts.

    (2) TITLE 10, UNITED STATES CODE.--In chapter 137 of title 10, United States Code:

    (A) Paragraphs (1), (2), (6), and (7) of subsection (c) of section 2304, relating to use of procedures other than competitive procedures under certain circumstances (subject to subsection (e) of such section).

    (B) Section 2304c, relating to orders under task and delivery order contracts.

    (3) OFFICE OF FEDERAL PROCUREMENT POLICY ACT.--Paragraphs (1)(B), (1)(D), and (2) of section 18(c) of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act (41 U.S.C. 416(c)), relating to inapplicability of a requirement for procurement notice.

    (b) WAIVER OF CERTAIN SMALL BUSINESS THRESHOLD REQUIREMENTS.--Subclause (II) of section 8(a)(1)(D)(i) of the Small Business Act (15 U.S.C. 637(a)(1)(D)(i)) and clause (ii) of section 31(b)(2)(A) of such Act (15 U.S.C. 657a(b)(2)(A)) shall not apply in the use of streamlined acquisition authorities and procedures referred to in paragraphs (1)(A) and (2)(A) of subsection (a) for a procurement referred to in section 502.

   SEC. 507. REVIEW AND REPORT BY COMPTROLLER GENERAL.

    (a) REQUIREMENTS.--Not later than March 31, 2004, the Comptroller General shall--

    (1) complete a review of the extent to which procurements of property and services have been made in accordance with this subtitle; and

    (2) submit a report on the results of the review to the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on Government Reform of the House of Representatives.

    (b) CONTENT OF REPORT.--The report under subsection (a)(2) shall include the following matters:

    (1) ASSESSMENT.--The Comptroller General's assessment of--

    (A) the extent to which property and services procured in accordance with this title have contributed to the capacity of the workforce of Federal Government employees within each executive agency to carry out the mission of the executive agency; and

    (B) the extent to which Federal Government employees have been trained on the use of technology.

    (2) RECOMMENDATIONS.--Any recommendations of the Comptroller General resulting from the assessment described in paragraph (1).

    (c) CONSULTATION.--In preparing for the review under subsection (a)(1), the Comptroller shall consult with the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on Government Reform of the House of Representatives on the specific issues and topics to be reviewed. The extent of coverage needed in areas such as technology integration, employee training, and human capital management, as well as the data requirements of the study, shall be included as part of the consultation.

   SEC. 511. IDENTIFICATION OF NEW ENTRANTS INTO THE FEDERAL MARKETPLACE.

    The head of each executive agency shall conduct market research on an ongoing basis to identify effectively the capabilities, including the capabilities of small businesses and new entrants into Federal contracting, that are available in the marketplace for meeting the requirements of the executive agency in furtherance of defense against or recovery from terrorism or nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological attack. The head of the executive agency shall, to the maximum extent practicable, take advantage of commercially available market research methods, including use of commercial databases, to carry out the research.

   SEC. 601. EFFECTIVE DATE.

    This division shall take effect 30 days after the date of enactment of this Act or, if enacted within 30 days before January 1, 2003, on January 1, 2003.

   SEC. 1001. SHORT TITLE.

    This division may be cited as the ``Immigration Reform, Accountability, and Security Enhancement Act of 2002''.

   SEC. 1002. DEFINITIONS.

    In this division:

    (1) ENFORCEMENT BUREAU.--The term ``Enforcement Bureau'' means the Bureau of Enforcement and Border Affairs established in section 114 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as added by section 1105 of this Act.

    (2) FUNCTION.--The term ``function'' includes any duty, obligation, power, authority, responsibility, right, privilege, activity, or program.

    (3) IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT FUNCTIONS.--The term ``immigration enforcement functions'' has the meaning given the term in section 114(b)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as added by section 1105 of this Act.

    (4) IMMIGRATION LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES.--The term ``immigration laws of the United States'' has the meaning given the term in section 111(e) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as added by section 1102 of this Act.

    (5) IMMIGRATION POLICY, ADMINISTRATION, AND INSPECTION FUNCTIONS.--The term ``immigration policy, administration, and inspection functions'' has the meaning given the term in section 112(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as added by section 1103 of this Act.

    (6) IMMIGRATION SERVICE FUNCTIONS.--The term ``immigration service functions'' has the meaning given the term in section 113(b)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as added by section 1104 of this Act.

    (7) OFFICE.--The term ``office'' includes any office, administration, agency, bureau, institute, council, unit, organizational entity, or component thereof.

    (8) SECRETARY.--The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary of Homeland Security.

    (9) SERVICE BUREAU.--The term ``Service Bureau'' means the Bureau of Immigration Services established in section 113 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as added by section 1104 of this Act.

    (10) UNDER SECRETARY.--The term ``Under Secretary'' means the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Immigration Affairs appointed under section 112 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as added by section 1103 of this Act.

   SEC. 1101. ABOLITION OF INS.

    (a) IN GENERAL.--The Immigration and Naturalization Service is abolished.

    (b) REPEAL.--Section 4 of the Act of February 14, 1903, as amended (32 Stat. 826; relating to the establishment of the Immigration and Naturalization Service), is repealed.

   SEC. 1102. ESTABLISHMENT OF DIRECTORATE OF IMMIGRATION AFFAIRS.

    (a) ESTABLISHMENT.--Title I of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.) is amended--

    (1) by inserting ``CHAPTER 1--DEFINITIONS AND GENERAL AUTHORITIES'' after ``TITLE I--GENERAL''; and

    (2) by adding at the end the following:

   ``SEC. 111. ESTABLISHMENT OF DIRECTORATE OF IMMIGRATION AFFAIRS.

    ``(a) ESTABLISHMENT.--There is established within the Department of Homeland Security the Directorate of Immigration Affairs.

    ``(b) PRINCIPAL OFFICERS.--The principal officers of the Directorate are the following:

    ``(1) The Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Immigration Affairs appointed under section 112.

    ``(2) The Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security for Immigration Services appointed under section 113.

    ``(3) The Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security for Enforcement and Border Affairs appointed under section 114.

    ``(c) FUNCTIONS.--Under the authority of the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Directorate shall perform the following functions:

    ``(1) Immigration policy, administration, and inspection functions, as defined in section 112(b).

    ``(2) Immigration service and adjudication functions, as defined in section 113(b).

    ``(3) Immigration enforcement functions, as defined in section 114(b).

    ``(d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.--

    ``(1) IN GENERAL.--There are authorized to be appropriated to the Department of Homeland Security such sums as may be necessary to carry out the functions of the Directorate.

    ``(2) AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS.--Amounts appropriated pursuant to paragraph (1) are authorized to remain available until expended.

    ``(e) IMMIGRATION LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES DEFINED.--In this chapter, the term `immigration laws of the United States' means the following:

    ``(1) This Act.

    ``(2) Such other statutes, Executive orders, regulations, or directives, treaties, or other international agreements to which the United States is a party, insofar as they relate to the admission to, detention in, or removal from the United States of aliens, insofar as they relate to the naturalization of aliens, or insofar as they otherwise relate to the status of aliens.''.

    (b) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.--(1) The Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.) is amended--

    (A) by striking section 101(a)(34) (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(34)) and inserting the following:

    ``(34) The term `Directorate' means the Directorate of Immigration Affairs established by section 111.'';

    (B) by adding at the end of section 101(a) the following new paragraphs:

    ``(51) The term `Secretary' means the Secretary of Homeland Security.

    ``(52) The term `Department' means the Department of Homeland Security.'';

    (C) by striking ``Attorney General'' and ``Department of Justice'' each place it appears and inserting ``Secretary'' and ``Department'', respectively;

    (D) in section 101(a)(17) (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(17)), by striking ``The'' and inserting ``Except as otherwise provided in section 111(e), the; and

    (E) by striking ``Immigration and Naturalization Service'', ``Service'', and ``Service's'' each place they appear and inserting ``Directorate of Immigration Affairs'', ``Directorate'', and ``Directorate's'', respectively.

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    (2) Section 6 of the Act entitled ``An Act to authorize certain administrative expenses for the Department of Justice, and for other purposes'', approved July 28, 1950 (64 Stat. 380), is amended--

    (A) by striking ``Immigration and Naturalization Service'' and inserting ``Directorate of Immigration Affairs'';

    (B) by striking clause (a); and

    (C) by redesignating clauses (b), (c), (d), and (e) as clauses (a), (b), (c), and (d), respectively.

    (c) REFERENCES.--Any reference in any statute, reorganization plan, Executive order, regulation, agreement, determination, or other official document or proceeding to the Immigration and Naturalization Service shall be deemed to refer to the Directorate of Immigration Affairs of the Department of Homeland Security, and any reference in the immigration laws of the United States (as defined in section 111(e) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as added by this section) to the Attorney General shall be deemed to refer to the Secretary of Homeland Security, acting through the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Immigration Affairs.

   SEC. 1103. UNDER SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY FOR IMMIGRATION AFFAIRS.

    (a) IN GENERAL.--Chapter 2 of title I of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as added by section 1102 of this Act, is amended by adding at the end the following:

   ``SEC. 112. UNDER SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY FOR IMMIGRATION AFFAIRS.

    ``(a) UNDER SECRETARY OF IMMIGRATION AFFAIRS.--The Directorate shall be headed by an Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Immigration Affairs who shall be appointed in accordance with section 103(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

    ``(b) RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE UNDER SECRETARY.--

    ``(1) IN GENERAL.--The Under Secretary shall be charged with any and all responsibilities and authority in the administration of the Directorate and of this Act which are conferred upon the Secretary as may be delegated to the Under Secretary by the Secretary or which may be prescribed by the Secretary.

    ``(2) DUTIES.--Subject to the authority of the Secretary under paragraph (1), the Under Secretary shall have the following duties:

    ``(A) IMMIGRATION POLICY.--The Under Secretary shall develop and implement policy under the immigration laws of the United States. The Under Secretary shall propose, promulgate, and issue rules, regulations, and statements of policy with respect to any function within the jurisdiction of the Directorate.

    ``(B) ADMINISTRATION.--The Under Secretary shall have responsibility for--

    ``(i) the administration and enforcement of the functions conferred upon the Directorate under section 1111(c) of this Act; and

    ``(ii) the administration of the Directorate, including the direction, supervision, and coordination of the Bureau of Immigration Services and the Bureau of Enforcement and Border Affairs.

    ``(C) INSPECTIONS.--The Under Secretary shall be directly responsible for the administration and enforcement of the functions of the Directorate under the immigration laws of the United States with respect to the inspection of aliens arriving at ports of entry of the United States.

    ``(3) ACTIVITIES.--As part of the duties described in paragraph (2), the Under Secretary shall do the following:

    ``(A) RESOURCES AND PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT.--The Under Secretary shall manage the resources, personnel, and other support requirements of the Directorate.

    ``(B) INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT.--Under the direction of the Secretary, the Under Secretary shall manage the information resources of the Directorate, including the maintenance of records and databases and the coordination of records and other information within the Directorate, and shall ensure that the Directorate obtains and maintains adequate information technology systems to carry out its functions.

    ``(C) COORDINATION OF RESPONSE TO CIVIL RIGHTS VIOLATIONS.--The Under Secretary shall coordinate, with the Civil Rights Officer of the Department of Homeland Security or other officials, as appropriate, the resolution of immigration issues that involve civil rights violations.

    ``(D) RISK ANALYSIS AND RISK MANAGEMENT.--Assisting and supporting the Secretary, in coordination with other Directorates and entities outside the Department, in conducting appropriate risk analysis and risk management activities consistent with the mission and functions of the Directorate.

    ``(3) DEFINITION.--In this chapter, the term ``immigration policy, administration, and inspection functions'' means the duties, activities, and powers described in this subsection.

    ``(c) GENERAL COUNSEL.--

    ``(1) IN GENERAL.--There shall be within the Directorate a General Counsel, who shall be appointed by the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Under Secretary.

    ``(2) FUNCTION.--The General Counsel shall--

    ``(A) serve as the chief legal officer for the Directorate; and

    ``(B) be responsible for providing specialized legal advice, opinions, determinations, regulations, and any other assistance to the Under Secretary with respect to legal matters affecting the Directorate, and any of its components.

    ``(d) FINANCIAL OFFICERS FOR THE DIRECTORATE OF IMMIGRATION AFFAIRS.--

    ``(1) CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER.--

    ``(A) IN GENERAL.--There shall be within the Directorate a Chief Financial Officer. The position of Chief Financial Officer shall be a career reserved position in the Senior Executive Service and shall have the authorities and functions described in section 902 of title 31, United States Code, in relation to financial activities of the Directorate. For purposes of section 902(a)(1) of such title, the Under Secretary shall be deemed to be an agency head.

    ``(B) FUNCTIONS.--The Chief Financial Officer shall be responsible for directing, supervising, and coordinating all budget formulas and execution for the Directorate.

    ``(2) DEPUTY CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER.--The Directorate shall be deemed to be an agency for purposes of section 903 of such title (relating to Deputy Chief Financial Officers).

    ``(e) CHIEF OF POLICY.--

    ``(1) IN GENERAL.--There shall be within the Directorate a Chief of Policy. Under the authority of the Under Secretary, the Chief of Policy shall be responsible for--

    ``(A) establishing national immigration policy and priorities;

    ``(B) performing policy research and analysis on issues arising under the immigration laws of the United States; and

    ``(C) coordinating immigration policy between the Directorate, the Service Bureau, and the Enforcement Bureau.

    ``(2) WITHIN THE SENIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICE.--The position of Chief of Policy shall be a Senior Executive Service position under section 5382 of title 5, United States Code.

    ``(f) CHIEF OF CONGRESSIONAL, INTERGOVERNMENTAL, AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS.--

    ``(1) IN GENERAL.--There shall be within the Directorate a Chief of Congressional, Intergovernmental, and Public Affairs. Under the authority of the Under Secretary, the Chief of Congressional, Intergovernmental, and Public Affairs shall be responsible for--

    ``(A) providing to Congress information relating to issues arising under the immigration laws of the United States, including information on specific cases;

    ``(B) serving as a liaison with other Federal agencies on immigration issues; and

    ``(C) responding to inquiries from, and providing information to, the media on immigration issues.

    ``(2) WITHIN THE SENIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICE.--The position of Chief of Congressional, Intergovernmental, and Public Affairs shall be a Senior Executive Service position under section 5382 of title 5, United States Code.''.

    (b) COMPENSATION OF THE UNDER SECRETARY.--Section 5314 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:

    ``Under Secretary of Immigration Affairs, Department of Justice.''.

    (c) COMPENSATION OF GENERAL COUNSEL AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER.--Section 5316 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:

    ``General Counsel, Directorate of Immigration Affairs, Department of Homeland Security.

    ``Chief Financial Officer, Directorate of Immigration Affairs, Department of Homeland Security.''.

    (d) REPEALS.--The following provisions of law are repealed:

    (1) Section 7 of the Act of March 3, 1891, as amended (26 Stat. 1085; relating to the establishment of the office of the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization).

    (2) Section 201 of the Act of June 20, 1956 (70 Stat. 307; relating to the compensation of assistant commissioners and district directors).

    (3) Section 1 of the Act of March 2, 1895 (28 Stat. 780; relating to special immigrant inspectors).

    (e) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.--(1)(A) Section 101(a)(8) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(8)) is amended to read as follows:

    ``(8) The term `Under Secretary' means the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Immigration Affairs who is appointed under section 103(c).''.

    (B) Except as provided in subparagraph (C), the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.) is amended by striking ``Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization'' and ``Commissioner'' each place they appear and inserting ``Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Immigration Affairs'' and ``Under Secretary'', respectively.

    (C) The amendments made by subparagraph (B) do not apply to references to the ``Commissioner of Social Security'' in section 290(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1360(c)).

    (2) Section 103 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1103) is amended--

    (A) in subsection (c), by striking ``Commissioner'' and inserting ``Under Secretary'';

    (B) in the section heading, by striking ``COMMISSIONER'' and inserting ``UNDER SECRETARY'';

    (C) in subsection (d), by striking ``Commissioner'' and inserting ``Under Secretary''; and

    (D) in subsection (e), by striking ``Commissioner'' and inserting ``Under Secretary''.

    (3) Sections 104 and 105 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1104, 1105) are amended by striking ``Director'' each place it appears and inserting ``Assistant Secretary of State for Consular Affairs''.

    (4) Section 104(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1104(c)) is amended--

    (A) in the first sentence, by striking ``Passport Office, a Visa Office,'' and inserting ``a

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    (B) in the second sentence, by striking ``the Passport Office and the Visa Office'' and inserting ``the Passport Services office and the Visa Services office''.

    (5) Section 5315 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by striking the following:

    ``Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization, Department of Justice.''.

    (f) REFERENCES.--Any reference in any statute, reorganization plan, Executive order, regulation, agreement, determination, or other official document or proceeding to the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization shall be deemed to refer to the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Immigration Affairs.

   SEC. 1104. BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION SERVICES.

    (a) IN GENERAL.--Chapter 2 of title I of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as added by section 1102 and amended by section 1103, is further amended by adding at the end the following:

   ``SEC. 113. BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION SERVICES.

    ``(a) ESTABLISHMENT OF BUREAU.--

    ``(1) IN GENERAL.--There is established within the Directorate a bureau to be known as the Bureau of Immigration Services (in this chapter referred to as the `Service Bureau').

    ``(2) ASSISTANT SECRETARY.--The head of the Service Bureau shall be the Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security for Immigration Services (in this chapter referred to as the `Assistant Secretary for Immigration Services'), who--

    ``(A) shall be appointed by the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Under Secretary; and

    ``(B) shall report directly to the Under Secretary.

    ``(b) RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY.--

    ``(1) IN GENERAL.--Subject to the authority of the Secretary and the Under Secretary, the Assistant Secretary for Immigration Services shall administer the immigration service functions of the Directorate.

    ``(2) IMMIGRATION SERVICE FUNCTIONS DEFINED.--In this chapter, the term `immigration service functions' means the following functions under the immigration laws of the United States:

    ``(A) Adjudications of petitions for classification of nonimmigrant and immigrant status.

    ``(B) Adjudications of applications for adjustment of status and change of status.

    ``(C) Adjudications of naturalization applications.

    ``(D) Adjudications of asylum and refugee applications.

    ``(E) Adjudications performed at Service centers.

    ``(F) Determinations concerning custody and parole of asylum seekers who do not have prior nonpolitical criminal records and who have been found to have a credible fear of persecution, including determinations under section 236B.

    ``(G) All other adjudications under the immigration laws of the United States.

    ``(c) CHIEF BUDGET OFFICER OF THE SERVICE BUREAU.--There shall be within the Service Bureau a Chief Budget Officer. Under the authority of the Chief Financial Officer of the Directorate, the Chief Budget Officer of the Service Bureau shall be responsible for monitoring and supervising all financial activities of the Service Bureau.

    ``(d) QUALITY ASSURANCE.--There shall be within the Service Bureau an Office of Quality Assurance that shall develop procedures and conduct audits to--

    ``(1) ensure that the Directorate's policies with respect to the immigration service functions of the Directorate are properly implemented; and

    ``(2) ensure that Service Bureau policies or practices result in sound records management and efficient and accurate service.

    ``(e) OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY.--There shall be within the Service Bureau an Office of Professional Responsibility that shall have the responsibility for ensuring the professionalism of the Service Bureau and for receiving and investigating charges of misconduct or ill treatment made by the public.

    ``(f) TRAINING OF PERSONNEL.--The Assistant Secretary for Immigration Services, in consultation with the Under Secretary, shall have responsibility for determining the training for all personnel of the Service Bureau.''.

    (b) COMPENSATION OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF SERVICE BUREAU.--Section 5315 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:

    ``Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security for Immigration Services, Directorate of Immigration Affairs, Department of Homeland Security.''.

    (c) SERVICE BUREAU OFFICES.--

    (1) IN GENERAL.--Under the direction of the Secretary, the Under Secretary, acting through the Assistant Secretary for Immigration Services, shall establish Service Bureau offices, including suboffices and satellite offices, in appropriate municipalities and locations in the United States. In the selection of sites for the Service Bureau offices, the Under Secretary shall consider the location's proximity and accessibility to the community served, the workload for which that office shall be responsible, whether the location would significantly reduce the backlog of cases in that given geographic area, whether the location will improve customer service, and whether the location is in a geographic area with an increase in the population to be served. The Under Secretary shall conduct periodic reviews to assess whether the location and size of the respective Service Bureau offices adequately serve customer service needs.

    (2) TRANSITION PROVISION.--In determining the location of Service Bureau offices, including suboffices and satellite offices, the Under Secretary shall first consider maintaining and upgrading offices in existing geographic locations that satisfy the provisions of paragraph (1). The Under Secretary shall also explore the feasibility and desirability of establishing new Service Bureau offices, including suboffices and satellite offices, in new geographic locations where there is a demonstrated need.

   SEC. 1105. BUREAU OF ENFORCEMENT AND BORDER AFFAIRS.

    (a) IN GENERAL.--Chapter 2 of title I of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as added by section 1102 and amended by sections 1103 and 1104, is further amended by adding at the end the following:

   ``SEC. 114. BUREAU OF ENFORCEMENT AND BORDER AFFAIRS.

    ``(a) ESTABLISHMENT OF BUREAU.--

    ``(1) IN GENERAL.--There is established within the Directorate a bureau to be known as the Bureau of Enforcement and Border Affairs (in this chapter referred to as the `Enforcement Bureau').

    ``(2) ASSISTANT SECRETARY.--The head of the Enforcement Bureau shall be the Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security for Enforcement and Border Affairs (in this chapter referred to as the `Assistant Secretary for Immigration Enforcement'), who--

    ``(A) shall be appointed by the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Under Secretary; and

    ``(B) shall report directly to the Under Secretary.

    ``(b) RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY.--

    ``(1) IN GENERAL.--Subject to the authority of the Secretary and the Under Secretary, the Assistant Secretary for Immigration Enforcement shall administer the immigration enforcement functions of the Directorate.

    ``(2) IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT FUNCTIONS DEFINED.--In this chapter, the term `immigration enforcement functions' means the following functions under the immigration laws of the United States:

    ``(A) The border patrol function.

    ``(B) The detention function, except as specified in section 113(b)(2)(F).

    ``(C) The removal function.

    ``(D) The intelligence function.

    ``(E) The investigations function.

    ``(c) CHIEF BUDGET OFFICER OF THE ENFORCEMENT BUREAU.--There shall be within the Enforcement Bureau a Chief Budget Officer. Under the authority of the Chief Financial Officer of the Directorate, the Chief Budget Officer of the Enforcement Bureau shall be responsible for monitoring and supervising all financial activities of the Enforcement Bureau.

    ``(d) OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY.--There shall be within the Enforcement Bureau an Office of Professional Responsibility that shall have the responsibility for ensuring the professionalism of the Enforcement Bureau and receiving charges of misconduct or ill treatment made by the public and investigating the charges.

    ``(e) OFFICE OF QUALITY ASSURANCE.--There shall be within the Enforcement Bureau an Office of Quality Assurance that shall develop procedures and conduct audits to--

    ``(1) ensure that the Directorate's policies with respect to immigration enforcement functions are properly implemented; and

    ``(2) ensure that Enforcement Bureau policies or practices result in sound record management and efficient and accurate recordkeeping.

    ``(f) TRAINING OF PERSONNEL.--The Assistant Secretary for Immigration Enforcement, in consultation with the Under Secretary, shall have responsibility for determining the training for all personnel of the Enforcement Bureau.''.

    (b) COMPENSATION OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF ENFORCEMENT BUREAU.--Section 5315 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:

    ``Assistant Security of Homeland Security for Enforcement and Border Affairs, Directorate of Immigration Affairs, Department of Homeland Security.''.

    (c) ENFORCEMENT BUREAU OFFICES.--

    (1) IN GENERAL.--Under the direction of the Secretary, the Under Secretary, acting through the Assistant Secretary for Immigration Enforcement, shall establish Enforcement Bureau offices, including suboffices and satellite offices, in appropriate municipalities and locations in the United States. In the selection of sites for the Enforcement Bureau offices, the Under Secretary shall make selections according to trends in unlawful entry and unlawful presence, alien smuggling, national security concerns, the number of Federal prosecutions of immigration-related offenses in a given geographic area, and other enforcement considerations. The Under Secretary shall conduct periodic reviews to assess whether the location and size of the respective Enforcement Bureau offices adequately serve enforcement needs.

    (2) TRANSITION PROVISION.--In determining the location of Enforcement Bureau offices, including suboffices and satellite offices, the Under Secretary shall first consider maintaining and upgrading offices in existing geographic locations that satisfy the provisions of paragraph (1). The Under Secretary shall

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   SEC. 1106. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN WITHIN THE DIRECTORATE.

    (a) IN GENERAL.--Chapter 2 of title I of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as added by section 1102 and amended by sections 1103, 1104, and 1105, is further amended by adding at the end the following:

   ``SEC. 115. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN FOR IMMIGRATION AFFAIRS.

    ``(a) IN GENERAL.--There is established within the Directorate the Office of the Ombudsman for Immigration Affairs, which shall be headed by the Ombudsman.

    ``(b) OMBUDSMAN.--

    ``(1) APPOINTMENT.--The Ombudsman shall be appointed by the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Under Secretary. The Ombudsman shall report directly to the Under Secretary.

    ``(2) COMPENSATION.--The Ombudsman shall be entitled to compensation at the same rate as the highest rate of basic pay established for the Senior Executive Service under section 5382 of title 5, United States Code, or, if the Secretary of Homeland Security so determines, at a rate fixed under section 9503 of such title.

    ``(c) FUNCTIONS OF OFFICE.--The functions of the Office of the Ombudsman for Immigration Affairs shall include--

    ``(1) to assist individuals in resolving problems with the Directorate or any component thereof;

    ``(2) to identify systemic problems encountered by the public in dealings with the Directorate or any component thereof;

    ``(3) to propose changes in the administrative practices or regulations of the Directorate, or any component thereof, to mitigate problems identified under paragraph (2);

    ``(4) to identify potential changes in statutory law that may be required to mitigate such problems; and

    ``(5) to monitor the coverage and geographic distribution of local offices of the Directorate.

    ``(d) PERSONNEL ACTIONS.--The Ombudsman shall have the responsibility and authority to appoint local or regional representatives of the Ombudsman's Office as in the Ombudsman's judgment may be necessary to address and rectify problems.

    ``(e) ANNUAL REPORT.--Not later than December 31 of each year, the Ombudsman shall submit a report to the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate on the activities of the Ombudsman during the fiscal year ending in that calendar year. Each report shall contain a full and substantive analysis, in addition to statistical information, and shall contain--

    ``(1) a description of the initiatives that the Office of the Ombudsman has taken on improving the responsiveness of the Directorate;

    ``(2) a summary of serious or systemic problems encountered by the public, including a description of the nature of such problems;

    ``(3) an accounting of the items described in paragraphs (1) and (2) for which action has been taken, and the result of such action;

    ``(4) an accounting of the items described in paragraphs (1) and (2) for which action remains to be completed;

    ``(5) an accounting of the items described in paragraphs (1) and (2) for which no action has been taken, the reasons for the inaction, and identify any Agency official who is responsible for such inaction;

    ``(6) recommendations as may be appropriate to resolve problems encountered by the public;

    ``(7) recommendations as may be appropriate to resolve problems encountered by the public, including problems created by backlogs in the adjudication and processing of petitions and applications;

    ``(8) recommendations to resolve problems caused by inadequate funding or staffing; and

    ``(9) such other information as the Ombudsman may deem advisable.

    ``(f) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.--

    ``(1) IN GENERAL.--There are authorized to be appropriated to the Office of the Ombudsman such sums as may be necessary to carry out its functions.

    ``(2) AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS.--Amounts appropriated pursuant to paragraph (1) are authorized to remain available until expended.''.

   SEC. 1107. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS WITHIN THE DIRECTORATE.

    (a) IN GENERAL.--Chapter 2 of title I of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as added by section 1102 and amended by sections 1103, 1104, and 1105, is further amended by adding at the end the following:

   ``SEC. 116. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS.

    ``(a) ESTABLISHMENT.--There is established within the Directorate an Office of Immigration Statistics (in this section referred to as the `Office'), which shall be headed by a Director who shall be appointed by the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Under Secretary. The Office shall collect, maintain, compile, analyze, publish, and disseminate information and statistics about immigration in the United States, including information and statistics involving the functions of the Directorate and the Executive Office for Immigration Review (or its successor entity).

    ``(b) RESPONSIBILITIES OF DIRECTOR.--The Director of the Office shall be responsible for the following:

    ``(1) STATISTICAL INFORMATION.--Maintenance of all immigration statistical information of the Directorate of Immigration Affairs.

    ``(2) STANDARDS OF RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY.--Establishment of standards of reliability and validity for immigration statistics collected by the Bureau of Immigration Services, the Bureau of Enforcement, and the Executive Office for Immigration Review (or its successor entity).

    ``(c) RELATION TO THE DIRECTORATE OF IMMIGRATION AFFAIRS AND THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW.--

    ``(1) OTHER AUTHORITIES.--The Directorate and the Executive Office for Immigration Review (or its successor entity) shall provide statistical information to the Office from the operational data systems controlled by the Directorate and the Executive Office for Immigration Review (or its successor entity), respectively, as requested by the Office, for the purpose of meeting the responsibilities of the Director of the Office.

    ``(2) DATABASES.--The Director of the Office, under the direction of the Secretary, shall ensure the interoperability of the databases of the Directorate, the Bureau of Immigration Services, the Bureau of Enforcement, and the Executive Office for Immigration Review (or its successor entity) to permit the Director of the Office to perform the duties of such office.''.

    (b) TRANSFER OF FUNCTIONS.--There are transferred to the Directorate of Immigration Affairs for exercise by the Under Secretary through the Office of Immigration Statistics established by section 116 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as added by subsection (a), the functions performed by the Statistics Branch of the Office of Policy and Planning of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the statistical functions performed by the Executive Office for Immigration Review (or its successor entity), on the day before the effective date of this title.

   SEC. 1108. CLERICAL AMENDMENTS.

    The table of contents of the Immigration and Nationality Act is amended--

    (1) by inserting after the item relating to the heading for title I the following:

   ``Chapter 1--DEFINITIONS AND GENERAL AUTHORITIES'';

    (2) by striking the item relating to section 103 and inserting the following:

   ``Sec..103..Powers and duties of the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Immigration Affairs.'';

   and

    (3) by inserting after the item relating to section 106 the following:

   ``Chapter 2--DIRECTORATE OF IMMIGRATION AFFAIRS

   ``Sec..111..Establishment of Directorate of Immigration Affairs.

   ``Sec..112..Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Immigration Affairs.

   ``Sec..113..Bureau of Immigration Services.

   ``Sec..114..Bureau of Enforcement and Border Affairs.

   ``Sec..115..Office of the Ombudsman for Immigration Affairs.

   ``Sec..116..Office of Immigration Statistics.''.

   SEC. 1111. TRANSFER OF FUNCTIONS.

    (a) IN GENERAL.--

    (1) FUNCTIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL.--All functions under the immigration laws of the United States vested by statute in, or exercised by, the Attorney General, immediately prior to the effective date of this title, are transferred to the Secretary on such effective date for exercise by the Secretary through the Under Secretary in accordance with section 112(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as added by section 1103 of this Act.

    (2) FUNCTIONS OF THE COMMISSIONER OR THE INS.--All functions under the immigration laws of the United States vested by statute in, or exercised by, the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization or the Immigration and Naturalization Service (or any officer, employee, or component thereof), immediately prior to the effective date of this title, are transferred to the Directorate of Immigration Affairs on such effective date for exercise by the Under Secretary in accordance with section 112(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as added by section 1103 of this Act.

    (b) EXERCISE OF AUTHORITIES.--Except as otherwise provided by law, the Under Secretary may, for purposes of performing any function transferred to the Directorate of Immigration Affairs under subsection (a), exercise all authorities under any other provision of law that were available with respect to the performance of that function to the official responsible for the performance of the function immediately before the effective date of the transfer of the function under this title.

   SEC. 1112. TRANSFER OF PERSONNEL AND OTHER RESOURCES.

    Subject to section 1531 of title 31, United States Code, upon the effective date of this title, there are transferred to the Under Secretary for appropriate allocation in accordance with section 1115--

    (1) the personnel of the Department of Justice employed in connection with the functions transferred under this title; and

    (2) the assets, liabilities, contracts, property, records, and unexpended balance of appropriations, authorizations, allocations,

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   SEC. 1113. DETERMINATIONS WITH RESPECT TO FUNCTIONS AND RESOURCES.

    Under the direction of the Secretary, the Under Secretary shall determine, in accordance with the corresponding criteria set forth in sections 1112(b), 1113(b), and 1114(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (as added by this title)--

    (1) which of the functions transferred under section 1111 are--

    (A) immigration policy, administration, and inspection functions;

    (B) immigration service functions; and

    (C) immigration enforcement functions; and

    (2) which of the personnel, assets, liabilities, grants, contracts, property, records, and unexpended balances of appropriations, authorizations, allocations, and other funds transferred under section 1112 were held or used, arose from, were available to, or were made available, in connection with the performance of the respective functions specified in paragraph (1) immediately prior to the effective date of this title.

   SEC. 1114. DELEGATION AND RESERVATION OF FUNCTIONS.

    (a) IN GENERAL.--

    (1) DELEGATION TO THE BUREAUS.--Under the direction of the Secretary, and subject to section 112(b)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (as added by section 1103), the Under Secretary shall delegate--

    (A) immigration service functions to the Assistant Secretary for Immigration Services; and

    (B) immigration enforcement functions to the Assistant Secretary for Immigration Enforcement.

    (2) RESERVATION OF FUNCTIONS.--Subject to section 112(b)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (as added by section 1103), immigration policy, administration, and inspection functions shall be reserved for exercise by the Under Secretary.

    (b) NONEXCLUSIVE DELEGATIONS AUTHORIZED.--Delegations made under subsection (a) may be on a nonexclusive basis as the Under Secretary may determine may be necessary to ensure the faithful execution of the Under Secretary's responsibilities and duties under law.

    (c) EFFECT OF DELEGATIONS.--Except as otherwise expressly prohibited by law or otherwise provided in this title, the Under Secretary may make delegations under this subsection to such officers and employees of the office of the Under Secretary, the Service Bureau, and the Enforcement Bureau, respectively, as the Under Secretary may designate, and may authorize successive redelegations of such functions as may be necessary or appropriate. No delegation of functions under this subsection or under any other provision of this title shall relieve the official to whom a function is transferred under this title of responsibility for the administration of the function.

    (d) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.--Nothing in this division may be construed to limit the authority of the Under Secretary, acting directly or by delegation under the Secretary, to establish such offices or positions within the Directorate of Immigration Affairs, in addition to those specified by this division, as the Under Secretary may determine to be necessary to carry out the functions of the Directorate.

   SEC. 1115. ALLOCATION OF PERSONNEL AND OTHER RESOURCES.

    (a) AUTHORITY OF THE UNDER SECRETARY.--

    (1) IN GENERAL.--Subject to paragraph (2) and section 1114(b), the Under Secretary shall make allocations of personnel, assets, liabilities, grants, contracts, property, records, and unexpended balances of appropriations, authorizations, allocations, and other funds held, used, arising from, available to, or to be made available in connection with the performance of the respective functions, as determined under section 1113, in accordance with the delegation of functions and the reservation of functions made under section 1114.

    (2) LIMITATION.--Unexpended funds transferred pursuant to section 1112 shall be used only for the purposes for which the funds were originally authorized and appropriated.

    (b) AUTHORITY TO TERMINATE AFFAIRS OF INS.--The Attorney General in consultation with the Secretary, shall provide for the termination of the affairs of the Immigration and Naturalization Service and such further measures and dispositions as may be necessary to effectuate the purposes of this division.

    (c) TREATMENT OF SHARED RESOURCES.--The Under Secretary is authorized to provide for an appropriate allocation, or coordination, or both, of resources involved in supporting shared support functions for the office of the Under Secretary, the Service Bureau, and the Enforcement Bureau. The Under Secretary shall maintain oversight and control over the shared computer databases and systems and records management.

   SEC. 1116. SAVINGS PROVISIONS.

    (a) LEGAL DOCUMENTS.--All orders, determinations, rules, regulations, permits, grants, loans, contracts, recognition of labor organizations, agreements, including collective bargaining agreements, certificates, licenses, and privileges--

    (1) that have been issued, made, granted, or allowed to become effective by the President, the Attorney General, the Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, their delegates, or any other Government official, or by a court of competent jurisdiction, in the performance of any function that is transferred under this title; and

    (2) that are in effect on the effective date of such transfer (or become effective after such date pursuant to their terms as in effect on such effective date);

   shall continue in effect according to their terms until modified, terminated, superseded, set aside, or revoked in accordance with law by the President, any other authorized official, a court of competent jurisdiction, or operation of law, except that any collective bargaining agreement shall remain in effect until the date of termination specified in the agreement.

    (b) PROCEEDINGS.--

    (1) PENDING.--Sections 111 through 116 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as added by subtitle A of this title, shall not affect any proceeding or any application for any benefit, service, license, permit, certificate, or financial assistance pending on the effective date of this title before an office whose functions are transferred under this title, but such proceedings and applications shall be continued.

    (2) ORDERS.--Orders shall be issued in such proceedings, appeals shall be taken therefrom, and payments shall be made pursuant to such orders, as if this Act had not been enacted, and orders issued in any such proceeding shall continue in effect until modified, terminated, superseded, or revoked by a duly authorized official, by a court of competent jurisdiction, or by operation of law.

    (3) DISCONTINUANCE OR MODIFICATION.--Nothing in this section shall be considered to prohibit the discontinuance or modification of any such proceeding under the same terms and conditions and to the same extent that such proceeding could have been discontinued or modified if this section had not been enacted.

    (c) SUITS.--This title, and the amendments made by this title, shall not affect suits commenced before the effective date of this title, and in all such suits, proceeding shall be had, appeals taken, and judgments rendered in the same manner and with the same effect as if this title, and the amendments made by this title, had not been enacted.

    (d) NONABATEMENT OF ACTIONS.--No suit, action, or other proceeding commenced by or against the Department of Justice or the Immigration and Naturalization Service, or by or against any individual in the official capacity of such individual as an officer or employee in connection with a function transferred pursuant to this section, shall abate by reason of the enactment of this Act.

    (e) CONTINUANCE OF SUIT WITH SUBSTITUTION OF PARTIES.--If any Government officer in the official capacity of such officer is party to a suit with respect to a function of the officer, and such function is transferred under this title to any other officer or office, then such suit shall be continued with the other officer or the head of such other office, as applicable, substituted or added as a party.

    (f) ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AND JUDICIAL REVIEW.--Except as otherwise provided by this title, any statutory requirements relating to notice, hearings, action upon the record, or administrative or judicial review that apply to any function transferred under this title shall apply to the exercise of such function by the head of the office, and other officers of the office, to which such function is transferred.

   SEC. 1117. INTERIM SERVICE OF THE COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION.

    The individual serving as the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization on the day before the effective date of this title may serve as Under Secretary until the date on which an Under Secretary is appointed under section 112 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as added by section 1103.

   SEC. 1118. EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW AUTHORITIES NOT AFFECTED.

    Nothing in this title, or any amendment made by this title, may be construed to authorize or require the transfer or delegation of any function vested in, or exercised by the Executive Office for Immigration Review of the Department of Justice (or its successor entity), or any officer, employee, or component thereof immediately prior to the effective date of this title.

   SEC. 1119. OTHER AUTHORITIES NOT AFFECTED.

    Nothing in this title, or any amendment made by this title, may be construed to authorize or require the transfer or delegation of any function vested in, or exercised by--

    (1) the Secretary of State under the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956, or under the immigration laws of the United States, immediately prior to the effective date of this title, with respect to the issuance and use of passports and visas;

    (2) the Secretary of Labor or any official of the Department of Labor immediately prior to the effective date of this title, with respect to labor certifications or any other authority under the immigration laws of the United States; or

    (3) except as otherwise specifically provided in this division, any other official of the Federal Government under the immigration laws of the United States immediately prior to the effective date of this title.

   SEC. 1120. TRANSITION FUNDING.

    (a) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR TRANSITION.--

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    (1) IN GENERAL.--There are authorized to be appropriated to the Department of Homeland Security such sums as may be necessary--

    (A) to effect--

    (i) the abolition of the Immigration and Naturalization Service;

    (ii) the establishment of the Directorate of Immigration Affairs and its components, the Bureau of Immigration Services, and the Bureau of Enforcement and Border Affairs; and

    (iii) the transfer of functions required to be made under this division; and

    (B) to carry out any other duty that is made necessary by this division, or any amendment made by this division.

    (2) ACTIVITIES SUPPORTED.--Activities supported under paragraph (1) include--

    (A) planning for the transfer of functions from the Immigration and Naturalization Service to the Directorate of Immigration Affairs, including the preparation of any reports and implementation plans necessary for such transfer;

    (B) the division, acquisition, and disposition of--

    (i) buildings and facilities;

    (ii) support and infrastructure resources; and

    (iii) computer hardware, software, and related documentation;

    (C) other capital expenditures necessary to effect the transfer of functions described in this paragraph;

    (D) revision of forms, stationery, logos, and signage;

    (E) expenses incurred in connection with the transfer and training of existing personnel and hiring of new personnel; and

    (F) such other expenses necessary to effect the transfers, as determined by the Secretary.

    (b) AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS.--Amounts appropriated pursuant to subsection (a) are authorized to remain available until expended.

    (c) TRANSITION ACCOUNT.--

    (1) ESTABLISHMENT.--There is established in the general fund of the Treasury of the United States a separate account, which shall be known as the ``Directorate of Immigration Affairs Transition Account'' (in this section referred to as the ``Account'').

    (2) USE OF ACCOUNT.--There shall be deposited into the Account all amounts appropriated under subsection (a) and amounts reprogrammed for the purposes described in subsection (a).

    (d) REPORT TO CONGRESS ON TRANSITION.--Beginning not later than 90 days after the effective date of division A of this Act, and at the end of each fiscal year in which appropriations are made pursuant to subsection (c), the Secretary of Homeland Security shall submit a report to Congress concerning the availability of funds to cover transition costs, including--

    (1) any unobligated balances available for such purposes; and

    (2) a calculation of the amount of appropriations that would be necessary to fully fund the activities described in subsection (a).

    (e) EFFECTIVE DATE.--This section shall take effect 1 year after the effective date of division A of this Act.

   SEC. 1121. FUNDING ADJUDICATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICES.

    (a) LEVEL OF FEES.--Section 286(m) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1356(m)) is amended by striking ``services, including the costs of similar services provided without charge to asylum applicants or other immigrants'' and inserting ``services''.

    (b) USE OF FEES.--

    (1) IN GENERAL.--Each fee collected for the provision of an adjudication or naturalization service shall be used only to fund adjudication or naturalization services or, subject to the availability of funds provided pursuant to subsection (c), costs of similar services provided without charge to asylum and refugee applicants.

    (2) PROHIBITION.--No fee may be used to fund adjudication- or naturalization-related audits that are not regularly conducted in the normal course of operation.

    (c) REFUGEE AND ASYLUM ADJUDICATION SERVICES.--

    (1) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.--In addition to such sums as may be otherwise available for such purposes, there are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of sections 207 through 209 of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

    (2) AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS.--Funds appropriated pursuant to paragraph (1) are authorized to remain available until expended.

    (d) SEPARATION OF FUNDING.--

    (1) IN GENERAL.--There shall be established separate accounts in the Treasury of the United States for appropriated funds and other collections available for the Bureau of Immigration Services and the Bureau of Enforcement and Border Affairs.

    (2) FEES.--Fees imposed for a particular service, application, or benefit shall be deposited into the account established under paragraph (1) that is for the bureau with jurisdiction over the function to which the fee relates.

    (3) FEES NOT TRANSFERABLE.--No fee may be transferred between the Bureau of Immigration Services and the Bureau of Enforcement and Border Affairs for purposes not authorized by section 286 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended by subsection (a).

    (e) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR BACKLOG REDUCTION.--

    (1) IN GENERAL.--There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary for each of the fiscal years 2003 through 2006 to carry out the Immigration Services and Infrastructure Improvement Act of 2000 (title II of Public Law 106-313).

    (2) AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS.--Amounts appropriated under paragraph (1) are authorized to remain available until expended.

    (3) INFRASTRUCTURE IMPROVEMENT ACCOUNT.--Amounts appropriated under paragraph (1) shall be deposited into the Immigration Services and Infrastructure Improvements Account established by section 204(a)(2) of title II of Public Law 106-313.

   SEC. 1122. APPLICATION OF INTERNET-BASED TECHNOLOGIES.

    (a) ESTABLISHMENT OF ON-LINE DATABASE.--

    (1) IN GENERAL.--Not later than 2 years after the effective date of division A, the Secretary, in consultation with the Under Secretary and the Technology Advisory Committee, shall establish an Internet-based system that will permit an immigrant, nonimmigrant, employer, or other person who files any application, petition, or other request for any benefit under the immigration laws of the United States access to on-line information about the processing status of the application, petition, or other request.

    (2) PRIVACY CONSIDERATIONS.--The Under Secretary shall consider all applicable privacy issues in the establishment of the Internet system described in paragraph (1). No personally identifying information shall be accessible to unauthorized persons.

    (3) MEANS OF ACCESS.--The on-line information under the Internet system described in paragraph (1) shall be accessible to the persons described in paragraph (1) through a personal identification number (PIN) or other personalized password.

    (4) PROHIBITION ON FEES.--The Under Secretary shall not charge any immigrant, nonimmigrant, employer, or other person described in paragraph (1) a fee for access to the information in the database that pertains to that person.

    (b) FEASIBILITY STUDY FOR ON-LINE FILING AND IMPROVED PROCESSING.--

    (1) ON-LINE FILING.--

    (A) IN GENERAL.--The Under Secretary, in consultation with the Technology Advisory Committee, shall conduct a study to determine the feasibility of on-line filing of the documents described in subsection (a).

    (B) STUDY ELEMENTS.--The study shall--

    (i) include a review of computerization and technology of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (or successor agency) relating to immigration services and the processing of such documents;

    (ii) include an estimate of the time-frame and costs of implementing on-line filing of such documents; and

    (iii) consider other factors in implementing such a filing system, including the feasibility of the payment of fees on-line.

    (2) REPORT.--Not later than 2 years after the effective date of division A, the Under Secretary shall submit to the Committees on the Judiciary of the Senate and the House of Representatives a report on the findings of the study conducted under this subsection.

    (c) TECHNOLOGY ADVISORY COMMITTEE.--

    (1) ESTABLISHMENT.--Not later than 1 year after the effective date of division A, the Under Secretary shall establish, after consultation with the Committees on the Judiciary of the Senate and the House of Representatives, an advisory committee (in this section referred to as the ``Technology Advisory Committee'') to assist the Under Secretary in--

    (A) establishing the tracking system under subsection (a); and

    (B) conducting the study under subsection (b).

    (2) COMPOSITION.--The Technology Advisory Committee shall be composed of--

    (A) experts from the public and private sector capable of establishing and implementing the system in an expeditious manner; and

    (B) representatives of persons or entities who may use the tracking system described in subsection (a) and the on-line filing system described in subsection (b)(1).

   SEC. 1123. ALTERNATIVES TO DETENTION OF ASYLUM SEEKERS.

    (a) ASSIGNMENTS OF ASYLUM OFFICERS.--The Under Secretary shall assign asylum officers to major ports of entry in the United States to assist in the inspection of asylum seekers. For other ports of entry, the Under Secretary shall take steps to ensure that asylum officers participate in the inspections process.

    (b) AMENDMENT OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT.--Chapter 4 of title II of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1221 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 236A the following new section:

   ``SEC. 236B. ALTERNATIVES TO DETENTION OF ASYLUM SEEKERS.

    ``(a) DEVELOPMENT OF ALTERNATIVES TO DETENTION.--The Under Secretary shall--

    ``(1) authorize and promote the utilization of alternatives to the detention of asylum seekers who do not have nonpolitical criminal records; and

    ``(2) establish conditions for the detention of asylum seekers that ensure a safe and humane environment.

    ``(b) SPECIFIC ALTERNATIVES FOR CONSIDERATION.--The Under Secretary shall consider the following specific alternatives to the detention of asylum seekers described in subsection (a):

    ``(1) Parole from detention.

    ``(2) For individuals not otherwise qualified for parole under paragraph (1), parole with

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    ``(3) For individuals not otherwise qualified for parole under paragraph (1) or (2), non-secure shelter care or group homes operated by private nonprofit voluntary agencies with expertise in the legal and social needs of asylum seekers.

    ``(4) Noninstitutional settings for minors such as foster care or group homes operated by private nonprofit voluntary agencies with expertise in the legal and social needs of asylum seekers.

    ``(c) REGULATIONS.--The Under Secretary shall promulgate such regulations as may be necessary to carry out this section.

    ``(d) DEFINITION.--In this section, the term `asylum seeker' means any applicant for asylum under section 208 or any alien who indicates an intention to apply for asylum under that section.''.

    (b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.--The table of contents of the Immigration and Nationality Act is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 236A the following new item:

   ``Sec..236B..Alternatives to detention of asylum seekers.''.

   SEC. 1131. EFFECTIVE DATE.

    This title, and the amendments made by this title, shall take effect one year after the effective date of division A of this Act.

   SEC. 1201. SHORT TITLE.

    This title may be cited as the ``Unaccompanied Alien Child Protection Act of 2002''.

   SEC. 1202. DEFINITIONS.

    (a) IN GENERAL.--In this title:

    (1) DIRECTOR.--The term ``Director'' means the Director of the Office.

    (2) OFFICE.--The term ``Office'' means the Office of Refugee Resettlement as established by section 411 of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

    (3) SERVICE.--The term ``Service'' means the Immigration and Naturalization Service (or, upon the effective date of title XI, the Directorate of Immigration Affairs).

    (4) UNACCOMPANIED ALIEN CHILD.--The term ``unaccompanied alien child'' means a child who--

    (A) has no lawful immigration status in the United States;

    (B) has not attained the age of 18; and

    (C) with respect to whom--

    (i) there is no parent or legal guardian in the United States; or

    (ii) no parent or legal guardian in the United States is available to provide care and physical custody.

    (5) VOLUNTARY AGENCY.--The term ``voluntary agency'' means a private, nonprofit voluntary agency with expertise in meeting the cultural, developmental, or psychological needs of unaccompanied alien children as licensed by the appropriate State and certified by the Director of the Office of Refugee Resettlement.

    (b) AMENDMENTS TO THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT.--Section 101(a) (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraphs:

    ``(53) The term `unaccompanied alien child' means a child who--

    ``(A) has no lawful immigration status in the United States;

    ``(B) has not attained the age of 18; and

    ``(C) with respect to whom--

    ``(i) there is no parent or legal guardian in the United States; or

    ``(ii) no parent or legal guardian in the United States is able to provide care and physical custody.

    ``(54) The term `unaccompanied refugee children' means persons described in paragraph (42) who--

    ``(A) have not attained the age of 18; and

    ``(B) with respect to whom there are no parents or legal guardians available to provide care and physical custody.''.

   SEC. 1211. RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE OFFICE OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT WITH RESPECT TO UNACCOMPANIED ALIEN CHILDREN.

    (a) IN GENERAL.--

    (1) RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE OFFICE.--The Office shall be responsible for--

    (A) coordinating and implementing the care and placement for unaccompanied alien children who are in Federal custody by reason of their immigration status; and

    (B) ensuring minimum standards of detention for all unaccompanied alien children.

    (2) DUTIES OF THE DIRECTOR WITH RESPECT TO UNACCOMPANIED ALIEN CHILDREN.--The Director shall be responsible under this title for--

    (A) ensuring that the best interests of the child are considered in decisions and actions relating to the care and placement of an unaccompanied alien child;

    (B) making placement, release, and detention determinations for all unaccompanied alien children in the custody of the Office;

    (C) implementing the placement, release, and detention determinations made by the Office;

    (D) convening, in the absence of the Assistant Secretary, Administration for Children and Families of the Department of Health and Human Services, the Interagency Task Force on Unaccompanied Alien Children established in section 1212;

    (E) identifying a sufficient number of qualified persons, entities, and facilities to house unaccompanied alien children in accordance with sections 1222 and 1223;

    (F) overseeing the persons, entities, and facilities described in sections 1222 and 1223 to ensure their compliance with such provisions;

    (G) compiling, updating, and publishing at least annually a State-by-State list of professionals or other entities qualified to contract with the Office to provide the services described in sections 1231 and 1232;

    (H) maintaining statistical information and other data on unaccompanied alien children in the Office's custody and care, which shall include--

    (i) biographical information such as the child's name, gender, date of birth, country of birth, and country of habitual residence;

    (ii) the date on which the child came into Federal custody, including each instance in which such child came into the custody of--

    (I) the Service; or

    (II) the Office;

    (iii) information relating to the custody, detention, release, and repatriation of unaccompanied alien children who have been in the custody of the Office;

    (iv) in any case in which the child is placed in detention, an explanation relating to the detention; and

    (v) the disposition of any actions in which the child is the subject;

    (I) collecting and compiling statistical information from the Service, including Border Patrol and inspections officers, on the unaccompanied alien children with whom they come into contact; and

    (J) conducting investigations and inspections of facilities and other entities in which unaccompanied alien children reside.

    (3) DUTIES WITH RESPECT TO FOSTER CARE.--In carrying out the duties described in paragraph (3)(F), the Director is encouraged to utilize the refugee children foster care system established under section 412(d)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act for the placement of unaccompanied alien children.

    (4) POWERS.--In carrying out the duties under paragraph (3), the Director shall have the power to--

    (A) contract with service providers to perform the services described in sections 1222, 1223, 1231, and 1232; and

    (B) compel compliance with the terms and conditions set forth in section 1223, including the power to terminate the contracts of providers that are not in compliance with such conditions and reassign any unaccompanied alien child to a similar facility that is in compliance with such section.

    (b) NO EFFECT ON SERVICE, EOIR, AND DEPARTMENT OF STATE ADJUDICATORY RESPONSIBILITIES.--Nothing in this title may be construed to transfer the responsibility for adjudicating benefit determinations under the Immigration and Nationality Act from the authority of any official of the Service, the Executive Office of Immigration Review (or successor entity), or the Department of State.

   SEC. 1212. ESTABLISHMENT OF INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON UNACCOMPANIED ALIEN CHILDREN.

    (a) ESTABLISHMENT.--There is established an Interagency Task Force on Unaccompanied Alien Children.

    (b) COMPOSITION.--The Task Force shall consist of the following members:

    (1) The Assistant Secretary, Administration for Children and Families, Department of Health and Human Services.

    (2) The Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Immigration Affairs.

    (3) The Assistant Secretary of State for Population, Refugees, and Migration.

    (4) The Director.

    (5) Such other officials in the executive branch of Government as may be designated by the President.

    (c) CHAIRMAN.--The Task Force shall be chaired by the Assistant Secretary, Administration for Children and Families, Department of Health and Human Services.

    (d) ACTIVITIES OF THE TASK FORCE.--In consultation with nongovernmental organizations, the Task Force shall--

    (1) measure and evaluate the progress of the United States in treating unaccompanied alien children in United States custody; and

    (2) expand interagency procedures to collect and organize data, including significant research and resource information on the needs and treatment of unaccompanied alien children in the custody of the United States Government.

   SEC. 1213. TRANSITION PROVISIONS.

    (a) TRANSFER OF FUNCTIONS.--All functions with respect to the care and custody of unaccompanied alien children under the immigration laws of the United States vested by statute in, or exercised by, the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization (or any officer, employee, or component thereof), immediately prior to the effective date of this subtitle, are transferred to the Office.

    (b) TRANSFER AND ALLOCATIONS OF APPROPRIATIONS AND PERSONNEL.--The personnel employed in connection with, and the assets, liabilities, contracts, property, records, and unexpended balances of appropriations, authorizations, allocations, and other funds employed, used, held, arising from, available to, or to be made available in connection with the functions transferred by this section, subject to section 1531 of title 31, United States Code, shall be transferred to the Office. Unexpended funds transferred pursuant to this section shall be used only for the purposes for which the funds were originally authorized and appropriated.

    (c) LEGAL DOCUMENTS.--All orders, determinations, rules, regulations, permits,

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    (1) that have been issued, made, granted, or allowed to become effective by the President, the Attorney General, the Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, their delegates, or any other Government official, or by a court of competent jurisdiction, in the performance of any function that is transferred pursuant to this section; and

    (2) that are in effect on the effective date of such transfer (or become effective after such date pursuant to their terms as in effect on such effective date);

   shall continue in effect according to their terms until modified, terminated, superseded, set aside, or revoked in accordance with law by the President, any other authorized official, a court of competent jurisdiction, or operation of law, except that any collective bargaining agreement shall remain in effect until the date of termination specified in the agreement.

    (d) PROCEEDINGS.--

    (1) PENDING.--The transfer of functions under subsection (a) shall not affect any proceeding or any application for any benefit, service, license, permit, certificate, or financial assistance pending on the effective date of this subtitle before an office whose functions are transferred pursuant to this section, but such proceedings and applications shall be continued.

    (2) ORDERS.--Orders shall be issued in such proceedings, appeals shall be taken therefrom, and payments shall be made pursuant to such orders, as if this Act had not been enacted, and orders issued in any such proceeding shall continue in effect until modified, terminated, superseded, or revoked by a duly authorized official, by a court of competent jurisdiction, or by operation of law.

    (3) DISCONTINUANCE OR MODIFICATION.--Nothing in this section shall be considered to prohibit the discontinuance or modification of any such proceeding under the same terms and conditions and to the same extent that such proceeding could have been discontinued or modified if this section had not been enacted.

    (e) SUITS.--This section shall not affect suits commenced before the effective date of this subtitle, and in all such suits, proceeding shall be had, appeals taken, and judgments rendered in the same manner and with the same effect as if this section had not been enacted.

    (f) NONABATEMENT OF ACTIONS.--No suit, action, or other proceeding commenced by or against the Department of Justice or the Immigration and Naturalization Service, or by or against any individual in the official capacity of such individual as an officer or employee in connection with a function transferred under this section, shall abate by reason of the enactment of this Act.

    (g) CONTINUANCE OF SUIT WITH SUBSTITUTION OF PARTIES.--If any Government officer in the official capacity of such officer is party to a suit with respect to a function of the officer, and pursuant to this section such function is transferred to any other officer or office, then such suit shall be continued with the other officer or the head of such other office, as applicable, substituted or added as a party.

    (h) ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AND JUDICIAL REVIEW.--Except as otherwise provided by this title, any statutory requirements relating to notice, hearings, action upon the record, or administrative or judicial review that apply to any function transferred pursuant to any provision of this section shall apply to the exercise of such function by the head of the office, and other officers of the office, to which such function is transferred pursuant to such provision.

   SEC. 1214. EFFECTIVE DATE.

    This subtitle shall take effect one year after the effective date of division A of this Act.

   SEC. 1221. PROCEDURES WHEN ENCOUNTERING UNACCOMPANIED ALIEN CHILDREN.

    (a) UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN FOUND ALONG THE UNITED STATES BORDER OR AT UNITED STATES PORTS OF ENTRY.--

    (1) IN GENERAL.--Subject to paragraph (2), if an immigration officer finds an unaccompanied alien child who is described in paragraph (2) at a land border or port of entry of the United States and determines that such child is inadmissible under the Immigration and Nationality Act, the officer shall--

    (A) permit such child to withdraw the child's application for admission pursuant to section 235(a)(4) of the Immigration and Nationality Act; and

    (B) remove such child from the United States.

    (2) SPECIAL RULE FOR CONTIGUOUS COUNTRIES.--

    (A) IN GENERAL.--Any child who is a national or habitual resident of a country that is contiguous with the United States and that has an agreement in writing with the United States providing for the safe return and orderly repatriation of unaccompanied alien children who are nationals or habitual residents of such country shall be treated in accordance with paragraph (1), unless a determination is made on a case-by-case basis that--

    (i) such child has a fear of returning to the child's country of nationality or country of last habitual residence owing to a fear of persecution;

    (ii) the return of such child to the child's country of nationality or country of last habitual residence would endanger the life or safety of such child; or

    (iii) the child cannot make an independent decision to withdraw the child's application for admission due to age or other lack of capacity.

    (B) RIGHT OF CONSULTATION.--Any child described in subparagraph (A) shall have the right to consult with a consular officer from the child's country of nationality or country of last habitual residence prior to repatriation, as well as consult with the Office, telephonically, and such child shall be informed of that right.

    (3) RULE FOR APPREHENSIONS AT THE BORDER.--The custody of unaccompanied alien children not described in paragraph (2) who are apprehended at the border of the United States or at a United States port of entry shall be treated in accordance with the provisions of subsection (b).

    (b) CUSTODY OF UNACCOMPANIED ALIEN CHILDREN FOUND IN THE INTERIOR OF THE UNITED STATES.--

    (1) ESTABLISHMENT OF JURISDICTION.--

    (A) IN GENERAL.--Except as otherwise provided under subsection (a) and subparagraphs (B) and (C), the custody of all unaccompanied alien children, including responsibility for their detention, where appropriate, shall be under the jurisdiction of the Office.

    (B) EXCEPTION FOR CHILDREN WHO HAVE COMMITTED CRIMES.--Notwithstanding subparagraph (A), the Service shall retain or assume the custody and care of any unaccompanied alien child who--

    (i) has been charged with any felony, excluding offenses proscribed by the Immigration and Nationality Act, while such charges are pending; or

    (ii) has been convicted of any such felony.

    (C) EXCEPTION FOR CHILDREN WHO THREATEN NATIONAL SECURITY.--Notwithstanding subparagraph (A), the Service shall retain or assume the custody and care of an unaccompanied alien child if the Secretary of Homeland Security has substantial evidence that such child endangers the national security of the United States.

    (2) NOTIFICATION.--Upon apprehension of an unaccompanied alien child, the Secretary shall promptly notify the Office.

    (3) TRANSFER OF UNACCOMPANIED ALIEN CHILDREN.--

    (A) TRANSFER TO THE OFFICE.--The care and custody of an unaccompanied alien child shall be transferred to the Office--

    (i) in the case of a child not described in paragraph (1) (B) or (C), not later than 72 hours after the apprehension of such child; or

    (ii) in the case of a child whose custody has been retained or assumed by the Service pursuant to paragraph (1) (B) or (C), immediately following a determination that the child no longer meets the description set forth in such paragraph.

    (B) TRANSFER TO THE SERVICE.--Upon determining that a child in the custody of the Office is described in paragraph (1) (B) or (C), the Director shall promptly make arrangements to transfer the care and custody of such child to the Service.

    (c) AGE DETERMINATIONS.--In any case in which the age of an alien is in question and the resolution of questions about such alien's age would affect the alien's eligibility for treatment under the provisions of this title, a determination of whether such alien meets the age requirements of this title shall be made in accordance with the provisions of section 1225.

   SEC. 1222. FAMILY REUNIFICATION FOR UNACCOMPANIED ALIEN CHILDREN WITH RELATIVES IN THE UNITED STATES.

    (a) PLACEMENT AUTHORITY.--

    (1) ORDER OF PREFERENCE.--Subject to the Director's discretion under paragraph (4) and section 1223(a)(2), an unaccompanied alien child in the custody of the Office shall be promptly placed with one of the following individuals in the following order of preference:

    (A) A parent who seeks to establish custody, as described in paragraph (3)(A).

    (B) A legal guardian who seeks to establish custody, as described in paragraph (3)(A).

    (C) An adult relative.

    (D) An entity designated by the parent or legal guardian that is capable and willing to care for the child's well-being.

    (E) A State-licensed juvenile shelter, group home, or foster home willing to accept legal custody of the child.

    (F) A qualified adult or entity seeking custody of the child when it appears that there is no other likely alternative to long-term detention and family reunification does not appear to be a reasonable alternative. For purposes of this subparagraph, the qualification of the adult or entity shall be decided by the Office.

    (2) HOME STUDY.--Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (1), no unaccompanied alien child shall be placed with a person or entity unless a valid home-study conducted by an agency of the State of the child's proposed residence, by an agency authorized by that State to conduct such a study, or by an appropriate voluntary agency contracted with the Office to conduct such studies has found that the person or entity is capable of providing for the child's physical and mental well-being.

    (3) RIGHT OF PARENT OR LEGAL GUARDIAN TO CUSTODY OF UNACCOMPANIED ALIEN CHILD.--

    (A) PLACEMENT WITH PARENT OR LEGAL GUARDIAN.--If an unaccompanied alien child is placed with any person or entity other than a parent or legal guardian, but subsequent to that placement a parent or legal

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    (B) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.--Nothing in this title shall be construed to--

    (i) supersede obligations under any treaty or other international agreement to which the United States is a party, including The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, and the Declaration of the Rights of the Child; or

    (ii) limit any right or remedy under such international agreement.

    (4) PROTECTION FROM SMUGGLERS AND TRAFFICKERS.--The Director shall take affirmative steps to ensure that unaccompanied alien children are protected from smugglers, traffickers, or others seeking to victimize or otherwise engage such children in criminal, harmful, or exploitative activity. Attorneys involved in such activities should be reported to their State bar associations for disciplinary action.

    (5) GRANTS AND CONTRACTS.--Subject to the availability of appropriations, the Director is authorized to make grants to, and enter into contracts with, voluntary agencies to carry out the provisions of this section.

    (6) REIMBURSEMENT OF STATE EXPENSES.--Subject to the availability of appropriations, the Director is authorized to reimburse States for any expenses they incur in providing assistance to unaccompanied alien children who are served pursuant to this title.

    (b) CONFIDENTIALITY.--All information obtained by the Office relating to the immigration status of a person listed in subsection (a) shall remain confidential and may be used only for the purposes of determining such person's qualifications under subsection (a)(1).

   SEC. 1223. APPROPRIATE CONDITIONS FOR DETENTION OF UNACCOMPANIED ALIEN CHILDREN.

    (a) STANDARDS FOR PLACEMENT.--

    (1) PROHIBITION OF DETENTION IN CERTAIN FACILITIES.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), an unaccompanied alien child shall not be placed in an adult detention facility or a facility housing delinquent children.

    (2) DETENTION IN APPROPRIATE FACILITIES.--An unaccompanied alien child who has exhibited a violent or criminal behavior that endangers others may be detained in conditions appropriate to the behavior in a facility appropriate for delinquent children.

    (3) STATE LICENSURE.--In the case of a placement of a child with an entity described in section 1222(a)(1)(E), the entity must be licensed by an appropriate State agency to provide residential, group, child welfare, or foster care services for dependent children.

    (4) CONDITIONS OF DETENTION.--

    (A) IN GENERAL.--The Director shall promulgate regulations incorporating standards for conditions of detention in such placements that provide for--

    (i) educational services appropriate to the child;

    (ii) medical care;

    (iii) mental health care, including treatment of trauma;

    (iv) access to telephones;

    (v) access to legal services;

    (vi) access to interpreters;

    (vii) supervision by professionals trained in the care of children, taking into account the special cultural, linguistic, and experiential needs of children in immigration proceedings;

    (viii) recreational programs and activities;

    (ix) spiritual and religious needs; and

    (x) dietary needs.

    (B) NOTIFICATION OF CHILDREN.--Such regulations shall provide that all children are notified orally and in writing of such standards.

    (b) PROHIBITION OF CERTAIN PRACTICES.--The Director and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall develop procedures prohibiting the unreasonable use of--

    (1) shackling, handcuffing, or other restraints on children;

    (2) solitary confinement; or

    (3) pat or strip searches.

    (c) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.--Nothing in this section shall be construed to supersede procedures favoring release of children to appropriate adults or entities or placement in the least secure setting possible, as defined in the Stipulated Settlement Agreement under Flores v. Reno.

   SEC. 1224. REPATRIATED UNACCOMPANIED ALIEN CHILDREN.

    (a) COUNTRY CONDITIONS.--

    (1) SENSE OF CONGRESS.--It is the sense of Congress that, to the extent consistent with the treaties and other international agreements to which the United States is a party and to the extent practicable, the United States Government should undertake efforts to ensure that it does not repatriate children in its custody into settings that would threaten the life and safety of such children.

    (2) ASSESSMENT OF CONDITIONS.--

    (A) IN GENERAL.--In carrying out repatriations of unaccompanied alien children, the Office shall conduct assessments of country conditions to determine the extent to which the country to which a child is being repatriated has a child welfare system capable of ensuring the child's well being.

    (B) FACTORS FOR ASSESSMENT.--In assessing country conditions, the Office shall, to the maximum extent practicable, examine the conditions specific to the locale of the child's repatriation.

    (b) REPORT ON REPATRIATION OF UNACCOMPANIED ALIEN CHILDREN.--Beginning not later than 18 months after the date of enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Director shall submit a report to the Judiciary Committees of the House of Representatives and Senate on the Director's efforts to repatriate unaccompanied alien children. Such report shall include at a minimum the following information:

    (1) The number of unaccompanied alien children ordered removed and the number of such children actually removed from the United States.

    (2) A description of the type of immigration relief sought and denied to such children.

    (3) A statement of the nationalities, ages, and gender of such children.

    (4) A description of the procedures used to effect the removal of such children from the United States.

    (5) A description of steps taken to ensure that such children were safely and humanely repatriated to their country of origin.

    (6) Any information gathered in assessments of country and local conditions pursuant to subsection (a)(2).

   SEC. 1225. ESTABLISHING THE AGE OF AN UNACCOMPANIED ALIEN CHILD.

    The Director shall develop procedures that permit the presentation and consideration of a variety of forms of evidence, including testimony of a child and other persons, to determine an unaccompanied alien child's age for purposes of placement, custody, parole, and detention. Such procedures shall allow the appeal of a determination to an immigration judge. Radiographs shall not be the sole means of determining age.

   SEC. 1226. EFFECTIVE DATE.

    This subtitle shall take effect one year after the effective date of division A of this Act.

   SEC. 1231. RIGHT OF UNACCOMPANIED ALIEN CHILDREN TO GUARDIANS AD LITEM.

    (a) GUARDIAN AD LITEM.--

    (1) APPOINTMENT.--The Director shall appoint a guardian ad litem who meets the qualifications described in paragraph (2) for each unaccompanied alien child in the custody of the Office not later than 72 hours after the Office assumes physical or constructive custody of such child. The Director is encouraged, wherever practicable, to contract with a voluntary agency for the selection of an individual to be appointed as a guardian ad litem under this paragraph.

    (2) QUALIFICATIONS OF GUARDIAN AD LITEM.--

    (A) IN GENERAL.--No person shall serve as a guardian ad litem unless such person--

    (i) is a child welfare professional or other individual who has received training in child welfare matters; and

    (ii) possesses special training on the nature of problems encountered by unaccompanied alien children.

    (B) PROHIBITION.--A guardian ad litem shall not be an employee of the Service.

    (3) DUTIES.--The guardian ad litem shall--

    (A) conduct interviews with the child in a manner that is appropriate, taking into account the child's age;

    (B) investigate the facts and circumstances relevant to such child's presence in the United States, including facts and circumstances arising in the country of the child's nationality or last habitual residence and facts and circumstances arising subsequent to the child's departure from such country;

    (C) work with counsel to identify the child's eligibility for relief from removal or voluntary departure by sharing with counsel information collected under subparagraph (B);

    (D) develop recommendations on issues relative to the child's custody, detention, release, and repatriation;

    (E) ensure that the child's best interests are promoted while the child participates in, or is subject to, proceedings or actions under the Immigration and Nationality Act;

    (F) ensure that the child understands such determinations and proceedings; and

    (G) report findings and recommendations to the Director and to the Executive Office of Immigration Review (or successor entity).

    (4) TERMINATION OF APPOINTMENT.--The guardian ad litem shall carry out the duties described in paragraph (3) until--

    (A) those duties are completed,

    (B) the child departs the United States,

    (C) the child is granted permanent resident status in the United States,

    (D) the child attains the age of 18, or

    (E) the child is placed in the custody of a parent or legal guardian,

   whichever occurs first.

    (5) POWERS.--The guardian ad litem--

    (A) shall have reasonable access to the child, including access while such child is being held in detention or in the care of a foster family;

    (B) shall be permitted to review all records and information relating to such proceedings that are not deemed privileged or classified;

    (C) may seek independent evaluations of the child;

    (D) shall be notified in advance of all hearings involving the child that are held in connection with proceedings under the Immigration and Nationality Act, and shall be given a reasonable opportunity to be present at such hearings; and

    (E) shall be permitted to consult with the child during any hearing or interview involving such child.

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    (b) TRAINING.--The Director shall provide professional training for all persons serving as guardians ad litem under this section in the circumstances and conditions that unaccompanied alien children face as well as in the various immigration benefits for which such a child might be eligible.

   SEC. 1232. RIGHT OF UNACCOMPANIED ALIEN CHILDREN TO COUNSEL.

    (a) ACCESS TO COUNSEL.--

    (1) IN GENERAL.--The Director shall ensure that all unaccompanied alien children in the custody of the Office or in the custody of the Service who are not described in section 1221(a)(2) shall have competent counsel to represent them in immigration proceedings or matters.

    (2) PRO BONO REPRESENTATION.--To the maximum extent practicable, the Director shall utilize the services of pro bono attorneys who agree to provide representation to such children without charge.

    (3) GOVERNMENT FUNDED REPRESENTATION.--

    (A) APPOINTMENT OF COMPETENT COUNSEL.--Notwithstanding section 292 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1362) or any other provision of law, when no competent counsel is available to represent an unaccompanied alien child without charge, the Director shall appoint competent counsel for such child at the expense of the Government.

    (B) LIMITATION ON ATTORNEY FEES.--Counsel appointed under subparagraph (A) may not be compensated at a rate in excess of the rate provided under section 3006A of title 18, United States Code.

    (C) ASSUMPTION OF THE COST OF GOVERNMENT-PAID COUNSEL.--In the case of a child for whom counsel is appointed under subparagraph (A) who is subsequently placed in the physical custody of a parent or legal guardian, such parent or legal guardian may elect to retain the same counsel to continue representation of the child, at no expense to the Government, beginning on the date that the parent or legal guardian assumes physical custody of the child.

    (4) DEVELOPMENT OF NECESSARY INFRASTRUCTURES AND SYSTEMS.--In ensuring that legal representation is provided to such children, the Director shall develop the necessary mechanisms to identify entities available to provide such legal assistance and representation and to recruit such entities.

    (5) CONTRACTING AND GRANT MAKING AUTHORITY.--

    (A) IN GENERAL.--Subject to the availability of appropriations, the Director shall enter into contracts with or make grants to national nonprofit agencies with relevant expertise in the delivery of immigration-related legal services to children in order to carry out this subsection.

    (B) INELIGIBILITY FOR GRANTS AND CONTRACTS.--In making grants and entering into contracts with such agencies, the Director shall ensure that no such agency is--

    (i) a grantee or contractee for services provided under section 1222 or 1231; and

    (ii) simultaneously a grantee or contractee for services provided under subparagraph (A).

    (b) REQUIREMENT OF LEGAL REPRESENTATION.--The Director shall ensure that all unaccompanied alien children have legal representation within 7 days of the child coming into Federal custody.

    (c) DUTIES.--Counsel shall represent the unaccompanied alien child all proceedings and actions relating to the child's immigration status or other actions involving the Service and appear in person for all individual merits hearings before the Executive Office for Immigration Review (or its successor entity) and interviews involving the Service.

    (d) ACCESS TO CHILD.--

    (1) IN GENERAL.--Counsel shall have reasonable access to the unaccompanied alien child, including access while the child is being held in detention, in the care of a foster family, or in any other setting that has been determined by the Office.

    (2) RESTRICTION ON TRANSFERS.--Absent compelling and unusual circumstances, no child who is represented by counsel shall be transferred from the child's placement to another placement unless advance notice of at least 24 hours is made to counsel of such transfer.

    (e) TERMINATION OF APPOINTMENT.--Counsel shall carry out the duties described in subsection (c) until--

    (1) those duties are completed,

    (2) the child departs the United States,

    (3) the child is granted withholding of removal under section 241(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act,

    (4) the child is granted protection under the Convention Against Torture,

    (5) the child is granted asylum in the United States under section 208 of the Immigration and Nationality Act,

    (6) the child is granted permanent resident status in the United States, or

    (7) the child attains 18 years of age,

   whichever occurs first.

    (f) NOTICE TO COUNSEL DURING IMMIGRATION PROCEEDINGS.--

    (1) IN GENERAL.--Except when otherwise required in an emergency situation involving the physical safety of the child, counsel shall be given prompt and adequate notice of all immigration matters affecting or involving an unaccompanied alien child, including adjudications, proceedings, and processing, before such actions are taken.

    (2) OPPORTUNITY TO CONSULT WITH COUNSEL.--An unaccompanied alien child in the custody of the Office may not give consent to any immigration action, including consenting to voluntary departure, unless first afforded an opportunity to consult with counsel.

    (g) ACCESS TO RECOMMENDATIONS OF GUARDIAN AD LITEM.--Counsel shall be afforded an opportunity to review the recommendation by the guardian ad litem affecting or involving a client who is an unaccompanied alien child.

   SEC. 1233. EFFECTIVE DATE; APPLICABILITY.

    (a) EFFECTIVE DATE.--This subtitle shall take effect one year after the effective date of division A of this Act.

    (b) APPLICABILITY.--The provisions of this subtitle shall apply to all unaccompanied alien children in Federal custody on, before, or after the effective date of this subtitle.

   SEC. 1241. SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE VISA.

    (a) J VISA.--Section 101(a)(27)(J) (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(27)(J)) is amended to read as follows:

    ``(J) an immigrant under the age of 18 on the date of application who is present in the United States--

    ``(i) who has been declared dependent on a juvenile court located in the United States or whom such a court has legally committed to, or placed under the custody of, a department or agency of a State, or an individual or entity appointed by a State, and who has been deemed eligible by that court for long-term foster care due to abuse, neglect, or abandonment, or a similar basis found under State law;

    ``(ii) for whom it has been determined in administrative or judicial proceedings that it would not be in the alien's best interest to be returned to the alien's or parent's previous country of nationality or country of last habitual residence; and

    ``(iii) for whom the Office of Refugee Resettlement of the Department of Health and Human Services has certified to the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Immigration Affairs that the classification of an alien as a special immigrant under this subparagraph has not been made solely to provide an immigration benefit to that alien;

   except that no natural parent or prior adoptive parent of any alien provided special immigrant status under this subparagraph shall thereafter, by virtue of such parentage, be accorded any right, privilege, or status under this Act;''.

    (b) ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS.--Section 245(h)(2) (8 U.S.C. 1255(h)(2)) is amended--

    (1) by amending subparagraph (A) to read as follows:

    ``(A) paragraphs (1), (4), (5), (6), and (7)(A) of section 212(a) shall not apply,'';

    (2) in subparagraph (B), by striking the period and inserting ``, and''; and

    (3) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:

    ``(C) the Secretary of Homeland Security may waive paragraph (2) (A) and (B) in the case of an offense which arose as a consequence of the child being unaccompanied.''.

    (c) ELIGIBILITY FOR ASSISTANCE.--A child who has been granted relief under section 101(a)(27)(J) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(27)(J)), as amended by subsection (a), and who is in the custody of a State shall be eligible for all funds made available under section 412(d) of such Act.

   SEC. 1242. TRAINING FOR OFFICIALS AND CERTAIN PRIVATE PARTIES WHO COME INTO CONTACT WITH UNACCOMPANIED ALIEN CHILDREN.

    (a) TRAINING OF STATE AND LOCAL OFFICIALS AND CERTAIN PRIVATE PARTIES.--The Secretary of Health and Human Services, acting jointly with the Secretary, shall provide appropriate training to be available to State and county officials, child welfare specialists, teachers, public counsel, and juvenile judges who come into contact with unaccompanied alien children. The training shall provide education on the processes pertaining to unaccompanied alien children with pending immigration status and on the forms of relief potentially available. The Director shall be responsible for establishing a core curriculum that can be incorporated into currently existing education, training, or orientation modules or formats that are currently used by these professionals.

    (b) TRAINING OF SERVICE PERSONNEL.--The Secretary, acting jointly with the Secretary of Health and Human Services, shall provide specialized training to all personnel of the Service who come into contact with unaccompanied alien children. In the case of Border Patrol agents and immigration inspectors, such training shall include specific training on identifying children at the United States border or at United States ports of entry who have been victimized by smugglers or traffickers, and children for whom asylum or special immigrant relief may be appropriate, including children described in section 1221(a)(2).

   SEC. 1243. EFFECTIVE DATE.

    The amendment made by section 1241 shall apply to all eligible children who were in the United States before, on, or after the date of enactment of this Act.

   SEC. 1251. GUIDELINES FOR CHILDREN'S ASYLUM CLAIMS.

    (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.--Congress commends the Service for its issuance of its ``Guidelines for Children's Asylum Claims'', dated December 1998, and encourages and supports the Service's implementation of such guidelines in an effort to facilitate the

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    (b) TRAINING.--The Secretary of Homeland Security shall provide periodic comprehensive training under the ``Guidelines for Children's Asylum Claims'' to asylum officers, immigration judges, members of the Board of Immigration Appeals, and immigration officers who have contact with children in order to familiarize and sensitize such officers to the needs of children asylum seekers. Voluntary agencies shall be allowed to assist in such training.

   SEC. 1252. UNACCOMPANIED REFUGEE CHILDREN.

    (a) IDENTIFYING UNACCOMPANIED REFUGEE CHILDREN.--Section 207(e) (8 U.S.C. 1157(e)) is amended--

    (1) by redesignating paragraphs (3), (4), (5), (6), and (7) as paragraphs (4), (5), (6), (7), and (8), respectively; and

    (2) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following new paragraph:

    ``(3) An analysis of the worldwide situation faced by unaccompanied refugee children, by region. Such analysis shall include an assessment of--

    ``(A) the number of unaccompanied refugee children, by region;

    ``(B) the capacity of the Department of State to identify such refugees;

    ``(C) the capacity of the international community to care for and protect such refugees;

    ``(D) the capacity of the voluntary agency community to resettle such refugees in the United States;

    ``(E) the degree to which the United States plans to resettle such refugees in the United States in the coming fiscal year; and

    ``(F) the fate that will befall such unaccompanied refugee children for whom resettlement in the United States is not possible.''.

    (b) TRAINING ON THE NEEDS OF UNACCOMPANIED REFUGEE CHILDREN.--Section 207(f)(2) (8 U.S.C. 1157(f)(2)) is amended by--

    (1) striking ``and'' after ``countries,''; and

    (2) inserting before the period at the end the following: ``, and instruction on the needs of unaccompanied refugee children''.

   SEC. 1261. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

    (a) IN GENERAL.--There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this title.

    (b) AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS.--Amounts appropriated pursuant to subsection (a) are authorized to remain available until expended.

   SEC. 1301. ESTABLISHMENT.

    (a) IN GENERAL.--There is established within the Department of Justice the Agency for Immigration Hearings and Appeals (in this title referred to as the ``Agency'').

    (b) ABOLITION OF EOIR.--The Executive Office for Immigration Review of the Department of Justice is hereby abolished.

   SEC. 1302. DIRECTOR OF THE AGENCY.

    (a) APPOINTMENT.--There shall be at the head of the Agency a Director who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.

    (b) OFFICES.--The Director shall appoint a Deputy Director, General Counsel, Pro Bono Coordinator, and other offices as may be necessary to carry out this title.

    (c) RESPONSIBILITIES.--The Director shall--

    (1) administer the Agency and be responsible for the promulgation of rules and regulations affecting the Agency;

    (2) appoint each Member of the Board of Immigration Appeals, including a Chair;

    (3) appoint the Chief Immigration Judge; and

    (4) appoint and fix the compensation of attorneys, clerks, administrative assistants, and other personnel as may be necessary.

   SEC. 1303. BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS.

    (a) IN GENERAL.--The Board of Immigration Appeals (in this title referred to as the ``Board'') shall perform the appellate functions of the Agency. The Board shall consist of a Chair and not less than 14 other immigration appeals judges.

    (b) APPOINTMENT.--Members of the Board shall be appointed by the Director, in consultation with the Chair of the Board of Immigration Appeals.

    (c) QUALIFICATIONS.--The Chair and each other Member of the Board shall be an attorney in good standing of a bar of a State or the District of Columbia and shall have at least 7 years of professional legal expertise in immigration and nationality law.

    (d) CHAIR.--The Chair shall direct, supervise, and establish the procedures and policies of the Board.

    (e) JURISDICTION.--

    (1) IN GENERAL.--The Board shall have such jurisdiction as was, prior to the date of enactment of this Act, provided by statute or regulation to the Board of Immigration Appeals (as in effect under the Executive Office of Immigration Review).

    (2) DE NOVO REVIEW.--The Board shall have de novo review of any decision by an immigration judge, including any final order of removal.

    (f) DECISIONS OF THE BOARD.--The decisions of the Board shall constitute final agency action, subject to review only as provided by the Immigration and Nationality Act and other applicable law.

    (g) INDEPENDENCE OF BOARD MEMBERS.--The Members of the Board shall exercise their independent judgment and discretion in the cases coming before the Board.

   SEC. 1304. CHIEF IMMIGRATION JUDGE.

    (a) ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICE.--There shall be within the Agency the position of Chief Immigration Judge, who shall administer the immigration courts.

    (b) DUTIES OF THE CHIEF IMMIGRATION JUDGE.--The Chief Immigration Judge shall be responsible for the general supervision, direction, and procurement of resource and facilities and for the general management of immigration court dockets.

    (c) APPOINTMENT OF IMMIGRATION JUDGES.--Immigration judges shall be appointed by the Director, in consultation with the Chief Immigration Judge.

    (d) QUALIFICATIONS.--Each immigration judge, including the Chief Immigration Judge, shall be an attorney in good standing of a bar of a State or the District of Columbia and shall have at least 7 years of professional legal expertise in immigration and nationality law.

    (e) JURISDICTION AND AUTHORITY OF IMMIGRATION COURTS.--The immigration courts shall have such jurisdiction as was, prior to the date of enactment of this Act, provided by statute or regulation to the immigration courts within the Executive Office for Immigration Review of the Department of Justice.

    (f) INDEPENDENCE OF IMMIGRATION JUDGES.--The immigration judges shall exercise their independent judgment and discretion in the cases coming before the Immigration Court.

   SEC. 1305. CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING OFFICER.

    (a) ESTABLISHMENT OF POSITION.--There shall be within the Agency the position of Chief Administrative Hearing Officer.

    (b) DUTIES OF THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING OFFICER.--The Chief Administrative Hearing Officer shall hear cases brought under sections 274A, 274B, and 274C of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

   SEC. 1306. REMOVAL OF JUDGES.

    Immigration judges and Members of the Board may be removed from office only for good cause, including neglect of duty or malfeasance, by the Director, in consultation with the Chair of the Board, in the case of the removal of a Member of the Board, or in consultation with the Chief Immigration Judge, in the case of the removal of an immigration judge.

   SEC. 1307. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

    There are authorized to be appropriated to the Agency such sums as may be necessary to carry out this title.

   SEC. 1311. TRANSITION PROVISIONS.

    (a) TRANSFER OF FUNCTIONS.--All functions under the immigration laws of the United States (as defined in section 111(e) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as added by section 1101(a)(2) of this Act) vested by statute in, or exercised by, the Executive Office of Immigration Review of the Department of Justice (or any officer, employee, or component thereof), immediately prior to the effective date of this title, are transferred to the Agency.

    (b) TRANSFER AND ALLOCATIONS OF APPROPRIATIONS AND PERSONNEL.--The personnel employed in connection with, and the assets, liabilities, contracts, property, records, and unexpended balances of appropriations, authorizations, allocations, and other funds employed, used, held, arising from, available to, or to be made available in connection with the functions transferred by this section, subject to section 1531 of title 31, United States Code, shall be transferred to the Agency. Unexpended funds transferred pursuant to this section shall be used only for the purposes for which the funds were originally authorized and appropriated.

    (c) LEGAL DOCUMENTS.--All orders, determinations, rules, regulations, permits, grants, loans, contracts, recognition of labor organizations, agreements, including collective bargaining agreements, certificates, licenses, and privileges--

    (1) that have been issued, made, granted, or allowed to become effective by the Attorney General or the Executive Office of Immigration Review of the Department of Justice, their delegates, or any other Government official, or by a court of competent jurisdiction, in the performance of any function that is transferred under this section; and

    (2) that are in effect on the effective date of such transfer (or become effective after such date pursuant to their terms as in effect on such effective date);

   shall continue in effect according to their terms until modified, terminated, superseded, set aside, or revoked in accordance with law by the Agency, any other authorized official, a court of competent jurisdiction, or operation of law, except that any collective bargaining agreement shall remain in effect until the date of termination specified in the agreement.

    (d) PROCEEDINGS.--

    (1) PENDING.--The transfer of functions under subsection (a) shall not affect any proceeding or any application for any benefit, service, license, permit, certificate, or financial assistance pending on the effective date of this title before an office whose functions are transferred pursuant to this section, but such proceedings and applications shall be continued.

    (2) ORDERS.--Orders shall be issued in such proceedings, appeals shall be taken therefrom, and payments shall be made pursuant

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    (3) DISCONTINUANCE OR MODIFICATION.--Nothing in this section shall be considered to prohibit the discontinuance or modification of any such proceeding under the same terms and conditions and to the same extent that such proceeding could have been discontinued or modified if this section had not been enacted.

    (e) SUITS.--This section shall not affect suits commenced before the effective date of this title, and in all such suits, proceeding shall be had, appeals taken, and judgments rendered in the same manner and with the same effect as if this section had not been enacted.

    (f) NONABATEMENT OF ACTIONS.--No suit, action, or other proceeding commenced by or against the Department of Justice or the Executive Office of Immigration Review, or by or against any individual in the official capacity of such individual as an officer or employee in connection with a function transferred under this section, shall abate by reason of the enactment of this Act.

    (g) CONTINUANCE OF SUIT WITH SUBSTITUTION OF PARTIES.--If any Government officer in the official capacity of such officer is party to a suit with respect to a function of the officer, and pursuant to this section such function is transferred to any other officer or office, then such suit shall be continued with the other officer or the head of such other office, as applicable, substituted or added as a party.

    (h) ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AND JUDICIAL REVIEW.--Except as otherwise provided by this title, any statutory requirements relating to notice, hearings, action upon the record, or administrative or judicial review that apply to any function transferred pursuant to any provision of this section shall apply to the exercise of such function by the head of the office, and other officers of the office, to which such function is transferred pursuant to such provision.

   SEC. 1321. EFFECTIVE DATE.

    This title shall take effect one year after the effective date of division A of this Act.

   SEC. 2101. SHORT TITLE.

    This title may be cited as the ``Chief Human Capital Officers Act of 2002''.

   SEC. 2102. AGENCY CHIEF HUMAN CAPITAL OFFICERS.

    (a) IN GENERAL.--Part II of title 5, United States Code, is amended by inserting after chapter 13 the following:

   ``Sec.

   ``1401. Establishment of agency Chief Human Capital Officers.

   ``1402. Authority and functions of agency Chief Human Capital Officers.``§1401. Establishment of agency Chief Human Capital Officers

    ``The head of each agency referred to under paragraphs (1) and (2) of section 901(b) of title 31 shall appoint or designate a Chief Human Capital Officer, who shall--

    ``(1) advise and assist the head of the agency and other agency officials in carrying out the agency's responsibilities for selecting, developing, training, and managing a high-quality, productive workforce in accordance with merit system principles;

    ``(2) implement the rules and regulations of the President and the Office of Personnel Management and the laws governing the civil service within the agency; and

    ``(3) carry out such functions as the primary duty of the Chief Human Capital Officer. ``§1402. Authority and functions of agency Chief Human Capital Officers

    ``(a) The functions of each Chief Human Capital Officer shall include--

    ``(1) setting the workforce development strategy of the agency;

    ``(2) assessing workforce characteristics and future needs based on the agency's mission and strategic plan;

    ``(3) aligning the agency's human resources policies and programs with organization mission, strategic goals, and performance outcomes;

    ``(4) developing and advocating a culture of continuous learning to attract and retain employees with superior abilities;

    ``(5) identifying best practices and benchmarking studies; and

    ``(6) applying methods for measuring intellectual capital and identifying links of that capital to organizational performance and growth.

    ``(b) In addition to the authority otherwise provided by this section, each agency Chief Human Capital Officer--

    ``(1) shall have access to all records, reports, audits, reviews, documents, papers, recommendations, or other material that--

    ``(A) are the property of the agency or are available to the agency; and

    ``(B) relate to programs and operations with respect to which that agency Chief Human Capital Officer has responsibilities under this chapter; and

    ``(2) may request such information or assistance as may be necessary for carrying out the duties and responsibilities provided by this chapter from any Federal, State, or local governmental entity.''.

    (b) TECHNICAL AND CONFORMING AMENDMENT.--The table of chapters for part II of title 5, United States Code, is amended by inserting after the item relating to chapter 13 the following:

   ``14. Chief Human Capital Officers

   1401''.

   SEC. 2103. CHIEF HUMAN CAPITAL OFFICERS COUNCIL.

    (a) ESTABLISHMENT.--There is established a Chief Human Capital Officers Council, consisting of--

    (1) the Director of the Office of Personnel Management, who shall act as chairperson of the Council;

    (2) the Deputy Director for Management of the Office of Management and Budget, who shall act as vice chairperson of the Council; and

    (3) the Chief Human Capital Officers of Executive departments and any other members who are designated by the Director of the Office of Personnel Management.

    (b) FUNCTIONS.--The Chief Human Capital Officers Council shall meet periodically to advise and coordinate the activities of the agencies of its members on such matters as modernization of human resources systems, improved quality of human resources information, and legislation affecting human resources operations and organizations.

    (c) EMPLOYEE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS AT MEETINGS.--The Chief Human Capital Officers Council shall ensure that representatives of Federal employee labor organizations are present at a minimum of 1 meeting of the Council each year. Such representatives shall not be members of the Council.

    (d) ANNUAL REPORT.--Each year the Chief Human Capital Officers Council shall submit a report to Congress on the activities of the Council.

   SEC. 2104. STRATEGIC HUMAN CAPITAL MANAGEMENT.

    Section 1103 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:

    ``(c)(1) The Office of Personnel Management shall design a set of systems, including appropriate metrics, for assessing the management of human capital by Federal agencies.

    ``(2) The systems referred to under paragraph (1) shall be defined in regulations of the Office of Personnel Management and include standards for--

    ``(A)(i) aligning human capital strategies of agencies with the missions, goals, and organizational objectives of those agencies; and

    ``(ii) integrating those strategies into the budget and strategic plans of those agencies;

    ``(B) closing skill gaps in mission critical occupations;

    ``(C) ensuring continuity of effective leadership through implementation of recruitment, development, and succession plans;

    ``(D) sustaining a culture that cultivates and develops a high performing workforce;

    ``(E) developing and implementing a knowledge management strategy supported by appropriate investment in training and technology; and

    ``(F) holding managers and human resources officers accountable for efficient and effective human resources management in support of agency missions in accordance with merit system principles.''.

   SEC. 2105. EFFECTIVE DATE.

    This title shall take effect 180 days after the date of enactment of this division.

   SEC. 2201. INCLUSION OF AGENCY HUMAN CAPITAL STRATEGIC PLANNING IN PERFORMANCE PLANS AND PROGRAM PERFORMANCE REPORTS.

    (a) PERFORMANCE PLANS.--Section 1115 of title 31, United States Code, is amended--

    (1) in subsection (a), by striking paragraph (3) and inserting the following:

    ``(3) provide a description of how the performance goals and objectives are to be achieved, including the operational processes, training, skills and technology, and the human, capital, information, and other resources and strategies required to meet those performance goals and objectives.'';

    (2) by redesignating subsection (f) as subsection (g); and

    (3) by inserting after subsection (e) the following:

    ``(f) With respect to each agency with a Chief Human Capital Officer, the Chief Human Capital Officer shall prepare that portion of the annual performance plan described under subsection (a)(3).''.

    (b) PROGRAM PERFORMANCE REPORTS.--Section 1116(d) of title 31, United States Code, is amended--

    (1) in paragraph (4), by striking ``and'' after the semicolon;

    (2) by redesignating paragraph (5) as paragraph (6); and

    (3) by inserting after paragraph (4) the following:

    ``(5) include a review of the performance goals and evaluation of the performance plan relative to the agency's strategic human capital management; and''.

   SEC. 2202. REFORM OF THE COMPETITIVE SERVICE HIRING PROCESS.

    (a) IN GENERAL.--Chapter 33 of title 5, United States Code, is amended--

    (1) in section 3304(a)--

    (A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``and'' after the semicolon;

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    (B) in paragraph (2), by striking the period and inserting ``; and''; and

    (C) by adding at the end the following:

    ``(3) authority for agencies to appoint, without regard to the provisions of sections 3309 through 3318, candidates directly to positions for which--

    ``(A) public notice has been given; and

    ``(B) the Office of Personnel Management has determined that there exists a severe shortage of candidates or there is a critical hiring need.

   The Office shall prescribe, by regulation, criteria for identifying such positions and may delegate authority to make determinations under such criteria.''; and

    (2) by inserting after section 3318 the following:``§3319. Alternative ranking and selection procedures

    ``(a)(1) the Office, in exercising its authority under section 3304; or

    ``(2) an agency to which the Office has delegated examining authority under section 1104(a)(2);

   may establish category rating systems for evaluating applicants for positions in the competitive service, under 2 or more quality categories based on merit consistent with regulations prescribed by the Office of Personnel Management, rather than assigned individual numerical ratings.

    ``(b) Within each quality category established under subsection (a), preference-eligibles shall be listed ahead of individuals who are not preference eligibles. For other than scientific and professional positions at GS-9 of the General Schedule (equivalent or higher), qualified preference-eligibles who have a compensable service-connected disability of 10 percent or more shall be listed in the highest quality category.

    ``(c)(1) An appointing official may select any applicant in the highest quality category or, if fewer than 3 candidates have been assigned to the highest quality category, in a merged category consisting of the highest and the second highest quality categories.

    ``(2) Notwithstanding paragraph (1), the appointing official may not pass over a preference-eligible in the same category from which selection is made, unless the requirements of section 3317(b) or 3318(b), as applicable, are satisfied.

    ``(d) Each agency that establishes a category rating system under this section shall submit in each of the 3 years following that establishment, a report to Congress on that system including information on--

    ``(1) the number of employees hired under that system;

    ``(2) the impact that system has had on the hiring of veterans and minorities, including those who are American Indian or Alaska Natives, Asian, Black or African American, and native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander; and

    ``(3) the way in which managers were trained in the administration of that system.

    ``(e) The Office of Personnel Management may prescribe such regulations as it considers necessary to carry out the provisions of this section.''.

    (b) TECHNICAL AND CONFORMING AMENDMENT.--The table of sections for chapter 33 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by striking the item relating to section 3319 and inserting the following:

   ``3319. Alternative ranking and selection procedures.''.

   SEC. 2203. PERMANENT EXTENSION, REVISION, AND EXPANSION OF AUTHORITIES FOR USE OF VOLUNTARY SEPARATION INCENTIVE PAY AND VOLUNTARY EARLY RETIREMENT.

    (a) VOLUNTARY SEPARATION INCENTIVE PAYMENTS.--

    (1) IN GENERAL.--

    (A) AMENDMENT TO TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE.--Chapter 35 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by inserting after subchapter I the following:

   ``SUBCHAPTER II--VOLUNTARY SEPARATION INCENTIVE PAYMENTS ``§3521. Definitions

    ``In this subchapter, the term--

    ``(1) `agency' means an Executive agency as defined under section 105; and

    ``(2) `employee'--

    ``(A) means an employee as defined under section 2105 employed by an agency and an individual employed by a county committee established under section 8(b)(5) of the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act (16 U.S.C. 590h(b)(5)) who--

    ``(i) is serving under an appointment without time limitation; and

    ``(ii) has been currently employed for a continuous period of at least 3 years; and

    ``(B) shall not include--

    ``(i) a reemployed annuitant under subchapter III of chapter 83 or 84 or another retirement system for employees of the Government;

    ``(ii) an employee having a disability on the basis of which such employee is or would be eligible for disability retirement under subchapter III of chapter 83 or 84 or another retirement system for employees of the Government;

    ``(iii) an employee who is in receipt of a decision notice of involuntary separation for misconduct or unacceptable performance;

    ``(iv) an employee who has previously received any voluntary separation incentive payment from the Federal Government under this subchapter or any other authority;

    ``(v) an employee covered by statutory reemployment rights who is on transfer employment with another organization; or

    ``(vi) any employee who--

    ``(I) during the 36-month period preceding the date of separation of that employee, performed service for which a student loan repayment benefit was or is to be paid under section 5379;

    ``(II) during the 24-month period preceding the date of separation of that employee, performed service for which a recruitment or relocation bonus was or is to be paid under section 5753; or

    ``(III) during the 12-month period preceding the date of separation of that employee, performed service for which a retention bonus was or is to be paid under section 5754.``§3522. Agency plans; approval

    ``(a) Before obligating any resources for voluntary separation incentive payments, the head of each agency shall submit to the Office of Personnel Management a plan outlining the intended use of such incentive payments and a proposed organizational chart for the agency once such incentive payments have been completed.

    ``(b) The plan of an agency under subsection (a) shall include--

    ``(1) the specific positions and functions to be reduced or eliminated;

    ``(2) a description of which categories of employees will be offered incentives;

    ``(3) the time period during which incentives may be paid;

    ``(4) the number and amounts of voluntary separation incentive payments to be offered; and

    ``(5) a description of how the agency will operate without the eliminated positions and functions.

    ``(c) The Director of the Office of Personnel Management shall review each agency's plan and may make any appropriate modifications in the plan, in consultation with the Director of the Office of Management and Budget. A plan under this section may not be implemented without the approval of the Director of the Office of Personnel Management.``§3523. Authority to provide voluntary separation incentive payments

    ``(a) A voluntary separation incentive payment under this subchapter may be paid to an employee only as provided in the plan of an agency established under section 3522.

    ``(b) A voluntary incentive payment--

    ``(1) shall be offered to agency employees on the basis of--

    ``(A) 1 or more organizational units;

    ``(B) 1 or more occupational series or levels;

    ``(C) 1 or more geographical locations;

    ``(D) skills, knowledge, or other factors related to a position;

    ``(E) specific periods of time during which eligible employees may elect a voluntary incentive payment; or

    ``(F) any appropriate combination of such factors;

    ``(2) shall be paid in a lump sum after the employee's separation;

    ``(3) shall be equal to the lesser of--

    ``(A) an amount equal to the amount the employee would be entitled to receive under section 5595(c) if the employee were entitled to payment under such section (without adjustment for any previous payment made); or

    ``(B) an amount determined by the agency head, not to exceed $25,000;

    ``(4) may be made only in the case of an employee who voluntarily separates (whether by retirement or resignation) under this subchapter;

    ``(5) shall not be a basis for payment, and shall not be included in the computation, of any other type of Government benefit;

    ``(6) shall not be taken into account in determining the amount of any severance pay to which the employee may be entitled under section 5595, based on any other separation; and

    ``(7) shall be paid from appropriations or funds available for the payment of the basic pay of the employee.``§3524. Effect of subsequent employment with the Government

    ``(a) The term `employment'--

    ``(1) in subsection (b) includes employment under a personal services contract (or other direct contract) with the United States Government (other than an entity in the legislative branch); and

    ``(2) in subsection (c) does not include employment under such a contract.

    ``(b) An individual who has received a voluntary separation incentive payment under this subchapter and accepts any employment for compensation with the Government of the United States within 5 years after the date of the separation on which the payment is based shall be required to pay, before the individual's first day of employment, the entire amount of the incentive payment to the agency that paid the incentive payment.

    ``(c)(1) If the employment under this section is with an agency, other than the General Accounting Office, the United States Postal Service, or the Postal Rate Commission, the Director of the Office of Personnel Management may, at the request of the head of the agency, waive the repayment if--

    ``(A) the individual involved possesses unique abilities and is the only qualified applicant available for the position; or

    ``(B) in the case of an emergency involving a direct threat to life or property, the individual--

    ``(i) has skills directly related to resolving the emergency; and

    ``(ii) will serve on a temporary basis only so long as that individual's services are made necessary by the emergency.

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    ``(2) If the employment under this section is with an entity in the legislative branch, the head of the entity or the appointing official may waive the repayment if the individual involved possesses unique abilities and is the only qualified applicant available for the position.

    ``(3) If the employment under this section is with the judicial branch, the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts may waive the repayment if the individual involved possesses unique abilities and is the only qualified applicant available for the position.``§3525. Regulations

    ``The Office of Personnel Management may prescribe regulations to carry out this subchapter.''.

    (B) TECHNICAL AND CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.--Chapter 35 of title 5, United States Code, is amended--

    (i) by striking the chapter heading and inserting the following:

    (ii) in the table of sections by inserting after the item relating to section 3504 the following:

   ``SUBCHAPTER II--VOLUNTARY SEPARATION INCENTIVE PAYMENTS

   ``3521. Definitions.

   ``3522. Agency plans; approval.

   ``3523. Authority to provide voluntary separation incentive payments.

   ``3524. Effect of subsequent employment with the Government.

   ``3525. Regulations.''.

    (2) ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS.--The Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts may, by regulation, establish a program substantially similar to the program established under paragraph (1) for individuals serving in the judicial branch.

    (3) CONTINUATION OF OTHER AUTHORITY.--Any agency exercising any voluntary separation incentive authority in effect on the effective date of this subsection may continue to offer voluntary separation incentives consistent with that authority until that authority expires.

    (4) EFFECTIVE DATE.--This subsection shall take effect 60 days after the date of enactment of this Act.

    (b) FEDERAL EMPLOYEE VOLUNTARY EARLY RETIREMENT.--

    (1) CIVIL SERVICE RETIREMENT SYSTEM.--Section 8336(d)(2) of title 5, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:

    ``(2)(A) has been employed continuously, by the agency in which the employee is serving, for at least the 31-day period ending on the date on which such agency requests the determination referred to in subparagraph (D);

    ``(B) is serving under an appointment that is not time limited;

    ``(C) has not been duly notified that such employee is to be involuntarily separated for misconduct or unacceptable performance;

    ``(D) is separated from the service voluntarily during a period in which, as determined by the Office of Personnel Management (upon request of the agency) under regulations prescribed by the Office--

    ``(i) such agency (or, if applicable, the component in which the employee is serving) is undergoing substantial delayering, substantial reorganization, substantial reductions in force, substantial transfer of function, or other substantial workforce restructuring (or shaping);

    ``(ii) a significant percentage of employees serving in such agency (or component) are likely to be separated or subject to an immediate reduction in the rate of basic pay (without regard to subchapter VI of chapter 53, or comparable provisions); or

    ``(iii) identified as being in positions which are becoming surplus or excess to the agency's future ability to carry out its mission effectively; and

    ``(E) as determined by the agency under regulations prescribed by the Office, is within the scope of the offer of voluntary early retirement, which may be made on the basis of--

    ``(i) 1 or more organizational units;

    ``(ii) 1 or more occupational series or levels;

    ``(iii) 1 or more geographical locations;

    ``(iv) specific periods;

    ``(v) skills, knowledge, or other factors related to a position; or

    ``(vi) any appropriate combination of such factors;''.

    (2) FEDERAL EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM.--Section 8414(b)(1) of title 5, United States Code, is amended by striking subparagraph (B) and inserting the following:

    ``(B)(i) has been employed continuously, by the agency in which the employee is serving, for at least the 31-day period ending on the date on which such agency requests the determination referred to in clause (iv);

    ``(ii) is serving under an appointment that is not time limited;

    ``(iii) has not been duly notified that such employee is to be involuntarily separated for misconduct or unacceptable performance;

    ``(iv) is separated from the service voluntarily during a period in which, as determined by the Office of Personnel Management (upon request of the agency) under regulations prescribed by the Office--

    ``(I) such agency (or, if applicable, the component in which the employee is serving) is undergoing substantial delayering, substantial reorganization, substantial reductions in force, substantial transfer of function, or other substantial workforce restructuring (or shaping);

    ``(II) a significant percentage of employees serving in such agency (or component) are likely to be separated or subject to an immediate reduction in the rate of basic pay (without regard to subchapter VI of chapter 53, or comparable provisions); or

    ``(III) identified as being in positions which are becoming surplus or excess to the agency's future ability to carry out its mission effectively; and

    ``(v) as determined by the agency under regulations prescribed by the Office, is within the scope of the offer of voluntary early retirement, which may be made on the basis of--

    ``(I) 1 or more organizational units;

    ``(II) 1 or more occupational series or levels;

    ``(III) 1 or more geographical locations;

    ``(IV) specific periods;

    ``(V) skills, knowledge, or other factors related to a position; or

    ``(VI) any appropriate combination of such factors;''.

    (3) GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE AUTHORITY.--The amendments made by this subsection shall not be construed to affect the authority under section 1 of Public Law 106-303 (5 U.S.C. 8336 note; 114 Stat. 1063).

    (4) TECHNICAL AND CONFORMING AMENDMENT.--Section 7001 of the 1998 Supplemental Appropriations and Rescissions Act (Public Law 105-174; 112 Stat. 91) is repealed.

    (5) REGULATIONS.--The Office of Personnel Management may prescribe regulations to carry out this subsection.

    (c) SENSE OF CONGRESS.--It is the sense of Congress that the implementation of this section is intended to reshape the Federal workforce and not downsize the Federal workforce.

   SEC. 2204. STUDENT VOLUNTEER TRANSIT SUBSIDY.

    (a) IN GENERAL.--Section 7905(a)(1) of title 5, United States Code, is amended by striking ``and a member of a uniformed service'' and inserting ``, a member of a uniformed service, and a student who provides voluntary services under section 3111''.

    (b) TECHNICAL AND CONFORMING AMENDMENT.--Section 3111(c)(1) of title 5, United States Code, is amended by striking ``chapter 81 of this title'' and inserting ``section 7905 (relating to commuting by means other than single-occupancy motor vehicles), chapter 81''.

   SEC. 2301. REPEAL OF RECERTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS OF SENIOR EXECUTIVES.

    (a) IN GENERAL.--Title 5, United States Code, is amended--

    (1) in chapter 33--

    (A) in section 3393(g) by striking ``3393a,'';

    (B) by repealing section 3393a; and

    (C) in the table of sections by striking the item relating to section 3393a;

    (2) in chapter 35--

    (A) in section 3592(a)--

    (i) in paragraph (1), by inserting ``or'' at the end;

    (ii) in paragraph (2), by striking ``or'' at the end;

    (iii) by striking paragraph (3); and

    (iv) by striking the last sentence;

    (B) in section 3593(a), by striking paragraph (2) and inserting the following:

    ``(2) the appointee left the Senior Executive Service for reasons other than misconduct, neglect of duty, malfeasance, or less than fully successful executive performance as determined under subchapter II of chapter 43.''; and

    (C) in section 3594(b)--

    (i) in paragraph (1), by inserting ``or'' at the end;

    (ii) in paragraph (2), by striking ``or'' at the end; and

    (iii) by striking paragraph (3);

    (3) in section 7701(c)(1)(A), by striking ``or removal from the Senior Executive Service for failure to be recertified under section 3393a'';

    (4) in chapter 83--

    (A) in section 8336(h)(1), by striking ``for failure to be recertified as a senior executive under section 3393a or''; and

    (B) in section 8339(h), in the first sentence, by striking ``, except that such reduction shall not apply in the case of an employee retiring under section 8336(h) for failure to be recertified as a senior executive''; and

    (5) in chapter 84--

    (A) in section 8414(a)(1), by striking ``for failure to be recertified as a senior executive under section 3393a or''; and

    (B) in section 8421(a)(2), by striking ``, except that an individual entitled to an annuity under section 8414(a) for failure to be recertified as a senior executive shall be entitled to an annuity supplement without regard to such applicable minimum retirement age''.

    (b) SAVINGS PROVISION.--Notwithstanding the amendments made by subsection (a)(2)(A), an appeal under the final sentence of section 3592(a) of title 5, United States Code, that is pending on the day before the effective date of this section--

    (1) shall not abate by reason of the enactment of the amendments made by subsection (a)(2)(A); and

    (2) shall continue as if such amendments had not been enacted.

    (c) APPLICATION.--The amendment made by subsection (a)(2)(B) shall not apply with respect to an individual who, before the effective date of this section, leaves the Senior

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   SEC. 2302. ADJUSTMENT OF LIMITATION ON TOTAL ANNUAL COMPENSATION.

    Section 5307(a) of title 5, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:

    ``(3) Notwithstanding paragraph (1), the total payment referred to under such paragraph with respect to an employee paid under section 5372, 5376, or 5383 of title 5 or section 332(f), 603, or 604 of title 28 shall not exceed the total annual compensation payable to the Vice President under section 104 of title 3. Regulations prescribed under subsection (c) may extend the application of this paragraph to other equivalent categories of employees.''.

   SEC. 2401. ACADEMIC TRAINING.

    (a) ACADEMIC DEGREE TRAINING.--Section 4107 of title 5, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:``§4107. Academic degree training

    ``(a) Subject to subsection (b), an agency may select and assign an employee to academic degree training and may pay or reimburse the costs of academic degree training from appropriated or other available funds if such training--

    ``(1) contributes significantly to--

    ``(A) meeting an identified agency training need;

    ``(B) resolving an identified agency staffing problem; or

    ``(C) accomplishing goals in the strategic plan of the agency;

    ``(2) is part of a planned, systematic, and coordinated agency employee development program linked to accomplishing the strategic goals of the agency; and

    ``(3) is accredited and is provided by a college or university that is accredited by a nationally recognized body.

    ``(b) In exercising authority under subsection (a), an agency shall--

    ``(1) consistent with the merit system principles set forth in paragraphs (2) and (7) of section 2301(b), take into consideration the need to--

    ``(A) maintain a balanced workforce in which women, members of racial and ethnic minority groups, and persons with disabilities are appropriately represented in Government service; and

    ``(B) provide employees effective education and training to improve organizational and individual performance;

    ``(2) assure that the training is not for the sole purpose of providing an employee an opportunity to obtain an academic degree or to qualify for appointment to a particular position for which the academic degree is a basic requirement;

    ``(3) assure that no authority under this subsection is exercised on behalf of any employee occupying or seeking to qualify for--

    ``(A) a noncareer appointment in the Senior Executive Service; or

    ``(B) appointment to any position that is excepted from the competitive service because of its confidential policy-determining, policymaking, or policy-advocating character; and

    ``(4) to the greatest extent practicable, facilitate the use of online degree training.''.

    (b) TECHNICAL AND CONFORMING AMENDMENT.--The table of sections for chapter 41 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by striking the item relating to section 4107 and inserting the following:

   ``4107. Academic degree training.''.

   SEC. 2402. MODIFICATIONS TO NATIONAL SECURITY EDUCATION PROGRAM.

    (a) FINDINGS AND POLICIES.--

    (1) FINDINGS.--Congress finds that--

    (A) the United States Government actively encourages and financially supports the training, education, and development of many United States citizens;

    (B) as a condition of some of those supports, many of those citizens have an obligation to seek either compensated or uncompensated employment in the Federal sector; and

    (C) it is in the United States national interest to maximize the return to the Nation of funds invested in the development of such citizens by seeking to employ them in the Federal sector.

    (2) POLICY.--It shall be the policy of the United States Government to--

    (A) establish procedures for ensuring that United States citizens who have incurred service obligations as the result of receiving financial support for education and training from the United States Government and have applied for Federal positions are considered in all recruitment and hiring initiatives of Federal departments, bureaus, agencies, and offices; and

    (B) advertise and open all Federal positions to United States citizens who have incurred service obligations with the United States Government as the result of receiving financial support for education and training from the United States Government.

    (b) FULFILLMENT OF SERVICE REQUIREMENT IF NATIONAL SECURITY POSITIONS ARE UNAVAILABLE.-- Section 802(b)(2) of the David L. Boren National Security Education Act of 1991 (50 U.S.C. 1902) is amended--

    (1) in subparagraph (A), by striking clause (ii) and inserting the following:

    ``(ii) if the recipient demonstrates to the Secretary (in accordance with such regulations) that no national security position in an agency or office of the Federal Government having national security responsibilities is available, work in other offices or agencies of the Federal Government or in the field of higher education in a discipline relating to the foreign country, foreign language, area study, or international field of study for which the scholarship was awarded, for a period specified by the Secretary, which period shall be determined in accordance with clause (i); or''; and

    (2) in subparagraph (B), by striking clause (ii) and inserting the following:

    ``(ii) if the recipient demonstrates to the Secretary (in accordance with such regulations) that no national security position is available upon the completion of the degree, work in other offices or agencies of the Federal Government or in the field of higher education in a discipline relating to the foreign country, foreign language, area study, or international field of study for which the fellowship was awarded, for a period specified by the Secretary, which period shall be established in accordance with clause (i); and''.

   SEC. 2403. COMPENSATORY TIME OFF FOR TRAVEL.

    Subchapter V of chapter 55 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by adding at end the following:``§5550b. Compensatory time off for travel

    ``(a) An employee shall receive 1 hour of compensatory time off for each hour spent by the employee in travel status away from the official duty station of the employee, to the extent that the time spent in travel status is not otherwise compensable.

    ``(b) Not later than 30 days after the date of enactment of this section, the Office of Personnel Management shall prescribe regulations to implement this section.''.

END

5B) Department of Homeland Security

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---

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nevada.

   Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I be allowed to proceed under Senator Lieberman's time.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

   TERRORISM INSURANCE

   Mr. REID. Mr. President, I have to believe that the President is not getting the right information from his staff; otherwise, knowing him, I cannot believe he would say some of the things he has said recently.

   I was running yesterday morning, and on Public Radio I heard a preview of the speech the President was going to give before a union in Pennsylvania. And I thought they must have made a mistake. Then, later in the day, I heard him complete that speech, and he went ahead just as they had said on Public Radio.

   As we consider homeland security and the measures we should take to defend America, I think it is important we talk about terrorism insurance. That is the issue I want to talk about. I believe the President has not received the proper information from his staff.

   Following the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon about a year ago, many American businesses have had trouble purchasing affordable insurance covering acts of terrorism.

   As a consequence, many construction projects and real estate transactions have been delayed, interrupted, and in some cases canceled. We are talking about billions of dollars worth of projects that have been stalled, some terminated, solely because of the lack of being able to purchase terrorism insurance.

   These problems cost many American workers their jobs and prevent businesses from being as productive as they could be. Clearly, the lack of affordable terrorism insurance has had a harmful effect on our Nation's already troubled economy.

   I am glad we are back from our break and the President is back from his vacation. However, as I have indicated, yesterday, the President made some statements relating to terrorism insurance, about the need for Congress to move forward on terrorism insurance, that simply were without any fact.

   As millions of students across the country go back to school, I want them to understand that they must speak the truth. I repeat, I do not think the President said what he said yesterday based upon full knowledge of all the information.

   The truth, Mr. President, is Senate Democrats--because I have been here offering the unanimous consent request for months--have been leading the effort to pass an effective terrorism insurance bill--and we started on this last year--while Republicans have delayed and attempted to thwart this important legislation time after time. The President should know that. The leadership in the Congress of his party has not allowed us to go forward on this legislation.

   One of the statements he made before the union is: I am for hard hats, not trial lawyers.

   This is terrorism insurance. We should move it forward. I am confident everyone can see through these statements the President made as being without fact.

   I want to remind him and the people who give him advice--give him good information, good background information so he can speak with the full knowledge of the facts.

   We are eager to pass terrorism insurance. We have done everything within our power to do that. This would help workers, businesses, and the Nation's economy.

   Shortly after the terrorist attacks last year, our colleagues--Senators DODD, SARBANES, and SCHUMER--developed a strong bill to help businesses get the affordable terrorism insurance they badly need.

   When we attempted to move this bill last December, the minority voiced no fundamental disagreement with the bill but argued over the number of amendments to be offered. This was done in an effort to prevent us from moving forward on this legislation. So we could not do it in December. We came right back and started on it. After having had many private attempts to get this legislation moving, we decided to go public and try to move it from the floor, right from where I stand.

   We tried offering in early spring unanimous consent agreements to take up the terrorism insurance legislation. Again, there was no objection to the base text or that the Dodd-Sarbanes-Schumer bill should be the vehicle we would bring to the floor. They wanted some amendments. We wanted to treat this as any other legislation. They said let us agree on the number of amendments. Whatever number we came up with wasn't appropriate. We could not move it. Finally, they simply disagreed with bringing up the bill at all.

   It is the right of the majority leader to decide which bills are brought to the floor. If the minority is opposed, they have the right to offer amendments and attempt to modify the text of the bill. We have offered to bring the bill up with amendments on each side so everyone could have the opportunity to make changes.

   Nevertheless, the minority continued to object and further prevented us from passing the terrorism insurance legislation.

   In April, the importance of the terrorism insurance legislation was enunciated by Secretary O'Neill in his testimony before the Appropriations Committee that the lack of terrorism insurance could cost America 1 percent of the GDP because major projects would not be able to get financing.

   Finally, we were able to get an agreement that we could bring the bill to the floor. We passed the legislation. And then came weeks and weeks of more stalling by the minority. We could not get agreement on appointing conferees. We attempted and attempted and attempted. First, they were upset because the ratio was 3 to 2, which is fairly standard. They said they wanted 4 to 3. So we came back

[Page: S8053]

   Finally, we were able to get agreement on the appointment of conferees. But now nothing is happening in the conference. We cannot do that alone. So I hope the record is clear. I know we refer to ``the people downtown''--that is, the government representatives, the lobbyists who are concerned about this issue, the real estate and hotel owners, and these special interest groups. They know how we have tried to move this legislation. I only hope the people who have lost their jobs and are unable to move forward--these people in Pennsylvania yesterday who were told we are holding this up--understand that simply is not the truth.

   So I certainly hope this legislation can be completed and we can have a bill sent to the President. It is the right thing to do. The legislation is important, and I hope we can do it sooner rather than later.

   I suggest the absence of a quorum and ask unanimous consent that the time be charged equally to both sides.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The clerk will call the roll.

   The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

   Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

   Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I yield 15 minutes of my time now to the Senator from Illinois who, I might say parenthetically, has been an extraordinarily thoughtful, constructive participant in the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee's consideration of the question of homeland security and, in that sense, has contributed mightily to the proposal we will put before the Chamber tonight. I am glad to yield 15 minutes to Senator Durbin.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois is recognized.

   Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, I thank Chairman LIEBERMAN for his leadership on the Governmental Affairs Committee. I think the record demonstrates that before the President called for the creation of a Department of Homeland Security, our committee, the Governmental Affairs Committee of the Senate, under Senator Lieberman's leadership, proposed a law to create such a Department.

   At the time, it is interesting because it was on a partisan roll call, if I remember correctly, nine Democrats for it, seven Republicans against it. We argued that a question of this magnitude, a challenge of this gravity, required a separate Department at that moment in time. Neither the President nor his loyal followers in the Senate were prepared to join us in that effort.

   So I salute Senator Lieberman for his leadership, and I am happy now that we have reached the point where we are speaking again, as we should when it comes to our Nation's defense, in a bipartisan manner. I hope that as we proceed to the debate on this bill, we can gather together again that same bipartisan force.

   There is nothing that says Congress or the Senate have to agree on everything and, frankly, if we did, it would probably betray the principles and values of this Nation. But when it comes to our national security and defense, particularly the creation of a Department of this magnitude, I think it is all well and good that when the debate ends, we do try to find some common ground.

   Our Government simply has to change and adapt to the challenge of international terrorism. A reorganization of this magnitude is not going to be simple--it is going to take some time--but this Congress is up to the task. Throughout our history, from 1789 when the first Congress created the first executive branch Departments of State, War, and Treasury, to 1988 when the latest Department, the Department of Veterans Affairs, was created, Congress has worked to make sure the Government was organized to do the job the American people asked of it.

   Protecting our Nation's people is our highest priority. On March 15, 2001, almost 6 months before the attack on September 11, the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, known by the shorthand name of the Hart-Rudman Commission, named after its co-chairmen the distinguished former Senators Gary Hart and Warren Rudman, released a report entitled ``Road Map For National Security: An Imperative For Change.'' The Commission was, unfortunately, prescient in seeing the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism. The No. 1 recommendation of the Hart-Rudman Commission was to create a Department of Homeland Security.

   It is worth quoting for the record some of the report that came out of the Commission. It says, the combination of unconventional weapons proliferation with the persistence of international terrorism will end the relative invulnerability of the U.S. homeland to catastrophic attack.

   These words were written 6 months before September 11. They went on in their report to recommend the creation of an independent national homeland security agency, and they suggested there were some agencies of Government which naturally would come under the roof and under the authority of this new Department and quite effectively, or at least more effectively, defend the United States.

   The blueprint they laid out was really the basis for this bill we have before us, the Senate version, the Governmental Affairs version, from Senator Lieberman. The backbone of the new Department will be FEMA, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, along with the Departments guarding our borders and our perimeter. This new Department everyone sees as a way to protect our country more robustly.

   Some have questioned, though, how a new Department and how reorganizing Government will really make us any safer. Right

   now there are more than 45 agencies in the Federal Government with some responsibility for homeland security. If we look at it, it is just too diffuse. It cannot be focused. It cannot be coordinated. In the words of my friend and former House colleague, Gov. Tom Ridge, we are going to, frankly, not have the force multipliers we need that organization and coordination will bring.

   Some of my colleagues have charged we are moving too quickly. Well, I happen to agree with the premise that this race to enact this legislation by September 11 of this year, on the 1-year anniversary of that terrible disaster, was precipitous. It would have been a miracle if we had been able to create a bill that quickly which would have really met the task. It is better for us to take the additional time to do it right. To meet some self-imposed deadline or some deadline imposed by the press or our critics does not make a lot of sense when we are talking about a Department that is going to be facing the responsibility of protecting America for decades to come.

   As a member of the committee, I want to report to our colleagues that I think our committee has done its job. This does not mean we should not debate the issue and deliberate on some alternatives and some modifications. What we have before us is an effort, backed by bipartisan work for many years under both Republican and Democrat chairmen. This committee has held 18 hearings since last September 11 setting up this new Department. It is a committee that has held a series of hearings over the last 4 or 5 years on the issues that are involved.

   I remind my colleagues that this extensive body of work of this committee and its chairman allowed our committee to report out a bill on May 22. Once the President decided he wanted a similar Department, we tried to coordinate his intentions with our own. Realizing that all wisdom does not reside in one branch of Government or the other, we have listened to the President's suggestions. I am hopeful he will be open to our own.

   One of the things I included in this as an element that was of particular personal interest related to the whole question of information technology. The proposal to restructure 28 agencies into a new, unified Homeland Security Department poses a complex challenge to integrate the system's infrastructure of our information technology to support the new Department's mission.

   Let me get away from these high falutin' words, high sounding words, and get back to the real world where I live, because I am not part of this computer generation. I struggle with my own computers and e-mail to try to be up to speed. In the amendment that I adopted, what we are really saying to the Office of Management and Budget

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   I am sorry to report to the Senate and to the people following this debate that that does not exist today. In fact, it has been a very low priority. If we look at the sorry state of affairs of computers at agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, we can certainly understand the need for this amendment. Currently, each of the agencies we expect to consolidate has its own separate information technology budget and program--the Coast Guard, Customs, FEMA, INS, Secret Service, Transportation Security Administration, and others.

   Each one has a unique system that does not necessarily have the capacity to communicate or coordinate these activities. Frankly, is that not what this debate is all about, so that all the agencies of the Federal Government will coordinate their resources, their authority, and their wisdom into one unified effort to create the force multiplier that Governor Ridge mentioned?

   Because these divergent systems need to be linked, it is important to ask key questions now to ensure this new Department will help the agencies brought together and others outside to coordinate their communication and share information. It is equally important to establish appropriate links between the Homeland Security Department and other agencies, such as the CIA, the National Security Agency, the Department of Defense, the FBI, the State Department, and State and local officials, which may not be embraced under the Homeland Security Department's organizational umbrella.

   Given the current state of affairs in the Federal information technology systems reflected in incomprehensible delays in meeting congressional mandates, I think this is long overdue. I will give two illustrations of why this is timely.

   Six years ago, Congress mandated the Customs Department and INS to establish a database to record those exiting the United States with visitor's visas. Those coming into the United States in many instances need visas to be in the United States, and we thought we should keep track of those who are leaving so we will know the net number of visa holders in the United States, which can range in the tens of millions at any given time.

   Six years ago, Congress said to the INS: Keep track of people leaving with a visa. Six years later, it is still not done. It has not been accomplished. The inspector general at the Department of Justice tells us it is years away.

   So when Attorney General Ashcroft said, to make America safer, we are going to take the fingerprints and photographs of all people coming into the United States on a visa, I am sure people around America were nodding their heads saying, I guess that is necessary; it is certainly reasonable. Well, it is technologically impossible today to do it. We do not have the computer capability to keep track of people leaving the United States with a visa, let alone the millions coming into the United States on visas.

   So for the Attorney General to make that suggestion is to say that he is going to go drill for oil on the Moon. It is not going to happen--not until we come a long way from where we are today.

   We also said, incidentally, to the FBI and the Immigration and Naturalization Service: We notice that they both collect fingerprints. Can they merge their databases so that law enforcement agencies across the Federal Government, across the Nation, around the world, will have access to a common database of fingerprints collected by the United States? We asked them to do that 3 years ago. It still has not been done.

   So when it comes to information technology, do not delude yourself into believing we are where we ought to be. We are not.

   The creation of this Department and the amendment which Senator Lieberman and others were happy to accept and said nice things about, I hope will move forward in achieving that goal.

   The enterprise architecture and resulting systems must be designed for interoperability between many different agencies. I hope we get this achieved quickly.

   I have had a great deal of frustration, even anger, over the lack of progress we have made since September 11. To have the new person in charge of information technology from the FBI testify before the Judiciary Committee saying it will be 2 years before the FBI is up to speed with their computers is totally unacceptable. Members should not stand for that one second. To think one can go to any computer store in any major city in America and buy computers with better capability than the computers of the Federal Bureau of Investigation is shameful. That exists today; it should change. This bill will be part of the change.

   Also, I raise another issue briefly. After the events of September 11, we heard from a number of people--Governor Ridge, Secretary Thompson of the Department of Health and Human Services--about concern for our Nation's food supply and its vulnerability to attack. We have to be mindful and sensitive. I thank Senator Lieberman for including my language on food safety and security in this legislation, directing the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security to contract with the National Academy of Sciences to conduct a detailed study to review all Federal statutes and regulations affecting the safety and security of the food supply, as well as the current organizational structure of food safety oversight to figure out if we can do it better. I think we can. I believed that for a long time. I pushed for better coordination, better definition, better objectives for food safety. Now, this is a different level. It is not a question of food that can be contaminated by natural causes, but food that could be jeopardized and contaminated by enemies of the United States. It is part of the same consideration but raises it to a much higher level.

   I close by thanking Senator Lieberman for his leadership on this issue. This reorganization is complicated. Although we are a great deliberative body, we have to roll up our sleeves and deal with it. We approach the anniversary of September 11 and know further attacks are not only possible, but in many instances our open society invites them. We do not have the luxury of waiting. If there were another attack since last September 11, this bill would have passed out of here a lot sooner. Now that we have the time to do it, let's do it and do it right.

   I thank Senator Lieberman for his leadership, and I yield the floor.

   Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I thank Senator Durbin for his statement and for the contributions he made substantively to the proposal and for his eloquent advocacy for the urgent necessity to get together and create a Department of Homeland Security.

   I yield the floor.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time to the Senator from Maine?

   Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I yield myself as much time as I may consume from the time of Senator Thompson.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

   Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I rise to discuss the legislation before the Senate that will result in the most significant reorganization of the executive branch in more than 50 years. The creation of a Cabinet-level Department of Homeland Security is of fundamental importance to our national security. I believe it is one of the most important pieces of legislation we will consider during this Congress.

   In the year since the terrorist attacks on our Nation, much has been done to make our country more secure. Congress has approved billions of dollars to secure our borders, protect critical infrastructure, train and equip first responders, and better detect and respond to a bioterrorism attack. Our brave men and women in uniform have been fighting valiantly in Afghanistan and have succeeded in many of the goals in the war against terrorism.

   The creation of the Department of Homeland Security is another important step in our efforts to secure our Nation against another terrorist attack. This sweeping reorganization dwarfs any corporate merger that you can think of. It involves some 200,000 employees and nearly $40 billion in budget. The task before the Senate is truly daunting, and it is important we get the job done right.

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   Currently, as many as 100 Federal agencies are responsible for homeland security. But not one of them has homeland security as its principal mission. That is the problem with our current organizational structure. With that many entities responsible, nobody is accountable and turf battles and bureaucratic disputes are virtually inevitable.

   If we are to overcome these problems and create a national security structure that can defend our Nation, we must unite the current patchwork of agencies into a single new Department of Homeland Security. This agency would work to secure our borders, help protect our ports, our transportation sector, and protect our critical infrastructure. It would synthesize and analyze homeland security intelligence from multiple sources, thus lessening the possibility of intelligence breakdowns or lack of communication. Furthermore, the new domestic security structure would coordinate Federal communications regarding threats and preparedness with State and local governments, as well as with the private sector.

   Our efforts to create a new Department of Homeland Security will help to remedy many of the current weaknesses of the past and thus help to protect us against future terrorist attacks.

   As a member of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, which held extensive hearings on the reorganization legislation, I have had the opportunity to consider a multitude of ideas and concepts regarding the creation of the new Department. We heard excellent testimony from Governor Ridge, from the Directors of the FBI and the CIA, and from a host of other experts. They all shed light on the problems that are created by our current disorganization in the area of homeland security. They all shed light on the problems that have impaired our ability to defend our homeland and on the threats that we now face and inevitably will face in the future.

   During the committee's consideration of this bill, I expressed concerns that in our effort to create a new Department, we must be careful to protect the traditional missions, the very important missions of the agencies that are being assembled into this giant new department. In particular, I believe the Coast Guard's traditional functions, such as search and rescue and marine resource protection, must be protected and maintained.

   Since the tragic events of September 11, the Coast Guard's focus has shifted dramatically to homeland security. I talked with Coast Guard officers in Portland, ME, who told me the amount of time they are now spending on port security operations and inspecting foreign vessels coming into the harbor in Portland. I have no doubt these are very important missions and that the Coast Guard plays an essential role in homeland security. And I believe it should play a leading role in the new Department. However, we know the Coast Guard cannot continue to focus on homeland security missions without jeopardizing its traditional focus.

   I am concerned that if the current resource allocation is maintained and the Coast Guard continues to perform these new homeland security responsibilities, its traditional missions will be sacrificed.

   The President's budget goes a long way to try to remedy this problem by allocating significant new funds for the Coast Guard. But we also need to make sure the organizational structure in the new Department also safeguards the Coast Guard's traditional mission.

   For example, prior to September 11, port security missions accounted for approximately 2 percent of the Coast Guard's resources. Immediately following the terrorist attacks, the Coast Guard deployed 59 percent of its resources to port security and safety missions. As a result, many of the aircraft and vessels traditionally used for search and rescue were far removed from their optimal locations for that function. Even after the immediate impact of the September 11 attacks subsided, its impact on the resources of the Coast Guard remained. Indeed, from April through June of this year, the Coast Guard devoted 9 percent fewer hours on search and rescue missions than it did in the year before.

   Because of the Coast Guard's importance to coastal areas throughout our Nation, any reduction in its traditional functions is cause for great concern. Those of us who represent coastal States know how absolutely vital the mission of the Coast Guard is. Last year alone, the Coast Guard performed over 39,000 search and rescue missions and saved more than 4,000 lives. On a typical day, the Coast Guard interdicts and rescues 14 illegal immigrants, inspects and repairs 135 buoys, helps over 2,500 commercial ships navigate in and out of U.S. ports, and saves 10 lives. That is on a typical day. In short, the Coast Guard's traditional missions are of vital importance and they simply must be preserved.

   Let me take a moment to talk about the Coast Guard's impact and its importance in my home State of Maine. Each year, the Coast Guard performs about 300 search and rescue missions in my State. These missions are literally a matter of life and death. Since October of 1999, 14 commercial fishermen have lost their lives at sea. Commercial fishing is one of the most dangerous of occupations, and the Coast Guard every year saves fishermen who get into trouble. How many more would have died or been injured if the nearest Coast Guard cutter had not been in port? How many more fishermen or recreational boaters will lose their lives if the local Coast Guard stations must devote the vast majority of their time to homeland security functions?

   I agree that the Coast Guard must perform homeland security functions. The role the Coast Guard is playing in securing our ports is vitally important. But it is also vitally important that it not do so at the expense of its traditional missions.

   To respond to this challenge, Senator Stevens of Alaska and I teamed up to offer an amendment during the Governmental Affairs Committee markup of this legislation. We offered a successful amendment to preserve the traditional functions of the Coast Guard, even as the agency is moved into the new Department of Homeland Security. I want to recognize Senator Stevens and thank him for his leadership on this issue, as well as recognize the support of our colleagues who voted for our amendment in committee.

   Our amendment establishes the right balance between homeland security functions and the traditional missions of the Coast Guard. It ensures that the Coast Guard's non-homeland-security functions shall be maintained after its

   transfer into the new Department but also provides for flexibility in the event of a national emergency or an attack on our Nation.

   The amendment also has the Commandant of the Coast Guard report directly to the Secretary. In the chairman's draft, he would not have done so. Thus, his role would have been devalued or demoted. Our amendment, the Stevens-Collins amendment, remedies that problem.

   Our amendment will help to protect our coastal communities' economies, their way of life, and their loved ones, while Americans, wherever they live, can rest assured that the Coast Guard will perform its necessary and vital homeland security functions. I believe our language strikes the right balance.

   As we craft this bill, it is also important that we never forget who is on the front lines in the event of a national emergency. We learned on September 11 who responds. It is not the response of people in Washington. The people who are on the front lines are our police officers, our firefighters, and our emergency medical personnel. That is why we need to make sure the new Department coordinates its activities and supports the activities of the local first responders.

   I thank Senator Feingold for his leadership in ensuring that the interests of the first responders are ever in our mind. I worked with him as well as with Senator Carper on an amendment in committee that strengthens the role of first responders in homeland security, that recognizes their contributions.

   We offered an amendment to enhance the cooperation and coordination among State and local first responders. The new Department will be required to designate an employee to be based in each and every 1 of the 50 States to be a liaison to State and local governments. I think that is so important. And it recognizes that this is a joint effort.

   Similarly, an amendment Senator Carnahan and I offered will help our

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   The amendment the Senator from Missouri and I offered in committee would expand the FIRE Program and provide fire departments with the ability over 3 years to receive maximum grants of $100,000 to hire personnel. When I talk to my fire chiefs at home, they tell me that not only do they need help with equipment and training but they need more firefighters.

   For those of us who went to New York City, one of the memories I will carry with me forever was talking with the fire commissioner and learning how many firefighters lost their lives on September 11. I will never forget his telling me that more firefighters died on that day than in the previous 70 years of the New York City Fire Department. It is the firefighters, the police officers, the emergency medical personnel who are always first on the scene. We cannot forget that these brave individuals will be the first to be called upon if and when a terrorist attack again occurs.

   The New Department of Homeland Security is an essential component of our response to current and future threats. As the brutal attacks of September 11 demonstrated, distance from our enemies and the barriers of oceans no longer guarantee the security of our homeland. The bill we are considering today is another important step in preserving and strengthening our homeland security. I believe this legislation will help to make our Nation more secure, and I am hopeful that we will pass it quickly after due consideration.

   I yield the floor.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Rhode Island.

   Mr. REED. Mr. President, I yield myself 10 minutes from the time controlled by Senator Byrd.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. NELSON of Nebraska). Without objection, it is so ordered.

   Mr. REED. Mr. President, we are here today for three major reasons. The first is the obvious need to restructure our security to confront new threats that were unanticipated in the cold war. The thought is that we do need to create a Department of Homeland Security. I support that. We are also here today because of the groundbreaking work of Senator Lieberman and colleagues on the Governmental Affairs Committee. Before this proposal was invoked by the administration, they were working on it. They were developing through hearings the substance to make the presentation for which we are here today. But finally, we are here today because of Senator Byrd's insistence that we consider this very significant reorganization in the context of our Constitution and of our responsibility as Members of the Senate to ensure we maintain the constitutional balance that is the heart of this Government.

   It would be ironic indeed that in the name of winning the war on terror, we lost the very goal we were trying to protect, which is a constitutional government in which all of us play a significant role--the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary.

   I think it is important, as we consider this legislation, to look carefully and thoughtfully at this proposed reorganization. It is an extraordinary combination of governmental entities. Approximately 170,000 employees will be combined into this new Department. It will affect 22 existing agencies. At least 11 full Senate committees have oversight responsibilities for these existing agencies.

   This is an extraordinary moment, and we have to act deliberately, carefully, and thoughtfully. That is why I think it is so critical that this debate take place and why it was so important that Senator Byrd was able to indeed encourage and inspire and in many respects direct the debate we are having today.

   One of the major elements within this organization--there are many, and I would like to allude to a few--is the treatment of intelligence. We understood very starkly and very tragically on September 11 that intelligence is probably the key to successful protection of the United States, our home. We understood that. And now we have to take that lesson and apply it.

   One of the proposals made by the administration is to create an intelligence capacity within the new Department of Homeland Security. I agree with that. I think this new Department has to have an intelligence capacity. Unfortunately, in terms of the administration's proposal, I think there are two clear shortcomings. First, they have established the intelligence capacity in the context of the infrastructure protection responsibilities of this new Department. Clearly, intelligence has to go beyond simply protecting our infrastructure.

   As Senator Lieberman indicated previously in some of his comments, the World Trade Center and other targets were not properly considered critical infrastructure in the United States. But certainly on September 11 it was the target of terrorists. I think we have to disassociate the intelligence aspects of the Department in the very narrow view of infrastructure protection.

   The amendment which Senator Lieberman will propose once we move to the bill will effectively address the issue and the problems.

   There is also another problem; that is, the administration would only allow this intelligence operation within the new Homeland Security Department to take data provided by other agencies and analyze it. It does not give that entity the right to reach out and get raw intelligence data. I think that has to be a critical responsibility and a critical authority of this new intelligence division.

   Again, the bill that I believe Senator Lieberman will submit at the conclusion of this debate will have that authority in the Homeland Security Department. That is critical.

   The essence here is to have a place in the Government where--as said so often because it is so true--all the dots are connected. But you can't do that and rely on the intelligence products of other agencies. You can't do that if your focus is restricted to infrastructure protection.

   As a result, I think this is illustrative of some of the problems of the administration's proposal, and certainly some of the problems of the House bill. I should point out, as has been pointed out before, that we are now debating whether the Senate will bring it up for consideration.

   There are other areas that are of concern to me. One has just been discussed quite articulately by my colleague and friend from Maine, Senator Collins; that is the Coast Guard. Here is an agency which, after September 11, has been decisively engaged in port protection. Port protection by the Coast Guard has gone from a rather minor operation before September 11 to one of their major operations. We have all seen that. In my community of Providence, RI, we have the Narragansett Bay. We have the Port of Providence. For the first time in my memory--and perhaps since World War II--we are seeing Coast Guard cutters escorting LNG tankers through the Narragansett Bay while the whole waterway was shut down by police and the National Guard. That is a time-consuming operation and one which has been replicated in the 361 ports of the United States. Also adding to that is the Coast Guard's obligation to patrol about 95,000 miles of coastline.

   The problem, though, is, as my colleague from Maine pointed out, that the Coast Guard has many other responsibilities. She referred to a typical day. On a typical day, the Coast Guard conducts 109 search and rescue missions, saves 10 lives, assists 92 boaters in trouble, and seizes 169 pounds of marijuana and 360 pounds of cocaine worth about $9.6 million. They intercept illegal immigrants coming into the United States. They respond to calls with respect to hazardous chemical spills. They inspect and repair boats. They assist nearly 200,000 tons of shipping just in the Great Lakes during the winter season alone. What will happen to these other responsibilities?

   I know the committee has dealt with this and has tried to strike a balance. But it is an area of concern, and it is an area that illustrates the difficulty of combining all of these agencies with the mission of homeland security which might trump other legitimate missions. We have to be careful with

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   Much can be said in a similar vein about the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Here you have an agency which has two major responsibilities: Protect the borders from illegal entry and at the same time provide assistance to those individuals who are in the United States legally who want to become citizens or who are here on some type of temporary protective status and need to be supervised by the United States. Those are diametrically opposed responsibilities.

   We have to ask ourselves the question: If the INS is part of the Department of Homeland Security, will they emphasize one and de-emphasize the other? I think, frankly, most people will assume they will emphasize protecting the borders of the United States. After all, that is probably the most important issue with respect to homeland security.

   What happens to the literally millions of individuals in the United States who legitimately need the services of the INS? Already today, there is a backlog of approximately 5 million cases around the country in terms of applications to the INS for clarification of status. Indeed, as the National Immigration Forum noted in their words, ``it is hard to imagine that a Federal agency whose primary issue is to deter terrorism will be able to strike and maintain an appropriate balance between admitting newcomers and deterring security threats.''

   We see that these contradictions are replete throughout the reorganization. I again think a careful, thorough, and complete deliberation should be attendant to the consideration of this legislation.

   I would like to mention just briefly a final area, an area which I think will come back again and again; that is, the administration's proposal--and the proposal in the House of Representatives--to put up severe barriers to the right of Federal employees to organize collectively and to exercise their rights; and, also, the protection for the Civil Service.

   We have to be very conscious of this and ask the very fundamental question: Why are we attempting to undercut provisions for which no one, I think, has seriously made the case they have interfered with our ability to conduct the war on terror, to conduct intelligence operations?

   As you probably realize, President Kennedy, 40 years ago, under executive order, gave Federal employees the right to organize in collective bargaining units. President Nixon expanded those rights in 1969. In 1978, the Civil Service Reform Act codified most of these executive orders.

   Throughout the course of our history, these responsibilities have also given the President the authority to make exemptions for national security. And they have made those exemptions.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has used 10 minutes.

   Mr. REED. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent for 1 additional minute.

   Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I yield one additional minute.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

   Mr. REED. I thank the Senator.

   Over the course of our history, certainly in the 40 years, since these rights became established by executive order, there have always been appropriate exemptions in which the President could, for national security reasons, exempt individual employees or groups of employees from these rights. Our Presidents have done that. As a result, we have a situation in which I think a classic statement applies: If it is not broke, why are we trying to fix it? And it is not broken.

   Again, in my final few moments, I heard from my colleague from Maine--and I have heard it again and again--those firefighters struggling up the stairs of the World Trade Center were union employees. No one checked with their bargaining agent before going up those stairs. In fact, I don't think they even checked with some of their captains and battalion commanders. They went up those upstairs because it was their job and their duty and their lives. And many of them paid with their lives.

   It is that spirit that emanates from those firefighters that encourages and embraces all dedicated civil servants in our Federal Government. I think to pursue this initiative is really, in a way, a slap at them, an insult to what they bring each and every day to their jobs, to their tasks, to their duty.

   So I hope we adopt provisions, which I believe the Lieberman bill has, which recognize the right to organize, the right for civil service protections, and also flexibility, for management, by the President.

   I yield the floor.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

   Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, how much time does the distinguished Senator from South Carolina wish to have?

   Mr. HOLLINGS. Thirty minutes.

   Mr. BYRD. I ask the Senator, could you make it 20? Could we try for 20 to start with?

   Mr. HOLLINGS: I will try to start with 20.

   Mr. BYRD. I certainly want to be considerate with this Senator, this very senior Member of the body. And I am glad that he is a Member at this time.

   Let's say 20 minutes at this point. My time is limited, but let's start with that and see how we come out.

   Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, right quickly, the distinguished Senator from Rhode Island was talking about the firemen running up those steps. It brings to mind 4 years ago the creation of the Office of Domestic Preparedness by this Congress.

   We were confronting terrorism long before 9/11. Mr. President, 144,000 individuals have been through schools in Nevada, New Mexico, Louisiana, Texas, and Alabama. There are five big schools there to train the first responders. And that training has been really salutary in the sense that in the state of New York we have had over 17,000 first responders who were trained in the ODP program. So I say to the Senator, many who rushed up those steps had received the training and were responding in accordance with the foreseeability that we had in the congressional branch with respect to terrorism.

   I jump right quickly, with my time limited, to the hearings that we had. We hear so much about Hart-Rudman. We had hearings in the Senate, not just deciding on Hart-Rudman, that large bureaucracy, but, on the contrary, after 3 days of hearings in the State-Justice-Commerce Subcommittee of Appropriations we came down with a further beefing up of the Office of Domestic Preparedness. At the present time, ODP has a budget of $1.2 billion. We already have at the desk, unanimously approved by the Appropriations Committee and ready for debate, an increase of $1 billion, some $2.2 billion.

   In short, we were on the floor of the Senate on 9/11 debating terrorism. I emphasize that because they go right to the point and say they don't believe in domestic security.

   We have been working on domestic security since immediately after 9/11. I got together--and I must tell this story because it has already passed me with respect to the gun crowd--but be that as it may, I sat down with the El Al chief pilot from Israel who flew over from Tel Aviv and sat down and talked with us, myself and about four other Senators.

   At that seating, he emphasized the security of the cockpit door because I asked him: Sir, how is it that El Al, the airline most subject to be under the gun, where the terrorists do not even wait now, for example, to get to a plane--they shoot up the ticket counter like they did out in Los Angeles--that you have not had a hijacking in 30 years?

   He said: There is one way to prevent hijackings. Secure the cockpit door, and never open that door in flight.

   Let me emphasize, he said: My wife can be assaulted in the cabin. I would go straight to the ground, and law enforcement would meet me there.

   In flight, you do not want to give responsibility to the pilots for law and order. You give the pilots the responsibility for flying the plane. If they have the responsibility, with a gun, for law and order, then they have made a bad mistake because the pilots cannot prevent a plane from being hijacked. The enemy is not a single hijacker. There are teams of terrorists, suicidal terrorists, who do not mind losing their lives. And, yes, you can stop one or two, maybe, but the next three will take that plane over, and you will have a 9/11.

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   I think our responsibility in this particular debate is--in addition to going up to New York on Friday, in addition to having the debate here, and a whole day turned over on next Wednesday, which I commend--but the main thing is for us to act and assume the responsibility that a 9/11 never happens again.

   Once you secure that door--Delta Airlines has gone along with it, JetBlue is going along with it, but we are still debating it.

   We immediately moved for airline security. We passed it 100-0 in a bipartisan bill. You see in the morning paper it is not turf. This Senate voted to put the Transportation Security Administration in the Justice Department. I was not trying to hold it because I am chairman of the Transportation Committee. I have commerce, science, and transportation. I was not trying to hold it in my committee. I voted to put it in Justice and defended this position on the House side arguing that Justice would get it up and going.

   Instead I got a bureaucrat who was more interested in the logo and his office equipment and did not even talk to the airline managers. We confirmed--the pressure was on--before Christmas.

   We voted without the committee confirming this particular gentlemen. We just reported it out and we had a vote on it without any debate whatsoever. But now we are behind the curve and we have Admiral Malloy over there, and I think he is a great man, and I think we can do a lot of repairing and we are going to be realistic about what we can accomplish. There is no use arguing about what kind of terminal dates and everything else. We live in the real world and we must work together.

   We put in rail security, we put in seaport security before Christmas of last year. You don't find the administration pressuring the House to get going to pass it. They are still fussing about fees and taxes over there. They don't want to pay for it. It is domestic politics, reelection, not seaport security.

   So there we are. We can go down the list of all the work we have done on it, and here comes this bill and what does it do? It organizes every entity that did not fail, like the Coast Guard, FEMA, and the Agriculture Department and everything else, and ignores the ones that did fail. 9/11 was an intelligence failure, and you will not get that out of the Select Committee on Intelligence that is investigating between the House and Senate because the entities of this administration--I am not saying the President knew anything will not be embarrassed. I am sure if the President knew anything he would have put measures in place to avoid it. But I can tell you here and now that the committee that is investigating is not going to speak out about the intelligence failure because it would reflect, if you please, poorly on the President's management of their FBI, their CIA, their National Security Agency.

   I have been on the Intelligence Committee. In fact, I started in this work in 1954 on the Hoover Commission. The same problem we had almost 50 years ago with the FBI talking to the CIA, and the CIA talking to the FBI, persists today. I have gotten together with Bob Mueller, and he is a good man. He has hired some CIA officials. Last year before Thanksgiving, we gave him $750 million to clean up his computerization. He reorganized the Department and instituted a Department of Domestic Intelligence and now is talking, I understand, to George Tenet, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

   The CIA failed on 9/11. We already had the blowing up of the World Trade Towers almost 10 years ago. But the CIA said we didn't know a plane could be used. They did not know a plane could be used? They had the direct record in 1994.

   In 1994, they had the Islamic group that was going to blow up the Eiffel Tower. Then, in 1995, they were working on a case out there in the Philippines where they uncovered a plan to blow up 12 planes at one time. The documents revealed that the terrorists, who had links to al Qaida, planned to ram a plane into the CIA building itself. But now they say they had no idea you could fly a plane into a building. Then al-Qaida blew up our embassies and blew up the USS Cole. They knew.

   Right to the point, they had warned about this crowd so much so that the President actually had on his desk on September 10--the day before--a plan to attack Afghanistan. We had the intelligence. We just were not paying attention. The FBI also failed. There isn't any question about that. We know about the flight schools in Arizona. Agent Williams sent notice saying: There is something wrong. These people of Mideastern descent are trying to learn how to fly. We believe they are connected to fundamentalist groups, something's not right to me.

   That word never did get up to the head of the FBI or the President of the United States. That was an intelligence failure. But we had the woman--Agent Coleen Rowley, I think her name was. When they arrested Moussaoui in Minnesota, they became so exercised she wrote a memo that: Look, this fellow doesn't want to learn how to take-off or land. He only wants to learn how to fly. We need to investigate him further. But the Minnesota field office was denied permission for a warrant.

   Why should we investigate him further? Because he was training to run a plane into the World Trade Towers. That is the record. I am not on any Intelligence Committee. I am not giving you any security information. If you want any kind of information along that line, there is a wonderful article that appeared in Time magazine on May 27, 2002.

   I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD.

   There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

   How the U.S. Missed the Clues

   None of this is pretty. In the immediate aftermath of the Sept. 11 attacks, members of the American political establishment stood together, determined to fight the war against terrorism, supporting those in military uniform and the buttoned-down bureaucrats whose job it was to make sure that something so awful would not happen again. Everyone--inside the Bush Administration as well as outside it--knew there had been massive failures of intelligence in the period before the attacks. But after Sept. 11, the Administration earned a reputation for steely-eyed competence, and its political opponents couched their legitimate criticism in language politer than that to which Washington is accustomed. That was then. In the past month, a series of disclosures have cast doubt on the most basic abilities of the national-security establishment. The Administration has looked alternately shifty and defensive; Democrats--some of them presidential candidates-in-waiting--have postured on motormouth TV. And the nation has been forced into a period of painful second-guessing, asking whether Sept. 11 could have been prevented. In August, it turns out, the President was briefed by the CIA on the possibility that al-Qaeda, the terrorist network headed by Osama bin Laden, might use hijacked airliners to win concessions from the U.S. Sources tell TIME that the briefing, which was first reported by CBS News, was in response to a request by Bush for detailed information on the kind of threat posed by al-Qaeda, not to American interests overseas--which had long preoccupied the spooks--but at home. During the period in which the brief was prepared, says a senior intelligence official, the CIA came to the conclusion that ``al-Qaeda was determined to attack the U.S.'' After the strike came, White House sources concede, the Administration made a conscious decision not to disclose the August briefing, hoping that it would be discussed ``in context''--and months later--when congressional investigations into the attacks eventually got under way. And that wasn't the only embarrassing paper kept under wraps. Earlier this month, the Associated Press reported new details from a July 2001 memo by an FBI agent in Pheonix, Ariz., who presciently noted a pattern of Arab men signing up at flight schools. The agent, Kenneth Williams, 42, has spent 11 years working in an FBI antiterrorism task force. He recommended an investigation to determine whether al-Qaeda operatives were training at the schools. He was ignored, and after the existence of the memo became known, the FBI insisted that even if it had been acted upon, it would not have led to the detention of the Sept. 11 hijackers. (Only one of them, Hani Hanjour, had trained in Arizona, and did so before Williams focused on flight school.) But sources tell TIME that at least one of the men Williams had under watch--a Muslim who has now left the U.S.--did indeed have al-Qaeda links. And Williams identified a second pair of suspected Islamic radicals now living in the U.S. as resident aliens, the sources say. They are currently under FBI surveillance. As if those missed signals weren't enough, last week it was also disclosed that in August, when the U.S. detained Zacarias

   Moussaoui--a man the French government knew was associated with Islamic extremists and who apparently wanted to learn to fly

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   At high levels of government, the awful possibility is dawning that things could have been different. ``If we'd had access to Moussaoui, if we'd had access to the Phoenix memo, could we have broken up the plot?'' asks a White House official who works on counterterrorism. Then he answers his own question: ``We would have taken action, and there's at least a distinct possibility that we may at the very least have delayed it.'' Bush was outraged at the suggestion that he might have been warned about impending strikes and failed to act. To ward off Democratic criticism, Vice President Dick Cheney warned against trying to ``seek political advantage'' from the new revelations; such commentary, he said, ``is thoroughly irresponsible and totally unworthy of national leaders in a time of war.'' He should have saved his breath; the blame game is under way, long before the lessons of all that happened last summer have been absorbed. And one thing we now know: there plenty of blame to go around.

   George W. Bush, they say, is a quick study, and last summer he needed to be. Threats and warnings of possible terrorist outrages against American interests were howling into Washington like a dirty blizzard. Fighting terrorism hadn't been a top priority in the early months of the Administration; cutting taxes, building a missile shield and other agenda had crowded it out. Bush's national-security aides had been warned during the transition that there was an al-Qaeda presence in the U.S., but in the first months of the Administration, says one official, a sense of urgency was lacking: ``They were new to this stuff.''

   By the time Bush left for a month's vacation on his ranch in Crawford, Texas, on Aug. 4, that mood had changed. Where the President goes, the responsibilities of office follow, and so, each morning, Bush sat in the ranch office and received the CIA's Presidential Daily Brief. The bried--or PDB, in Langley-speak--is the CIA's chance to mainline its priorities into the President's thinking. Each day, the PDB is winnowed to a few pages; when the President is in Washington, one of two ``briefers''--agency up-and-comers who flesh out the written text--gets to work at 2 a.m. to bone up on background material. The brief itself is delivered at 8 a.m. in front of the President's national-security team. (Sometimes CIA Director George Tenet delivers it himself.) One briefer had moved to Texas for the vacation, and the PDB was transmitted to Crawford over a secure system. At the briefing on Monday, Aug. 6--a day when the Texas heat would reach 100 [degrees]--Bush received a 1 1/2 -page document, which, according to Rice, was an ``analytic report'' on al-Qaeda. Included was a mention that al-Qaeda might be tempted to hijack airliners, perhaps so that they might use hostages to secure the release of an al-Qaeda leader or sympathizer. Rice was not present but discussed the briefing with Bush immediately after it had ended, as she always does.

   They had mush to talk about. Throughout the summer, top officials had become convinced, with a growing sense of foreboding, that a major operation by al-Qaeda was in the works. For many in the loop, it seemed likely that any attack would be aimed at Americans overseas. But sources tell TIME that the Aug. 6 briefing had a very different focus; it was explicitly concerned with terrorism in the homeland. The Aug. 6 briefing had been put together, says one official, because the President had told Tenet, ``Give me a sense of what al-Qaeda can do inside the U.S.'' At a press conference last week, Rice said the brief concentrated on the history and methods of al-Qaeda. Since much of the material in it was a rehash of intelligence dating to 1997 and '98, it is doubtful that it was much use in answering Bush's question.

   According to Rice, there was just a sentence or two on hijacking--and the passage did not address the possibility that a hijacked plane would ever be flown into a building. That was the first of four crucial mistakes made last summer. Administration officials insisted all last week that turning a plane into a suicide bomb was something that nobody had contemplated. But that just isn't so. In 1995, authorities in the Philippines scuppered a plan--masterminded by Ramzi Yousef, who had also plotted the 1993 World Trade Center bombing--for mass hijackings of American planes over the Pacific. Evidence developed during the investigation of Yousef and his partner, Abdul Hakim Murad, uncovered a plan to crash a plane into CIA headquarters in Langley, Va. And as long ago as 1994, in an incident that is well known among terrorism experts, French authorities foiled a plot by the Algerian Armed Islamic Group to fly an airliner into the Eiffel Tower. ``Since 1994,'' says a French investigator into al-Qaeda cases, ``we should all have been viewing kamikaze acts as a possibility for all terrorist hijackings.'' But if Rice's account is accurate, nobody significant in the Bush Administration did.

   There might have been more discussion of the risks of hijackings in the President's briefing if its writers had known about the Phoenix memo. But they hadn't seen it, nor had anyone in the CIA or the White House. Yet Senator Richard Shelby, the ranking Republican on the Senate Intelligence Committee, calls the memo, which is said to contain detailed descriptions of named suspects, ``one of the most explosive documents I've seen in eight years.'' The memo, on which the Senate Intelligence Committee was briefed last November, has now become the focus of a huge political row in Washington. Members of the Senate Judiciary Committee--including Republican Arlen Specter, who had an angry exchange over the memo with FBI Director Robert Mueller on Saturday--are desperate to see it, and may yet subpoena it. ``The fact that the Phoenix memo died on Somebody's desk takes your breath away,'' says Senator Richard Durbin, a Democratic committee member from Illinois. ``They just shuffled it off.''

   Agent Williams wrote the memo on July 5, detailing his suspicions about some Arabs he had been watching, who he thought were Islamic radicals. Several of the men had enrolled at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University in Prescott, Ariz. Williams posited that bin Laden's followers might be trying to infiltrate the civil-aviation system as pilots, security guards or other personnel, and he recommended a national program to track suspicious flight-school students. The memo was sent to the counterterrorism division at FBI headquarters in Washington and to two field offices, including the counterterrorism section in New York, which has had long experience in al-Qaeda investigations.

   That experience counted for nothing. In all three offices, the memo was pretty much ignored, disappearing into the black hole of bureaucratic hell that is the FBI. That was the second key mistake. Sources tell TIME that the memo was never forwarded--not even to the level of Mike Rolince, chief of the international-terrorism section. ``The thing fell into the laps of people who were grossly overtaxed,'' says a senior FBI official. The G-men claim to have been swamped by tips about coming al-Qaeda operations. But Williams was onto something. The flight students he was tracking were supporters of radical Islamic groups. Some of them, sources say, are believed to be connected to Hamas and Hizballah, terrorist organizations based in the Middle East, while at least one other--who has left the U.S.--had links to al-Qaeda. Another pair mentioned in the memo, neither of whom attended flight school, are the ones under FBI surveillance--which, sources say, is the reason Mueller won't make the memo public.

   However fevered the analysis of the Williams memo is now, it didn't get much attention when it was written. Last July, FBI headquarters wasn't concentrating on an attack within the U.S. ``Nobody was looking domestically,'' says a recently retired FBI official. ``We didn't think they had the people to mount an operation here.''

   That was the third huge mistake--and a somewhat baffling conclusion to draw, given the evidence at hand. In spring of 2001, Ahmed Ressam, the ``millennium bomber,'' was on trial in Los Angeles, charged with being part of a plot to bomb Los Angeles International Airport and other locations at the end of 1999. In her press conference last week, Rice conceded that in 2001 the FBI ``was involved in a number of investigations of potential al-Qaeda personnel operating in the United States.''

   But investigators had some reasons for being preoccupied with attacks and threats outside the U.S. Al-Qaeda's most notorious blows against American interests had taken place in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, the sites of the 1998 embassy bombings, and in Yemen, where the U.S.S. Cole was bombed in October 2002. And in the first half of last year, the CSG monitored information suggesting the likelihood of another attack overseas. In June 2001, the State Department issued a worldwide caution warning American citizens of possible attacks. That month, says a recently retired senior FBI official, ``we were constantly worried that something was going to happen. Our best guesstimate was something in Southeast Asia.'' A French investigator involved in al-Qaeda cases confirms the thought. ``The prevailing logic from around 1998,'' he says, ``was that al-Qaeda and bin Laden had very openly designated America as its prime target--but it was a target that it preferred to attack outside the U.S.''

   By July the level of noise about terrorism from intelligence sources around the world was deafening. The CSG, then chaired by Richard Clarke, a Clinton Administration holdover who was consumed with terrorist threats to the point of obsession, was meeting almost every day. A specific threat was received on the life of Bush, who was due to visit Genoa, Italy, for a G-8 summit that month. Roland Jacquard, a leading French expert on terrorism, says that when Russian and Western intelligence agencies compared notes before the summit, they were stunned to find they all had information indicating that a strike was in the offing. When the Genoa summit passed without incident, says a French official, attention turned to the possibility of attacks on U.S. bases in Belgium and Turkey. Then, at the end of July, Djamel Beghal, a Franco-Algerian al-Qaeda associate, was picked up in Dubai on his way from Afghanistan back to Europe. Beghal started talking and implicated a network of al-Qaeda operatives in Europe, who, he said, were planning to blow up the American embassy in Paris. (Beghal, who has since been extradited to France, has said his confession was coerced.) ``We shared everything we knew with the Americans,'' says a French justice official.

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   They may have shared too much. At least in France, investigators now acknowledge that Al-Qaeda may have been involved in a massive feint to Europe while the real attack was always planned for the U.S. ``People were convinced that Europe remained the theater for Islamic terrorists,'' says Jacquard. ``It's anyone's guess whether that was a technique to get people looking in the wrong place. But that's what happened.''

   By the beginning of August, the President had made his request for a briefing on domestic threats. One of them was about to be uncovered. And therein lay the fourth mistake. On Aug. 16, Moussaoui was arrested in Minnesota for an immigration violation, just a day after the staff at the flight school where he was training told the FBI of their suspicions about him. The Minnesotans weren't alone; when American officials checked with their French counterparts, they discovered that Moussaoui had long been suspected of mixing in extremist circles. (The Zelig of modern terrorism, Moussaoui has been associated with al-Qaeda networks everywhere from London to Malaysia.) The FBI started urgently investigating Moussaoui's past; agents in Minneapolis sought a national-security warrant to search his computer files but were turned down by lawyers at FBI headquarters who said they didn't have sufficient evidence that he belonged to a terrorist group. Immediately after Moussaoui's arrest, agents twice visited the Airman Flight School in Norman, Okla., where he had studied before heading to Minnesota; two of the Sept. 11 hijackers had visited Norman in July 2000. The FBI did inform the CIA of Moussaoui's arrest, and the CIA ran checks on him while asking foreign intelligence services for information. But neither the FBI nor the CIA ever informed the counterterrorism group in the White House. ``Do you think,'' says a White House antiterrorism official, ``that if Dick Clarke had known that the FBI had in custody a foreigner who couldn't speak English, who was trying to fly a plane in midair, he wouldn't have done something?''

   Since at least two of the four failures--those involving Moussaoui and the Phoenix memo--can be laid at the door of the FBI, the bureau is feeling the heat. ``The FBI has a long pattern of not sharing information with others,'' says a former Clinton Administration official. ``Now it's not even sharing the information with itself.'' Mueller, who knew about the Phoenix memo shortly after Sept. 11, plainly did not anticipate the criticism it would engender. Since it became public, officials have defensively pointed out that if the bureau had tried to track down all Muslim flight-school attendees, it would have been accused of racial profiling. White House officials defend Mueller; he is ``tenacious about changing things,'' says one, who admits, ``You can't change a culture that's 60 years in the making overnight.'' But on Capitol Hill the bureau is running out of friends. ``I have no doubt that the FBI needs reform,'' said Senate Republican leader Trent Lott last week.

   Yet when the blame gets assigned, as it will now that a joint congressional investigation into Sept. 11 is getting down to work, the FBI won't monopolize it. The ugly truth is that nine months after huge weaknesses in the national security system were revealed, they remain unaddressed. In Washington, says a senior Clinton Administration official, ``information just moves through stovepipes,'' never getting pooled by different agencies until it is too late. The intelligence services were built to fight the cold war, not an enemy that flits from Afghan caves to apartments in London. The division between domestic and international security made sense when the former was concerned with what criminals did and the latter with foreign countries. But some criminals are now as powerful as countries, and some countries are run by criminals.

   Nine months ago, the appointment of Tom Ridge as Homeland Security czar was billed as the shake-up Washington needed. So far, he has been more of a mild foot stamp than an earthquake. Instead of real reform, the Administration has resorted to its usual mode: attempting to control warring satrapies from the White House. The remarkable aspect of last week's events in Washington was the unintended revelation that Rice is the true manager of counterterrorism policy. In the past, the National Security Council got into trouble when it adopted an operational role rather than one of analysis (think Oliver North), and for Bush this identification of one of his closest advisers with the operational failures of counterterrorism policy could yet be politically troubling.

   Among his supporters, however, the President still rides high. Bush's simple, passionate argument--that he would never have sat idly if he had known what was coming on Sept. 11--helped stiffen spines. Republicans pointed out that members of congressional intelligence committees get the same information the President receives in his PDB and yet had not made a fuss about the Aug. 6 briefing. That claim was disputed; Tom Daschle, the Democrat's leader in the Senate, insisted the Senate and the Administration did not have ``identical information'' about al-Qaeda threats.

   In a sense, the spat over who got what version of which memo epitomizes Washington at its worst. The capital at its best would appreciate that the most important question isn't what Bush (or anyone else) knew before Sept. 11; it is what the Administration and Congress have and have not done to fix a broken system. But November and the midterm elections, you may have noticed, are only six months away. Washington is reverting to form.

   Mr. HOLLINGS. Time magazine got into it very thoroughly--much more so than the committee that has been leaking. I was disappointed Sunday when I heard my distinguished colleague from Tennessee say: No, he would not take a polygraph test.

   I am an old trial lawyer. You are not going to convict my client on a polygraph test. We used it in the Hoover Commission 50 years ago, and it is an indicator. I wanted to make sure the staff on the Intelligence Committee--as I found out, I had been doubledealed by the CIA and was told: I cannot give you that information, Senator, because your staff does not have the appropriate clearance.

   Before you serve here as a Capitol policeman, you have to take a polygraph, and also before you serve in the FBI, CIA, and Secret Service--go down the list--but not the staff of the Senate Intelligence Committee.

   So I learned that in a war you never ask your man to do something you do not do yourself first. So I went over to take a polygraph test. To the very first question, I started off my answer ``in my humble opinion'' and the needle went right off the chart. I flunked. It took 2 hours and they gave me a chance again, and after that 2-hour test, I passed it and came back and I still brought it up that as a member of the Intelligence Committee, they do not have the appropriate clearance. If they want to know where the leaks are, go to the committees.

   Mr. President, the National Security Agency failed. They had all kinds of warnings about al-Qaida. They had Arabic friends over there. They got the word on September 10 in Arabic that ``the match is about to begin,'' but they didn't translate the Arabic into English until September 12.

   Now comes the National Security Council. It is interesting that in 1947 we had the same problem of coordination--instituting not only the CIA, but the 1947 National Security Council that the function of the Council shall be to advise the President with respect to the integration--that is joining--of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security, so as to enable the military services and the other Departments and Agencies of Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving national security.

   If you don't have a President right at the catbird seat pointing to them and saying you either talk and coordinate with each other or else you are out, it is not going to be done. You can pass all the bills you want in the U.S. Congress. You are just passing another entity for finger-pointing. They need correlation again and again.

   Here is exactly what the President said in the National Security Presidential directive he made. I had a copy of it here. It is with respect to ordering the bush National Security Council. Incidentally, what I am saying I had said to him at the Cabinet table over 2 months ago. But on February 13--I ask unanimous consent that this National Security Presidential directive of February 13, 2001, be printed in the RECORD.

   There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

   National Security Presidential Directives--NSPDs, the White House, Washington, February 13, 2001

   MEMORANDUM FOR
The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of Defense
The Attorney General
The Secretary of Agriculture
The Secretary of Commerce
The Secretary of Health and Human Services
The Secretary of Transportation
The Secretary of Energy
Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency
Director of the Office of Management and Budget
United States Trade Representative
Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers
Director, National Drug Control Policy
Chief of Staff to the President
Director of Central Intelligence
Director, Federal Emergency Management Agency
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Assistant to the President for Economic Policy
Counsel to the President
Chief of Staff and Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

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   This document is the first in a series of National Security Presidential Directives. National Security Presidential Directives shall replace both Presidential Decision Directives and Presidential Review Directives as an instrument for communicating presidential decisions about the national security policies of the United States.

   National security includes the defense of the United States of America, protection of our constitutional system of government, and the advancement of United States interest around the globe. National security also depends on America's opportunity to prosper in the world economy. The National Security Act of 1947, as amended, established the National Security Council to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national security. That remains its purpose. The NSC shall advise and assist me in integrating all aspects of national security policy as it affects the United States--domestic, foreign, military, intelligence, and economics (in conjunction with the National Economic Council (NEC)). The National Security Council system is a process to coordinate executive departments and agencies in the effective development and implementation of those national security policies.

   The National Security Council (NSC) shall have as its regular attendees (both statutory and non-statutory) the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The Director of Central Intelligence and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as statutory advisors to the NSC, shall also attend NSC meetings. The Chief of Staff to the President and the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy are invited to attend any NSC meeting. The Counsel to the President shall be consulted regarding the agenda of NSC meetings, and shall attend any meetings when, in consultation with the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, he deems it appropriate. The Attorney General and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall be invited to attend meetings pertaining to their responsibilities. For the Attorney General, this includes both those matters within the Justice Department's jurisdiction and those matters implicating the Attorney General's responsibility under 28 U.S.C. 511 to give his advice and opinion on questions of law when required by the President. The heads of other executive departments and agencies, as well as other senior officials, shall be invited to attend meetings of the NSC when appropriate.

   The NSC shall meet at my direction. When I am absent from a meeting of the NSC, at my direction the Vice President may preside. The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs shall be responsible, at my direction and in consultation with the other regular attendees of the NSC, for determining the agenda, ensuring that necessary papers are prepared, and recording NSC actions and Presidential decisions. When international economic issues are on the agenda of the NSC, the Assistant to the President for Nation Security Affairs and the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy shall perform these tasks in concert.

   The NSC Principals Committee (NSC/PC) will continue to be the senior interagency forum for consideration of policy issues affecting national security, as it has since 1989. The NSC/PC shall have as its regular attendees the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, the Chief of Staff to the President, and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (who shall serve as chair). The Director of Central Intelligence and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall attend where issues pertaining to their responsibilities and expertise are to be discussed. The Attorney General and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall be invited to attend meetings pertaining to their responsibilities. For the Attorney General, this includes both those matters within the Justice Department's jurisdiction and those matters implicating the Attorney General's responsibility under 28 U.S.C. 511 to give his advice and opinion on questions of law when required by the President. The Counsel to the President shall be consulted regarding the agenda of NSC/PC meetings, and shall attend any meeting when, in consultation with the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, he deems it appropriate. When international economic issues are on the agenda of the NSC/PC, the Committee's regular attendees will include the Secretary of Commerce, the United States Trade Representative, the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy (who shall serve as chair for agenda items that principally pertain to international economics), and, when the issues pertain to her responsibilities, the Secretary of Agriculture. The Chief of Staff and National Security Adviser to the Vice President shall attend all meetings of the NSC/PC, as shall the Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor (who shall serve as Executive Secretary of the NSC/PC). Other heads of departments and agencies, along with additional senior officials, shall be invited where appropriate.

   The NSC/PC shall meet at the call of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs in consultation with the regular attendees of the NSC/PC. The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs shall determine the agenda in consultation with the foregoing, and ensure that necessary papers are prepared. When international economic issues are on the agenda of the NSC/PC, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy shall perform these tasks in concert.

   The NSC Deputies Committee (NSC/DC) will also continue to serve as the senior sub-Cabinet interagency forum for consideration of policy issues affecting national security. The NSC/DC can prescribe and review the work of the NSC interagency groups discussed later in this directive. The NSC/DC shall also help ensure that issues being brought before the NSC/PC or the NSC have been properly analyzed and prepared for decision. The NSC/DC shall have as its regular members the Deputy Secretary of State or Under Secretary of the Treasury or Under Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs, the Deputy Secretary of Defense or Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Deputy Attorney General, the Deputy Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Deputy Chief of Staff to the President for Policy, the Chief of Staff and National Security Adviser to the Vice President, the Deputy Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs, and the Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor (who shall serve as chair). When international economic issues are on the agenda, the NSC/DC's regular membership will include the Deputy Secretary of Commerce, A Deputy United States Trade Representative, and, when the issues pertain to his responsibilities, the Deputy Secretary of Agriculture, and the NSC/DC shall be chaired by the Deputy Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs for agenda items that principally pertain to international economics. Other senior officials shall be invited where appropriate.

   The NSC/DC shall meet at the call of its chair, in consultation with the other regular members of the NSC/DC. Any regular member of the NSC/DC may also request a meeting of the Committee for prompt crisis management. For all meetings the chair shall determine the agenda in consultation with the foregoing, and ensure that necessary papers are prepared.

   The Vice President and I may attend any and all meetings of any entity established by or under this directive.

   Management of the development and implementation of national security policies by multiple agencies of the United States Government shall usually be accomplished by the NSC Policy Coordination Committees (NSC/PCCs). The NSC/PCCs shall be the main day-to-day fora for interagency coordination of national security policy. They shall provide policy analysis for consideration by the more senior committees of the NSC system and ensure timely responses to decisions made by the President. Each NSC/PCC shall include representatives from the executive departments, offices, and agencies represented in the NSC/DC.

   Six NSC/PCCs are hereby established for the following regions: Europe and Eurasia, Western Hemisphere, East Asia, South Asia, Near East and North Africa, and Africa. Each of the NSC/PCCs shall be chaired by an official of Under Secretary or Assistant Secretary rank to be designated by the Secretary of State.

   Eleven NSC/PCCs are hereby also established for the following functional topics, each to be chaired by a person of Under Secretary or Assistant Secretary rank designated by the indicated authority:

   Democracy, Human Rights, and International Operations (by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs);

   International Development and Humanitarian Assistance (by the Secretary of State);

   Global Environment (by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy in concert);

   International Finance (by the Secretary of the Treasury);

   Transnational Economic Issues (by the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy);

   Counter-Terrorism and National Preparedness (by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs);

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   Defense Strategy, Force Structure, and Planning (by the Secretary of Defense);

   Arms Control (by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs);

   Proliferation, Counterproliferation, and Homeland Defense (by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs);

   Intelligence and Counterintelligence (by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs); and

   Records Access and Information Security (by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs).

   The Trade Policy Review Group (TPRG) will continue to function as an interagency coordinator of trade policy. Issues considered within the TPRG, as with the PCCs, will flow through the NSC and/or NEC process as appropriate.

   Each NSC/PCC shall also have an Executive Secretary from the staff of the NSC, to be designated by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The Executive Secretary shall assist the Chairman in scheduling the meetings of the NSC/PCC, determining the agenda, recording the actions taken and tasks assigned, and ensuring timely responses to the central policymaking committees of the NSC system. The Chairman of each NSC/PCC, in consultation with the Executive Secretary, may invite representatives of other executive departments and agencies to attend meetings of the NSC/PCC where appropriate.

   The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, at my direction and in consultation with the Vice President and the Secretaries of State, Treasury, and Defense, may establish additional NSC/PCCs as appropriate.

   The Chairman of each NSC/PCC, with the agreements of the Executive Secretary, may establish subordinate working groups to assist the PCC in the performance of its duties.

   The existing system of Interagency Working Groups is abolished.

   The oversight of ongoing operations assigned in PDD/NSC-56 to Executive Committees of the Deputies Committee will be performed by the appropriate regional NSC/PCCs, which may create subordinate working groups to provide coordination for ongoing operations.

   The Counter-Terrorism Security Group, Critical Infrastructure Coordination Group, Weapons of Mass Destruction Preparedness, Consequences Management and Protection Group, and the interagency working group on Enduring Constitutional Government are reconstituted as various forms of NSC/PCC on Counter-Terrorism and National Preparedness.

   The duties assigned in PDD/NSC-75 to the National Counterintelligence Policy Group will be performed in the NSC/PCC on Intelligence and Counterintelligence, meeting with appropriate attendees.

   The duties assigned to the Security Policy Board and other entities established in PDD/NSC-29 will be transferred to various NSC/PCCs, depending on the particular security problem being addressed.

   The duties assigned in PDD/NSC-41 to the Standing Committee on Nonproliferation will be transferred to the PCC on Proliferation, Counterproliferation, and Homeland Defense.

   The duties assigned in PDD/NSC-36 to the Interagency Working Group for Intelligence Priorities will be transferred to the PCC on Intelligence and Counterintelligence.

   The duties of the Human Rights Treaties Interagency Working Group established in E.O. 13107 are transferred to the PCC on Democracy, Human Rights, and International Operations.

   The Nazi War Criminal Records Interagency Working Group established in E.O. 13110 shall be reconstituted, under the terms of that order and until its work ends in January 2002, as a Working Group of the NSC/PCC for Records Access and Information Security.

   Except for those established by statute, other existing NSC interagency groups, ad hoc bodies, and executive committees are also abolished as of March 1, 2001, unless they are specifically reestablished as subordinate working groups within the new NSC system as of that date. Cabinet officers, the heads of other executive agencies, and the directors of offices within the Executive Office of the President shall advise the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs of those specific NSC interagency groups chaired by their respective departments or agencies that are either mandated by statute or are otherwise of sufficient importance and vitality as to warrant being reestablished. In each case the Cabinet officer, agency head, or office director should describe the scope of the activities proposed for or now carried out by the interagency group, the relevant statutory mandate if any, and the particular NSC/PCC that should coordinate this work. The Trade Promotion Coordinating Committee established in E.O. 12870 shall continue its work, however, in the manner specified in that order. As to those committees expressly established in the National Security Act, the NSC/PC and/or NSC/DC shall serve as those committees and perform the functions assigned to those committees by the Act.

   To further clarify responsibilities and effective accountability within the NSC system, those positions relating to foreign policy that are designated as special presidential emissaries, special envoys for the President, senior advisors to the President and the Secretary of State, and special advisors to the President and the Secretary of State are also abolished as of March 1, 2001, unless they are specifically redesignated or reestablished by the Secretary of State as positions in that Department.

   This Directive shall supersede all other existing presidential guidance on the organization of the National Security Council system. With regard to application of this document to economic matters, this document shall be interpreted in concert with any Executive Order governing the National Economic Council and with presidential decision documents signed hereafter that implement either this directive or that Executive Order.

   [signed: George W. Bush]

   Mr. HOLLINGS. You will find in there that 11 functional coordinating committees within the council itself, chaired by the National Security Council. Among them are committees on counterterrorism and national preparedness, chaired by Condoleezza Rice, to Advisor to the President for National Security Affairs. You have another committee on counterproliferation and homeland defense, which the President of the United States thought was necessary in February of last year, chaired by Condoleezza Rice. There is another one on intelligence and counterintelligence, again chaired by Condoleezza Rice.

   Later we see President's National Security Advisor on the TV saying: We did not get anything specific. In fairness to her, she is an expert in foreign policy. She used to instruct a course, I understand, at Stanford. She has never served in law enforcement or counterterrorism. But it is time to get real. This bill does not directly deal with the entities that failed. It is about running around, like my Navy friend used to say, ``when in danger, when in doubt, run in circles scream and shout.''

   The administration propose this big bureaucracy. I have 110,000 of them already at DOT. I have been working on transportation security of the airlines, the rails, and the seaports. How are you going to get a department full of midlevel personnel in charge if you cannot get the Executive level, the Presidential level, engaged in active management. I told the President of the United States: Mr. President, I want you to get hourly reports on the homeland security intelligence as you receive those hourly political reports from Carl Rove. He knows what is going on politically in this country. I want him to know what is going on intelligence-wise with respect to homeland security, but we do not have that.

   What we have is another finger-pointing agency. As Harry Truman said: The buck stops here. He is the one who brought in the 1947 initiative to reorganize for national security. He did not mind assuming that responsibility.

   Mr. President, do you think if you were President that you would depend on the Department of Homeland Security for your intelligence analysis? No, no, that is not going to ever happen. One, that Department is only going to be fed what the President says to feed them. The FBI is not going to tell them everything. The CIA is not going to tell them everything. It

   is a culture. We have to break down that culture, but the only place we know they are not afraid to tell is the National Security Council of the President of the United States.

   The Secretary of the Homeland Defense Department would not even know what to ask for. They do not have any kind of intelligence collection. They do not have the authority or resources to do that. They would create another analysis department, but it will not function properly unless it is fused. There has to be a fusion, an integration, as they said in 1947, of domestic and foreign intelligence so they know where to act. We have read in the newspapers where they are getting their money for terrorism, outfitting Canada and so on.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.

   My time is limited, so I will close with the idea that, we can pass this bill ipso facto, word for word--either bill--this afternoon, and 4 or 5 years from now after they have had a chance to organize, we can have another 9-11. We are not going to prevent it with this particular measure.

   Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I yield 5 additional minutes to the Senator.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

   Mr. HOLLINGS. That is all right, Mr. President. I will yield the time back and come back in on the debate. This is

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   The President has to play the game of President, be the chief executive. Mr. President, I say to Senator Byrd, in his mind, does he think he would depend on the Department of Domestic Security for making a decision? He is not going to depend on that Department or any other, except for the National Security Council.

   There is no substitute for the CIA being on the Council or for the FBI being on the Council, the Attorney General, or the Secretary of Homeland Security. Put him on the National Security Council. Let's begin to emphasize the domestic side of foreign policy and international threats.

   That is what has to be done, and it has to be done at the White House. You cannot run all over the country fundraising; you have to go to work. That is one fault with this particular President. I cannot put him to work. I see him out with flags, military people, policemen, firemen, and others. Carl Rove has him. I would like to get hold of him, and we could get this Government going. He has to go to work and bring them in and say: I want to make sure I know what I am doing. And this Department does not help him know what he is doing.

   I yield the floor.

   Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, how much time does the Senator from New York wish?

   Mrs. CLINTON. Ten minutes.

   Mr. BYRD. I yield 10 minutes to the distinguished Senator from New York, Mrs. Clinton.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New York.

   Mrs. CLINTON. Mr. President, I thank the Senator. I rise to join Senator Byrd in speaking about our homeland security needs. Our colleague from South Carolina always teaches me something whenever I have the pleasure and privilege of hearing him speak in this Chamber.

   New Yorkers particularly owe Senator Byrd a great debt of gratitude because he and his very worthy staff have done a tremendous amount of work to help New York recover and rebuild from the tragedy of September 11.

   As we appear today in this Chamber, I cannot help but remark that Senator Byrd has been focused on homeland security from the moment I first spoke with him on September 12 around 7 a.m. after we knew the full extent of the damage, and I was going up to see what had happened in New York for myself. He has been extremely understanding and also very knowledgeable about what it was going to take to make us more secure.

   I also thank Senator Lieberman for his tremendous efforts in trying to craft legislation that will make us safer. We are not just doing this for a political exercise or just to reorganize for the sake of reorganizing, but we know there are serious issues to be addressed, some of which Senator Hollings spoke about.

   I do support the idea of a Homeland Security Department, but I come today to recognize the seriousness of the issues that should be addressed while we are trying to determine what it is we need to do to make our Government more prepared.

   There are a number of issues, and my colleagues have raised quite a few of them, but I want to focus on one particular aspect of our homeland security, and that is the resources that our frontline firefighters, police officers, and emergency responders need to be the soldiers to defend our homeland security. Just as we support our men and women in uniform who are doing a very important job extremely well, from Afghanistan to the Middle East to the Far East, we have to do the same for our local homeland defenders.

   I have been disappointed in the disconnect between rhetoric and resources from the administration. We certainly have had many heartfelt and moving moments where words have captured our feelings.

   When it comes to providing the resources that our police, our firefighters, and our emergency responders need, I think the administration has fallen short. That was certainly clear over the August recess when the President chose not to sign the emergency designation for the $5.1 billion supplemental appropriations bill, which included $2.5 billion for improving our homeland security.

   That number did not come out of thin air. It was the result of hearings, testimony, and evidence presented by people on the front lines. A number of people from New York who were in our police department and our fire department, who had been there on September 11, who understood what we needed to be well prepared, came down to set forth a very clear agenda that they hoped the Federal Government would help them meet.

   The supplemental appropriations bill, for example, would have given our first responders $100 million so that police and firefighters would have communications systems that could talk to each other. We found out, tragically, on September 11 that we did not have that, and New York is not alone in not having what is called interoperability between the police and firefighter radio systems.

   There would have been $150 million in additional FIRE Act grant funding to help fire departments improve their emergency preparedness, and there would have been $90 million to track the long-term health care of those who responded at Ground Zero, not just so we fulfill our obligation to take care of these brave men and women but also so we can be better prepared to take care of all of our first responders.

   I am not alone in thinking the President's refusal to sign the emergency designation was a terrible mistake. The International Association of Firefighters has voiced its concern in very clear, unmistakable language. I know they are particularly passionate about this issue because they lost so many of their colleagues.

   In his August 20 letter to President Bush, the International Association of Firefighters general president, Harold Schaitberger, had this to say:

   I would be dishonest if I did not convey our anger, concern and growing doubt about your commitment to us ..... No one, not even the President, has the right to pontificate about his or her commitment and respect for firefighters while ignoring our legitimate needs.

   With all due respect, support entails more than kind words.

   The President said he was exercising fiscal discipline by not making the emergency designation and said that this was, in his view, wasteful congressional spending; that $5 billion was not an emergency even if it went to the kind of emergency needs and services that we know we are lacking.

   I have to respectfully disagree. I think we do face an emergency. We are rushing through this legislation because clearly we think we face an emergency. But the real emergency is not in Washington to reorganize a huge Government department. The real emergency is in the police stations and the firehouses and the emergency rooms of America. That is why I am concerned that when the Congress goes through the kind of process it did to arrive at a need for $5.1 billion and it is totally disregarded, then why on Earth would we want to give up congressional oversight and authority in setting the agenda to protect our country?

   I believe it is imperative we do everything we can in setting up this Department to get the money to where it needs to go. We have to get the dollars where the responsibility rests.

   When a disaster occurs, whether it is man-made or accidental, we do not call the White House. We do not even call the Senate or the Congress or the Governor's office. In most instances, we call 911.

   It is clear the kind of support we need for direct Federal homeland security funding needs to be a part of any homeland security defense program.

   We have a heavy responsibility in Washington, not just to talk the talk

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   Some bioterrorism funding--about $1.1 billion--has been dispersed to the States, and that helps, but that does not answer the need that our firefighters, police officers, and emergency responders have.

   I think it is clear, if we are going to be debating this Department, let us talk about the real needs that are out there. We have to be sure we follow the clear example that has been set by communities in trying to shift funds to meet their emergency needs. We have to help them shoulder these additional burdens. Clearly, the Federal, State, and local governments are at partnership in preparing, in being responsible, and then finally in responding. But if they do not have the resources, they cannot do the job.

   So as we debate this Department, let us join with the people on our front lines who understand what they really need--groups such as the U.S. Conference of Mayors, the National League of Cities, and the National Association of Counties. Let us support direct Federal funding to local communities. Let us do it in the form of a community development block grant. Let us follow the money where it needs to go.

   From my perspective, it is imperative we debate resources, not just reorganization. It would be a cruel deception to pass something called Homeland Security Department reorganization, which we all know is going to take years to untangle to try to get focused and to be effective, and not provide the dollars that our frontline defenders need.

   I ask unanimous consent for 2 additional minutes.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

   Mrs. CLINTON. This is compounded because the administration's budget calls for eliminating money that would go to our police, firefighters, and local law enforcement; eliminating more than $500 million from the COPS program; eliminating entirely Federal funding for hiring new so-called COPS officers; eliminating and cutting other essential programs such as the local law enforcement block grant. This makes no sense to me.

   It is fine to have this abstract, theoretical, philosophical, even constitutional debate, as important as it is--and I believe with all my heart it is a critical debate--but let us not kid ourselves: If we do not get resources

   where it counts, we are not going to be better prepared, we are not going to be better defended. I hope as we debate homeland defense, we also recognize the obligation we owe to those men and women who would answer the call today when it is sent out.

   I yield back the remainder of my time.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

   The Senator from West Virginia.

   Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I thank Mrs. Clinton, the distinguished Senator from New York, for her very appropriate, meaningful, and forceful remarks in connection with this matter and in connection with other matters she has addressed. And I thank Senator Hollings, the chairman of the committee which has jurisdiction over transportation, the chairman of the appropriations subcommittee which has jurisdiction over the State, Justice, and Commerce Departments and other agencies; and thanks to Senator Reed for his excellent presentation.

   This time is going on my time, which is all right. I am prepared to yield to the distinguished senior Senator from Washington, who sits on the Appropriations Committee and who presides over the Transportation Subcommittee of that committee with a high degree of dignity and poise, and someone who always brings to the committee's attention and to the Senate's attention the length and breadth of her great knowledge that she acquires through the holding of hearings, through the study she gives to the budget requests that come before the committee. I yield 15 minutes to the Senator.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. JOHNSON). The Senator from Washington.

   Mrs. MURRAY. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from West Virginia for his leadership on this issue and for yielding me the time today.

   On June 6, President Bush addressed the American public, informing the public he had changed his mind. After months of rejecting just such a proposal, he now saw the benefit of organizing a new Department of Homeland Security. His aides had handed him a plan. To his eyes, it was a good plan and one that should be implemented.

   However, something else happened that week as well that happens all too frequently in America. The Coast Guard, one of the agencies that would be merged into the President's new Department of Homeland Security, was performing search and rescue operations across the Nation.

   In my home State of Washington, the Coast Guard was dispatching helicopters and motorboats throughout Willapa Bay to search for three missing Fort Lewis soldiers. On the evening of June 1, their 20-foot pleasure craft washed ashore in Bay Center, WA. Unfortunately, those soldier's bodies were recovered the next morning.

   As I look today at the President's request, I am very mindful of the impact it could have on the Coast Guard's ability to carry out other missions like search and rescue.

   We need to be responsive to the President's request. We need to give this and future administrations the tools they need to better secure America. However, we cannot sacrifice the critical safety work of the Coast Guard for the incomplete plan the President's aides drew up in the basement of the White House.

   I rise today because I am deeply concerned that in our rush to do something about homeland security, we may well overlook the consequences it will have on the safety and security of all Americans. Frankly, given what I have seen so far, I have very real reasons for concern. Of course, I believe, like all my colleagues, that we need to do everything we can to make sure our Government and our military can meet the challenges since September 11. We have to focus considerable energy and resources on addressing those challenges.

   Those who want to harm us will look for new ways to exploit our weaknesses. We have to do better. The world has changed. We must adapt. But we must balance the needs of our country.

   In my role as chairman of the Appropriations Transportation Subcommittee, I have worked very hard to provide the resources to meet our needs at our borders, at our seaports, airports, and throughout our Nation's transportation infrastructure. Often, that has meant pushing this administration to support the necessary funding, sometimes without success.

   We are moving forward, and we are making America more secure. The Senate has followed a deliberate process, and the leadership of Senator Byrd has been critical to this endeavor. He has made sure that we move forward responsibly to meet the new challenges facing our Nation. But let's face it, it takes a while to get even the simple things right. I have been working with the Transportation Security Administration for months on airline security, and even the smallest things have taken a while to work out.

   Look at what we face at our northern border. It took many months and we had to put a lot of pressure on this administration just to get the National Guard deployed at the northern border to fill the gaping holes in our border security

   left by years of negligence. It then took many more weeks to get our guardsmen armed, secure. Securing our border is essential, but so is ensuring the efficient flow of people, goods, and services across our border with our friends in Canada. Canada is our Nation's largest trading partner. Many millions of people in both countries depend on that trade for their livelihoods. If we do the wrong thing, the loss of jobs in our border communities will be devastating.

   How will the Department of Homeland Security, envisioned by the President, balance the complexity of those competing needs of the American people? We do not know. We are supposed to trust this administration.

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   Now the administration wants to rush through a homeland security bill which was drawn up by a handful of White House aides. It is the largest Government reorganization since 1947. Look at what has happened in the House since the President submitted his proposal. The standing committees looked at the proposal and saw major problems. The House Transportation and Infrastructure Subcommittee unanimously voted to keep the Coast Guard out of that new Department. Based on their expertise and their research, the standing committee saw the clear need to maintain the Coast Guard outside of the new Department.

   What happened? The select committee ignored that recommendation and put a rubber stamp on the President's original proposal. In fact, several times the standing committees made constructive improvements to bills, only to see their recommendations rejected by the select committee.

   The administration wants to rush this proposal through Congress. Anyone who raises a legitimate question is immediately derided as ``trying to reserve turf.''

   This is not about turf. It is about safety. It is about a young Coast Guardsmen who climbed aboard foreign vessels in the open seas, not knowing what they may find. It is about TSA security agents who are trying to make sure that passengers attempting to board our planes do not pose a security threat. I am proud to work to try to provide them with some job security just as they work hard to protect our Nation's security.

   These are real questions that need to be answered. This afternoon, I raise some of those questions because there is a lot at stake for the people I represent and for every American. I want to make sure we do this right. So far, I have not gotten the answers I need.

   I have two major concerns. First, we have not yet figured out how to fulfill our traditional missions and the new security missions at the same time. If we combined all these various agencies into one massive Department with a primary mission of homeland security, how are we going to meet the traditional needs across the board?

   Let's look at the Coast Guard, just one agency. Since September 11, the Coast Guard has shifted resources away from traditional missions to homeland events. That is an appropriate response, but it comes at a cost. Unfortunately, it means the Coast Guard is spending less time interdicting drugs and illegal migrants, enforcing fishery and marine safety laws, and protecting our marine environment.

   But the traditional missions have not disappeared. We still need the Coast Guard to keep drugs and the illegal migrants off our shores. We need them to protect our environment. And we need them to protect the lives of our fishermen and the integrity of our fishing grounds. Frankly, even without the new security needs, we have a long way to go to meet even those basic missions.

   I am concerned we are rushing into a new organization that could compromise our ability to meet all the challenges we are facing. What will be the commitment from the Department of Homeland Security to protecting our marine environment or enforcing our fisheries laws or conducting search and rescue operations? If the administration continues to play budget games and underfund the Department, as it has done so far with the TSA, will the scarce dollars go only to security and not to traditional missions?

   Right now, we cannot even get the basic facts. I would like to know how much of the current Coast Guard budget is going toward homeland security. On July 9, the Coast Guard Commandant said 40 percent of the Coast Guard's operating budget goes to the missions of the new Department. A few weeks later, on July 30, the Commandant said almost 50 percent of the Coast Guard's budget went to homeland security. That is a difference of at least $350 million. That number matters because the boats and resources used for homeland defense are often the very same ones needed for search and rescue and other missions.

   I am not raising this to criticize Admiral Collins. He is doing an excellent job. I work closely with him. But it shows how difficult it is to get even the most basic questions answered as we look at this new Department. The answers matter because the vast majority of Americans live in coastal States or along the Great Lakes or inland waterways, and every American is impacted when the Coast Guard slows down its work stopping illegal drugs. To include the Coast Guard in the new Department will impact the lives of millions of people. I think we need to explore these questions closely.

   Simply put, we have not done a good job meeting our traditional missions and security missions at the same time. I would like to know how one massive Department, focused primarily on security, will help us meet the needs out there.

   Second, I am very concerned about accountability and authority over everything from the staff of the new Department to its budget. The administration has asked for unprecedented power and control over this proposed Department. Some of the demands for power over workers really trouble me. The President wants changes in the personnel rules so he can have flexibility. Is the President suggesting that today's unionized border agents are not doing an adequate job or that today's unionized Customs officials are not responding to new mission requirements in a timely manner? If that is what he is suggesting, then he is wrong.

   I have been on the border. I have met with the Border Patrol and Customs agents. These professionals are our sons and daughters, they are our neighbors, they are our friends, they are our husbands, and they are our wives. They serve the American people selflessly, often jeopardizing their own health and safety. I do not think those who serve in the Department of Homeland Security should be second-class citizens, given a lower level of rights and respect.

   In addition to dramatic new control over workers, the administration wants the power to move the money around without congressional input. Let me tell you, given what I have seen so far, this is pretty scary news for families in Washington State. Right now, as a United States Senator, I can fight to make sure the needs in my State are being met. As elected Members of Congress, we know the needs in our communities and we are accountable to our voters. But the administration now wants accountants in the Office of Management and Budget to decide what is important to the people of my home State of Washington. If that happens, my constituents will lose out at a cost to their safety and security.

   Let's just look at what happened with the supplemental appropriations bill. Under the leadership of Chairman BYRD, the Appropriations Committee held unprecedented and comprehensive hearings on how to best meet our obligations to the American people. We spent countless hours hearing from national and local experts. We passed the funding to meet the needs before us. Congress passed that funding, but then the President eliminated more than $5 billion of it. With a wave of his hand, over the August break, the President eliminated funding that we here in Congress considered critical, after many hours of hearings, to protecting the American public.

   He eliminated $11 million from Coast Guard operations. The President eliminated, with a wave of his hand, $262 million for critical Coast Guard procurement, including funding for coastal patrol boats for our security. The President eliminated $150 million for our Nation's airports, as they are working so hard to meet the December deadline for installing explosive detection devices. And the President eliminated $480 million from its already shortchanged Transportation and Security Administration.

   The Office of Management and Budget has not been a good advocate for the people of my home State of Washington. Given that record, I am very reluctant to give OMB dramatic new power over the safety and security of my constituents. The OMB originally blocked the Coast Guard's desperately needed improvements to the marine 911 system. When they brought it to their attention, the OMB changed its policy, but under the

   President's plan there is no way for us in Congress to address the arbitrary decision made by the OMB. Granting the President dramatic new authority is not just a bureaucratic exercise. It has real consequences for the people I represent. I take that responsibility very seriously.

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   If we are not going to figure out how all the functions are going to be performed and we can't tie money to functions, this reorganization may consign many functions to death, as we saw when the President eliminated $5.1 billion in homeland security funding.

   In closing, we need to better define the missions of the various agencies, and we need to make sure they continue to fulfill their traditional missions. It is essential for our economic security and our physical safety. The House bill does not strike a balance, and we have to do better. We need to really understand the consequences of this proposal and ensure that it will actually increase our homeland security and not jeopardize our citizens in other ways.

   I believe this has not been thought out enough and we should certainly not race to put a rubberstamp on such an incomplete proposal. I think every Senator feels pressure to do something, anything, about homeland security. But it is much more important to do the right thing.

   I look forward to having a good debate about the new Department of Homeland Security. There are a lot of serious questions, and I look forward to hearing some serious answers.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

   Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I thank the very distinguished Senator who is a member of the Senate Appropriations Committee, as I have already indicated, for her exceedingly incisive remarks which reflect the high dedication that this Senator always brings to her work. I personally appreciate it, as the chairman of the committee. She is a fine member of that committee, and she has lived up to those--and far better--encomiums than I have been able to deliver today.

   How much time does the distinguished senior Senator from New York wish to have?

   Mr. SCHUMER. Will 15 minutes be all right?

   Mr. BYRD. Let's try 15 minutes and hope that will do the job.

   Mr. SCHUMER. I thank the Senator. Before my friend from Washington State leaves the floor, I want to thank her for her leadership on this issue. I particularly thank our distinguished leader, the senior Senator from West Virginia, for his leadership on this issue.

   The Senate, at certain times, has an important role--at all times it has important roles, but there is an important role that it has now, and that is for the Senate to be, of course, what one of the Founding Fathers called the cooling saucer. If there was ever a time where there was a need for that cooling saucer that the Senate should be and has been through its history in its finest moments, it is now. That is because we face a whole new challenge in these United States, a challenge that says every one of our citizens is on the front line.

   This new war on terrorism means that small groups of bad people can do real damage in our homeland. Until 9/11, this was something that was unknown to us. There were battlefronts and there was the homefront, but now the homefront is the battlefront, and the battlefront is the homefront and that demands dramatic and significant changes in our Government.

   If the senior Senator from West Virginia were not here, we probably would have just rolled over and we would not have had the kind of debate we are having.

   He knows his history, whether it be of the Roman Senate or of the U.S. Senate or all the various Senates in between. I was going to ask him--because my family and I just visited Venice--about the Venetian Senate, to see how that compared. I didn't even know Venice had a Senate until I visited, but we will get that history lesson at another time. We have more pressing issues now.

   The Senator from West Virginia is bringing the Senate to its best. He is not being obstructionist. He is not saying no. He is simply saying not to rush on such a major piece of legislation that is going to involve the most dramatic reorganization of the Government in history, on a major piece of legislation that is called on to defend us in brand-new ways.

   We no longer just have the battlefront, but we have the homefront. My citizens from New York believe they are on the battlefront. They walk into a subway car and they worry what might happen. A plane flies overhead and they worry what might happen. They look at a reservoir or powerplant and they worry what might happen. This is not a time to rush things through because the very safety of our citizens is at stake.

   When government was founded, when men and women got off their knees and founded government, it had two purposes: To protect from foreign invasion and keep the domestic tranquility. For the first time, those two issues were combined.

   A lengthy and worthy debate of the Senate is what is called for and the senior Senator from West Virginia, Mr. Byrd, whom we all admire so, has summoned the best in us and asked us to do that. I am proud to get up here and ask for that.

   I would also like to praise my good friend from Connecticut. He has put together an excellent piece of legislation that talks about the Senate's prerogatives, not just today but as we go forward. It says a single man, albeit elected, the only man elected by all the people--the only person elected by all the people, so far, the President of the United States--should have some power. But this is not what the Founding Fathers intended.

   He should not be allowed to take one from one agency and put it in another. He should not be allowed to move employees from one place to another without the approval of the Congress.

   I regret to say that the House moved all too quickly. I am glad Senator Lieberman and his committee have had a chance to improve on the House legislation, and to improve on it in a very significant way in major areas that the Senator from Connecticut has outlined.

   What I am saying today is that we have to go beyond that as well and address some of the substantive areas of security--not simply how we reorder the Government and rearrange it, and not simply the balance of power between the President, the Senate, and the House, which is very important and worthy of debate--Senator Lieberman has put his oar in the water on that one and given it a powerful stroke, if we pass his proposal--but also to debate some of the substance of homeland security. I fear that if we simply rearrange the agencies and run away from spending the extra dollars we have to spend to make our homeland more secure, we will have not done the full job. That is why I feel so strongly about having a continued debate.

   Let me mention a few areas where I have had some expertise in that substantive area. No matter what you do about rearranging and putting a department here and a department there, we will still not be secure unless we delve into those departments.

   One which I am going to touch on briefly is a computer system throughout the Justice Department. Recognizing that we are not reorganizing the FBI or the CIA, let me focus on the areas where we are, such as the INS. Our computer systems are totally backward. We had a hearing in my Judiciary subcommittee which has oversight over the FBI where we showed that the computer systems of the FBI cannot search for two words. They can search for the word ``flight'' and for the word ``school,'' but they cannot search for the words ``flight school.'' Something is dramatically the matter. The INS computers--we are moving the INS around--are just as bad, and maybe worse. Until we update those computers, all sorts of bad people with bad intentions will be able to get into this country even though another part of the Government knows they are bad. We should be addressing that problem when we are doing a homeland security bill.

   Then let me talk about the issue that is of greatest concern to me, which is, frankly, the issue that seems to be of great concern to our President, and rightfully so. To me, the worst danger I can conceive of that could befall us in this war on terrorism is that a terrorist group could smuggle a nuclear weapon, or a few, into this country and detonate them. As horrible as 9/11 was, as aching as my city and State are, it would pale before the damage of a nuclear explosion in downtown New York, or downtown Chicago, or downtown Houston, or downtown Los Angeles, San Francisco, Boston, Kansas City, or anywhere else.

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   Yet right now, if, God forbid, a terrorist group should get hold of such a nuclear weapon either by purchasing it from the few powers that have them that we are worried about--Pakistan, Russia, and, down the road, Iraq, if they develop enough U-238--that weapon could be smuggled into this country, say, on one of the large containers that are unloaded from our ships or brought through the borders--Canadian and Mexican--on trucks, with virtually no detection. What a surprising thought. It is no longer that a missile would

   deliver such a bomb or that a plane would deliver such a bomb but, rather, that it would come across our border at ground or water level. That is a frightening thought.

   The good news is we can do something about it. The good news, when you talk to the scientists at Brookhaven National Lab out on Long Island or Argonne Lab in the suburbs of Chicago, is they say we could develop a device that could at a distance of 40 or 50 feet detect nuclear weapons, if they, God forbid, should be smuggled into this country, because nuclear radioactivity involves gamma rays which can pierce all but lead. To deal with surrounding the bomb in lead, you can just use an x-ray detection device. The x ray would detect the lead. The problem is, they have the technology to do this, but it is only done in lab conditions in cyclotrons and atom smashers.

   We need it to go through every container that comes into America. Right now, the only way you can detect radiation is through a Geiger counter. Unfortunately, a Geiger counter has to be placed maybe 3 feet from the radioactive source. You can't go into every one of these big containers with a Geiger counter and push it up against every crate--There are probably 30, 40, or 50 crates in each container; there are hundreds of containers on these ships and thousands that come across by truck--without bringing commerce to a standstill.

   The alternative is to develop a device that would do this 40 or 50 feet away, and then install it on every crane that either loads or unloads a container bound for the United States, or that is here in the United States, and put it on every toll booth for a truck that goes over the Canadian border or Mexican border. The cost of developing this device is probably about $500 million, and then probably another $1 billion to install it.

   The good senior Senator from Virginia, Mr. Warner--obviously not of my party--and I have legislation that would begin to do this, that would start the research.

   For the love of me, why can't we get support for this? Why isn't the White House supporting this? We are very worried about Iraq producing nuclear weapons. We should be. But why aren't we making our homeland secure from the delivery of those nuclear weapons? Maybe it won't be Iraq. Maybe it will be Iran. Maybe it will be North Korea. Maybe it will be someone else we can't even think about.

   I think we should be able to debate that proposal on the floor of this Senate--not a year from now but now. I feel the urgency of this. The safety of our citizens is at stake. If it takes an extra day or two, so be it. That is the role of the Senate.

   Why doesn't the White House get behind this kind of proposal? For some reason, they won't. I think it is because they don't want to spend the money, as amplified by the recent almost virtual pocket veto of the $5 billion that was part of the appropriations bill. But I will bet if you ask each American if they would spend $1 billion to prevent nuclear weapons from being smuggled into our country and the worst kind of catastrophe imaginable to befall us, they would all say yes. If asked, my 99 colleagues would say yes.

   That is the kind of thing we are trying to do here--not be obstructionists. The Senator from West Virginia, as the leader of our band here, has made it clear he doesn't want to be an obstructionist. The Senator from Connecticut has made it clear he believes we have to do things to improve the legislation.

   I ask that we continue to debate this legislation. I understand we have time constraints. Those are real. I understand that. I understand we cannot debate this bill for 3 or 4 months right now. But we don't have to have an artificial deadline that it must be finished by next week. If we think that deadline is needed, let us stay in session, go in early, and stay in late until the major amendments are dealt with. I am confident my colleagues from Connecticut and Tennessee will deal with those amendments in a fair way. They are not trying to say it is their way or no way. In fact, that is why we have bills, and that is why we have them debated.

   But the reorganization of Government agencies is an important issue. I agree with it. I am supportive of it. But I do not think it is the only issue facing homeland security.

   And for our President--and I respect him and repeat that every New Yorker owes him a debt of gratitude for being so helpful in the $21 billion this Senate so generously voted for and the House voted for--but when he says the Senate is getting in the way, that the Senate better pass his bill his way, not the way I would want or the Senator from Connecticut would want or, in fact, the Senator from Tennessee would want, he is not being fair, not just to the Senate but to the American people because we do have a crisis. It is a slow crisis; it is an insidious crisis.

   Unfortunately, for politicians, the incentives are backward; in other words, we all love to allocate money, build a school, and get up there and say: Here is a school. But what is our goal with homeland security? What do we want to happen? Nothing. We are very successful if nothing happens. And that provides negative incentives or perverse incentives for the political process. That is the real worry.

   If we were to put $3 billion into the northern border, if we were to put $1 billion into the INS computer system, if we were to spend $1 billion to----

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.

   Mr. SCHUMER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent for 30 additional seconds to finish my thought.

   Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I yield the Senator 1 additional minute.

   Mr. SCHUMER. I thank the Senator.

   If we were to spend another $1 billion on nuclear weapons, I think it would be worth it. I think the American people would be for us. I may be wrong, but at least I would like the chance to debate and vote on issues I consider to be urgent, pressing needs for my constituency in my State that I love so, and for the people of the United States, for the country I love so.

   With that, I yield the floor.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.

   Mr. LIEBERMAN. I thank the Senator from New York for a very thoughtful statement.

   I yield the floor.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia.

   Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the distinguished Senator from California, Mrs. Boxer, be recognized at 5 p.m. for a period of 10 minutes, out of my time.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

   Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, the President wants the Congress to grant the administration the authority to write its own civil service system, regardless of what has been written in current law, that would apply only to Federal workers within a new Department of Homeland Security.

   As I have expressed before on this floor, I am concerned that these changes mask the administration's larger hidden agenda, an agenda that would have the Federal Government function more like a big corporation. We all certainly ought to be concerned about that idea, given our recent experience with the inner workings of big corporations.

   I come, Mr. President, from the coalfields of southern West Virginia, not from a corporate boardroom. So I approach this with a different perspective than the administration, quite obviously. Before I would ever vote to approve a homeland security measure, I would want to know more about the working conditions of its prospective employees. Will the employees who currently enjoy collective bargaining rights continue to enjoy those same rights at the new Department? Will these employees have complete whistleblower protections?

   Before I vote to approve a homeland security measure, I want to know about the pay system. How will the payroll systems and personnel systems be merged into the new Department? How would the special pay rates, already in existence at the separate

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   Presidential spokesman Ari Fleischer says these new procedures are needed to enable managers to fire workers who drink on the job. Would they also be able to fire workers because they join a union, because they vote Democratic, because they have red hair or no hair or lots of hair or white hair?

   The administration argues that the Secretary for Homeland Security will require significant flexibility in the hiring and firing process because, for example, according to the administration, existing due process and appeal rights make it impossible to fire or demote Federal employees who are poor performers.

   But this and other claims are simply not true. A report by the nonpartisan Partnership for Public Service recently stated:

   [W]hat is missing from the current debate ..... is the institutional experience government has accumulated with Title 5 modifications that have already successfully allowed government agencies to emulate high-performing workplaces--without compromising merit principles, including protections against politicized personnel decisions.

   Mr. President, the fact is, the administration currently enjoys broad flexibilities when it comes to the Federal workforce. A report by the Congressional Research Service points out:

   Executive branch departments and agencies currently have considerable flexibility to perform personnel functions in such areas as recruiting, hiring, compensation, promotion, training, and retention. The extent to which the departments and agencies are using the flexibilities is unknown.

   ``Unknown.''

   One of the most important protections granted by the civil service system, that could be eliminated under the President's proposal, is for whistleblowers. Remember Franklin's whistle? Remember the story about Benjamin Franklin's whistle, that he paid too much for his whistle? I am talking about whistleblowers, just now.

   The day the President made the announcement of his newfound support for a Department of Homeland Security was the very day that an FBI whistleblower, Coleen Rowley, was to testify before Congress on the embarrassing failures of that agency leading up to the September 11 tragedy. It is clear the administration hoped to limit coverage of that hearing by offering its secret plan that was hatched in the bowels of the White House to establish a new Department of Homeland Security, on the same day--a plan, I might add, that would not provide its employees the same level of protection with regard to whistleblowers as that FBI agent enjoyed that day.

   Whistleblower protections are essential to protect Federal employees against managerial reprisals for lawfully disclosing information they believe demonstrates a violation of law or mismanagement of authority.

   The President seemed to agree with this principle when he issued an executive order on January 20, 2001, that required all Federal workers to obey their duty and report fraud, waste, and abuse.

   Excessive secrecy enforced by repression can threaten national security by covering up Government breakdowns that sustain unnecessary vulnerability to terrorism. An example from the post-September 11 period provided by the American Federation of Government employees is illuminating. In testimony before the House Select Committee on Homeland Security, American Federation for Government Employees President, Bobby L. Harnage, Sr., provided the following story, and I quote from his testimony:

   In the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks, two union officers of the National Border Patrol Council--border agents Mark Hall and Mark Lindenmann--went on the NBC Today Show and testified before Congress to speak out against security on the United States northern border. They said that despite all the talk, no new agents had been placed on the northern border and that agents were not making criminal background checks on people caught entering the United States illegally. These statements prompted the Immigration and Naturalization Service supervisors to propose to summarily fire the agents, stating in internal e-mails that ``the President of the local union deemed it necessary to independently question our readiness in a public forum,'' that ``managers must take a stance which bears no tolerance of dissent,'' and that managers must ``view resistance from rank and file as insubordination.''

   Well, this is what employees are often up against when they speak out against the company line, even when the company line involves the security of the United States.

   Without knowledge that the union would represent them and that an impartial whistleblower hearing process was in place to review subsequent INS actions against them, we can be sure that they never would have said a word and Congress would never have heard the truth of what was really happening on the northern border of the United States.

   Before the August recess, Congress overwhelmingly approved state-of-the-art corporate whistleblower protection as an encouragement for private sector workers to defend America's financial markets. Our homeland security requires similar rights for Government workers to make disclosures in defending American families against terrorism. Without full whistleblower protections in place, Congress would have had a difficult time in the past learning of the problems associated with governmental reorganizations, and there have been some serious problems in our recent history.

   As a rule of thumb, it is important to remember that Federal Government reorganizations have been difficult to accomplish. As James M. Lindsay, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institute, recently said:

   History suggests we never get reorganizations right the first time, and this is an especially ambitious proposal. A lot of follow-through will be needed to make it work.

   Recent experience in providing the executive branch with flexibility in establishing a new Government agency holds great lessons for what we are being asked to do today. This flexibility failed in an identical experiment at the Federal Aviation Administration in which Congress gave the flexibility to replace merit system and collective bargaining procedures with so-called superior management alternatives. The result was chaos. Personnel disputes rose sharply, morale plummeted, and the mishmash of employee organizations sprang up to replace coherent labor-management dialog in disputes from all directions.

   In the year 2000, Congress learned the obvious lesson and restored the merit system's due process procedures and remedies. What about the new Transportation Security Agency that was created last year? Congress reluctantly agreed to the administration's request for exceptions to the civil service system for employees at the new agency because they wanted to streamline personnel procedures to allow faster hiring and provide for flexibility and shifting people among jobs as the new agency was established. That sounds familiar, doesn't it?

   The results have been mixed at best. Recall that just a few short weeks ago the administration fired its hand-picked director of the new Transportation Safety Administration, John W. McGaw, only 6 months after the agency was established. Creating an effective and efficient Department of Homeland Security and retaining the basic rights of Federal workers are not mutually exclusive.

   I am not here to say our civil service system is perfect, but I do say that using the security of the United States and the rights of Federal workers as a bargaining chip to further a political agendum is simply unacceptable. What an irony that this administration is using an attack by terrorists who have no respect for the rule of law or the rights of workers as a justification for us not to respect our own laws or the rights of workers.

   So I am grateful for this opportunity today to speak on this issue. I am grateful for the opportunity for the Senate to address the issue. I ask the distinguished Senator from Wyoming if he wishes to speak.

   Mr. THOMAS. I do.

   Mr. BYRD. I yield the floor.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wyoming is recognized.

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   Mr. THOMAS. Mr. President, I want to comment for a few minutes on the subject that is before the Senate. I am not a member of the committee. I have not spent as much time on it as have others. But I think there are probably different views and we have heard the same views now for quite a long time. Perhaps it would be well to talk a little bit about some of the other points of view that might be available and might be discussed later. I understand this is not actually on the issue but, rather, on a motion to proceed thereto. It is a very important issue, of course.

   Nothing could be more important than homeland security. We have talked about it and we continue to talk about it at great length. The fact is, it is a high priority, certainly, for all of us to protect the homeland. In order to do that, we need to have a homeland security department with the most effective management that we can have, the most effective employees, and a system that works as effectively as possible. So we support plans that protect workers through civil rights, equal opportunity guarantees, whistleblower protections, and all those fundamental rights which will be kept. Accountability is also a must, and giving the department flexibility in hiring and firing and creating a powerful deterrent for others to ensure they don't engage in behavior that would endanger homeland protection.

   The bill now before us will compromise national security and place more importance, frankly, on bureaucracy and bureaucratic security than on national security. That really is not the issue here.

   This is not a new issue. The President has the authority in every other agency, but there seems to be an inclination to be able to roll it back for the Department of Homeland Security. Under this bill, the President would have more flexibility to make decisions--or should have--for reasons of national security, and for HUD, for the Department of Education, he would have more than he does under this proposal. That seems strange to me. This is a proposal that deals with those kinds of emergencies--the things that are changeable--and flexibility needs to be there.

   So it seems to me that without some basic flexibility to manage, freedom to hire the right people, fire the wrong people, that national security would be at risk and not be secure. Here are some examples. The Senate bill prevents the President from holding services accountable. Last month, two America West pilots showed up to work drunk.

   They showed up on Monday and were fired on Tuesday. If they had been INS personnel, it would have taken 18 months--540 days--to be held accountable. These are the kinds of issues with which we have to deal. This is not the normal effort. There is a bottom line that the President does need to have sufficient flexibility. After all, it is the President and the people in the executive branch who are going to do the job. What we do is give them the opportunity and the flexibility to do it.

   Certainly there are controls. These controls will not be gone. But we have to provide the opportunity to the person who will be responsible for carrying out this role. It is easy to sit here and talk about all the restraints we should have because we do not have to do that job; someone else does.

   The Senate bill does not provide the new Department budget transfer authority. Without transfer authority, if intelligence indicated terrorists were developing a new type of biological weapon, the Secretary would be unable to transfer funds from one division to another to acquire additional medicines or vaccines or improve detection equipment. It does not provide the flexibility to attract, hire, and reward good performance or hold poor performers accountable. That is what we need to do in all of Government, but more particularly in this Department where they are going to face issues they have never before faced.

   The Office of Personnel Management reports it can take up to 5 months or more to hire a new Federal employee and 18 months to terminate. If one is not getting the job done, is this what we want in homeland defense? I do not think so.

   The bill does not provide for reorganization authority. The Senate bill will prevent the new Secretary from consolidating inspection work of the Customs Service, Border Patrol, and Agriculture inspectors at our ports of entry, leaving the current seam between these activities. Frankly, that has been the weakness in our system since September 11--there is information here, there is information there, and we need to bring it together in a seamless way, and that is one of the strengths and one of the purposes of this whole operation. Yet this bill will not allow that to happen.

   It will strip the President of existing authority to act to preserve national security. The Senate would take away the President's existing authority to exempt agencies in the new Department of collective bargaining requirements where national security requires it. Ever since President Jimmy Carter used this important national security authority in time of war--we are in a war of terrorism. To weaken the President's authority seems to be contradictory of where we are or where we need to go.

   Certainly, there needs to be great discussion, and I admire the emphasis and effort that has been made. I certainly respect the judgment everyone brings to this Chamber, but there are differences of view, and they ought to be reflected, and they will be reflected, in the bill. We are getting the impression today, however, that there is nothing right about the bill, that the way the President has requested it is all wrong, and that cannot be the case. There has to be a balance, and I am sure there will be an effort to strike a balance.

   Of course, we have to recognize rules that do protect Federal workers. And, indeed, there should be rules. They represent the best in America, and they deserve strong civil service protections under the President's plan. Employees of the new Department will continue to be protected by important civil service laws, rules, and regulations that protect them against discrimination on the basis of age, disability, race, color, or religion. Those protections will be there, protected by the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the Social Security Act, the Civil Rights Act, the Hatch Act, Government ethical standards, and they should continue, and indeed they will.

   I know this is a very important issue. I know also that many Senators have worked very hard and are seeking to do what they believe is best to put together this homeland defense bill. But I do believe there has to be some recognition that this is different, that we are asking the executive branch to carry out a job that is unusual in a different time. It has to have some flexibility so that the decisions to accomplish what it is all about can be made. That is what the President and those who have put together this original proposition are for.

   A letter has been written by the former Governor of Pennsylvania that lays out the need for these flexibilities very persuasively. I happen to agree. Certainly there are limits to what we want to do, but we do want to make this a successful effort and give those who are in charge of handling it the flexibility to make it work. I hope we will balance this bill.

   Mr. President, I appreciate the time. I yield the floor.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. MILLER). The Senator from Connecticut.

   Mr. LIEBERMAN. I thank the Chair.

   Mr. President, I know Senator Boxer is expected around 5. I would like to speak for a few moments until then.

   I thank my colleague from Wyoming for his statement. To pick up on what he said, that one might get the impression listening to the debate that there was not anything good in this bill--specifically in the President's proposal on homeland security--there is a natural way, when amendments are filed, to focus on where we disagree, where the amendment disagrees with the underlying bill. But there is a big iceberg under the surface on which there seems to be disagreement. On that there is great agreement. In fact, I believe, though it is hard to quantify this, that more than 90 percent of the bill the Governmental Affairs Committee approved in late July is exactly the same as what President Bush desires. It is quite similar to the bill the Democratic majority on the committee adopted by a 9-to-7 vote in May which, in turn, is similar to the proposal of

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   There is enormous agreement on what I would say are the guts of this bill and the guts of a new Department of Homeland Security: Coordinate the disparate agencies that are now disorganized, overlapping, creating gaps and vulnerabilities that terrorists took advantage of on September 11 and will again unless we close those gaps and eliminate those vulnerabilities. We cannot let that happen. Border security agencies are being brought together; emergency response is being centralized, working much more closely with State and local officials; infrastructure protection; intelligence, most important, to create that one place where all the dots come together so that we can see the terrorist plots before they are carried out and stop them; science and technology. Let's use the brain power, the innovation, as the Defense Department has, to make us as successful in the battle to defend the American people at home as those technological innovations have made us abroad in the fight in pursuit of our principles and our national interest.

   Most of this proposal enjoys broad bipartisan support. There are a few parts of the proposal right at the center which are in dispute. I understand the President does not support our proposal for a strong intelligence division in the new Department. It is critically important to break down the barriers that existed and still exist, to some degree, between the FBI, the CIA, local law enforcement, and State and local law enforcement as opposed to Federal law enforcement; bring all those dots together on one table so they can see the outline of what is coming and stop it before it happens.

   There is dispute from the White House on our national office to combat terrorism because we want the nomination of the director of that office to be approved by the Senate. So these are real disputes related to homeland security.

   The dispute that is going on now and the question of civil service rights is not relevant. I hate to see it stand as an obstacle in the path to adopting legislation creating a Department of Homeland Security which, as I say, will give the President at least 90 percent of what he wants in this new Department. In fact, far from limiting the authority of the new Secretary of Homeland Security with regard to the management flexibility that that Secretary has, our legislation protects the existing flexibility in law.

   The new Secretary would be able to remove employees for poor performance, transfer employees as needed, reward and give bonuses to those who perform ably. In fact, we add by this legislation to the existing management flexibility that the new Secretary would have because of a bipartisan amendment worked on very hard and thoughtfully by Senator Voinovich and Senator Akaka which would give the President and the Secretary of Homeland Security new powers to reward employees, attract top talent and reshape the workforce. It is quite an advance.

   So far from limiting the management flexibility of the new Secretary, we are increasing it beyond what any other Secretary has today, and we give the administration an open invitation, specifically in the letter in regard to the legislation we are proposing, by requiring the Secretary to come back every 6 months and to offer legislative recommendations.

   We specifically enumerate this again on personnel management that emerges from the experience the Secretary has over those 6 months.

   We have to remember that the civil service system evolved for a reason. It was designed to create some accountability, to protect the Federal workforce from favoritism, from patronage, from politicization, by creating a transparent framework for a merit-based personnel system. Obviously, it is not perfect. That is why we included these major reforms in the bill we reported out of our committee. But to essentially discard it, as the President's proposal would do, to give the Secretary and the President effectively unlimited authority to rewrite the civil service rules, would be a real step backward.

   A lot of this has to do with accountability. Accountability is an important goal in our public life and our public service. When people are being taken from the place where they work now--28 different agencies and offices, the Customs Service, the Coast Guard, the Transportation Security Agency, FEMA--and they are brought into this new Department, I think most managers in the private sector would want to do it in a way that would encourage those employees to believe we are all on the same team and we expect the most from them, we are going to work with them.

   By pulling away these civil service protections, I think we are going to have exactly the opposite effect. At a time when the average worker would naturally be anxious about a change of office or status, we are going to hang a sword over their heads that says no more civil service protection; they will lose their rights and, at worst, their job without the right to protest and seek review.

   Responding to the Senator from Wyoming, I say he is right, that some of our colleagues have not said enough positively either about the President's proposal particularly, because it is embraced in so much of what the committee will bring to the

   floor.

   There are these disagreements. I hope we can work them out. I hope where they are fundamental, we can put them off for 6 months and do the urgent work, which is to get this bill done.

   Let me say a word while I am speaking about items in dispute that I hope can be put off. This is the question of collective bargaining. I must say I have learned a lot about this. I have not been involved in some of these questions for a while, and I learned that collective bargaining rights were extended to Federal employees for the first time in 1962 by Executive order of President Kennedy and then were embraced in statute in 1978 under President Carter. In both the Executive order and the statute, there was a provision made that reflected, I think, special concerns during the cold war which said that if the President determined that union membership in a given agency or office was inconsistent with national security, the President could remove the right to collectively bargain without giving a reason other than to say it was inconsistent with national security, without any right of review or appeal by the employees who were therefore losing a basic right, which is to join a union.

   I do point out that Federal employees can neither strike nor in most cases do they negotiate for their salaries, which are usually set by statute.

   I am going to stop for a moment and ask my friend and colleague from Pennsylvania whether he would like to address the Senate on the motion before us.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania.

   Mr. SPECTER. I had not expected to address the Senate on this issue, but I never turn down an invitation.

   Mr. LIEBERMAN. Should I rescind my offer?

   Mr. SPECTER. The Senator could, but not after it has been accepted.

   Mr. LIEBERMAN. Go right ahead. We both learned that at the same law school.

   Mr. SPECTER. Senator Lieberman and I went to the same law school, and I think he knows one can rescind an offer, but not after it is accepted. At that point, it is too late.

   Mr. LIEBERMAN. I am pleased to have the Senator have the floor.

   Mr. SPECTER. I am glad to see the legislation on homeland security on the floor. This is historic legislation. As the distinguished Senator from Connecticut has said, this is maybe the most important bill that will come out of his committee during his tenure. It is my hope we can move through the bill, go to conference, and have legislation on the President's desk which the President can accept.

   One of the key points at issue is the way the analysis of intelligence is going to be structured, and it is my hope that we will be able to take a step at this time on reforms which have long been in the making.

   When I chaired the Intelligence Committee in the 104th Congress, I proposed legislation which would have brought under one umbrella the CIA and all of the intelligence agencies. There is on the President's desk now a similar proposal. It would be acceptable to this Senator to have that umbrella control really anywhere, but the

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   The proposal which I think is indispensable is not to change the operation of the CIA or the FBI or the Defense Intelligence Agency or National Security, but when it comes to analysis, to bring it all together so that the analysts are under one umbrella. I believe that had there been an umbrella prior to September 11, 2001, there is a good chance that 9/11 could have been prevented.

   We know by hindsight about the FBI report out of Phoenix, and about the young man who had Osama bin Laden's picture on his wall while studying flight training, as well as other indicia of connections to Osama bin Laden. We know about the application for a warrant under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of Zacarias Moussaoui, which would have yielded very substantial information about his connections to al-Qaeda.

   We know about the two at Kuala Lumpur, known to the CIA, but not communicated to the FBI or Immigration and Naturalization Service in a timely way. We know of the information from the National Security Agency on September 10, a threat, that was not translated until September 12. There are other factors at issue here where we could have connected the dots, as the metaphor is used.

   This bill is a very substantial undertaking. I discussed the matter on a number of occasions with the distinguished Senator from Tennessee who raises a valid consideration that this bill may be going too far in the sense that it takes in a great deal of territory. It does that. However, the question is, When will it be done, if not now?

   The business of consolidating Federal agencies is a Herculean task facing all sorts of obstacles, and it is only the event of 9/11 and the threat of another 9/11 which is a motivating factor to make these enormous changes.

   Earlier today I heard the Senator from Tennessee say next year would be time enough to study the intelligence agencies. There is one big problem with that: The Senator from Tennessee will not be here next year. We need to take advantage of his skill this year.

   Perhaps almost as important as the skill of the Senator from Tennessee is the momentum which we have. I have offered to give him some tips on his new job. I saw a headline in the paper the other day, ``Senator Thompson Demoted to District Attorney.'' First of all, I do not know that it is a demotion because I have held that position. However, that is what the headline said, Senator Thompson demoted.

   I was surfing on Sunday. It is hard to surf and not see Senator Thompson or Senator Lieberman, or both of them. Senator Thompson was in a heated exchange with former Secretary Eagleburger, and then the program was interrupted for some entertainment. I thought Secretary Eagleburger and Senator Thompson were entertaining. They put on a portion of this television show. I wonder how many ex-district attorneys in the Senate turned down that television contract before Senator Thompson got it?

   At any rate, Senator Thompson was sitting behind a big desk in a dimly lit room and two assistant district attorneys approach him. I could not get the gist of it entirely, but I guess the thrust of it was someone in the room was in favor of legalizing drugs. The comment was made: What about our war on drugs? This District Attorney Thompson said: We have to have a war on something in Congress for people to be elected.

   It seemed a little cynical for him to turn on his colleagues even before he is on his new payroll. I trust the Ethics Committee would not let him be on the payroll yet, although he is doing those shows.

   Back to a serious vein, this is the time to do it. I talked to Governor Ridge after a meeting he had with the President today. I have supplied him with language and I sent a copy of it to Senator Lieberman and a copy to Senator Thompson. The President wants to be sure that the President has the authority to continue to work with the CIA as he always has. Absolutely, he should have that authority. He does have that authority. There is nothing we can do in legislation that would change it. The change in the language was made to have the analysis groups under one umbrella, subject to the President's direction to the contrary.

   An earlier draft stated the reverse, that the President can direct all of these intelligence agencies to coordinate. You

   cannot wait for the President to make a direction. He is too busy to do it. The generalization has to be that they will be working together under one umbrella, and they will be coordinating the analysis, but this must be made explicit in statute. If the President wants to change that, of course he can. I do not think he needs that authority in the statute, but I am pleased to eliminate any question about it. It is my hope we can find some common ground on that question.

   Washington, DC, has a way of having matters slide if we do not strike while the iron is hot. It is hard to get anything done in Washington, DC, while the iron is hot. However, when it cools off, it is extraordinarily difficult. It has been a long time and many efforts have been made to bring these agencies together. It is a limited juncture to call on the analytical sections to be under one umbrella.

   Homeland security will do a lot in response to another 9/11, but if that happens, it is really a very sad situation. Ninety-nine percent of our effort needs to be made to prevent it. If we have to respond to another 9/11, we are in deep trouble. Maybe something even more serious may occur--not that 9/11 was not serious enough, but it may involve weapons of mass destruction. Who knows what it may involve. We have a very heavy responsibility to do everything we can to prevent it. When we look at what was known before, with the dots there, and the possibility of putting them together, that is what we have to work toward.

   I have worked a lot with the principals on this issue. I had the opportunity to serve on the Governmental Affairs Committee. I know the work of Senator Thompson, who was chairman, and Senator Lieberman, who is now chairman. We have structured this to accommodate all of the competing interests.

   I think it will probably be a long day before Senator Lieberman will make an ex parte invitation for me to speak again. I yield the floor.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.

   Mr. LIEBERMAN. I do not regret the acceptance by the Senator from Pennsylvania, and I thank him very much for his remarks. He went right to the heart of one of the most important debates we will have on the bill, which is how do we structure the intelligence division of this new Department to make sure that we never again look back, as we have now after September 11, and say these barriers to communication between the FBI, the CIA, a whole bunch of people, if those barriers had been broken, and all the information was in one place, we might well have been able to prevent September 11. We have to have it within our power to do that.

   I understand some of the concerns of the White House, but I do think the phrasing that Senator Specter has talked about is just right. I hope he may play a role in bringing us all together on this. I thank him, also, for the fact that he was my lead cosponsor; I was his lead cosponsor in October of last year when we introduced the original version of the bill creating the Department of Homeland Security which, in fairness, was based in good measure on the recommendation of the Hart-Rudman Commission. I look forward to his active participation in this debate and the days ahead.

   Under a previous order, I believe Senator Boxer was to be recognized next, with the time to be taken from Senator Byrd.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from California.

   Mrs. BOXER. I thank Senator Lieberman for all his hard work on this bill, and Senator Thompson as well. I thank Senator Byrd because in his 50 years in Congress, he has seen a lot and he has raised some very important issues at which this Senate ought to look. I rise to say thank you to him and to make note that when Senator Lieberman first brought the concept of Homeland Security and a Cabinet-level position for Tom Ridge, this administration was not for that in any way, shape, or form.

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   It is my understanding not having been on the committee, to my sadness--maybe if I was, I would have had more to say in how this bill would come about--my understanding is that not one Republican voted for the first version of that bill in the committee itself.

   So we see a real transition from something that was an idea Senator Lieberman had, the Democrats supported, to one that has been embraced, with some very important differences that will come out on this floor.

   I want to talk to some of those, as well as some of my own concerns.

   I have been in elected life now for 26 years--not as long as Senator Byrd, but long enough to know that reshuffling a structure doesn't necessarily mean you are going to solve your problem. As a matter of fact, it could in many ways make people less accountable, hiding under more layers of bureaucracy. So I approach this debate with an attitude that basically says I am not so sure about this.

   I think what Senator Byrd is trying to do here by speaking with some of us who have some of these problems with the bill is to try to see if we can let the Senate work its will and shape this so it does not become an unwieldy bureaucracy that will be not more accountable but less accountable.

   We all know what brought us together as a country was what happened on September 11. We will never forget it, and we will commemorate it. But I agree with those who say we have to do this right. It would be a disservice to those who were so adversely impacted if we were to set some artificial deadline for restructuring of the Government, a restructuring which is so huge that a Brookings Institution scholar, Paul Light, said:

   I would rank it the No. 1 reorganization in American history in terms of difficulty.

   My view is this should be done right. We should keep congressional accountability in the process and not give up the very important powers we have under the Constitution, the checks and balances, not just for this administration but for any administration.

   It is interesting to hear President Bush's own words. He says it is the most extensive reorganization of the Federal Government since the 1940s.

   The amendment is 350 pages. I say to Senator Lieberman, I believe he has done an incredible job of improving the bill from the House version, and I certainly shudder to think if that House version were to become law because it has a lot of serious problems. So I say straight out to Senator Lieberman, thank you for your work in this regard.

   Senator Conrad made a point today to some of us, stating he had heard from the OMB Director way before September 11 that changing the civil service protections was one of the things this administration has always wanted to do and that all the things that are contained in the House bill, as they would pertain to the employees of this new organization, are not new things to this administration. They have wanted to break the back, if you will, of whistleblower protection in other cases. They have wanted to break the back of any type of collective bargaining.

   As we know, Federal employees cannot strike, nor should they. That is not an issue. But this administration would like to weaken the protections that do belong to Federal employees.

   I think Senator Lieberman made a very good point when he said, in a conversation with some of us in leadership, that the protections in his bill that are afforded to the Federal employees who would work in homeland defense are the very same protections that are afforded to the Department of Defense civilian employees.

   So it seems to me a rather cruel thing to say you are creating a Department that, next to the Department of Defense--and maybe even in some cases, in some circumstances, even more--for these people who would be put in the line of fire, that we would, as one of the first things, look at weakening

   the rights they are afforded and make them second-class citizens. This is very disturbing to me.

   Think back to September 11, to the heroes of September 11. They were not anyone in this Chamber. They were not anyone in the back room writing this bill. They were working people. They were people, yes, who were afforded the protections of collective bargaining; yes, afforded the protections of union membership. They never looked at their watch and said: Oh, gee, I have been on the 74th floor of the World Trade Center, and now I have worked 8 hours and I am coming down.

   I just think it is most unfortunate that the President would not take this opportunity to keep us together here, focused on protecting our magnificent country and the people who reside therein, and instead use it as an opportunity to get through some of the things he was unable to get through in other bills. It is very disturbing to me.

   I think Senator Lieberman has shown tremendous leadership in standing strong for those protections. Again, the heroes of September 11 were union members. The heroes of September 11 never let us down. How do you create a new Department such as this and undercut these employees when they need to be at their top performance level, where they need to have the best morale, where they need to believe they are not treated worse, certainly, than any other Federal employee?

   There are other things Senator Lieberman did in this bill that I applaud. A weakening of the Freedom Of Information Act that is in the House bill--that would have been a mess for us. Many of our communities want to know what chemicals are polluting their air, ground, and water. Again, some in the House use this as a way to weaken that act and say: We cannot give out that information; the terrorists may get it. A mother of little children needs to know if there is arsenic in a plant, if there is a harmful pollutant at a plant. Therefore, I am very pleased that, with Senator Leahy's help, where he was able to fix this, that is not a problem.

   For the remainder of my remarks, I focus on the Federal Emergency Management Administration and a couple of other agencies that were just lifted and taken lock, stock, and barrel into this new, enormous creation called the Department of Homeland Security. In California, we suffer from every kind of natural disaster you can imagine, from earthquakes to fire, to flood, to drought, to pestilence. We see it all. Unfortunately, we see it often.

   People sometimes say to me: Senator, why do people want to stay in California? Every other month, you are having another crisis.

   I guess you have to just be there to understand. You are living in an area that is God's gift to the world. With that beauty come all these problems.

   The bottom line of it is, we, unfortunately, have a terrible share of these disasters. Putting the Federal Emergency Management Administration, lock, stock and barrel, into this new Department I just think is going to be a real problem for us. Why not just take those folks in the Department who would work on homeland security but leave the others in place?

   It took many years to straighten out the problems of FEMA. I have gone through the worst of it. Under President Clinton and under James Lee Witt, we saw a tremendous uplifting of FEMA's morale. They know what they are doing now. All of us, Democrats and Republicans, have benefited from that. Our people have benefited from that. Now we are moving this, lock, stock and barrel, and I am very worried about accountability.

   Others have spoken of the Coast Guard. I feel the same way about that. Search and rescue--last year, the Coast Guard saved 530 lives in California. I know how important they are to homeland security, but the same thing should apply here. You do not have to lift the whole thing up, lock, stock, and barrel.

   We also have the INS situation, where the immigration and naturalization services are very far behind.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.

   Mrs. BOXER. I ask for 2 additional minutes.

   Mr. BYRD. I yield 2 additional minutes to the distinguished Senator from California.

   Mrs. BOXER. I thank Senator Byrd. Now that he is here, I can tell him how much I appreciate his raising the red flags.

   The INS, backlogged with processing immigration--good people, kind people, family people. It seems to me, again, we should have done this in a little bit of a different way.

   If we really want to do something for homeland security, I would rather see

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   I was an economics major. One thing we know is that if the Government spends and invests in the needs of the people, such as homeland security, it is going to create thousands of jobs, and it would do something that is important. It doesn't help the economy to sit on that money. Frankly, it does not help the economy or homeland security if you create a big bureaucracy and they have no place to even put these people. And, by the way, if they are just going to be changed in name only, it is very confusing to me why we are doing this.

   From all of my years in public life, I think we could have done this in a very lean and mean way. We could have made this a Cabinet-level position, which most of us supported. If the President wanted it to happen, he could have said we are going to have people dispatched who report to Tom Ridge and to each of these agencies and start to bring back and forth to him what we need to do in those agencies.

   I thank you very much, Mr. President. I have a lot of serious questions about this.

   I thank my colleagues for their consideration.

   I yield the floor.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Tennessee.

   Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. President, we have had a good discussion on this motion to proceed.

   I thank Senator Byrd for doing what he has done. I will say publicly what I told him privately before the recess: I thought he was doing all of us a favor by slowing us down a little bit. There was an awful lot of talk about we must get this done by September 11 for symbolic reasons, and symbolism is important. But it is not nearly as important as it is to get this right. We will not get it right forever. We will be dealing with it probably for some time to come. But it is important to get it as right as we can. I think it is very important that we take the time necessary to do that. We can disagree as to how long is enough time. But I do think we can all agree that in retrospect, we were kind of headed toward a stampede there for a little while where we wanted to get something passed so we could say we got something passed. That receives short-term benefits maybe to us but it doesn't do much in terms of long-term benefits to the country. I think we are where we need to be now. We have come back. We have had a chance to digest this, discuss it, debate it in a public forum, and now to discuss it here on the floor.

   Senator Byrd made some very interesting and valid points about things that we need to consider. He, I think rightfully, pointed out that the NSA creation was probably the model that not only the President is going by, but the model that we all can have in terms of importance and in terms of how long it takes to put these things together. It took a good while to put the National Security Agency together. I believe it took 6 months between the time the bill was introduced and the time that it was passed. I point out that it was after a war. I do think probably Congress had a little more leisure during those days than we have. It was 2 years after the war. Of course, we are just beginning our endeavor. We don't have quite the leisure that perhaps the Congress did at that time.

   We have been considering the overall concept one way or another, formally or informally, for some time. The Gilmore Commission came in December of 2000 with a recommendation for a Homeland Security Department. The Hart-Rudman Commission came out in February, I believe, of last year, with a recommendation. We didn't pay enough attention to it soon enough. But it was out there. It was discussed and considered at that time. Congress, from time to time, has certainly considered many of the component problems that have led to this bill.

   For example, the problems with the INS are certainly no secret. We have been dealing with that. We have been dealing with other problems the Government has.

   I suggest the time is ripe, and there is no reason now for us not to address this issue after we have had a full-fledged discussion. I think the analogy to the Transportation Security Administration that was referred to and that was referred to in the newspaper today is a good one. I think it shows the difficulty that we have when we establish an agency that is having to recreate itself on the one hand and do the job on the other simultaneously. That is a very good point. What we are doing here in terms of the Department of Homeland Security is TSA enlarged in many respects.

   That leads me to perhaps a slightly different conclusion. That leads me to the conclusion that what we need to do to avoid that problem is to give the people who are in charge and have the responsibility for making sure this works the tools

   they can use to make it work. We had a civil service organization system, and we had a management system, the paradigm for which was established many years ago. We live in a different world now. That is what the President is talking about when he is talking about managerial flexibility and having the tools with which to manage this thing.

   If you talk to corporate leaders who have undergone transitions that are much less complicated than what we are doing, they talk about how difficult it is and how important it is to have the right kind of culture but also to have the managerial talent, the managerial wherewithal and flexibility to address those thousands of problems and difficulties that you are going to have in trying to pull all these factors together. These corporate managers don't even have Congress to answer to or deal with or worry about. Certainly, when it comes to Government, Congress cannot deal with each of these issues.

   We have to either trust our leadership to the point of giving them some managerial flexibility or not. I think that is what we are doing here. That is what this is all about. It is not a major grant of new power; it is a granting of power by Congress after thorough deliberation to better manage what Congress is establishing within the discretion of Congress, and having the annual appropriations process, among other hearings and considerations, in which to evaluate what is going on. I think we have to give that kind of authority if we are going to place on these people the kinds of responsibilities that we are placing on them.

   There has been a concern expressed about personal liberties. Democracy always has to--especially a democracy under attack--balance the national security of the country with the personal liberties that we hold so dear. I think we have done a pretty good job of that. Some of the things that the administration has done have been somewhat controversial. They are not really reflected in this bill. This bill really doesn't deal with any of those things. But I do think it is appropriate to point out that in other times President Lincoln instituted habeas corpus. President Roosevelt had internments, and things of that nature. Other Presidents have taken rather severe action when they deemed it necessary in times of war and in times of national security. We are not even approaching things of that nature. And we are not really even approaching the subject matter in this bill.

   So I respectfully suggest that there is no danger here of giving the President too much power. The danger, quite frankly, is that we are establishing a new Department that is complex, multifaceted, and is going to be difficult to organize without giving the President some authority that several other Government agencies already have, that the Congress has already given them.

   We will have an opportunity to discuss this later when appropriate amendments come up. But in the area of national security, and in the area of flexibility with regard to some of these agencies, what the President is basically asking for is the same authority that prior Presidents have had in the national security area, and the same

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   I yield the floor.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia.

   Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, how much time do I have remaining?

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Twenty-four minutes.

   Mr. BYRD. I thank the Chair.

   Mr. President, I begin my closing remarks where I should begin, by thanking Senator Lieberman and Senator Thompson for the leadership they have demonstrated in holding hearings, in holding the markups, in exploring the questions that were asked, in attempting to find solutions to questions and concerns and problems that occurred to them through others and sometimes not through others. I thank these two Senators who represent, I believe, the finest.

   I have been a Member of the body now 44 years next January 3, the Lord willing. The fine old woman who raised me taught me to say that: I will do thus and so or so and so, the Lord willing. Of course, that comes from the Book of James, the 4th chapter, and the 14th and 15th verses: Don't say that you will go to a city tomorrow and that you will purchase thus and so and that you will do thus and so, but say, the Lord willing, you will go and do thus and so.

   And I thank these Senators. I am glad that the Good Lord has permitted me to live in this age when we can have Senators who acquire the high qualities of the two Senators who are about to manage the legislation that will create a Homeland Security Department.

   I favor the creation of a Homeland Security Department. And I think that the Senate within the next few minutes should vote unanimously to proceed to take up this legislation. That is the way it should be

   done. Let's take it up, and then let the Senate work its will.

   I thank the two leaders for their cooperation in helping to bring this about and in providing a time and an opportunity when we can mull over and talk about and decide these great questions that confront us.

   I would have resisted going to the bill had the motion been made prior to the August recess. I would have resisted with all of my heart and all of my strength. But I do not resist going to the bill now. With the Senate in recess, we have had a month in which to read the House bill, which largely reflects the administration's position, to read also the legislation that has been reported from Senator Lieberman's and Senator Thompson's committee. And I have taken occasion to do just that.

   Now, when we proceed to take up the House bill, it will be done, and then, at some point, presumably early on, Senator Lieberman will offer his substitute. He will offer the committee of the committee which he chairs. And the Senate will then have both bills before it. The underlying measure will be the House bill. And then there will be the substitute, which will be a clean bill reported by Senator Lieberman's committee. So the Senate will have before it both bills. Senators may proceed to amend the underlying bill. They may proceed to amend Senator Lieberman's bill, the substitute. We will have both bills before us.

   I call to the attention of Senators that once we pass this bill, whatever the bill is that the Senate passes--I am not saying I am going to vote for it; I may--but whenever the Senate passes legislation dealing with the creation of a Department of Homeland Security, then that is the last time the Senate will visit the matter until the legislation comes back from the committee of conference. And that legislation will be in the form of a conference report, which cannot be amended. Senators will have to take that measure, then, up or down.

   So this is it. This is our chance, and our only chance, to fully discuss and amend the legislation. And I hope Senators will approach the matter in that vein, realizing that the product that emanates from this Senate, after whatever time we take to debate and vote on it, will be the final product the Senate itself will have had an opportunity to mold and to amend. That is it.

   We are going to have to live with that. I have been greatly concerned about the legislation, as I have read it, that the House has passed, and with particular reference to title VIII of that bill, which I will not go into now.

   But I have been greatly concerned. I am concerned that the Constitution and its principles and the rights and privileges that flow from that great document--which has no equal in the world as far as governmental, organic documents are concerned, no equal----

   I am concerned that those rights and prerogatives that flow from that document will have been impinged upon. I am greatly concerned about the constitutionality, in whole or in part, of some of the things that we are about to do--if we do them--that are particularly contained in the House bill.

   Now, we may pass legislation that is unconstitutional, and if it is never tried out in courts, it may be out there and there may not come an occasion where there is a case or controversy which goes to court. But I say that we have a responsibility.

   I used to hear Sam Ervin, that eminent jurist and great late Senator from North Carolina, say that we in the Senate have a duty to determine in our own minds the constitutionality of measures that we pass.

   That is why I joined with Senators on both sides of the aisle in bringing the line-item veto and pushing that matter to a decision by the U.S. Supreme Court. Of course, we didn't have standing, as the Court determined, but we did proceed; but those who did have standing were pursuing it. Thank God, somebody pursued it, and I say thank God to the Supreme Court of the United States for throwing out that bad legislation. I said it was bad and the Court agreed.

   Here we are today with legislation that can certainly be dangerous in many ways. I have talked about some of those things, and I will have a further opportunity. But before I proceed with my final prepared remarks, let me thank Senator Thompson and Senator Lieberman. I thank Senator Thompson for his closing remarks today, and I also thank Senator Lieberman. These are gentlemen and I respect them as gentlemen. They have high and noble principles. That cannot be said of all men, of course.

   We are here today because nearly 11 months ago, 19 men commandeered 4 aircraft. Their goal we know all too well. They crashed one aircraft into the Pentagon. One hurtled into the north tower of the World Trade Center. Another tore into the south tower a few minutes later. The men and women aboard the final plane, after learning of the fate of the others, decided to resist the hijackers. They knew that, in all likelihood, they were about to die. But they entered into the embrace of death willingly after having decided to do what they could do to prevent the untimely and abrupt death of other men and women.

   I have no doubt, as we were taken out of this Capitol that day, ushered out by the policemen here, that that last plane was coming to hit this Capitol or the White House--one or the other. I just know in my own mind that it was headed here. But those men and women on that plane died for us. Their plane crashed in rural Pennsylvania. If not for the heroic efforts of those men and women, we would have scores of additional names to remember as victims of the worse terrorist attack in the history of our country.

   We are here today debating because of those 19 hijackers. We are here because of the rescue workers who moved so quickly, so selflessly, so valiantly to save lives, only to lose their own while carrying out their duty. We are here because of those thousands of men and women who, on September 11, 1 year ago, were sitting at the desks, walking through the halls, doing their jobs, only to have such brutality bring to an end their

   precious lives, and so abruptly. They never had time to say good-bye to their loved ones. We are here, Senators, because we can never forget that day and because we never want this Nation to have to go through and experience the horrors of that day again.

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   In many ways, the creation of a new Department of Homeland Security will serve as a legacy to those more than 3,000 men and women who had lost their lives on that clear fall day 1 year ago. We must not rush to create a department in the memory of those who lost their lives on September 11. If that Homeland Security Department does not better prevent another attack, what becomes of the sacrifice of those lives almost 1 year ago? If in the rush to create a new department we make Americans more vulnerable to attack while the transition is going forward rather than less, what kind of a legacy does that leave? What tribute does this Congress and this President pay to the victims of September 11 if we only tangle the lines of homeland security rather than straighten them and strengthen them?

   I believe that much is to be said in gratitude to Senator Lieberman and Senator Thompson and their committee for their efforts to straighten the lines. I honor and respect and pay tribute to these Senators and to the product which they have given this Senate and which we will soon be discussing. But having been in various and sundry legislative branches at the State and local levels and at the Federal level, I know there is no committee, including the one I chair, that can be perfect.

   As an experienced legislator, I look at this product in that fashion. It is a good product. It is a much better product than that which the House has sent us after 2 days of floor debate. But I think the full Senate can do better.

   I believe that if we act in haste to pass this legislation, then we pay no tribute, we honor, no memory.

   The legislation creates a new Department of Homeland Security. It is originally based on the plan of four men--not exactly the committee of five which wrote the Declaration of Independence. It is quite a different group. I don't say that disparagingly of the four fine men who came up with this idea in the bowels of the White House.

   But the legislation to create a new Department is based on the plan that originally was hatched in the subterranean caverns of the White House--four men, fine men, sitting in the depths of the White House, trying to counter mounting political pressures. These four men have done nothing more, really, than shuffle boxes on a piece of paper.

   The administration calls this the largest reorganization of Government since World War II. I say it is the largest reorganization of Government since our constitutional Framers sat at the Convention in 1787. They reorganized the Government under the Articles of Confederation. Under that Government, under the Articles of Confederation, the Congress was the legislative, the executive, and the judicial. So those men reorganized the Government and gave to the various States, to vote on in their ratifying conventions, this product that was signed by those men in Philadelphia on September 17, 1787.

   That was the first reorganization. That was the greatest reorganization because no longer do we operate under the Articles of Confederation but we operate under the Constitution of the United States. So now we have come to another reorganization proposal, the one we have been discussing.

   Terrorists have the advantage of knowing when they will strike, where they will strike, and how they will strike. Law-abiding men and women do not know when the terrorists will attack, where they will attack, or how they will attack. If the truth be told, there is no department that this Congress can conceive that alone can save Americans from terrorist attacks. Moving a few squares on a flowchart will not, on its own, save lives.

   I remain suspicious about a complex, extensive reorganization plan originally authored only by a group of four men in absolute secret, a plan which we are told was not revealed until the day the President revealed it, at which time several of the Department heads, whose Departments would be affected by the plan, had not been contacted and not been consulted. That is what I understand from reading the press. So I remain suspicious about a complex, extensive reorganization plan authored only by a group of four men in absolute secret. I believe such a plan is likely--likely--to be politically motivated somewhere along the line. There is an old fiddle tune I used to play, ``Somewhere Along the Line.''

   I hope that is not true. I hope the motivations were pure, but should we not all be a little suspicious of this process? Congress should be especially careful, given the way this plan was formulated. We ought to consider our actions thoroughly and realize that the steps we take in the next few weeks will have ramifications for decades to come.

   In the past few weeks, as the House select committee has held its hearings and the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee has drafted its plan, the focus has not been on how to best save lives. Rather, the focus, in part at least, has been on the ``bureaucratic turf wars'' that have developed. Should Secret Service be in, or should Secret Service be out?

   The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. DAYTON). The time under the Senator's control has expired.

   Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I have need for a few more

   minutes. May I call upon the mercy of the distinguished Senator who chairs this committee, if he has time, if he would let this poor Senator from the hills of West Virginia have a few more minutes?

   Mr. LIEBERMAN. The Senator is moving me. I say to Senator Byrd, obviously I do not want to cut him off. I guess in return I ask for a certain amount of mercy because I hope to leave in an hour to attend an event at my daughter's school. The Senator may proceed as he will. I do not intend to use the rest of my time, and I hope Senator Byrd will finish with as much dispatch as he can and still make his points.

   Mr. REID. Will my friend from West Virginia yield for a question?

   Mr. BYRD. Yes.

   Mr. REID. I am wondering, with the three managers of the bill here on this phase of the debate, if we can agree on what time we are going to vote today. The time runs out at 6:37 p.m. It is my understanding that Senators THOMPSON and LIEBERMAN will be willing to give back some of their time.

   Mr. LIEBERMAN. Yes, Senator Thompson has concluded his remarks. When Senator Byrd has finished, I will have concluding remarks that will go no longer than 5 minutes.

   Mr. REID. Is Senator Byrd going to speak for 10 minutes?

   Mr. BYRD. Well, let me put it this way. As far as I am concerned, we can vote now. As far as I am concerned, we can vote by voice. I intend to vote to proceed to take up this measure, but Senators have been told we would vote. I will stop editorializing on my own remarks and read what I have prepared and sit down.

   Mr. LIEBERMAN. Fine. I thank the Senator.

   Mr. REID. So the answer is we do not have a time certain.

   Mr. LIEBERMAN. But no later than 6:36 p.m.

   Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished chairman, Senator Lieberman, for his generosity.

   What about the Secret Service, should it be in or out? What about the Coast Guard? Why is the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms left out? While the 170,000 men and women targeted to move into this new Department try to figure out where the desks and telephones will be, the Nation's homeland defense system may be far less effective, not more.

   We in the Congress must insist on more information about the fine details, such as what this plan means for the separation of powers, why one agency was selected while others were left out. We must take time to determine if this approach is the best approach or if it is little more than cherry-picking the best agencies while leaving others behind.

   There will be those who charge that by moving to slow this legislation, I and others are endangering the lives of Americans and that we are thinking about our pet projects in our own States. What a sorry, empty claim to make. This Congress, at the urging of the Senate Appropriations Committee which I chair, has added $15 billion for homeland security over the course of the past 8 months. That funding has helped us to take immediate steps to make Americans safer from attack and to better prepare our response efforts should another attack occur.

   That funding paid for more than 2,200 agents and inspectors to guard our

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   Across this country, local police officers, firefighters, and emergency medical teams are receiving new training and equipment to handle threats that before last fall they hardly considered possible. Federal law enforcement also benefited from the work of this Congress. Because of the funding initiated by the Appropriations Committee, the FBI started to hire hundreds of new agents. More than 300 additional protective personnel were hired to protect the Nation's nuclear weapons complex. Air marshals have been hired to protect our planes. Seven hundred and fifty food inspectors were hired to ensure the safety of the meals served at America's kitchen tables. We have paid for smallpox vaccines and health department training. We are tightening security at our seaports and purchasing new bomb-detecting equipment at our airports. We are taking steps to protect American lives now, today, and not just waiting for a bureaucratic shuffle to protect us.

   Congress, the elected representatives of the people, have done this. Congress also acted to provide additional emergency funding to strengthen terrorism prevention and to give much-needed aid to first responders at the local level. But President Bush has refused to spend some of these critical funds because he and OMB Director Mitch Daniels want to make a point about budget discipline.

   If the President is really serious about preventing terror, as he says he is, he should not play politics with this important funding, which by the signature of his name could have been released to the people at the local levels, throughout the land, for the protection of the people and the protection of the infrastructure of our country.

   Members of Congress and the President would like to be able to tell the public that they honored the victims of September 11 by creating a new Department for Homeland Security on the anniversary of the tragedy. That is understandable for politicians. But as Senator Thompson pointed out, we want the right product. We want to take the time and do the job right.

   In a few days, Americans will pause to remember the moment when the airplanes struck the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and the Pennsylvania field. We will remember the mothers and fathers, the brothers and sisters, the firefighters, the police officers, the ambulance drivers. We will remember all of those who lost their lives in those tragic moments. But as we craft this legacy to their lives, we owe them more than a press release. We owe them our best judgment. We owe them rational, responsible action. We owe them a legacy that may truly save other lives, the lives of the people and the families of those who died, the progeny of those fathers whose lives were wiped out in the batting of an eye.

   Based on what we know about the legislative proposals before us, there can be no assurance that such a legacy will ever result. I am concerned that the monument that will result from this effort may be one of weakened protections for America's civil servants, one that may allow the security that is our goal to buckle under the weight of an administration's untold agenda. What will this legislation do to the people's rights, to the first amendment, to the second amendment, the third or fourth? Do we know what this bill does to the fundamental protections embodied in the Constitution?

   I am concerned about what we do not know about what has been kept from us by an administration adept at dealing in the shadows. I am concerned that this bill goes too far to protect the privacy of the White House and not far enough to protect

   the privacy of law-abiding citizens outside the White House.

   We are being pressed to pass this legislation to protect American lives, but we must not allow ourselves to be blinded to the new threats it may present to our laws and our constitutional system if we pass the legislation for which the administration has asked.

   Each of us has an obligation not just to put a new banner over a collection of agencies but to ensure that those agencies work together to protect the American people. Reorganizations of any size have a tendency to drift, to veer off course. A reorganization of the magnitude envisioned is likely to careen out of our control if we do not take the necessary steps to keep it on track. We cannot throw up our arms in celebration at the moment a bill is signed into law and walk away wrapped in the folds of glory. If that is all we do, we will surely drop the reins.

   This Senate must do everything within its power now to ensure that the promise embodied in this proposed reorganization is kept. We must focus beyond the mere creation of a new Department and grapple with the details of its implementation. We should insist on a clear understanding of the mission of the new Department. We should know the criteria that are used to determine which agencies will be part of it. We should insist that the constitutional rights of the people are protected. We should insist on assurances that this administration will not use this reorganization as a cover to dismantle worker protections. We should insist that the important non-homeland-security work of the transferred agencies is not sacrificed as those agencies assume new missions.

   Senators know of my great respect and fondness for history of the ancient Romans. Montesquieu first pointed the way, and having read a great deal of Montesquieu's work, I came to the conclusion that Montesquieu must have been right because he loved the history of the ancient Romans. As a matter of fact, he wrote a history of the ancient Romans. So I decided I would do some of that reading, too.

   I close with a quotation. Gaius Petronius Arbiter, a Roman poet and advisor to Nero, is reported to have said:

   We trained hard ..... but it seemed that every time we were beginning to form into teams we would be reorganized. I was to learn later in life that we tend to meet any new situation by reorganizing; and a wonderful method it can be for creating the illusion of progress while producing confusion, inefficiency and demoralization.

   What a quotation from a Roman 2,000 years ago, and more. Before we rush ahead with so many questions unanswered, let us ensure that the product of our work is not just an illusion but substance. If it is a monument we are building, let it be one that will endure.

   I yield the floor.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maryland.

   Mr. SARBANES. Mr. President, I simply thank the very able Senator from West Virginia for once again calling on the Senate to face these very fundamental questions that are involved and which he has been speaking to in the course of the day. I think it behooves all of our colleagues not only to have listened to the able Senator but to go back and read his remarks and to consider them carefully and thoughtfully as we address this major legislation.

   Now we are embarked, of course, on creating a new Department, but we need to be very careful in how we do it. We need to be very thorough in how we do it. We need to be very thoughtful in how we do it.

   I commend the chairman of the committee, the able Senator from Connecticut, because I think he has brought all of those qualities to this legislation that he has now brought forth in the Senate.

   There are very important questions involved here in terms of how the political system works and how the checks and balances work and what the allocation of powers is. Some say this is a fight over turf or over prerogatives. It is no such thing. This is trying to resolve the most basic questions about how our system of self-government is to work and what the balance is to be between the legislative and the executive branches; indeed, the judicial branch is drawn into this, as well.

   I hope as we address this legislation in the days to come, my colleagues keep in mind the analysis and the history which the Senator from West Virginia has brought to the floor today. I express my deep appreciation once again. He reminds us of the fundamental questions we confront and of the importance of rising to this occasion.

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   Mr. BYRD. I thank the Senator for the generous remarks.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.

   Mr. LIEBERMAN. I agree with my friend from Maryland: The Senator from West Virginia has made a contribution here with his thoughtful leadership over the years, of course, and his thoughtful statements today. Even when I do not meet the statements with personal agreement, I know he forces me to think about fixed premises that I may bring to the debate, as well as everyone in this case, and that will make the product of our deliberations better than it would otherwise be.

   I was thinking about the quote at the end of Senator Byrd's remarks. It is true that reorganization or reform can sometimes not be in the interest of progress and can be a cover for disorganization and an excuse for inaction more broadly.

   I do want to argue that this proposal that has come out of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, which builds on work that had been done by the Hart-Rudman Commission, which meshed with recommendations from the White House, is a necessary reorganization.

   The current state of reality in our Federal Government is that we are disorganized. It is in some ways dysfunctional as it comes to protecting the security of the American people from a threat we have imagined, we have seen some small evidence of over the years. But on September 11 we were shocked from our lethargy and our apathy and our tolerance of disorganization, seeing the painful personal consequences of that disorganization--almost 3,000 Americans dead only because they were Americans, struck in a vicious and savage and cunning way only because they were Americans. They did not have the courage to take us on on a conventional field of battle but struck an undefended target full of innocent Americans.

   That disorganization can no longer be tolerated. I have a sense of urgency about this. I look at the evidence we have accumulated about the various ways in which our intelligence and law enforcement personnel could have cooperated, could have shared information prior to September 11. I wonder, could we have prevented this from happening? I look at the way in which we have tolerated disorganization and overlap at our borders with failures of the various Federal agencies there and inability even to communicate with one another. I look at our ports, with 95 percent of the goods coming into the United States of America. Most people are shocked by this number: 95 percent come in by ship, yet the Customs Service is able to truly inspect only 1 percent of the containers coming in.

   I could go on and on about airport security pre-September 11 and security of our financial systems, cybersystems, and all the rest. We are just not organized to prevent what happened on September 11 from ever happening again.

   In this regard, I have the echo in my mind of a meeting I attended some months ago with families of victims of September 11, mostly families of victims because most of them were from Connecticut, some from New York, who died in the World Trade Center. The plaintive question they asked me was, how could this have happened? I do not want to ever be in a position to face another group of fellow Americans who ask me again, how could this have happened?

   I make no claims that adoption of the bill that our committee has reported on will be a guarantee against terrorism. I suppose if someone has so little regard for their own life and other lives that they are prepared to strap bombs around themselves and walk into a crowd, that is not easy to stop. But something as well planned, as comprehensive, with as

   many contacts with private sector bodies, including flight training schools and public agencies, we should be able to prevent. The only way to begin to do it is to create a structure that is accountable, that has a uniform chain of command, and that will put people in place to overcome the gaps the terrorists took advantage of on September 11.

   That is why I have urgently brought this matter to the floor, with the wonderful bipartisan group of members of the Governmental Affairs Committee who contributed substantially to the product on the floor, and the various Members of the Senate on both sides with whom we have worked on parts of this proposal. There were 18 hearings, 3 or 4 days of committee meetings and markup. A lot of work has been done on this, building on work that had been done years before by others, as to how we can best protect the American people from terrorism.

   It is time to proceed. We have had a very good opening day of debate. Obviously, there are some differences of opinion regarding the pace of action in Congress or whether the executive branch is seeking or being given too much authority, whether one or another agency that is consolidated by this bill should be consolidated, how strong our intelligence division should be in this Department, how much should we bring matters together. Should we give this President and his successors unprecedented authority over civil service and Federal employees?

   All of these matters, I know, will be directly discussed in the days ahead. And many of them, if not all of them, will be subjects of amendment before this Chamber. This is a big bill. It is a big proposal which responds to an urgent problem. As others have said, it would be the largest reorganization of the Federal Government in 50 years, since the post-World War II reorganization of our national security apparatus. That is what the reality of our times requires. It is why we need the debate we will have in the days, and perhaps weeks, ahead.

   In the paper today, there is a story that our intelligence service is working with foreign intelligence services and has tracked the movement of gold, substantial amounts of gold, apparently owned by al-Qaida, from Pakistan through Iran, the United Arab Emirates, into Sudan, where it may be in Khartoum now. What does this tell us? That the enemy is out there, that we won a victory, a great victory, in Afghanistan, but that was only the first battle of the war.

   Again, the enemy is not out there on a field of battle where we can see them, or in ships at sea. They are in the shadows. They have not diminished their intention to strike at America, and Americans only, because we are America and Americans. Now we, as the representatives of the American people here in Congress, we draw ourselves together, to have our debate, have our discussion, but in the end, to do what we must do to create a Department of Homeland Security that will be a strong line of defense against al-Qaida and anyone else out there intending to strike at the American people here at home.

   One thing I do know, in the midst of all the debate, is we are ready to proceed. We have had a good opening day. Many more days of debate will come. But on the specific motion before us now, the motion to proceed, I am sure we are ready to vote.

   I yield whatever remaining time I have and I ask for the yeas and nays on the motion to proceed.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second? There appears to be.

   The question is on agreeing to the motion to proceed. The clerk will call the roll.

   The legislative clerk called the roll.

   Mr. REID. I announce that the Senator from Hawaii (Mr. AKAKA), and the Senator from Delaware (Mr. BIDEN), are necessarily absent.

   Mr. NICKLES. I announce that the Senator from North Carolina (Mr. HELMS), the Senator from Texas (Mr. GRAMM), the Senator from Arkansas (Mr. MURKOWSKI), and the Senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. SANTORUM), are necessarily absent.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber desiring to vote?

   The result was announced--yeas 94, nays 0, as follows:

   Allard

   Allen

   Baucus

   Bayh

   Bennett

   Bingaman

   Bond

   Boxer

   Breaux

   Brownback

   Bunning

   Burns

   Byrd

   Campbell

   Cantwell

   Carnahan

   Carper

   Chafee

   Cleland

   Clinton

   Cochran

   Collins

   Conrad

   Corzine

   Craig

   Crapo

   Daschle

   Dayton

   DeWine

   Dodd

   Domenici

   Dorgan

   Durbin

   Edwards

   Ensign

   Enzi

   Feingold

   Feinstein

   Fitzgerald

   Frist

   Graham

   Grassley

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   Gregg

   Hagel

   Harkin

   Hatch

   Hollings

   Hutchinson

   Hutchison

   Inhofe

   Inouye

   Jeffords

   Johnson

   Kennedy

   Kerry

   Kohl

   Kyl

   Landrieu

   Leahy

   Levin

   Lieberman

   Lincoln

   Lott

   Lugar

   McCain

   McConnell

   Mikulski

   Miller

   Murray

   Nelson (FL)

   Nelson (NE)

   Nickles

   Reed

   Reid

   Roberts

   Rockefeller

   Sarbanes

   Schumer

   Sessions

   Shelby

   Smith (NH)

   Smith (OR)

   Snowe

   Specter

   Stabenow

   Stevens

   Thomas

   Thompson

   Thurmond

   Torricelli

   Voinovich

   Warner

   Wellstone

   Wyden

   Akaka

   Biden

   Gramm

   Helms

   Murkowski

   Santorum

   The motion was agreed to.

   Mr. REID. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote and move to lay that motion on the table.

   The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

END

5C) Homeland Security Act of 2002

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   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will now resume consideration of H.R. 5005, which the clerk will state.

   The senior assistant bill clerk read as follows:

   A bill (H.R. 5005) to establish the Department of Homeland Security, and for other purposes.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senator from Connecticut is recognized to call up amendment No. 4471.

   Mr. REID. Madam President, will the Senator from Connecticut yield to let me say a word or two?

   Mr. LIEBERMAN. I will.

   Mr. REID. Madam President, I have been a part of some conversations. I think the two leaders are going to have Senator Lieberman and Senator Thompson, the managers, determine what is relevant. I don't think they are going to do that. They will follow your lead on that.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut is recognized.

   AMENDMENT NO. 4471

   Mr. LIEBERMAN. Madam President, I call up amendment No. 4471 and ask for its immediate consideration.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.

   The senior assistant bill clerk read as follows:

   The Senator from Connecticut [Mr. LIEBERMAN] proposes an amendment numbered 4471.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that further reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

   (The amendment is printed in the RECORD of Tuesday, September 3, 2002, under ``Text of Amendments.'')

   Mr. LIEBERMAN. Madam President, this legislation is a result of the bipartisan work of the committee, and the occupant of the chair, the Senator from Missouri, has been a contributing member of it. It was endorsed by our committee on July 25 by a 12-to-5 vote. I believe very strongly that this deserves passage by the full Senate.

   The substitute I am offering was modified in two respects after the committee held its business meetings in July. First, we added an offset to certain direct spending in the bill related, in fact, to civil service reform. Second, we have clarified earlier language about the conduct of risk and threat assessment by the new Department. Both changes were made after canvassing members of our committee and with the approval of the majority of the committee. I will describe them in more detail in a few moments.

   This amendment, almost a year in the making, would create a focused and accountable Department of Homeland Security to enable our domestic defenses to rise to the unprecedented challenge of defeating terrorism on our home soil. Our defenses are either disorganized or organized for another day that is past.

   This bill aims to reorganize our homeland defenses to meet the unprecedented threats from terrorism that are sadly part of the 21st century. This amendment would also create a White House office to ensure coordination across the many offices involved in the fight against terrorism, including intelligence, diplomatic and law enforcement agencies, foreign policy agencies, and economic assistance agencies that will remain outside the Department.

   We recognize that the threat of terrorism on American soil will painfully be with us for some time. Therefore, the American people deserve and demand a Government equipped to meet and beat that threat. This committee-endorsed bill is presented in three divisions. Division A establishes a Department of Homeland Security, a White House office, and a national strategy for combating terrorism. Division B incorporates the provisions of the bipartisan Kennedy-Brownback reform of the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

   We are going to hear a lot during the debate, I am confident, about the need for further reorganization of the constituent agencies we have brought together in this bill. But the committee-endorsed bill actually does undertake a massive reorganization of the one agency that just about everyone agrees is in desperate need of reform, and that is the INS. Division C incorporates consensus civil service reforms, themselves the product of intensive collaboration and discussion over a period of time--months and perhaps years--that were added as an amendment by the bipartisan team of Senators VOINOVICH and AKAKA.

   I expect we will hear people saying that our legislation hasn't given the President all the management flexibility he has asked for. Of course, that is literally true because we believe the administration's request simply went too far, usurping not only the fundamental responsibility of Congress to adopt civil service laws, but to undermine important protections that guard the workplace and Federal workers against favoritism and also that create some limits on the executive, some sense of accountability that is placed on those who have sway over those who have chosen to serve the public as Federal employees.

   I urge my fellow Senators on both sides of the aisle to look carefully at the reforms we have incorporated and the new flexibilities that we do provide, which are sensible and significant indeed and, I believe, if passed, would give the Secretary of Homeland Security more management flexibility than any Secretary operating under current law has ever had.

   I know this promises to be a controversial discussion, a serious discussion, and sometimes a passionate discussion. I look forward to airing our differences, resolving them, and getting a good bill to conference and then to the President's desk, certainly by the end of this session.

   We in the Congress have accomplished great and seemingly daunting tasks in the past; but, honestly, I can think of few in my time in the Senate, which is now 14 years, that have been more critical to our common future and cry out to us to work across party lines, to raise America's guard against the savage, inhumane, cunning threat

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   The legislation I offer today was, as I have said, endorsed in July. It was endorsed in a bipartisan vote of the Governmental Affairs Committee. That marked the end of one of many stages in the bill's development in our committee. All told, we have been at this for almost a year now--more than 11 months. We have worked with colleagues on both sides of the aisle. We have worked with experts in the field in various aspects of counterterrorism and homeland security. We have worked very closely since June 6--when President Bush endorsed the idea of a Department of Homeland Security--with the President and his staff at the White House.

   We gleaned insight and learned a lot from 18 hearings of the Governmental Affairs Committee that were held after September 11 on this subject and dozens of hearings held by other committees of the Congress.

   I must say that I am proud for our committee of the product of these labors. This legislation puts forth a creative, constructive, and comprehensive solution to the core homeland security challenges we now face.

   Our legislation differs in some respects, including some important ones from the House-passed bill and also from the President's proposal. We are going to hear people dwell on those differences for much of the debate. That is understandable. In some ways, it would be surprising if legislation as significant and this large were passed without dissent. In some ways, it would be not only surprising but unhealthy. The spirit of debate and controversy is here, and I hope out of it we will emerge with a very strong bill. In the case of each significant difference, I believe in the path we have taken, and I look forward to explaining why.

   Let me say again we cannot allow the differences to overshadow the vast common ground on which we stand. Mahatma Gandhi said: ``Honest disagreement is often a good sign of progress.'' He had a point. With a bill this big, as I said, I would be uneasy if the Senate began the process in total unison.

   Let's realize the underlying reality and not lose sight of it. Just about everyone in this Chamber, on both sides of the aisle, understands the urgent necessity of reordering and reorganizing our capabilities to detect danger, protect Americans from attack, and respond in the event of an incident. That consensus should guide us and should ultimately dominate here. In fact, it is hard to find a Member of the Senate or the other body who will say they are against the creation of a Department of Homeland Security. People have different ideas about how one or another piece of it might look, but there is no one I have heard who is really against the creation of this Department.

   In the end, that is because I think people understand that the current state of disorganization in the Federal Government's apparatus for responding to homeland security threats is dangerous. The consensus, therefore, for responding to that disorganization is by organizing the Federal Government better to meet those threats, to protect our people, to protect our infrastructure, to see the threats before they emerge through good intelligence and law enforcement, to invest in science and technology, to make protection of the American people at home easier and more effective. In the end, I am confident that we will pass a bill creating a Department of Homeland Security, and the sooner the better.

   The American people understand why the creation of a strong accountable Homeland Security Department is the best way forward. They know that the formation of such a Department will not of itself win our war against terrorism. Obviously, we need to continue to encourage and support our military that is on the front lines of offense against the al-Qaida forces that struck us on September 11 and clearly remain out there in the shadows scheming, arming, readying themselves to strike us again.

   The disadvantage we now have in defending ourselves because of our disorganization can no longer be afforded. Today, as former Assistant Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter told our committee on June 26:

   ``Homeland security remains institutionally homeless.''

   It is well stated, ``Homeland security remains institutionally homeless.'' Everyone is in charge, therefore, no one is in charge. Our legislation would give this vital mission a home under a single roof and a firm foundation with someone, the Secretary, clearly in charge with the responsible authority and accountability and hopefully the resources to get results.

   For the first time, we would require in statute close and ongoing White House coordination of the many other pieces of the fight against this 21st century threat--terrorism--and those pieces could not be included in the Homeland Security Department. They include defense, diplomacy, finance, law enforcement, and others.

   For the first time, we, through this legislation, would require a comprehensive assessment of threats and vulnerability so that we understand the worst threats and the best ways to respond. We need a blueprint today. We do not have it. For the first time, we would create a new intelligence division focused on the threats to our homeland, equipped to truly connect the intelligence and law enforcement dots from Federal, State, and local agencies, from human and signal intelligence, from closed and open sources, from law enforcement and foreign sources, including particularly the Counterterrorism Center at the CIA.

   These dots were not connected before September 11. We lived to experience the disastrous consequences of that failure.

   For the first time, we would bolster emergency preparedness and response efforts to ensure that all layers and levels of Government are working together to anticipate and prepare for the worst. Today, coordination is the exception, not the rule, and that is no longer acceptable.

   For the first time, we would build strong bonds between Federal, State, and local governments to target terrorism. State and local officials are clearly on the front lines as first responders and, as I like to say, first preventers in the fight against terrorism.

   Today, local communities are already expending funds to better protect their people and their assets post-September 11. They are waiting for help. They need better training, new tools, and a coordinated prevention and protection strategy. That absence of coordination and failure of adequate support for State and local first responders and first preventers is no longer justifiable.

   For the first time, we would bring key border and national entry agencies together to ensure that dangerous people and goods and containers are kept out of our country without restricting the flow of legal immigration and commerce that nourishes the Nation.

   Today, threats to America may be slipping through the cracks because of our disorganization, and that is indefensible. For the first time, we would promote dramatic new research and technology development opportunities in homeland defense. This war has no traditional battlefield, as I have said. One of the nontraditional battlefields where we must emerge is the laboratory with science and technology. This bill would leverage Government and academic research capabilities and focus private sector innovation on the challenge. Today these efforts are blurred and dispersed, and that is unwise.

   For the first time under this proposal, we would facilitate close and comprehensive coordination between the public and private sectors to protect critical infrastructure. Fully 85 percent of our critical infrastructure is owned and operated by the private sector, but our Government is not now working systematically with those companies to identify and close vulnerabilities in, for example, communications networks, electric grids or food distribution systems. That is unbearable.

   Finally, our legislation would adopt consensus civil service reforms to give Government new tools to manage it. These bipartisan reforms, introduced by Senators VOINOVICH and AKAKA, would provide significant new management flexibility in hiring employees and shaping the workforce, while assuring that the basic public accountability of the civil service system is not summarily dissolved.

   Under our bill, new flexibilities will increase accountability, strengthen the chain of command, and give the Secretary and agencies throughout our

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   As the writer H.G. Wells once said, ``Adapt or perish--now as ever--is nature's inexorable imperative.''

   That is our choice today. Adapt and get stronger, or grow weaker; adapt, or give the American people reason to live in fear; adapt, or live at the mercy of our cruel and cunning terrorist enemies rather than being in control of our own destiny, as a great people should be.

   So that we have an understanding of why this legislation takes the form it does, let me tell you briefly how it has evolved. It has been a very careful and collaborative process, nearly a year in the making. Last October, Senator Specter and I introduced legislation to create a Department of Homeland Security. That was S. 1534. That legislation drew heavily on the recommendation of the Hart-Rudman Commission on National Security in the 21st Century, which was chartered by the Secretary of Defense and supported by both the President and Congress, with the mission of providing the most comprehensive Government-sponsored review of our national security in more than 50 years.

   The Commission released three reports in 1999, 2000, 2001, respectively. Its third report, phase 3, entitled ``Roadmap for National Security: Imperative for Change,'' warned that we would soon face asymmetrical and terrorist threats and would need a focused Cabinet-level homeland security agency with adequate budget authority and direct accountability to the President to detect and counter those threats.

   The Commission's conclusion, headed by our former colleagues Gary Hart and Warren Rudman, was issued on January 31, 2001, more than a half year before the day of darkness, September 11, 2001. Their conclusion included this statement: ``The United States is today very poorly organized to design and implement any comprehensive strategy to protect the homeland.''

   Senators Hart and Rudman, and the other distinguished members of the Commission, made their case effectively and, I might say, eloquently. But the attacks of September 11 tragically drove the message home as no words could or, unfortunately, did. We were suddenly and clearly aware that we were more susceptible than we ever expected to the brutality of terrorism directed against innocent Americans for one reason only: Because they were Americans.

   No matter their origin, in terms of ethnicity, religion, race, gender, age, place in life, new American or born American, but just because they were Americans in America, they were targets. We realized we were susceptible to that kind of violent extremism and we did not have the organizational capabilities to leverage our strengths and protect ourselves to the best of our ability.

   So the bill I was privileged to introduce with my colleague from Pennsylvania, Senator ARLEN SPECTER, making it obviously bipartisan, last October, hewed closely to the model proposed by the Hart-Rudman Commission and also drew on recommendations made by the Gilmore Commission and others. We called for a new Department made up of the Coast Guard, Customs, Border Patrol, and FEMA, as well as some smaller offices on critical infrastructure protection and emergency preparedness.

   The compelling need for such a Department was reinforced in

   those 18 hearings before the Governmental Affairs Committee during which 85 different witnesses testified on various aspects of homeland security. We learned a great deal also from dozens of other hearings by other committees on both sides of the Hill. So for those who may worry or suggest that we are moving more rapidly than we should, this is the record: Painstaking, deliberative, extensive consultation, investigation, education by experts, and an openness to ideas wherever they came from because of the critical necessity to do something to protect our security.

   As chairman of the committee, I have been guided by a maxim that was used about foreign and defense policy, which is that partisanship stops at our Nation's coasts. In the same way, since this new enemy, the terrorists, has brought warfare within the United States of America, I say when we are discussing matters of homeland security, partisanship also must stop. That is the spirit in which our committee has gone forward.

   We discovered, whether the subject was anthrax in the mail or port security or critical infrastructure protection, that the Federal Government is now lacking an approach to our problems that is either strong enough or coordinated enough to meet what we now know, post-September 11, is the reality of the challenge to us. In other words, we are dividing our strengths at a time when we should be multiplying them.

   Again and again, the same message emerged from the witnesses who came before us, in big bold letters one might say: We still are not adequately prepared for terrorism at home, and a strong Cabinet-level Department, encompassing the key programs related to homeland security, is the necessary first step to addressing those deficiencies and closing those vulnerabilities.

   The need for such a Department was further underscored by our experience with the Office of Homeland Security that was established last October by Executive Order of the President. The President appointed Gov. Tom Ridge to fill that position. Governor Ridge is an able, hard-working public servant. He has had the President's confidence and his ear from the very start. But we saw then, and the President would later acknowledge, that the office simply lacked the budgetary and organizational authority to reshape the Federal bureaucracy to define priorities and to get results. Only a Cabinet-level Secretary in charge of the Cabinet-level Department could accomplish that task.

   In the debate that has already begun and clearly will go on in consideration of this bill, the President and the administration and their allies in this Chamber are saying we have not given the Executive enough management flexibility. The fact is that flexibility must come with power. It was our bill almost a year ago, in contrast to the President's position, that wanted to give the Executive the authority to be able to carry out the necessary changes in the Federal bureaucracy.

   So to portray somehow that this bill is protective of the Federal bureaucracy is not right. In fact, the President's original position that this task could be carried out by an Office of Homeland Security did not give that office the power.

   It had no management flexibility because the constituent agencies exercised the authority they had under law which was superior to the director of the office. Therefore, in that sense, as well as all the specific senses in which we give management flexibility to the Executive, we are proposing a Department with a strong Secretary. That is the way to get the job done: blend the employees together, encourage them to work together, and set standards for them achieving homeland security. That can only be done by a strong Secretary.

   At the same time, however, it became apparent that no single Department could address all of the Federal programs or coordinate all the programs of all the Federal agencies engaged in homeland security or in the war on terrorism. Therefore, last May, Senator Specter and I combined our proposal with legislation introduced by our colleague from Florida, Senator BOB GRAHAM, chairman of the Intelligence Committee, calling for the creation of a National Office for Combating Terrorism within the White House to coordinate Federal antiterrorism efforts government-wide.

   In contrast to the position created for Governor Ridge by Executive Order, this office would be a Senate confirmed-position, with full accountability and authority as well as statutory power to review Federal budgets related to terrorism.

   The combined legislation that we have before the Senate in the form of this substitute amendment which I have introduced this afternoon, resulted from, as I said, Senator Specter and I joining with Senator Graham. Obviously, there is more added by the committee. That legislation originally was introduced on May 2, and considered by the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee on May 22 of this year, and reported out on a 9-to-7 vote--a vote exactly split along party lines.

   On June 6, we got a surprise, a welcome surprise. We gained another supporter, a most important supporter. That was, of course, President George

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   It went further, however, and also proposed that additional programs and agencies be transferred to the new Department--and there were some good ideas there--to ensure the new administration proposals were properly considered and necessary adjustments made to our legislation.

   As chairman of the Governmental Affairs Committee, I held four additional hearings on aspects of the President's proposal. Incorporating the insight from those hearings, as well as input from extensive discussion with colleagues, including committee chairmen and ranking members, we prepared an expanded version of S. 2452. The expanded version went a considerable way toward incorporating the proposals the President and the administration made that had not been made part of our original bill. It was further amended during two very thoughtful, constructive days of committee deliberation and was ultimately endorsed by our Senate Governmental Affairs Committee by a bipartisan vote of 12 to 5. That is what I offered as a substitute amendment to H.R. 5005. The amendment I now offer is the product of this lengthy and healthy process of consultation and deliberation. I thank my colleagues in the Senate for indulging me in this brief history

   expedition, and I want to say why I take the time to discuss the time it took; and that is to demonstrate that we have gone a great distance to hone this bill, to be open to input from anyone, to reach consensus, to modify, and amplify different sections.

   The Department we have designed would for the first time combine, under a single chain of command and under the leadership of a single Secretary who is accountable to the President and the people, dozens of agencies and offices responsible for homeland security.

   The Department's overarching mission, as stated in Section 101 of this amendment, is twofold: To promote homeland security, particularly with regard to terrorism; and to carry out the other functions and promote the other missions of entities transferred to the Department as provided by law. That is a very important statement.

   As much attention as the first part of the mission, homeland security, will get in this debate, the second half cannot be forgotten because even though this Department's very reason for being created is to intelligently organize our Government's homeland security efforts, many of its constituent agencies perform vital, non-homeland security duties, as well. They cannot and will not stop doing that work.

   Our bill, in clear and unequivocal language, requires the Department to uphold these other missions and functions.

   The extent to which the constituent agencies and programs that are brought into this Department can both protect homeland security and continue to carry out the other responsibilities will depend on the extent to which we in Congress, through the appropriations process, are prepared to support this new Department.

   The Secretary will be responsible for running the Department and for developing policies and plans for the promotion of homeland security. The legislation also charges the Secretary with including State and local governments, tribes, and other entities who, again, are first responders and first preventers of the fight against terrorism in every State and city and county and town in our country. The Secretary must consult them, with the Secretary of Defense and also State officers, regarding possible integration of the U.S. military, including the National Guard, into all aspects of the homeland security strategy and its implementation. The Guard is a mighty force, with an historic mission which was originally, of course, to protect homeland security. It has tremendous potential in this new 21st century, in responding to this 21st century threat to our security without making it by any stretch, kind of a Federal constabulary. But the Guard has extraordinary skill and equipment sophistication and can play a very constructive role here.

   We also have charged the Secretary with the responsibility of developing a comprehensive information technology blueprint for the Department. The Senator from Illinois, Mr. Durbin, talked quite eloquently and effectively about one aspect of that yesterday. In addition, the Secretary is responsible for administering the homeland security advisory system, and for annually reviewing and updating the Federal Response Plan for homeland security and emergency preparedness.

   This is a big job. The size should make it clear how much we need the new Department. No one in Government is performing these duties adequately today. If they are doing the duties, they are not doing them systematically, certainly not synergistically. There are a lot of gears turning. Some are touching each other, some are not. Some are spinning in isolation. We want the gears to turn together, generating torque, producing energy, and getting results. That means more security for the American people at home.

   No one can claim that the creation of a new Department is a guarantee or panacea for all our problems. I agree with Charles Boyd, distinguished American, great public servant and Executive Director of the Hart-Rudman Commission:

   ``There is no perfect organizational design, no flawless managerial mix. The reason is that organizations are made up of people, and people invariably devise informal means of dealing with one another in accord with the accidents of personality and temperament.''

   Even excellent organizational structure cannot make impetuous or mistaken leaders patient or wise, but poor organizational design can make good leaders less effective.

   That, in one sense, is what this is all about. Poor organizational design makes good leaders less effective with unnecessary gaps, overlaps, and bureaucratic barriers--by spreading authority and resources too thin, by diminishing accountability, by tolerating overlap and inefficiency--while good organizational design will empower good leaders, hold people accountable, and enable their talent and hard work to make a difference.

   In other words, 10 gallons of gas poured into a well-designed, efficient engine can get you long distances at high speeds, but 10 gallons poured into an old, less efficient engine won't get you very far in a very efficient way.

   That leads me to a second caution about the legislation, which is the blueprint that we need to build a Homeland Security Department that America needs. In a number of areas likely to be the most controversial, I strongly believe we have chosen the right path. But it would be arrogant of me or anyone to suggest that this legislation is perfect. It is not. That is why we have specifically built into it room for adjustment and refinement as the administration actually begins moving the pieces together. And we have given them a year from the effective date to, in fact, do that.

   We require the administration to report back to Congress 6 months after the effective date or earlier during the reorganization process, and every 6 months thereafter, and require recommendations for changes to law at these junctures and throughout the process.

   So even the passage of this bill will be not the end of the process, but its start; as Churchill once said in a very different context, ``not the beginning of the end, but the end of the beginning.''

   But the fact that we cannot guarantee perfection is no argument against this legislation. Obviously, even our country's Constitution, which Senator Byrd and Senator Thompson and others quite eloquently and correctly honored and celebrated in yesterday's debate, the very foundation of our democracy, a democracy created with as much foresight and wisdom as any other in the history of government, was not perfect. It has been amended 27 times. At the time, the Founders understood it had to be built to change over time. Indeed, during the ratification debate, Alexander Hamilton urged those who criticized the

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   Similarly, we must not fail to create this Department in pursuit of a perfect Department. History has dropped at our feet an urgent and necessary challenge, to reshape our Government, to protect the lives and affirm the values of our people, for surely our terrorist enemies are as intent on striking and destroying our humanistic, tolerant, inclusive, free values as they are of destroying our people. We can either meet the moment by staying focused on that goal or we can let it pass by bickering over petty and sometimes partisan or ideological particulars.

   Let the debate go forward, but let us, as we go forward in debating and amending this substitute amendment that I have laid down, remember the urgent challenge the terrorists have given us

   and the broad ground we all seem to occupy about most of how we should respond to that challenge, by creating this Department.

   Let's have some debates and disagreements. But when it is all over, let's remember, not only in this bill but more generally in our values, there is so much more that unites us, and that ultimately is our greatest strength against our enemies, past, present, and future. We must be certain to preserve that when this debate is done and a new Department of Homeland Security is created.

   Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD an addendum statement, a section-by-section analysis, and a letter dated August 28, 2002.

   There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

   Mr. President, I want to share with the Senate my views on the meaning and intent of the provisions we added to this legislation since the Governmental Affairs Committee first considered the bill in May and filed the accompanying report to S. 2452. This legislation has been almost a year in the making, and reflects the thoughtful contributions of an array of distinguished legislators and policy experts.

   Last October, I introduced legislation with Senator Specter to create a Department of Homeland Security (S. 1534). That legislation drew heavily on the recommendations of the United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, also known as the Hart-Rudman Commission. It called for a new department made up of the Coast Guard, Customs, Border Patrol, and FEMA, as well as some smaller offices that specialize in critical infrastructure protection and emergency preparedness. The compelling need for such a department was quickly underscored in a series of hearings before the Governmental Affairs Committee examining aspects of homeland security. Whether the subject was anthrax in the mail, port security, or critical infrastructure protection, the Federal government generally did not have a strong, coordinated approach to address the range of threats. A strong, Cabinet-level department encompassing key programs related to homeland security would be a vital first step to addressing this deficiency. At the same time, however, it became apparent that no single department could address all of the Federal programs engaged in the war on terrorism. Therefore, I combined forces with Sen. Graham, who had proposed legislation to create a White House terrorism office to coordinate federal efforts to combat terrorism government-wide. In contrast to the position created by executive order for Gov. Ridge, this office would be a Senate-confirmed position with full accountability and authority, as well as statutory power to review federal budgets relating to terrorism. The combined legislation, the ``National Homeland Security and Combating Terrorism Act of 2002,'' was introduced on May 2, 2002. It was considered by the Governmental Affairs Committee on May 22, 2002 and reported out on a 7-3 vote. A full account of the background and history of that legislation is included in its accompanying report, No. 107-175.

   Before the full Senate had a chance to consider that bill, however, the President announced his support for a Department of Homeland Security. That announcement was followed, on June 18, with a legislative proposal from the administration. The administration's bill encompassed almost all of S. 2452's organizational elements regarding a Department of Homeland Security. It went further, however, and proposed that additional programs and agencies be transferred to the new department. To ensure that these new administration proposals were properly considered, the Governmental Affairs Committee held four additional hearings. Then, working with other committee chairmen and ranking members, I prepared an amendment to S. 2452 that was considered at a July 24-25 business meeting of the Governmental Affairs Committee. That expanded version of S. 2452 went a considerable way to incorporate Administration proposals that had not been part of the original bill. It was further amended during two days of Committee deliberation, and ultimately endorsed by a bipartisan Committee vote of 12 to 5.

   What follows is a description of some of the key changes to the legislation since the May 22, 2002 markup of S. 2452. It should be considered in concert with Report 107-175, which describes the core of the legislation--most of which is unchanged. A complete section-by-section analysis is also included.

   As reported out of the Governmental Affairs Committee (GAC) on May 22nd, S. 2452 created a Department of Homeland Security with three directorates: Border and Transportation Protection, Critical Infrastructure Protection, and Emergency Preparedness and Response. The GAC-endorsed legislation now includes additional programs and agencies that will be organized into six directorates: the original three, plus directorates for Intelligence, Immigration and Science and Technology, an expanded version of a Science and Technology Office in the original bill. The key changes are summarized below:

   The GAC-endorsed legislation adds the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to the agencies incorporated into the Directorate for Border and Transportation Protection. TSA was created through the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. 107-71, which was signed into law on November 19, 2001. The agency's mission is to protect the country's transportation systems, including rail, highways, and maritime, although currently its main focus is to improve aviation safety. TSA's responsibilities include meeting a series of deadlines to upgrade aviation security, including the hiring of more than 30,000 airport security personnel, deploying explosive detection systems and other security equipment, facilitating airport passenger and baggage inspection, and implementing other measures to heighten the safety of air travel.

   The inclusion of TSA in the Department will permit better coordination of transportation security operations with other agencies that are responsible for security at the borders. These agencies, which include the Customs Service, Coast Guard, Border Patrol, INS, and border inspection agents from the Animal Plant and Health Inspection Service, are responsible for conducting inspections of travelers and goods entering the United States and for securing the international boundaries the United States shares with Mexico and Canada. TSA's mission to secure our transportation infrastructure is closely tied to maintaining the security of the ports of entry where these border agencies are stationed. For example, cargo containers that pass through our ports are conveyed to other parts of the country through our transportation system, either on rail or the highways, and could cause significant harm and disruption to our transportation infrastructure if they contained explosives or were used in a terrorist attack. It is essential for these agencies to coordinate their efforts so that security measures are linked and more seamlessly implemented. This process will be easier with TSA and the key border agencies in the same chain of command.

   Our transportation system must also be able to move people and goods quickly and efficiently from the borders throughout the country. To ensure the security of this system, TSA needs access to key information regarding vulnerabilities and threats. The Department's Directorate of Intelligence, which I will describe shortly, will have the intelligence architecture to help provide this critical information to TSA and other agencies within the Department. By being closely tied to that intelligence directorate, and to the other border agencies in the Department that will be collecting vital information, TSA will be in a better position to prevent future attacks using the transportation system.

   Finally, as a new agency TSA may be able to take advantage of some economies of scale offered by the new Department. Specifically, it may not need to create certain capabilities--administrative or otherwise--that will already exist in other components of the Department.

   In S. 2452, the Customs Service was transferred intact to the Department. This remains the case in the GAC-endorsed legislation, which also provides that Customs will be preserved as a distinct entity.

   At the request of the Senate Finance Committee Chairman and Ranking Member, the legislation incorporates an amendment, adopted by the Committee and agreed to by both the White House and the Finance Committee Chairman and Ranking Member, which will preserve the ability of the Treasury Secretary--with the concurrence of the Secretary--to issue regulations on customs revenue functions that involve economic judgments within the expertise of the Treasury Department, and which can have a major impact on our economy and relationships with foreign countries. These customs revenue functions include: assessing, collecting, and refunding duties, taxes, and fees on imported goods; administering import quotas and labeling requirements; collecting import data needed to compile international trade statistics; and administering reciprocal trade agreements and trade preference legislation. The Customs Service, reporting to the Secretary, is responsible for administering and enforcing these laws, and indeed

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   The legislation transfers the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) from the Department of the Treasury to the Directorate for Border and Transportation Protection. FLETC provides basic and advanced agency-specific training for law enforcement officers and analysts at over 70 Federal agencies. This training allows for greater standardization of law enforcement training that is also more cost-effective and is taught by professional instructors using modern facilities. Many of its key customer agencies are being transferred to the new Department, including the Secret Service, INS, Border Patrol, Customs Service, Coast Guard, and Federal Protective Service. Given these relationships, the Department will benefit from the inclusion of FLETC.

   FLETC also provides training to State and local entities and to foreign law enforcement personnel, programs generally not otherwise available to these agencies. The programs also enhance networking and cooperation throughout the law enforcement community, domestically as well as world-wide. Therefore, these programs will support and complement the Department's efforts to work more closely with State and local agencies as well as foreign governments to detect and prevent acts of terrorism.

   The legislation transfers the Coast Guard to the new Department, and specifies that it be maintained as a distinct entity. At the July 24-25 business meeting, the Committee adopted language intended to maintain the structural and operational integrity of the Coast Guard and the authority of the Commandant, ensure continuation of the non-homeland security missions of the Coast Guard and the Service's capabilities to carry out these missions as it is transferred to the new Department, and ensure that the Commandant reports to the Secretary.

   The language, offered as an amendment by Senators Stevens and Collins, states that the Secretary may not make any significant change to any of the non-homeland security missions and capabilities of the Coast Guard without the prior approval of the Congress in a subsequent statute. The President may waive this restriction for no more than 90 days upon his declaration and certification to the Congress that a clear, compelling, and immediate state of national emergency exists that justifies such a waiver.

   The language further directs that the Coast Guard's organizational structure, units, personnel, and non-homeland security missions shall be maintained intact and without reduction after the transfer unless Congress specifies otherwise in subsequent Acts. The language also states that Coast Guard personnel, ships, aircraft, helicopters, and vehicles may not be transferred to the operational control of, or diverted to the principal and continuing use of, any other organization, unit, or entity of the Department.

   Upon the transfer of the Coast Guard to the Department, the Commandant shall report directly to the Secretary and not through any other official of the Department.

   The Inspector General of the Department shall annually assess the Coast Guard's performance of all its missions with a particular emphasis on examining the non-homeland security missions.

   None of the conditions in the approved language shall apply when the Coast Guard operates as a service in the Navy under section 3 of title 14, United States Code.

   The legislation creates a separate directorate for intelligence (DI) to serve as a national level focal point for information available to the government relating to the plans, intentions, and capabilities of terrorists and terrorist organizations. To emphasize its importance to all aspects of Homeland Security, the DI is an independent directorate within the Department, and is headed by an Under Secretary who reports to the Secretary.

   This directorate is a new addition to the legislation since the May 22 markup. It stems from the Administration's proposal to create an intelligence analysis unit within the Department. However, the President's concept has been altered and strengthened in response to testimony before the Committee and input from key senators. Specifically, this proposal reflects important input from Senators Levin and Akaka, both in negotiations and amendments offered at the business meeting. In addition, Intelligence Chairman Senator GRAHAM, Intelligence Vice Chairman Senator SHELBY, former Intelligence Chairman Senator SPECTER and Senator DURBIN contributed key ideas.

   As an independent directorate--without the operational responsibilities of other directorates--the DI will focus on providing intelligence analysis to all of the other directorates in the Department, to State and local government, and to law enforcement, for the purpose of preventing terrorist attacks, enhancing border security, protecting critical infrastructure, enhancing emergency preparedness and response, and better informing our research and development activities.

   It is important to note that the new Department, through its component organizations, will be one of the largest generators in the government of information relevant to terrorism. The data it obtains about persons and goods entering the country must be better organized and coordinated with threat data from other agencies if the new Department is going to be able to do its job. The DI, therefore, will be responsible for receiving and analyzing law enforcement information from agencies of the United States government, State and local government agencies (including law enforcement agencies), and the private sector, and fusing such information and analysis with analytical products, assessments, and warnings concerning foreign intelligence from the CIA's Counterterrorist Center in order to detect and identify threats of terrorism and other threats to homeland security. The Counterterrorist Center shall have primary responsibility for the analysis of foreign intelligence relating to international terrorism. However, the DI may also conduct its own supplemental analysis of foreign intelligence relating to threats of terrorism against the United States and other threats to homeland security.

   The DI's mission is critical to all the Department's activities, as well as to the homeland security mission of the intelligence community, law enforcement community, and State and local governments. For this reason, unless the President directs otherwise, the Secretary is provided with broad, routine access to reports, assessments, analytical information, and other information--including unevaluated intelligence--from the intelligence community and other United States government agencies. The Secretary will also receive information from State and local government agencies, and the private sector. As the President may further provide, the Secretary is also authorized to request additional information--either information that an agency already has in its possession, or new information that could require further investigation. The Secretary will work with the Director of Central Intelligence and the Attorney General to ensure that all material received by the Department is protected against unauthorized disclosure and that sources and methods are protected.

   The provision also reflects an amendment by Senator AKAKA that makes the Department a full participant in the process, managed by the Director of Central Intelligence, whereby the intelligence community establishes overall requirements and priorities for the collection of national intelligence. Similarly, the Akaka amendment also makes the Directorate responsible for consulting with the Attorney General and other officials to establish overall collection priorities and strategies for information, including law enforcement information, relating to domestic threats.

   The intelligence proposal reflected in the GAC-endorsed legislation was developed after examining the Administration's proposal and hearing from expert witnesses on the critical need for a national level focal point for the analysis of all information available to the United States to combat terrorism. On June 26 and 27, the Committee held hearings on how to shape the intelligence functions of the proposed Department--to determine how, in light of the failure of our government to bring all of the information available to various agencies together prior to September 11 the government should receive information from the field, both foreign and domestic, and convert it, through analysis, into actionable information that better protects our security.

   The Committee heard testimony from former directors of the Defense Intelligence Agency and National Security Agency, from FBI Director Mueller and Director of Central Intelligence Tenet, and from William Webster--who headed both the FBI and CIA. It also heard from the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Intelligence Committee, Senators Bob Graham and Richard Shelby, whose investigation into the failures of September 11 is expected to yield recommendations for broader reforms that address long-standing and systemic problems within the intelligence community.

   Senator Graham's written testimony stated that the Intelligence Committee's hearings thus far have uncovered several factors that contributed to the failures of September 11--one of which is ``the absence of a single set of eyes to analyze all the bits and pieces of relevant intelligence information, including open source material.'' Senator SHELBY'S written testimony stated that ``most Americans would probably be surprised to know that even nine months after the terrorist attacks, there is today no federal official, not a single one, to whom the President can turn to ask the simple question, what do we know about current terrorist threats against our homeland? No one person or entity has meaningful access to all such information the government possesses. No one really knows what we know, and no one is even in a position to go to find out.'' General Patrick Hughes, former director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, echoed these points. His testimony stated that, ``in our intelligence community, we currently have an inadequate capability to process, analyze, prepare in contextual and technical forms that make sense and deliver cogent intelligence to users as soon as possible so that the time dependent operational demands for intelligence are met.''

   The Administration's approach falls short of what we need. A key concern is the mission and position of the intelligence unit

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   To be most effective, the entity responsible for producing all-sources intelligence analysis should not be charged with implementing operational responsibilities. The danger in the Administration's approach is that the intelligence analysis function will be consumed by the operational needs of critical infrastructure protection, and not focus enough on other aspects of the homeland security fight.

   There is also a practical reason why these two functions should be under different Under Secretaries. Both are very complex functions that have never before been performed in our government. These are very demanding jobs and the GAC endorsed amendment places them under different Under Secretaries so that, like border and transportation security, science and technology, immigration, and emergency preparedness and response, they will receive the focused leadership and attention necessary to succeed. Just protecting our cyber assets--which is only one aspect of critical infrastructure--is a daunting challenge that grows more each year.

   The Under Secretary for Intelligence, who will have to establish and operate a robust Directorate of Intelligence to systematically analyze the threats to our country will be fully consumed with that function. The Under Secretary for Critical Infrastructure Protection, whose role will be to map the threat information to the vulnerabilities in our critical infrastructure, and work closely with other agencies, and the private sector to ensure adequate protective measures are put in place, will also have a huge challenge. However, by making the same official responsible for establishing a robust intelligence division and protecting critical infrastructure, the Administration's proposal underestimates the challenges that we face in both areas.

   Secondly, the President's proposal does not allow the DI sufficient, routine access to information produced by other parts of the Intelligence Community and other agencies. The GAC-endorsed legislation provides the Secretary with broad, routine access to reports, assessments, analytical information, and other information--including unevaluated intelligence--relating to the capabilities, intentions, and activities of terrorists and terrorist organizations, unless otherwise directed by the President. ``Unevaluated intelligence'' refers to the substance of intelligence reports, absent any information about sources and methods. We use this term based on the recommendation of the Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee--precisely to make it clear that information about sources and methods, which is generally included in ``raw intelligence'', will be protected. In contrast, the Administration's proposal would curtail the Secretary's access to unanalyzed information. The Secretary would have routine access to reports, assessments, and analytical information. But, except for information concerning vulnerabilities to critical infrastructure, the Secretary would receive access to unanalyzed information only as the President may further provide.

   At the Committee's hearing on June 27, Senator Shelby, the Vice Chairman of the Intelligence Committee, objected to the limitations on information access in the President's proposal. He stated that ``unlike information relating to infrastructure or other vulnerabilities to terrorist attack--all of which the Secretary would be given access to `whether or not such information has been analyzed'--information on terrorist threats themselves would be available to the Department only in the form of what is known as `finished' intelligence.'' He testified that, under Sec. 203 of the President's proposal, the Secretary may obtain the underlying information only `by request' or when the President specifically provides for its transmission to the new Department. Senator Shelby called these limitations in the President's bill ``unacceptable''. Clearly, the Administration's proposal would reinforce tendencies not to share information among agencies that have historically been reluctant to share. Our purpose is to remove obstacles to information sharing--obstacles that clearly contributed to the tragedy of September 11--not to reinforce them.

   The GAC-endorsed amendment establishes a proactive DI. In addition to helping set intelligence priorities and receiving analysis from all other agencies in government, it would have routine access to the unevaluated intelligence, the information behind the reports that DHS will receive, unless the President directs otherwise. The Secretary will also be able to request and receive additional information (as the President further provides) that might require agencies to conduct separate investigations or redeploy resources. We anticipate that the cases would be rare where an agency is unwilling or unable to comply with the Secretary's request; however, the President will ultimately determine how conflicts, if any, will be resolved.

   During the July 24-25 business meeting, Senator Thompson offered an amendment reflecting the President's approach on intelligence; however that amendment was defeated.

   S. 2452 included a Directorate for Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP). The GAC endorsed amendment continues to include that directorate, and expands it to incorporate significant additions as proposed by the President. The Directorate will be headed by an Under Secretary who is appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.

   The CIP will combine the key entities, currently scattered across the Federal government, that are charged with working with the private sector and other agencies to protect various sectors of our nation's critical infrastructure. The authorities, functions, personnel, and assets of several offices are transferred to the Department. These include the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office of the Department of Commerce (established by Presidential Decision Directive 63 in 1998 to coordinate federal initiatives on critical infrastructure); and the National Infrastructure Protection Center of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (other than the Computer Investigations and Operations Section, which the Administration requested remain in the FBI to ensure that it continues to have a capability to pursue computer crimes). To these we have added several important entities from the President's proposal: (1) the National Communications System of the Department of Defense (established by Executive Order in 1984 to assist the President and others in: (a) the exercise of telecommunications functions and (b) coordinating the planning for and provision of national security and emergency preparedness communications); (2) the Computer Security Division of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) of the Department of Commerce (which is tasked with improving information systems security); (3) The National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center of the Department of Energy (established to serve as a source of national competence to address critical infrastructure protection and continuity through support for activities related to counterterrorism, threat assessment, and risk mitigation); (4) The Federal Computer Incident Response Center of the General Service Administration (a partnership of computer incident response, security, and law enforcement personnel to share information and handle computer security incidents); and (5) The Energy Security and Assurance Program of the Department of Energy, a national security program to help reduce America's energy supply vulnerability from severe disruptions due to natural or malevolent causes.

   Finally, the GAC endorsed legislation transfers the Federal Protective Service of the General Services Administration (GSA) to the CIP. The President proposed that FPS be transferred to the Border and Transportation Protection Directorate. The Federal Protective Service oversees security at Federal property managed by GSA. Its expertise and mission is to provide physical security for some of our nation's key resources, making it more appropriate that it be combined with the other entities responsible for physical security and cyber security in this Directorate.

   The GAC endorsed legislation establishes specialized research and analysis units in the CIP to process intelligence and identify vulnerabilities in key areas, including: (a) Public health, (b) food and water storage, production, and distribution; (c) commerce systems, including banking and finance; (d) energy systems, including electric power and oil and gas production and storage; (e) transportation systems, including pipelines; (f) information and communication systems; (g) continuity of government services; and (h) other systems or facilities the destruction of which would cause substantial hard to health, safety, property, or the environment.

   Among its other duties, the CIP shall be responsible for receiving relevant information from the Directorate of Intelligence, law enforcement, and other information to assess the vulnerabilities of the key resources and critical infrastructures; identifying priorities and supporting protective measures by the Department and other entities; developing a comprehensive national plan for securing key resources and critical infrastructure; enhancing and sharing of information regarding cyber-security and physical security; developing security standards, tracking vulnerabilities, proposing improved risk management policies; and delineating the roles of various governmental agencies in preventing, defending, and recovering from attacks.

   The Directorate will also be responsible for establishing the necessary organizational structure to provide leadership and focus on both cyber-security and physical security, and ensuring the maintenance of a nucleus of

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   The creation of this Directorate indicates broad consensus on the need for a single entity to coordinate a national effort to secure America's critical infrastructure. This is a shared responsibility of Federal, State, and local governments along with a private sector which owns 85% of our nation's critical infrastructure. However, unlike the President's proposal, which combines information analysis and infrastructure protection under one Under Secretary, the GAC amendment places Critical Infrastructure Protection in its own directorate where it will work closely with the Intelligence Directorate. This was done both to elevate and stress the centrality of intelligence analysis to all of the Department's missions, but also because critical infrastructure protection is a sufficiently complex and daunting challenge that it will require the focused leadership and attention of an Under Secretary.

   As reported out of the Committee in May, S. 2452 would have transferred the law enforcement programs of the Immigration and Naturalization Service to the new Department, while leaving its service functions at the Department of Justice. However, key senators and immigration experts argued that this course could undermine the critical task of reforming the INS. The GAC-endorsed legislation now transfers all immigration functions to the new Department, but specifies that the INS be disbanded and reorganized along the lines of a major, bipartisan reform bill, S. 2444, sponsored by Senators Kennedy and Brownback. These senators are the chairman and ranking member, respectively, of the immigration subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee, and have assembled an impressive bipartisan majority of that committee in support of their legislation. Rather than try to characterize their handiwork for them, I am attaching a letter from Senators Kennedy and Brownback describing the substance of the immigration reforms now incorporated in this legislation.

   Because the work of reforming INS is very demanding, the immigration programs will be in their own directorate, with direct accountability to the Secretary, rather than included as part of the Border and Transportation Protection directorate. However, to ensure adequate coordination between immigration programs and other agencies that operate at the border, the legislation creates a Border Security Working Group. This Working Group will consist primarily of the Secretary, or his designee, and the Under Secretaries for Immigration and Border and Transportation Protection. It will meet at least four times a year, and coordinate matters including budget requests, staffing requirements, and use of equipment. This working group can also bring in other federal agencies with border operations (such as the Drug Enforcement Administration or the Food and Drug Administration) that are not part of the Department, offering a critical mechanism for government-wide coordination along the border and at ports of entry.

   The legislation also gives the Secretary regulatory authority over the visa application process. Consular employees at the Department of State would continue to process visa applications. However, the Secretary would have authority to issue regulations concerning the application process. This would include the required procedures for considering an application, such as whether all applicants must be interviewed in person or what kind of identification documents would be required. In addition, the Secretary would have authority to station Departmental employees oversees to consult with State Department employees on the visa process and specific threats.

   The homeland security mission will face profound technological needs and requirements, and the challenges are substantial. The first challenge derives from the fact that most research and development of new technologies relevant to homeland security will occur outside the new Department--in other agencies, academia, and the private sector. Therefore, the Department will require powerful tools and mechanisms to elicit cooperation from entities external to the Department, and to coordinate R&D efforts across a range of disparate groups, each with their own missions and priorities, in service to homeland security goals. The legislation attempts to provide the Directorate of Science and Technology with the mechanisms it needs to resolve this fundamental coordination problem. The legislation establishes a Security Advanced Research Projects Agency (SARPA), which is inspired by the highly successful Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) of the Department of Defense (DOD). Following the DARPA model, SARPA will have funding, in the form of an Acceleration Fund, to support key homeland security R&D both within and outside of the federal government, and to leverage collaboration on R&D between entities, particularly among the agencies. A second mechanism provided under the legislation is a Science and Technology Council consisting of senior R&D officials from the agencies and other appropriate entities. The Council will assist the Under Secretary in coordinating interagency efforts to execute the science and technology agenda of the Department, primarily through supporting the development of a comprehensive technology roadmap for establishing common priorities and allocating individual responsibilities. Another important mechanism is the ability to directly engage any of the Department of Energy (DOE) national laboratory and sites through joint sponsorship agreements in carrying out R&D activities for homeland security purposes. With respect to bioterrorism research, the Secretary will be able to ensure that the best researchers are focused on developing necessary countermeasures against biothreats by establishing general priorities for biothreat research programs conducted at the National Institutes of Health.

   A second R&D challenge is to assure that the Directorate will have expedient access to broad, deep, and ongoing support for critical analysis and decision-making regarding scientific or technical issues. To address this issue, the legislation provides authority for the Directorate to contract with or establish Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs) to obtain independent analytical, scientific, and technical expertise and support, including support for risk analysis and risk management functions. In addition, an Office of Risk Analysis and Assessment is created within the Directorate to ensure that such risk analysis functions are given institutional priority and conducted internally or through outsourcing to FFRDCs.

   A third challenge is for the Department to develop and effectively manage a critical mass of internal homeland security R&D capabilities. The legislation transfers a number of entities from the Department of Energy, and one to be created in the Department of Defense, that will constitute a core scientific base upon which the Department will conduct in-house R&D efforts central to its mission. Fundamental to developing this in-house expertise is the ability to procure a strong talent base and to engage them in innovative projects quickly. In view of this, the legislation affords the Secretary with flexible management tools to hire and retain top flight scientific and technical personnel, as well as to accelerate R&D and prototype projects to advance the homeland security mission.

   Intelligent and coordinated deployment of technology within the Department is a fourth challenge that must be overcome. Too often, government agencies are hampered and distracted from their fundamental missions as a result of unstructured and technically unsophisticated approaches to technology acquisition and deployment that lead to interoperability problems downstream. The legislation establishes an Office for Technology Evaluation and Transition to assist the Under Secretary in his responsibilities as the chief technology officer and to assure his central role in testing, evaluating, and approving new homeland security technologies being considered by the Department for acquisition.

   Lastly, the Committee recognizes that a sea of scientific and technological expertise and resources resides outside the walls of the Federal government, and has therefore included several provisions to engage the private sector in maintaining our national security. Transition of technology is emphasized throughout the section. An Advisory Panel consisting of experts from the private sector and academia may be convened by the Secretary to advise the Under Secretary and Council and promote communication with non-federal entities. The Office of Technology Evaluation and Transition described earlier will provide a gateway and clearinghouse for companies with innovative technologies relating to homeland security. This Office will also have particular responsibility for facilitating the transition of technologies into fielded systems for use by the Department, other agencies, or private sector entities. Another provision requires the Secretary to articulate a strategy and plan for encouraging biotechnology firms, pharmaceutical companies, and other entities to develop countermeasures against biological and chemical weapons, with a view towards commercial production. A fourth provision directs the Under Secretary to establish a National Emergency Technology Guard composed of teams of volunteer experts in science and technology to assist local communities in responding to and recovering from disasters requiring specialized scientific or technical skills.

   Taken in combination, the mechanisms granted by the legislation provide the Department with an array of tools with which to forcefully tackle the set of R&D challenges confronting it. The legislative history and specific details regarding the legislation are discussed in greater detail below.

   S. 2452, as reported out of the Committee on May 22, contained a provision establishing an Office of Science and Technology within the new Department of Homeland Security. The underlying intent of this provision was to create an R&D entity similar in organization and function to the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, which was selected as an appropriate model for the Department's R&D component in light of the fact that the Department, as originally contemplated, would have had limited capability to conduct R&D internally. Consequently, it was determined that the Department could most effectively initiate and promote R&D in support of its mission through a DARPA-like entity with a lean, flexible organizational structure joined with funding to leverage external interagency collaboration. Since the release of the President's proposal for the Department, and in

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   The legislation redesignates the Office of Science and Technology as the ``Directorate of Science and Technology'' (``Directorate''), and elevates the head of the Directorate to the rank of a Senate-confirmed Under Secretary. This follows the consensus view of the National Academy of Sciences that the Directorate's chief science and technology (S&T) official requires sufficient stature to influence and coordinate S&T policies and activities outside the Department. The Under Secretary will be responsible for executing the Directorate's mission of managing and supporting R&D activities to meet national homeland security needs and objectives; articulating national R&D goals, priorities, and strategies pursuant to the mission of the Department; coordinating with entities within and outside government to advance the R&D agenda of the Department; advising the Secretary of the Department on all scientific and technical matters; facilitating the transfer and deployment of technologies critical to homeland security needs; and generally serving as the Department's chief technology officer.

   The legislation provides a number of key components to assist the Directorate in meeting its mission. First among these is SARPA, the new R&D agency modeled after DARPA that was established in the original version of the legislation and is retained in the amended legislation. DARPA was created in 1958 in response to the launch of Sputnik. It is an organization that recruits outstanding scientific and technical talent and funds high-risk, high-payoff projects that offer the potential for revolutionary advances. DARPA's nimble, aggressive and creative approach has consistently produced impressive and effective war-fighting technologies. Moreover, in the course of fulfilling its central mission, DARPA has developed technologies with broad commercial and societal application, such as the Internet. Of particular significance to the Committee in selecting DARPA as a model for the S&T apparatus in the Department is DARPA's use of its funding to leverage R&D investments in other parts of DOD, effectively generating a multiplier effect that maximizes DARPA's contribution to national defense in disproportion to its actual funding level. Over five decades, DARPA has been recognized as one of the most productive engines of technological innovation in the U.S. government.

   While DARPA concentrates primarily on the development of revolutionary technologies, SARPA will have a broader focus consistent with its larger mission. Since there are many technologies relevant to homeland security in various stages of development and deployment, SARPA will promote a wide range of technology development, transition, and deployment efforts, as well as research for revolutionary new technologies. Nevertheless, the Committee anticipates that with an Acceleration Fund authorized at $200 million for FY03, SARPA will have the foundation for replicating or exceeding DARPA's success in catalyzing critical new technologies by initiating and leveraging R&D among public, private, or university innovators. Under an amendment offered by Senator Stevens, ten percent of the Acceleration Fund is to be allocated to Coast Guard homeland security R&D missions for FY'04 and FY'05 through a joint agreement with the Commandant of the Coast Guard.

   While Congress should restrain itself in directing particular management strategies, it is the Committee's expectation that SARPA will take full advantage of evolving modern management strategies in the R&D field, particularly in assuring effective technology transition. For example, the Committee would expect SARPA to engage in a careful ``needs identification'' effort which involves eventual technology ``users'' in its R&D roadmapping and planning exercises. The Committee also expects that it operate not simply as a traditional research organization but that it explore methods to involve venture participants, incubate new technologies, encourage the startup process, facilitate prototyping, and promote strategic government and private sector supporters and investors. SARPA will also need to actively encourage connections with technology first-adopters in and out of government, and establish interactive feedback systems for technology development and deployment to ensure sustained interaction between front-line researchers and with users.

   To support the Directorate and its functions, an interagency Science and Technology Council, which is the successor to the Science and Technology Steering Council contained in the original version of the legislation, will advise the Under Secretary on priorities and strategies for homeland security R&D. This Council will consist of senior R&D officials from across the government and will serve to facilitate interagency coordination on R&D activities pertinent to homeland security. One of the chief responsibilities of the Council will be to assist the Under Secretary in developing overarching technology roadmap that will enable a coherent national homeland security R&D program to be coordinated among the many federal agencies.

   The Administration's proposal contemplated the designation of one of the DOE national laboratories to serve as the primary research and development center for the Department. However, in recognition of the extensive scope and nature of homeland security R&D, as well as the different research and technology-related capabilities possessed by each of the DOE laboratories and sites, the GAC-endorsed legislation establishes in the Directorate an Office for National Laboratories to coordinate and utilize such entities in creating a networked laboratory system to support the missions of the Department. Through joint sponsorship agreements with the DOE, the legislation allows the Department to easily access and benefit from the combined expertise of all of the DOE laboratories and sites.

   The Department will have extraordinary analytical needs cutting across of all of its Directorates, especially with regard to the assessment, analysis, and management of threats, vulnerabilities, and risks. Although the Administration's bill did not specifically address this need, the President's Strategic Plan released in mid-July suggests that risk analysis is a fundamental issue that needs to be addressed in planning for our nation's security. Although the legislation vests ultimate responsibility for risk analysis and risk management by the Department with the Secretary, all the Directorates will be required to assist the Secretary in coordination with each other and consistent with their own missions. The Directorate of Science and Technology has a contributing role to play in this framework by providing the Secretary and the other Directorates with scientific and technical support for such functions. To ensure that the Directorate has access to the requisite resources and expertise to fulfill its risk analysis responsibilities and other research-related functions, the legislation gives the Department the power to contract with or establish FFRDCs-independent, non-profit institutions that conduct analysis and provide support integral to the mission and operation of the sponsoring agency. Thirty-six FFRDCs across the nation have proven indispensable in enabling the government to undertake research with a creativity and flexibility not always available within the confines of a federal agency. The importance of FFRDCs is underscored by a prominent study on homeland security conducted by the National Academy of Sciences, which recommended the establishment of an FFRDC to furnish capabilities related to risk analysis, scenario-based threat assessments, red teaming, and other functions. Moreover, an Office of Risk Analysis and Assessment is created within the Directorate to ensure that these functions are given institutional priority and carried out--whether internally or through outsourcing to FFRDCs--in a coordinated manner in accordance with the Secretary's requirements and overall management. This Office will assume operational responsibility within the Directorate and on behalf of the Under Secretary for supporting the risk analysis and risk management needs of the Secretary and the other Directorates, as well as help ensure that R&D activities are aligned with risks and threats.

   The President's proposal included language that would grant the Department control over funds appropriated to the National Institute of Health (NIH) for bioterrorism research. Although the provision clearly contemplated that these funds would remain committed to the NIH for application in accordance with the Department's guidelines, the Committee was concerned that the provision technically allowed for such funds to be transferred to other agencies, thereby depriving the NIH of funding necessary to conduct its critical research in this area. With the collaboration of staff from the Administration and Senator Thompson's office, a final provision was negotiated under which NIH funds would not be transferred out of the HHS. Instead, through joint strategic agreements, the Secretary of the Department would set general research priorities for the funds, while the HHS would establish the specific scientific research agenda as well as award and manage all grants. This modified language will protect our strategic commitment to biodefense research, while leaving the means and methods for this research to the scientists at the NIH.

   The President's proposal targeted a number of R&D entities and programs in other agencies for transfer into the Department. While the Committee does not agree with all of the Administration's transfers, it recognizes the value of providing the Department with a critical base of in-house R&D capabilities. Therefore, most of the programs targeted by the Administration have been moved, including the chemical, biological, and nuclear threat assessment and detection programs within the Department of Energy (DOE) relevant to homeland security, and the National Bio-Weapons Defense Analysis Center to be created within the Department of Defense. The transferred programs will be collectively supervised by a new Office of Laboratory Research. Together, these transferred entities will confer a basic in-house research capability with the resident scientific expertise to help the Directorate better coordinate the broader government-wide homeland R&D portfolio.

   Given that the Federal government represents only one of several sectors in our nation with R&D resources and expertise, the Department will require mechanisms to engage and benefit from private sector and academic efforts regarding homeland security. Toward this end, the legislation allows for the establishment of an Advisory Panel consisting of experts from the private sector,

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   The Directorate will also include an Office for Technology Evaluation and Transition, which will serve as a clearinghouse and national point-of-contact for companies and other entities that possess technologies relevant to homeland security. The Office will evaluate these technologies and, if appropriate, assist in developing and transitioning them into Department entities or other agencies possessing matching needs. The Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) provides an applicable model for this function, and the legislation requires the Office to coordinate with or work through TSWG, or use TSWG as a model, in performing this technology solicitation and transition role. It is also intended that this Office serve as the Department's internal center for testing and evaluating new technologies being considered for acquisition or deployment by the Department or its entities. The new Department will be a large one, and very dependent on technology in carrying out its homeland mission. As a result, it is vital that new technologies deployed in the Department's component Directorates and other entities be compatible and interoperable to ensure efficiency and expanded capability. The Office, by performing the Department's testing and evaluation function, will support the Under Secretary in carrying out his duties as the Department's chief technology officer. In addition to conducting testing and evaluation activities for the Department, the Office will also coordinate with the Department's Chief Information Officer and with other agencies in promoting government-wide compatibility and interoperability with regard to homeland security technologies and systems.

   Rapidly developing medicines and antidotes to counter chemical and biological weapons is an enormous challenge and one that government-supported R&D cannot accomplish on its own. The legislation directs the Secretary to implement a strategy to engage the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries in the critical research and product development that will produce antidotes and vaccines to the chemical and biological weapons that terrorists may employ against our nation. This strategy should explore and suggest ways to provide incentives and facilitate ``bench-to-bedside'' transition for these products.

   Recognizing that technological prowess in this country is in communities, as well as colleges and companies, the Department must tap the boundless expertise and energy of ordinary citizens. Drawing on legislation developed in the Senate Commerce Committee, the legislation endorsed by the Committee creates a National Emergency Technology Guard of volunteers with expertise in science and technology to assist local communities in responding to and recovering from emergencies requiring scientific or technical expertise.

   As reported on May 22, S. 2452 included a Directorate of Emergency Preparedness and Response, with FEMA as its core. The new GAC-endorsed legislation retains this directorate and expands it to include some of the programs the Administration proposed moving to the new department. This amendment also provides that the President may appoint the same person to serve as both the Director of FEMA and the Under Secretary for this directorate.

   This directorate's responsibilities include organizing and training local entities to respond to emergencies and providing State and local authorities with equipment for detection, protection, and decontamination in an emergency involving weapons of mass destruction; overseeing Federal, State, and local emergency preparedness training and exercise programs; assembling a single Federal disaster plan to help orchestrate Federal assistance for any emergency; coordinating among private sector entities, including the health community, in emergency planning and response activities; and developing a comprehensive plan to address the interface of medical informatics and the medical response to terrorism. (Medical informatics is the scientific field that addresses the storage, retrieval, sharing, and optimal use of biomedical information, data, and knowledge for problem-solving and decision-making.) This directorate also creates a National Crisis Action Center to coordinate federal support for State and local governments and the private sector during a crisis; additionally, the directorate is responsible for ensuring the appropriate integration of operational activities of the Department of Defense, the National Guard, and other federal agencies in the Federal Response Plan in order to respond to acts of terrorism and other disasters.

   In addition to FEMA, the Emergency Preparedness and Response directorate transfers the National Office of Domestic Preparedness, within the FBI. This entity was created by the Attorney General in 1998 and coordinates federal efforts to assist state and local emergency responders with training and materials necessary to respond to an event involving weapons of mass destruction. The Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP) within the Department of Justice is also transferred. ODP was developed to help train State and local law enforcement agencies to respond to terrorist incidents.

   The Administration proposed transferring the Select Agent Registration Enforcement Program from the Centers for Disease Control within the Department of Health and Human Services, to the Department. The Select Agent Registration Enforcement Program was developed to identify all biological agents and toxins that may threaten public health and safety, regulate the transfer of such agents and toxins, and establish a registration scheme regulating their possession, use, and transfer. The GAC-endorsed legislation transfers this program to the Emergency Preparedness and Response directorate because it is a program critical to preparing for and responding to a public health emergency. The Under Secretary for Science and Technology, the Secretary of Agriculture, and the Director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention will work together to establish and update the list of toxins to be monitored.

   Like the Administration's proposal, the GAC-endorsed legislation transfers the Strategic National Stockpile to the new department. The Strategic National Stockpile is a stockpile of drugs and vaccines that may be used in the event of a terrorist attack or other emergencies. However, because of CDC's experience and expertise, the legislation allows for the Stockpile to be managed on a day-to-day basis for the Department by CDC through a new Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Division, which is created in this legislation pursuant to an amendment from Senator Cleland. However, the Department would remain in charge of the overall strategic planning concerning the Stockpile. The Public Health Emergency and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 authorized funds for both the Stockpile and the acquisition of smallpox vaccine doses and potassium iodide. Consequently, the GAC-endorsed legislation transfers responsibility for the acquisition of smallpox doses and potassium iodide to this directorate as well.

   Finally, the Administration also proposed transferring the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Public Health Preparedness (OPHP) from the Department of Health and Human Services to the Emergency Preparedness and Response directorate. This office has three primary components: (1) the awarding and administration of state and local grants for public health preparedness; (2) the Principal Science Advisor, who advises the Secretary on the global R&D strategy for HHS; and, (3) the Office of Emergency Preparedness, which manages rapid-response emergency health and first-responder personnel. From this Office of the Assistant Secretary for Public Health Preparedness, the GAC-endorsed legislation transfers the Office of Emergency Preparedness.

   The other two components of the OPHP each play a role in emergency response, but also a very extensive role in general public health. Because they perform a dual-use function, and because of their extensive interaction with other parts of HHS, it does not seem appropriate to transfer them to the new department. Additionally, experts in the public health and biomedical communities expressed concern that the Administration's proposal would not operate effectively. The OPHP was established to address the problems of intra-agency communication and coordination, and it could reverse the gains achieved by this office to remove it from the department with which it is primarily engaged. Indeed, HHS would be probably be forced to re-create this capacity internally if OPHP were transferred to the Department.

   At the same time, it is important the Department have in-house capability to address biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. Consequently, the Department would include those public health and biomedical programs--the OEP, the Select Agent Registration Enforcement Programs, and the Strategic National Stockpile--which focus primarily on terrorism and emergency response.

   SECRET SERVICE

   The legislation adopts the Administration's proposal to include the United States Secret Service as a distinct entity reporting directly to the Secretary. The Service has a dual mission of protection and investigation, with a central focus on preventing attacks and other missions now very relevant to terrorist threats. The Service was originally created to safeguard the country's currency and financial payment systems, and it remains the sole agency charged with enforcing the counterfeiting statutes. Its responsibility for protecting the country's financial infrastructure has led to an expansion of the Service's investigative mission, which now includes crimes involving identity theft, credit card fraud, false identification documents, computer fraud, and financial institution fraud. In addition, the Secret Service is well-known for its mission to protect the nation's highest elected leaders and their families, as well as visiting heads of state. In recent years, the Secret Service has assumed responsibility for planning, coordinating, and implementing security operations at National Special Security Events, as designated by the President. It also has created the National Threat Assessment Center, which provides advice and training to law enforcement and other organizations with responsibilities to investigate or prevent targeted violence.

   The missions of the Secret Service have a clear connection to the fundamental mission of the new Department. Its protective mission is central to safeguarding the country's

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   STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT COORDINATION

   Homeland security is clearly a joint responsibility among the Federal, State, and local governments. There are many ways in which the bill recognizes the importance of these relationships and places a high priority on ensuring that the Department works closely with, and provides significant assistance to, State and local agencies. To coordinate this effort, the Department will have an office devoted to facilitating effective communications and partnerships with State and local government. The Office for State and Local Government Coordination will be established within the office of the Secretary to ensure that the needs and role of State and local governments are considered throughout the work of each of the Department's directorates. In addition to coordinating the activities of the Department relating to State and local governments, the Office will be responsible for assessing and advocating for the resources needed by State and local government to implement the national strategy for combating terrorism. This advocacy function is necessary so that budget decisions to implement the national strategy are made with the full understanding of the role that State and local governments will play in implementing the strategy, as well as the resources necessary at all levels of government for success.

   The Secretary, in conjunction with the Director of the National Office for Combating Terrorism, is responsible for working with State and local governments to develop a national strategy for combating terrorism--not simply a Federal strategy. Thus, the Office for State and Local Government Coordination will develop a process for receiving meaningful input from State and local government to assist in the development of the strategy for homeland security and other homeland activities. The Office will also provide State and local government with regular information, research, and technical support to assist local efforts at securing the homeland.

   The GAC-endorsed legislation incorporates an amendment, offered by Senators Collins and Carper, which creates the position of Chief Homeland Security Liaison Officer, who is charged with coordinating the efforts of homeland security liaison officers in each state. These liaison officers will work with State and local first responders to make sure that these organizations receive the training and resources they need. A Federal Interagency Committee on First Responders will bring together the federal agencies that work most closely with State and local first responders and will be counseled by an Advisory Council, including representatives of first responders and urban and rural communities.

   To further encourage communication and coordination between the Department and State and local agencies, the GAC-endorsed legislation authorizes the Secretary to establish an employee exchange program. This program--which was suggested by Senator Voinovich--would allow employees of the Department and State and local agencies with homeland security responsibilities to work together, to share their specialized expertise, and to enhance their ability to assess threats against the country, develop appropriate responses, and inform the public. Employees who participate in the program must have appropriate training or experience to perform the work required by the assignment, and assignments must be structured to appropriately safeguard classified and other sensitive information.

   OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

   The legislation includes an amendment offered by Senator Thompson that creates an Office of International Affairs within the office of the Secretary. The Director of the Office will be responsible for promoting the exchange of information with foreign nations to encourage sharing of best practices and technologies relating to homeland security. This information exchange will include joint research and development on countermeasures, joint training exercises for first responders, exchange programs, and international conferences. The Director will manage the activities under this provision in consultation with the Department of State and other relevant Federal officials. These programs will be developed first with countries that are already highly focused on homeland security issues and that have previously engaged in fruitful cooperation with the United States in the area of counterterrorism.

   MANAGEMENT AND TRANSITION ISSUES

   Management structure

   The Administration's proposed legislation calls for the appointment of a number of management officials to support the Secretary in carrying out the mission of the Department. The Committee-endorsed legislation includes much, though not all, of the management structure proposed by the Administration.

   Secretary--First and foremost, the Committee-endorsed legislation calls for a strong Secretary, vested with effective, centralized management authority over what will be a large new organization. Although responsibilities under this legislation are allocated among the various Directorates, it is intended that all powers provided under this bill be subject to the full control and direction of the Secretary. Also, while the bill establishes the basic organizational framework for the new Department and establishes its principal components, carrying out this organizational task is only part of the role that the new Secretary must play. While a number of more subjective management factors cannot be defined in statutory language, we anticipate that the new Secretary will need to spend a great deal of time on key management tasks that cannot be embodied in a formal organizational structure. These tasks include: creating a sense of shared values across the new Department and its disparate components; ensuring that core skills and competencies are both developed and shared across the Department; developing an effective common departmental strategy for achieving the agency's missions with buy-in among component agencies; deciding on the key systems and management processes apart from the organizational structure that will manage and bind together the new Department; assuring that the success of those systems and processes are measured and evaluated frequently to test their performance; ensuring that departmental personnel gain experience in a variety of agency components to encourage cross-agency thinking, capability, and solutions so that the synergy of a new Department can be realized, and establishing a leadership style that will create a strong organizational culture based on the values and attitudes the new Department must have to effectively perform its mission. The bill aims to create a structure that will enable the new Secretary to carry out these critical management efforts.

   The Department will be headed by a Presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed Secretary. The Secretary's duties include developing policies and plans for the promotion of homeland security, carrying out and promoting the other established missions of entities transferred to the Department, and developing a comprehensive strategy for combating terrorism and the homeland security response in conjunction with the Director of the National Office for Combating Terrorism.

   The Secretary is charged with consulting with the Secretary of Defense and the nation's governors to integrate the National Guard into the nation's strategy to combat terrorism. The Secretary must also consult and coordinate with the Secretary of Defense regarding military organization, equipment, and assets that are critical to fighting terrorism, as well as the training of personnel to respond to terrorist attacks involving chemical or biological agents.

   Section 102 details numerous other duties of the Secretary.

   Deputy Secretary--Section 103 provides for appointment of a Deputy Secretary, subject to Senate confirmation, responsible for assisting the Secretary.

   Under Secretary for Management--The Administration proposal calls for the appointment of an Under Secretary for Management with broad responsibilities for management and administration of the Department. Section 104 of the Committee-endorsed bill establishes this position with substantially the same responsibilities as in the Administration bill. These include budget and other financial matters, procurement, human resources and personnel, information technology and communications, facilities and other material resources, security for the Department, and managing performance measures for the Department.

   Assistant Secretaries--The Administration requested authority for the President to appoint not more than six Senate-confirmed Assistant Secretaries, without specifying in statute what the responsibilities of these officers would be. Following generally the Administration's approach, section 105 of the legislation authorizes the President to appoint up to five such Assistant Secretaries (these do not include the two additional, Senate-confirmed Assistant Secretary positions, with immigration-related functions, established in division B of the legislation.) The President must describe the general responsibilities when submitting a nominee for confirmation. The authority of the President to assign functions to up to five Assistant Secretaries should provide important flexibility in designing the management structure for the Department.

   Inspector General--The Department will include an office of Inspector General under the Inspector General Act of 1978, thereby applying the authorities and independence provided under that Act. The legislation would define a narrow set of circumstances under which the Secretary could prohibit the Inspector General from carrying out an investigation or performing other duties if necessary in the interest of national security or other compelling circumstances specified in the legislation. This language is modeled closely on provisions that apply to the Inspectors General at the Departments of Justice, Defense, and Treasury, the United States Postal Service, and the Central Intelligence Agency. Also modeled closely on provisions applicable at Treasury, is a provision

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   Chief Financial Officer--The legislation would establish a Chief Financial Officer (CFO) and a Chief Information Officer (CIO) at the new Department. Section 107 would define the Department as an agency under the CFO Act, thereby making applicable the requirements of the CFO Act of 1994, regarding, for example, the qualifications and responsibilities of the CFO and annual financial reporting. Under the CFO Act, the CFO at the Department must be either appointed by the President subject to Senate confirmation, or designated by the President, in consultation with the Secretary, from among Senate-confirmed officials at the Department.

   Chief Information Officer--Section 108 of the legislation would establish a Chief Information Officer (CIO) at the new Department. Furthermore, the provisions of law defining the responsibilities of the CIO, including the Paperwork Reduction Act and Clinger-Cohen, would apply by their own terms to the new Department. Under applicable law, the CIO need not be Senate-confirmed.

   Chief Human Capital Officer--The Secretary must appoint or designate a Chief Human Capital Officer to advise and assist the Department in workforce skills, training, recruitment, retention, and other issues necessary to attract and retain a highly qualified workforce.

   Civil Rights Office--Section 110 of the bill establishes a Civil Rights Office, whose head will be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. The Office will have two important functions. First, the Civil Rights Office will have responsibility for coordinating the administration of and ensuring compliance with laws prohibiting discrimination against Department employees and beneficiaries of Department programs (see, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §2000d, 2000e-16).

   Second, it will advise the Secretary, as well as the Department's directorates and offices, on the constitutional and statutory framework that governs the Department's interactions with the citizenry at large and help develop and implement policies that ensure that consideration of this group's civil rights are appropriately incorporated and implemented in Department programs and activities. It also will oversee the Department's compliance with requirements related to the civil rights of individuals affected by the Department's programs and activities. Authority to investigate specific complaints by the citizenry at large of civil rights or civil liberties violations, however, will reside in the Office of the Inspector General, to which the Civil Rights Office will refer any matter that, in the opinion of the Civil Rights Officer, warrants further investigation.

   Privacy Officer--A Chief Privacy Officer will oversee the Department's compliance with privacy laws and help ensure that personal information is appropriately safeguarded. Several federal agencies that deal with sensitive personal information, such as the Internal Revenue Service and the U.S. Postal Service, currently have similar privacy advocates to aid in the development of policies and provide assistance to agency officials. The Chief Privacy Officer's mandate extends beyond overseeing compliance with existing privacy laws, such as the Privacy Act, and includes assisting in the development of policies that incorporate privacy safeguards and minimize the risk of inappropriate disclosure or use of personal information. The Privacy Officer may also assist in the development of privacy impact assessments, when required by law or considered appropriate by the Secretary, which are documents that explain how an agency takes into account privacy considerations when initiating information collections and developing information systems.

   The Constitution clearly assigns to Congress what is called the ``power of the purse''--the power to appropriate funds and to prescribe the conditions governing the use of those funds. The Framers thus made Congress responsible to the people for how the people's money gets spent. The legislation contains provisions reaffirming that appropriated funds may be used only for the purposes stated by Congress. To provide for initial funding of the Department, the legislation requires the Administration to submit a transition plan and proposed budget by September 15, 2002, so that Congress can appropriate timely start-up funds based on that proposal.

   By contrast, the Administration has requested that the new Department be excepted from the traditional arrangements regarding the use of appropriated funds. For initial funding for the Department, the Administration proposed to take funds (up to 5%) from each agency slated for transfer to the Department and use these funds for any purpose under the legislation. This could total roughly $2 billion. To adjust funding priorities without having to go back to Congress, the Administration requested permanent power to take funds (up to 5%) from each appropriations account in the Department and use those funds for any other purpose in the Department.

   Senator Byrd and Senator Stevens, the Chairman and Ranking Member of the Appropriations Committee, respectively, wrote to me expressing their strong legal objection to the appropriation transfer provisions requested by the Administration:

   ``The proposal by the President provides the new Secretary with extraordinary powers, powers that could potentially tip the delicate balance of constitutional powers between the Legislative and Executive branches of government. These are powers that the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State do not currently have, nor should they have. The Framers carefully crafted that balance, and it has served the nation well for more than 200 years.''

   Senators Byrd and Stevens also requested that the legislation include provisions to sustain existing law and practice governing the use of appropriated funds, and language that they agreed to is included in the legislation. These provisions are designed to provide for establishment of the Department, while preserving the customary and Constitutional role of Congress in appropriating funds and in ensuring that such funds are used effectively and efficiently and according to the will of the people, as expressed through their elected Senators and Representatives.

   Under the legislation, initial funding for the Department will be provided through appropriations Acts, not through transfer of funds appropriated for other purposes. To provide this initial funding in a timely fashion, the legislation requires the President to submit a transition plan by September 15, 2002, including a proposal for financing the initial operations of the Department. The financing proposal might consist of any combination of specific appropriations transfers, specific reprogrammings, or specific new appropriations. By putting the Administration on notice, even before the legislation is enacted, this provision has given the Administration ample time to submit their plan while Congress still has time to act on the Administration's proposal.

   To further clarify that initial funding will be provided by appropriations acts, the legislation states that transferred funds may only be used for their original purposes unless Congress approves in advance a reallocation of such funds. This provision does not limit the ability of an agency transferred to the Department to use transferred funds for a new position previously authorized in law, but does reinforce that transferred funds may not be used to fund a new position established under this legislation itself.

   Looking beyond the transition period, the Administration sought to justify its request for power to transfer appropriations by stating, in the analysis accompanying the Administration's proposed legislation: ``Appropriations transfer provisions are enacted annually in a number of appropriations acts.'' While declining now to grant the broad, permanent transfer power requested by the Administration, this Committee-endorsed legislation does not address whether any power to transfer funds should subsequently be included in annual appropriations acts for the Department. In fact, annual appropriations bills often build in such flexibility, but more often in smaller amounts under close oversight by Congress. The proper way for the Administration to seek this authority is to request it as part of their annual appropriations, not as permanent authority in the enabling legislation.

   The Committee concluded that the Congress and the Executive Branch must fully understand the annual and multi-year funding requirements for the Department to ascertain the most appropriate funding levels to protect the American people from homeland security threats.

   Accordingly, the GAC-endorsed legislation requires the new Department, beginning with the fiscal year 2005 budget request, to submit annually a Future Years Homeland Security Program to accompany the annual departmental budget request and the National Terrorism Prevention and Response Program Budget mandated elsewhere in the Committee-approved legislation. The language requires that Future Years Homeland Security Program be structured, and include the same type of information and level of detail, as the Future Years Defense Program required by statute to be submitted to the Congress by the Department of Defense.

   S. 2452, as reported on May 22, set an effective date of 180 days after enactment for the transfer of personnel and assets to the new Department, and included ``savings provisions'' to generally preserve the status quo with respect to the ongoing missions of the agencies being transferred. The Administration's subsequent proposed legislation requested greater flexibility with respect to the timing of the transition by giving the President discretion to move agencies at any time over a one-year transition period. It also requested further flexibilities to enable the Administration to make certain incidental transfers and to allocate transferred assets and personnel.

   The GAC-approved legislation now includes, in subtitle B of title XI, transition provisions based on the corresponding provisions of the Administration's proposed legislation. These provisions include most of the transition-related flexibilities requested by the Administration. The principal exceptions are that, under the GAC-endorsed legislation, the Administration would not have the flexibility to use funds, appropriated by Congress for one purpose, for a different purpose (discussed above), or in the area of withdrawing collective bargaining rights from personnel transferred or employed in the new Department.

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   Following the Administration's approach, the Committee-approved legislation adopts from the Administration bill an effective date and a ``transition period''--the effective date is generally 30 days after enactment (unless enacted less than 30 days before January 1, 2003, in which case that is the effective date), and the ``transition period'' is the one year period following the effective date. The President is then authorized to direct the transfer of any asset to the Department at any time the President directs, up to the end of the transition period. This should allow agencies to be transferred to the Department in an orderly progression, leaving the Administration free to determine which are in a position to be transferred first.

   This legislation, by bringing numerous agencies responsible for homeland security together for the first time under a single chain-of-command responsible for policy and funding, represents one of the most significant reorganizations of the Federal government. However, once these agencies are consolidated into one Department, further reorganization of offices and functions at the departmental level may be needed to integrate incoming offices and to gain additional coordination, efficiency, and effectiveness. The legislation provides for departmental reorganization, by: (1) authorizing the Secretary to reorganize unilaterally to the extent consistent with applicable law; and (2) instructing the Secretary to recommend legislation enabling specific further reorganization involving organizational structures established in law.

   The Administration has not offered a proposal for departmental reorganization for consideration by Congress, but, instead, requested that the Secretary be granted the power generally to conduct such reorganizations unilaterally. Under the Administration's proposal, the only limits on this reorganization power would be that the Secretary could not abolish the Secret Service or the Coast Guard, and the Secretary would have to give Congress 90 days notice before overriding a statute.

   Many of the statutes establishing entities and assigning functions reflect important policy judgments of Congress and ongoing critical missions required by law, however, and it would be inappropriate for Congress to cede to the executive the power to override these statutes unilaterally, without opportunity for Congress to evaluate, debate, and decide. This view was also expressed by a Senator Byrd and Senator Stevens, the leaders of the Senate Appropriations Committee, in a letter stating their objection to a provision in the President's proposal:

   ``Congress should not authorize the Executive Branch to establish, consolidate, alter, or discontinue agencies of government that are established in statute. This is Congress' responsibility.''

   The legislation establishes reorganization authorities and procedures designed to enable the Secretary to achieve an efficient and effective structure for the Department, while maintaining the appropriate role of Congress in deciding whether statutory law should be changed. Under section 191 of the bill, the Secretary can proceed, without further congressional approval, with any reorganization that does not change organizational structure established by law. The Secretary can perform substantial reorganization and consolidation under this authority. For example, agency units responsible for human resources, information technology or other management functions are typically not established in law, so the Secretary could conduct substantial reorganization and consolidation of such functions to make them more efficient and effective.

   Furthermore, as the Secretary identifies specific entities established in law that he or she believes should be reorganized, the legislation instructs the Secretary to submit recommendations to Congress on an ongoing basis for legislation providing for such reorganization. Specifically, section 185(d)(1)(B) of the legislation requires the Secretary to recommend any legislation that the Secretary determines necessary to ``reorganize agencies, executive positions, and the assignment of functions within the Department.'' Anticipating that the Secretary may develop reorganization proposals over the one-year transition period, the bill does not require the Secretary to submit these recommendations as a single reorganization plan, but rather requires submission of these recommendations as they become available, the first no later than 6 months after enactment of the Act and any subsequent recommendations at least every 6 months thereafter until 6 months after the transition is completed.

   The legislation specifies that several of the agencies transferred to Department--i.e., the United States Customs Service, the United States Coast Guard, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the United States Secret Service--each ``shall be maintained as a distinct entity within the Department.'' This requirement does not impose precise constraints on the Secretary's authority to reorganize with respect to these agencies, since each of these agencies is established by law and this legislation prohibits the Secretary from reorganizing in contravention of such law. Instead, the ``distinct entity'' requirements serves as an instruction to the President and Secretary that Congress intends that the unique identity of each of these four agencies should be preserved.

   Under current law, the President and Secretary can reward excellence, remove poorly performing employees, offer recruitment bonuses, and use many other performance-oriented management tools. In an effort to give the Department and other agencies additional flexibility in the management of personnel, our legislation adopts significant, government-wide civil service reforms, contained in provisions proposed by Senators Voinovich and Akaka. To support research and development, we also provided the Secretary of Homeland Security authority to use innovative techniques to hire talent and fund projects. Taken together, this package will give the Secretary the ability to: speed up staffing of new employees; recruit and retain top science and technology talent; procure temporary services outside the civil service system when there is a critical need; reshape the workforce; reform old competitive-hiring practices; provide more effective bonuses for exemplary performance; promote procurement flexibility in research, development, the prototyping of new technologies, and other procurement; and make additional valuable changes to help the new Department attract, maintain, and motivate the best talent. These reforms represent a major modernization of the way federal agencies are managed.

   SEN. VOINOVICH'S AND SEN. AKAKA'S AMENDMENT

   Division C of the legislation contains important provisions to strengthen significantly the management of the federal workforce government-wide that were offered at the Committee's business meeting by Senators Voinovich and Akaka, and were agreed to by the Committee by voice vote.

   The Voinovich-Akaka amendment establishes a chief human capital officer (CHCO) at each major agency (i.e., at the agencies required to have Chief Financial Officers under the CFO Act). The primary responsibility is to advise and assist their respective directors in selecting, developing, training, and managing a high-quality workforce. The creation of a CHCO is intended to help identify and prioritize the recruitment, retention, and workforce management needs across the government. The CHCO will have added importance in the new Department, because consolidation of the different agencies into the Department will pose unique recruitment, retention, training, and workforce management challenges. The CHCO will heighten awareness of workforce issues and provide leadership in resolving these issues.

   Another section of the Voinovich-Akaka provision, Section 2202 in the GAC-endorsed legislation, allows agencies to hire candidates directly and bypass the current civil-service hiring requirements once the Office of Personnel Management has determined that there is a severe shortage of candidates for the position. This provision also allows agencies to streamline its staffing procedures by authorizing more flexible merit assessment tools. This will make the government more competitive with the private sector by improving the federal hiring process.

   The Voinovich-Akaka provisions include government-wide authority for Voluntary Separation Incentive Payments and Voluntary Early Retirement Authority, two programs currently allowed only in limited situations. The expansion of this authority would give agencies the flexibility required to reorganize the workforce should an agency need to undergo substantial consolidation, transfer of functions, or other substantial workforce reshaping. The provision would allow agencies to reduce high-grade, managerial, or supervisory positions, correct skill imbalances, and reduce operating costs without being forced to reduce overall staff levels.

   The Voinovich-Akaka proposal increases the cap on the total annual compensation of senior executives, Administrative Law Judges, officers of the court, and other senior level positions to allow career executives to receive performance awards and other authorized payments within the cap in a single year. This will enable agencies to better reward excellence in the ranks of the most senior and experienced parts of the workforce. It also includes measures to help federal employees earn academic degrees, a step that will help enable agencies to build a highly trained workforce and retain valuable employees who wish to continue their education. To fill the serious gap in foreign language skills across the federal government, which is a particular homeland security problem, Section 2402 eases the restrictions on placement of National Security Education Program (NSEP) fellows who are proficient in languages critical to our national security. The provision would allow NSEP fellows to work in a non-national security position in the federal government, including a homeland security position, if a national security position is not available.

   These authorities complement the flexible authority in Section 135 enabling the Science and Technology Directorate to attract outstanding scientists and technologists.

   All these detailed and carefully considered personnel provisions provide the Administration with a major management opportunity and flexibility.

   It is our responsibility to ensure that Federal agencies with a role in homeland security can purchase--quickly and efficiently--the most high-tech and sophisticated products and services to support antiterrorism efforts and to defend against biological, chemical, nuclear, or radiological attacks. Last year's National Defense Authorization Act provided the Department of Defense with many of these authorities. Title V of this bill

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   Title V would give Federal agencies new procurement flexibility in fighting terrorism. It would streamline procurement procedures for contingency operations or peacekeeping and humanitarian operations; permit agencies to use more ``commercial-style'' contracting procedures for technologies or products which are cutting-edge; and require agencies to do ongoing market research to identify new companies, including small businesses, with new capabilities to help agencies in the fight against terrorism.

   Title V also requires that the Comptroller General complete a review of the extent to which procurements and services have been made in accordance with this subtitle and submit a report on the results of the review.

   There is a one year sunset for these provisions.

   This authority complements the flexible procurement authority in Section 135 concerning R&D and technology prototyping.

   The Committee-approved legislation authorizes the Secretary to hire experts and consultants, in accordance with existing law, for periods of up to one year and subject to a pay cap equivalent to the GS-15 level. However, the amendment provides additional hiring flexibility to the Secretary by expanding his authority under current law if necessary to meet urgent homeland security needs. In such cases, the Secretary may obtain personal services, including those of experts or consultants, for periods not to exceed one year without a ceiling on the amount of compensation that may be paid to those individuals. These provisions will allow the Secretary to meet critical needs of the Department by securing the services of individuals with specialized experience and expertise.

   During the Cold War, Presidents acquired the power to take away--by executive order--the collective bargaining rights of particular agencies or subdivisions when he determines that national security is at stake. Agency managers may also remove from collective bargaining individual employees engaged in certain kinds of work directly affecting national security, subject to review by the independent Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA).

   Most of the tens of thousands of employees that will make up the new Department will be transferred from existing federal agencies, and the Congressional Research Service estimates that about 43,000 (mostly in the Customs Service, the INS, the Coast Guard and FEMA) are now represented by unions. Thus far, no President--including President Bush--has tried to deny collective bargaining rights to these workers. Nevertheless, these existing employees are fearful they will lose their collective bargaining rights simply by virtue of being transferred to a department organized around a mission of homeland security--even if their duties remain substantially the same.

   The Committee-approved legislation seeks to provide these employees some reassurance. It provides that, for offices and employees transferred into the Department with pre-existing rights to unionize, those rights may not be withdrawn on an office-wide basis by executive order. However, the legislation still provides the Administration ample authority to remove collective bargaining rights if national security is at issue. These rights can be withdrawn from individual employees if their primary job duty materially changes and consists of intelligence, counterintelligence, or investigative duties related to terrorism investigation and their membership in a collective-bargaining unit would adversely affect national security. If so, following existing procedures, Department managers may remove employees from collective bargaining immediately upon determining that such action is warranted, subject to review by the FLRA. Thus, for the employees of offices transferred to the Department with existing rights to form a union, the Committee-endorsed legislation allows the Administration to immediately take employees out of collective bargaining to protect national security, but requires the Administration to state clear reasons for doing so and allows for due process review.

   Furthermore, with respect to newly created offices at the Department, the legislation retains the President's authority to remove collective bargaining rights from an entire office by executive order, if the primary function of the office is intelligence, counterintelligence, or investigative duties directly related to terrorism investigation, and if collective bargaining rights cannot be applied consistent with national security.

   It is important to remember that bargaining rights of Federal employees are very limited compared to the private sector. Federal employees have no right to strike. Most have their salary and benefits set in statute. And they may not bargain over, or agree to, anything that would affect managers' statutory prerogatives, which include hiring, firing, assigning personnel and work, as well as taking any necessary action during an emergency.

   The Committee-approved legislation provides that any construction work financed by assistance under this legislation will be subject to the Davis-Bacon Act, which requires the payment of prevailing wages. The prevailing wage under Davis-Bacon means the local average wage, as determined by the Secretary of Labor.

   The Davis-Bacon Act itself applies to federal construction contracts, and, in addition, Davis-Bacon requirements have been incorporated into more than 50 program statutes that provide assistance to non-federal parties for construction. For example, federal assistance programs that apply Davis-Bacon requirements include: a variety of transportation construction grant programs (including interstate highways, mass transportation, airport improvement); FEMA emergency preparedness grants; various environmental programs (including drinking and waste water treatment, and Superfund cleanup).

   Like these other statutes, the Committee-endorsed legislation would require the payment of prevailing wages in any construction supported by assistance under this legislation. For example, under the Emergency Preparedness Enhancement Pilot Program under section 153, the Department may award grants for the deployment of innovative emergency preparedness technologies. If such a grant is used for construction, the contractor would have to pay the prevailing wage. Section 194 would not affect grant programs that are not under this legislation, even if administered by the Department, however. For example, under the Stafford Act, Davis-Bacon applies to FEMA grants for emergency preparedness, but not to FEMA's grants for disaster relief. Thus, disaster relief under the Stafford Act will remain exempt from Davis-Bacon even after FEMA and its disaster-relief functions are transferred to the new Department.

   At the request of Senator Thompson, the legislation incorporates the text of S. 2530, granting some law enforcement authorities to certain Inspectors General. That bill was reported out of the Governmental Affairs Committee on June 25, 2002. Briefly, the proposal amends the Inspector General Act to authorize certain IG officers to carry a firearm or make an arrest in certain instances while engaged in official duties as authorized by this Act or other statute, or by a request from the Attorney General, and to seek and execute warrants under the authority of the United States upon probable cause that a violation has been committed. A full description of the proposal and its legislative history can be found in the accompanying Committee report, No. 107-176.

   The GAC-endorsed legislation will ensure that information systems are effectively deployed in the new Department and government-wide. Improved management of information resources is a vital aspect of enhanced homeland security. Federal agencies have deployed information systems in stovepipes, with little thought given to interoperability with the systems of other agencies. Interoperable information systems would allow for efficient sharing of data and better communications between agencies responsible for intelligence gathering, border security, crisis response, and other homeland security missions. Agencies vital to homeland security are also plagued by poor information security and outdated technologies. These management challenges need to be addressed both within the new Department and government-wide.

   The legislation contains several new provisions that impose general mandates and establish accountability mechanisms with respect to information systems within the Department. The Secretary is required to direct the acquisition and management of the Departments information resources, including the information systems of agencies being transferred into the Department. In ensuring proper Department-wide management, the Secretary will be assisted by the Chief Information Officer. The Secretary is responsible for making the Department's information systems effective, efficient, secure, and interoperable, and will report to Congress on the implementation of an enterprise architecture for the Department. The CIO will work closely with the Under Secretary for Science and Technology on the development, testing, and deployment of new IT technologies.

   The need for more effective cooperation between agencies such as the FBI, CIA, Department of State, and INS has become obvious, yet poorly developed information systems are getting in the way when technology should be enhancing agencies' effectiveness. The federal government has barely addressed the inability of agencies to link up their information systems. Pursuant to language proposed by Sen. Durbin, the legislation requires the OMB Director to develop a comprehensive enterprise architecture for information systems of agencies related to homeland security, and to make sure agencies implement the plan. The architecture and resulting systems must be designed so that they can achieve interoperability between federal agencies responsible for homeland defense, that they are capable of being deployed quickly and upgraded with improved technologies, and that effective information security is maintained. The OMB Director and the Secretary will also facilitate improved interoperability between information systems of Federal, State and local agencies responsible for homeland defense.

   Enterprise architectures require systematically thinking through the relationship

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   The Committee-approved legislation includes a key compromise on the public disclosure of certain sensitive information that may be submitted to the Department--one that thoughtfully balances the public's right to know and the legitimate security concerns of private entities that may share information with the Department. Specifically, the legislation provides that records pertaining to the vulnerability of--and threats to--critical infrastructure that are voluntarily furnished to the Department and that are not customarily made public by the provider, are not subject to public disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act. Furthermore, the provision would not limit the disclosure of a record used to satisfy a legal obligation or to obtain a permit or other government approval, or received by another Federal, State, or local agency independently of the Department.

   Senators Bennett and Levin offered this provision at the business meeting. The language of the provision had also been developed in conjunction with the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, Senator Leahy. Senator Bennett explained to the Committee that the amendment addresses the concerns of three groups--the federal government, which wants to receive information from the private sector in order to better understand and address vulnerabilities and threats to critical infrastructure; the private sector, which has said it would like to help the government, but not if it would be disadvantaged by disclosure of sensitive information; and the public-access and environmental communities, which did not want public access diminished to information that is of importance to the public. Senators Bennett and Levin told the Committee that all three of these interested groups found the amendment acceptable. Senator Bennett further reported that the Administration had examined the provision and supported it as well.

   To safeguard against the erosion of non-security programs within the transferred entities, the revised legislation establishes a reporting requirement designed to monitor the performance of non-homeland security missions by entities transferred to the Department--pursuant to an amendment by Senators Akaka and Carper. For each of the first five years after a program or agency is transferred to the Department, the relevant Under Secretary must report to the Secretary, the Comptroller General, and Congress regarding the performance of that entity, with particular emphasis on non-homeland security missions. These reports shall seek to inventory non-homeland security capabilities, including the personnel, budgets, and flexibilities used to carry out those functions. The reports shall include information regarding whether any changes are required to enable the transferred entities to continue to carry out non-homeland security missions without diminishment. Under another provision, the Comptroller General is also required to submit reports to Congress that include an evaluation of how successfully the Department is meeting homeland security and other missions.

   FIREFIGHTERS

   The legislation includes an amendment by Senators Carnahan and Collins to provide federal assistance to local communities to hire additional firefighters, who clearly play a critical first responder role for terrorist threats. The amendment amends the Federal Fire Prevention and Control Act of 1974 to authorize the Director of FEMA to award 3-year grants to local communities to hire additional firefighters. It would fund 75% of a firefighter's salary and benefits over three years. Communities applying for grants under the program would be required to present a plan for how they will fund the position at the conclusion of the third year. The three-year cost is capped at $100,000 per fire fighter. The amendment authorizes $1 billion for FY 2003 and FY 2004 for this program. If fully appropriated, the amendment would provide funding for as many as 10,000 new firefighters each year, able to play a vital role in terrorism response.

   The amendment addresses a critical and urgent need. Federal programs currently exist to fund training and equipment for firefighters and other first responders, and more funding for these needs has been proposed in response to the events of September 11. However, no Federal funds have been made available to fund personnel even though the staffing shortage in the nation's fire departments has reached crisis proportions. Two-thirds of all fire departments do not have adequate staffing, falling below the accepted industry consensus standards developed by the National Fire Protection Association. According to the International Association of Firefighters, most fire departments are not able to comply with OSHA's ``two-in/two-out'' standard for safe fire ground operations. These standards require that if two firefighters enter a dangerous environment, there must be at least two firefighters stationed outside to perform a rescue operation if needed.

   The International Association of Fire Chiefs estimates that 75,000 additional fire fighters are needed to bring fire department staffing up to minimally acceptable levels for safety and effective response. In addition, investigations into firefighter fatalities conducted by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) over the past decade have consistently identified inadequate staffing as either the primary cause or a significant contributing factor to the death of the firefighter. Clearly, without additional assistance, our firefighters' lives are being jeopardized.

   The Carnahan/Collins amendment reflects broad consensus that in order to protect the public against acts of terrorism and other dangers, the nation's fire departments must have adequate personnel, training, and equipment. One of the major purposes of the Department will be to assess and advocate for the resource needs of State and local governments. The need for more firefighters has already been well documented and thus it is appropriate that this issue be addressed now.

   The amendment includes an amendment offered by Senators Carper and Torricelli that authorizes funding for Amtrak to finance system-wide safety and security, make life safety improvements to critical rail tunnels, and help ensure Amtrak has adequate fleet capacity in the event of a national security emergency. This funding is authorized to be appropriated to the Department over two years for Amtrak and will remain available until obligated.

   Pursuant to an amendment by Sen. Durbin, the GAC-endorsed legislation would require the Secretary to enter into an agreement with and provide funding to the National Academy of Sciences to conduct a detailed and comprehensive review of Federal statutes and regulations affecting the safety and security of the food supply and to review the efficiency and effectiveness of the organizational structure of Federal food safety oversight. It requires the Academy to report its findings, conclusions, and recommendations, to Congress not later than 1 year after enactment of this Act and spells out the issues that must be addressed in the report. The Secretary must provide Congress and the President with a response to the recommendations.

   Pursuant to amendment offered by Senator Akaka, for himself and Senator Levin, the legislation would extend whistleblower protections to airport security screeners. For baggage screeners who are federal employees, the legislation would extend the same whistleblower protections as apply generally to federal employees. They are protected against retaliation for coming forward with information about a violation of law, rule, or regulation; mismanagement; waste; abuse; or a danger to health or safety. For airport screening personnel who are not federal employees, the bill provides the same whistleblower protections as apply to air carrier personnel. They are protected against retaliation for coming forward with information about a violation relating to air carrier safety.

   Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record a section-by-section analysis and a letter dated August 28, 2002.

--

   Legislation to Establish a Department of Homeland Security and the National Office for Combating Terrorism as Supported by Bipartisan Vote of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee

   Sec. 1. Short Title. This Act may be cited as the ``National Homeland Security and Combating Terrorism Act of 2002.''

   Sec. 2. Outlines the organization of the Act into 3 divisions: (A) National Homeland Security and Combating Terrorism, (B) Immigration Reform, Accountability, and Security Enhancement Act of 2002, and (C) Federal Workforce Improvement.

   DIVISION A--NATIONAL HOMELAND SECURITY AND COMBATING TERRORISM

   Sec. 100. Definitions. Defines terms used in Division A.

   Title I. Department of Homeland Security

   Subtitle A--Establishment of the Department of Homeland Security

   Sec. 101. Establishment of the Department of Homeland Security. Establishes the Department of Homeland Security whose mission is (1) to promote homeland security, particularly with regard to terrorism; and (2) carry out the other functions, and promote the other missions, of entities transferred to the Department as provided by law. The homeland security mission includes preventing terrorist attacks or other homeland threats within the United States; reducing the vulnerability of the United States; and minimizing the damage, and assisting in the recovery, from terrorist attacks or other natural or man-made crises within the United States.

   Sec. 102. Secretary of Homeland Security. States that the Secretary of Homeland Security shall be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. This section outlines the Secretary's broad responsibilities for developing policies, goals, objectives, priorities and plans for the promotion of homeland security, which include: developing a national strategy with the Director of the National Office for Combating Terrorism (established in Titles II and III), and advising the Director on the development of a comprehensive budget for programs under the strategy. The Secretary is also responsible for including State and local governments and other entities into the full range of homeland security activities; consulting with the Secretary of Defense and State governors regarding integration of the United States military, including the National Guard, into all aspects of the strategy and

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   Sec. 102--subsection (c). Visa Issuance. Vests in the Secretary authority to issue regulations with respect to visas and other immigration and nationality laws implemented by consular officers. The Secretary is also authorized to assign employees of the Department to diplomatic and consular posts to advise consular officers regarding specific security threats relating to the adjudication of visa applications, review applications, and investigate matters under the jurisdiction of the Secretary. The Secretary of State may direct a consular officer to refuse a visa in the foreign policy or security interests of the United States.

   Sec. 102--subsection (d). Amends the National Security Act to include the Secretary as a member of the National Security Council.

   Sec 103. Deputy Secretary. Establishes a Deputy Secretary for Homeland Security, appointed subject to Senate confirmation, responsible for assisting the Secretary in the administration and operations of the Department.

   Sec. 104. Under Secretary for Management. Establishes an Under Secretary for Management, appointed subject to Senate confirmation, who will be responsible for the management and administration of the Department, including the budget and appropriations, procurement, human resources and personnel, information technology, facilities and property, and other functions.

   Sec. 105. Assistant Secretaries. Establishes not more than 5 Assistant Secretaries, appointed subject to Senate confirmation. When submitting the name of an individual to the Senate for confirmation, the President shall describe the general responsibilities that the appointee will exercise and, subject to that, the Secretary shall assign each Assistant Secretary such functions as the Secretary considers appropriate.

   Sec. 106. Inspector General. Provides that there shall be an Inspector General (IG) in the Department subject to the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App), who, under the Inspector General Act, will be appointed subject to Senate confirmation. The Secretary may prohibit the IG from carrying out audits or performing other duties if the Secretary determines it necessary to prevent the disclosure of certain sensitive information, preserve national security, or prevent significant impairment to the national interest. The IG must notify Congress when the Secretary exercises these powers. The IG also shall have oversight over internal investigations performed by any other investigatory offices where they exist in the Department's subagencies. The Inspector General shall also designate one official to review information and receive complaints alleging abuses of civil rights and civil liberties by employees and officials of the Department; publicize information on the responsibilities and functions of the official; and submit semi-annual reports to Congress describing the implementation of this section. (The civil rights language parallels a USA Patriot Act provision requiring the designation of a similar official in the Justice Department's IG office.)

   Sec. 107. Chief Financial Officer. Establishes a Chief Financial Officer (CFO), appointed subject to Senate confirmation.

   Sec. 108. Chief Information Officer. Establishes a Chief Information Officer (CIO) to assist the Secretary with Department-wide information resources management.

   Sec. 109. General Counsel. Establishes a General Counsel, appointed subject to Senate confirmation, to serve as the chief legal officer of the Department.

   Sec. 110. Civil Rights Officer. Establishes a Civil Rights Officer, appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, who shall be responsible for, among other duties, ensuring compliance with all civil rights laws and regulations applicable to Department employees and participants in Department programs and overseeing compliance with statutory and constitutional requirements related to the civil rights of individuals affected by the Department's programs and activities.

   Sec. 111. Privacy Officer. Establishes a Privacy Officer, appointed by the Secretary, who will oversee compliance with the Privacy Act and other applicable laws relating to the privacy of personal information. The Privacy Officer will assist the Department with the development and implementation of policies and procedures to ensure that privacy considerations and safeguards are incorporated and implemented in programs and activities; and that information is handled in a manner that minimizes the risks of harm to individuals from inappropriate disclosure.

   Sec. 112. Chief Human Capital Officer. States that the Secretary shall appoint or designate a Chief Human Capital Officer to advise and assist the Department on workforce skills, training, recruitment, retention, and other issues necessary to attract and retain a highly qualified workforce.

   Sec. 113. Office of International Affairs. Creates Office of International Affairs within the Office of the Secretary, headed by a Director, who shall be responsible for: promoting information and education exchange with foreign nations, including joint research and development on countermeasures, joint training exercises of first responders, and exchange of expertise on terrorism prevention, response and crisis management; planning international conferences, exchange programs and training activities; and managing international activities within the Department in consultation with the Department of State and other relevant Federal officials. The Director shall initially concentrate on fostering cooperation with countries that are already highly focused on homeland security issues and have been cooperative with the United States in the area of counterterrorism.

   Sec. 114. Executive Schedule Positions. Establishes the Executive Schedule levels for the Secretary, Deputy Secretary, Under Secretaries, Assistant Secretaries, and other senior officers.

   Subtitle B--Establishment of Directorates and Offices

   Sec. 131. Directorate of Border and Transportation Protection. Establishes a Directorate of Border and Transportation Protection which shall be headed by an Under Secretary who is appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. The Directorate shall be responsible for securing borders, territorial waters, ports, waterways, air, land, and sea transportation systems, including coordinating governmental activities at ports of entry. It shall also be responsible for using intelligence to establish inspection priorities for agricultural products and livestock from locations suspected of terrorist activities, harboring terrorists, or of having unusual human health or agriculture disease outbreaks. In addition, it shall provide agency-specific training for agents and analysts from within the Department, other agencies, State and local agencies and international entities that have partnerships with the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center. Authorities, functions, personnel, and assets are transferred from the Customs Service, which shall be maintained as a distinct entity; the Coast Guard, which shall also be maintained as a distinct entity and shall report directly to the Secretary; that portion of the Animal Plant and Health Inspection Service of the Department of Agriculture which administers laws relating to agricultural quarantine inspections at points of entry; the Transportation Security Administration of the Department of Transportation; and the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center of the Department of Treasury (a center which provides training to law enforcement officers of 70 Federal partner agencies).

   Sec. 131 subsection (d)--Exercise of Customs Revenue Functions. Notwithstanding the transfer of authorities, functions, personnel, and assets from the Customs Service, the Secretary of the Treasury shall retain authority to issue regulations governing customs revenue functions, with the concurrence of the Secretary and with the assistance of the Customs Service. The Customs Service is responsible for administering and enforcing the laws regarding customs revenue functions, which include: assessing, collecting and refunding duties, taxes and fees on imported goods; administering import quotas and labeling requirements; collecting import data needed to compile international trade statistics; and administering reciprocal trade agreements and trade preference legislation. These regulations will be administered by the Secretary. Within 60 days, the Secretary of the Treasury will submit recommendations to Congress regarding the appropriate allocation of legal authorities relating to these functions.

   Sec. 131 subsection (e)--Preserving Coast Guard Mission Performance. Preserves the structural and operational integrity of the Coast Guard, the authority of the Commandant, the non-homeland security missions of the Coast Guard and the Coast Guard's capabilities to carry out these missions even as it is transferred to the new Department. The Coast Guard must be maintained intact and without reduction after transfer to the Department unless Congress legislates otherwise. No missions, functions, personnel or assets may be controlled by, or diverted to the principal and continuing use of any other part of the Department. The Secretary may not make a substantial change to the Coast Guard's non-security missions or capabilities without prior Congressional approval by statute. However, the President may waive this restriction for up to 90 days if he certifies to Congress that there is a clear, compelling and immediate state of national emergency. None of these conditions shall apply when the Coast Guard operates as a service in the Navy under section 3 of title 14, United States Code.

   The Coast Guard will report directly to the Secretary. The Inspector General of the Department will conduct an annual review to assess the Coast Guard's performance, particularly with respect to non-security missions.

   Sec. 132. Directorate of Intelligence. Establishes a Directorate of Intelligence, headed by an Under Secretary appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The Directorate shall serve as a national-level focal point for the analysis of information available to the United States Government relating to the plans, intentions, and capabilities of terrorists and terrorist organizations for the purpose of supporting the mission of the Department. The Directorate shall communicate,

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   In general, the Directorate shall be responsible for receiving and analyzing law enforcement information, intelligence and other information to detect and identify specific threats of terrorism; working with the Director of Central Intelligence and the intelligence community to establish overall intelligence priorities; requesting additional information; disseminating information to other entities, including state and local law enforcement, to assist in deterring, preventing and responding to terrorism and other threats; establishing, in conjunction with other appropriate officials, secure communications and information technology infrastructure, and advanced analytical tools; and ensuring that all material received by the Department is protected against unauthorized disclosure and handled consistent with the authority of the Director of Central Intelligence to protect sources and methods, and similar authorities of the Attorney General concerning sensitive law enforcement information. The Directorate is also responsible for providing training and other support to providers of information to the Department or consumers of information from the Department; and making recommendations to the Secretary for improving policies and procedures governing sharing of law enforcement, intelligence, and other information within the Federal government and between the Federal government and state and local governments and law enforcement agencies. The Directorate shall be staffed, in part, by analysts via reimbursable detail from agencies of the intelligence community.

   Sec. 132 subsection (c)--Access to Information. Provides that, unless otherwise directed by the President, the Secretary shall have access to, and agencies shall provide, all reports, assessments, analytical information, and information, including unevaluated intelligence, relating to the plans, intentions, capabilities, and activities of terrorist organizations and to other areas of responsibility that may be collected, possessed, or prepared by any other United States government agency. As the President may further provide, the Secretary shall receive additional information requested by the Secretary. The Secretary may enter into cooperative agreements with agencies, and regardless of whether the Secretary has entered into any such cooperative agreement, all agencies shall promptly provide information to the Secretary.

   Sec. 132 subsection (e)--Additional Responsibilities. The Under Secretary for Intelligence is also responsible for developing analyses concerning the means terrorists might employ to exploit vulnerabilities in homeland security infrastructure; developing and conducting experiments, tests and inspections to test weaknesses in homeland defenses; developing and practicing counter-surveillance techniques to prevent attacks; conducting risk assessments to determine the risk posed by specific kinds of terrorist attacks; and working with the Directorate of Critical Infrastructure Protection, other agencies, State and local governments, the private sector and local law enforcement and intelligence agencies to address vulnerabilities.

   Sec. 133. Directorate of Critical Infrastructure Protection. Establishes a Directorate of Critical Infrastructure Protection which shall be headed by an Under Secretary who is appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. Among other duties, the Directorate shall be responsible for: receiving relevant intelligence from the Directorate of Intelligence, law enforcement information and other information to comprehensively assess the vulnerabilities of key resources and critical infrastructures; identifying priorities and supporting protective measures by the Department and other entities; developing a comprehensive national plan for securing key resources and critical infrastructure (as part of the National Strategy described in Title III); establishing specialized research and analysis units to identify vulnerabilities and protective measures in key areas of critical infrastructure, as well as other systems or facilities whose destruction or disruption could cause substantial harm to health, safety, property, or the environment; enhancing and sharing of information regarding cyber-security and physical security, developing security standards, tracking vulnerabilities, proposing improved risk management policies, and delineating the roles of various governmental agencies in preventing, defending, and recovering from attacks; and working with the Department of State and other appropriate agencies to help establish cyber security policy, standards and enforcement mechanisms. The Directorate will also be responsible for establishing the necessary organizational structure to provide leadership and focus on both cyber-security and physical security, and ensuring the maintenance of a nucleus of cyber and physical security experts in the United States Government.

   The authorities, functions, personnel and assets of the following offices are transferred to the Department: (1) the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office of the Department of Commerce, (established by Presidential Decision Directive 63 in 1998 to coordinate federal initiatives on critical infrastructure); (2) The National Infrastructure Protection Center of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (other than the Computer Investigations and Operations Section); (3) the National Communications System of the Department of Defense (established by Executive Order in 1984 to assist the President and others in (a) the exercise of telecommunications functions and (b) coordinating the planning for and provision of national security and emergency preparedness communications); (4) the Computer Security Division of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) of the Department of Commerce (the NIST division that is tasked with improving information systems security); (5) The National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center of the Department of Energy (established to serve as a source of national competence to address critical infrastructure protection and continuity through support for activities related to counterterrorism, threat assessment, and risk mitigation); (6) The Federal Computer Incident Response Center of the General Service Administration (a partnership of computer incident response, security, and law enforcement personnel to share information on and handle computer security incidents); (7) The Energy Security and Assurance Program of the Department of Energy (a national security program to help reduce America's energy supply vulnerability from severe disruptions due to natural or malevolent causes); and (8) The Federal Protective Service of the General Services Administration (GSA) (which oversees security at Federal property managed by GSA).

   Sec. 134. Directorate of Emergency Preparedness and Response. Establishes a Directorate of Emergency Preparedness and Response which shall be headed by an Under Secretary appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. Among other duties, the Directorate shall be responsible for carrying out Federal emergency preparedness and response activities; providing State and local authorities with equipment for detection, protection, and decontamination in an emergency involving weapons of mass destruction; overseeing Federal, State and local emergency preparedness training and exercise programs; developing and managing a single response system for national incidents; managing and updating a Federal disaster response plan; using the resources of both human and animal health communities in emergency planning and response activities; creating a National Crisis Action Center to coordinate Federal support for State and local governments and the private sector in a crisis; coordinating and integrating operational activities of the Department of Defense, the National Guard, and other Federal agencies into the Federal response plan; managing, in consultation with the Under Secretary of Science and Technology and the Centers for Disease Control, the Select Agent Registration Program; overseeing the Centers for Disease Control's management of the Strategic National Stockpile of drugs, biologics, and devices, which is transferred to the Department; and developing a comprehensive plan to address the interface of medical informatics and the medical response to terrorism.

   The authorities, functions, personnel and assets of the following entities are transferred: the Federal Emergency Management Agency; the National Office of Domestic Preparedness of the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice (created by the Attorney General in 1998 to coordinate and facilitate federal efforts to assist state and local emergency responders with training and materials necessary to respond to an event involving weapons of mass destruction); the Office of Domestic Preparedness of the Department of Justice (developed to assist in the training of state and local law enforcement agencies to respond to terrorist incidents); the Office of Emergency Preparedness within the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Public Health Emergency Preparedness of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) (responsible for coordinating HHS efforts to plan and prepare for a national response to medical emergencies arising from the use of weapons of mass destruction); the Strategic National Stockpile of the Department of Health and Human Services; and the functions of the Select Agent Registration Program (HHS) and the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) (a program designed to identify all biological agents and toxins that have the potential to pose severe threats to public health and safety, regulate the transfer of such agents and toxins, and establish a registration scheme regulating their possession, use and transfer).

   Sec. 135. Directorate of Science and Technology. Establishes a Directorate of Science and Technology which shall be headed by an Under Secretary appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. The Directorate will support the mission of the Department by (1) managing and supporting research and development activities to meet national homeland security needs and objectives; (2) articulating national research and development goals, priorities, and strategies pursuant to the mission of the Department; (3) coordinating with entities within and outside the Department to advance the research and development agenda of the Department; (4) advising the Secretary of the Department on all scientific and technical matters; and, (5) facilitating

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   This section authorizes the Secretary to exercise certain transactional and hiring authorities relating to research and development and the Secretary shall have the authority to transfer funds to agencies. Additionally, DHS will help direct the use of bioterrorism-related funds, appropriated to NIH, through joint strategic agreements between the Secretary of HHS and the Secretary of DHS. Under such agreements, the Secretary of DHS will have the authority to determine the broad, general research priorities, while the Secretary of HHS will have the authority to set the specific, scientific research agenda. NIH will continue to manage and award all funds. The Secretary is also able to contract with existing Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs), or establish such centers. This section also establishes an Acceleration Fund, to be administered by the Security Advanced Research Projects Agency (SARPA), to stimulate research and development projects; the Fund is authorized to receive an appropriation of $200,000,000 for fiscal year 2003 and such sums as are necessary in subsequent fiscal years. Through a joint agreement with the Coast Guard, ten percent of the Acceleration Fund is to be allocated to Coast Guard homeland security missions for FY'04 and FY'05.

   The Directorate also establishes several mechanisms to promote research and development activities. These include: (1) a Science and Technology Council composed of senior research and development officials to, among other things, provide the Under Secretary with recommendations on priorities and strategies, and facilitate coordination among agencies, the private sector, and academia; (2) the Security Advanced Research Projects Agency (SARPA) to undertake and stimulate basic and applied research, leverage existing research and development, and accelerate the transition and deployment of technologies; (3) an Office of Risk Analysis and Assessment to, among other duties, conduct and commission studies of threat assessment and risk analysis to help guide the research priorities of the Department; (4) an Office of Technology Evaluation and Transition to serve as the principal clearinghouse for receiving and evaluating proposals for innovative technologies; (5) an Office for National Laboratories, which shall enter, on behalf of the Department, into joint sponsorship agreements with the Department of Energy (DOE) to coordinate and utilize the resources and expertise of DOE national laboratories and sites; and, (6) an Office of Laboratory Research, which shall incorporate personnel, functions, and assets from several programs and activities transferred from DOE that are related to chemical and biological security, nuclear smuggling, and nuclear assessment, as well as the National Bio-Weapons Defense Analysis Center which is transferred from the Department of Defense. The Office shall also administer the disbursement and undertake oversight of research and development funds transferred to HHS and other agencies outside the Department, and shall have a Science Advisor for bioterrorism. This section also requires the Secretary to develop a comprehensive long-term strategy and plan for engaging for-profit and other non-Federal entities in research, development, and production of homeland security countermeasures for biological, chemical, and radiological weapons.

   Sec. 136. Directorate of Immigration Affairs. Establishes a Directorate of Immigration Affairs to carry out all functions of that Directorate in accordance with Division B of the Act.

   Sec. 137. Office for State and Local Government Coordination. Establishes within the Office of the Secretary an office to oversee and coordinate programs for and relationships with State and local governments; assess, and advocate for, the resources needed by State and local governments to implement the National Strategy for combating terrorism; provide State and local governments with regular information, research and technical support; and develop a process for receiving meaningful input from State and local governments to assist in the development of the National Strategy and other homeland security activities. The Secretary shall appoint a Chief Homeland Security Liaison Officer, who shall coordinate the activities of homeland security liaison officers in each state. The officers shall coordinate between the Department and State and local first responders, provide training for State and local entities, identify homeland security functions in which the Federal role duplicates the State or local role and recommend ways to reduce inefficiencies, and assist State and local entities in priority setting based on discovered needs of first responder organizations. Establishes the Interagency Committee on First Responders, composed of the Chief Homeland Security Liaison Officer and representatives from Federal agencies including HHS, CDC, FEMA, Coast Guard, DoD, FBI and others, who will ensure coordination among the Federal agencies involved with State and local first responders, identify community-based first responder needs, recommend new or expanded grant programs to improve local first responder services, and find ways to streamline support by Federal agencies for local first responders. Also establishes the Advisory Council for the Interagency Committee, which shall be composed of no more than 13 members representing community-based first responders from both urban and rural communities.

   Sec. 138. United States Secret Service. Transfers the authorities, functions, personnel and assets of the United States Secret Service, which shall be maintained as a distinct entity reporting directly to the Secretary.

   Sec. 139. Border Coordination Working Group. Requires the Secretary to establish a border security working group with the Under Secretaries for Border and Transportation Security and for Immigration Affairs. The Working Group would, with respect to all border security functions, develop coordinated budget requests, allocations of appropriations, staffing requirements, communication and in other areas; coordinate joint and cross-training programs for personnel; monitor, evaluate and make improvements in the coverage and geographic distribution of border security programs and personnel; develop and implement policies and technologies to ensure the speedy, orderly and efficient flow of lawful traffic, travel and commerce, and enhanced scrutiny for high risk traffic, travel and commerce; and identify systemic problems in coordination with border security agencies and propose changes to mitigate such problems. The Secretary shall consult with and may include representatives of such agencies in Working Group deliberations as appropriate.

   Sec. 140. Executive Schedule Positions. Adds the appropriate Under Secretaries within the Department to the Executive Schedule.

   Subtitle C--National Emergency Preparedness Enhancement--The National Emergency Preparedness Enhancement Act of 2002

   Sec. 151. Short Title.

   Sec. 152. Preparedness Information and Education. Establishes a Clearinghouse on Emergency Preparedness, headed by a director, who will consult with Federal agencies, task forces and others to collect information on emergency preparedness, including information relevant to the Strategy. The Clearinghouse will ensure efficient dissemination of emergency preparedness information; establish a one-stop shop for emergency preparedness information, including a web site; develop an ongoing public awareness campaign, including a theme to be implemented annually during National Emergency Preparedness Week; and compile and disseminate information on best practices for emergency preparedness.

   Sec. 153. Pilot Program. Authorizes the Department to award grants to private entities to pay the Federal share of the cost of improving emergency preparedness and of educating employees and others using the entities' facilities about emergency preparedness. The Federal share of the cost shall be 50 percent, up to a maximum of $250,000 per grant recipient. There are authorized to be appropriated $5,000,000 for each of fiscal years FY 2003 through 2005 for such grants.

   Sec. 154. Designation of National Emergency Preparedness Week. Designates each week that includes September 11 as ``National Emergency Preparedness Week'' and requests that the President issue a proclamation each year to observe the week with appropriate programs and activities. In conjunction with the week, the head of each Federal agency, as appropriate, shall coordinate with the Department to inform and educate the private sector and the general public about emergency preparedness activities, and tools, giving a high priority to efforts designed to address terrorist attacks.

   Subtitle D--Miscellaneous Provisions

   Sec. 161. National Biological and Chemical Weapons Defense Analysis Center. Establishes within the Department of Defense a National Biological and Chemical Weapons Defense Analysis Center to develop countermeasures to potential attacks by terrorists using biological or chemical weapons that are weapons of mass destruction, and designates it for transfer to the Department.

   Sec. 162. Review of Food Safety. Requires the Secretary to enter into an agreement with and provide funding to the National Academy of Sciences to conduct a detailed and comprehensive review of Federal statutes and regulations affecting the safety and security of the food supply and to review the efficiency and effectiveness of the organizational structure of Federal food safety oversight. Requires the Academy to report its findings and conclusions, and recommendations, to Congress not later than 1 year after enactment of this Act and prescribes the issues which shall be addressed in the report. The Secretary is further required to provide Congress and the President a response to the recommendations.

   Sec. 163. Exchange of Employees between agencies and State and Local governments.

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   Sec. 164. Whistleblower Protection for Federal Employees Who are Airport Security Screeners. Extends to federal employees who are baggage screeners for the Transportation Security Agency the same whistleblower protections as apply generally to federal employees. They are protected against retaliation for coming forward with information about a violation, mismanagement, waste, abuse, or a danger to health or safety.

   Sec. 165. Whistleblower Protection for Certain Airport Employees. Extends to airport screening personnel who are not federal employees the same whistleblower protections as apply to air carrier personnel. They are protected against retaliation for coming forward with information about a violation relating to air carrier safety.

   Sec. 166. Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Division. This section establishes a Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Division within the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. This new division will lead and coordinate the counter-bioterrorism efforts of the CDC, as well as serve as the focal point for coordination and communication between the CDC and both the public health community and the Department of Homeland Security. Additionally, this division will train public health personnel in responses to bioterrorism.

   Sec. 167. Coordination with the Department of Health and Human Services under the Public Health Service Act. This section ensures that the Federal Response Plan is consistent with Section 319 of the Public Health Service Act, which grants the Secretary of Health and Human Services authority to act in the event of a public health emergency.

   Sec. 168. Rail Security Enhancements. Authorizes grants over a 2-year period for the benefit of Amtrak, including $375 million for the cost of enhancements to security and safety of Amtrak rail passenger service; $778 million for life safety improvements to Amtrak tunnels between New York and Washington built between 1872 and 1910; and $55 million for emergency repair and return to service of Amtrak passenger cars and locomotives. This money will remain available until expended.

   Sec. 169. Grants for Firefighting Personnel. This section amends the Federal Fire Prevention and Control Act of 1974 (15 U.S.C. 2229), as amended, to provide grants to hire employees engaged in fire protection. Grants shall be awarded for a 3-year period. The total amount shall not exceed $100,000 per firefighter, indexed for inflation, over the 3-year grant period. The Federal grant shall not exceed 75 percent of the total salary and benefits cost for additional firefighters hired. The Director may waive the 25 percent non-Federal match for a jurisdiction of 50,000 or fewer residents or in cases of extreme hardship. Grants may only be used for additional firefighting personnel, and shall not be used to supplant funding allocated for personnel from State and local sources. $1,000,000,000 is authorized for each of fiscal years 2003 and 2004 for grants under this subsection.

   Sec. 170. Review of Transportation Security Enhancements. Requires the Comptroller General to prepare and submit a report to Congress within one year that reviews all available intelligence on terrorist threats against aviation, seaport, rail and transit facilities; reviews all available information on the vulnerabilities of such facilities; and reviews the steps taken by agencies since September 11 to improve security at such facilities to determine the effectiveness of those measures at protecting passengers and transportation infrastructure from terrorist attack. The report shall also include proposed steps to reduce deficiencies found in aviation, seaport, rail and transit security, and the costs of implementing those steps. Within 90 days after the report is submitted to the Secretary, the Secretary shall provide to Congress and the President the Department's response to the report and its recommendations to further protect passengers and infrastructure from terrorist attack.

   Sec. 171. Interoperability of Information Systems. Requires the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, in consultation with the Secretary, to develop an enterprise architecture to achieve interoperability among information systems of federal agencies with responsibility for homeland security, and to establish timetables for implementation. The Director will ensure the implementation of the architecture by federal agencies, and report to Congress on progress achieved. The architecture must be designed so that information systems can be deployed rapidly and upgraded with new technologies, and must be highly secure. The section also requires the Director, in consultation with the Secretary, to develop a plan to achieve interoperability among the information systems of federal, state, and local agencies with responsibility for homeland security, and to report to Congress on progress achieved.

   Sec. 172. Extension of Customs User Fees. Extends customs user fees by six months to March 31, 2004. The two fees covered include the merchandise processing fee and a fee on passengers and conveyances.

   Subtitle E--Transition Provisions

   Sec. 181. Definitions. Defines the term ``agency,'' for purposes of subtitle E, to include any entity, organizational unit, or function transferred or to be transferred under this title. Defines the term ``transition period'' to mean the 12-month period beginning with the effective date of Division A.

   Sec. 182. Transfer of Agencies. Provides that the transfer of an agency to the Department shall occur when the President directs, but in no event later than the end of the transition period.

   Sec. 183. Transitional Authorities. Provides that until an agency is transferred, existing officials shall provide the Secretary such assistance as he may request in preparing for the integration of the agency into the Department and may detail personnel to assist with the transition on a reimbursable basis. During the transition period the President may designate any officer who has been confirmed by the Senate, and who continues as such an officer, to act until the office is filled, subject to the time limits in the Vacancies Act. A Senate-confirmed officer of an agency transferred to the Department may be appointed to a Departmental office with equivalent authorities and responsibilities without being again confirmed by the Senate for the new position.

   Sec. 184. Incidental Transfers and Transfer of Related Functions. The Director of OMB, in consultation with the Secretary, may make additional incidental transfers of personnel and assets. Also, at any time an agency is transferred to the Department, the President may transfer any agency established to carry out or support adjudicatory or review functions in relation to the transferred agency. However, the President would not be authorized to transfer the Executive Office of Immigration Review in the Justice Department under this section. The transfer of an agency that is part of a department will include the transfer of related secretarial functions to the new Secretary of Homeland Security.

   Sec. 185. Implementation Progress Reports and Legislative Recommendations. Provides that the Secretary shall prepare and submit to Congress a series of Implementation Progress Reports. The initial report is due not later than 6 months after the date of enactment. Additional reports are due every six months until the final report which will be due not later than 6 months after the transfer is completed.

   Sec. 185 subsection (c)--Contents. This subsection specifies the information to be provided. Reports will describe the steps needed to transfer and incorporate agencies into the Department, a timetable, and a progress report on meeting the schedule. Reports will also include information workforce planning, information technology matters, and other matters necessary for the successful implementation of the transition.

   Sec. 185 subsection (d)--Legislative Recommendations. Calls upon the Secretary to submit recommendations for legislation that the Secretary determines necessary as part of each semi-annual implementation progress report. If the legislative recommendations are ready sooner, the bill specifically invites the Secretary to submit them in advance of the balance of the report. The Secretary is to provide recommended legislation that would, among other things, facilitate the integration of transferred entities into the Department; reorganize within the Department, or provide the Secretary additional authority to do so; address inequities in pay or other terms and conditions of employment; enable the Secretary to engage in essential procurement; and otherwise help further the mission of the Department.

   Sec. 186. Transfer and Allocation. Provides that, except where otherwise provided in this title, personnel employed in connection with, and the assets, liabilities, contracts, property records, and any unexpended balance on appropriations, authorizations, allocations and other funds related to the functions and entities transferred, shall be transferred to the Secretary as appropriate, subject to the approval of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget and subject to applicable laws on the transfer of appropriated funds. Unexpended funds transferred pursuant to this section shall be used only for purposes for which the funds were originally authorized and appropriated.

   Sec. 187. Savings Provisions. In general, this section provides that all orders, determinations, rules, regulations, permits, agreements, contracts, recognitions of labor organizations, collective bargaining agreements and other administrative actions in effect at the time this Division takes effect shall continue in effect according to their terms until modified or revoked. Certain proceedings, such as notices of proposed rulemaking or applications for licenses, permits, or financial assistance pending at the time this title takes effect shall also continue. Suits and other proceedings commenced before the effective date of this Act are also not affected. Administrative actions by an agency relating to a function transferred under this title may be continued by the Department.

   Sec. 187 subsection (f)(1). Employee Rights. This subsection is intended to assure employees in agencies transferred to the new

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   Sec. 187 subsections (f)(2)--(4). Other personnel matters. The transfer of an employee to the Department will not alter the terms and conditions of employment, including compensation. Any conditions for appointment, including the requirement of Senate confirmation, would continue to apply. Any employee transferred with pre-existing whistleblower protection rights may not be deprived of those rights based on a determination of necessity for good administration.

   Sec. 187 subsection (g). No effect on intelligence authorities. The transfer of authorities under this title shall not be construed as affecting the authorities of the Director of Central Intelligence, the Secretary of Defense, or the heads of departments and agencies within the intelligence community.

   Sec. 188. Transition Plan. By September 15, 2002, the President is required to submit to Congress a transition plan, including a detailed plan for transition to the Department and implementation of relevant portions of the Act, and including a proposal for financing the new operations of the Department for which appropriations are not available.

   Sec. 189. Use of Appropriated Funds. This section sets forth a number of conditions on the use of funds by the Department, the Office, and the National Combating Terrorism Strategy Panel. Balances of appropriations and other funds transferred under the Act may be used only for the purposes for which they were originally available and subject to the conditions provided by the law originally appropriating or otherwise making available the amount. The President shall notify Congress not less than 15 days before transferring funds or assets under this Act. Additional conditions under this section apply to disposal of property, receipt and use of gifts, and other matters. The President shall submit a detailed budget request for the Department for FY 2004.

   Subtitle F--Administrative Provisions

   Sec. 191. Reorganizations and Delegations. Provides that the Secretary may, as appropriate, reorganize within the Department, except where specific organizational structure is established by law. The Secretary may delegate any of the functions of the Secretary and authorize successive redelegations to other officers or employees of the Department. However, any function vested by law, or assigned by this title, to an organizational unit of the Department or to the head of an organizational unit may not be delegated outside of that unit.

   Sec. 192. Reporting Requirements. Requires the Comptroller General of the United States to submit to Congress a report not later than 15 months after the effective date of this division and each year for the succeeding five years containing an evaluation of the progress reports submitted under section 185 and the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the Comptroller General concerning how successfully the Department is meeting the homeland security missions of the Department and the other missions of the Department.

   This section also outlines additional reports to be submitted by the Secretary. These include: (1) biennial reports relating to (a) border security and emergency preparedness, and (b) certifying preparedness to prevent, protect against, and respond to natural disasters, cyber attacks, and incidents involving weapons of mass destruction; (2) a report outlining proposed steps to consolidate management authority for Federal operations at key points of entry into the United States; (3) a report with definitions of the terms ``combating terrorism'' and ``homeland security,'' and (4) a strategic plan and annual performance plan, along with annual performance reports, required by existing statutes.

   Sec. 193. Environmental Protection, Safety, and Health Requirements. Provides that the Secretary shall ensure that the Department complies with all applicable environmental, safety and health statutes and requirements, and develops procedures for meeting such requirements.

   Sec. 194. Labor Standards. All laborers and mechanics employed by contractors or subcontractors in the performance of construction work financed in whole or in part with assistance received under this Act shall be paid wages at rates not less than those prevailing on similar construction in the locality as determined by the Secretary of Labor in accordance with the Davis-Bacon Act (40 U.S.C. 276a et. seq.).

   Sec. 195. Procurement of Temporary and Intermittent Services. In addition to the authority to hire experts or consultants on a temporary or intermittent basis in accordance with section 3109(b) of title 5, United States Code, the Secretary may procure personal services, whenever necessary due to an urgent homeland security need, for periods of not more than a year without regard to the pay limitations of section 3109.

   Sec. 196. Preserving Non-Homeland Security Mission Performance. Establishes a reporting requirement designed to monitor the performance of non-homeland security missions by entities transferred to the Department. For each of the first five years after a program or agency is transferred to the Department, the relevant Under Secretary must report to the Secretary, the Comptroller General and Congress regarding the performance of that entity, with particular emphasis on non-homeland security missions. These reports shall seek to inventory non-homeland security capabilities, including the personnel, budgets and flexibilities used to carry out those functions. The reports shall include information regarding whether any changes are required to enable the transferred entities to continue to carry out non-homeland security missions without diminishment.

   Sec. 197. Future Years Homeland Security Program. Beginning with the FY 2005 budget request, each budget request shall be accompanied by a Future Years Homeland Security Program, reflecting the estimated expenditures and proposed appropriations included in that budget covering the fiscal year with respect to which the budget is submitted and at least the four succeeding fiscal years.

   Sec. 198. Protection of Voluntarily Furnished Confidential Information. Records pertaining to the vulnerability of, and threats to, critical infrastructure that are voluntarily furnished to the Department and that are not customarily made public by the provider are not subject to public disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act. This provision would not cover records submitted to satisfy legal requirements or to obtain permits or other approvals, and would not cover information that another Federal, State or local agency receives independently of the Department.

   Sec. 199. Authorization of Appropriations. Authorizes such sums as may be necessary to enable the Secretary to administer and manage the Department and to carry out the Department's functions created by the Act.

   Title II--National Office for Combating Terrorism

   Sec. 201. National Office for Combating Terrorism. This section establishes a terrorism office within the Executive Office of the President, to be run by a Director who will be appointed by the President with advice and consent of the Senate. The responsibilities of the Director will include: (1) to develop national objectives and policies for combating terrorism; (2) to direct and review the development of a comprehensive national assessment of terrorist threats and vulnerabilities to those threats, to be conducted by heads of the relevant Federal agencies; (3) to develop, with the Secretary of Homeland Security, a National Strategy for combating terrorism under Title III; (4) to coordinate, oversee and evaluate implementation and execution of the Strategy; (5) to coordinate the development of a comprehensive annual budget for programs and activities under the Strategy, including the budgets of the military departments and agencies with the National Foreign Intelligence Program relating to international terrorism, but excluding military programs, projects, or activities relating to force protection; (6) to have lead responsibility for budget recommendations relating to military, intelligence, law enforcement and diplomatic assets in support of the Strategy; (7) to exercise funding authority for Federal terrorism prevention and response agencies; (8) to serve as an adviser to the National Security Council; and (9) work with the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to ensure that the Director receives relevant information related to terrorism from the FBI, and that such information is made available to appropriate Federal agencies and State and local law enforcement officials. The President, in consultation with the Director, shall assign resources as appropriate to the Office. The establishment of the Office within the Executive Office of the President shall not be construed as affecting access by Congress to information or personnel of the Office.

   Sec. 202. Funding for Strategy Programs and Activities. This section establishes a process for the Director to review the proposed budgets for federal programs under the Strategy. The Director will, in consultation with the Director of the Office of Management and Budget and the Secretary of Homeland Security, identify programs that contribute to the Strategy, and provide advice to the heads of the executive departments and agencies on the amount and use of these programs through budget certification procedures and the development of a consolidated budget for the Strategy. The Director

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   Title III--National Strategy for Combating Terrorism and the Homeland Security Response

   Sec. 301. Strategy. This section directs the Secretary and Director to develop the National Strategy for combating terrorism and homeland security response for the detection, prevention, protection, response and recovery necessary to counter terrorist threats. The Secretary has responsibility for portions of the Strategy addressing border security, critical infrastructure protection, emergency preparation and response, and integrating state and local efforts with activities of the Federal government. The Director has overall responsibility for the development of the Strategy, and particularly for those portions addressing intelligence, military assets, law enforcement and diplomacy. The Strategy will include: (1) policies and procedures to maximize the collection, translation, analysis, exploitation and dissemination of information related to combating terrorism and homeland security response throughout the Federal government and with State and local authorities; (2) plans for countering chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, explosives, and cyber threats; (3) plans for improving the resources of, coordination among, and effectiveness of health and medical sectors for detecting and responding to terrorist attacks on homeland; (4) specific measures to enhance cooperative efforts between the public and private sectors in protecting against terrorist attacks; (5) a review of measures needed to enhance transportation security with respect to potential terrorist attacks; and (6) other critical areas. This section also establishes the National Combating Terrorism and Homeland Security Response Council to assist with preparation and implementation of the Strategy. Members of the Council will be the heads of federal terrorism prevention and response agencies or their designees. The Secretary and Director will co-chair the Council, which will meet at their direction.

   Sec. 302. Management Guidance for Strategy Implementation. This section directs the Office of Management and Budget, in consultation with the Secretary and the Director, to provide management guidance for Federal agencies to successfully implement the Strategy, and to report to Congress on these efforts. It also requires the General Accounting Office to evaluate the management guidance and agency performance in implementing the Strategy.

   Sec. 303. National Combating Terrorism Strategy Panel. This section establishes a nonpartisan, independent panel to conduct an assessment of the Strategy as well as an independent, alternative assessment of measures required to combat terrorism, including homeland security measures. The panel will prepare a preliminary report no later than July 1, 2004, with a final report by December 1, 2004 and every four years thereafter.

   Title IV--Law Enforcement Powers of Inspector General Agents

   Sec. 401. Law Enforcement Powers of Inspector General Agents. This section amends the Inspector General Act to authorize certain IG officers to carry a firearm or make an arrest in certain instances while engaged in official duties as authorized by this Act or other statute, or by the Attorney General; and to seek and execute warrants under the authority of the United States upon probable cause that a violation has been committed. This section also describes the conditions under which the Attorney General may authorize exercise of powers under this section, and it lists those offices of Inspector General which are exempt from this requirement. This section further describes the circumstances under which the Attorney General may also rescind or suspend powers authorized for an Office of Inspector General, and provides that determinations by the Attorney General in this section shall not be reviewable in or by any court. The section also requires the Offices of Inspector General to enter into memoranda of understanding to establish an external review process for ensuring that adequate safeguards and management procedures continue to exist within each Office.

   Title V--Federal Emergency Procurement Flexibility

   Subtitle A--Temporary Flexibility for Certain Procurements

   Sec. 501. Defines the term ``executive agency.''

   Sec. 502. Procurements for Defense Against or Recovery from Terrorism or Nuclear, Biological, Chemical, or Radiological Attack. States that the authorities provided in this subtitle apply to any procurement of property or services by or for an executive agency that, as determined by the head of the executive agency, are to be used to facilitate defense against or recovery from terrorism or nuclear, biological, chemical or radiological attack for one year after the date of enactment.

   Sec. 503. Increased Simplified Acquisition Threshold for Procurements in Support of Humanitarian or Peacekeeping Operations or Contingency Operations. Raises the threshold amounts to $250,000 for contracts carried out in the United States and to $500,000 for contracts outside the United States pursuant to section 502. Raises the Small Business reserve to $250,000 for contracts inside the United States and $500,000 for contracts outside the United States for procurements carried out pursuant to section 502.

   Sec. 504. Increased Micro-Purchase Threshold for Certain Procurements. Raises the micro-purchase threshold with respect to procurements referred to in section 502 to $10,000.

   Sec. 505. Application of Certain Commercial Items Authorities to Certain Procurements. Applies commercial items procedures to non-commercial items for emergency purposes. Requires the Director of OMB to issue guidance and procedures for use of simplified acquisition procedures for a purchase of property or services in excess of $5,000,000. Provides continuation of authority for simplified purchase procedures.

   Sec. 506. Use of Streamlined Procedures. Lists streamlined acquisition procedures which may be used. The head of an executive agency shall use, when appropriate, streamlined acquisition authorities and procedures provided by law including use of procedures other than competitive procedures and task and delivery order contracts. This provision removes the thresholds ($5 million for manufacturing and $3 million for all other contracts) for contracts with limited competition under the small business ``8(A)'' and HUB Zone programs. Waiving the threshold means that small disadvantaged businesses within the ``8(A)'' program and qualified HUB Zone small business concerns can compete for contracts using limited competition (or sole source competition) regardless of the value of the contract.

   Sec. 507. Review and Report by Comptroller General. Requires that not later than March 31, 2004, the Comptroller General complete a review of the extent to which procurements of property and services have been made in accordance with this subtitle, and submit a report on the results of the review to the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee and House Government Reform Committee. The report shall assess the extent to which property and services procured in accordance with this subtitle have contributed to the capacity of Federal employees to carry out the missions of the agencies, and the extent to which Federal employees have been trained on the use of technology. The report shall include any recommendations of the Comptroller General resulting from the assessment. The Comptroller General shall consult with the Committee on Governmental Affairs and the Committee on Governmental Reform on the specific issues and topics to be reviewed, including areas such as technology integration, employee training, and human capital management, and the data requirements of the study.

   Subtitle B--Other Matters

   Sec. 511. Identification of New Entrants Into the Federal Marketplace. Requires agencies to do ongoing market research to identify new companies with new capabilities, including small businesses, to help agencies facilitate defense against or recovery from terrorism or nuclear, biological, chemical or radiological attack.

   Title VI--Effective Date

   Sec. 601. Provides that the Division shall take effect 30 days after the date of enactment, or if enacted within 30 days before January 1, 2003, on January 1, 2003.

   DIVISION B--IMMIGRATION REFORM, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND SECURITY ENHANCEMENT ACT OF 2002

   Sec. 1001. Short Title. This Division may be cited as the ``Immigration Reform, Accountability, and Security Enhancement Act of 2002.''

   Sec. 1002. Definitions. Defines key terms, including Under Secretary, Enforcement Bureau, and Service Bureau.

   Title XI--Directorate of Immigration Affairs

   Subtitle A--Organization

   Sec. 1101. Abolition of INS. This section abolishes the Immigration and Naturalization Service (``INS'').

   Sec. 1102. Establishment of Directorate of Immigration Affairs. This section establishes a Directorate of Immigration Affairs (``Directorate'') within the Department of Homeland Security (``DHS''). The Directorate is divided into three parts: the Under Secretary for Immigration Affairs, the Assistant Secretary for Immigration Services (the ``Service Bureau''), and the Assistant Secretary for Enforcement and Border Affairs (the ``Enforcement Bureau''). The functions of the Directorate are also tripartite: (1) immigration policy, administration, and inspection functions; (2) immigration service and adjudication functions; and (3) immigration enforcement functions. This section also authorizes funds to the DHS as necessary to carry out the functions of the Directorate and defines what is meant by U.S. immigration laws.

   Sec. 1103. Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Immigration Affairs. This section establishes that the Directorate will be headed by the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Immigration Affairs (``Under Secretary''). Charged with all responsibilities and authority in the administration of the Directorate, the Under Secretary is responsible for: (1) administration and enforcement

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   Sec. 1104. Bureau of Immigration Services. This section establishes the Bureau of Immigration Services (``Service Bureau''), headed by the Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security for Immigration Services. The Assistant Secretary shall be appointed by the Secretary of Homeland Security in consultation with the Under Secretary and shall report directly to the Under Secretary. The Assistant Secretary shall administer the immigration service and adjudication functions of the Directorate which include: (1) adjudication of petitions for classification of non-immigrant and immigrant status; (2) adjudication of applications for adjustment of status and change of status; (3) adjudication of naturalization applications; (4) adjudication of asylum and refugee applications; (5) adjudications at Service Centers; (6) determinations of custody and parole of asylum seekers; and (7) all other adjudications under U.S. immigration laws. A Chief Budget Officer, under the authority of the CFO, shall be responsible for monitoring and supervising all financial activities of the Service Bureau. An Office of Quality Assurance is established to develop procedures and conduct audits to ensure the Directorate's policies with regard to services and adjudications are properly implemented, and to ensure sound records management and efficient and accurate service. An Office of Professional Responsibility is established to ensure the professionalism of the Service Bureau, and receive and investigate charges of misconduct or ill treatment made by the public. The Assistant Secretary for Immigration Services, in consultation with the Under Secretary, shall determine the training of Service Bureau personnel.

   Sec. 1105. Bureau of Enforcement and Border Affairs. This section establishes the Bureau of Enforcement and Border Affairs (``Enforcement Bureau''), headed by the Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security for Enforcement and Border Affairs. The Enforcement Bureau Assistant Secretary shall be appointed by the Secretary for Homeland Security, in consultation with the Under Secretary, and shall report directly to the Under Secretary of the Directorate. The Enforcement Bureau Assistant Secretary shall administer the immigration enforcement functions of the Directorate which include the following functions: (1) border patrol; (2) detention; (3) removal; (4) intelligence; and (5) investigations. A Chief Budget Officer, under the authority of the CFO, shall be responsible for monitoring and supervising all financial activities of the Enforcement Bureau. An Office of Professional Responsibility shall ensure the professionalism of the Enforcement Bureau, and receive and investigate charges of misconduct or ill treatment made by the public. An Office of Quality Assurance shall develop procedures and conduct audits to ensure the Directorate's policies with regard to enforcement are correctly implemented; and that the Enforcement Bureau's policies and practices result in sound records management and efficient and accurate record-keeping. The Enforcement Bureau Assistant Secretary, in consultation with the Under Secretary, shall determine the training of Enforcement Bureau personnel.

   Sec. 1106. Office of the Ombudsman within the Directorate. This section establishes an Office of the Ombudsman within the Directorate of Immigration Affairs. The Ombudsman shall be appointed by the Secretary of Homeland Security and report directly to the Secretary of Homeland Security. The Office of Ombudsman will: (1) assist individuals in resolving problems with the Directorate or any component thereof; (2) identify systemic problems encountered by the public in dealings with the Directorate or any component thereof; (3) propose changes in the administrative practices or regulations of the Directorate or any component thereof to mitigate these problems; (4) identify potential legislative changes that may be appropriate to mitigate such problems; and (5) monitor the coverage and geographic distribution of local offices of the Directorate. The Ombudsman shall have the responsibility and authority to appoint local or regional representatives as may be necessary to address and rectify problems. The Ombudsman shall submit an annual report to the House and Senate Judiciary Committees on the activities of the Ombudsman during the fiscal year, providing a full analysis identifying actions taken by the Ombudsman's Office, including initiatives to improve the responsiveness of the Directorate; a summary of serious or systemic problems encountered by the public; an accounting of those items that have been addressed, are being addressed, and have not been addressed with reasons for and results of such action; recommendations to resolve problems encountered by the public; recommendations for action as may be appropriate to resolve problems encountered by the public; recommendations to resolve problems caused by inadequate funding or staffing; and other information as the Ombudsman deems advisable. Appropriations are authorized as necessary to carry out this section.

   Sec. 1107. Office of Immigration Statistics within the Directorate. This section establishes the Office of Immigration Statistics within the Directorate, headed by a Director who shall be appointed by the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Under Secretary. The office shall collect, maintain, compile, analyze, publish, and disseminate information and statistics involving the functions of the Directorate and the Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR) (or successor entity). The Director shall be responsible for: (1) maintaining immigration statistical information of the Directorate ; and (2) establishing standards of reliability and validity for immigration statistics collected by the Service Bureau, the Enforcement Bureau, and the EOIR. The Directorate and the EOIR shall provide statistical information from their respective operational data systems to the Office of Immigration Statistics. The Director, under the direction of the Under Secretary shall ensure the interoperability of the databases of the Directorate, the Service Bureau, the Enforcement Bureau, and the EOIR to permit the Director of the Office to perform the duties of the office. The functions performed by the Statistics Branch of the INS Office of Policy and Planning are transferred to the Office of Immigration Statistics.

   Sec. 1108. Clerical amendments. This section includes clerical amendments.

   Subtitle B--Transition Provisions

   Sec. 1111. Transfer of Functions. All functions under U.S. immigration laws vested by statute in, or exercised by, the Attorney General are transferred to the Secretary of Homeland Security. The functions of the Commissioner of the INS are transferred to the Directorate. The Under Secretary may, for purposes of performing any function transferred to the Directorate, exercise all authorities under any other provision of law that were available with respect to the performance of the function.

   Sec. 1112. Transfer of Personnel and other Resources. There are transferred to the Under Secretary for appropriate allocation: (1) the personnel of the DOJ employed in connection with the functions transferred pursuant to this title; and (2) the assets, liabilities, contracts, property, records, and unexpended balance of appropriations, authorizations, allocations, and other funds employed, held, used, arising from, available to, or to be made available to the INS in connection with the functions transferred pursuant to this title.

   Sec. 1113. Determinations with Respect to Functions and Resources. The Under Secretary shall determine: (1) which of the functions transferred under section 111 are immigration policy, administration and inspection functions; immigration service and adjudication functions; and immigration enforcement functions; and (2) which of the personnel, assets, liabilities, grants, contracts, property, records, and unexpended balances of appropriations, authorizations, allocations, and other funds were held or used, arose from, were available to, or were made available, in connection with the performance of the respective functions immediately prior to the title's effective date.

   Sec. 1114. Delegation and Reservation of Functions. The Under Secretary shall delegate immigration service and adjudication functions to the Assistant Secretary for Immigration Services, and immigration enforcement functions to the Assistant Secretary for Enforcement and Border Affairs. Immigration policy, administration and inspection functions are reserved for the Under Secretary. Some delegations may be made on a nonexclusive basis. The Under Secretary may make delegations to such officers and employees of the office of the Under Secretary, the Service Bureau, and the Enforcement Bureau, respectively, as the Director may designate, and may authorize successive re-delegations of such functions as may be necessary or appropriate.

   Sec. 1115. Allocation of Personnel and other Resources. The Under Secretary shall make allocations of personnel, assets, liabilities, grants, contracts, property, records, and unexpended balances of appropriations, authorizations, allocations, and other funds held, used, arising from, available to, or to be made available in connection with such functions. Unexpended funds transferred by section 112 shall be used only for allocated purposes. The Attorney General, in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall provide for the termination of affairs of the INS. The Under Secretary is authorized to provide for an appropriate allocation, or coordination, or both, of resources

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   Sec. 1116. Savings Provisions. All orders, determinations, rules, regulations, permits, grants, loans, contracts, recognition of labor organizations, agreements, including collective bargaining agreements, certificates, licenses, privileges, any proceedings or any application for any benefit, service, as well as the continuance of lawsuits and other matters are transferred to the new entities and shall continue until modified or terminated.

   Sec. 1117. Interim service of the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization. The INS Commissioner serving on the day before the effective date of this title may serve as the Under Secretary until one is appointed.

   Sec. 1118. Executive Office for Immigration Review Authorities not Affected. Nothing in the legislation may be construed to authorize or require the transfer or delegation of any function vested in, or exercised by the EOIR (or its successor entity) or any officer, employee, or component thereof immediately prior to the effective date of this title.

   Sec. 1119. Other Authorities not Affected. Nothing in this legislation may be construed to authorize or require the transfer or delegation of any function vested in, or exercised by the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Labor or their special agents, or under the U.S. immigration laws.

   Sec. 1120. Transition Funding. Funds are authorized to the Department of Homeland Security as necessary to abolish the INS, establish the Directorate and its components, transfer the functions required under this Act, and carry out any other duty made necessary by this division. These funds will be deposited into a separate account established in the general fund of the U.S. Treasury. Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, and at the end of each fiscal year in which appropriations are made, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall submit a report to Congress concerning the availability of funds to cover transition costs.

   Subtitle C--Miscellaneous Provisions

   Sec. 1121. Funding Adjudication and Naturalization Services. This section requires that all fees collected for the provision of adjudication or naturalization services be used only to fund adjudication or naturalization services, or subject to the availability of funds, similar services provided without charge to asylum and refugee applicants. In addition to funds already appropriated for this purpose, funds are authorized as necessary to carry out sections of the Immigration and Nationality Act dealing with asylum and refugee processing. Separate accounts are established in the U.S. Treasury for appropriated funds and other deposits available to the Service Bureau and the Enforcement Bureau. Fees may not be transferred between these accounts. Funds are also authorized as necessary to carry out the Immigration Services and Infrastructure Improvement Act of 2000 (Title II of P.L. 106-313).

   Sec. 1122. Application of Internet-based Technologies. Not later than two year after enactment, the Secretary, in consultation with the Under Secretary and the Technology Advisory Committee, shall establish an Internet-based system that will allow an immigrant, non-immigrant, employer, or other person who files any application, petition, or other request for benefit under the U.S. immigration laws with the Directorate to access case status information on-line. In establishing the database, the Under Secretary shall consider all applicable privacy issues and no personally identifying information shall be accessible to unauthorized persons. Fees will not be charged to anyone using the database to access information about him/herself. The Under Secretary, in consultation with the Technology Advisory Committee is required to conduct a study on the feasibility of an on-line filing system and report to the House and Senate Judiciary Committee on the results within one year of enactment. To assist in carrying out this section, the Under Secretary is required to establish a Technology Advisory Committee.

   Sec. 1123. Alternatives to Detention of Asylum Seekers. This section authorizes the Under Secretary to assign asylum officers to major ports of entry to assist in the inspection of asylum seekers. For other ports, the under Secretary shall take steps to ensure that asylum officers are able to participate in the inspection process. This section also promote alternatives to detention of asylum seekers who do not have prior nonpolitical criminal records and establish conditions for detention of asylum seekers that ensure a safe and humane environment. The Under Secretary is required to consider the following specific alternatives to detention: parole; parole with appearance assistance provided by private nonprofit voluntary agencies; non-secure shelter care or group homes operated by private nonprofit voluntary agencies; and noninstitutional settings for minors, such as foster care or group homes operated by private nonprofit voluntary agencies.

   Subtitle D--Effective Date

   Sec. 1131. Effective Date. This title shall take effect one year after the effective date of division A of this Act.

   Title XII--Unaccompanied Alien Children Protection

   Sec. 1201. Short Title. This title may be cited as ``The Unaccompanied Alien Child Protection Act of 2002.''

   Sec. 1202. Definitions. Key terms, including unaccompanied alien child, are defined.

   Subtitle A--Structural Changes

   Sec. 1211. Responsibilities of the Office of Refugee Resettlement with Respect to Unaccompanied Alien Children. The Office of Refugee Resettlement (``Office'') shall be responsible for coordinating and implementing the care and placement of unaccompanied alien children who are in Federal custody by reason of their immigration status and ensuring minimum standards of detention for all unaccompanied alien children. The Director of the Office (``Director'') shall be responsible for: (1) ensuring that the best interests of the child are considered in the care and placement of unaccompanied alien children; (2) making placement, release, and detention determinations; (3) implementing determinations; (4) convening the Interagency Task Force on Unaccompanied Alien Children (in the absence of the Assistant Secretary); (5) identifying a sufficient number of qualified persons, entities, and facilities to house unaccompanied alien children; (6) overseeing persons, entities and facilities; (7) compiling and publishing at least annually a State-by-State list of professionals or other entities qualified to contract with the Office to provide services; (8) maintaining statistical information and other data on unaccompanied alien children in the Office's custody and care; (9) collecting and compiling statistical information from the INS (or successor entity); and 10) conducting investigations and inspections of facilities and other entities where unaccompanied alien children reside. The Director is also encouraged to utilize the refugee children foster care system. The Director shall have the power to contract with service providers and compel compliance with the terms and conditions of section 1323. Nothing in this title may be construed to transfer the responsibility for adjudicating benefit determinations under the Immigration and National Act from the authority of any official of the Service (or its successor entity), the EOIR (or its successor entity) or the Department of State.

   Sec. 1212. Establishment of Interagency Task Force on Unaccompanied Alien Children. An Interagency Task Force on Unaccompanied Alien Children is established consisting of various key agencies and departments of the federal government.

   Sec. 1213. Transition Provisions. All functions with respect to the care and custody of unaccompanied alien children under the immigration laws, vested in, or exercised by, the Commissioner or his employees is transferred to the Office.

   Sec. 1214. Effective Date. This subtitle shall take effect one year after the effective date of division A of this Act.

   Subtitle B--Custody, Release, Family Reunification, and Detention

   Sec. 1221. Procedures when Encountering Unaccompanied Alien Children. This section establishes procedures to be followed when encountering unaccompanied alien children. At the border, or at ports of entry, an unaccompanied alien child may be removed from the United States if deemed inadmissible under the Immigration and Nationality Act, unless the child is a national of a country contiguous to the U.S. and who fears persecution or would be harmed if returned to that country. Custody of all unaccompanied alien children found in the interior of the United States shall be under the jurisdiction of the Office, with exceptions of children who have committed crimes and or threaten national security. An unaccompanied alien child shall be transferred to the Office within 72 hours of apprehension.

   Sec. 1222. Family Reunification for Unaccompanied Alien Children with Relatives in the United States. Unaccompanied alien children in the custody of the Office shall be promptly placed with one of the following in order of preference: (1) a parent; (2) a legal guardian; (3) an adult relative; (4) an entity designated by the parent or legal guardian; (5) a state-licensed juvenile shelter or group home; or (6) other qualified adults or entities.

   Sec. 1223. Appropriate Conditions for Detention of Unaccompanied Alien Children. Unaccompanied children shall not be placed in adult detention facilities, but children who exhibit violent or criminal behavior can be detained in appropriate facilities for delinquent children. The Office shall establish appropriate standards and conditions for the detention of unaccompanied alien children, providing appropriate educational services, medical care, mental health care, access to telephones, access to legal services, access to interpreters, supervision by professionals trained in the care of children, recreational programs and activities, spiritual and religious needs, and dietary needs. The Director and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall develop procedures which prohibit shackling, handcuffing, or other restraints; solitary confinement; or pat or strip searches.

   Sec. 1224. Repatriated Unaccompanied Alien Children. Consistent with international agreements to which the United States is a party and to the extent practicable, the United States shall undertake efforts to ensure that it does not repatriate children in its custody into settings that

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   Sec. 1225. Establishing the Age of an Unaccompanied Alien Child. To address problems created by reliance on inaccurate methods for establishing the age of a child, the Director shall establish procedures for determining age.

   Sec. 1226. Effective Date. This subtitle shall take effect one year after the effective date of division A of this Act.

   Subtitle C--Access by Unaccompanied Alien Children to Guardians Ad Litem and Counsel

   Sec. 1231. Right of unaccompanied alien children to guardians ad litem. No later than 72 hours after the Office assumes custody of an unaccompanied alien child, the Director shall appoint a guardian ad litem to look after the child's best interests. The qualifications, duties, and powers of the guardian ad litem are set forth.

   Sec. 1232. Right of unaccompanied alien children to counsel. The Director shall ensure that all unaccompanied alien children have competent counsel appointed to represent them in immigration proceedings. Where possible, the Director shall utilize pro bono attorneys. Otherwise, the Director shall appoint government-funded counsel. Requirements for representation are set forth, including duties and access to children.

   Sec. 1233. Effective date; applicability. This subtitle shall take effect one year after the effective date of division A of this Act and shall apply to all unaccompanied alien children in Federal custody on, before, or after the effective date of this subtitle.

   Subtitle D--Strengthening Policies for Permanent Protection of Alien Children

   Sec. 1241. Special Immigrant Juvenile Visa. This section strengthens the Special Immigrant Juvenile Visa to make it a useful and flexible means of providing permanent protection to a small number of abused, neglected and abandoned youths.

   Sec. 1242. Training for officials and certain private parties who come into contact with unaccompanied alien children. This section provides training to officials involved in dependency proceedings, social service providers, as well INS personnel who come into contact with unaccompanied alien children. The Secretary of Homeland Security, acting jointly with the Secretary of Health and Human Services, shall provide specialized training to all personnel of the Service who come into contact with unaccompanied alien children.

   Sec. 1243. Effective Date. The amendments of section 1341 shall apply to all unaccompanied alien children in Federal custody on, before, or after the effective date of this Act.

   Subtitle E--Children Refugee and Asylum Seekers

   Sec. 1251. Guidelines for children's asylum claims. The section expresses the sense of Congress commending the INS for the issuance of its Guidelines for Children's Asylum Claims and requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to provide training to asylum officers, immigration judges, members of the Board of Immigration Appeals and immigration officers on these guidelines.

   Sec. 1252. Unaccompanied Refugee Children. This section requires an analysis of the situation faced by unaccompanied refugee children around the world and requires training on the needs of these refugee children.

   Subtitle F--Authorization of Appropriations

   Sec. 1261. Authorization of Appropriations. This section authorizes such sums as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this title.

   Title XIII--Agency for Immigration Hearings and Appeals

   Subtitle A--Structure and Function

   Sec. 1301. Establishment. This section abolishes the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) and creates the Agency for Immigration Hearings and Appeals (AIHA).

   Sec. 1302. Director of the Agency. This section provides that the agency shall have a Director, who shall be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. The Director runs the agency, appoints the Chair and members of the appellate body (Board of Immigration Appeals) and the Chief Immigration Judge. Also provides that the agency shall have a Deputy Director, General Counsel, Pro Bono Coordinator, and other offices as deemed necessary.

   Sec. 1303. Board of Immigration Appeals. This section establishes the Board of Immigration Appeals to perform the appellate functions of the agency, and shall consist of a Chair and at least 14 Board Members (who are appointed by the Director in consultation with the Chair). Provides that the Chair and Board Members must be an attorney in good standing and have a minimum of 7 years professional legal expertise in immigration and nationality law. Also provides that the Board retains the jurisdiction it holds under EOIR and Board Members are compelled to exercise their independent judgment.

   Sec. 1304. Chief Immigration Judge. This section establishes the Office of the Chief Immigration Judge to administer the immigration courts, headed by a Chief Immigration Judge. Provides that the Chief Immigration Judge and each immigration judge must be an attorney in good standing and have a minimum of 7 years professional legal expertise in immigration and nationality law. Also provides that the immigration courts retain the jurisdiction they hold under EOIR and immigration judges are compelled to exercise their independent judgment.

   Sec. 1305. Chief Administrative Hearing Officer. This section establishes the position of Chief Administrative Hearing Officer to hear cases involving unfair immigration-related employment practices and penalties for document fraud.

   Sec. 1306. Removal of Judges. This section provides that the Director, in consultation with the appropriate component head, may remove Board Members or immigration judges for good cause, which shall include neglect of duty and malfeasance.

   Sec. 1307. Authorization of Appropriations. This section authorizes the appropriation of funds necessary to execute this title. [Note: Since these entities already exist, the execution of this title should be budge