Congressional Record Weekly Update

Return to the Congressional Report Weekly.

1A) Conference Report of Defense Authorization
Title XIII--Nonproliferation and Export Control Assistance

   SUBTITLE A--GENERAL PROVISIONS

   Sec. 1301. Authorization of appropriations

   This section authorizes $162,000,000 for fiscal year 2003 for Nonproliferation and Export Control Assistance. Of this amount, $2,000,000 is authorized for section 584 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as added by section 1303 of this Act, and $65,000,000 for fiscal year 2003 for science and technology centers in the independent states of the former Soviet Union. Finally, $382,400,000 is authorized for fiscal year 2003 for ``Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs.''

   Sec. 1302. Nonproliferation technology acquisition programs for friendly foreign countries

   The Managers have consistently supported programs to improve the border security and export control services of friendly foreign countries. Providing reasonably sophisticated detection equipment to those countries can help stem the flow of materials usable in weapons of mass destruction, whether they are radioactive materials or equipment for the manufacture of chemical weapons. To this end, section 1302 authorizes the Department of State to spend up to $5 million annually to buy nuclear, chemical, and biological detection systems for other countries' export control services, as well as $10 million a year for x-ray systems to image sea-cargo containers. The Managers do not intend for these programs to take away from any existing programs or authorities. Rather, these are intended to be two very specific additions to the nonproliferation and export control tool kit.

   To make effective use of these funds, however, the Secretary should develop and budget for a multiyear training plan to assist foreign personnel in the utilization of these detection systems. Although multiyear training will not be required in every case, it will in some; and follow-up training to ensure proper use and maintenance of the equipment will guard against the provision of equipment that is never used or that falls quickly into disrepair. The provision requires the Secretary to submit annual reports for four years to the Senate Foreign Relations and House International Relations Committees describing the systems provided and the progress, status, and budget for a multiyear training program to operate those systems.

   Sec. 1303. International nonproliferation and export control training

   The Department of State, working with other U.S. Government agencies and with governments and non-governmental organizations in friendly countries, has done much to improve export control law, regulations, procedures, and equipment around the world--and most notably in the independent states of the former Soviet Union. The Managers have supported these programs and worked to expand them. The Managers believe that such training, and especially training conducted in the United States where participants can observe a sophisticated export control system firsthand, deserves specific attention in the law. Section 1303 therefore adds nonproliferation export control training to the activities specifically authorized by Chapter 9 of Part II of the Foreign Assistance Act.

   Education and training conducted under this section shall be of a technical nature, emphasizing techniques for detecting, deterring, monitoring, interdicting, and countering proliferation. The Managers see education and training in export control law, regulation, organization, and procedures as fully compliant with this requirement, although we must also train foreign personnel in detection and investigative techniques. The Managers also intend that this section not interfere with education and training programs that take place overseas. Rather, it reflects the Managers' belief that one important element in export control training consists of exposing participants to how our own export control system combines effectiveness with adherence to democratic principles and the rule of law.

   Sec. 1304. Relocation of scientists

   From 1992 through its expiration in 1996, the Soviet Scientists Immigration Act (P.L. 102-509) allowed a total of up to 750 highly skilled scientists and their families to be admitted to the United States without meeting the normal requirement that an alien's services in the sciences, arts, or business be sought by an employer in the United States. Section 1304 revives this law for another 4 years and increases to 950 the total number of such scientists who, over the two 4-year periods, having met criteria set by the Attorney General, may be so admitted. The Attorney General is directed to consult with other departments and agencies to determine whether any changes are needed in the regulations governing this program, and use of this provision is denied to a scientist who has previously been granted the status of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.

   Sec. 1305. International Atomic Energy Agency regular budget assessments

   The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is a particularly important international organization. It furthers U.S. national security objectives by helping to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons material, especially through its work on effective verification and safeguards measures. The Department of State has concluded that the IAEA ``is a critical and effective instrument for verifying compliance with international nuclear nonproliferation agreements, and serves as an essential barrier to the spread of nuclear weapons.'' The organization is poised to become even more active and important, moreover, as more countries sign the new model safeguards protocol that grants the IAEA the right to inspect undeclared facilities, and as the nuclear

[Page:
H6465]

   Nearly two decades of ``zero budget growth'' have impaired the ability of the IAEA to carry out its mission and to hire and retain the most qualified inspectors and Managers. The proportion of safeguards inspectors who hold doctorate degrees has fallen from 32 percent in 1985 to 19 percent in 2000. In June 2001, IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed El Baradei told his Board of Governors that zero real growth had left the safeguards mission underfunded by $20 million in the regular budget, which ``led to a situation where ..... we are in a position to carry out only adequate safeguards, not optimum safeguards, owing to our inability to modernize equipment and make full use of available new technologies.'' Voluntary contributions by the United States lessen the IAEA's budgetary constraints, but they cannot readily be used for the long-term capital investments or permanent staff increases necessary for an effective IAEA safeguards regime.

   In light of these real problems in an agency upon which the United States depends to enforce the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the Managers believe that a gradual and sustained increase in the IAEA's regular budget is needed. The Managers also believe that more of that budget should be devoted to nuclear nonproliferation activities, but this cannot be achieved unless the total increases as well.

   The IAEA's 2003 regular budget has already been fixed, so no increase in that budget can be achieved before 2004. Given the urgency of attending to materials that pose a risk of being used in nuclear or radiological terrorism, notably research reactor fuels that use fissile material and ``orphaned'' radioactive sources, this section authorizes a $10,000,000 increase in the United States voluntary contribution to the IAEA for 2003.

   The Managers have been informed of the Administration's decision no longer to insist that its approximate share of the IAEA budget be reduced from 25 percent to 22 percent, in keeping with reductions that are required by law in our contributions to most United Nations organizations. Section 308 makes clear that it was not the intent of Congress that the United States' contributions to all United Nations-related organizations and activities be reduced pursuant to the Admiral James W. Nance and Meg Donovan Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2000 and 2001 (contained in Appendix G of P.L. 106-113), which sets 22 percent assessment rates as benchmarks for the general United Nations budget, the Food and Agricultural Organization, the World Health Organization, and the International Labor Organization. Rather, contributions for an important and effective agency like the IAEA should be maintained at levels commensurate with the criticality of their missions.

   Sec. 1306. Amendments to the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000

   This section specifies in greater detail the content of the reports to the Congress that are required pursuant to the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000. It also makes clear that if a person only transfers to Iran advanced conventional weapons covered by section 2(a)(1)(E) of the Act, that person is not automatically exempt from sanctions. This amendment to section 5(a)(2) of the Act is in keeping with the original intent of Congress.

   Sec. 1307. Amendments to the North Korea Threat Reduction Act of 1999

   This section amends Section 822(a) of the North Korea Threat Reduction Act of 1999 (Subtitle B of title VIII of division A of HR 3427, as enacted into law by section 1000(a)(7)) by substituting for the existing listing of facilities, components, goods and so forth, the term ``specified nuclear item,'' which is further defined as such material, facilities, components, goods, services or technology which would be subject to an Agreement for Cooperation if exported to North Korea; and components that are listed in Annex A or B to the Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines.

   Sec. 1308. Annual report on the proliferation of missiles and essential components of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons

   This section consolidates four existing reporting requirements into one annual report on the proliferation of missiles and nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.

   SUBTITLE B--RUSSIAN FEDERATION DEBT REDUCTION FOR NONPROLIFERATION

   Sec. 1311. Short title

   This section states the short title as ``Russian Federation Debt for Nonproliferation Act of 2002.''

   Sec. 1312. Findings and purposes

   This section sets forth findings regarding the United States' security interest in preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction and reducing world stockpiles of such weapons, especially in the Russian Federation. Among the findings are that existing nonproliferation assistance programs have made substantial progress, but that the threats posed by inadequate management of weapons of mass destruction stockpiles and complexes in the Russian Federation remain urgent, especially the threat that weapons of mass destruction materials or technology will be sold or stolen and diverted to rogue states or terrorists.

   New funding streams are needed for programs to stem these threats, and the burden will have to be shared by the Russian Federation, the United States, and other governments. The Russian Federation assumed the Soviet Union's debts and owes roughly $2.7 billion to the United States and perhaps ten times that amount to other advanced industrialized countries. Debt reduction could be designed to provide additional funding for nonproliferation and arms reduction initiatives, and this funding could be especially large if U.S. friends and allies were to follow the U.S. lead in this regard. The bold June 2002 decision of the G-8 at its Kananaskis meeting to provide the Russian Federation ``10 plus 10 over 10''--$10,000,000,000 in U.S. nonproliferation assistance and $10,000,000,000 in assistance from the other members over 10 years--includes the possibility of member states using debt reduction as a means of financing this assistance.

   This section also states that it is in the vital national security interests of the United States that: all stocks of nuclear weapons and weapons-usable nuclear material in the Russian Federation are secure and accounted for; stocks of nuclear weapons and weapons-usable nuclear material that are excess to military needs in the Russian Federation are monitored and reduced; any chemical or biological weapons, related materials, and facilities in the Russian Federation are destroyed; the Russian Federation's nuclear weapons complex is reduced to a size appropriate to its post-Cold War missions, and its experts in weapons of mass destruction technologies are shifted to gainful and sustainable civilian employment; the Russian Federation's export control system blocks any proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the means of delivering such weapons, and materials, equipment, know-how, or technology that would be used to develop, produce, or deliver such weapons; and these objectives are accomplished with sufficient monitoring and transparency to provide confidence that they have in fact been accomplished and that the funds provided to accomplish these objectives have been spent efficiently and effectively.

   Subsection (b) states that the purposes of this subtitle are to facilitate the accomplishment of the United States objectives described in the findings set forth in subsection (a) by providing for the use of a portion of the Russian Federation's foreign debt to fund nonproliferation programs, and to help ensure that the resources made available to the Russian Federation are targeted to the accomplishment of these objectives. This subsection also states that the intent is to allow the use of additional resources for these purposes. Specifically, the Managers do not intend that debt reduction be used as a substitute for current direct assistance to nonproliferation programs in the Russian Federation.

   Sec. 1313. Definitions

   Section 1313 defines five terms of art. In particular, in this subtitle, the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means the Committee on International Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.

   Sec. 1314. Authority to reduce the Russian Federation's Soviet-era debt obligations to the United States

   The Russian Federation has assumed the debts owed by the former Soviet Union, including roughly $480,000,000 in Lend-Lease debt dating back to U.S. assistance during World War II and $2,240,000,000 in debt owed to the United States as a result of credits extended under Title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954. Section 1314 authorizes the President to reduce this debt after notifying the appropriate congressional committees of his intention at least 15 days in advance of any formal determination to do so, and allocates such sums as may be necessary in fiscal year 2003 for the cost of reduction in this debt. Debt reduction may be implemented upon entry into force of a ``Russian Federation Nonproliferation Investment Agreement'' authorized under section 1315. The authority provided by this section shall be available only to the extent, however, that appropriations for the cost (as defined in section 502(5) of the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990) of reducing any debt pursuant to this section are made in advance.

   The Managers understand that any debt reduction agreement reached pursuant to this subtitle is likely to involve the full value of the Russian Federation's Soviet-era official debt to the United States. The purpose of the debt reduction will be to provide new funds for nonproliferation programs in the Russian Federation, rather than to provide debt relief to a country that is, after all, meeting its international financial obligations. The Managers hope, therefore, that any debt reduction agreement will encompass not only the face value of the debt, but also the interest or other debt servicing charges that would otherwise be owed.

   Sec. 1315. Russian Federation nonproliferation investment agreement

   This section authorizes the President, in consultation with other appropriate officials of the Federal Government, to enter into a ``Russian Federation Nonproliferation Investment Agreement'' with the Russian Federation concerning the use of the funds saved by that country as a result of any debt reduction provided pursuant to this subtitle. The Managers intend that such an agreement govern any debt reduction provided pursuant to sections 1314.

[Page: H6466]

   The Managers are especially cognizant of the need to ensure that funds provided through Russian Federation debt reduction be invested in nonproliferation programs or projects in an efficient and transparent manner. The Russian Federation Nonproliferation Investment Agreement shall therefore ensure that: (1) an amount equal to the value of the debt reduced pursuant to this subtitle will be made available for agreed nonproliferation programs and projects; (2) each such program or project will be approved by the President; (3) administration and oversight of nonproliferation programs and projects will incorporate best practices from established threat reduction and nonproliferation assistance programs; (4) each program or project funded pursuant to the Agreement will be subject to audits conducted by or for the United States Government to confirm that agreed funds are expended on agreed projects and meet agreed targets and benchmarks; (5) unobligated funds for investments pursuant to the Agreement will not be diverted to other purposes; (6) funds allocated to programs and projects pursuant to the Agreement will not be subject to any taxation by the Russian Federation; (7) all matters relating to the intellectual property rights and legal liabilities of United States firms in a given project will be agreed upon before the expenditure of funds would be authorized for that project; and (8) not less than 75 percent of the funds made available for each nonproliferation program or project under the Agreement will be spent in the Russian Federation.

   Further, this subsection expresses the sense of Congress that: to the extent practicable, the boards and administrative mechanisms of existing threat reduction and nonproliferation programs should be used in the administration and oversight of programs and projects under the Agreement; the United States and the Russian Federation should consider commissioning the General Accounting Office and the Russian Chamber of Accounts to conduct joint audits to ensure that the funds saved by the Russian Federation as a result of any debt reduction are used exclusively, efficiently, and effectively to implement agreed programs or projects pursuant to the Agreement; and the Agreement should provide for significant penalties if agreed funds are misappropriated, or if the President is unable to certify for two consecutive years that Russia has made material progress in stemming the flow of sensitive goods, technologies, material and know-how related to the design, development, and production of weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them to state sponsors of international terrorism, as required in section 1317.

   Sec. 1316. Independent media and the rule of law

   The United States has an important interest in encouraging the development of an independent media sector and the rule of law in the Russian Federation. Such developments would help develop Russian involvement in and cooperation with Western political and economic institutions, thereby increasing Russia's economic well-being and its likelihood of maintaining nonproliferation programs on its own (through increased transparency and a decreased incentive to profit from illicit technology sales). They would also make it less likely that a rogue operation to engage in proliferation could ever go undetected or unexposed.

   Section 1316 therefore provides that up to 10 percent of the funds saved by the Russian Federation as a result of any debt relief provided pursuant to this subtitle may be used to promote a vibrant, independent media sector and the rule of law in the Russian Federation. The mechanism for this would be an endowment to support the establishment of a ``Center for an Independent Press and the Rule of Law'' in the Russian Federation, which shall be directed by a joint United States-Russian Board of Directors in which the majority of members, including the chairman, shall be United States personnel, and which shall be responsible for the management of the endowment, its funds, and the Center's programs. While the President is not obligated to use the authority provided by this section, given events in Russia over the past year, in which independent media outlets have been closed or placed under government control, the Managers strongly urge the executive branch to explore exercising this authority.

   Sec. 1317. Restrictions on debt reduction authority

   The overarching framework for debt-for-nonproliferation under this subtitle is that benefits to the Russian Federation that flow from debt reduction and devoting the funds saved to nonproliferation programs are greater than any similar benefits gained from the proliferation of sensitive items and technologies to state sponsors of terrorism. As such, the first condition of any debt reduction is the need for the Russian Federation to stem the flow of sensitive goods, technologies, material, and know-how related to the research, design, development, and production of weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them to countries that have been determined by the Secretary of State to have repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism. In particular, the Managers are most concerned regarding the proliferation of dual-use nuclear and missile goods, technologies, materials, and know-how to Iran. Section 1317 therefore conditions section 1314 concerning the authority to grant debt reduction by requiring the President to certify to the appropriate committees of Congress that the Russian Federation has made and continues to make ``material progress'' toward that end before any debt reduction can be provided. For this purpose, 'material progress' is defined as significant, measurable, and demonstrable reductions in Russian proliferation as measured on an annual basis. Until that certification can be made, no debt reduction can be provided, unless the President waives this requirement pursuant to the provisions of subsection (c).

   This section also states in subsection (b) that if in any subsequent annual report to Congress submitted pursuant to section 1317 the President cannot certify that the Russian Federation continues to meet the condition required in subsection (a), then the authorities granted under this subtitle may not be exercised and funds may not be expended, unless and until such certification is made to the appropriate congressional committees. Under subsection (c), the President may waive the requirements of subsections (a) and (b) for a given fiscal year if the President determines that the imposition of those requirements in that fiscal year would be detrimental to the national interest of the United States and so reports to the appropriate committees of Congress.

   Sec. 1318. Discussion of Russian Federation debt reduction for nonproliferation with other creditor states

   Western countries, other than the United States, hold roughly 90 percent of the Russian Federation's Soviet-era official bilateral debt. Were these countries to join with the United States in allowing this debt to be used for nonproliferation programs in the Russian Federation, the funds available for such purposes would be greatly enhanced. Section 1318 expresses the sense of Congress that the President and other appropriate officials designated by the President should pursue discussions with other creditor states to: ensure that other advanced industrial democracies, especially the largest holders of Soviet-era Russian debt, dedicate significant proportions of their bilateral official debt with the Russian Federation or equivalent amounts of direct assistance to the G-8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, as agreed upon in the Statement by G-8 Leaders on June 27, 2002; and reach agreement, as appropriate, to establish a unified Russian Federation official debt reduction fund to manage and provide financial transparency for the resources provided by creditor states through debt reductions.

   Sec. 1319. Implementation of United States policy

   This section expresses the sense of Congress that implementation of debt-for-nonproliferation programs with the Russian Federation should be overseen by the coordinating mechanism established pursuant to section 1334 of this Act. This interagency committee is intended to coordinate all U.S. Government nonproliferation programs in the former Soviet Union and will be best situated to provide efficient and effective oversight and management of both existing nonproliferation programs and programs or projects resulting from any debt reduction.

   Sec. 1320. Consultations with Congress

   This section requires the President to consult with the appropriate congressional committees on a periodic basis to review the implementation of this subtitle and the Russian Federation's eligibility for debt reduction pursuant to this subtitle.

   Sec. 1321. Annual reports to Congress

   This section requires the President, no later than December 31, 2003, and annually by December 31 of each subsequent year, to prepare and transmit to Congress a report concerning actions taken to implement this subtitle during the fiscal year preceding the fiscal year in which the report is transmitted. The report shall include (1) a description of the activities undertaken pursuant to this subtitle during the fiscal year; (2) a description of the nature and amounts of the loans reduced pursuant to this subtitle during the fiscal year; (3) a description of any agreement entered into under this subtitle; (4) a description of the progress during the fiscal year of any projects funded pursuant to this subtitle; (5) a summary of the results of relevant audits performed in the fiscal year; and (6) a certification, if appropriate, that the Russian Federation continues to meet the condition required by section 1317(a) and an explanation as to why such certification was or was not made.

   SUBTITLE C--NONPROLIFERATION ASSISTANCE COORDINATION

   Sec. 1331. Short title

   This section states that this subtitle may be cited as the ``Nonproliferation Assistance Coordination Act of 2002.''

   Sec. 1332. Findings

   This section states the findings of Congress. United States nonproliferation efforts in the independent states of the former Soviet Union have achieved important results in keeping weapons of mass destruction and related material, technology and knowledge out of the hands of terrorists and rogue states. The many U.S. programs are managed by several departments, however, and repeated studies have cited a lack of effective coordination. For example, the Russia Task Force of the Secretary of Energy Advisory Board, chaired by former Senator (and now Ambassador) Howard Baker and former

[Page: H6467]

   The Administration formed an interagency mechanism for its review of these programs, and the Managers believe that a similar approach is needed for continuing high-level coordination among programs. Private sector spending and foreign investment are increasingly important sources of employment for ex-weapons scientists in the former Soviet Union. Some of these efforts are channeled through U.S. Government or U.S.-supported institutions like the Department of Energy's Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention program, the State Department's International Science and Technology Centers program and the Cooperative Research and Development Foundation. The Managers also believe that nongovernmental efforts, like those of Ted Turner's Nuclear Threat Initiative, will also play an important role, however, and the U.S. Government should coordinate its efforts with those of the private sector.

   Sec. 1333. Definitions

   This section defines terms used in this subtitle. It defines the term ``independent states of the former Soviet Union'' to have the meaning given the term in section 3 of the FREEDOM Support Act (22 U.S.C. 5801). ``Appropriate committees of Congress'' is defined to mean the Committees on Foreign Relations, Armed Services, and Appropriations of the Senate and the Committees on International Relations, Armed Services, and Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

   Sec. 1334. Establishment of committee on nonproliferation assistance

   This section directs the President to establish a mechanism to coordinate U.S. efforts in formulating and carrying out programs for achieving nonproliferation and threat reduction. This mechanism shall include: representatives designated, respectively, by the Secretaries of State, Defense, Energy, and Commerce, the Attorney General, and the Director of the Office of Homeland Security or such successor department or agency; and any other executive branch official the President selects. Each department or agency representative should, to the maximum extent possible, have been appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. The President shall designate the chair of the coordination mechanism, and the chair may invite the head of any other department or agency to send a representative to participate from time to time in the activities of the coordinating committee.

   Sec. 1335. Purposes and authority

   This section directs that the interagency coordination mechanism should have the authority to commission analyses on issues relating to coordination of nonproliferation assistance programs within the U.S. Government, between the U.S. public and private sectors, and between the United States and other countries. Within the U.S. Government, the coordination mechanism should provide guidance to coordinate, de-conflict and maximize the utility of nonproliferation assistance programs. It should also consider and make recommendations, as necessary, to the President and Congress regarding proposals for new legislation or regulations relating to U.S. nonproliferation efforts in the independent states of the former Soviet Union. Given the large number of departments and congressional committees with a role in this effort, it will be especially useful for the Administration to bring agencies together and make coherent recommendations regarding the increased nonproliferation efforts that are clearly required today. As the aforementioned Baker-Cutler task force stated in its report to the Secretary of Energy, ``[t]he most urgent unmet national security threat to the United States today is the danger that weapons of mass destruction or weapons-usable material in Russia could be stolen and sold to terrorists or hostile nation-states and used against American troops abroad or citizens at home.'' (P. iii)

   Sec. 1336. Administrative support

   This section directs that all United States departments and agencies shall provide, to the extent permitted by law, such information and assistance as may be requested by the coordination mechanism in carrying out its functions and activities established pursuant to section 1334.

   Sec. 1337. Confidentiality of information

   This section assures that information which has been submitted or received in confidence shall not be publicly disclosed, except to the extent required by law, and such information shall be used by the coordination mechanism only for the purpose of carrying out the functions and activities set forth in this subtitle. This section does not, in and of itself, exempt such information from the Freedom of Information Act. It is intended, rather, to underscore the need for departmental representatives to discuss candidly the successes and shortfalls of their nonproliferation assistance programs and to enable committee members to ``think outside the box'' in formulating guidance for executive branch programs and recommendations to the President and Congress.

   Sec. 1338. Statutory construction

   Section 1338 makes clear that the Nonproliferation Assistance Coordination Act of 2002 does not remove the existing authority of any U.S. department or agency over nonproliferation efforts in the independent states of the former Soviet Union. The interagency coordination mechanism is not to be an operational agency. This subtitle does not give it the budgetary authority vested in the executive branch departments or in the Office of Management and Budget. Neither does this subtitle apply to any activity that is reportable pursuant to title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.).

   Sec. 1339. Reporting and consultation

   Section 1339 stipulates that not later than 120 days after each inauguration of a President of the United States of America, the President shall submit a report to the Congress on his or her general and specific nonproliferation and threat reduction objectives and how the efforts of executive branch agencies will be coordinated most effectively, pursuant to section 1334 of this Act, to achieve those objectives.

   SUBTITLE D--IRAN NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION PREVENTION ACT OF 2002

   Sec. 1341. Short title

   This section states that this subtitle may be cited as the ``Iran Nuclear Proliferation Act of 2002.''

   Sec. 1342. Withholding of voluntary contributions to the IAEA for programs and projects in Iran

   This section amends Section 307 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2227) by adding at the end the following: ``(d) (1) Notwithstanding subsection (c), if the Secretary of State determines that programs and projects of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Iran are inconsistent with United States nuclear nonproliferation and safety goals, will provide Iran with training or expertise relevant to the development of nuclear weapons, or are being used as a cover for the acquisition of sensitive nuclear technology, the limitations of subsection (a) shall apply to such programs and projects, and the Secretary of State shall so notify the appropriate congressional committees (as defined in section 3 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003.)''

   Sec. 1343. Annual review by Secretary of State of programs and projects of the IAEA; U.S. opposition to certain programs and projects of the agency

   This section directs the Secretary to undertake a comprehensive annual review of all programs and projects of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the countries described in section 307(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (U.S.C. 2227(a)) and shall determine if such programs and projects are consistent with United States nuclear nonproliferation and safety goals. The Secretary shall also, not later than one year after the date of enactment of this Act, and on an annual basis thereafter for five years, submit to Congress a report containing the results of this review.

   This section also directs the Secretary to direct the United States representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency to oppose programs of the Agency that are determined by the Secretary under the review conducted under subsection (a)(1) to be inconsistent with nuclear nonproliferation and safety goals of the United States.

   Sec. 1344. Reporting requirements

   This section requires that, not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, and on an annual basis thereafter for five years, the Secretary, in consultation with the United States representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency, shall prepare and submit to Congress a report that contains (1) a description of the total amount of annual assistance to Iran from the International Atomic Energy Agency; (2) a list of Iranian officials in leadership positions at the Agency; (3) the expected time frame for the completion of the nuclear power reactors at the Bushehr nuclear power plant; (4) a summary of the nuclear materials and technology transferred to Iran from the Agency in the preceding year that could assist in the development of Iran's nuclear weapons program; and (5) a description of all programs and projects of the International Atomic Energy Agency in each country described in section 307(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2227(a)) and any inconsistencies between the technical cooperation and assistance programs and projects of the Agency and United States nuclear nonproliferation and safety goals in those countries. The report required to be submitted under subsection (a) shall be submitted in an unclassified form, to the extent appropriate, but may include a classified annex.

   Sec. 1345. Sense of Congress

   This section states the sense of Congress that the President should pursue internal reforms at the International Atomic Energy Agency that will ensure that all programs and projects funded under the Technical Cooperation and Assistance Fund of the Agency are compatible with United States nuclear nonproliferation policy and international nuclear nonproliferation norms. Pursuant to section 307 of the Foreign Assistance Act, the Managers note the continued restrictions in that provision regarding Cuba which include limitations on U.S. funding for IAEA technical cooperation activities in that country.

[Page: H6468]

   Title XIV--Expediting the Munitions Licensing Process

   Sec. 1401. License officer staffing

   This section authorizes $10,000,000 for fiscal year 2003 to be appropriated for ``Diplomatic and Consular Programs'' for salaries and expenses of the Office of Defense Trade Controls of the Department. This section also requires that, effective January 1, 2003, the Secretary shall assign to the Office of Defense Trade Controls of the Department a sufficient number of license review officers to ensure that the average weekly caseload for each officer does not routinely exceed 40. It is important to note that, given the qualitative differences between individual cases (e.g., in their technical complexity), the caseload for some license review officers might appropriately be significantly fewer than 40 cases per week.

   Finally, given the priority placed on expedited license reviews in recent years by the Department of Defense, this section states that the Secretary of Defense should ensure that military officers are continuously detailed to the Office of Defense Trade Controls of the Department of State on a nonreimbursable basis.

   Sec. 1402. Funding for database automation

   This section directs that of the amount authorized to be appropriated under the appropriations account of the Department entitled ``Capital Investment Fund'' for fiscal year 2003, $4,000,000 is authorized to be available for the Office of Defense Trade Controls of the Department for the modernization of information management.

   Sec. 1403. Information management priorities

   Sec. 1403 requires the Secretary to establish a secure, Internet-based system for the filing and review of applications for export of United States Munitions List items. Of the amount made available pursuant to section 1402, $3,000,000 is authorized to be available to fully automate the Defense Trade Application System, and to ensure that the system: (1) is a secure, electronic system for the filing and review of Munitions List license applications; (2) is accessible by United States companies through the Internet for the purpose of filing and tracking their Munitions List license applications; and (3) is capable of exchanging data with the Export Control Automated Support System of the Department of Commerce, the Foreign Disclosure and Technology Information System and the USXPORTS systems of the Department of Defense, the Export Control System of the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Proliferation Information Network System of the Department of Energy.

   Sec. 1404. Improvements to the automated export system

   Section 1404 mandates that the Secretary of Commerce, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Treasury, publish regulations in the Federal Register to require, upon the effective date of those regulations, filing through the Automated Export System for the remainder of exports that were not covered by regulations issued pursuant to section 1252(b) of the Security Assistance Act of 1999 (113 Stat. 1501A at 1536, as enacted into law by section 1000(a)(7) of Public Law 106-113; 13 U.S.C. 301 note).

   This section also requires the Secretary of State to conclude an information-sharing arrangement with the heads of the United States Customs Service and the Census Bureau to adjust the Automated Export System to parallel information currently collected by the Department of State.

   This section also significantly increases the penalties for failure to file export declarations through the Automated Export System and for knowingly failing to file or filing misleading export information through the Shippers Export Declaration (or any successor document) or the Automated Export System. It sets forth procedures for civil penalty imposition by the Department of Commerce, but permits other agencies to use their own procedures if the Secretary of Commerce delegates enforcement functions to them. It also authorizes the Secretary of Commerce to designate officers or employees of the Office of Export Enforcement to conduct investigations pursuant to chapter 9 of title 13 of the U.S. Code (on the census). In conducting such investigations, those officers or employees may, to the extent necessary or appropriate to the enforcement of this chapter, exercise such authorities as are conferred upon them by other laws of the United States, subject to policies and procedures approved by the Attorney General. The Commissioner of Customs is given similar authority to designate officers or employees of the Customs Service to enforce the provisions of this chapter, or to conduct investigations pursuant to this chapter. Finally, this section authorizes the Secretary of Commerce to promulgate regulations for the implementation and enforcement of this section. The criminal fines provided for in this section are exempted from the provisions of section 3571 of title 18, United States Code. A clerical amendment to the table of sections at the beginning of chapter 9 of title 13, United States Code, strikes the item relating to section 305 and inserts, ``305. Penalties for unlawful export information activities.''

   Sec. 1405. Adjustment of threshold amounts for congressional review purposes

   Pursuant to section 36 of the Arms Export Control Act, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the House International Relations Committee receive prior notice of hundreds of arms sales each year. As inflation and improved technology have raised the cost of weapons systems, the old dollar thresholds in the law have forced the reporting of more and more export licenses that are of no substantive interest to either committee, but that necessarily subject U.S. companies to additional delays due to the requirement for congressional consideration.

   This section sets new prior notice thresholds of $25,000,000 for major defense equipment and $100,000,000 for other items, and $300,000,000 for design and construction services, which will apply to most sales to NATO members, Australia, Japan or New Zealand. The one exception will be sales to one or more of those countries that incorporate a new or increased sales territory that includes a country outside of that group. The Managers believe that approval of such a sales territory is tantamount to approving future sales to the listed countries, and sometimes such third-country sales pose security or policy concerns. The Managers note that discussions on the issue of notification thresholds with the Department of State and the Department of Defense will continue in the coming year.

   Sec. 1406. Congressional notification of removal of items from the munitions list

   This section requires the President to provide 30 days' notice to the Congress in accordance with the procedures applicable to reprogramming justifications under section 634A(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 of any items proposed to be removed from the Munitions List. The Defense Trade Security Initiative calls for a review of the Munitions List every 4 years. The Managers understand that the Administration is currently reviewing a portion of the list to determine if items warrant removal from the list. While the recent completion of the review of one-quarter of the Munitions List did not remove any items to the detriment of U.S. national security, the Managers believe that the oversight responsibilities of Congress with regard to the sale of lethal military arms would be prudently exercised by the opportunity to review under these procedures any proposed deletions to the Munitions List. The Managers trust that continued consultation with the Department of State over the ongoing review of and changes to the Munitions List will allow any alterations to the Munitions List to occur without undue delay, controversy, or diminution of U.S. national security.

   Title XV--National Security Assistance Strategy

   Sec. 1501. Briefing on the strategy

   Foreign Military Financing (FMF), transfers of excess defense articles (EDA), and International Military Education and Training (IMET) are justified not simply in military terms, but as contributions to the overall national security of the United States. The fact that they are authorized in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the Arms Export Control Act reflects a recognition that they are intended primarily to serve foreign policy objectives.

   It can be most difficult, however, to keep foreign policy objectives in the forefront when the details of program implementation involve detailed issues of military efficiency at home and abroad. The Managers believe that the State Department must develop a national security assistance strategy that integrates the FMF, EDA and IMET programs, on a country-by-country basis, into the National Security Strategy of the United States. This will bring greater coherence to those programs and ensure that they achieve maximum benefits for U.S. foreign policy. The Managers appreciate the fact that relevant officials are trying to impose greater strategic and policy discipline on these programs, and they expect to see tangible results in this regard.

   This section directs that, no later that March 31, 2003, officials of the Department of State and the Department of Defense shall brief the appropriate congressional committees regarding their plans and progress in formulating and implementing a national security assistance strategy. This briefing shall include: (a) how, and to what extent, the elements of the strategy recommended in section 501(b) of the Security Assistance Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 2305(b)) have been or will be incorporated in security assistance plans and decisions; (b) the number of out-years considered in the strategy; (c) actions taken to include the programs listed in section 501(c) of the Security Assistance Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 2305(c)), as well as similar programs of military training or other assistance to the military or security forces of a foreign country; (d) how a national security assistance strategy is being implemented regarding specific countries; (e) any programmatic changes adopted or expected as a result of adopting a strategic approach to security assistance policymaking; (f) any obstacles encountered in formulating or implementing a national security assistance strategy; and (g) any resources or legislative needs highlighted by this process. It is especially important to include similar programs other than FMF, EDA, and IMET, so that uniform policy and standards are maintained over all such programs.

   Sec. 1502. Security assistance surveys

   This section encourages the Secretary of State to use security assistance surveys in the preparation of a national security assistance strategy. This section also authorizes $2,000,000 to be available to the Secretary to

[Page: H6469]

   Title XVI--Miscellaneous Provisions

   Sec. 1601. Nuclear and missile nonproliferation in south Asia

   The war against terrorism has made South Asia a military theater of operations and has produced new, cooperative relations between the United States and both India and Pakistan. It has not reduced, however, the risk that this region will contribute to the proliferation, or even the use, of nuclear weapons. Indeed, concern over the security of special nuclear material in South Asia has been heightened by the increased tension in the area. In promulgating a statement of United States policy on nonproliferation objectives in South Asia, the Managers intend that the executive branch maintain and demonstrate a high priority for these concerns. Osama bin Laden's efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction make clear that nonproliferation is now part and parcel of the war on terrorism, and not a subsidiary issue. The Committee also intends that all U.S. policy and actions on nuclear issues in South Asia be consistent with United States obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (21 U.S.T. 483) and with past U.S. policy on these matters.

   To this end, subsection (a) states that it shall be the policy of the United States, consistent with its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to encourage and work with the governments of India and Pakistan to achieve nonproliferation objectives by September 30, 2003, including: the continuation of a nuclear testing moratorium; a commitment not to deploy nuclear weapons or ballistic missiles that can carry nuclear weapons and to restrain the ranges and types of missiles developed or deployed; agreement by both governments to bring their export controls in accord with the guidelines established by the major international nonproliferation regimes; establishment of a modern, effective system to control the export of sensitive dual-use items, technology, technical information, and materiel that can be used in the design, development, or production of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles; and bilateral meetings between senior Indian and Pakistani officials to discuss security issues and establish confidence-building measures with respect to nuclear policies and programs.

   Subsection (b) states that it shall be the policy of the United States, consistent with its obligations under the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to encourage and, where appropriate, to work with the Governments of India and Pakistan to achieve not later than September 30, 2003, the establishment by those governments of modern, effective systems to protect and secure their nuclear devices and materiel from unauthorized use, accidental employment, or theft. Any such dialogue with India or Pakistan would not be represented or considered, nor would it be intended, as granting any recognition to India or Pakistan, as appropriate, as a nuclear weapon state (as defined in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons).

   Finally, this section requires the President to submit, not later than March 1, 2003, to the appropriate congressional committees a report describing United States efforts to achieve the objectives listed in subsections (a) and (b), the progress made toward the achievement of those objectives, and the likelihood that each objective will be achieved by September 30, 2003.

   Sec. 1602. Real-time public availability of raw seismological data

   One area in which policy and science both benefit from close collaboration is seismology--the study of disturbances in the earth's crust. Scientists measure seismic waves primarily to study earthquakes and to differentiate them from rock falls and man-made explosions. Public benefits from this work have included a better understanding of earthquakes, improved ability to warn of possible tsunamis so that people can move to higher ground, monitoring of volcanos for public safety purposes, improved techniques to locate oil reserves, and the detection and characterization of nuclear weapons tests. Data gathered for national security reasons can in turn be of great use to science. Pursuant to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, an International Monitoring System (IMS) is being put in place that will link 170 seismic monitoring stations, including some that are new or in locations to which outside observers have not previously had access. The United States participates in the development of the IMS and receives near-real time data from the seismic and other sensors in that system.

   These data, if made available to scientists in a timely fashion, would improve worldwide earthquake monitoring capabilities. Combining IMS data with seismological data from sites outside the IMS will, in turn, enable scientists to assist governments--including our own--in determining whether an unusual seismic event was a nuclear weapons test. The United States has pressed for near-real time release of IMS data to the public, but has not achieved international consensus in favor of that.

   The Managers believe that more must be done to bring about the timely release of these data. The case for letting all the world's experts obtain these data in a timely fashion is one that every country should understand: more complete data and competitive analysis decrease the risk that an event will be misinterpreted. And if, as appears to be the case, nearly all countries accept this argument, then they ought to act upon that, either through appropriate international organizations or through separate bilateral or multilateral agreements regarding each country's data.

   Section 1602 directs the head of the Air Force Technical Applications Center (AFTAC) to make available to the public, as soon as possible after receipt, all raw seismological data provided to the United States Government by any international monitoring organization that is directly responsible for seismological monitoring. AFTAC is the U.S. Government agency that gathers these data, so its director is an appropriate official to release them.

   Sec. 1603. Detailing U.S. governmental personnel to international arms control and nonproliferation organizations

   United States Government personnel have performed important work for international organizations over the years. One well-known example was UNSCOM, the United Nations Special Commission in Iraq, which conducted inspections in that country in an effort to locate and destroy weapons of mass destruction capabilities. Such details of U.S. personnel serve both our own national interest and the world's need for technical and logistical expertise in these crucial organizations. Too often, however, the personnel detailed to international organizations find that their careers suffer because they have spent months or years away from their home offices and outside normal personnel career paths. This section directs the Secretary of State to develop measures whereby U.S. personnel may be detailed to international arms control and nonproliferation organizations without having their careers suffer, and to report to the appropriate committees no later than May 1, 2003, on measures taken.

   Sec. 1604. Diplomatic presence overseas

   As the events since September 11, 2001, have made all too clear, antiterrorism and nonproliferation are increasingly important elements of American foreign and national security policy. These are not issues that America can handle alone. Rather, we must enlist other nations to do their part as well, both at home and in international fora. To meet the challenges of the 21st century, U.S. missions overseas must have high-level personnel who have both language training and substantive expertise in nonproliferation and political military affairs.

   This section authorizes the Secretary of State to create the position of Counselor for Nonproliferation and Political Military Affairs at U.S. missions overseas, to be filled by career Civil Service officers or Foreign Service officers who will receive, as a rule, 10 months of special substantive or language training before assuming their posts.

   Sec. 1605. Compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention

   On April 24, 1997, the Senate provided its advice and consent to ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention subject to the condition, among others, that the President certify that no sample collected in the United States pursuant to the Convention will be transferred for analysis to any laboratory outside the territory of the United States. Congress enacted the same condition into law as section 304(f)(1) of the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998 (22 U.S.C. 6724(f)(1)). Part II, paragraph 57, of the Verification Annex of the Convention requires that all samples requiring off-site analysis under the Convention shall be analyzed by at least two laboratories that have been designated as capable of conducting such testing by the Organization for the Prevention of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). The only United States laboratory currently designated by the OPCW is the United States Army Edgewood Forensic Science Laboratory.

   In order to comply with the Chemical Weapons Convention, the certification submitted pursuant to condition (18) of the resolution of ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention, and section 304 of the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998 (22 U.S.C. 6724), the United States must possess, at a minimum, a second OPCW-designated laboratory. The possession of a second laboratory is especially necessary in view of the potential for a challenge inspection to be initiated against the United States by a foreign nation. To qualify as a designated laboratory, a laboratory must be certified under ISO Guide 25 or a higher standard, and complete three proficiency tests. The laboratory must have the full capability to handle substances listed on Schedule 1 of the Annex on Schedules of Chemicals of the Convention. In order to handle such substances in the United States, a laboratory also must operate under a bailment agreement with the United States Army.

   Several existing United States commercial laboratories have approved quality control systems, already possess bailment agreements with the United States Army, and have the capabilities necessary to obtain OPCW designation. The Managers believe that, in order to safeguard samples taken on U.S. territory and bolster the legitimacy of the analysis of those samples, thereby protecting the proprietary and business interests of U.S. firms, and to promote similar transparency and confidence when inspections are conducted abroad, one of the

[Page: H6470]

   This section therefore requires that the United States National Authority, by June 1, 2003, select a nongovernmental laboratory to pursue designation by the OPCW. A report is required by March 1, 2003, detailing a plan for securing OPCW designation of a third United States laboratory by December 1, 2004. With three designated U.S. laboratories, the OPCW could randomly send a real sample to two laboratories and a false sample to the third, so that a laboratory would never be sure what sample it was analyzing. This approach, which is in keeping with OPCW intent worldwide, would reduce significantly the value of any espionage information that a country or company might hope to gain by infiltrating a laboratory.

1B) Floor Debate on Department of State Authorizations for FY 2002 and 2003

[Page: H6649]
---

   Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee on Rules, I call up House Resolution 545 and ask for its immediate consideration.

   The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

   H. Res. 545

   Resolved, That upon adoption of this resolution it shall be in order to consider the conference report to accompany the bill (H.R. 1646) to authorize appropriations for the Department of State for fiscal years 2002 and 2003, and for other purposes. All points of order against the conference report and against its consideration are waived. The conference report shall be considered as read.

   The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Dan Miller of Florida). The gentleman from Florida (Mr. Diaz-Balart) is recognized for 1 hour.

   Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Speaker, for the purpose of debate only, I yield the customary 30 minutes to the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. McGovern) pending which I yield myself such time as I may consume. During consideration of this resolution, all time yielded is for the purposes of debate only.

   (Mr. DIAZ-BALART asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

   Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Speaker, House Resolution 545 is a rule waiving all points of order against the conference report to accompany H.R. 1646, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for 2002 and 2003, and against its consideration.

   The underlying legislation has taken on a new meaning, Mr. Speaker, this year. The United States is leading a worldwide war against terrorism. This is a very difficult task, which requires a careful combination of strength as well as diplomacy. The legislation that we will consider today supports the needs of President Bush and his administration to conduct the foreign relations of the United States while keeping our citizens abroad safe from harm.

   It provides $13.8 billion in fiscal year 2003 to help achieve these goals, including $5.2 billion for counterterrorism assistance to our allies and $1.6 billion for security at our embassies abroad.

   I am very pleased to see that this report includes increased authorization levelings for human rights monitoring as part of our effort in Congress to promote human rights around the world. This legislation also requires State Department officials to work to reform the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, whose membership includes some of the world's worst human rights violators.

   The underlying legislation will also help promote our Nation's message of freedom and support for democracy by providing new authorities to our international broadcasting entities, with an emphasis on those countries whose governments obviously do not permit freedom of the press.

   I am pleased to see a continued commitment to our friends in Israel. Every country under international law has the right to designate its capital city. In fact, however, this has not been the case with Israel. This legislation requires compliance with existing U.S. law that recognizes Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, which has been the capital of that country since 1950.

   This legislation also enacts the Middle East Peace Commitments Act of 2002, which requires the President to formally determine whether the Palestinian Authority is complying with its commitments under international

[Page: H6650]

   It is important, Mr. Speaker, we continue to support our democratic allies around the world. For example, Taiwan has demonstrated its continued commitment to a democratic path even under the constant threat just miles off its shores. The administration has shown that they have a clear understanding of Taiwan's security needs by requesting four Kidd class destroyers which this bill provides for.

   Mr. Speaker, as we continue our efforts to prevent future acts of terror, it is important that we provide the administration with the necessary tools to continue to bring the world's community on board. I would like to thank the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde), the chairman, and the gentleman from California (Mr. Lantos), the ranking member, and all the members of the Committee on International Relations for in effect making the tough decisions required to produce thoughtful legislation that meets our most important priorities in this field, the field of foreign affairs.

   I urge all of my colleagues to support this straightforward rule, noncontroversial rule as well as this very important underlying legislation.

   Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

[Time: 14:45]

   Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Florida for granting me the customary time for debate, and I yield myself such time as I may consume.

   Mr. Speaker, I am very glad that the House is able to review and act on the conference report on H.R. 1646, the fiscal year 2002 and fiscal year 2003 authorizations for the Department of State; and I commend the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde), the chairman of the Committee on International Relations, and the gentleman from California (Mr. Lantos), his distinguished ranking member, for moving the conference process along; and I thank all the conferees for their work.

   The rule providing for debate is the standard rule for a conference report. It waives all points of order against the conference report and against consideration. It provides that the conference report shall be considered as read and it allows for 1 hour of debate equally divided. As such, this rule should be supported.

   This bipartisan bill has much to commend it. It authorizes $8.6 billion for the operations of the State Department and related agencies in fiscal year 2003, slightly more than the level approved in the House version of the bill. The measure's funding level includes a substantial increase for the State Department as requested by the administration.

   I do want to clarify that this is not a foreign aid authorization bill which would involve the authorization of our bilateral development economic and security programs. This bill primarily authorizes funding for the State Department programs, multilateral aid administered by the State Department such as international peacekeeping funds and refugee assistance and U.S. information programs such as freedom broadcasting to the Middle East and Asia.

   Most importantly, this bill authorizes $564 million for worldwide security upgrades to protect U.S. diplomatic missions and personnel abroad. It also strengthens the authority of the United States to fight terrorism as well as strengthening our commitment to Israel and peace in the Middle East, reform at the United Nations, the survival of a democratic Taiwan, the promotion of religious freedom, and protection for the victims of human trafficking.

   Mr. Speaker, I am sure every Member of this body could find at least one provision in this bill that runs counter to his or her convictions about what is best for U.S. policy. For example, this bill authorizes $25.9 million for broadcasting Radio and TV Marti to Cuba. Since TV Marti reaches no one in Cuba, I find it a particulars waste of Americans' hard-earned tax dollars. There is a shocking lack of accountability in Radio Marti's professional conduct and broadcast content. Often, it broadcasts news to Cuban households many hours after such news has already been broadly reported by other sources, including sometimes even Cuban government programs such as in the case of Jimmy Carter's recent address to the Cuban people. I know that the Committee on International Relations has been looking into the lack of effectiveness of Radio and TV Marti, and I hope that this waste of U.S. taxpayer dollars will soon be remedied.

   The conference report also includes a total of $5.2 billion to fund security assistance provisions, including counterterrorism and other military assistance to our allies. This section of the bill facilitates access by U.S. pilots to the Gulf Air Warfare Center in the United Arab Emirates and authorizes funding for the destruction of surplus weapon stockpiles in the former Soviet Union, Africa, and elsewhere. It also includes a new program to forgive certain Russian debts in exchange for investments in nonproliferation programs.

   My colleagues will detail many of these key provisions, but I would like to take a few moments just to highlight a few. This bill serves as the vehicle for the release of funds previously appropriated for back payments of U.S. dues to the United Nations. The Omnibus Appropriations Act for fiscal year 2000 provided $926 million for U.S. back payments to the United Nations. However it conditioned the release of these funds on enactment of an authorization bill that specified U.N. agreement to certain reforms, including a decrease in the percentage of assessed U.S. contributions to the organization. These conditions were successfully negotiated by former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations Richard Holbrooke.

   In May of 2001, the House passed its version of H.R. 1646 and authorized both the release of the $582 million and a third installment of $244 million. However, 2 weeks before the House considered the bill, the United States lost its seat on the U.N. Commission on Human Rights. The House responded by adopting an amendment conditioning release of the remaining installment on the return of the U.S. to the commission. Since then the United States has regained the seat. This bill, therefore, authorizes the third and final installment owed to the United Nations.

   This bill also completes the process of U.N. reform under which U.S. dues to the United Nations will be reduced from 25 to 22 percent, providing American taxpayers with $2 billion in savings. In addition, this bill modestly increases the level of U.S. contributions for U.N. peacekeeping, raising it from 25 to 27 percent.

   At a time when the United States is asking so much of the United Nations, it is important that we put in place the financial and legal structure that will ensure the U.S. remains a responsible and accountable leader of this singular international body.

   I am also very pleased to see a number of important programs authorized in this bill. Among these is the inclusion of the Tibet Policy Act, which requires the State Department to create an office for a special coordinator for Tibetan issues. It also requires the U.S. to undertake a number of initiatives to improve the condition of human rights and religious freedom for the Tibetan people and encourage dialogue between the Chinese Government and the Dalai Lama over the future of Tibet. It also calls for the release of the 11-year-old Panchen Lam from detention by China, an act that would significantly increase confidence among the international community about China's commitment to respect the culture and religion of the Tibetan people.

   The gentleman from California (Mr. Lantos), my colleague and the ranking member, should be commended for his leadership on this issue along with our colleagues, the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Smith), the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Wolf), and the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Kirk). This bill will also enact the East Timor Transition to Independence Act, which authorizes economic aid for East Timor and provides a framework for a strong bilateral relationship between the U.S. and the world's newest nation. I want to thank the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde), chairman, and the gentleman from California (Mr. Lantos), ranking member, as well as the efforts of the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Smith) and the gentleman from Rhode Island (Mr. Kennedy), for their long leadership in support of freedom and human rights in East Timor.

[Page: H6651]

   The conference report also requires the State Department to report to Congress on the extent to which the British Government has implemented the recommendations for police reform in Northern Ireland listed in the Patten Commission's report. The establishment of a new, nonpartisan police is critical to the implementation of the Good Friday Peace Accords and bringing peace and genuine security to the people of Northern Ireland. It also emphasizes the importance of continuing the decommissioning of weapons by all Irish armed groups and the investigations of the murders of Rosemary Nelson, Patrick Finucane, and Roberts Hammill. So many of our colleagues have worked long and hard to secure a just and lasting peace in Northern Ireland, and we are all appreciative of the leadership on this provision of the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Payne), the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Smith), the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Neal), the gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman), the gentleman from New York (Mr. Crowley), and the gentleman from New York (Mr. King).

   Finally, the conference report agreement also extends and strengthens authorizations provided for the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, it requires the State Department to maintain a special envoy for Sudanese issues; authorizes $5 million for a special court to try war criminals and human rights abusers in Sierra Leone; it requires annual country reports on the use of children as soldiers; and it requires the State Department to report to the Congress on U.S. efforts in Colombia to promote alternative development, recovery, and resettlement of internally displaced persons, judicial reform, and the peace process and human rights. It also requires reports on the activities of U.S. private contractors involved in counter-narcotics programs in Colombia, an issue brought so compellingly to the attention of the House by the gentlewoman from Illinois (Ms. Schakowsky) and the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra).

   Mr. Speaker, this is an important bill that is long overdue, and I urge my colleagues to approve the rule and adopt the conference report on H.R. 1646.

   Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

   Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. LaHood).

   Mr. LaHOOD. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to object to some language that is in this conference report having to do with assistance to Lebanon. There was an attempt early on with an amendment to eliminate most of the money for Lebanon, and I guess wiser heads prevailed.

   I want to offer my thanks to the chairman of the full Committee on International Relations for working out an arrangement that will allow for the country of Lebanon to be authorized for $35 million. The language I object to is that they have carved out $10 million that cannot be used for the country, $10 million of the $35 million, until there is a certification from the President that a certain group that is in the country is no longer a threat. I think this is a mistake to have this kind of language in there. The country of Lebanon is 3 million people. It is a peace-loving country. It is caught in the switches between other countries who are involved in disputes. To single out this country for this kind of certification I think is without merit. I wish the language were not in there.

   The $35 million is walking-around change compared to the money that is authorized for a lot of other countries. Lebanon certainly does not deserve this kind of treatment from this Congress. I know there are people in the administration, particularly in the State Department, who have strong objections to the way that Lebanon is being treated. I, too, have strong objections, and I wanted to make those objections known. I intend to vote for the rule. I know that the chairman and others have worked very hard to put together a good conference report; but my objection for the country of Lebanon needs to be noted here. Again, this to me is just an opportunity to take a very unjustified criticism of a country that has tried to work with the United States, has tried to work with other countries in the region. I object to the language, and I hope at some point people will come to respect the country of Lebanon and what the leaders there are trying to do.

   Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from California (Mrs. Tauscher).

   Mrs. TAUSCHER. Mr. Speaker, I rise to state my very strong support for the conference report on the International Relations Authorization Act for fiscal year 2003. I commend the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde); the ranking member, the gentleman from California (Mr. Lantos), as well as Senator Biden and Senator Lugar, for their hard work to support the State Department at a time when alliances and international partners matter most.

   By paying more of our back dues to the United Nations, we are finally stepping up to the plate and being a responsible partner in this great international organization we helped create.

   This bill also makes a bit of history by authorizing a new way to protect the United States from the threat of weapons of mass destruction: debt-for-security swaps.

   In June, the leaders of the G-8 nations agreed to fund nonproliferation programs at $20 billion over the next 10 years and stated that debt-for-program exchanges should be used to stop the spread of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.

   Several months ago I introduced the first bipartisan nonproliferation legislation in the 107th Congress with the gentleman from New York (Mr. McHugh), the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Green), and the gentleman from California (Mr. Schiff), the Russian Federation Debt Reduction for Nonproliferation Act for 2002, that would authorize the President to forgive a portion of Russia's outstanding debt to us in exchange for Russia using that money to lock down loose nuclear weapons and material.

   Our colleagues in the House and Senate went a step further, including a debt-swap provision in the State Department authorization bill. Debt-for-security swaps are an important development. They will help Russia reduce its outstanding debt, involve Russia and the rest of the G-8 countries in programs that directly improve U.S. national security, and extend burden-sharing to our allies.

   Mr. Speaker, now is the time to seize this existing and unique opportunity to use a tool that would both help stabilize the Russian economy and find new sources of funding for the critical programs that keep nuclear weapons out of the hands of Saddam and al Qaeda. I encourage Members to vote for this bill.

   Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from California (Mr. Dreier).

   (Mr. DREIER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

   Mr. DREIER. Mr. Speaker, I congratulate the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Diaz-Balart) for his very important efforts on this legislation. I also join in commending the chairman of the Committee on International Relations, the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde), and the ranking member, the gentleman from California (Mr. Lantos), for reporting out this very important State Department authorization. This, as we know, covers a wide range of issues; and I would like to take just a moment to focus on one particular issue, and that has to do with the new degree of flexibility which is being put into place to deal with our war on drugs.

   We know that President Uribe from Colombia is here in the United States. He met with President Bush today and met with a number of us yesterday. I believe that efforts are being made by leaders in Latin America to deal with the tremendous scourge of drugs that have been flowing into this country.

[Time: 15:00]

   But we had a very antiquated structure for certification, decertification, was something that went on. In fact, it was very, very poorly crafted and I believe that it played a role in exacerbating rather than improving the situation. The language that is included in this conference report provides, as I mentioned, a degree of flexibility. So it basically uses the two words ``demonstrably failed'' in describing what it is that countries would have done who are dealing with this issue.

   So the point is, we need to congratulate, encourage and support those nations which are helping us deal with

[Page: H6652]

   I want to congratulate all those involved in this very important effort and to say that I strongly support the rule that is being managed by the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Diaz-Balart) and the conference report that the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde) will be managing.

   Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Pallone).

   Mr. PALLONE. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the rule and I must say that I support most of the provisions of the conference report. I am concerned, though, and I do object to one provision with regard to India. In section 1601 of the legislation, the President is required to submit a report to Congress with regard to U.S. efforts relative to nonproliferation benchmarks. There is mention in that regard of both India and Pakistan.

   Mr. Speaker, I do not think that India should be mentioned and specified in this report for the following reasons: First of all, in the House version of the bill we did not include India. India was included at the behest of the Senate. And if you think about it, since 1998, when India and Pakistan both tested nuclear weapons, India has had very good relations with the United States and has had numerous discussions on the issue of benchmarks for nonproliferation. Right now basically there is no disagreement between the United States and India in that regard. India has stated very dramatically that it has put in place a moratorium on further testing of nuclear weapons. India has also been very adamant about a policy of no first use of nuclear weapons, which is certainly not the case with regard to Pakistan. For that reason, I do not think we need to include India in any further negotiations or in any report that would have to be submitted on behalf of the President.

   I am not quite sure why it was the case that the conference report did not adopt the House version of the bill, which I think made a lot more sense than the Senate version, and I did want to raise an objection at this time because I think that once again our policy is somehow reflecting that if Pakistan is included then India has to be included as well. I think that does not make sense under the circumstances.

   Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.

   I urge my colleagues to approve this rule and to approve the conference report.

   Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

   Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. I again would like to thank Chairman HYDE and Ranking Member LANTOS for leading the Committee on International Relations to a very, not only successful but I think admirable and commendable result in this legislation. This is, as I stated before, very important legislation. By virtue of the fact that it is in effect consensus legislation in that it is supported in a bipartisan way by an overwhelming majority obviously of the committee, but also I am sure later by the House, it does not I think in any way minimize the importance and really the brilliance of the result.

   This country, the Nation, the United States of America, has not only a role in leadership, a leadership role in the world but constantly has to be developing ways to implement that leadership on behalf of protection of democracies and the spreading of the values of freedom. This legislation goes a long way in once again doing that, and so it is legislation that I strongly support and urge my colleagues to as well.

   I think that if there is a chairman and ranking member whom I certainly look at and admire for their clarity and their leadership and their vision, it is the chairman and the ranking member of the Committee on International Relations. I would like to reiterate not only my thanks but my admiration for both of them. This is another example of why I think we all thank them and admire them. The issue was brought out of the fact that this legislation, for example, supports broadcasting to the oppressed people of Cuba, and it does and I am very proud of that. Despite the fact of the opposition of some folks such as the gentleman who expressed opposition once again to broadcasting to the oppressed people of Cuba, the overwhelming majority on a bipartisan basis of this Congress has supported and has continued and continues to support that broadcasting and the efforts to offer news and information as well as assistance to that people only 90 miles from our shores that have been suffering for over 40 years oppression. Again, if there is a leadership of a committee that I think demonstrates on a bipartisan basis in terms of the chairman and the ranking member clarity and lack of confusion with regard to dictators and tyranny and oppression, it is the leadership again of Chairman HYDE and Ranking Member LANTOS.

   I think this is legislation that we can all be proud of, Mr. Speaker. Again, I strongly support it and the rule, which is eminently fair and permits obviously all Members to express any points of view that they may have on this legislation.

   Mr. Speaker, I urge support for the rule and the underlying legislation.

   Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time, and I move the previous question on the resolution.

   The previous question was ordered.

   The resolution was agreed to.

   A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

   Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to the rule, I call up the conference report on the bill (H.R. 1646) to authorize appropriations for the Department of State for fiscal years 2002 and 2003, and for other purposes.

   The Clerk read the title of the bill.

   The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Dan Miller of Florida). Pursuant to House Resolution 545, the conference report is considered as having been read.

   (For conference report and statement, see proceedings of the House of September 23, 2002 at page H 6422.)

   The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde) and the gentleman from California (Mr. Lantos) each will control 30 minutes.

   The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde).

   GENERAL LEAVE

   Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and to include extraneous material on the legislation under consideration.

   The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Illinois?

   There was no objection.

   Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

   I rise in strong support of the conference report on H.R. 1646, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003. This comprehensive foreign policy legislation will give the President and the Secretary of State the tools they need to conduct a foreign policy that strengthens the security of the United States, protects American interests and promotes American values.

   Mr. Speaker, it is traditional that in matters of foreign policy the Congress leaves the President and the Secretary of State some flexibility. This legislation respects that tradition, but it also sets limits, both on the amounts that may be spent and on the purposes for which they may be used. It identifies foreign policy priorities and it requires that Congress be kept informed.

   Mr. Speaker, this conference report reaffirms and strengthens the authority of the U.S. officials to combat terrorism and to protect our embassies and the people who work in them. It also reaffirms and strengthens the United States' commitment to the survival of Israel and to a just peace in the Middle East, to United Nations reform, to the continued existence of a democratic Taiwan, and to religious freedom and other fundamental human rights.

   To be specific, Mr. Speaker, this legislation will enhance our national security by authorizing $1.6 billion for security at our embassies and other United

[Page: H6653]

   The conference report also reaffirms and strengthens our commitment to freedom and democracy by setting aside funds for enhanced human rights monitoring, extending the life of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, providing for enhanced U.S. diplomatic efforts to promote human rights in Tibet and Vietnam, and requiring State Department officials to work for reform of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights whose membership now includes some of the world's worst human rights violators.

   This legislation would also complete the process of United Nations budget reform which we began several years ago under which the U.S. dues to the U.N. will be lowered from 25 percent to 22 percent of the total. Our contributions to U.N. peacekeeping operations will also be reduced through the end of fiscal year 2004 and thereafter will be capped at 25 percent. In addition, 15 provisions promote sound financial and management practices at the U.N. and its affiliated agencies.

   The conference report will strengthen our bilateral relationship with important allies, such as Israel and Taiwan. It not only provides enhanced antiterrorism assistance for Israel but also contains provisions to spur compliance with existing U.S. law recognizing Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. The conference report also includes the Middle East Peace Commitments Act of 2002, which requires the President to determine whether the Palestinian Authority is complying with its commitments under international agreements, including the renunciation of terrorism and violence, and to report to Congress on what actions will be taken in the event of noncompliance. The legislation also authorizes the transfer to Taiwan of four Kidd class destroyers, as requested by the Bush administration, and requires that Taiwan be treated for purposes of military assistance as though it had been designated as a major non-NATO ally.

[Time: 15:15]

   Finally, Mr. Speaker, the bill contains important provisions to protect a variety of other vital American interests. For instance, it requires a plan from the State Department for improving the recruitment of veterans into the Foreign Service, as well as a report on steps taken by the U.S. Agency for International Development to ensure that the bidding procession is fair to small businesses in the United States. The legislation will require senior State Department officials in the law enforcement bureau to have some experience with law enforcement and/or international counternarcotics efforts, and it will require the State Department to report to Congress on foreign governments that refuse to extradite criminals for prosecution in the United States or to comply with the Hague Convention on International Child Abduction, as well as on joint cooperative efforts to eradicate opium in Colombia.

   Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to vote ``yes'' on this important legislation.

   I would like the record to show what a pleasure it was to work with the ranking Democrat, the gentleman from California (Mr. Lantos), whose cooperation and vision has added greatly to the end product.

   Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

   Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume, and I rise in strong support of this conference report.

   Mr. Speaker, first I want to thank my good friend, the gentleman from Illinois, for his most gracious words.

   Mr. Speaker, let me at the outset congratulate the distinguished chairman of the Committee on International Relations on bringing this conference report to the floor. Since this matter last came before the House, a myriad of procedural and substantive issues blocked the path of this bill. At every turn, the outstanding leadership of the gentleman from Illinois (Chairman HYDE) brought us closer to our shared goal, and today an important and very substantive bill is before us.

   Mr. Speaker, I believe this bill blends the very best features of the original House-passed measure and the Senate amendments. The conference report authorizes funds for the conduct of the foreign relations of the United States of America and funds urgent U.S. priorities, such as the security of our embassies abroad, broadcasting to the Middle East and Asia to communicate our values and points of view to foreign audiences, protection of refugees, and scores of other issues.

   Perhaps most significantly, Mr. Speaker, our bill takes a huge step towards normalizing our relations with the United Nations. It allows payment of our remaining arrears payments to the U.N. and clears our debts with a host of other smaller, but important, international organizations.

   In addition, our bill includes a new authorization that clears the way for the United States to begin paying our bills on time instead of a year late. Because of late payments, the U.N. has been forced to adopt unsound budgetary practices. Our legislation will help put the United Nations and other international organizations on a proper and businesslike financial footing.

   Mr. Speaker, I am particularly delighted that the conference report includes language on the reentry of the United States into UNESCO, the United Nations Economic, Social and Cultural Organization. Several of us have been working for years to bring about this result, and I am truly pleased that in his speech before the United Nations on September 12, President Bush added his support for this critical initiative. The conference report now reflects this new consensus, which is truly bipartisan, to rejoin this important organization, so that the voice of the United States will be loud and clear in UNESCO.

   Our actions are particularly timely, as we are in the midst of working with the United Nations to enforce U.N. Security Council resolutions aimed at Iraq. Our bill clearly demonstrates Congress' commitment to multilateralism, and it offers a vote of confidence in the United Nations. It is now time for the United Nations to prove itself worthy of such confidence by defending its principles and enforcing its resolutions. With the passage of this bill, the United States will have done its part. Now the Members of the United Nations Security Council must do theirs.

   Mr. Speaker, there are a number of other important features in this bill, and I would like to highlight some of them.

   Our bill authorizes U.S. counterterrorism and nonproliferation assistance as well as military assistance to recent and future NATO entrants and some of our key allies in the war against terrorism.

   The bill also includes a trailblazing initiative to strengthen nonproliferation programs in Russia while retiring that nation's huge Soviet-era debt. Under our initiative, the United States will forgive that debt, and Russia will use the savings to pursue programs, such as securing its stocks of weapons-grade uranium and plutonium from terrorists and state sponsors of terrorism.

   The bill has numerous important provisions on the Middle East, including the stopping of illegal weapons transfers to the Palestinians and ensuring that the PLO is abiding by the commitments it made almost a decade ago in 1993 to stop the use of violence and to negotiate peacefully. Our bill reaffirms United States policy that Jerusalem is the undivided and eternal capital of the State of Israel.

   I also note that a compromise provision on Lebanon included in the conference report will create a real incentive for that government to deploy its forces along its own national frontier in areas currently controlled by Hezbollah, a terrorist organization. Our bill provides for new exchange programs for Sudanese oppressed by war and for scientists who conduct research on HIV-AIDS.

   Our legislation, Mr. Speaker, provides that the Secretary of State should establish programs to train scientists and public policy experts on

[Page: H6654]

   I am particularly pleased, Mr. Speaker, that the conference report contains the Tibetan Policy Act of 2002, legislation I introduced along with my good friends and colleagues, Senator Feinstein, the gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman), and the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Kirk). This legislation is the first piece of comprehensive Tibet legislation ever enacted in the Congress of the United States, and it will send a strong signal to the Chinese Government that the United States has not forgotten the plight of Tibet and its people. Our legislation will promote human rights and religious freedom in Tibet, and it will ensure the development sponsored by international institutions benefits the people of Tibet.

   The conference report also contains measures I introduced, along with the gentleman from New Hampshire (Mr. Kennedy) and many others, to help the people of East Timor. After more than 2 decades of brutal Indonesian rule in East Timor and the enormous devastation subsequent to East Timor's vote for independence, our legislation will ensure that East Timor's people get the assistance they need to get back on their feet.

   In addition, Mr. Speaker, our act provides for ensuring that those who commit crimes against humanity are not treated with impunity. In particular, we provide U.S. funding for the Special Court in Sierra Leone, which will deal with the human rights atrocities from that country's deadly civil war and authorizes a new U.S. rewards program to help apprehend those that the Special Court indicts.

   Our legislation reauthorizes funding for victims of human trafficking, extends the life of the Commission on International Religious Freedom, and ensures that human rights are more fully integrated into the State Department's policy considerations.

   Mr. Speaker, this is a major piece of legislation, crafted in a truly bipartisan manner with a great deal of statesmanship on the part of many Members. But I particularly want to pay special tribute to my good friend, the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde), the distinguished chairman of the Committee on International Relations, for his leadership on this most important legislation. I urge all of my colleagues to support it.

   Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

   Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Souder).

   (Mr. SOUDER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

   Mr. SOUDER. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this legislation, but I have a serious reservation that I would like to discuss. I speak as chairman of the Subcommittee on Drug Policy and cochair of the Speaker's Drug Task Force to express my concern with the permanent modification to the annual drug certification process contained in this bill.

   The annual certification process is one of the strongest tools that we have as a Nation to ensure full cooperation from other nations with our efforts to control international narcotics traffic by conditioning U.S. foreign aid on such full cooperation. I believe that this is a reasonable and basic condition on the use of taxpayer dollars. Clearly, American workers should not be asked to subsidize the programs of foreign governments that will not help us stop drug traffic.

   As a practical matter, we have also heard scores of anecdotal reports that the threat of decertification often has been the only real means for American officials serving abroad to get meaningful cooperation on matters such as extradition, law enforcement, and many other means of controlling the drug trade.

   In fact, I was part of the Presidential delegation down to the swearing in of the new President of Bolivia; and outgoing President Cariaga made a special pitch to me and the other members of the delegation, Do not compromise this regulation. He said it was the only tool that they really had in Bolivia to take them down from supplying one-third of our cocaine down to about 2 percent, and he said that this was the most effective tool.

   I appreciate very much the work that the gentleman from Illinois (Chairman HYDE) and his staff did to minimize what I believe will be a permanent weakening of the certification process in this legislation. I was disappointed that the administration supported weakening the certification standard from fully cooperating, which has been proven to work successfully over several years, to leaning toward a new standard that would only decertify those countries that have failed demonstrably to make substantial efforts to cooperate.

   Instead of the burden falling on countries who want American aid to cooperate completely with our efforts, we will now presume in many cases that the foreign nations are cooperating, and the State Department will have to prove that they are not doing so. No major drug source or transit country should ever presume that it is entitled to American money, and this body certainly should not enshrine such a presumption into law.

   I am particularly concerned that it appears that the administration and the other body were determined to weaken the standard to satisfy a single foreign country. I worked with the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Mica), who has long been involved with this statute, to propose an alternative. The alternative would have kept the current standard for decertification, but only would have publicly named those countries who are not fully cooperating, instead of the entire majors list, which will still be made public under the modified law.

[Time: 15:30]

   We believe that this would have addressed the concerns of the nations. They have talked to me on every visit down to Central and South America, and they are concerned about this listing and seeming to have to go through a proving process, but it would only have listed those who are not fully cooperating, and would have still maintained our option to enforce tough sanctions.

   I am still baffled that the administration would not work with us on this compromise which I believe is far superior to the provision in the bill today.

   I am pleased, however, that the conferees agreed to change the certification reporting date back to September 15 from early November, which had been proposed in the original version of the bill. An early November report would have essentially removed any congressional role from the process.

   I also strongly support the bill's provision allowing the President to use the old ``fully cooperating'' standard in making certification determination as he sees fit. I fully encourage the administration to use this standard as the basis for its determinations in the coming year, rather than the weaker ``demonstrably failed'' standard included in this bill. The traditional standard has been successful for many years as a tool for our foreign policy and has reflected congressional intent for many years on the proper standard to be applied in allocating taxpayer dollars. Unfortunately, the new standard seems only to reflect an agreement between the administration and a few select Members of Congress.

   Let me give one specific example. If a Nation does not cooperate with us on extradition, one of the toughest and most important things, does that mean that they have demonstrably failed, or does it mean they are not fully cooperating? Clearly, they would not be fully cooperating, but it is not clear that they would have demonstrably failed. So at the margins of the real world, unless the administration takes the fully cooperating standard, we are in a real box here.

   My question would be, is this going to be our new standard on terrorism? Is this going to be our new standard on human rights? If not, why is it different on drugs than it is on human rights and terrorism? I know that it has been offensive for us to list all of these different countries and try to make them prove the case, but we need something more than ``demonstrably failed'' and we need something that enables and gives the administration the flexibility. I hope they will exercise what they have been given in this bill, because there is nothing more tragic

[Page: H6655]

   Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Vermont (Mr. Sanders), my good friend and our distinguished colleague.

   Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Speaker, I thank my good friend, the gentleman from California (Mr. Lantos), for yielding me this time.

   Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong support of the Israel-Arab Peace Partners Program, which is reauthorized in H.R. 1646. The Israel-Arab Peace Partners Program is a program that I helped to create in 1999 with my good friend, the gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman). I would like to thank the gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman) for his leadership on this program and for his help to ensure that it was reauthorized in this bill and that it receives proper funding in the appropriations process. I would also like to thank the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde) very much for his support and for his effort, as well as the ranking member, the gentleman from California (Mr. Lantos), who has been very supportive of the effort as well.

   The Israel-Arab Peace Partners Program authorizes a $750,000 pool of grant money within the State Department's Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs to fund public and private nonprofit organizations for people-to-people activities with participants from Israel, the West Bank, Arab countries, and the United States. Through this program, American organizations link up with Israeli, Arab, and American partners to exchange skills and ideas on issues such as health care, the peace process, the environment, and education. By working on issues of common interest to all, people of the region are able to form bonds that cross borders and build trust and skills that not only helps each of their individual communities, but also helps bring them closer to peace. In addition, it brings American citizens and organizations in contact with people from a region where the United States plays such a crucial role.

   I think it is important to note the wide range of well-respected groups that have participated in the program over the last few years. Brandeis University, Catholic Relief Services, Fairfax County Public Schools, St. Michael's College, Arava Institute for Environmental Studies, Seeds of Peace, American-Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, Conflict Management Group, and American University. Some of these groups already have well-established programs in the Middle East; for others the Israel-Arab Peace Partners Program provides an opportunity to begin programs that will grow in the years to come. The more groups we can aid in establishing ties in the region, the better chance we have to build a long lasting network of organizations which are working toward professional development, community exchanges, and peace.

   This summer I was able to meet with a group of 20 Israeli, Palestinian, Jordanian, and American students who were here in Washington to participate in a program funded through the Israel-Arab Peace Partners Program. Amid all the senseless killing and suffering going on in the Middle East, I was amazed to see this group of students come together to study the environment. For many of the Israeli students, it was their first time meeting an Arab person their age and vice versa. After working together on month-long, environmentally-focused internships all across this country, these students began to see each other not just as Arabs or Israelis or Americans, but as colleagues and friends. They were able to understand a little bit better what it was like to live as an Israeli or an Arab in the Middle East.

   This understanding and the real life professional skills that they learned from each other and through their internships was, to me, a ray of hope amid all the devastation in the Middle East, and it really was an honor to see people from the Middle East, from Israel, from the Palestinian Authority, from Arab countries coming together in the midst of all of the horror that is existing there, talking about the environment, talking about how people can work together to make the entire region a better place in which to live.

   So, Mr. Speaker, I am very strongly supportive of this effort. I think the relatively small amounts of money that we are spending here to bring people together who are living amidst all of the horror that is going on in the Middle East, to have Arabs talking to Jews talking to Christians, is exactly what we should be doing. I would hope that this becomes a step forward in continuing to have the United States fund programs like this.

   Again, I want to thank the chairman and ranking member for their strong support.

   Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased to yield 3 minutes to the learned gentleman from New York (Mr. Fossella).

   (Mr. FOSSELLA asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

   Mr. FOSSELLA. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Illinois for yielding me this time.

   I would like to highlight one provision in this conference report that I think is critical and underscores why there needs to be a consistent, government-wide policy when it comes to dealing with victims of terrorism.

   In the first half of 2002, Congress introduced several legislative initiatives to allow all victims of terrorism equal opportunity to recover damages from the assets of terrorists and State sponsors of terrorism. The purpose of the bill is to allow victims of terrorism to obtain justice and, simultaneously, to hold accountable those who commit and support terror. Provisions have passed both the House and the other body by a recorded vote of 81 to 3.

   The proposed language included in the State authorization conference report will allow only two victims to receive compensatory damages for acts of international terrorism from the frozen assets of designated State sponsors of terrorism and completely ignores what Congress has attempted to achieve this year on behalf of all of the victims. Now, this is not to take away from the victims of terrorism. It is important. They suffered, they suffered greatly, and they are entitled to compensation. But what this underscores and highlights really is important, because all of those folks who may have suffered the same set of circumstances, even worse in some cases, from the same groups of terrorists or those who sponsor terrorism, have been shut out and denied the same level of justice that others on a piecemeal approach have obtained.

   In light of what has happened in the last year, where potentially we are looking at thousands of victims of terrorism, is it not about time that an American citizen who suffers from the hands, the violent hands of a terrorist or those who sponsor terrorism and is able to obtain a judgment where the assets are frozen should be entitled to the same set of rights? Instead, what we have, and I hope it does not continue, but unless we pass it in the two competing bills in the House and the Senate, it will; unless we do something about it, each year there will be victims, and whoever can hire the best attorney or the best lobbyist will find its way into one of these conference reports. As long as that continues, there will be families and victims of terrorism who will be denied the same set of compensatory damages. I do not think it is right, I do not think it is just. I just want to bring that out to underscore why we need to pass it for all Americans who are entitled to the same set of rights and opportunities when it comes to justice.

   Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. Schiff), my good friend and distinguished colleague.

   Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.

   Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 1646, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act and, in particular, language in the bill on Russian Federation Debt for Nonproliferation. I want to applaud the conferees for including this very important language on ways to reduce the threat of weapons of mass destruction in the final conference report.

   The demise of the Soviet empire ushered in a new post-Cold War period and

[Page: H6656]

   During the last 11 years, the Nunn-Lugar program, which was launched to reduce threats from the former Soviet Union, has done much to dismantle these stockpiles. However, continuing economic and social weaknesses in Russia, coupled with an eroding early warning system, poorly secured Russian weapons materials, and poorly paid Russian weapons scientists and security personnel increase the threat of mass destruction on an unprecedented scale if such materials fall into the hands of terrorists or rogue nations.

   Now, more than ever, we must make a fundamental shift in the way we think about the spread of weapons of mass destruction and our own national security. Using Russia's debt to the United States as a funding mechanism for programs addressing the inadequate security of the Russian weapons stockpile is an innovative approach we must explore.

   The Russian Federation Debt Reduction for Nonproliferation Act, which I coauthored with the gentlewoman from California (Mrs. Tauscher), the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Green), and the gentleman from New York (Mr. McHugh), will provide a means to forgive the loans and credits owed to the United States by Russia in exchange for cooperation with U.S. efforts to monitor and reduce weapons-usable nuclear material, nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, and the facilities where they may be built.

   Securing Russia's arsenal is a massive challenge, but not an impossible one. While the cost of a terrorist attack on the United States involving Russian expertise or smuggled Russian nuclear chemical or biological materials is staggering, funding for these simple measures that can prevent these attacks is sensible and urgent, and I urge Members' support.

   Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

• [Begin Insert]

   Mr. Speaker, before I yield back the balance of my time, I would just like to express my appreciation to Committee staff for the exceptionally effective work that they have put into this legislation. Legislation of this scope and magnitude could never be completed without the dedicated effort of our staff.

   The Republican staff of the Committee on International Relations worked with us in a bipartisan way. I want to express my particular gratitude to Kristen Gilley, Walker Roberts and Joseph Rees of the majority staff.

   I want to acknowledge the efforts of all of the members of the Democratic staff, since in a bill of this scope, everyone had a hand in the final product. Four people deserve particular recognition.

   David Abramowitz, our Democratic Chief Counsel has devoted enormous effort to the successful completion of this bill. We have greatly benefited from his solid legal and political judgement.

   David Fite, played a critical role in the security provisions of this bill, and I want to thank him for his outstanding contributions.

   lNisha Desai was heavily involved in the initial drafting and adoption of this bill. She has since left our staff, but her contribution was significant.

   Peter Yeo, Deputy Democratic Staff Director, as always played an extremely helpful role in bringing this legislation to completion.

   In addition, I want to express thanks to Art Rynearson of the Office of Senate Legislative Council, who helped assure that the substances of the legislation was accurate and accomplished what we intended. He is one of thee many unsung heroes who makes this institution function, as we owe him our thanks.

   Mr. Speaker, I again congratulate the Chairman of the Committee, and yield back the balance of my time.

   Mr. KNOLLENBERG. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to signal my intent to support H.R. 1646, the State Department Authorization Act. It is a good bill with many provisions that will aid the State Department in its mission around the world.

   However, I also must express my deep disappointment at the inclusion of Section 1224 regarding assistance to Lebanon. Section 1224 withholds $10 million of the Economic Support Fund allocated to Lebanon for the Fiscal Year 2003 and for all subsequent years unless and until the President certifies that the armed forces of Lebanon have been deployed to the internationally recognized border between Lebanon and Israel and that the government of Lebanon is effectively asserting its authority in the area in which such armed forces have been deployed.

   I do not oppose the goal of extending Lebanese control to southern Lebanon. Unfortunately, this provision does absolutely nothing to further that goal and will in fact hinder any progress. The U.S. should continue to press the Lebanese and Syrian governments on this point. The people of Lebanon will only know long-term peace and stability when Lebanon is willing and able to assert its independence. The U.S. must continue to press for full compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 425. However, this provision will not lead us toward this goal.

   I have supported efforts to expand U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) activities in southern Lebanon following the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces. However, far from supporting Hezbollah, this assistance undermines that terrorist organization by eliminating the desperate conditions that so many cite as a reason that region is a terrorist haven.

   I have received repeated assurances that U.S. money only goes through American non-governmental organizations to support projects that provide clean water, medicine, agricultural assistance and other basic humanitarian needs. None of this money goes to the Lebanese government or to any terrorist organization.

   With these facts in mind, it makes no sense to me to withhold funding that undermines terrorist control of southern Lebanon. Until the grip that Hezbollah has on that region is weakened, the government of Lebanon will not be able to deploy armed forces to the border.

   Unfortunately, Section 1224 only punishes the people of Southern Lebanon rather than offer a solution to the security needs of Israel.

   I will vote for the bill, but it is my hope Congress will revisit this issue in future legislation.

   Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Speaker, I support the inclusion of Section 213 in H.R. 1646, the Department of State Authorization Act Conference Report. This section of the conference report repeals Section 738 of the 2001 Agriculture Appropriations Act, which gave unwarranted special treatment to foreign agriculture attachés. Both the State Department and the Office of Management and Budget support repealing Section 738, and H.R. 1646 does just that.

   In 1978, Congress, with the support of the Office of Management and Budget, endorsed the State Department as the sole manager for overseas property. In 1990, Congress directed State to implement a uniform housing policy for and with the input of all agencies overseas.

   That system worked. It has the support of OMB, the General Accounting Office, and apparently had the support of Congress. But last year, a little-noticed section of the Agriculture Appropriations Act changed the system for one agency: the Foreign Agriculture Service.

   The provision required the State Department to obtain FAS approval to sell property originally purchased to house FAS employees overseas. Moreover, FAS gained the right to occupy new residences permanently.

   That provision created an exception for one agency, an exception that if copied by other agencies would disrupt the equitable management of overseas property. Overseas property management would lose much needed flexibility and make the housing of overseas personnel more difficult and costly.

   At my request, GAO looked into this matter. In a July 11th letter, GAO concluded the ``restrictions on the sales of residences purchased for agricultural attachés do not appear to be in the government's best interests. As the single manager for overseas property, State is responsible for implementing cost-effective decisions about the sale of unneeded overseas real estate and using sales proceeds for the government's highest priorities. . . . [T]he restrictions weaken efforts to improve management of the government's overseas properties and conflict with congressional and executive branch efforts to establish State as the single real property manager.''

   The properties at issue are not just regular old houses. In Cairo, the residence is a 4,200-square-foot, two-level house with four bedrooms, three bathrooms, two living rooms, a dining room, two kitchens, a sunroom, a breakfast room, and terraces. In Vienna, the residence is a 3,500-square-foot, three-story villa with six bedrooms, three bathrooms, a terrace, breakfast room, basement, and garage. Both houses exceed established housing standards.

   This unsound FAS exception is delaying the sale of these valuable properties, a sale that could net at least $2.1 million. The provision may also complicate the sale of other properties, such as an underutilized property in Bangkok worth $50 million.

   The State Department manages 3,500 properties in more than 220 locations overseas and has had the authority to sell those properties since 1926. Proceeds from sales are used to acquire and maintain other properties. In the wake of the 1998 embassy bombings in

[Page: H6657]

   Mr. Speaker, the letter from GAO, ``Current Law Limits the State Department's Authority to Manage Certain Overseas Properties Cost Effectively'' (GAO-02-790R, July 11, 2001) follows. A more complete version of the letter is available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02790r.pdf.

• [End Insert]

   U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,

   Washington, DC, July 11, 2002.
Hon. CHRISTOPHER SHAYS,
Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives.
Subject: Current Law Limits the State Department's Authority to Manage Certain Overseas Properties Cost Effectively

   DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Department of State is the central manager for real estate at U.S. embassies and consulates and has the statutory authority to sell properties and use the sales proceeds to acquire and maintain other overseas properties. Section 738 in the fiscal year 2001 Agriculture Appropriations Act prohibits State from selling residences purchased to house agricultural attachés without approval from the Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) and requires the department to use the proceeds from such sales to purchase residences for these attachés. Legislation currently before the Congress would repeal section 738.

   At your request, this report discusses the effect of section 738 on State's management of overseas properties. We examined this issue as part of our review of the Department of State's performance in identifying and selling unneeded overseas real estate. In conducting this assignment, we interviewed officials and analyzed records at the Department of State, FAS, and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).

   RESULTS IN BRIEF

   Section 738 limits the Department of State's authority to implement cost-effective decisions about sales of unneeded overseas property and the use of sales proceeds. Because of section 738's restrictions, State has delayed two property sales valued at nearly $4 million that appear to be in the government's best interests. FAS is concerned that if section 738 is repealed, selling these properties will result in increased costs for FAS since it would have to lease housing for attachés who previously lived rent-free in government-owned housing. State acknowledges that this could occur but save its financial analysis shows that selling the houses benefits the government as a whole. Although section 738 applies only to residences purchased for agricultural section 738 applies only to residences purchased for agricultural attachés, OMB and State are concerned that it could lead to fragmented and less cost-effective management of overseas property if other agencies seek similar treatment for their senior representatives. In our view, section 738's restrictions do not appear to be in the government's best interests.

   This report suggests that the Congress may wish to consider repealling section 738. State officials, commenting on a draft of this report, said they agreed with the report's information and conclusions regarding the negative effects of section 738 on overseas property management. FAS officials reiterated their view that repealing section 738 could result in increased costs for FAS. We believe that if the section's repeal and sale of residences used by agricultural attachés increases FAS costs, the Department of Agriculture can request that the Congress consider providing additional funds for FAS operations.

   BACKGROUND

   The Foreign Buildings Act of 1926, as amended, authorizes the Secretary of State to sell overseas properties that are used to support diplomatic and consular operations in foreign countries. The Department of State manages about 3,500 government-owned properties--including embassy and consular office buildings, housing, and land--at more than 220 overseas locations. The law authorizes the Secretary to use the proceeds from the sale of overseas properties to acquire and maintain other overseas properties and requires the Secretary to report such transactions to the Congress with the department's annual budget estimates. The Secretary has delegated this authority to State's Bureau of Overseas Building Operations.

   Over the years, as a result of congressional and OMB actions, overseas property management has been consolidated under State. In 1978, the Congress endorsed State as the single manager for overseas property and asked OMB to prepare a proposal for implementing this concept. In 1979, OMB issued a report that supported the concept of single management and acquisition planning for overseas property under State. OMB noted that the Congress was strengthening and broadening State's existing role as the central manager for overseas property. In 1990, the Congress directed State to establish and implement a uniform housing policy for agencies' overseas personnel. Resulting new overseas housing regulations, issued in 1991 and 1992 with the agreement of the foreign affairs agencies and the Department of Defense, reinforced State's authority to act as the single manager for overseas property. These authorities show that the Congress and the executive branch had intended that State should manage overseas property in a consolidated, integrated manner and that doing so would be in the government's best interests. We have supported this concept since the 1960s because it is more effective, efficient, and economical than having multiple property managers.

   Since 1997, State has increased efforts to identify and sell unneeded overseas real estate in response to congressional direction and our recommendations. As part of this effort, State sold two residences occupied by agricultural attachés for about $855,000 and proposed selling three others for more than $4 million. FAS argued that these properties were purchased to house its attachés; and consequently, FAS should have a say in approving the sales and in determining how the sales proceeds should be used. As a result, FAS sought and the Congress enacted legislation that requires State to obtain FAS approval to sell residences purchased to house agricultural attachés. Additionally, State must use the proceeds from such sales to acquire other suitable residences for agricultural attachés (not necessarily at the same post), and FAS has the right to occupy these properties permanently. According to FAS, State manages 13 properties purchased for agricultural attachés.

   SECTION 738 LIMITS STATE'S AUTHORITY TO MAKE COST-EFFECTIVE DECISIONS ON CERTAIN PROPERTIES

   Section 738 of the fiscal year 2001 Agriculture Appropriations Act limits State's authority to sell unneeded property by making sales decisions contingent on FAS approval. Proposed sales of residences in Cairo, Egypt, and Vienna, Austria, illustrate the potential limitations. Although selling these properties appears to be in the U.S. government's best interests, State has postponed these sales because of concerns about section 738. In October 1998, the State Inspector General reported that the Cairo and Vienna residences were larger than housing standards allow, were underutilized, and should be sold. According to State records, the Cairo residence is a 4,200-square-foot, two-level house with four bedrooms, three bathrooms, two living rooms, a dining room, two kitchens, a sunroom, a breakfast room, and terraces. The Vienna residence is a 3,500-square-foot, three-story villa with six bedrooms, three bathrooms, a terrace, breakfast room, basement, and garage. These residences are larger than the housing standards allow. Figures 1 and 2 show photographs of the Cairo and Vienna residences.

   State financial analyses suggest that selling the Cairo and Vienna residences would yield net benefits for the government of at least $2.1 million. In addition, using a measure of investment performance, State determined that selling the two residences was a substantially more efficient use of government resources than continued ownership. In February 2001, FAS informed State that it approved the sale of the Vienna residence on condition that the sales proceeds were used to purchase a replacement residence in Vienna and new residences for agricultural attachés at two other posts. Because FAS's proposed use of the proceeds would not address the government's highest priority overseas property needs, State officials decided to postpone the Vienna sale pending repeal of section 738. State subsequently postponed the Cairo sale for the same reason.

   State and OMB believe that the sales proceeds should be used to meet the government's highest priority needs. According to its long-range facilities plan, State seeks to reinvest sales proceeds where there is the greatest need or the most opportunity to reduce government operating costs. This plan notes that, in recent years, most sales proceeds have been earmarked for specific capital construction projects, such as building secure embassies. In future years, State plans to use sales proceeds to purchase additional residential housing. Within this broad priority, State plans to direct these proceeds to several objectives: (1) Buying residential properties in locations that offer the greatest rent savings to contain leasing costs, (2) buying earthquake resistant residential properties in seismic areas to address safety issues, and (3) buying key diplomatic properties. Although we did not assess State's priorities or use of proceeds from property sales, its approach is consistent with recommendations we made in 1996 regarding using sales proceeds for the highest priority overseas facility needs.

   FAS believes that the sales proceeds should be used to purchase replacement and additional residences for agricultural attachés--not to purchase properties according to State's priorities. FAS said that past sales had displaced two of its attachés from government-owned housing, forcing it to pay about $400,000 over the past 5 years to lease replacement residences. FAS is concerned about having to cut its program budgets to fund additional leases for replacement housing. In addition, FAS complained that it had insufficient advance notice of the proposed sales and had difficulty freeing up funds to pay for replacement housing for displaced attachés.

   State acknowledged that FAS may have to lease replacement residences if section 738 is repealed and the two residences are sold. However, financial analyses of the proposed sales considered these costs in determining

[Page: H6658]

   According to State, if section 738 remained in effect, it could be a complicating factor in the future sale of a compound in downtown Bangkok that could be worth as much as $50 million. In 1998, the State Inspector General reported that the compound--a 15-acre wooded site located in a prime commercial area that contains five executive residences (one occupied by the agricultural attaché) and several other facilities--was underutilized and should be sold. Before the 1997 Asian financial crisis, State had planned to sell the compound and use the proceeds to finance the construction of new facilities at the post, including housing for more than 200 embassy families that would reduce post lease costs by about $73 million over 10 years. Recognizing the changed economic conditions, State reported that further study is needed to determine the appropriate time to sell the compound and the appropriate use of the sales proceeds.
State and OMB Support Repealing Section 738; FAS Opposes Its Repeal

   State and OMB support legislation currently before the Congress that would repeal section 738. They argue that its restrictions on State's authority seriously weaken centralized management of overseas properties because they essentially establish a separate executive housing program for FAS and subordinate governmentwide priorities to agency priorities. For example, FAS could disapprove the sale of oversize or high-value residences purchased for agricultural attachés while State was selling residences purchased for ambassadors, deputy chiefs of mission, consuls general, and senior representatives of other foreign affairs agencies. State reported that, between 1997 and 2002, it sold 17 executive residences for about $38 million and is planning to sell 15 additional residences for about $20 million. Additionally, State and OMB pointed out that other foreign affairs agencies and Defense have experienced budgetary effects from the sale of such residences. In these cases, agencies must weigh housing costs in deciding whether to station their employees overseas. State and OMB are also concerned that unless section 738 is repealed, other agencies may seek similar legislation, leading to more fragmented property management and unequal and uneconomical housing policies at taxpayer expense.

   FAS opposes repealing section 738. FAS argues that section 738 maintains Agriculture's entitlement to residences purchased to house its attachés. FAS believes that repealing section 738 would allow State to ignore what FAS believes was the Congress' intent in providing funds to purchase these residences, while imposing substantial budgetary costs on FAS.

   CONCLUSIONS

   Section 738's restrictions on the sales of residences purchased for agricultural attachés do not appear to be in the government's best interests. As the single manager for overseas property, State is responsible for implementing cost-effective decisions about the sale of unneeded overseas real estate and using sales proceeds for the government's highest priorities. However, for residences purchased to house agricultural attachés, implementation of State's decisions is contingent on FAS approval and priorities. Although its analysis shows that selling the Vienna and Cairo residences would be financially advantageous to the government, State does not plan to proceed with these sales if section 738 remains in force. We recognize that, if section 738 is repealed, selling these residences may affect FAS's budget. However, FAS's budgetary concerns need to be weighed against the government's overall benefits from these sales--which include disposing of unneeded property and reinvesting the proceeds where they provide the greatest return. In addition, the restrictions weaken efforts to improve management of the government's overseas properties and conflict with congressional and executive branch efforts to establish State as the single real property manager.

   MATTER FOR CONGRESSIONAL CONSIDERATION

   In light of our findings, Congress may wish to consider repealing section 738 of the fiscal year 2001 Agriculture Appropriations Act.

   AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR EVALUATION

   State officials, commenting on a draft of this report, said the report fairly and accurately represents their positions on the negative effects of section 738 and the reasons they support its repeal. They said it is in the government's interest to have a single property manager with the authority to sell unneeded properties and reinvest the proceeds where they will produce the greatest benefits. State officials reiterated their concern that, by according FAS special treatment, section 738 threatens the centralized management of overseas property and is unfair to the staff of other foreign affairs agencies and Defense.

   FAS official reiterated their concern that repealing section 738 could result in additional annual lease costs for FAS and that FAS would need additional budget resources to maintain its current level of services overseas, FAS officials also questioned whether section 738 would fragment overseas property management, stating that only Defense was in a position to assert similar claims to overseas housing.

   We continue to believe that, in considering whether to repeal section 738, budgetary concerns need to be weighed against the government's interests in selling these residences and maintaining a single property manager with the authority to sell unneeded properties and reinvest the proceeds where they will produce the greatest benefits. If the section's repeal and subsequent property sales increase FAS costs, Agriculture can request that Congress consider providing more funds for FAS operations. Additionally, we agree with State that section 738 accords FAS preferential treatment and that other foreign affairs agencies and Defense will likely seek similar treatment for their overseas executives. We believe this would weaken centralized overseas property management, which we have long supported because it is more effective, efficient, and economical than an noncentralized approach.

   SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

   To determine the effect of section 738 on State's management of overseas property, we analyzed applicable laws, regulations, and guidance that provide State's authority to sell properties and use the proceeds. Key laws, regulations, and guidance include the Foreign Buildings Act, section 738 of the fiscal year 2001 Agriculture Foreign Affairs Manual. We also examined past GAO and State Inspector General reports on overseas property management. We analyzed State and FAS records that summarized their assessment of the effect of section 738 on State's authority to buy and sell overseas properties and act as the single manager for overseas property. We discussed section 738's effect with appropriate State, FAS, and OMB officials. We examined State's rationale for selling the properties in Cairo, Vienna, and other locations, including State's financial analyses of the proposed sales, OMB guidance on evaluating asset sales, and State's fiscal year 2002 to 2007 long-range buildings plan. We did not access the accuracy or reliability of the property appraisals or other underlying data used in State's analyses or the priorities and objectives in its long-range plan.

   We conducted this review from April to July 2002 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

   We are sending copies of this report to other interested congressional committees, the Secretaries of Agriculture and State, the FAS Director, State's Director of Overseas Buildings Operations, OMB, and other interested parties. Copies will be made available to others on request. In addition, this report will be available at no charge on our Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

   If you have questions about this report, please contact me at 202-512-4128 or by e-mail at fordj@gao,gov John Brummet, Michael Rohrback, Ed Kennedy, Richard Seldin, Janey Cohen, and Stephanie Robinson made major contributions to this report.

   Sincerely yours,

   Jess T. Ford,
Director, International Affairs and Trade.

• [Begin Insert]

   Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. Speaker, I rise in reluctant support of this important legislation. I say ``reluctant'', not because of what is in the bill, but because of what is not in the bill. This bill could have been a much better product, and it strongly underscores why the American people should think long and hard about which party should be in control of this great institution come November.

   It is unconscionable that we are debating this bill today only because Speaker HASTERT and Majority Whip DELAY threatened to throw this entire bill in the waste can unless it excluded a non-binding, ``Sense of the Congress'' resolution stating merely that the United States should re-engage in the international effort to reduce the greenhouse gas emissions that have led to global warming. Were this to continue unabated, the consequences could be so dramatic that we can barely imagine them today.

   The language that was forcibly removed by the Speaker and the Majority Whip already was passed by the full House. Its arbitrary removal by the anti-environmental House Republican leadership shows not only how radical things have gotten around here, but more importantly that they do not want the American people to know anything about their radical, anti-environmental agenda--certainly not with just over a month before the mid-term elections.

   Second, the perennial underfunding of State Department operations had become a international embarrassment due to the shortsighted cuts forced by our friends on the other side of the aisle. Now we can say that some relief is on the way, although many Americans would be embarrassed to see the awful conditions of some of our diplomatic facilities

[Page: H6659]

   Second, I am glad to have joined with my colleague from Alabama, Mr. HILLIARD, the Congressional Black Caucus and the Asian-Pacific American Caucus, in developing language in this bill to ensure that the State Department makes progress in its recruitment and promotion of minorities to its senior-most ranks. Our language makes clear that Congress is looking for results in the recruitment and promotion of minority professionals. It provides $2 million to increase minority recruitment in the Department and requires the Department to track its results with a database.

   The General Accounting Office (GAO) reported in a long-term study that despite years of effort from Congress, the State Department has failed to make any significant progress in the recruitment and promotion of qualified minorities to senior management positions. For example, the State Department--along with the Federal Emergency Management Agency--actually promoted fewer minority managers in 1999 than in 1990.

   While having more minorities take the foreign service exam is a step in the right direction, that is but a small step, and only one among many more

   steps needed, to rectify the severe under-representation of qualified Hispanic Americans, African Americans and Asian-Pacific Americans in the foreign affairs agencies. All three caucuses join together to urge President Bush and Secretary of State Powell to ensure that we, at long last, get on with the business of obtaining results in minority recruitment and promotion at the State Department and the foreign affairs agencies.

   If the State Department is to make progress, minorities must have a seat at the table. And that means, among other things, a seat at the table at the promotion boards and the selection boards--the entities that placed officers in senior positions. We will look for results and we will continue with these efforts until we see results.

   Third, this bill includes the ``Iran Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act'', a bill I first introduced in 1998, and whose passage could not be more timely than today. In response to Iran's efforts to develop the Bushehr nuclear power plant in the Persian Gulf, the language I introduced requires the U.S. to withhold proportional assistance to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for programs and projects of the Agency that go toward the development of the Bushehr plant if the Secretary of State were to determine that it is inconsistent with US nonproliferation policy, helps Iran develop nuclear weapons expertise, or is a cover of acquisition of sensitive technology. We must keep a watchful eye on IAEA activities in Iran--one of the nations that President Bush singled out as part of the ``axis of evil'' that threatens our way of life. While I have no interest in cutting off all IAEA assistance to Iran, it is ludicrous for the U.S. to support--even indirectly--a plant which clearly poses a threat to the United States and to stability in the Middle East.

   Finally, this bill provides language I was glad to sponsor to provide the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) with a modest increase for the first time in years. This vital and cost-effective organization promotes the fundamental American values of democracy and human rights abroad. By leading many efforts in the struggle for freedom worldwide, NED enjoys strong bipartisan support as it advances our national security. From Lech Walesa in Poland to Nelson Mandela in South Africa to human rights activists in Nigeria to civil society leaders in Mexico, NED and it core institutes have assisted grassroots organizations that have helped bring about peaceful transitions to democracy.

   Mr. Speaker, despite the outrage committed by the majority on global warming, for the reasons I have mentioned, I urge my colleagues to support this bill.

   Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of the conference report to accompany H.R. 1646, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act.

   Mr. Speaker, at the outset, I want to commend Chairman HYDE and Ranking Member LANTOS for their diligent efforts in producing a bill which will truly assist in the conduct of our foreign affairs.

   There are a few specific provisions in the conference agreement which I would like to draw attention to. The first is the Middle East Peace Commitments Act. This section requires the President to report to Congress on the Palestinians adherence to their commitments to resolve their conflict with Israel through exclusively non-violent means. If the President cannot report to Congress that the Palestinians are complying with their commitments to peace, and unless the President utilizes a national security waiver, the legislation requires the imposition of one or more of following sanctions: the denial of visas to PLO and Palestinian Authority officials; the downgrading of the status of the PLO office in Washington; the designation of the PLO, the PA, or any of their constituent groups or arms as Foreign Terrorist Organizations; or the cut-off of all non-humanitarian aid to the West Bank and Gaza.

   Mr. Speaker, the problem with the U.S. policy to date isn't that we're disengaged--far from it. The problem is that for all our effort, we haven't gotten any commitment to peace from the Palestinians. It doesn't seem to matter how many envoys and senior policy makers the President sends to meet with Palestinian leaders, these visits have failed to produce any change in Palestinian behavior. With the adoption of these sanctions, Congress is sending a strong message to the Palestinians that America's never-ending supply of last-chances has run out.

   Another important provision in the conference report concerns Taiwan. Last year, President Bush altered arms sales discussions between the U.S. and Taiwan from once a year to an as needed basis. The experience with this policy has thus far been satisfactory and has removed a major irritant in U.S.-PRC relations by removing the focus an annual meeting between the U.S. and Taiwan provides. However, in order to ensure Congress's historic role in assessing Taiwan's defense needs under the Taiwan Relations Act, the bill requires that the Administration consult with the Congress twice annually regarding Taiwan's defense needs. This provision will ensure that the Congress retains its unique role in determining the types and quantity of defense articles and services that should be provided to Taiwan.

    Lastly, Mr. Speaker, the conference report authorizes the final payment of our U.N. arrearage. For too long the late payment of our dues has set an example for other nations to follow and has caused serious budget problems for the U.N. At a time when the President has challenged the United Nations to be a forceful advocate for peace and security, or risk irrelevance, it helps for us to demonstrate that we support the U.N. by putting our money where our mouth is.

   Mr. Speaker, I commend Chairman HYDE and Ranking Member LANTOS for their extraordinary work on this measure and I urge my colleagues to support the conference report.

   Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, Section 1601 of the State Department Authorization Conference Agreement addresses nuclear missile nonproliferation in South Asia. I have reservations about the provision. U.S.--India relations are strong and both countries are looking forward to an enhancement and expansion of their economic, political and strategic potential. The engagement between our two nations continues to be mutually beneficial. In light of this tangible bilateral progress being made, and India's long-standing commitment to regional and global peace and security, provisions of Section 601 create an unnecessary diversion in the steadily strengthening bilateral relationship between the U.S. and India.

• [End Insert]

   Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

   Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

   The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Dan Miller of Florida). Without objection, the previous question is ordered on the conference report.

   There was no objection.

   The conference report was agreed to.

   A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

END

1C) Foreign Relations Authorization
Mr. REID. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent the Senate proceed to the consideration of the conference report to accompany H.R. 1646, just received from the House; that the report be considered and agreed to; that the correcting resolution, H. Con. Res. 483 at the desk be agreed to; the motion to reconsider be laid upon the table, with no intervening action or debate; and that any statements related to this matter be printed in the RECORD.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

   (The report is printed in the House proceedings of the RECORD of September 23, 2002.)

   Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I am pleased to present to the Senate the conference report on H.R. 1646, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for fiscal year 2003.

   The bill contains two divisions. Division A is the State Department Authorization Act, and contains authorization of appropriations for the Department of State, and other foreign policy programs, and also contains several policy provisions. Division B contains the Security Assistance Act, which provides authorizations and legal authorities under the Arms Export Control Act and the Foreign Assistance Act.

   This bill includes several important items, including the completion of a project that Senator HELMS and I began in 1997, the legislation to authorize payment of our back dues to the United Nations in exchange for reform in that organization. The conference

[Page: S9402]  GPO's PDF

   The bill includes two other provisions important to continuing the improvement of our relationship with the United Nations. First, the bill clears the way for the payment of nearly $80 million in new arrears which have accumulated in the last few years. Second, the bill authorizes the payment of our dues to the UN at the beginning of the calendar year, rather than the current system whereby we pay our dues at the start of the U.S. fiscal year. That late payment of our dues is detrimental, not only to UN operations, but to U.S.-UN relations. I hope the Administration will embrace this provision and request the necessary funds in the fiscal year 2004 budget.

   Further, the bill authorizes funding at levels equal to or exceeding the President's budget request for the Department of State, embassy security, contributions for international organizations and international peacekeeping, and international broadcasting. The United States is a great power, and it has substantial responsibilities around the world, In order to meet those responsibilities, it must have a well-funded and well-equipped diplomatic corps. And if we are going to deploy our diplomats around the world, we must protect them. We cannot provide perfect security for our people, but we can and must take all reasonable precautions against known dangers. In 1999, Congress provided an authorization of $4.5 billion over five years--or $900 million per year, for embassy construction and security. This bill adds an additional $100 million to this authorization for fiscal year 2003.

   Division B of this bill is the Security Assistance Act of 2002. It includes: foreign military assistance, including Foreign Military Financing and International Military Education and

   Training; international arms transfers; and many of our arms control, nonproliferation and antiterrorism programs.

   This division includes some significant initiatives. For example, several provisions are designed to streamline the arms export control system, so as to make it more efficient and responsive to competitive requirements in a global economy, without sacrificing controls that serve foreign policy or nonproliferation purposes. This is a vital enterprise. U.S. industry depends upon the efficient processing of arms export applications, and U.S. firms lose contracts when the U.S. Government cannot make up its mind expeditiously.

   At the same time, however, an ill-advised export license could lead to sensitive equipment getting into the hands of enemies or of unstable regimes. So there is a tension between the need for efficiency and the need not to make a mistake that ends up putting U.S. lives at risk. This bill addresses that tension providing funds for improved staffing levels, information and communications to enable the State Department to make quicker and smarter export licensing decisions. It also raises modestly the prior notice thresholds for most arms sales to our NATO allies, Australia, New Zealand or Japan. On the other hand, this bill adds a prior notice requirement for some sales of small arms and light weapons and strengthens the prior notice requirement for changes in the United States Munitions List.

   Division B includes several new nonproliferation and antiterrorism measures. For example, the ban on arms sales to state supporters of terrorism, in section 40(d) of the Arms Export Control Act, is broadened to include states engaging in the proliferation of chemical, biological or radiological weapons.

   This bill requires the President to establish an interagency mechanism to coordinate nonproliferation programs directed at the independent states of the former Soviet Union. This provision is based on S. 673, a bill introduced by Senator HAGEL and me with the co-sponsorship of Senators DOMENICI and LUGAR. It will ensure continuing, high-level coordination of our many nonproliferation programs, so that we can be more confident that they will mesh with each other. The need for better coordination has been cited in several reports, including last year's report of the Russia Task Force of the Secretary of Energy Advisory Board, chaired by former Senator Howard Baker and former White House counsel Lloyd Cutler.

   This bill encourages the Secretary of State to seek an increase in the regular budget of the International Atomic Energy Agency, beyond that required to keep pace with inflation. Because the IAEA's budget for 2003 has already been adopted, this bill authorizes an increase in the U.S. voluntary contribution to IAEA programs. This organization is vital to our nuclear nonproliferation efforts, its workload is increasing, and now it has begun a major program to locate and secure ``orphaned'' radioactive sources that could otherwise show up in a terrorist's radiological weapon.

   Subtitle XIII-B of this bill is the ``Russian Federation Debt for Nonproliferation Act of 2002,'' a provision that Senator LUGAR and I introduced, with the support of Senator HELMS. This subtitle authorizes the President to offer Soviet-era debt reduction to the Russian Federation in

   the context of an arrangement whereby the savings to Russia would be invested in agreed nonproliferation programs or projects. Debt reduction is a potentially important means of funding the costs of securing Russia's stockpiles of sensitive nuclear material, chemical weapons and dangerous pathogens, of destroying its chemical weapons and dismantling strategic weapons, and of helping its former weapons experts to find civilian careers and resist offers from rogue states or terrorists.

   Three months ago, the Bush Administration persuaded the G-8 countries to take a significant step: they agreed to what is known as ``10 plus 10 over 10,'' a commitment to provide the Russian Federation $10 billion in U.S. nonproliferation assistance and $10 billion in assistance from the other G-8 members over the next 10 years. This joint willingness to provide $20 billion opens new possibilities in Russian nonproliferation. It also sends a message to Moscow that working with the West or nonproliferation will be more profitable than selling dangerous technology to Iran.

   The G-8 agreement included the important possibility of the leading economic powers using debt reduction to finance this assistance, and the Administration worked with us to ensure that this subtitle gives the President the flexibility he would need if he chose to use debt reduction. Pursuant to the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990, he must still obtain appropriations for the cost of reducing any debt pursuant to this section. I have every hope, however, that we will see the day when both the United States and several of our allies use debt reduction to increase our nonproliferation assistance to Russia.

   In closing, I thank my colleagues on the conference committee, particularly Chairman HYDE and Representative LANTOS in the other body, and Senator HELMS, for their cooperation in putting together this bill.

   I would also like to recognize the hard work of all the staff on both the House and Senate committees, who did much of the preliminary work to prepare the bill for consideration by the conference committee. Equally important, I want to recognize the invaluable contributions and tireless efforts of the Deputy Legislative Counsel in the Senate, Art Rynearson. Mr. Rynearson labored many hours, including all of this past weekend, to assist the Committee staff in preparing and refining the legislative language in the conference report. This report would not have been ready for consideration at this time without his hard work.

   This conference report is important to the operation of our U.S. foreign policy agencies. It has received strong approval in the other body. I urge its approval by the Senate.

   Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, this legislation is the culmination of a bipartisan effort begun early in the 107th Congress. Senator BIDEN chaired our conference committee and was a tremendous leader in finalizing the bill and ensuring its bipartisan support. I thank him for his leadership of the committee and his friendship over the past 30 years.

[Page: S9403]  GPO's PDF

   Given the strange events of the 107th Congress, this bill in fact had bipartisan authorship. We provided a first draft of this legislation to Senator BIDEN in May 2001, when the Senate leadership changed hands. The bill approved by the conference committee is similar to that draft in many respects. It contains important details that advance our national interest and reflect shifts in priorities that followed the terrorist attacks on our country of September 2001.

   The bill allows for the payment of our U.N. assessments in a manner that encourages that organization to embrace improved financial practices and to complete the reforms that were initiated at our insistence, including the critical issue of appropriate representation of American personnel in U.N. positions.

   This bill accomplishes a number of other important objectives. It reaffirms Congress's strong support for Israel as an important ally in a turbulent region by recognizing the right of Israel to name Jerusalem as its own capitol and by financial backing to ensure its national security. It promotes stability in the Taiwan Straits by reaffirming our insistence that any resolution of that long-standing conflict must be peaceful and based on the freely expressed assent of the people of Taiwan.

   We have, I hope conclusively, clarified the status of the American Institute in Taiwan by requiring that the American flag be flown just as proudly over that Institute as it is over all American diplomatic facilities.

   The legislation recognizes the importance of maintaining pressure on the repressive Castro regime in Cuba and moves us toward the goal of liberating the Cuban people. It does this by specifically authorizing continued radio broadcasting to Cuba.

   The bill provides Secretary Powell with additional authorities to meet the increasing need for effective American diplomacy in the present crisis and to enhance the capacity of Diplomatic Security agents. It also makes equitable pay, personnel and travel adjustments for the benefit of State Department personnel.

   We also extended indefinitely the reporting requirement on international child abductions, reflecting our dissatisfaction with the lack of success in reuniting American parents with their children when they are kidnapped overseas by the other parent. We established new reporting obligations that ensure that Congress is notified when individuals who have previously

   engaged in terrorist activities are granted visas for entry into the United States.

   The progress that Russia has made toward becoming a real democracy has been painful but necessary. This bill emphasizes the establishment in Russia of a free press and the rule of law as indispensable institutions in a functioning democracy. These institutions would focus public attention on dangerous activities that are ignored or condoned by government officials. I expect that these institutions, once firmly established, would have a restraining effect on highly questionable activities, such as Russian support for the Iranian nuclear program, and help curtail the proliferation of weapons technology and expertise, nuclear know-how is just as dangerous as nuclear material. This bill also encourages the Russian Government to make serious contributions to nonproliferation efforts in order to give them a stake in these efforts and complement our efforts in Russia.

   The Tibet Policy Act in this bill culminates the Senate's decades-long support for the Tibetan people. It bolsters Administration efforts by specifying investment guidelines to invigorate the Tibetan economy while preserving the distinct identity of the people. Most notably, this will end any dispute over the importance of the Special Coordinator for Tibet by legally mandating such a position.

   The Security Assistance portion of this bill contains several important provisions, particularly those regarding the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. While I support the overarching framework of the Russian debt-for-nonproliferation provision in Title XIII, I harbor deep concerns about continued Russian proliferation to such state sponsors of terrorism as Iran. Thus, the Title includes a provision that places restriction on this debt reduction authority by requiring the President to certify that the Russian Federation has made and continues to make ``material progress'' in stemming the flow of sensitive goods, technologies, material, and know-how related to weapons of mass destruction to states that are international sponsors of terrorism. In this era of uncertainty, it is critical that we address this threat. Following in this vein, the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000 has been amended to require additional information be provided in required reports on transfers of weapons or weapons-related technologies to Iran.

   With nonproliferation and disarmament issues taking a front seat in this bill, a provision has been included to allow development assistance to be spent for the destruction of surplus stockpiles of small arms, light weapons and other munitions in developing countries. This is indeed an important activity for developing countries as they emerge from periods of civil war or ethnic conflict.

   The Security Assistance title of this bill also recognizes that South Asia is a critical theater of operations in our war against terrorism, and encourages the U.S. Government to continue to work on issues of nuclear and missile proliferation in this region. To this end, this section states that it shall be the policy of the United States, consistent with its obligations under the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to encourage and work with the Governments of India and Pakistan to achieve a specific set of nonproliferation objectives by

   September 30, 2003. The Administration must continue to make this a high priority in its key foreign policy objectives.

   Title XI affirms strong support for the profoundly important responsibilities of the Verification and Compliance Bureau to promote compliance analysis and enforce countries' compliance with their legal and political nonproliferation commitments. The title authorizes a larger budget than requested for this Bureau, including $1.8 million for additional personnel to adequately staff the mission of this critical Bureau and to improve verification capabilities. This Bureau is essential to ensuring that treaties and agreements are more than simple parchment, and should be adequately funded to carry out its mission.

   Furthermore, I am happy to support a Title XII provision that provides the President with the authority to enter into bilateral or multilateral agreements for post-undergraduate flying and tactical leadership training at facilities in Southwest Asia. This is critical addition for our war against terrorism, as it enables the United States to maintain a positive influence in the region and enables our forces to have access to training and range facilities. Additionally, Title XIV recognizes the important work of the Office of Defense Trade Controls, and supports additional authorities so that it can achieve a greater level of efficiency in processing munitions licenses.

   Finally, every Senator knows that no bill is possible without many long hours and hard work by staff. I can't tell these young men and women often enough what a great service they do for the Senate and for the country. I am particularly grateful to Patti McNerney, the Committee's Republican Staff Director, Rich Douglas, the Chief Republican Counsel, Senior Staff Members Mark Lagon and Mark Esper, Republican Counsel Jeff Gibbs, and Professional Staff Members Carolyn Leddy and Maurice Perkins. I am grateful for the work of the rest of the Committee's Republican Staff: Skip Fischer, Walter Lohman, Jed Royal, Jose Cardenas, Brian Fox, Susan Williams, David Merkel, Kelly Siekman, Sara Battaglia, Philip Griffin, Lester Munson, Kris Klaich, Hannah Williams, and Sarah Bardinelli.

   The cooperative efforts and hard work of the Democratic Committee staff members, especially Brian McKeon, the Committee's Chief Counsel, Ed Levine, and Jofi Joseph, as well as the current and former staff directors, Tony Blinken and Ed Hall.

   Last--but by no means least--I note that Art Rynearson, the Deputy Legislative Counsel of the Senate, has done his usual superb job of putting this conference report into proper legislative form. I say thank you to all.

   The conference report was agreed to.

   The concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 483) was agreed to.

3A) Homeland Security Act of 2002
SA 4713. Mr. JEFFORDS (for himself, Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire, and Ms. SNOWE) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed to amendment SA 4471 proposed by Mr. LIEBERMAN to the bill H.R. 5005, to establish the Department of Homeland Security, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

    At the end of title I, add the following:

   SEC. 199A. SHORT TITLE.

    This subtitle may be cited as the ``First Responder Terrorism Preparedness Act of 2002''.

   SEC. 199B. FINDINGS AND PURPOSES.

    (a) FINDINGS.--Congress finds that--

    (1) the Federal Government must enhance the ability of first responders to respond to incidents of terrorism, including incidents involving weapons of mass destruction; and

    (2) as a result of the events of September 11, 2001, it is necessary to clarify and consolidate the authority of the Federal Emergency Management Agency to support first responders.

    (b) PURPOSES.--The purposes of this subtitle are--

    (1) to establish within the Federal Emergency Management Agency the Office of National Preparedness;

    (2) to establish a program to provide assistance to enhance the ability of first responders to respond to incidents of terrorism, including incidents involving weapons of mass destruction; and

    (3) to address issues relating to urban search and rescue task forces.

   SEC. 199C. DEFINITIONS.

    (a) MAJOR DISASTER.--Section 102(2) of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5122(2)) is amended by inserting ``incident of terrorism,'' after ``drought),''.

    (b) WEAPON OF MASS DESTRUCTION.--Section 602(a) of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5196(a)) is amended by adding at the end the following:

    ``(11) WEAPON OF MASS DESTRUCTION.--The term `weapon of mass destruction' has the meaning given the term in section 2302 of title 50, United States Code.''.

   SEC. 199D. ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICE OF NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS.

    Subtitle A of title VI of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5196 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following:

   ``SEC. 616. OFFICE OF NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS.

    ``(a) IN GENERAL.--There is established in the Federal Emergency Management Agency an office to be known as the `Office of National Preparedness' (referred to in this section as the `Office').

    ``(b) APPOINTMENT OF ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR.--

    ``(1) IN GENERAL.--The Office shall be headed by an Associate Director, who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.

    ``(2) COMPENSATION.--The Associate Director shall be compensated at the annual rate of basic pay prescribed for level IV of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of title 5, United States Code.

    ``(c) DUTIES.--The Office shall--

    ``(1) lead a coordinated and integrated overall effort to build, exercise, and ensure viable terrorism preparedness and response capability at all levels of government;

    ``(2) establish clearly defined standards and guidelines for Federal, State, tribal, and local government terrorism preparedness and response;

    ``(3) establish and coordinate an integrated capability for Federal, State, tribal, and local governments and emergency responders to plan for and address potential consequences of terrorism;

    ``(4) coordinate provision of Federal terrorism preparedness assistance to State, tribal, and local governments;

    ``(5) establish standards for a national, interoperable emergency communications and warning system;

    ``(6) establish standards for training of first responders (as defined in section 630(a)), and for equipment to be used by first responders, to respond to incidents of terrorism, including incidents involving weapons of mass destruction; and

    ``(7) carry out such other related activities as are approved by the Director.

    ``(d) DESIGNATION OF REGIONAL CONTACTS.--The Associate Director shall designate an officer or employee of the Federal Emergency

[Page: S9144]

    ``(e) USE OF EXISTING RESOURCES.--In carrying out this section, the Associate Director shall--

    ``(1) to the maximum extent practicable, use existing resources, including planning documents, equipment lists, and program inventories; and

    ``(2) consult with and use--

    ``(A) existing Federal interagency boards and committees;

    ``(B) existing government agencies; and

    ``(C) nongovernmental organizations.''.

   SEC. 199E. PREPAREDNESS ASSISTANCE FOR FIRST RESPONDERS.

    (a) IN GENERAL.--Subtitle B of title VI of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5197 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following:

   ``SEC. 630. PREPAREDNESS ASSISTANCE FOR FIRST RESPONDERS.

    ``(a) DEFINITIONS.--In this section:

    ``(1) FIRST RESPONDER.--The term `first responder' means--

    ``(A) fire, emergency medical service, and law enforcement personnel; and

    ``(B) such other personnel as are identified by the Director.

    ``(2) LOCAL ENTITY.--The term `local entity' has the meaning given the term by regulation promulgated by the Director.

    ``(3) PROGRAM.--The term `program' means the program established under subsection (b).

    ``(b) PROGRAM TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE.--

    ``(1) IN GENERAL.--The Director shall establish a program to provide assistance to States to enhance the ability of State and local first responders to respond to incidents of terrorism, including incidents involving weapons of mass destruction.

    ``(2) FEDERAL SHARE.--The Federal share of the costs eligible to be paid using assistance provided under the program shall be not less than 75 percent, as determined by the Director.

    ``(3) FORMS OF ASSISTANCE.--Assistance provided under paragraph (1) may consist of--

    ``(A) grants; and

    ``(B) such other forms of assistance as the Director determines to be appropriate.

    ``(c) USES OF ASSISTANCE.--Assistance provided under subsection (b)--

    ``(1) shall be used--

    ``(A) to purchase, to the maximum extent practicable, interoperable equipment that is necessary to respond to incidents of terrorism, including incidents involving weapons of mass destruction;

    ``(B) to train first responders, consistent with guidelines and standards developed by the Director;

    ``(C) in consultation with the Director, to develop, construct, or upgrade terrorism preparedness training facilities;

    ``(D) to develop, construct, or upgrade emergency operating centers;

    ``(E) to develop preparedness and response plans consistent with Federal, State, and local strategies, as determined by the Director;

    ``(F) to provide systems and equipment to meet communication needs, such as emergency notification systems, interoperable equipment, and secure communication equipment;

    ``(G) to conduct exercises; and

    ``(H) to carry out such other related activities as are approved by the Director; and

    ``(2) shall not be used to provide compensation to first responders (including payment for overtime).

    ``(d) ALLOCATION OF FUNDS.--For each fiscal year, in providing assistance under subsection (b), the Director shall make available--

    ``(1) to each of the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, $3,000,000; and

    ``(2) to each State (other than a State specified in paragraph (1))--

    ``(A) a base amount of $15,000,000; and

    ``(B) a percentage of the total remaining funds made available for the fiscal year based on criteria established by the Director, such as--

    ``(i) population;

    ``(ii) location of vital infrastructure, including--

    ``(I) military installations;

    ``(II) public buildings (as defined in section 13 of the Public Buildings Act of 1959 (40 U.S.C. 612));

    ``(III) nuclear power plants;

    ``(IV) chemical plants; and

    ``(V) national landmarks; and

    ``(iii) proximity to international borders.

    ``(e) PROVISION OF FUNDS TO LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND LOCAL ENTITIES.--

    ``(1) IN GENERAL.--For each fiscal year, not less than 75 percent of the assistance provided to each State under this section shall be provided to local governments and local entities within the State.

    ``(2) ALLOCATION OF FUNDS.--Under paragraph (1), a State shall allocate assistance to local governments and local entities within the State in accordance with criteria established by the Director, such as the criteria specified in subsection (d)(2)(B).

    ``(3) DEADLINE FOR PROVISION OF FUNDS.--Under paragraph (1), a State shall provide all assistance to local government and local entities not later than 45 days after the date on which the State receives the assistance.

    ``(4) COORDINATION.--Each State shall coordinate with local governments and local entities concerning the use of assistance provided to local governments and local entities under paragraph (1).

    ``(f) ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES.--

    ``(1) DIRECTOR.--For each fiscal year, the Director may use to pay salaries and other administrative expenses incurred in administering the program not more than the lesser of--

    ``(A) 5 percent of the funds made available to carry out this section for the fiscal year; or

    ``(B)(i) for fiscal year 2003, $75,000,000; and

    ``(ii) for each of fiscal years 2004 through 2006, $50,000,000.

    ``(2) RECIPIENTS OF ASSISTANCE.--For each fiscal year, not more than 10 percent of the funds retained by a State after application of subsection (e) may be used to pay salaries and other administrative expenses incurred in administering the program.

    ``(g) MAINTENANCE OF EXPENDITURES.--The Director may provide assistance to a State under this section only if the State agrees to maintain, and to ensure that each local government that receives funds from the State in accordance with subsection (e) maintains, for the fiscal year for which the assistance is provided, the aggregate expenditures by the State or the local government, respectively, for the uses described in subsection (c)(1) at a level that is at or above the average annual level of those expenditures by the State or local government, respectively, for the 2 fiscal years preceding the fiscal year for which the assistance is provided.

    ``(h) REPORTS.--

    ``(1) ANNUAL REPORT TO THE DIRECTOR.--As a condition of receipt of assistance under this section for a fiscal year, a State shall submit to the Director, not later than 60 days after the end of the fiscal year, a report on the use of the assistance in the fiscal year.

    ``(2) EXERCISE AND REPORT TO CONGRESS.--As a condition of receipt of assistance under this section, not later than 3 years after the date of enactment of this section, a State shall--

    ``(A) conduct an exercise, or participate in a regional exercise, approved by the Director, to measure the progress of the State in enhancing the ability of State and local first responders to respond to incidents of terrorism, including incidents involving weapons of mass destruction; and

    ``(B) submit a report on the results of the exercise to--

    ``(i) the Committee on Environment and Public Works and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

    ``(ii) the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

    ``(i) COORDINATION.--

    ``(1) WITH FEDERAL AGENCIES.--The Director shall, as necessary, coordinate the provision of assistance under this section with activities carried out by--

    ``(A) the Administrator of the United States Fire Administration in connection with the implementation by the Administrator of the assistance to firefighters grant program established under section 33 of the Federal Fire Prevention and Control Act of 1974 (15 U.S.C. 2229) (as added by section 1701(a) of the Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (114 Stat. 1654, 1654A-360));

    ``(B) the Attorney General, in connection with the implementation of the Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) Program established under section 1701(a) of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (42 U.S.C. 3796dd(a)); and

    ``(C) other appropriate Federal agencies.

    ``(2) WITH INDIAN TRIBES.--In providing and using assistance under this section, the Director and the States shall, as appropriate, coordinate with--

    ``(A) Indian tribes (as defined in section 4 of the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (25 U.S.C. 450b)) and other tribal organizations; and

    ``(B) Native villages (as defined in section 3 of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (43 U.S.C. 1602)) and other Alaska Native organizations.''.

    (b) COST SHARING FOR EMERGENCY OPERATING CENTERS.--Section 614 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5196c) is amended--

    (1) by inserting ``(other than section 630)'' after ``carry out this title''; and

    (2) by inserting ``(other than section 630)'' after ``under this title''.

   SEC. 199F. PROTECTION OF HEALTH AND SAFETY OF FIRST RESPONDERS.

    Subtitle B of title VI of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5197 et seq.) (as amended by section 199E(a)) is amended by adding at the end the following:

   ``SEC. 631. PROTECTION OF HEALTH AND SAFETY OF FIRST RESPONDERS.

    ``(a) DEFINITIONS.--In this section:

    ``(1) FIRST RESPONDER.--The term `first responder' has the meaning given the term in section 630(a).

    ``(2) HARMFUL SUBSTANCE.--The term `harmful substance' means a substance that the President determines may be harmful to human health.

    ``(3) PROGRAM.--The term `program' means a program described in subsection (b)(1).

    ``(b) PROGRAM.--

    ``(1) IN GENERAL.--If the President determines that 1 or more harmful substances are being, or have been, released in an area that the President has declared to be a major disaster area under this Act, the President shall

[Page: S9145]

    ``(2) ACTIVITIES.--A program shall include--

    ``(A) collection and analysis of environmental and exposure data;

    ``(B) development and dissemination of educational materials;

    ``(C) provision of information on releases of a harmful substance;

    ``(D) identification of, performance of baseline health assessments on, taking biological samples from, and establishment of an exposure registry of first responders exposed to a harmful substance;

    ``(E) study of the long-term health impacts of any exposures of first responders to a harmful substance through epidemiological studies; and

    ``(F) provision of assistance to participants in registries and studies under subparagraphs (D) and (E) in determining eligibility for health coverage and identifying appropriate health services.

    ``(3) PARTICIPATION IN REGISTRIES AND STUDIES.--

    ``(A) IN GENERAL.--Participation in any registry or study under subparagraph (D) or (E) of paragraph (2) shall be voluntary.

    ``(B) PROTECTION OF PRIVACY.--The President shall take appropriate measures to protect the privacy of any participant in a registry or study described in subparagraph (A).

    ``(4) COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS.--The President may carry out a program through a cooperative agreement with a medical or academic institution, or a consortium of such institutions, that is--

    ``(A) located in close proximity to the major disaster area with respect to which the program is carried out; and

    ``(B) experienced in the area of environmental or occupational health and safety, including experience in--

    ``(i) conducting long-term epidemiological studies;

    ``(ii) conducting long-term mental health studies; and

    ``(iii) establishing and maintaining environmental exposure or disease registries.

    ``(c) REPORTS AND RESPONSES TO STUDIES.--

    ``(1) REPORTS.--Not later than 1 year after the date of completion of a study under subsection (b)(2)(E), the President, or the medical or academic institution or consortium of such institutions that entered into the cooperative agreement under subsection (b)(4), shall submit to the Director, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Secretary of Labor, and the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency a report on the study.

    ``(2) CHANGES IN PROCEDURES.--To protect the health and safety of first responders, the President shall make such changes in procedures as the President determines to be necessary based on the findings of a report submitted under paragraph (1).''.

   SEC. 199G. URBAN SEARCH AND RESCUE TASK FORCES.

    Subtitle B of title VI of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5197 et seq.) (as amended by section 199F) is amended by adding at the end the following:

   ``SEC. 632. URBAN SEARCH AND RESCUE TASK FORCES.

    ``(a) DEFINITIONS.--In this section:

    ``(1) URBAN SEARCH AND RESCUE EQUIPMENT.--The term `urban search and rescue equipment' means any equipment that the Director determines to be necessary to respond to a major disaster or emergency declared by the President under this Act.

    ``(2) URBAN SEARCH AND RESCUE TASK FORCE.--The term `urban search and rescue task force' means any of the 28 urban search and rescue task forces designated by the Director as of the date of enactment of this section.

    ``(b) ASSISTANCE.--

    ``(1) MANDATORY GRANTS FOR COSTS OF OPERATIONS.--For each fiscal year, of the amounts made available to carry out this section, the Director shall provide to each urban search and rescue task force a grant of not less than $1,500,000 to pay the costs of operations of the urban search and rescue task force (including costs of basic urban search and rescue equipment).

    ``(2) DISCRETIONARY GRANTS.--The Director may provide to any urban search and rescue task force a grant, in such amount as the Director determines to be appropriate, to pay the costs of--

    ``(A) operations in excess of the funds provided under paragraph (1);

    ``(B) urban search and rescue equipment;

    ``(C) equipment necessary for an urban search and rescue task force to operate in an environment contaminated or otherwise affected by a weapon of mass destruction;

    ``(D) training, including training for operating in an environment described in subparagraph (C);

    ``(E) transportation;

    ``(F) expansion of the urban search and rescue task force; and

    ``(G) incident support teams, including costs of conducting appropriate evaluations of the readiness of the urban search and rescue task force.

    ``(3) PRIORITY FOR FUNDING.--The Director shall distribute funding under this subsection so as to ensure that each urban search and rescue task force has the capacity to deploy simultaneously at least 2 teams with all necessary equipment, training, and transportation.

    ``(c) GRANT REQUIREMENTS.--The Director shall establish such requirements as are necessary to provide grants under this section.

    ``(d) ESTABLISHMENT OF ADDITIONAL URBAN SEARCH AND RESCUE TASK FORCES.--

    ``(1) IN GENERAL.--Subject to paragraph (2), the Director may establish urban search and rescue task forces in addition to the 28 urban search and rescue task forces in existence on the date of enactment of this section.

    ``(2) REQUIREMENT OF FULL FUNDING OF EXISTING URBAN SEARCH AND RESCUE TASK FORCES.--Except in the case of an urban search and rescue task force designated to replace any urban search and rescue task force that withdraws or is otherwise no longer considered to be an urban search and rescue task force designated by the Director, no additional urban search and rescue task forces may be designated or funded until the 28 urban search and rescue task forces are able to deploy simultaneously at least 2 teams with all necessary equipment, training, and transportation.''.

   SEC. 199H. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

    Section 626 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5197e) is amended by striking subsection (a) and inserting the following:

    ``(a) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.--

    ``(1) IN GENERAL.--There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as are necessary to carry out this title (other than sections 630 and 632).

    ``(2) PREPAREDNESS ASSISTANCE FOR FIRST RESPONDERS.--There are authorized to be appropriated to carry out section 630--

    ``(A) $3,340,000,000 for fiscal year 2003; and

    ``(B) $3,458,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2004 through 2006.

    ``(3) URBAN SEARCH AND RESCUE TASK FORCES.--

    ``(A) IN GENERAL.--There are authorized to be appropriated to carry out section 632--

    ``(i) $160,000,000 for fiscal year 2003; and

    ``(ii) $42,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2004 through 2006.

    ``(B) AVAILABILITY OF AMOUNTS.--Amounts made available under subparagraph (A) shall remain available until expended.''.

3B) HERO Act of 2002

Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to introduce the HERO Act, the Homeland Emergency Responders Organization Act. This Act will establish the Office of National Preparedness within the Federal Emergency Management Agency. The HERO Act will improve the ability of first responders to prepare for and respond to terrorist attacks by getting grants to them directly through this new Office.

In the past several months, I've received numerous letters and calls from state and community leaders on the critical issue of homeland security. Two overriding themes have surfaced again and again: We must allocate more resources to homeland security. And, those resources must go directly to cities and other local governments. I believe that the best ideas on how to make the hometown more secure come from the hometown.

The HERO Act is a federal grant program that will improve the readiness of first responders at both the local and state levels. Since it utilizes an existing agency--FEMA--and its regional offices, federal grants will get to those who need them most, when they need them most--NOW!

The Director of the new Office will make grants available to first responders through each of FEMA's 10 regional offices. Each of these regional offices serves several states, as well as Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, and the Northern Mariana's. Eligibility for grants will be based on criteria such as population density and proximity to international borders.

Dispersing funds directly to first responders, like the Broward County Sheriff's Office or the Hollywood, Florida Police Department, will enable local communities to concentrate on their highest priorities--training, purchasing communications equipment, or upgrading emergency operating centers.

The new Office will also distribute grants to each of the 50 states. The state grants can be used--to establish or upgrade state-wide emergency notification systems, plan terrorism response exercises, or to coordinate inter- and intra-state antiterrorism programs. First responders in cities and towns across America need our help to make the homeland more secure. They, in fact we, can't wait for a new agency to be approved, and then created, before we take the first steps towards a more secure homeland. Local communities need our help and support now.

I am looking forward to working with my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to move this bill as quickly as possible. Time is of the essence. Let's make the homeland more secure.

4A) Department of State Authorization
Title XVI Sec. 1605. Compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention

   On April 24, 1997, the Senate provided its advice and consent to ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention subject to the condition, among others, that the President certify that no sample collected in the United States pursuant to the Convention will be transferred for analysis to any laboratory outside the territory of the United States. Congress enacted the same condition into law as section 304(f)(1) of the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998 (22 U.S.C. 6724(f)(1)). Part II, paragraph 57, of the Verification Annex of the Convention requires that all samples requiring off-site analysis under the Convention shall be analyzed by at least two laboratories that have been designated as capable of conducting such testing by the Organization for the Prevention of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). The only United States laboratory currently designated by the OPCW is the United States Army Edgewood Forensic Science Laboratory.

   In order to comply with the Chemical Weapons Convention, the certification submitted pursuant to condition (18) of the resolution of ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention, and section 304 of the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998 (22 U.S.C. 6724), the United States must possess, at a minimum, a second OPCW-designated laboratory. The possession of a second laboratory is especially necessary in view of the potential for a challenge inspection to be initiated against the United States by a foreign nation. To qualify as a designated laboratory, a laboratory must be certified under ISO Guide 25 or a higher standard, and complete three proficiency tests. The laboratory must have the full capability to handle substances listed on Schedule 1 of the Annex on Schedules of Chemicals of the Convention. In order to handle such substances in the United States, a laboratory also must operate under a bailment agreement with the United States Army.

   Several existing United States commercial laboratories have approved quality control systems, already possess bailment agreements with the United States Army, and have the capabilities necessary to obtain OPCW designation. The Managers believe that, in order to safeguard samples taken on U.S. territory and bolster the legitimacy of the analysis of those samples, thereby protecting the proprietary and business interests of U.S. firms, and to promote similar transparency and confidence when inspections are conducted abroad, one of the

[Page: H6470]

   This section therefore requires that the United States National Authority, by June 1, 2003, select a nongovernmental laboratory to pursue designation by the OPCW. A report is required by March 1, 2003, detailing a plan for securing OPCW designation of a third United States laboratory by December 1, 2004. With three designated U.S. laboratories, the OPCW could randomly send a real sample to two laboratories and a false sample to the third, so that a laboratory would never be sure what sample it was analyzing. This approach, which is in keeping with OPCW intent worldwide, would reduce significantly the value of any espionage information that a country or company might hope to gain by infiltrating a laboratory.

4B) Iraq's Chemical and Biological Weapons
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, amidst the wall-to-wall reporting on Iraq that has become daily grist for the Nation's news media, a headline in this morning's USA Today leaped out from the front page: ``In Iraq's arsenal, Nature's deadliest poison.''

   The article describes the horrors of botulinum toxin, a potential weapon in Iraq's biological warfare arsenal. According to the Journal of the American Medical Association, botulinum toxin is the most poisonous substance known. We know that Saddam Hussein produced thousands of litres of botulinum toxin in the run up to the Gulf war. We also know where some of the toxin came from. Guess. The United States, which approved shipments of botulinum toxin from a nonprofit scientific specimen repository to the government of Iraq in l986 and l988.

   I recently asked Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld about these shipments during an Armed Services Committee hearing a week ago. I repeat today what I said to him then: In the event of a war with Iraq, might the United States be facing the possibility of reaping what it has sown?

   The threat of chemical and biological warfare is one of the most terrifying prospects of a war with Iraq, and it is one that should give us serious pause before we embark on a course of action that might lead to an all-out, no-holds-barred conflict.

   Earlier this week, British Prime Minister Tony Blair released an assessment of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction program which contained the jolting conclusion that Iraq could launch chemical or biological warheads within 45 minutes of getting the green light from Saddam Hussein.

   The British government assessment, while putting Iraq's chemical and biological capabilities in starker terms than perhaps we have seen before, closely tracks with what U.S. officials have been warning for some time: namely, Saddam Hussein has the means and the know-how to wage biological and chemical warfare, and he has demonstrated his willingness to use such weapons. By the grace of God, he apparently has not yet achieved nuclear capability.

   On the matter of biological warfare, Gen. Richard Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee last week that many improvements have been made to the protective gear worn by American soldiers and to the sensors used to detect chemical or biological agents.

   But according to the USA Today article on botulinum toxin, U.S. troops would be just as vulnerable to botulinum toxin today as they were during the Gulf war.

   This is what the article states:

   There's still no government-approved vaccine, and the only antitoxin is made by extracting antibodies from the blood of vaccinated horses using decades-old technology.

   Last year's anthrax attack on the U.S. Senate gave all of us in this Chamber firsthand experience with biological warfare and new insight into the insidious nature of biological weapons. And that attack--hear me now--involved only about a teaspoon or so of anthrax sealed in an envelope. The potential consequences of a massive bioweapons attack against American soldiers on the battlefield boggle the imagination.

   My concerns over biological warfare were heightened last week when I came across a report in Newsweek that the U.S. Government had cleared numerous shipments of viruses, bacteria, fungi, and protozoa to the Government of Iraq in the mid-1980s, at a time when the U.S. was cultivating Saddam Hussein as an ally against Iran. The shipments included anthrax and botulinum toxin.

   Moreover, during the same time period, the Centers for Disease Control, CDC, was also shipping deadly toxins to Iraq, including vials of West Nile fever virus and Dengue fever.

   This is not mere speculation. I have the letters from the CDC and the American Type Culture Collection laying out the dates of shipments, to whom they were sent, and what they

[Page: S9400]  GPO's PDF

   Why does this matter today? Why do I care about something that happened nearly 20 years ago when Saddam Hussein was considered to be a potential ally and Iran's Ayatollah Khomeni was public enemy No. 1 in the United States? I care because it is relevant to today's debate on Iraq. This is not yesterday's news. This is tomorrow's news.

   Federal agencies have documents detailing exactly what biological material was shipped to Iraq from the United States. We have a paper trail. We not only know that Iraq has biological weapons, we know the type, the strain, and the batch number of the germs that may have been used to fashion those weapons. We know the dates they were shipped, and the addresses to which they were shipped.

   We have in our hands--now get this--the equivalent of a Betty Crocker cookbook of ingredients that the U.S. allowed Iraq to obtain and that may well have been used to concoct biological weapons. At last week's Armed Services Committee hearing, Secretary Rumsfeld said he has no knowledge of any such shipments, and doubted that they ever occurred. He seemed to be a little affronted at the very idea that the United States would ever countenance entering into such a deal with the devil.

   Secretary Rumsfeld should not shy away from this information. On the contrary, he should seek it out if he does not know it. Let's find out. No one is alleging that the United States deliberately sneaked biological weapons to Iraq under the table during the Iran-Iraq war. I am not suggesting that. I am confident that our Government is not that stupid. It was simply a matter of business as usual, I suppose. We freely exchange information and technology including scientific research with our friends. At the time, I suppose, Iraq was our friend. If there is any lesson to be learned from the Iraq experience, it is that we should choose our friends more carefully, see further down the road and exercise tighter controls on the export of materials that could be turned against us. Today's friend may be tomorrow's enemy.

   This is not the first time I have advocated stricter controls on exports. In fact, I added an amendment to the 1996 Defense Authorization Act that was specifically designed to curb the export of dual-use technology to potential adversaries of the United States.

   In the case of the biological materials shipped to Iraq, the Commerce Department and the CDC have lists of the shipments. The Defense Department ought to have the same lists so that the decisionmakers will know exactly what types of biological agents American soldiers may face in the field. Doesn't that make sense? Shouldn't the Defense Department know what is out there, so that the generals can know what counter-measures they might need to take to protect their troops?

   I believe the answer to those questions is yes, and so I am sending the information I have to Secretary Rumsfeld. He said he did not have any such information so I am going to send it to Secretary Rumsfeld. No matter how repugnant he finds the idea of the U.S. even inadvertently aiding Saddam Hussein in his quest to obtain biological weapons, the Secretary should have this information at hand, and should make sure that his field commanders also have it.

   The most deadly of the biological agents that came from the U.S. were shipped to the government of Iraq by the American Type Culture Collection, ATCC, a non-profit organization that provides biological materials to industry, government, and educational institutions around the world. According to its own records, the ATCC sent 11 separate shipments of biological materials to the government of Iraq between 1985 and 1988. The shipments included a witches brew of pathogens including anthrax, botulinum toxin, and gangrene.

   Meanwhile, the CDC was shipping toxic specimens to Iraq--including West Nile virus and dengue fever--from January 1980 until October 13, 1993.

   The nexus between the U.S.-approved shipments of pathogens and the development of Iraq's biological weapons program is particularly disturbing. Consider the following chain of events: In May of 1986, the ATCC reported the first shipments of anthrax and botulinum toxin to Iraq. A second shipment including anthrax and botulinum toxin was sent to Iraq in September of 1988.

   At approximately the same time that the first shipment was sent in April of 1986, Iraq turned from studying literature on biological warfare to experimenting with actual samples of anthrax and botulinum toxin. The turning point, according a report to the United Nations Security Council from the U.N. weapons inspection team, came when ``bacterial strains were received from overseas'' and delivered to an Iraqi biological weapons laboratory.

   In April of 1988, the U.N. weapons inspectors reported that Iraq began research on the biological agent Clostridium perfringens, more commonly known as gas gangrene. Clostridium perfringens cultures were among the materials shipped to Iraq by the ATCC in both 1986 and 1988.

   These are only a few examples of the pathogens that Iraq is known to have imported from the United States. It is not known how many of these materials were destroyed following the Persian Gulf war, or how many Iraq continues to possess, whether they are still viable, or whether in its pursuit of biological weapons, Iraq has developed ways to extend the shelf life of toxic biological agents. There is much that we do not know about Iraq's biological warfare program. But there are two important facts in which we can have great confidence: Iraq has biological weapons, and Iraq obtained biological materials from the United States in the 1980s.

   I asked Secretary Rumsfeld, at last week's Armed Services Committee hearing, whether we might be reaping what we have sown in Iraq, in terms of biological weapons. The question was rhetorical, but the link between shipments of biological material from the United States and the development of Iraq's biological weapons program is more than just an historical footnote.

   The role that the U.S. may have played in helping Iraq to pursue biological warfare in the 1980s should serve as a strong warning to the President that policy decisions regarding Iraq today could have far reaching ramifications on the Middle East and on the United States in the future. In the 1980s, the Ayatollah Khomeni was America's sworn enemy, and the U.S. Government courted Saddam Hussein in an effort to undermine the Ayatollah and Iran. Today, oh, how different. Saddam Hussein is America's biggest enemy, America's greatest enemy, America's most dangerous enemy, and the U.S. is said to be making overtures today to Iran.

   The Washington Post reported today that the President is expected to authorize military training for at least 1,000 members of the Iraqi opposition to help overthrow Saddam Hussein. The opposition groups include the Kurds in the north, and the Shiite Muslims in the south.

   The decision to provide military training to Iraqi opponents of Saddam Hussein would mark a major change in U.S. policy, ending a prohibition on lethal assistance to the Iraqi opposition. It is not a decision that should be undertaken lightly.

   Although administration officials told the Post that initial plans called for modest steps that would allow members of the Iraqi opposition to provide liaison to the local population and perhaps guard prisoners of war, the officials did not shut the door on providing training and equipment for more lethal activities.

   ``Nobody is talking about giving them guns yet,'' one official was quoted as saying. ``That would be a dramatic step, but there are many dramatic steps yet to be taken.''

   Has the administration adequately explored the potential ramifications of creating ethnic armies of dissidents in Iraq? Could the U.S. be laying the groundwork for a brutal civil war in Iraq? Could this proposed policy change precipitate a deadly border conflict between the Kurds and Turkey? Could we perhaps be setting the stage for a Shiite-ruled Iraq that could align itself with Iran and result in the domination of the Middle East by hard-line Shiite Muslims along the lines of the Ayatollah Khomeni?

   These are legitimate questions. They are troubling questions. And they should be carefully thought through before we unleash an open-ended attack on Iraq. We had better think about these questions. We better ask these questions. The administration had better listen and so had the American people.

   There are many outstanding questions that the United States should consider before marching in lockstep down the path of committing America's military forces to effect the immediate overthrow of Saddam Hussein. The peril of biological weapons is only one of those considerations, but it is an important one.

   Has it been thought out? Has it been discussed? Has the administration said anything to Congress about this, whether or not the administration has explored these questions? Here are the questions. Don't say they were not asked. The more we know now, the better off our troops will be in the future.

   Decisions involving war and peace--the most fundamental life and death decisions--should never be rushed through this Senate. I say that again. Decisions involving war and peace--the most fundamental of life and death decisions--they affect your sons and daughters out there, your blood. Such decisions should never be rushed through, never be rushed through or muscled through in haste.

   Our Founding Fathers understood that and they wisely vested in the Congress--not in the President, not in any President, Democrat or Republican--the power to declare war.

   We are going to discuss this. There is going to be a discussion of it. It is not going to be rammed through all that fast.

   Congress has been presented with a Presidential request for authorization to use military force against Iraq. We now have the responsibility to consider that request, consider it carefully, consider it thoroughly, and consider it on our own timetable. I urge my colleagues to do just that and avoid the pressure--avoid the pressure to rush to judgment on such an important and vital and far-reaching and momentous matter.

   I yield the floor.

   Mr. REID. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

   The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

   Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

5A) Joint Resolution Authorizing Force against Iraq
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to introduce a Joint Resolution. It authorizes the use of U.S. Armed Forces to defend our national security interests against the threat posed by Iraq. However, this Resolution does set some definitive conditions for the President prior to engaging the U.S. Armed Forces. It requires the President to exhaust diplomatic efforts to obtain Iraq's compliance with the U.N. Security Council Resolutions. It also requires the President to present the Congress with a comprehensive plan of how stability will be maintained in the region in a post-strike environment.

The young men and women of our Armed Forces are already fighting a war on terrorism . Before we expand their role, and send them even deeper into harm's way, I want assurances that we have explored and exhausted every avenue for a peaceful and diplomatic solution. I also want assurances that we have a plan for maintaining stability in the region once we declare victory.

Let me be perfectly clear. I am well aware that for more than a decade, Iraq has violated virtually every U.N. Security Council Resolution. With each violation, the threat to international peace and security becomes more ominous. I believe that Iraq not only poses a threat to our national security interests, but also threatens the stability and security of the entire region and indeed, the world. It is becoming more and more evident that we must be proactive in defending our nation. We know that the United States is a terrorism target, and we know that Iraq constitutes a real and imminent threat against our national security interests.

However, only Congress has the authority to declare war. The Congress must be convinced that every conceivable option has been explored. The Congress must be convinced that the post-strike plan for maintaining stability in that region is achievable. The Congress must agree that a preemptive strike is our only course of action.

I urge my colleagues to vote for this Resolution.

5B) Options with Regard to Iraq
Mr. DeFAZIO. Mr. Speaker, the rush to war continues here in Washington, despite the possibility of the reinstatement of effective, unfettered inspections aimed at the destruction of weapons of mass destruction that Saddam Hussein may have hidden from past inspections or may have developed since that time.

Now, Prime Minister Tony Blair, as a surrogate for this administration, did provide a more concrete and detailed report than anything provided by the Bush administration to the United States Congress thus far on what is going on in Iraq. But the interesting thing is, in reading through the 50-some odd pages of this report and perusing the photographs, the actual conclusion is that inspections did work, U.N. sanctions did work, and are still working. The containment and deterrence doctrine has worked with Saddam Hussein.

In fact, the previous program before the inspectors left was extraordinarily successful, more so than would be admitted by this administration, that is very dismissive about the possibility of going back in with intrusive, unfettered inspections with a mandate to destroy any weapons of mass destruction that this miscreant may have managed to develop.

I will read a few quotes from Prime Minister Blair's report. He talks about their attempts to obtain nuclear weapons: ``In August 1990, Iraq instigated a crash program to develop a single nuclear weapon within a year. By the time of the Gulf War, the crash program had made little progress.''

They go on to say that ``UNSCOM had totally dismantled the physical infrastructure of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program, including the dedicated facilities and equipment for uranium separation and enrichment, and for weapon development and production, and removed the remaining highly enriched uranium.'' It is hard to reconcile that with the assertions that intrusive inspections under the auspices of the U.N. will have no impact on Saddam Hussein or his attempts to obtain weapons of mass destruction.

In early 2002, the British intelligence judged that while sanctions remained effective, Iraq will not be able to produce nuclear weapons. That is on page 27 of the justification given by the Prime Minister of Britain for a preemptive war against Iraq. He cannot build or obtain nuclear weapons, according to British intelligence, as long as the sanctions remain in effect, and that is without intrusive inspections backed by the full force of the United States and around the world.

There are many other passages. This is incredibly instructive reading. I would recommend it to my colleagues in Congress. It is certainly more detailed than anything provided to this Congress, either in classified briefings or outside of classified briefings, and certainly more detailed than anything provided to the American public, NATO or anybody else by the United States, and the British have done us a service.

But the case they make is the opposite of the conclusion of their Prime Minister. The case that is strongly made here is that a return to the regime of an intrusive, unfettered weapons inspection and destruction program would effectively preclude this dictator from ever obtaining weapons with which he could threaten other countries in that region, and most certainly the United States of America.

So this, to me, certainly demonstrates that the rush to war, the first preemptive war in the history of the United States, the first preemptive war since the horrible destruction of World War II and the U.N. and the agreements we have reached since then, breaking with all precedent, the United States, in some bizarre version of ``Minority Report,'' the movie, will decide that we have people in the administration who can determine whether or not someone presents a real and present threat to the United States, even if they made no threats, even if there is no documentation of them having the capabilities on carrying out on the threats they have not made; and we, the United States of America, should be able, in violation of all international law and all precedents of our Nation, be able to preemptively attack and destroy that country for the purposes of regime change, because we do not like who is running that country.

Well, there are a lot of brutal dictators around the world running a lot of countries I do not like, including Saddam Hussein; and I would support democratic efforts and subversion efforts and any other way to get those people out of power. But a war that opens the door to worldwide conflicts, to Taiwan and China, India and Pakistan and any other host of countries, is an incredibly dangerous precedent, and this report from the Prime Minister to his Parliament documents that it is not necessary. We have an effective option before us.

5C) A Grave and Gathering Danger
Mr. HORN. Mr. Speaker, the House will soon take up the question of whether to authorize the President to use any necessary means, including military force, to require Iraq to abide by its agreements with the United Nations to destroy its stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons. There is of course no question that Saddam Hussein has repeatedly violated these agreements and that he continues to pursue the development of weapons of mass destruction. The only real question is whether Congress and the United Nations will enforce these international resolutions.

Mr. Speaker, I strongly support the President and I believe that it is important that we act promptly on this issue. The President made clear in his address to the General Assembly of the United Nations that there is a clear and compelling case for forcing Saddam Hussein to obey UN agreements or face real and immediate consequences. As we prepare to debate this issue, I urge my colleagues to review the President's remarks because I believe this speech not only could help avert a new Persian Gulf war but also could help restore credibility to a United Nations that has been drifting toward irrelevance.

I have been a strong and consistent supporter of the United Nations. I believe it is essential that we have a strong, credible and effective international forum where disputes can be debated and resolved without bloodshed, where problems that stretch beyond the boundaries and resources of any one nation can be tackled by the joint efforts of many countries and where those who flout the laws of civilized behavior not only face condemnation but international penalties with real bite.

In his speech, President Bush presented two challenges. One was to Saddam Hussein to abide by a series of UN resolutions over the past 12 years requiring him to halt production of weapons of mass destruction, to end internal political repression in Iraq and to abide by the terms of the ceasefire that ended the Gulf War. The other challenge was to the United Nations to enforce its own resolutions, if Saddam continues to murder and maim within Iraq while furiously working to complete his arsenal of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons.

By ordering Saddam to disarm and then failing to take any effective action to enforce those orders, the United Nations has endangered its own credibility. Since the 1991 ceasefire, the UN Security Council has issued 12 specific demands for Iraq to comply with requirements to eliminate weapons of mass destruction and other steps. Iraq has repeatedly and brazenly refused. As a result, UN weapons inspection teams left Iraq four years ago, ending any check on Saddam's growing arsenal.

President Bush made clear that this steady drift into danger will not be allowed to continue. Saddam has a well-documented history of invading neighboring nations like Iran and Kuwait, and using highly lethal concoctions of poison gas and nerve agents despite all prohibitions in international law and in civilized behavior. He also has a fully documented history of gassing entire villages of opposition groups within Iraq, as in 1988 when attacks against Kurdish villages killed hundreds of women and children.

The President puts it very simply: ``The history, the logic and the facts lead to one conclusion: Saddam Hussein's regime is a grave and gathering danger. To suggest otherwise is to hope against the evidence. To assume this regime's good faith is to bet the lives of millions and the peace of the world in a reckless gamble, and this is a risk we must not take.''

President Bush then posed two unavoidable questions that only the United Nations can now answer: ``Are Security Council resolutions to be honored and enforced or cast aside without consequences? Will the United Nations serve the purpose of its founding or will it be irrelevant?''

The only adequate response to those questions is forceful and unequivocal action by the United Nations to require that Iraq immediately comply with the terms of the 1991 ceasefire and subsequent UN requirements, beginning with the complete elimination of weapons of mass destruction. These demands are not onerous or outrageous. They simply require that Iraq abide by the same standards of human decency that guide every civilized nation. To demand less would be to abandon millions of innocent people within Iraq and to endanger millions more throughout the rest of the world. It would also set the precedent that the malignant whims of a determined dictator can reduce the United Nations to a hollow debating society that cannot uphold the promise of world peace.

A war against Iraq by a renewed international coalition or by the United States alone would be a grave and sobering step with many risks and unknowns. We cannot and should not take such a step without full consideration by the United Nations and the Congress, as the President has promised. But the dangers of continued inaction, of endless dithering, are too frightening to ignore. We must act to support the President.

5D) Resolutions to Take Action Against Iraq
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, Members of Congress face few decisions as important for their constituents as the issue of war or peace

I oppose the resolution requested by President Bush that would give him a blank check to start a war against Iraq at any time and in any manner that he chooses. This clearly is too broad. It authorizes the President to act unilaterally no matter what the U.N. decides or does. That would abdicate congressional responsibility and is reminiscent of the equally open-ended Tonkin Gulf Resolution in 1964. It also fails to limit his authority to working within the U.N. framework on peaceful measures to enforce U.N. sanctions. Finally, the President's proposal embodies his alarming new doctrine of pre-emptive U.S. attacks on other nations even when they pose no imminent threat to the U.S.

Instead, I join with many of my colleagues who support a more sensible, more justified and far less dangerous position: we advocate that the U.S. pursue inspections through the U.N., while continuing to deter Saddam Hussein, as we have been able to do for the past decade. To implement this view, we have introduced an alternative resolution endorsing President Bush's request for U.N. inspections.

The Administration simply has not made the case that Iraq threatens the United States with weapons of mass destruction, and that we are in such imminent danger of attack that U.S. military action is either the prudent or the justified course. Everyone agrees that Saddam Hussein is a very brutal dictator. He has: ruthlessly repressed his own people; committed aggression in the past; violated U.N. sanctions; sought to develop weapons of mass destruction; and remained hostile to the United States.

But that does not end the matter, for two reasons. First, the same could be said for any number of other countries, such a North Korea, China, and Iran. Will the U.S. attack each of them, and others, because some day they might be able to threaten us with weapons of mass destruction?

Second, even if a

A U.S. attack poses other severe dangers:

American military commanders fear it would dilute our fight against al Qaida. We have not yet captured those who killed thousands of Americans, and who, we know, are still trying to kill more. That is job number one.

America's attacking Iraq alone would ignite a firestorm of anti-American fervor in the Middle East and Muslim world and breed thousands of new potential terrorists.

As we see in Afghanistan, there would be chaos and inter-ethnic conflict following Saddam's departure. A post-war agreement among them to cooperate peacefully in a new political structure would not be self-executing. Iraq would hardly become overnight a shining

If we violate the U.N. Charter and unilaterally assault another country when it is not yet a matter of necessary self-defense, then we will set a dangerous precedent, paving the way for any other nation that chooses to do so, too, including those with nuclear weapons such as India and Pakistan and China.

We will trigger an arms-race of nations accelerating and expanding their efforts to develop weapons of destruction, so that they can deter

The war, plus the need to rebuild Iraq and create a united, peaceful country, would cost billions of dollars badly needed at home. For millions of Americans, the biggest threat to their security in the lack of decent wage jobs, health insurance or affordable housing for their families. For senior citizens, it is their need to choose between buying enough food and buying prescription drugs. Indeed, most Americans are more frightened about security at our airports than about some strutting dictator thousands of miles away. Yet the Bush Administration's deficit budget won't even permit meeting the year-end deadline for installing new baggage and passenger screening systems to protect us against an immediate threat here at home.

The huge costs of war and nation building, which will increase our deficit, along with the impact of the likely sharp rise in oil prices, will deal a double-barreled blow to our currently fragile economy.

If it were plausible that we had to attack Iraq now, in order to head off strategic threats to the United States in the near future

In fact, it is precisely because they lack such evidence that the President, Secretary Rumsfeld and Vice President CHENEY have increasingly downplayed claims of an impending nuclear threat from Iraq and have switched to elaborating on what a bad person Saddam has been.

But such a departure from the principles of our tradition

In addition, Americans should ask the White House and the Congress about the timing of the vote on any IRAQ resolution. What's the rush? According to press reports, our military leaders have made clear they will not be ready to launch an attack for months, and would prefer to do so in January or February. Why, then, do we need to decide such a complex and consequential issue in a few days? Why cut short the national debate to which the American people are entitled? Is it because the Administration is aware that a growing number of Americans are troubled by all of the unanswered questions? Americans are puzzled why Iraq has suddenly become such a threat that the White House is prepared to go to war and shed the blood of American men and women, not to mention great numbers of innocent Iraqi civilians.

They are right to ask. What has changed in the last six months or year that suddenly makes an attack on Iraq the leading item on the Administration's agenda? All of the reasons now being cited by the White House

I would hope that this headlong rush to judgment does not have anything to do with the November elections.

I expect the Bush Administration to present very soon some conveniently last-minute

Is this because the White House knew it would be unhappy with the result?

Is it because the Administration was unable to pressure all of the intelligence agencies to reach the

Is it because the White House has been pressing the Intelligence Community to find some new

Mr. Speaker, It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that one or more of these considerations played a role in the otherwise inexplicable delay. Therefore, I have asked the Chairman and Ranking Member of the House Committee on Intelligence to vigorously investigate what dissents any of the intelligence agencies may have registered from the NIE's overall conclusions, from its component findings and from its assumption

This summer, several major newspapers reported that senior officers at the Pentagon, including members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not believe that Iraq posed a sufficient threat to the U.S. to warrant the risks and the costs of a war. Now they apparently have been brought on board a White House war train that is about to leave the station. Why have they suddenly reversed their position? I trust their initial professional judgment.

In these tense times, we should keep in mind the recent warning from another military leader, General Anthony Zinni, who was Marine Commandant and also has headed our Armed Forces Central Command, which guards our interests in the Middle East. He currently is a key advisor on that region to the Administration. General Zinni reminded us that military commanders, who know the full horrors of war are hesitant to plunge ahead unless the national interest is clearly at stake, while those who have never worn a uniform or seen combat often are the ones who most easily and enthusiastically beat the drums of war.

Return to the Congressional Report Weekly.