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1A) 50th Anniversary of the Paducah Plant
Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I rise today to pay tribute to the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant and all its workers, past and present, on the occasion of the facility's upcoming 50th anniversary, which will be celebrated by the Paducah community on October 24th.

The Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant is currently the only operating uranium enrichment facility in the United States. Production of enriched uranium began in Paducah in 1952, and the plant has operated continuously since that time. Until 1964, the plant's output was almost entirely for the purposes of national defense as it produced fissionable material for our country's nuclear arsenal. The Paducah workers during that period played a vital role in securing our freedom and helped America prevail in the cold war. Unfortunately, the Federal Government didn't always do right by the workers, who were often exposed to hazardous conditions and materials which would later sicken and even kill some. Even today, we are still working to correct this shameful injustice.

After 1964, Paducah production began shifting to enriched uranium for commercial nuclear reactors; helping to provide the benefits of cleanly generated electric power to millions of people. After 1973, Paducah no longer enriched uranium for military purposes. However, the plant continues to help create a more secure world as the U.S. recipient for nuclear materials from the former Soviet arsenal. Under the Megatons to Megawatts program, nuclear weapons are dismantled in Russia and the nuclear material is shipped to Paducah where it is repackaged and shipped worldwide for civilian electric power production.

Over the last half century, a number of companies have operated the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant. Carbide and Carbon Chemicals Company, (later Union Carbide) was the original operator of the plant. Successor operators included Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Lockheed Martin Energy Systems, and finally United States Enrichment Corporation, which took over direct operation of the plant in 1999, and continues as the operator today. Today 1,500 workers are employed at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant. What is remarkable is that despite the past sins of the Federal Government, these employees remain dedicated to their jobs and the important work they perform every day. It is a testament to those individuals in particular and this region in general.

In addition to the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant itself, an entire complex of supporting plants were built to support enrichment activities at Paducah. Two electric generating plants were constructed to supply the large power demands of the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant. These were the TVA Shawnee Steam Plant in western McCracken County, Kentucky, and the EEI plant in Joppa, Illinois. Additionally, a uranium hexaflouride plant was constructed in Metropolis, IL. Together, these four facilities comprise the economic and industrial heart of the region.

In recent years, we have learned that there were often risks associated with work at Paducah, particularly during the earlier years of its operation. Some workers were exposed to cancer-causing chemicals and radiological hazards. Many of these workers have now benefited from the Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program, which I am proud to have helped bring into existence. Working alongside the union representing the workers, I have also fought to make sure that medical screening is available to all workers so that they may be tested and treated for any problems they incur as a result of working at the plant. We have also embarked upon the task of cleaning up some of the legacy waste materials left on the site. The Department of Energy's recently announced DUF6 conversion plant will be a huge step in this direction, as it will clean up thousands of cylinders of depleted uranium hexaflouride which have been stored on the site for decades. The conversion plant additionally will add new jobs to the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant complex.

While significant challenges lie ahead for America's domestic uranium enrichment industry, it is appropriate to pause on this occasion to commemorate the Golden Anniversary of the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant, and the dedicated service of all the employees over the last half century. The workers at Paducah today continue the fine tradition of service, commitment, and productivity. I am sure they are up to any future challenge to be met in keeping a viable domestic uranium enrichment capability.

1B) Nuclear and Radiological Terrorism Threat Reduction Act of 2002
By Mr. BIDEN (for himself, Mr. LUGAR, Mr. DOMENICI, Mrs. CLINTON, Mr. GREGG, and Mr. SCHUMER):

   S. 3121. A bill to authorize the Secretary of State to undertake measures in support of international programs to detect and prevent acts of nuclear or radiological terrorism, to authorize appropriations to the Department of State to carry out those measures, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

   Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, today I am introducing the ``Nuclear and Radiological Terrorism Threat Reduction Act of 2002.'' This is a bill to strengthen the efforts of the world community to gain control over the vast amounts of radioactive materials that, left uncontrolled, could cause economic disruption and sow terror in American cities.

   In the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's hearing on March 6 of this year, experts testified that an amount of ground up radioactive cobalt-60 the size of the ball in your ball point pen could contaminate an area of Manhattan greater than the footprint of the World Trade Center. The damage and risk would be so great that buildings in the affected area might have to be abandoned, destroyed, and trucked away as radioactive waste.

   We learned that if a terrorist dispersed a few hundred curies of radioactive material, the resulting public panic could make much of downtown Washington, DC uninhabitable without a difficult and expensive clean-up. Decontamination is a serious and poorly understood problem because many of the radioactive isotopes a terrorist might choose will bind chemically to construction materials such as marble and stone used in our most precious buildings.

   One curie of radioactive cesium-137, strontium-90, cobalt-60 or iridium-192 poses a significant risk. But sources as strong as several hundred curies are used every day in world-wide commerce. They serve to estimate the oil in active oil wells, to provide a compact and convenient source of x-rays to check the quality of welds in the field, and to provide pencil beams of radiation to measure the amount of soda or beer in an aluminum can.

   Hospitals, primarily in poorer countries, but also in the United States, use cesium-137 or cobalt-60 sources as strong as several thousand curies to provide radiation therapy in cancer treatment. Some of these sources are used in Southern California in mobile treatment centers mounted in trucks. These rolling radioactive sources move on the highways and through the streets of our country and perhaps of other countries, where they are vulnerable to accident or foul play.

   Each year many radioactive sources, world wide, are abandoned or stolen and leak out of the existing control system. They become ``orphan'' sources, unwanted and with nobody to care for them or keep them out of trouble. Sometimes industrial sources are abandoned in place when their owners go out of business. They can then find their way into the scrap metal pool, and may arrive on the doorstep of a steel mill.

   That happened shortly before our March 6 hearing. A 2-curie cesium-137 source turned up on the conveyor belt of the Nucor Steel Mill in Hertford, NC. Caught just before it would have gone into the furnace, it was identified, removed, and taken into safe custody by the North Carolina radiation protection authorities. Where did it come from? A bankrupt chemical company in the Baltimore area whose equipment was sold for scrap. But when the records were traced it was found that the company had bought not one, but four, such sources. Fortunately, two more were traced and recovered, but one of those ``gauge sources'' still is missing.

   If the source found at Nucor had gone into the molten steel, the clean-up would have cost the company millions of dollars. If it had gotten into the

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   Far more intense radioactive sources turn up in strange places from time to time.

   In 1987, two junk collectors in Brazil broke open an abandoned gamma ray cancer treatment machine containing 1,400 curies of Cesium-137. Inside they found about 2/3 of an ounce of softly glowing powder. Several people were delighted at the idea of glowing in the dark and they rubbed the powder on their bodies. They contaminated not only themselves, but their homes and families. The toll: 5 people dead, 21 requiring intensive care, 49 requiring some hospitalization, 249 contaminated, and 111,800 people tested in improvised medical facilities at a local soccer stadium.

   And that was an accident. A deliberate attack using the same 20 grams of material could have had far greater consequences, as our witnesses told the Committee.

   ``Dirty bombs'' do not even need to explode. Murders have been committed by the simple act of inserting a small radioactive source in the victim's desk chair and simply waiting until radiation sickness and death followed. If a terrorist is willing to die, he could merely fling finely powdered material from the window of a tall building and allow the wind to spread his poison.

   Finally, I worry that other terrorist groups, not just Al Qaeda, could make a radiological dispersion device. Radioactive material is out there for the taking, especially in the former Soviet Union.

   In January of this year, three hunters gathering firewood in a forest in the former Soviet republic of Georgia found two abandoned cans of strontium-90, each containing 40,000 curies of material. Because the heat from these sources melted the snow for yards around, the hunters were delighted to find free warmth for their tent. They picked up and carried off the sources in their backpacks. All three woodsmen were critically injured, but since they did not break open the two cans, environmental contamination was limited.

   A team from the government of Georgia, assisted by the International Atomic Energy Agency, recovered the sources, but several more are apparently missing and unaccounted for. The nuclear industry of the former Soviet Union made hundreds of similar devices.

   In fact, 40,000 curies of strontium-90 represents a small source by Soviet standards. A string of 131 arctic sites in Russia is powered by radioisotope thermal generators--portable power plants that draw energy from the heat liberated by the decay of radioactive nuclei. Each site uses a 300,000-curie source. That raises the maximum damage that a terrorist dirty bomb could do by a factor of ten beyond anything the Committee heard at our March hearing.

   There once were 136 sites in this chain, but the Norwegian government replaced five with solar-powered installations. The remaining 131 should be replaced as soon as possible so as to remove a potential source of truly destructive dirty bombs.

   We must, and we can, raise significant and sensible barriers to protect against terrorists who would use the power of the atom to do us harm. To that end, Senators Lugar, Domenici, Clinton, Gregg and Schumer join me today in introducing the ``Nuclear and Radiological Terrorism Threat Reduction Act of 2002.''

   The bill's principal cosponsors, Senators Lugar and Domenici, have been among the Senate's long-time leaders in the causes of non-proliferation, threat reduction and counter-terrorism, and I welcome their support. Senator Gregg's position on the Appropriations Committee has sensitized him to the need to protect our embassies. And both of the Senators from New York, Mr. Schumer and Mrs. Clinton, attended the Foreign Relations Committee's classified session where we learned some of the specifics regarding the threat of nuclear and radiological terrorism.

   Our bill takes the initiative in several significant areas:

   One, it creates a new program to establish a network of five regional shelters around the globe to provide secure, temporary storage of unwanted, unused, obsolete and orphaned radioactive sources. The bill authorizes $5 million to get started in Fiscal Year 2003, and up to $20 million a year for construction and operation of the facilities in the future. We envision accomplishing our goals through bilateral negotiations with the host nations or, when advantageous to the United States, through special contributions to the International Atomic Energy Agency, the IAEA. Regional storage facilities can remove some of the most dangerous material from circulation.

   Two, to round up the sources to be stored in the regional facilities, we propose an accelerated program--in cooperation with the IAEA--to discover, inventory, and recover unwanted radioactive material from around the world. This would be similar to the Department of Energy's Off-site Source Recovery Program, but aimed at material outside our borders. This bill will make a modest start by authorizing $5 million a year in special voluntary contributions to the IAEA.

   Three, recognizing the threat posed by the very intense radioactive sources packaged by the former Soviet Union to provide electric power to very remote locations, such as lighthouses, weather stations, communications nets, and other measuring equipment, the bill authorizes funding to replace that equipment with non-nuclear technologies. We believe that $10 million a year over the next three years should not merely make a dent in this problem; it should largely solve it.

   Four, other bills this year have provided funding to train American first responders to handle a radiological emergency. The bill we introduce today authorizes $5 million a year for the next three years to train responders abroad. This is a matter of self-protection for the United States: we have diplomatic missions at risk around the world, and we will be funding the construction and operation of temporary storage sites for radioactive material. Should accidents or incidents occur, we would like to be able to rely upon competent responses by our host countries.

   Five, this bill requires the Secretary of State to conduct a global assessment of the radiological threat to U.S. missions overseas and to provide the results to the appropriate committees of the Congress in an unclassified form, but with a classified annex giving details if he deems necessary. We hope the Secretary will take into account the locations of the interim storage facilities and also the results of this threat assessment in choosing where first to provide the overseas first responder training authorized by this bill.

   Six, the Customs Service is charged with preventing illicit shipments of radioactive material and fissile material from reaching our shores. Inspection of today's large cargo containers for fissile material, in particular, is a technologically challenging task, one performed most safely and easily before the containers are loaded aboard ship. Customs has agreements to permit U.S. inspectors to do their jobs in ports of embarkation. In order to assist the Service, the Nuclear and Radiological Threat Prevention Act establishes a special representative with the rank of ambassador within the State Department for negotiation of international agreements that ensure inspection of cargoes of nuclear material at ports of embarkation. This special representative will work in close cooperation with the Customs Service to make certain that the agreements meet the Service's needs.

   Seven, we could diminish the threat of Dirty bombs by reducing use of radioactive material where other technologies could be substituted. This bill mandates a study by the National Academy of Sciences to tell us how and where safe sources of radiation can replace dangerous ones. Some substitutions are well known: for many applications, X-ray machines powered by the electric grid are almost as convenient as the gamma ray ``cameras'' that use intense iridium-178 sources. Powered radiation sources can replace radioactive sources in some oil well logging work. Linear accelerators are replacing radioactive cobalt and cesium in cancer therapy. All of the substitute sources have one thing in common: a switch. When that switch is turned ``off,'' the radiation source is safe. There may be many more applications

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   Fissile material is the indispensable element of a true nuclear weapon. At our March 6, 2002, hearing experts from the Department of Energy weapons laboratories told the Committee that terrorists in possession of highly enriched uranium or plutonium could assemble a crude ``improvised nuclear device'' with a yield large enough to smash Washington from the White House to the Capitol. Such an improvised nuclear device would not require a Manhattan Project. In a study done in the 1970s, the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment wrote that a group of two or three technically competent individuals in possession of enriched uranium or weapons-grade plutonium could probably build a one-kiloton device in a few months.

   For that reason, one provision of this bill deals specifically with developing the tools to guard against illicit traffic in highly enriched uranium and plutonium.

   Last summer, a meeting in Washington to discuss ``nuclear science and Homeland Security'' was sponsored by the Department of Energy, the National Science Foundation, NSF, and other Federal science funding agencies. It brought together some of the best scientists in our universities and colleges, all of whom were willing to put aside their normal research to help strengthen our security at home. But few of those scientists can use the research money they already have for this work. Research support given for one purpose usually may not be channeled into other uses.

   Therefore, this bill establishes a small program within the NSF to support researchers at colleges and universities who will work on the detection of fissile materials--the hardest and most critical task or on real-time identification of radioisotopes and decontamination of buildings after a dirty bomb goes off.

   The Department of Energy has a special role to play in this program: we expect that Department and its national laboratories to work in cooperation with NSF to transition laboratory apparatus into field-ready operational hardware. This bill authorizes $10 million a year for research funded by the NSF and an additional $5 million a year for the Department of Energy to accomplish the transition.

   The threat of radiological terrorism, and even of true nuclear terror attacks, is real. We know that most radiological attacks will kill few Americans, but there is little doubt they will lead to economic crimes of the greatest consequence. The radioactive source that killed only a few people in Brazil cost hundreds of millions of dollars to clean up. And nobody tried to cause that destruction.

   We must do something to head off the nuclear and radiological terrorist threat where it will most likely first appear: in foreign countries.

   The ``Nuclear and Radiological Terrorism Threat Reduction Act'' gives us a good start at doing just that.

   I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the RECORD.

   There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

   S. 3121

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

   SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Nuclear and Radiological Terrorism Threat Reduction Act of 2002''.

   SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:

    (1) It is feasible for terrorists to obtain and to disseminate radioactive material using a radiological dispersion device (RDD), or by emplacing discrete radioactive sources in major public places.

    (2) It is not difficult for terrorists to improvise a nuclear explosive device of significant yield once they have acquired the fissile material, highly enriched uranium, or plutonium, to fuel the weapon.

    (3) An attack by terrorists using a radiological dispersion device, lumped radioactive sources, an improvised nuclear device (IND), or a stolen nuclear weapon is a plausible event.

    (4) Such an attack could cause catastrophic economic and social damage and could kill large numbers of Americans.

    (5) The first line of defense against both nuclear and radiological terrorism is preventing the acquisition of radioactive sources, special nuclear material, or nuclear weapons by terrorists.

   SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.

    In this Act:

    (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.--The term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives.

    (2) BYPRODUCT MATERIAL.--The term ``byproduct material'' has the same meaning given the term in section 11 e. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2014(e)).

    (3) IAEA.--The term ``IAEA'' means the International Atomic Energy Agency.

    (4) INDEPENDENT STATES OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION.--The term ``independent states of the former Soviet Union'' has the meaning given the term in section 3 of the FREEDOM Support Act (22 U.S.C. 5801).

    (5) NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICE.--The term ``nuclear explosive device'' means any device, whether assembled or disassembled, that is designed to produce an instantaneous release of an amount of nuclear energy from special nuclear material that is greater than the amount of energy that would be released from the detonation of one pound of trinitrotoluene (TNT).

    (6) RADIOLOGICAL DISPERSION DEVICE.--The term ``radiological dispersion device'' is any device meant to spread or disperse radioactive material by the use of explosives or otherwise.

    (7) RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL.--The term ``radioactive material'' means--

    (A) source material and special nuclear material, but does not include natural or depleted uranium;

    (B) nuclear by-product material;

    (C) material made radioactive by bombardment in an accelerator; and

    (D) all refined isotopes of radium.

    (8) RADIOACTIVE SOURCE.--The term ``radioactive source'' means radioactive material that is permanently sealed in a capsule or closely bonded and includes any radioactive material released if the source is leaking or stolen, but does not include any material within the nuclear fuel cycle of a research or power reactor.

    (9) RADIOISOTOPE THERMAL GENERATOR.--The term ``radioisotope thermal generator'' or ``RTG'' means an electrical generator which derives its power from the heat produced by the decay of a radioactive source by the emission of alpha, beta, or gamma radiation. The term does not include nuclear reactors deriving their energy from the fission or fusion of atomic nuclei.

    (10) SECRETARY.--The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary of State.

    (11) SOURCE MATERIAL.--The term ``source material'' has the meaning given that term in section 11 z. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2014(z)).

    (12) SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL.--The term ``special nuclear material'' has the meaning given that term in section 11 aa. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2014(aa)).

   SEC. 4. INTERNATIONAL REPOSITORIES.

    (a) AUTHORITY.--The Secretary, acting through the United States Permanent Representative to the IAEA, is authorized to propose that the IAEA conclude agreements with up to five countries under which each country would provide temporary secure storage for orphaned, unused, surplus, or other radioactive sources other than special nuclear material, nuclear fuel, or spent nuclear fuel.

    (b) VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS AUTHORIZED.--

    (1) IN GENERAL.--The Secretary is authorized to make a voluntary contribution to the IAEA to fund the United States share of the program authorized by subsection (a) if the IAEA agrees to protect sources under the standards of the United States or IAEA code of conduct, whichever is stricter.

    (2) FISCAL YEAR 2003.--The United States share of the costs of the program described in subsection (a) is authorized to be 100 percent for fiscal year 2003.

    (c) TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE.--The Secretary is authorized to provide the IAEA, through contracts with the Department of Energy or the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, with technical assistance to carry out the program described in subsection (a).

    (d) NONAPPLICABILITY OF NEPA.--The National Environmental Policy Act shall not apply to any activity conducted under this section.

    (e) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.--

    (1) IN GENERAL.--There are authorized to be appropriated for the Department of State $5,000,000 for fiscal year 2003 and $20,000,000 for each fiscal year thereafter to carry out this section.

    (2) AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS.--Amounts appropriated pursuant to paragraph (1) are authorized to remain available until expended.

   SEC. 5. RADIOACTIVE SOURCE DISCOVERY, INVENTORY, AND RECOVERY.

    (a) AUTHORITY.--The Secretary is authorized to make United States voluntary contributions to the IAEA to support a program to promote radioactive source discovery, inventory, and recovery.

    (b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.--

    (1) IN GENERAL.--There is authorized to be appropriated to the Department of State $5,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2003 through 2012 to carry out subsection (a).

    (2) AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS.--Amounts appropriated pursuant to paragraph (1) are authorized to remain available until expended.

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   SEC. 6. RADIOISOTOPE THERMAL GENERATOR-POWERED FACILITIES IN THE INDEPENDENT STATES OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION.

    (a) RTG POWER UNITS.--The Secretary is authorized to assist the Government of the Russian Federation to substitute solar (or other non-nuclear) power sources to replace RTG power units operated by the Russian Federation and other independent states of the former Soviet Union in applications such as lighthouses in the Arctic, remote weather stations, unattended sensors, and for providing electricity in remote locations. Any replacement shall, to the maximum extent practicable, be based upon tested technologies that have operated for at least one full year in the environment where the replacement will be used.

    (b) ALLOCATION OF FUNDS.--Of the funds made available to carry out this section, the Secretary may use not more than 20 percent of the funds in any fiscal year to replace dangerous RTG facilities that are similar to those described in subsection (a) in countries other than the independent states of the former Soviet Union.

    (c) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.--

    (1) IN GENERAL.--There is authorized to be appropriated to the Department of State $10,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2003, 2004, and 2005 to carry out this section.

    (2) AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS.--Amounts appropriated pursuant to paragraph (1) are authorized to remain available until expended.

   SEC. 7. FOREIGN FIRST RESPONDERS.

    (a) IN GENERAL.--The Secretary is authorized to conclude an agreement with a foreign country, or, acting through the United States Permanent Representative to the IAEA, to propose that the IAEA conclude an agreement with that country, under which that country will carry out a program to train first responders to--

    (1) detect, identify, and characterize radioactive material;

    (2) understand the hazards posed by radioactive contamination;

    (3) understand the risks encountered at various dose rates;

    (4) enter contaminated areas safely and speedily; and

    (5) evacuate persons within a contaminated area.

    (b) UNITED STATES PARTICIPATION.--The Department of State is hereby designated as the lead Federal entity for cooperation with the IAEA in implementing subsection (a) within the United States. In carrying out activities under this subsection the Secretary of State shall take into account the findings of the threat assessment report required by section 8 and the location of the interim storage facilities under section 4.

    (c) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.--

    (1) IN GENERAL.--There are authorized to be appropriated to the Department of State $2,000,000 for fiscal year 2003, $5,000,000 for fiscal year 2004, and $5,000,000 for fiscal year 2005 to carry out this section.

    (2) AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS.--Amounts appropriated pursuant to paragraph (1) are authorized to remain available until expended.

   SEC. 8. THREAT ASSESSMENT REPORT.

    (a) IN GENERAL.--Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees--

    (1) detailing the preparations made at United States diplomatic missions abroad to detect and mitigate a radiological attack on United States missions and other United States facilities under the control of the Secretary; and

    (2) setting forth a rank-ordered list of the Secretary's priorities for improving radiological security and consequence management at United States missions, including a rank-ordered list of the missions where such improvement is most important.

    (b) BUDGET REQUEST.--The report shall also include a proposed budget for the improvements described in subsection (a)(2).

    (c) FORM OF SUBMISSION.--The report shall be unclassified with a classified annex if necessary.

   SEC. 9. SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR INSPECTIONS OF NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL MATERIALS.

    Section 1 of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2651a) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

    ``(h) SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR INSPECTIONS OF NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL MATERIALS.--

    ``(1) ESTABLISHMENT OF POSITION.--There shall be within the Bureau of the Department of State primarily responsible for nonproliferation matters a Special Representative for Inspections of Nuclear and Radiological Materials (in this subsection referred to as the `Special Representative'), who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The Special Representative shall have the rank and status of ambassador.

    ``(2) RESPONSIBILITIES.--The Special Representative shall have the primary responsibility within the Department of State for assisting the Secretary of State in negotiating international agreements that ensure inspection of cargoes of nuclear and radiological materials destined for the United States at ports of embarkation, and such other agreements as may control radioactive materials.

    ``(3) COOPERATION WITH UNITED STATES CUSTOMS SERVICE.--In carrying out the negotiations described in paragraph (2), the Special Representative shall cooperate with, and accept the assistance and participation of, appropriate officials of the United States Customs Service.''.

   SEC. 10. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT GRANTS.

    (a) IN GENERAL.--Subject to the availability of appropriations, there is established a program under which the Director of the National Science Foundation shall award grants for university-based research into the detection of fissile materials, identification of radioactive isotopes in real time, the protection of sites from attack by radiological dispersion device, mitigation of consequences of such an attack, and attribution of materials used in attacks by radiological dispersion device or by improvised nuclear devices. Such grants shall be available only to investigators at baccalaureate and doctoral degree granting academic institutions. In carrying out the program, the Director of the National Science Foundation shall consult about this program with the Secretary of Energy in order to minimize duplication and increase synergies. The consultation shall also include consideration of the use of the Department of Energy to develop promising basic ideas into field-ready hardware. The Secretary of Energy shall work with the national laboratories and industry to develop field-ready prototype detectors.

    (b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.--

    (1) IN GENERAL.--There is authorized to be appropriated to the National Science Foundation $10,000,000, and to the Department of Energy $5,000,000, to carry out this section in fiscal years 2003 through 2008.

    (2) AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS.--Amounts appropriated pursuant to paragraph (1) are authorized to remain available until expended.

   SEC. 11. STUDY AND REPORTS BY THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES.

    (a) STUDY.--Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary, in consultation with the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, acting through a contract with the National Academy of Sciences, shall conduct a study of the use of radioactive sources in industry and of potential substitutes for those sources.

    (b) REPORTS.--Not later than six months after entry into the contract referred to in subsection (a), the National Academy of Sciences shall submit an initial report to the Secretary and the appropriate congressional committees and, not later than three months after submission of the initial report, shall submit to the Secretary and those committees a final report.

   Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I'm pleased to join Senator Biden and Senator Lugar in sponsoring the Nuclear and Radiological Terrorism Threat Reduction Act of 2002.

   Only a few months ago, I introduced the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 2002 with these same Senators and many others as co-sponsors. It's being called the Domenici-Biden-Lugar bill. I am pleased to learn that most provisions of that Act are being incorporated in the Conference on the Armed Services bill.

   The current bill and the Domenici-Biden-Lugar bill are highly complementary. The first bill focused entirely on the contributions that the Department of Energy should be authorized to make to minimize risks of nuclear and radiological risks to our citizens. The current bill focuses on the contributions that the Department of State should make in that same arena. And in both cases, there is careful recognition of the importance of a tight partnership between those two Departments in accomplishing this vital mission.

   I'm particularly pleased with this bill's focus on assisting in the creation of a number of international repositories that can be used to store radioactive sources safely, while ensuring that they don't become ``orphaned'' sources that might fuel a terrorist's dirty bomb. Other provisions to assist the IAEA in promoting source inventory and recovery are also critical.

   One important application of this new bill must be to help the Russian Federation address the large number of Radio-isotope Thermal Generators that rely on large quantities of radioactive material to power many remote installations, especially lighthouses. These large radioactive sources, in isolated locations, are very vulnerable to compromise. With this bill, we can assist other nations, like Norway, in shifting the power for these lighthouses away from radioactive materials to other means of power.

   Another important aspect of the bill involves the authorization for the State Department to help other nations in developing their own First Responder program for response to dirty bomb or nuclear threats. In this country, we now have a First Responder program that grows stronger each year, thanks to the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici bill that created the effort. Now we need to share the lessons we have been learning with others.

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   This new bill is another important contribution to our nation's efforts to ensure that terrorists will never threaten the United States or other nations with radiological or nuclear weapons.

   By Mr. BROWNBACK (for himself and Mr. HELMS):

   S. 3122. A bill to allow North Korean's to apply for refugee status or asylum; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

   Mr. BROWNBACK. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce legislation that will clarify the status of North Korean refugees.

   As a Nation, the United States is the world's leader in the protection of refugees. The world takes its lead from the United States when reacting to asylum-seekers, and the example we set have far-reaching implications for those who flee persecution. For this reason, we have stood firm against excuses for the denial of basic human rights and life's basic liberties.

   The tenuous status of North Korean refugees in China is well documented. As we all know from news reports, including several news programs, that few North Koreans are able to seek asylum and refuge, be it in China or elsewhere. The few that do, however, are functionally barred from seeking asylum in the United States or being admitted to the United States as refugees. As I understand it, the State Department has expressed concerns that the legal hurdle to admitting North Koreans refugees is the fact that South Korea automatically conveys its citizenship to any escapee from North Korea who makes it to South Korea. In short, the State Department claims it cannot, as a matter of law, consider any North Korean to be a refugee.

   I am not persuaded that this is the case, but even if we assume that to be true, we must stand firm for the proposition that the moral obligation that we have for refugees everywhere seeking basic human liberties should not be laid aside because of that legal technicality and it should not preclude the United State from providing refugee protections to North Korean refugees.

   The bill I am introducing today clarifies and fixes that technicality. It says quite simply that, for asylum and refugee purposes, a North Korean is a North Korean. This bill in no way detracts from the generosity of the South Korean government or the South Korean people. It does not encourage refugees to choose the United States over South Korea as a safe haven. Far from it, since those refugees who are able to reach South Korea will go there and will be afforded the rights that refugees escaping from persecution rightfully deserve whether under various international conventions or the South Korean Constitution. Instead, this bill recognizes the physical obstacles facing North Korean refugees and removes the technicality that compromises our ability to help them.

   The bill I am introducing today has the support of the Lawyers Committee on Human Rights, Amnesty International, the International Rescue Committee, the U.S. Committee on Refugees, Immigration and Refugee Services of America, among others.

2A) Department of Defense Authorizations
Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I am pleased to be here with my distinguished colleague from Hawaii to offer this bill. It is the largest Defense bill in history. It is a bill that merits the support of every Member of the Senate.

   I do congratulate Senator Inouye for his leadership and for his hard work and cooperation with the Members of the House, whom he has named, with whom we have worked on this bill.

   We have had different views on this bill, but we have proceeded without rancor and I think worked out a compromise that is satisfactory to the administration, particularly the Department of Defense and the President. I believe it is a balanced and fair bill.

   There were nearly $18 billion in differences between the House and Senate bills. All of these have been reconciled within the limits of discretion and with good will. I think these compromises should receive overwhelming support from the Department because they actually make the bill much more functional, more workable. It is the kind of bill that we should have in the times we are in now, where we are close to a very difficult problem as far as Iraq is concerned.

   This bill fully funds all military requirements for the armed services. It contains a 4.1-percent pay increase and lifetime health care benefits for the military retirees.

   It further reduces the out-of-pocket costs for some of the military families who do not have the benefit of on-base housing.

   We really have tried to strike a balance between near-term readiness and the investments we must make for the future, as far as our defense establishment is concerned.

   This bill mandates full funding for six Stryker brigades to transform our ground combat forces and adds funds for future combat systems.

   For the Navy, funding the CVN-X and the DD-X and the littoral combat ship and the Virginia class submarine,

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   One of the difficult dreams I have is a flight of our fighters coming back to meet a tanker and finding it is not there. We have to work on this and work very hard to make sure we have the tanker capacity because our air power depends entirely upon our tanker capability. These commitments will deliver the capabilities we must have for the fiscal years ahead of us.

   These systems not only contribute to the war against terrorism today, but they will fund replacement of equipment rapidly deteriorating. They must be functional for us in combat in the global war on terrorism. It is consistent with the President's budget request. This bill in particular funds a missile defense system at the President's request.

   I hope all Members will realize, ranging from ground- and sea-based missiles to airborne lasers, we are going to have layers of defense that will protect our troops abroad and at sea, and our people here at home. That missile defense system must go forward.

   Again, I commend my good friend, the chairman of the committee. It is a pleasure to work with him and the chairman of our full committee, Senator Byrd, in their efforts to move this bill forward. We have urged that the Defense bill be first, and the Defense bill is first. It indicates the priority that the whole national Federal Government places upon defense. I believe this conference report, as I said, merits the support of every Senator.

   I also send my personal appreciation to the chairman of the House subcommittee, Congressman JERRY LEWIS, and the ranking member of the House subcommittee, Congressman JACK MURTHA. They have been very gracious people to work with under difficult circumstances.

   I also ask that the Senate commend the staffs of both the majority and minority in the Senate and the majority and the minority in the House. These people have worked behind the scenes, around the clock, sometimes through weekends, to eliminate the difficult problems that have come up in this bill. As I said, $18 billion of difference and there is not an argument between us in terms of this bill. But led by Charlie Houy here on the majority side and Steve Cortese, who is by my side now, our staffs have worked, I think, just without any rancor at all.

   I do want to say at last, though, Kevin Roper and Greg Dahlberg, as Senator Inouye mentioned, made a tremendous contribution to this work in the House.

   I urge approval of this conference report.

3A) Department of Veterans Affairs Emergency Preparedness Act of 2002
;SA 4883. Mr. DASCHLE (for Mr. ROCKEFELLER) proposed an amendment to the bill H.R. 3253, to amend title 38, United States Code, to provide for the establishment within the Department of Veterans Affairs of improved emergency medical preparedness, research, and education programs to combat terrorism, and for other purposes; as follows:

    Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following:

   SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Department of Veterans Affairs Emergency Preparedness Act of 2002''.

   SEC. 2. ESTABLISHMENT OF MEDICAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS CENTERS AT DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS MEDICAL CENTERS.

    (a) IN GENERAL.--(1) Subchapter II of chapter 73 of title 38, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new section:``§7325. Medical emergency preparedness centers

    ``(a) ESTABLISHMENT OF CENTERS.--(1) The Secretary shall establish four medical emergency preparedness centers in accordance with this section. Each such center shall be established at a Department medical center and shall be staffed by Department employees.

    ``(2) The Under Secretary for Health shall be responsible for supervising the operation of the centers established under this section. The Under Secretary shall provide for ongoing evaluation of the centers and their compliance with the requirements of this section.

    ``(3) The Under Secretary shall carry out the Under Secretary's functions under paragraph (2) in consultation with the Assistant Secretary of Veterans Affairs with responsibility for operations, preparedness, security, and law enforcement functions.

    ``(b) MISSION.--The mission of the centers shall be as follows:

    ``(1) To carry out research on, and to develop methods of detection, diagnosis, prevention, and treatment of injuries, diseases, and illnesses arising from the use of chemical, biological, radiological, incendiary or other explosive weapons or devices posing threats to the public health and safety.

    ``(2) To provide education, training, and advice to health care professionals, including health care professionals outside the Veterans Health Administration, through the National Disaster Medical System established pursuant to section 2811(b) of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 300hh-11(b)) or through interagency agreements entered into by the Secretary for that purpose.

    ``(3) In the event of a disaster or emergency referred to in section 1785(b) of this title, to provide such laboratory, epidemiological, medical, or other assistance as the Secretary considers appropriate to Federal, State, and local health care agencies and personnel involved in or responding to the disaster or emergency.

    ``(c) SELECTION OF CENTERS.--(1) The Secretary shall select the sites for the centers on the basis of a competitive selection process. The Secretary may not designate a site as a location for a center under this section unless the Secretary makes a finding under paragraph (2) with respect to the proposal for the designation of such site. To the maximum extent practicable, the Secretary shall ensure the geographic dispersal of the sites throughout the United States. Any such center may be a consortium of efforts of more than one medical center.

    ``(2) A finding by the Secretary referred to in paragraph (1) with respect to a proposal for designation of a site as a location of a center under this section is a finding by the Secretary, upon the recommendations of the Under Secretary for Health and the Assistant Secretary with responsibility for operations, preparedness, security, and law enforcement functions, that the facility or facilities submitting the proposal have developed (or may reasonably be anticipated to develop) each of the following:

    ``(A) An arrangement with a qualifying medical school and a qualifying school of public health (or a consortium of such schools) under which physicians and other persons in the health field receive education and training through the participating Department medical facilities so as to provide those persons with training in the detection, diagnosis, prevention, and treatment of injuries, diseases, and illnesses induced by exposures to chemical and biological substances, radiation, and incendiary or other explosive weapons or devices.

    ``(B) An arrangement with a graduate school specializing in epidemiology under which students receive education and training in epidemiology through the participating Department facilities so as to provide such students with training in the epidemiology of contagious and infectious diseases and chemical and radiation poisoning in an exposed population.

    ``(C) An arrangement under which nursing, social work, counseling, or allied health personnel and students receive training and education in recognizing and caring for conditions associated with exposures to toxins through the participating Department facilities.

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    ``(D) The ability to attract scientists who have made significant contributions to the development of innovative approaches to the detection, diagnosis, prevention, or treatment of injuries, diseases, and illnesses arising from the use of chemical, biological, radiological, incendiary or other explosive weapons or devices posing threats to the public health and safety.

    ``(3) For purposes of paragraph (2)(A)--

    ``(A) a qualifying medical school is an accredited medical school that provides education and training in toxicology and environmental health hazards and with which one or more of the participating Department medical centers is affiliated; and

    ``(B) a qualifying school of public health is an accredited school of public health that provides education and training in toxicology and environmental health hazards and with which one or more of the participating Department medical centers is affiliated.

    ``(d) RESEARCH ACTIVITIES.--Each center shall conduct research on improved medical preparedness to protect the Nation from threats in the area of that center's expertise. Each center may seek research funds from public and private sources for such purpose.

    ``(e) DISSEMINATION OF RESEARCH PRODUCTS.--(1) The Under Secretary for Health and the Assistant Secretary with responsibility for operations, preparedness, security, and law enforcement functions shall ensure that information produced by the research, education and training, and clinical activities of centers established under this section is made available, as appropriate, to health-care providers in the United States. Dissemination of such information shall be made through publications, through programs of continuing medical and related education provided through regional medical education centers under subchapter VI of chapter 74 of this title, and through other means. Such programs of continuing medical education shall receive priority in the award of funding.

    ``(2) The Secretary shall ensure that the work of the centers is conducted in close coordination with other Federal departments and agencies and that research products or other information of the centers shall be coordinated and shared with other Federal departments and agencies.

    ``(f) COORDINATION OF ACTIVITIES.--The Secretary shall take appropriate actions to ensure that the work of each center is carried out--

    ``(1) in close coordination with the Department of Defense, the Department of Health and Human Services, and other departments, agencies, and elements of the Government charged with coordination of plans for United States homeland security; and

    ``(2) after taking into consideration applicable recommendations of the working group on the prevention, preparedness, and response to bioterrorism and other public health emergencies established under section 319F(a) of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 247d-6(a)) or any other joint interagency advisory group or committee designated by the President or the President's designee to coordinate Federal research on weapons of mass destruction.

    ``(g) ASSISTANCE TO OTHER AGENCIES.--The Secretary may provide assistance requested by appropriate Federal, State, and local civil and criminal authorities in investigations, inquiries, and data analyses as necessary to protect the public safety and prevent or obviate biological, chemical, or radiological threats.

    ``(h) DETAIL OF EMPLOYEES FROM OTHER AGENCIES.--Upon approval by the Secretary, the Director of a center may request the temporary assignment or detail to the center, on a nonreimbursable basis, of employees from other departments and agencies of the United States who have expertise that would further the mission of the center. Any such employee may be so assigned or detailed on a nonreimbursable basis pursuant to such a request.

    ``(i) FUNDING.--(1) Amounts appropriated for the activities of the centers under this section shall be appropriated separately from amounts appropriated for the Department for medical care.

    ``(2) In addition to funds appropriated for a fiscal year specifically for the activities of the centers pursuant to paragraph (1), the Under Secretary for Health shall allocate to such centers from other funds appropriated for that fiscal year generally for the Department medical care account and the Department medical and prosthetics research account such amounts as the Under Secretary determines appropriate to carry out the purposes of this section. Any determination by the Under Secretary under the preceding sentence shall be made in consultation with the Assistant Secretary with responsibility for operations, preparedness, security, and law enforcement functions.

    ``(3) There are authorized to be appropriated for the centers under this section $20,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2003 through 2007.''.

    (2) The table of sections at the beginning of such chapter is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 7324 the following new item:

   ``7325. Medical emergency preparedness centers.''.

    (b) PEER REVIEW FOR DESIGNATION OF CENTERS.--(1) In order to assist the Secretary of Veterans Affairs and the Under Secretary of Veterans Affairs for Health in selecting sites for centers under section 7325 of title 38, United States Code, as added by subsection (a), the Under Secretary shall establish a peer review panel to assess the scientific and clinical merit of proposals that are submitted to the Secretary for the designation of such centers. The peer review panel shall be established in consultation with the Assistant Secretary of Veterans Affairs with responsibility for operations, preparedness, security, and law enforcement functions.

    (2) The peer review panel shall include experts in the fields of toxicological research, infectious diseases, radiology, clinical care of patients exposed to such hazards, and other persons as determined appropriate by the Secretary. Members of the panel shall serve as consultants to the Department of Veterans Affairs.

    (3) The panel shall review each proposal submitted to the panel by the officials referred to in paragraph (1) and shall submit to the Under Secretary for Health its views on the relative scientific and clinical merit of each such proposal. The panel shall specifically determine with respect to each such proposal whether that proposal is among those proposals which have met the highest competitive standards of scientific and clinical merit.

    (4) The panel shall not be subject to the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.).

   SEC. 3. EDUCATION AND TRAINING PROGRAMS ON MEDICAL RESPONSES TO CONSEQUENCES OF TERRORIST ACTIVITIES.

    (a) IN GENERAL.--(1) Subchapter II of chapter 73 of title 38, United States Code, is amended by adding after section 7325, as added by section 2(a)(1), the following new section:``§7326. Education and training programs on medical response to consequences of terrorist activities

    ``(a) EDUCATION PROGRAM.--The Secretary shall carry out a program to develop and disseminate a series of model education and training programs on the medical responses to the consequences of terrorist activities.

    ``(b) IMPLEMENTING OFFICIAL.--The program shall be carried out through the Under Secretary for Health, in consultation with the Assistant Secretary of Veterans Affairs with responsibility for operations, preparedness, security, and law enforcement functions.

    ``(c) CONTENT OF PROGRAMS.--The education and training programs developed under the program shall be modelled after programs established at the F. Edward Hebért School of Medicine of the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences and shall include, at a minimum, training for health care professionals in the following:

    ``(1) Recognition of chemical, biological, radiological, incendiary, or other explosive agents, weapons, or devices that may be used in terrorist activities.

    ``(2) Identification of the potential symptoms of exposure to those agents.

    ``(3) Understanding of the potential long-term health consequences, including psychological effects, resulting from exposure to those agents, weapons, or devices.

    ``(4) Emergency treatment for exposure to those agents, weapons, or devices.

    ``(5) An appropriate course of followup treatment, supportive care, and referral.

    ``(6) Actions that can be taken while providing care for exposure to those agents, weapons, or devices to protect against contamination, injury, or other hazards from such exposure.

    ``(7) Information on how to seek consultative support and to report suspected or actual use of those agents.

    ``(d) POTENTIAL TRAINEES.--In designing the education and training programs under this section, the Secretary shall ensure that different programs are designed for health-care professionals in Department medical centers. The programs shall be designed to be disseminated to health professions students, graduate health and medical education trainees, and health practitioners in a variety of fields.

    ``(e) CONSULTATION.--In establishing education and training programs under this section, the Secretary shall consult with appropriate representatives of accrediting, certifying, and coordinating organizations in the field of health professions education.''.

    (2) The table of sections at the beginning of such chapter is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 7325, as added by section 2(a)(2), the following new item:

   ``7326. Education and training programs on medical response to consequences of terrorist activities.''.

    (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.--The Secretary of Veterans Affairs shall implement section 7326 of title 38, United States Code, as added by subsection (a), not later than the end of the 90-day period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act.

   SEC. 4. AUTHORITY TO FURNISH HEALTH CARE DURING MAJOR DISASTERS AND MEDICAL EMERGENCIES.

    (a) IN GENERAL.--(1) Subchapter VIII of chapter 17 of title 38, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new section:``§1785. Care and services during certain disasters and emergencies

    ``(a) AUTHORITY TO PROVIDE HOSPITAL CARE AND MEDICAL SERVICES.--During and immediately following a disaster or emergency referred to in subsection (b), the Secretary may furnish hospital care and medical services to individuals responding to, involved in, or otherwise affected by that disaster or emergency.

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    ``(b) COVERED DISASTERS AND EMERGENCIES.--A disaster or emergency referred to in this subsection is any disaster or emergency as follows:

    ``(1) A major disaster or emergency declared by the President under the Robert B. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5121 et seq.).

    ``(2) A disaster or emergency in which the National Disaster Medical System established pursuant to section 2811(b) of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 300hh-11(b)) is activated by the Secretary of Health and Human Services under paragraph (3)(A) of that section or as otherwise authorized by law.

    ``(c) APPLICABILITY TO ELIGIBLE INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE VETERANS.--The Secretary may furnish care and services under this section to an individual described in subsection (a) who is a veteran without regard to whether that individual is enrolled in the system of patient enrollment under section 1705 of this title.

    ``(d) REIMBURSEMENT FROM OTHER FEDERAL DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES.--(1) The cost of any care or services furnished under this section to an officer or employee of a department or agency of the United States other than the Department or to a member of the Armed Forces shall be reimbursed at such rates as may be agreed upon by the Secretary and the head of such department or agency or the Secretary concerned, in the case of a member of the Armed Forces, based on the cost of the care or service furnished.

    ``(2) Amounts received by the Department under this subsection shall be credited to the Medical Care Collections Fund under section 1729A of this title.

    ``(e) REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.--Within 60 days of the commencement of a disaster or emergency referred to in subsection (b) in which the Secretary furnishes care and services under this section (or as soon thereafter as is practicable), the Secretary shall submit to the Committees on Veterans' Affairs of the Senate and the House of Representatives a report on the Secretary's allocation of facilities and personnel in order to furnish such care and services.

    ``(f) REGULATIONS.--The Secretary shall prescribe regulations governing the exercise of the authority of the Secretary under this section.''.

    (2) The table of sections at the beginning of that chapter is amended by adding at the end the following new item:

   ``1785. Care and services during certain disasters and emergencies.''.

    (b) MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES ON ACTIVE DUTY.--Section 8111A(a) of such title is amended--

    (1) by redesignating paragraph (2) as paragraph (4);

    (2) by designating the second sentence of paragraph (1) as paragraph (3); and

    (3) by inserting between paragraph (1) and paragraph (3), as designated by paragraph (2) of this subsection, the following new paragraph:

    ``(2)(A) During and immediately following a disaster or emergency referred to in subparagraph (B), the Secretary may furnish hospital care and medical services to members of the Armed Forces on active duty responding to or involved in that disaster or emergency.

    ``(B) A disaster or emergency referred to in this subparagraph is any disaster or emergency as follows:

    ``(i) A major disaster or emergency declared by the President under the Robert B. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5121 et seq.).

    ``(ii) A disaster or emergency in which the National Disaster Medical System established pursuant to section 2811(b) of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 300hh-11(b)) is activated by the Secretary of Health and Human Services under paragraph (3)(A) of that section or as otherwise authorized by law.''.

   SEC. 5. INCREASE IN NUMBER OF ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF VETERANS AFFAIRS.

    (a) INCREASE.--Subsection (a) of section 308 of title 38, United States Code, is amended by striking ``six'' in the first sentence and inserting ``seven''.

    (b) FUNCTIONS.--Subsection (b) of such section is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

    ``(11) Operations, preparedness, security, and law enforcement functions.''.

    (c) NUMBER OF DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARIES.--Subsection (d)(1) of such section is amended by striking ``18'' and inserting ``19''.

    (d) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.--Section 5315 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by striking ``(6)'' after ``Assistant Secretaries, Department of Veterans Affairs'' and inserting ``(7)''.

   SEC. 6. CODIFICATION OF DUTIES OF SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS RELATING TO EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS.

    (a) IN GENERAL.--(1) Subchapter I of chapter 81 of title 38, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new section:``§8117. Emergency preparedness

    ``(a) READINESS OF DEPARTMENT MEDICAL CENTERS.--(1) The Secretary shall take appropriate actions to provide for the readiness of Department medical centers to protect the patients and staff of such centers from chemical or biological attack or otherwise to respond to such an attack so as to enable such centers to fulfill their obligations as part of the Federal response to public health emergencies.

    ``(2) Actions under paragraph (1) shall include--

    ``(A) the provision of decontamination equipment and personal protection equipment at Department medical centers; and

    ``(B) the provision of training in the use of such equipment to staff of such centers.

    ``(b) SECURITY AT DEPARTMENT MEDICAL AND RESEARCH FACILITIES.--(1) The Secretary shall take appropriate actions to provide for the security of Department medical centers and research facilities, including staff and patients at such centers and facilities.

    ``(2) In taking actions under paragraph (1), the Secretary shall take into account the results of the evaluation of the security needs at Department medical centers and research facilities required by section 154(b)(1) of the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-188; 116 Stat. 631), including the results of such evaluation relating to the following needs:

    ``(A) Needs for the protection of patients and medical staff during emergencies, including a chemical or biological attack or other terrorist attack.

    ``(B) Needs, if any, for screening personnel engaged in research relating to biological pathogens or agents, including work associated with such research.

    ``(C) Needs for securing laboratories or other facilities engaged in research relating to biological pathogens or agents.

    ``(c) TRACKING OF PHARMACEUTICALS AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT.--The Secretary shall develop and maintain a centralized system for tracking the current location and availability of pharmaceuticals, medical supplies, and medical equipment throughout the Department health care system in order to permit the ready identification and utilization of such pharmaceuticals, supplies, and equipment for a variety of purposes, including response to a chemical or biological attack or other terrorist attack.

    ``(d) TRAINING.--The Secretary shall ensure that the Department medical centers, in consultation with the accredited medical school affiliates of such medical centers, develop and implement curricula to train resident physicians and health care personnel in medical matters relating to biological, chemical, or radiological attacks or attacks from an incendiary or other explosive weapon.

    ``(e) PARTICIPATION IN NATIONAL DISASTER MEDICAL SYSTEM.--(1) The Secretary shall establish and maintain a training program to facilitate the participation of the staff of Department medical centers, and of the community partners of such centers, in the National Disaster Medical System established pursuant to section 2811(b) of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 300hh-11(b)).

    ``(2) The Secretary shall establish and maintain the training program under paragraph (1) in accordance with the recommendations of the working group on the prevention, preparedness, and response to bioterrorism and other public health emergencies established under section 319F(a) of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 247d-6(a)).

    ``(3) The Secretary shall establish and maintain the training program under paragraph (1) in consultation with the following:

    ``(A) The Secretary of Defense.

    ``(B) The Secretary of Health and Human Services.

    ``(C) The Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

    ``(f) MENTAL HEALTH COUNSELING.--(1) With respect to activities conducted by personnel serving at Department medical centers, the Secretary shall develop and maintain various strategies for providing mental health counseling and assistance, including counseling and assistance for post-traumatic stress disorder, following a bioterrorist attack or other public health emergency to the following persons:

    ``(A) Veterans.

    ``(B) Local and community emergency response providers.

    ``(C) Active duty military personnel.

    ``(D) Individuals seeking care at Department medical centers.

    ``(2) The strategies under paragraph (1) shall include the following:

    ``(A) Training and certification of providers of mental health counseling and assistance.

    ``(B) Mechanisms for coordinating the provision of mental health counseling and assistance to emergency response providers referred to in paragraph (1).

    ``(3) The Secretary shall develop and maintain the strategies under paragraph (1) in consultation with the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the American Red Cross, and the working group referred to in subsection (e)(2).''.

    (2) The table of sections at the beginning of such chapter is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 8116 the following new item:

   ``8117. Emergency preparedness.''.

    (b) REPEAL OF CODIFIED PROVISIONS.--Subsections (a), (b)(2), (c), (d), (e), and (f) of section 154 of the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-188; 38 U.S.C. note prec. 8101) are repealed.

    (c) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.--Subsection (g) of such section is amended--

    (1) in paragraph (1), by inserting ``of section 8117 of title 38, United States Code'' after ``subsection (a)''; and

    (2) in paragraph (2), by striking ``subsections (b) through (f)'' and inserting ``subsection (b)(1) of this section and subsections

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4A) Biological, Chemical, and Radiological Countermeasures Research Act of 2002
The legislation, a refined version of S. 1764 introduced on December 4, 2001, proposes incentives that will enable biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies to take the initiative -- for good business reasons -- to conduct research to develop countermeasures, including diagnostics, drugs, and vaccines, to treat those who might be exposed to or infected by biological, chemical or radiological agents and materials in a terror attack.

The premise of this legislation is that direct government funding of this research is likely to be much more expensive to the government and less likely to produce the countermeasures we need to defend America. Shifting some of the risk and expense of this research to entrepreneurial private sector firms is likely to be less expensive to the government and much more likely to produce the countermeasures we need to protect ourselves in the event of an attack.

For biotechnology companies, incentives for capital formation are needed because most such companies have no approved products or revenue from product sales to fund research. They rely on investors and equity capital markets to fund the research. These companies must focus on research that will lead to product sales and revenue and end their dependence on investor capital. When they are able to form the capital to fund research, biotech companies tend to be innovative and nimble and focused on the intractable diseases for which no effective medical treatments are available. Special research credits for pharmaceutical companies are also needed.

For both biotech and pharmaceutical companies, there is no established or predictable market for these countermeasures. Investors and companies are justifiably reluctant to fund this research, which will present technical challenges similar in complexity to development of effective treatments for AIDS. Investors and companies need assurances that research on countermeasures has the potential to provide a rate of return commensurate with the risk, complexity and cost of the research, a rate of return comparable to that which may arise from a treatment for cancer, MS, Cystic Fibrosis and other major diseases or from other investments.

The legislation provides tax incentives to enable companies to form capital to conduct the research and tax credits usable by larger companies with tax liability with respect to which to claim the credits. It provides a guaranteed and pre-determined market for the countermeasures and special intellectual property protections to serve as a substitute for a market. Finally, it establishes liability protections for the countermeasures that are developed.

Specifics of the legislation are as follows:

1. Setting Research Priorities (Section 101): The Department of Homeland Security sets the countermeasure research priorities in advance. It focuses the priorities on threats for which countermeasures are needed, and with regard to which the incentives make it "more likely" that the private sector will conduct the research to develop countermeasures. It is required to consider the status of existing research, the availability of non-countermeasure markets for the research, and the most effective strategy for ensuring that the research goes forward. The Department then provides information to potential manufacturers of these countermeasures in sufficient detail to permit them to conduct the research and determine when they have developed the needed countermeasure. The Department is responsible for determining when a manufacturer has, in fact, successfully developed the needed countermeasure.

2. Registration of Companies (Section 102): Biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies register with the Department to become eligible for the incentives in the legislation. They are obligated to provide reports to the Department as requested and be open to inspections. The Department certifies which companies are eligible for the incentives. Once a company is certified as eligible for the incentives, it becomes eligible for the tax incentives for capital formation, and if it successfully develops a countermeasure that meets the specifications of the Department, it becomes eligible for the procurement, patent, and liability provisions.

3. Diagnostics (Section 103): The incentives apply to development of diagnostics, as well as drugs, vaccines and other needed countermeasures.

4. Research Tools (Section 104): A company is also eligible for certification for the tax and patent provisions if it seeks to develop a research tool that will make it possible to quickly develop a countermeasure to a previously unknown agent or toxin, or an agent or toxin not targeted by the Department for research.

5. Capital Formation for Countermeasures Research (Section 201): The legislation provides that a company seeking to fund research is eligible to elect from among four tax incentives. The companies are eligible to:
a. Establish an R&D Limited Partnership to conduct the research. The partnership passes through all business deductions and credits to the partners. Section 201 (b)(1).
b. Issue a special class of stock for the entity to conduct the research. The investors would be entitled to a zero capital gains tax rate on any gains realized on the stock. Section 201 (b)(2).
c. Receive a special tax credit to help fund the research. Section 201 (b)(3).
d. Receive a special tax credit for research conducted at a non-profit and academic research institution. Section 201 (b)(4).

A company must elect only one of these incentives and, if it elects one of these incentives, it is then not eligible to receive benefits under the Orphan Drug Act. The legislation includes amendments (Section 218) to the Orphan Drug Act championed by Senators Hatch, Kennedy and Jeffords (S. 1341). The amendments make the Credit available from the date of the application for Orphan Drug status, not the date the application is approved as provided under current law.

6. Countermeasure Purchase Fund (Section 202): The legislation provides that a company that successfully develops a countermeasure -- through FDA approval -- is eligible to sell the product to the Federal government at a pre-established price and in a pre-determined amount. The company is given notice of the terms of the sale before it commences the research.

7. Intellectual Property Incentives (Section 203): The legislation provides that a company that successfully develops a countermeasure is eligible to elect one of two patent incentives. The two alternatives are as follows:
a. The company is eligible to receive a patent for its invention with a term as long as the term of the patent when it was issued by the Patent and Trademark Office, without any erosion due to delays in the FDA approval process. This alternative is available to any company that successfully develops a countermeasure irrespective of its paid-in capital.
b. The company is eligible to extend the term of any patent owned by the company for two years. The patent may not be one that is acquired by the company from a third party. This is included as a capital formation incentive for small biotechnology companies with less than $750 million in paid-in capital, or, at the discretion of the Department of Homeland Security, to any firm that successfully develops a countermeasure.

In addition, a company that successfully develops a countermeasure is eligible for a 10 year period of market exclusivity on the countermeasure.

8. Liability Protections (Section 204): The legislation provides for protections against liability for the company that successfully develops a countermeasure.

9. Accelerated Approval of Countermeasure (Section 211): The countermeasures are considered for approval by the FDA on a "fast track" basis.

10. Special Approval Standards (Section 212): The countermeasures may be approved in the absence of human clinical trails if such trails are impractical or unethical.

11. Limited Antitrust Exemption (Section 213): Companies are granted a limited exemption from the antitrust laws as they seek to expedite research on countermeasures.

12. Biologics Manufacturing Capacity and Efficiency (Sections 214-215): Special incentives are incorporated to ensure that manufacturing capacity is available for countermeasures.

13. Strengthening of Biomedical Research Infrastructure: Authorizes appropriations for grants to construct specialized biosafety containment facilities where biological agents can be handled safely without exposing researchers and the public to danger (Section 216). Also reauthorizes a successful NIH-industry partnership challenge grants to promote joint ventures between NIH and its grantees and for-profit biotechnology, pharmaceutical and medical device industries with regard to the development of countermeasures and research tools (Section 217).

14. Adjuvents (Section 219): The legislation provides incentives for the development and use of adjuvents to enhance the potency of countermeasures.

15. Annual Report (Section 220): The Department is required to prepare for the Congress an annual report on the implementation of these incentives.

16. International Conference (Section 221): The Department is required to organize an annual international conference on countermeasure research.

5A) Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq
AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF MILITARY FORCE AGAINST IRAQ RESOLUTION OF 2002 -- (Extensions of Remarks - October 17, 2002)

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Mr. NETHERCUTT. Mr. Speaker, it is appropriate that we discuss fully here the most serious responsibility entrusted to Congress, authorizing the President to use force in defense of our nation. The decision by Congress to authorize the deployment of the U.S. military requires somber analysis, and sober consideration, but this is not a discussion we should delay. The President has presented to the American people a compelling case for intervening in Iraq, and this body has acted deliberately in bringing to the House floor a resolution that unequivocally expresses our support for the Commander in Chief.

The threat to our national security from Iraq could not be more apparent. It is perhaps best illustrated by the size and scope of Iraqi efforts to develop and deploy weapons of mass destruction, a horrifying capability only recognized after the 1991 Persian Gulf War. The United Nations Special Commission on Iraq succeeded in destroying 38,500 chemical munitions, 480,000 liters of chemical agents, and 1.8 million liters of precursor chemicals. Iraq admitted to developing offensive biological weapons , including 19,000 liters of botulinum, 8,400 liters of anthrax, and 2,000 liters of aflatoxin, clostridium, and ricin. Inspectors accounted for over 800 Soviet-supplied Scud missiles and 43 of 45 chemical and biological warheads that Iraq admitted to. About 40 clandestine nuclear weapons facilities were discovered and destroyed, and the International Atomic Energy Agency revealed that at the time of the Persian Gulf War, Iraq was less than two years away from producing a nuclear weapon.

Yet, this list of poisons describes only what UN Inspectors were able to detect in the face of official Iraqi resistance, deception and denial. For example, UNSCOM could not account for 31,600 chemical munitions, 500 mustard gas bombs, and 4,000 tons of chemical weapon precursors. The Inspectors were unable to account for any of Iraq's biological agents, or the delivery systems needed to weaponize these agents. Such was the status of the Iraqi weapons program a decade ago. In the intervening period, development efforts have continued unabated, and indeed have accelerated following the withdrawal of UN inspectors.

Iraq has repeatedly demonstrated a resolve to develop deadly weapons of mass destruction, and, more horrifyingly, to use them. Saddam Hussein murdered 5,000 of his own citizens in Halabja, and injured 10,000 more, in a gas attack. 20,000 Iranians died terrible deaths in clouds of mustard gas and nerve agents. In breach of U.N. imposed sanctions, Iraq has continued to develop long-range missiles that expand the threat that these toxins pose to the world community. The British Government has estimated that Iraq could possess missiles capable of reaching the Bosphorous Straits within five years. Current Iraqi military planning envisions the use of these weapons in a conflict, and as the world waits for compliance with any of the 16 Security Council Resolutions that are presently in abeyance, this capability grows.

Perhaps in different hands the deadly arsenal possessed by Saddam Hussein's Iraq would be less of an imminent threat. To be sure, the doctrine of mutually assured destruction deterred the United States and the Soviet Union from direct conflict for more than forty years. But such a doctrine is dependent upon rational actors and an expectation that civilized nation-states seek the preservation of their citizenry. Such assumptions fail in Iraq, a country that under Saddam Hussein has demonstrated an unabated hatred of the United States and a willingness to sacrifice and murder its citizens in the interests of the ruling clique. Ongoing hostilities in the Northern and Southern no-flight zones make it increasingly likely that an unexpected event could lead to the use of these mass casualty weapons against our citizens. To wait for an Iraqi epiphany is to invite disaster. Inaction is immoral--the United States has a responsibility to the community of nations to eliminate this threat before it grows ever greater. To concur that Saddam Hussein is a threat is to agree upon the need for action, for can one reasonably argue that intervention is easier in a nuclear-weapon capable Mesopotamia?

• This authorization of force is at some level, a recognition of the ongoing state of war with Iraq. Conflict with Iraq has never truly ceased since the conclusion of the Gulf War, and coalition aircraft supporting Operation Northern and Southern Watch have been fired upon thousands of times. It is revealing to examine the record of only the last three weeks, since Iraq sent a letter to the United Nations expressing a willingness to resume weapons inspections. Sixty-seven attempts have been made to down coalition aircraft in this period; 406 attempts have been made this year. It is beyond comprehension to believe that this body would argue for further deliberation, further study, further diplomacy, were our pilots to be attacked so in any other place on the globe. Yet, we have tolerated this low-level conflict for nearly a decade.

Opponents of this resolution have responded by asking, ``Why now?'' What compelling reason could there be for acting today, that was not before us a year ago?

Three years ago this body declared Iraq to be unacceptably in breach of its international obligations and urged the President ``to take appropriate action, in accordance with the Constitution and relevant laws of the United States, to bring Iraq into compliance with its international obligations.'' Three years ago, we also declared it to be the policy of the United States to change the regime in Baghdad and promote a democratic state.--Three Years Ago!--The credibility of this body is even called into question, for us now to insist on further deliberation, further consultation, further delay. These issues aren't new, my colleagues, they are have been before us for years. It is only the leadership of this President that has allowed us to do our duty and seriously consider the implications of the threat that has been before us for so many years.

The U.S. has struggled against the tepid resolutions and the general inactivity of the international community for a decade. To what avail, but a rearmed, emboldened dictator, confident in his ability to flaunt international law, willing to flex his might against lesser states in the region, and capable of intimidating all others. This is not hasty, precipitous action on our part, but something closer to negligence for having waited so long to confront the danger to our citizenry.

Critics of this resolution are notably short of alternatives or specifics. Regime change cannot happen through domestic posturing. Disarmament requires more than hopes and good wishes.

It has been suggested that multilateral diplomacy is preferable to unilateral action. As a permanent member of the Security Council, it is appropriate for the United States to work with the United Nations to seek common ground and broad international support for U.S. actions. Where agreement with the United Nations may fail, we should look to our other regional alliances, seeking common ground and unity of purpose. Our success in 1991, was attributable, in part, to the collective outrage of the world community with Iraq's unabashed violation of Kuwait's territorial integrity. Acting in concert with our allies is inarguably the first and best choice, but we must remember that the President has sworn to ``preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States.''

Ultimately, the President's actions must be guided by Americas national security interests. Where broader regional interests intersect with our security concerns, we should welcome assistance and combine efforts in the pursuit of liberty and freedom. But we must not predicate our actions on global opinion. When necessary, the United States must be prepared to act alone. Our success in 1991 was attributable also to American might and resolve--while our cause was strengthened by the support of the United Nations, our Armed Forces were trained and equipped to act alone if necessary. It was knowledge of American resolve, and first-hand experience with the unrelenting application of our combined arms, not Security Council resolutions, which led Iraqi forces to surrender in droves.

Our allies abroad should take note of this resolution. While we are encouraging the President to continue his efforts to build international support, and to exhaust diplomatic alternatives to armed conflict, our friends and foes alike must know that diplomacy can indeed be exhausted. It is appropriate for Congress to acknowledge the prospect of unilateral military action, and such action only serves to add credibility and urgency to ongoing negotiations. I do not share the deep, unyielding belief in the power of international law and global institutions that some here have expressed. It is not irresponsible to act alone when all others have failed to act.

On Tuesday, December 9, 1941, two days after the attacks on Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt addressed the nation and reflected upon the coming challenges facing the country. He noted:

It is our obligation to our dead it is our sacred obligation--to their children and our children--that we must never forget what we have learned.

And what we all have learned is this.

There is no such thing as security for any nation or any individual in a world ruled by the principles of gangsterism.

There is no such thing as impregnable defense against powerful aggressors who sneak up in the dark and strike without warning.

We have learned that our ocean-girt hemisphere is not immune from severe attack that we cannot measure our safety in terms of miles on any map.

Sixty years later, in New York, and Washington, DC, and Pennsylvania, we learned that the lessons that President Roosevelt implored us to remember had not changed so much. Gangsterism, unbridled aggression and acute vulnerability are the very same dangers we face today. In 1941, Congress stood with the President and promised full support to protect and defend our nation. Today we must do no less.


5B) Fixation on Iraq Does Not Make Us Safer
Mr. McDERMOTT. Mr. Speaker, I submit the following article.

(By Stimson Bullitt)

How best can we defend our territory, our government and our lives from present threats?

The big threat comes from the author of the most serious attack on us, al-Qaida, the network of cells scattered across much of the world.

Rather than a conventional war against another nation, to defeat this enemy calls for police action against a criminal gang, and its members through an integrated program: Intelligence to track and discover, and action to prosecute, those who undertake and plan attacks on us.

Second, restrict the most dreadful weapons . For this, we must cease our Lone Ranger approach, refusing to cooperate to limit creation and spread of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons . As a step toward observance of a rule of law between nations, we should cease to refuse to join the International Criminal Court. Our expressed fear of being prosecuted recalls the Old Testament verse: ``The guilty flee when no man pursueth.''

It has been proposed that we shift our concentration to Iraq because its brutal and ruthless leadership is hostile to us and has a record of seeking to develop deadly weapons . The proposal is to remove both the leadership and the weapons and to do so by making war against that country, How does Iraq threaten us, and what price may we pay to remove the threat?

Far off, and with no navy, Iraq cannot invade us. Nor does it have the only other means by which it directly could attack us: long-range planes or missiles. An ICBM silo can't be trundled around between hiding places and is easy to spot and to destroy. If Iraq were to undertake some, as soon as they were observed under construction, our forces should and would dispatch them like the proverbial ducks in a barrel. That's the place for preemptive strikes.

Iraq could seek to attack us indirectly by assisting al-Qaida to smuggle weapons across our border. The most destructive means would be an atom bomb in a ship's hold, incinerating one of our port cities.

However, like Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Algeria, Iraq has a Muslim population but a secular government, not a theocracy. By contrast, al-Qaida is composed of impassioned Islamist fanatics. Iraq's government may hesitate to entrust weapons to those whose dislike and distrust may turn them back against it.

Rather than seeking such a weapon from Iraq's government, disinclined to furnish one even if it had one, a]-Qaida agents may be more likely to seek one from territory of the former Soviet Union, where countless and uncounted nukes are under the charge of lowpaid bureaucrats, many of whom are incompetent or criminal.

Would our prospective gain from reducing or avoiding the foregoing modest risk exceed the price that a solo invasion would impose on us?

Quantities of American soldiers' lives and taxpayers'dollars would depend on war's uncertainties, among which would be the weapons Iraq may have available to use against our invading troops. If its armed force is as strong as we are told it is, to overcome it will impose a heavy cost.

Going alone would demonstrate such disagreement that would lead to refusals of the needed cooperative action for the long, long war on international terrorism. When we act without allies, where international law calls for some degree of consent among the leading nations, our disregard of such law impairs our influence, reduces our power. If we think we can protect ourselves from cells of zealots without the willing cooperation of governments where they are located, we are nuts.

Prospective allies' unwillingness to commit combat troops to the endeavor would give us pause, raising doubt in reasonable minds. Are we really the only one right, and all others wrong?

Left with the job of rebuilding a nation unfamiliar with democratic processes or government under law, we would risk the chaos that would set Iraq's neighbors at war,

It would not stop al-Qaida's war on us but would intensify its energies. Terrorists are widespread. Iraq did not send Mohammed Atta or Timothy McVeigh, nor did it organize al-Qaida or the Aryan Nations. After Oklahoma City, we convicted two men. We did not attack Aryan Nations communities in northern Idaho or in Michigan. If England struck Boston, from which some of the IRA bombings in England have been financed, we would not approve.

To assault a nation, whether Afghanistan, Iraq or another, fails to protect our country from terrorist attacks. And it kills an unnecessary number of people. Violating human morality reduces our claim to stand for civilized decency as a nation. Others should be killed only when necessary to defend our liberty or lives.

By violating our duty of ``a decent respect to the opinions of mankind,'' in Jefferson's phrase, we terrify and offend other nations and thereby increase the numbers and passions of those who will aim terrorist attacks against us.

Stimson Bullitt is a lawyer, developer of Harbor Steps in downtown Seattle, and former president of KING Broadcasting. He has written several books, including ``To Be A Politician.''


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