Congressional Record Weekly Update

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1A) Strategic Nuclear Provisions
SEC. 1031. STRATEGIC FORCE STRUCTURE PLAN FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND DELIVERY SYSTEMS.

(a) PLAN REQUIRED.--The Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy shall jointly prepare a plan for the United States strategic force structure for nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons delivery systems for the period of fiscal years from 2003 through 2012. The plan shall--

(1) define the range of missions assigned to strategic nuclear forces in the national defense strategy consistent with--
(A) the Quadrennial Defense Review dated September 30, 2001, under section 118 of title 10, United States Code;
(B) the Nuclear Posture Review dated December 2001 under section 1041 of the Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (as enacted into law by Public Law 106-398; 114 Stat. 1654A-262); and
(C) other relevant planning documents;

(2) delineate a baseline strategic force structure for such weapons and systems over such period consistent with such Nuclear Posture Review;

(3) define sufficient force structure, force modernization and life extension plans, infrastructure, and other elements of the defense program of the United States associated with such weapons and systems that would be required to execute successfully the full range of missions defined under paragraph (1);

(4) identify the budget plan that would be required to provide sufficient resources to execute successfully the full range of missions using such force structure called for in that national defense strategy; and

(5)(A) evaluate options for achieving, prior to fiscal year 2012, a posture under which the United States maintains a number of operationally deployed nuclear warheads at a level of from 1,700 to 2,200 such warheads, as outlined in the Nuclear Posture Review referred to in paragraph (1)(B); and
(B) contain an assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of options for achieving such posture as early as 2007, including effects on cost, the dismantlement workforce, and any other affected matter.
(b) REPORT.--Not later than March 1, 2003, the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy shall submit a report on the plan to the congressional defense committees.

SEC. 1032. ANNUAL REPORT ON WEAPONS TO DEFEAT HARDENED AND DEEPLY BURIED TARGETS.
(a) ANNUAL REPORT.--Not later than April 1 of each year, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, and the Director of Central Intelligence shall jointly submit to the congressional defense committees, the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives a report on the research and development, procurement, and other activities undertaken during the preceding fiscal year by the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, and the intelligence community to develop weapons to defeat hardened and deeply buried targets.
(b) REPORT ELEMENTS.--The report for a fiscal year under subsection (a) shall-- (1) include a discussion of the integration and interoperability of the activities referred to in that subsection that were undertaken during that fiscal year, including a discussion of the relevance of such activities to applicable recommendations by theChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, assisted under section 181(b) of title 10, United States Code, by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council; and
(2) set forth separately a description of the activities referred to in that subsection, if any, that were undertaken during such fiscal year by each element of--

(A) the Department of Defense;

(B) the Department of Energy; and

(C) the intelligence community.
(c) DEFINITION.--In this section, the term ``intelligence community'' has the meaning given such term in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).
(d) TERMINATION.--No report is required under this section after the submission of the report that is due on April 1, 2007.

SEC. 1033. REPORT ON EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR EARTH-PENETRATOR WEAPON AND OTHER WEAPONS.

(a) NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES STUDY.--The Secretary of Defense shall request the National Academy of Sciences to conduct a study and prepare a report on the following:
(1) The anticipated short-term effects and long-term effects of the use by the United States of a nuclear earth-penetrator weapon on the target area, including the effects on civilian populations in proximity to the target area at the time of or after such use and the effects on United States military personnel who after such use carry out operations or battle damage assessments in the target area.
(2) The anticipated short-term and long-term effects on civilian population in proximity to a target area--
(A) if a non-penetrating nuclear weapon is used to attack a hard or deeply-buried target; and
(B) if a conventional high-explosive weapon is used to attack an adversary's facilities for storage or production of weapons of mass destruction and, as a result of such attack, radioactive, nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons materials, agents, or other contaminants are released or spread into populated areas.

(b) REPORT.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit to Congress the report under subsection (a), together with any comments the Secretary may consider appropriate on the report. The report shall be submitted in unclassified form to the maximum extent possible, with a classified annex if needed.

1B) Nonproliferation Provisions Independent of CTR Programs
SEC. 1203. LIMITATION ON FUNDING FOR JOINT DATA EXCHANGE CENTER IN MOSCOW.

    (a) LIMITATION.--Not more than 50 percent of the funds made available to the Department of Defense for fiscal year 2003 for activities associated with the Joint Data Exchange Center in Moscow, Russia, may be obligated or expended for any such activity until--

    (1) the United States and the Russian Federation enter into a cost-sharing agreement as described in subsection (d) of section 1231 of the Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (as enacted into law by Public Law 106-398; 114 Stat. 1654A-329);

    (2) the United States and the Russian Federation enter into an agreement or agreements exempting the United States and any United States person from Russian taxes, and from liability under Russian laws, with respect to activities associated with the Joint Data Exchange Center;

    (3) the Secretary of Defense submits to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives a copy of each agreement referred to in paragraphs (1) and (2); and

    (4) a period of 30 days has expired after the date of the final submission under paragraph (3).

    (b) JOINT DATA EXCHANGE CENTER.--For purposes of this section, the term ``Joint Data Exchange Center'' means the United States-Russian Federation joint center for the exchange of data to provide early warning of launches of ballistic missiles and for notification of such launches that is provided for in a joint United States-Russian Federation memorandum of agreement signed in Moscow in June 2000.

   SEC. 1204. SUPPORT OF UNITED NATIONS-SPONSORED EFFORTS TO INSPECT AND MONITOR IRAQI WEAPONS ACTIVITIES.

    (a) LIMITATION ON AMOUNT OF ASSISTANCE IN FISCAL YEAR 2003.--The total amount of the assistance for fiscal year 2003 that is provided by the Secretary of Defense under section 1505 of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Control Act of 1992 (22 U.S.C. 5859a) as activities of the Department of Defense in support of activities under that Act may not exceed $15,000,000.

    (b) EXTENSION OF AUTHORITY TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE.--Subsection (f) of section 1505 of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Control Act of 1992 (22 U.S.C. 5859a) is amended by striking ``2002'' and inserting ``2003''.

   SEC. 1205. COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON COORDINATION AND INTEGRATION OF ALL UNITED STATES NONPROLIFERATION ACTIVITIES.

    Section 1205 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 (Public Law 107-107; 115 Stat. 1247) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

    ``(d) ANNUAL REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION OF PLAN.--(1) Not later than January 31, 2003, and each year thereafter, the President shall submit to Congress a report on the implementation of the plan required by subsection (a) during the preceding year.

    ``(2) Each report under paragraph (1) shall include--

    ``(A) a discussion of progress made during the year covered by such report in the matters of the plan required by subsection (a);

    ``(B) a discussion of consultations with foreign nations, and in particular the Russian Federation, during such year on joint programs to implement the plan;

    ``(C) a discussion of cooperation, coordination, and integration during such year in the implementation of the plan among the various departments and agencies of the United States Government, as well as private entities that share objectives similar to the objectives of the plan; and

    ``(D) any recommendations that the President considers appropriate regarding modifications to law or regulations, or to the administration or organization of any Federal department or agency, in order to improve the effectiveness of any programs carried out during such year in the implementation of the plan.''.

   SEC. 1206. REPORT REQUIREMENT REGARDING RUSSIAN PROLIFERATION TO IRAN AND OTHER COUNTRIES OF PROLIFERATION CONCERN.

    (a) REPORT REQUIREMENT.--Not later than March 15 of 2003 through 2009, the President shall submit to Congress a report (in unclassified and classified form as necessary) describing in detail Russian proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile goods, technology, expertise, and information, and of dual-use items that may contribute to the development of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, to Iran and to other countries of proliferation concern during the year preceding the year in which the report is submitted. The report shall include a detailed description of the following, for the year covered by the report:

    (1) The number, type, and quality of direct and dual-use weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile goods, technology, expertise, and information transferred.

    (2) The form, location, and manner in which such transfers took place.

    (3) The contribution that such transfers could make to the recipient countries' weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs, and an estimate of how soon such countries will test, possess, and deploy weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles.

    (4) The impact and consequences that such transfers have, and could have over the next 10 years--

    (A) on United States national security;

    (B) on United States military forces deployed in the region to which such transfers are being made;

    (C) on United States allies, friends, and interests in that region; and

    (D) on the military capabilities of the country receiving such transfers from Russia.

    (5) The policy and strategy that the President intends to employ to halt Russian proliferation, the policy tools that the President intends to use to carry out that policy and strategy, the rationale for employing such tools, and the timeline by which the President expects to see material progress in ending Russian proliferation of direct and dual-use weapons of mass destruction and missile goods, technology, expertise, and information.

    (b) DEFINITION.--In this section, the term ``country of proliferation concern'' means any country identified by the Director of Central Intelligence as having engaged in the acquisition of dual-use and other technology useful for the development or production of weapons of mass destruction (including nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, and biological weapons) or advanced conventional munitions--

    (1) in the most recent report under section 721 of the Combatting Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 (title VII of Public Law 104-293; 50 U.S.C. 2366); or

    (2) in any successor report on the acquisition by foreign countries of dual-use and other technology useful for the development or production of weapons of mass destruction.

   SEC. 1207. MONITORING OF IMPLEMENTATION OF 1979 AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA ON COOPERATION IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY.

    (a) IN GENERAL.--The Secretary of State shall--

    (1) monitor the implementation of the Agreement specified in subsection (c);

    (2) keep a systematic account of the protocols to the Agreement;

    (3) coordinate the activities of all agencies of the United States Government that carry out cooperative activities under the Agreement; and

    (4) ensure that all activities conducted under the Agreement comply with applicable laws and regulations concerning the transfer of militarily sensitive technologies and dual-use technologies.

    (b) RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COOPERATION.--Except as otherwise provided by the Secretary of State, the functions of the Secretary under this section shall be carried out through the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Cooperation of the Department of State.

    (c) AGREEMENT DEFINED.--For purposes of this section, the term ``Agreement'' means the agreement between the United States and the People's Republic of China known as the ``Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the People's Republic of China on Cooperation in Science and Technology'', signed in Washington on January 31, 1979, and its protocols.

    (d) BIENNIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS.--(1) Not later than April 1 of each even-numbered year, the Secretary of State shall submit to Congress a report on the implementation of the Agreement and on activities under the Agreement. Each such report shall be submitted in both classified and unclassified form, as necessary.

    (2) Each report under this subsection shall provide an evaluation of the benefits of the Agreement to the economy, to the military, and to the industrial base of the People's Republic of China and shall include the following:

    (A) An accounting of all activities conducted under the Agreement since the previous report (or, in the case of the first report, since the Agreement was entered into) and a projection of activities to be undertaken under the Agreement during the next two years.

    (B) An estimate of the costs to the United States to administer the Agreement during the period covered by the report.

    (C) An assessment of how the Agreement has influenced the foreign and domestic policies of the People's Republic of China and the policy of the People's Republic of China toward scientific and technological cooperation with the United States.

    (D) An analysis by the Director of Central Intelligence of the involvement of military specialists, weapons specialists, and intelligence specialists of the People's Republic of China in the activities of the Joint Commission established under the Agreement and in other activities conducted under the Agreement.

    (E) A determination by the Secretary of Defense, developed with the assistance of the Director of Central Intelligence, of the extent to which the activities conducted under the Agreement have enhanced the military and defense industrial base of the People's Republic of China, and an assessment of the effect that projected activities under the Agreement for the next two years, including the transfer of technology and know-how, could have on the economic and military capabilities of the People's Republic of China.

    (F) An assessment by the Inspector General of the Department of Commerce of--

    (i) the extent to which programs or activities carried out under the Agreement provide access to technology, information, or know-how that could enhance military capabilities of the People's Republic of China; and

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    (ii) the extent to which those programs or activities are carried out in compliance with export control laws and regulations of the United States, especially those laws and regulations governing so-called ``deemed exports''.

    (G) Any recommendations of the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, or Director of Central Intelligence for improving the monitoring of the activities of the Joint Commission established under the Agreement.

    (3) The Secretary of State shall prepare each report under this subsection in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Director of the National Science Foundation.

    (e) INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP.--The President shall establish an interagency working group to oversee the implementation of the Agreement by departments and agencies of the United States. The working group shall consist of representatives of such departments, agencies, and offices of the executive branch as the President considers appropriate. The working group shall perform the following functions:

    (1) Assisting the Secretary of State and other appropriate officials in setting standards under the Agreement for science and technology transfers between the United States and the People's Republic of China.

    (2) Monitoring ongoing programs and activities under the Agreement and recommending future programs and activities under the Agreement.

    (3) Developing a comprehensive database of all government-to-government programs and United States Government-funded programs under the Agreement.

    (4) Coordinating activities under the Agreement between United States Government agencies, including elements of the intelligence community, as appropriate.

   SEC. 1208. EXTENSION OF CERTAIN COUNTERPROLIFERATION ACTIVITIES AND PROGRAMS.

    (a) EXTENSION OF INTERAGENCY COUNTERPROLIFERATION PROGRAM REVIEW COMMITTEE.--Section 1605(f) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 (22 U.S.C. 2751 note) is amended by striking ``September 30, 2004'' and inserting ``September 30, 2008''.

    (b) LATER DEADLINE FOR SUBMISSION OF ANNUAL REPORT.--Subsection (a) of section 1503 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 (22 U.S.C. 2751 note) is amended by striking ``February 1 of each year'' and inserting ``May 1 each year''.

    (c) ADDITIONAL MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED IN ANNUAL REPORT.--Subsection (b) of such section is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

    ``(8) A discussion of the limitations and impediments to the biological weapons counterproliferation efforts of the Department of Defense (including legal, policy, and resource constraints) and recommendations for the removal or mitigation of such impediments and for ways to make such efforts more effective.''.

    (d) TECHNICAL AMENDMENT TO REFLECT CHANGE IN POSITION TITLE.--Section 1605(a)(4) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 (22 U.S.C. 2751 note) is amended by striking ``Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology'' in the first sentence and inserting ``Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logisitics''.

   SEC. 1209. SEMIANNUAL REPORT BY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE ON CONTRIBUTIONS BY FOREIGN PERSONS TO EFFORTS BY COUNTRIES OF PROLIFERATION CONCERN TO OBTAIN WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND THEIR DELIVERY SYSTEMS.

    (a) CONTENT OF SEMIANNUAL REPORT.--The Combatting Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 (title VII of Public Law 104-293) is amended by inserting after section 721 (50 U.S.C. 2366) the following new section:

   ``SEC. 722. SEMIANNUAL REPORT ON CONTRIBUTIONS OF FOREIGN PERSONS TO WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND DELIVERY SYSTEMS EFFORTS OF COUNTRIES OF PROLIFERATION CONCERN.

    ``(a) REPORTS.--The Director of Central Intelligence shall submit to Congress a semiannual report identifying each foreign person that, during the period covered by the report, made a material contribution to the research, development, production, or acquisition by a country of proliferation concern of--

    ``(1) weapons of mass destruction (including nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, or biological weapons); or

    ``(2) ballistic or cruise missile systems.

    ``(b) PERIOD OF SEMIANNUAL REPORTS.--Semiannual reports under subsection (a) shall be submitted as follows:

    ``(1) One semiannual report shall cover the first six months of the calendar year and shall be submitted not later than January 1 of the following year.

    ``(2) The other semiannual report shall cover the second six months of the calendar year and shall be submitted not later than July 1 of the following year.

    ``(c) FORM OF REPORTS.--(1) A report under subsection (a) may be submitted in classified form, in whole or in part, if the Director of Central Intelligence determines that submittal in that form is advisable.

    ``(2) Any portion of a report under subsection (a) that is submitted in classified form shall be accompanied by an unclassified summary of such portion.

    ``(d) DEFINITIONS.--In this section:

    ``(1) The term `foreign person' means any of the following:

    ``(A) A natural person who is not a citizen of the United States.

    ``(B) A corporation, business association, partnership, society, trust, or other nongovernmental entity, organization, or group that is organized under the laws of a foreign country or has its principal place of business in a foreign country.

    ``(C) Any foreign government or foreign governmental entity operating as a business enterprise or in any other capacity.

    ``(D) Any successor, subunit, or subsidiary of any entity described in subparagraph (B) or (C).

    ``(2) The term `country of proliferation concern' means any country identified by the Director of Central Intelligence as having engaged in the acquisition of dual-use and other technology useful for the development or production of weapons of mass destruction (including nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, and biological weapons) or advanced conventional munitions--

    ``(A) in the most recent report under section 721; or

    ``(B) in any successor report on the acquisition by foreign countries of dual-use and other technology useful for the development or production of weapons of mass destruction.''.

    (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.--Section 722 of the Combatting Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996, as added by subsection (a), shall take effect with the report with respect to the first six months of 2003 required to be submitted under that section not later than January 1, 2004.

   SEC. 1210. REPORT ON FEASIBILITY AND ADVISABILITY OF SENIOR OFFICER EXCHANGES BETWEEN THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE MILITARY FORCES OF TAIWAN.

    (a) PRESIDENTIAL REPORT.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to Congress a report on--

    (1) the feasibility and advisability of conducting combined operational training with, and exchanges of general and flag officers between, the Armed Forces of the United States and the military forces of Taiwan; and

    (2) the progress being made in meeting United States commitments to the security of Taiwan.

1C) Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs
TITLE XIII--COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION WITH STATES OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION

   Sec..1301..Specification of Cooperative Threat Reduction programs and funds.

   Sec..1302..Funding allocations.

   Sec..1303..Prohibition against use of funds until submission of reports.

   Sec..1304..Report on use of revenue generated by activities carried out under Cooperative Threat Reduction programs.

   Sec..1305..Prohibition against use of funds for second wing of fissile material storage facility.

   Sec..1306. Limited waiver of restrictions on use of funds for threat reduction in states of the former Soviet Union.

   SEC. 1301. SPECIFICATION OF COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAMS AND FUNDS.

    (a) SPECIFICATION OF CTR PROGRAMS.--For purposes of section 301 and other provisions of this Act, Cooperative Threat Reduction programs are the programs specified in section 1501(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (Public Law 104-201; 110 Stat. 2731; 50 U.S.C. 2362 note).

    (b) FISCAL YEAR 2003 COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION FUNDS DEFINED.--As used in this title, the term ``fiscal year 2003 Cooperative Threat Reduction funds'' means the funds appropriated pursuant to the authorization of appropriations in section 301 for Cooperative Threat Reduction programs.

    (c) AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS.--Funds appropriated pursuant to the authorization of appropriations in section 301 for Cooperative Threat Reduction programs shall be available for obligation for three fiscal years.

   SEC. 1302. FUNDING ALLOCATIONS.

    (a) FUNDING FOR SPECIFIC PURPOSES.--Of the $416,700,000 authorized to be appropriated to the Department of Defense for fiscal year 2003 in section 301(23) for Cooperative Threat Reduction programs, the following amounts may be obligated for the purposes specified:

    (1) For strategic offensive arms elimination in Russia, $70,500,000.

    (2) For strategic nuclear arms elimination in Ukraine, $6,500,000.

    (3) For nuclear weapons transportation security in Russia, $19,700,000.

    (4) For nuclear weapons storage security in Russia, $40,000,000.

    (5) For activities designated as Other Assessments/Administrative Support, $14,700,000.

    (6) For defense and military contacts, $18,900,000.

    (7) For weapons of mass destruction infrastructure elimination activities in Kazakhstan, $9,000,000.

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    (8) For weapons of mass destruction infrastructure elimination activities in Ukraine, $8,800,000.

    (9) For chemical weapons destruction in Russia, $50,000,000.

    (10) For biological weapons proliferation prevention in the former Soviet Union, $55,000,000.

    (11) For weapons of mass destruction proliferation prevention in the States of the former Soviet Union, $40,000,000.

    (b) ADDITIONAL FUNDS AUTHORIZED FOR CERTAIN PURPOSES.--Of the funds authorized to be appropriated to the Department of Defense for fiscal year 2003 in section 301(23) for Cooperative Threat Reduction programs, $83,600,000 may be obligated for any of the purposes specified in paragraphs (1) through (4) and (9) of subsection (a) in addition to the amounts specifically authorized in such paragraphs.

    (c) REPORT ON OBLIGATION OR EXPENDITURE OF FUNDS FOR OTHER PURPOSES.--No fiscal year 2003 Cooperative Threat Reduction funds may be obligated or expended for a purpose other than a purpose listed in paragraphs (1) through (11) of subsection (a) until 30 days after the date that the Secretary of Defense submits to Congress a report on the purpose for which the funds will be obligated or expended and the amount of funds to be obligated or expended. Nothing in the preceding sentence shall be construed as authorizing the obligation or expenditure of fiscal year 2003 Cooperative Threat Reduction funds for a purpose for which the obligation or expenditure of such funds is specifically prohibited under this title or any other provision of law.

    (d) LIMITED AUTHORITY TO VARY INDIVIDUAL AMOUNTS.--(1) Subject to paragraphs (2) and (3), in any case in which the Secretary of Defense determines that it is necessary to do so in the national interest, the Secretary may obligate amounts appropriated for fiscal year 2003 for a purpose listed in any of the paragraphs in subsection (a) in excess of the specific amount authorized for that purpose.

    (2) An obligation of funds for a purpose stated in any of the paragraphs in subsection (a) in excess of the specific amount authorized for such purpose may be made using the authority provided in paragraph (1) only after--

    (A) the Secretary submits to Congress notification of the intent to do so together with a complete discussion of the justification for doing so; and

    (B) 15 days have elapsed following the date of the notification.

    (3) The Secretary may not, under the authority provided in paragraph (1), obligate amounts for a purpose stated in any of paragraphs (5) through (10) of subsection (a) in excess of 125 percent of the specific amount authorized for such purpose.

    (4) In this section, the term ``specific amount authorized'' means, with respect to a purpose listed in any paragraph in subsection (a)--

    (A) the amount specifically authorized for that purpose in subsection (a), plus

    (B) in the case of a purpose listed in paragraph (1), (2), (3), (4), or (9) of subsection (a), any amount obligated under subsection (b) for that purpose.

   SEC. 1303. PROHIBITION AGAINST USE OF FUNDS UNTIL SUBMISSION OF REPORTS.

    Not more than 50 percent of fiscal year 2003 Cooperative Threat Reduction funds may be obligated or expended until 30 days after the date of the submission of--

    (1) the report required to be submitted in fiscal year 2002 under section 1308(a) of the Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (as enacted into law by Public Law 106-398; 114 Stat. 1654A-341); and

    (2) the update for the multiyear plan required to be submitted for fiscal year 2001 under section 1205 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 (Public Law 103-337; 22 U.S.C. 5952 note).

   SEC. 1304. REPORT ON USE OF REVENUE GENERATED BY ACTIVITIES CARRIED OUT UNDER COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAMS.

    (a) ADDITIONAL REPORT REQUIREMENTS.--Section 1308(c) of the Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (as enacted into law by Public Law 106-398; 114 Stat. 1654A-341) is amended by inserting at the end the following new paragraphs:

    ``(6) To the maximum extent practicable, a description of how revenue generated by activities carried out under Cooperative Threat Reduction programs in recipient States is being utilized, monitored, and accounted for.

    ``(7) A description of the defense and military activities carried out under Cooperative Threat Reduction programs during the fiscal year ending in the year preceding the year of the report, including--

    ``(A) the amounts obligated or expended for such activities;

    ``(B) the purposes, goals, and objectives for which such amounts were obligated and expended;

    ``(C) a description of the activities carried out, including the forms of assistance provided, and the justification for each form of assistance provided;

    ``(D) the success of each activity, including the goals and objectives achieved for each;

    ``(E) a description of participation by private sector entities in the United States in carrying out such activities, and the participation of any other Federal department or agency in such activities; and

    ``(F) any other information that the Secretary considers relevant to provide a complete description of the operation and success of activities carried out under Cooperative Threat Reduction programs.''.

    (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.--Paragraphs (6) and (7) of section 1308(c) of such Act, as added by subsection (a), shall apply beginning with the report submitted under that section in 2004.

   SEC. 1305. PROHIBITION AGAINST USE OF FUNDS FOR SECOND WING OF FISSILE MATERIAL STORAGE FACILITY.

    No funds authorized to be appropriated for Cooperative Threat Reduction programs for any fiscal year may be used for the design, planning, or construction of a second wing for a storage facility for Russian fissile material.

   SEC. 1306. LIMITED WAIVER OF RESTRICTIONS ON USE OF FUNDS FOR THREAT REDUCTION IN STATES OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION.

    (a) AUTHORITY TO WAIVE RESTRICTIONS AND ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS.--If the President submits the certification and report described in subsection (b) with respect to an independent state of the former Soviet Union for a fiscal year--

    (1) the restrictions in subsection (d) of section 1203 of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Act of 1993 (22 U.S.C. 5952) shall cease to apply, and funds may be obligated and expended under that section for assistance, to that state during that fiscal year; and

    (2) funds may be obligated and expended during that fiscal year under section 502 of the FREEDOM Support Act (22 U.S.C. 5852) for assistance or other programs and activities for that state even if that state has not met one or more of the requirements for eligibility under paragraphs (1) through (4) of that section.

    (b) CERTIFICATION AND REPORT.--(1) The certification and report referred to in subsection (a) are a written certification submitted by the President to Congress that the waiver of the restrictions and requirements described in paragraphs (1) and (2) of that subsection during such fiscal year is important to the national security interests of the United States, together with a report containing the following:

    (A) A description of the activity or activities that prevent the President from certifying that the state is committed to the matters set forth in the provisions of law specified in paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection (a) in such fiscal year.

    (B) An explanation of why the waiver is important to the national security interests of the United States.

    (C) A description of the strategy, plan, or policy of the President for promoting the commitment of the state to, and compliance by the state with, such matters, notwithstanding the waiver.

    (2) The matter included in the report under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

    (c) FISCAL YEARS COVERED.--The authority under subsection (a) shall apply only with respect to fiscal years 2003, 2004, and 2005.

    (d) EXPIRATION OF AUTHORITY.--The authority under subsection (a) shall expire on September 30, 2005.

    (e) ADMINISTRATION OF RESTRICTIONS ON ASSISTANCE.--Subsection (d) of section 1203 of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Act of 1993 (title XII of Public Law 103-160; 107 Stat. 1778; 22 U.S.C. 5952) is amended--

    (1) by striking ``any year'' and inserting ``any fiscal year''; and

    (2) by striking ``that year'' and inserting ``such fiscal year''.

1D) Department of Energy Provisions
Subtitle A--National Security Programs Authorizations

   SEC. 3101. NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION.

    (a) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.--Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated

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    (1) For weapons activities, $5,901,641,000.

    (2) For defense nuclear nonproliferation activities, $1,104,130,000.

    (3) For naval reactors, $706,790,000.

    (4) For the Office of the Administrator for Nuclear Security, $325,929,000.

    (b) AUTHORIZATION OF NEW PLANT PROJECTS.--From funds referred to in subsection (a) that are available for carrying out plant projects, the Secretary of Energy may carry out new plant projects as follows:

    (1) For weapons activities, the following new plant projects:

    Project 03-D-101, Sandia underground reactor facility (SURF), Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico, $2,000,000.

    Project 03-D-103, project engineering and design, various locations, $17,039,000.

    Project 03-D-121, gas transfer capacity expansion, Kansas City Plant, Kansas City, Missouri, $4,000,000.

    Project 03-D-122, prototype purification facility, Y-12 plant, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, $20,800,000.

    Project 03-D-123, special nuclear materials requalification, Pantex plant, Amarillo, Texas, $3,000,000.

    (2) For naval reactors, the following new plant project:

    Project 03-D-201, cleanroom technology facility, Bettis Atomic Power Laboratory, West Mifflin, Pennsylvania, $7,200,000.

   SEC. 3102. DEFENSE ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT.

    (a) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.--Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated to the Department of Energy for fiscal year 2003 for environmental management activities in carrying out programs necessary for national security in the amount of $6,759,846,000, to be allocated as follows:

    (1) For defense environmental restoration and waste management, $4,510,133,000.

    (2) For defense environmental management cleanup reform in carrying out environmental restoration and waste management activities necessary for national security programs, $982,000,000.

    (3) For defense facilities closure projects, $1,109,314,000.

    (4) For defense environmental management privatization, $158,399,000.

    (b) AUTHORIZATION OF NEW PLANT PROJECTS.--From funds referred to in subsection (a) that are available for carrying out plant projects, the Secretary of Energy may carry out new plant projects as follows:

    (1) For environmental restoration and waste management activities, the following new plant project:

    Project 03-D-403, immobilized high-level waste interim storage facility, Richland, Washington, $6,363,000.

    (2) For defense environmental management cleanup reform, the following new plant project:

    Project 03-D-414, project engineering and design, various locations, $8,800,000.

   SEC. 3103. OTHER DEFENSE ACTIVITIES.

    Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated to the Department of Energy for fiscal year 2003 for other defense activities in carrying out programs necessary for national security in the amount of $462,664,000.

   SEC. 3104. DEFENSE NUCLEAR WASTE DISPOSAL.

    Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated to the Department of Energy for fiscal year 2003 for defense nuclear waste disposal for payment to the Nuclear Waste Fund established in section 302(c) of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (42 U.S.C. 10222(c)) in the amount of $315,000,000.

   Subtitle B--Program Authorizations, Restrictions, and Limitations

   SEC. 3141. ANNUAL ASSESSMENTS AND REPORTS TO THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS REGARDING THE CONDITION OF THE UNITED STATES NUCLEAR WEAPONS STOCKPILE.

    (a) ANNUAL ASSESSMENTS REQUIRED.--For each nuclear weapon type in the stockpile of the United States, each official specified in subsection (b) on an annual basis shall, to the extent such official is directly responsible for the safety, reliability, performance, or military effectiveness of that nuclear weapon type, complete an assessment of the safety, reliability, performance, or military effectiveness (as the case may be) of that nuclear weapon type.

    (b) COVERED OFFICIALS.--The officials referred to in subsection (a) are the following:

    (1) The head of each national security laboratory.

    (2) The commander of the United States Strategic Command.

    (c) USE OF TEAMS OF EXPERTS FOR ASSESSMENTS.--The head of each national security laboratory shall establish and use one or more teams of experts, known as ``red teams'', to assist in the assessments required by subsection (a). Each such team shall include experts from both of the other national security laboratories. Each such team for a national security laboratory shall--

    (1) review the matters covered by the assessments under subsection (a) performed by the head of that laboratory;

    (2) subject such matters to challenge; and

    (3) submit the results of such review and challenge, together with the findings and recommendations of such team with respect to such review and challenge, to the head of that laboratory.

    (d) REPORT ON ASSESSMENTS.--Not later than December 1 of each year, each official specified in subsection (b) shall submit to the Secretary concerned, and to the Nuclear Weapons Council, a report on the assessments that such official was required by subsection (a) to complete. The report shall include the following:

    (1) The results of each such assessment.

    (2)(A) Such official's determination as to whether or not one or more underground nuclear tests are necessary to resolve any issues identified in the assessments and, if so--

    (i) an identification of the specific underground nuclear tests that are necessary to resolve such issues; and

    (ii) a discussion of why options other than an underground nuclear test are not available or would not resolve such issues.

    (B) An identification of the specific underground nuclear tests which, while not necessary, might have value in resolving any such issues and a discussion of the anticipated value of conducting such tests.

    (C) Such official's determination as to the readiness of the United States to conduct the underground nuclear tests identified under subparagraphs (A)(i) and (B), if directed by the President to do so.

    (3) In the case of a report submitted by the head of a national security laboratory--

    (A) a concise statement regarding the adequacy of the science-based tools and methods being used to determine the matters covered by the assessments;

    (B) a concise statement regarding the adequacy of the tools and methods employed by the manufacturing infrastructure required by section 3137 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 (42 U.S.C. 2121 note) to identify and fix any inadequacy with respect to the matters covered by the assessments; and

    (C) a concise summary of the findings and recommendations of any teams under subsection (c) that relate to the assessments, together with a discussion of those findings and recommendations.

    (4) In the case of a report submitted by the Commander of the United States Strategic Command, a discussion of the relative merits of other nuclear weapon types (if any), or compensatory measures (if any) that could be taken, that could enable accomplishment of the missions of the nuclear weapon types to which the assessments relate, should such assessments identify any deficiency with respect to such nuclear weapon types.

    (5) An identification and discussion of any matter having an adverse effect on the capability of the official submitting the report to accurately determine the matters covered by the assessments.

    (e) SUBMITTALS TO THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS.--(1) Not later than March 1 of each year, the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy shall submit to the President--

    (A) each report, without change, submitted to either Secretary under subsection (d) during the preceding year;

    (B) any comments that the Secretaries individually or jointly consider appropriate with respect to each such report;

    (C) the conclusions that the Secretaries individually or jointly reach as to the safety, reliability, performance, and military effectiveness of the nuclear weapons stockpile of the United States; and

    (D) any other information that the Secretaries individually or jointly consider appropriate.

    (2) Not later than March 15 of each year, the President shall forward to Congress the matters received by the President under paragraph (1) for that year, together with any comments the President considers appropriate.

    (f) CLASSIFIED FORM.--Each submittal under subsection (e) shall be in classified form only, with the classification level required for each portion of such submittal marked appropriately.

    (g) DEFINITIONS.--In this section:

    (1) The term ``national security laboratory'' has the meaning given such term in section 3281 of the National Nuclear Security Administration Act (50 U.S.C. 2471).

    (2) The term ``Secretary concerned'' means--

    (A) the Secretary of Energy, with respect to matters concerning the Department of Energy; and

    (B) the Secretary of Defense, with respect to matters concerning the Department of Defense.

    (h) FIRST SUBMISSIONS.--(1) The first submissions made under subsection (d) shall be the submissions required to be made in 2003.

    (2) The first submissions made under subsection (e) shall be the submissions required to be made in 2004.

   SEC. 3142. PLANS FOR ACHIEVING ENHANCED READINESS POSTURE FOR RESUMPTION BY THE UNITED STATES OF UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS.

    (a) PLANS REQUIRED.--The Secretary of Energy, in consultation with the Administrator for Nuclear Security, shall prepare plans for achieving, not later than one year after the date on which the plans are submitted under subsection (c), readiness postures of six months, 12 months, 18 months, and 24 months for resumption by the United States of underground nuclear weapons tests.

    (b) READINESS POSTURE.--For purposes of this section, a readiness posture of a specified number of months for resumption by the United States of underground nuclear weapons tests is achieved when the Department of Energy has the capability to resume such tests, if directed by the President to resume such tests, not later than the specified number of months after the date on which the President so directs.

    (c) REPORT.--The Secretary shall include with the budget justification materials submitted to Congress in support of the Department of Energy budget for fiscal year 2004 (as submitted with the budget of the President under section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code) a report on the plans required by subsection (a). The report shall include--

    (1) an assessment of the current readiness posture for resumption by the United States of underground nuclear weapons tests;

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    (2) the plans required by subsection (a) and, for each such plan, the estimated cost for implementing such plan and an estimate of the annual cost of maintaining the readiness posture to which the plan relates; and

    (3) the recommendation of the Secretary, developed in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, as to the optimal readiness posture for resumption by the United States of underground nuclear weapons tests, including the basis for that recommendation.

   SEC. 3143. REQUIREMENTS FOR SPECIFIC REQUEST FOR NEW OR MODIFIED NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

    (a) REQUIREMENT FOR REQUEST FOR FUNDS FOR DEVELOPMENT.--(1) In any fiscal year after fiscal year 2002 in which the Secretary of Energy plans to carry out activities described in paragraph (2) relating to the development of a new nuclear weapon or modified nuclear weapon, the Secretary shall specifically request funds for such activities in the budget of the President for that fiscal year under section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code.

    (2) The activities described in this paragraph are as follows:

    (A) The conduct, or provision for conduct, of research and development which could lead to the production of a new nuclear weapon by the United States.

    (B) The conduct, or provision for conduct, of engineering or manufacturing to carry out the production of a new nuclear weapon by the United States.

    (C) The conduct, or provision for conduct, of research and development which could lead to the production of a modified nuclear weapon by the United States.

    (D) The conduct, or provision for conduct, of engineering or manufacturing to carry out the production of a modified nuclear weapon by the United States.

    (b) BUDGET REQUEST FORMAT.--The Secretary shall include in a request for funds under subsection (a) the following:

    (1) In the case of funds for activities described in subparagraph (A) or (C) of subsection (a)(2), a single dedicated line item for all such activities for new nuclear weapons or modified nuclear weapons that are in phase 1, 2, or 2A or phase 6.1, 6.2, or 6.2A (as the case may be), or any concept work prior to phase 1 or 6.1 (as the case may be), of the nuclear weapons acquisition process.

    (2) In the case of funds for activities described in subparagraph (B) or (D) of subsection (a)(2), a dedicated line item for each such activity for a new nuclear weapon or modified nuclear weapon that is in phase 3 or higher or phase 6.3 or higher (as the case may be) of the nuclear weapons acquisition process.

    (c) EXCEPTION.--Subsection (a) shall not apply to funds for purposes of conducting, or providing for the conduct of, research and development, or manufacturing and engineering, determined by the Secretary to be necessary--

    (1) for the nuclear weapons life extension program;

    (2) to modify an existing nuclear weapon solely to address safety or reliability concerns; or

    (3) to address proliferation concerns.

    (d) DEFINITIONS.--In this section:

    (1) The term ``life extension program'' means the program to repair or replace non-nuclear components, or to modify the pit or canned subassembly, of nuclear weapons that are in the nuclear weapons stockpile on the date of the enactment of this Act in order to assure that such nuclear weapons retain the ability to meet the military requirements applicable to such nuclear weapons when first placed in the nuclear weapons stockpile.

    (2) The term ``modified nuclear weapon'' means a nuclear weapon that contains a pit or canned subassembly, either of which--

    (A) is in the nuclear weapons stockpile as of the date of the enactment of this Act; and

    (B) is being modified in order to meet a military requirement that is other than the military requirements applicable to such nuclear weapon when first placed in the nuclear weapons stockpile.

    (3) The term ``new nuclear weapon'' means a nuclear weapon that contains a pit or canned subassembly, either of which is neither--

    (A) in the nuclear weapons stockpile on the date of the enactment of this Act; nor

    (B) in production as of that date.

   SEC. 3144. DATABASE TO TRACK NOTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION PHASES OF SIGNIFICANT FINDING INVESTIGATIONS.

    (a) AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR DATABASE.--Amounts authorized to be appropriated by section 3101(a)(1) for the National Nuclear Security Administration for weapons activities shall be available to the Deputy Administrator for Nuclear Security for Defense Programs for the development and implementation of a database for all national security laboratories to track the notification and resolution phases of Significant Finding Investigations (SFIs). The purpose of the database is to facilitate the monitoring of the progress and accountability of the national security laboratories in Significant Finding Investigations.

    (b) IMPLEMENTATION DEADLINE.--The database required by subsection (a) shall be implemented not later than September 30, 2003.

    (c) NATIONAL SECURITY LABORATORY DEFINED.--In this section, the term ``national security laboratory'' has the meaning given that term in section 3281(1) of the National Nuclear Security Administration Act (title XXXII of Public Law 106-65; 113 Stat. 968; 50 U.S.C. 2471(1)).

   SEC. 3145. DEFENSE ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT CLEANUP REFORM PROGRAM.

    (a) PROGRAM REQUIRED.--From funds made available pursuant to section 3102(a)(2) for defense environmental management cleanup reform, the Secretary of Energy shall carry out a program to reform DOE environmental management activities. In carrying out the program, the Secretary shall allocate, to each site for which the Secretary has submitted to the congressional defense committees a site performance management plan, the amount of those funds that such plan requires.

    (b) TRANSFER AND MERGER OF FUNDS.--(1) Funds so allocated shall, notwithstanding section 3624, be transferred to the account for DOE environmental management activities and, subject to paragraph (2) and subsection (c), shall be merged with and be available for the same purposes and for the same period as the funds available in such account. The authority provided by section 3629 shall apply to funds so transferred.

    (2) No funds so allocated may be obligated or expended until 30 days after the Secretary submits to the congressional defense committees a description of the activities to be carried out at each site to which funds are so allocated.

    (c) LIMITATION ON USE OF ALL MERGED FUNDS.--Upon a transfer and merger of funds under subsection (b), all funds in the merged account that are available with respect to the site may be used only to carry out the site performance management plan for the site.

    (d) SITE PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT PLAN DEFINED.--For purposes of this section, a site performance management plan for a site is a plan, agreed to by the applicable Federal and State agencies with regulatory jurisdiction with respect to the site, for the performance of activities to accelerate the reduction of environmental risk in connection with, and to accelerate the environmental cleanup of, the site.

    (e) DOE ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT ACTIVITIES DEFINED.--For purposes of this section, the term ``DOE environmental management activities'' means environmental restoration and waste management activities of the Department of Energy in carrying out programs necessary for national security.

   SEC. 3146. LIMITATION ON OBLIGATION OF FUNDS FOR ROBUST NUCLEAR EARTH PENETRATOR PROGRAM PENDING SUBMISSION OF REPORT.

    (a) REPORT-AND-WAIT REQUIREMENT.--None of the funds made available to the Secretary of Energy for fiscal year 2003 for the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator program may be obligated until--

    (1) the Secretary of Defense submits to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives a report described in subsection (b); and

    (2) a period of 30 days has passed after such report is received by those committees.

    (b) REPORT.--A report under subsection (a)(1) is a report on the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator program, prepared by the Secretary of Defense in consultation with the Secretary of Energy, that sets forth the following:

    (1) The military requirements for the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator.

    (2) The nuclear weapons employment policy regarding the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator.

    (3) A detailed description of the categories or types of targets that the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator is designed to hold at risk.

    (4) An assessment of the ability of conventional weapons to defeat the same categories and types of targets as are described pursuant to paragraph (3).

   Subtitle C--Proliferation Matters

   SEC. 3151. TRANSFER TO NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE'S COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM RELATING TO ELIMINATION OF WEAPONS GRADE PLUTONIUM PRODUCTION IN RUSSIA.

    (a) TRANSFER OF PROGRAM.--There are hereby transferred to the Administrator for Nuclear Security the following:

    (1) The program, within the Cooperative Threat Reduction program of the Department of Defense, relating to the elimination of weapons grade plutonium production in Russia.

    (2) All functions, powers, duties, and activities of that program performed before the date of the enactment of this Act by the Department of Defense.

    (b) TRANSFER OF ASSETS.--(1) Notwithstanding any restriction or limitation in law on the availability of Cooperative Threat Reduction funds specified in paragraph (2), so much of the property, records, and unexpended balances of appropriations, allocations, and other funds employed, used, held, available, or to be made available in connection with the program transferred by subsection (a) are transferred to the Administrator for use in connection with the program transferred.

    (2) The Cooperative Threat Reduction funds specified in this paragraph are the following:

    (A) Fiscal year 2002 Cooperative Threat Reduction funds, as specified in section 1301(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 (Public Law 107-107; 115 Stat. 1254; 22 U.S.C. 5952 note).

    (B) Fiscal year 2001 Cooperative Threat Reduction funds, as specified in section 1301(b) of the Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (as enacted into law by Public Law 106-398; 114 Stat. 1654A-339; 22 U.S.C. 5959 note).

    (C) Fiscal year 2000 Cooperative Threat Reduction funds, as specified in section 1301(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (Public Law 106-65; 113 Stat. 792; 22 U.S.C. 5952 note).

    (c) AVAILABILITY OF TRANSFERRED FUNDS.--(1) Notwithstanding any restriction or limitation in law on the availability of Cooperative Threat Reduction funds specified in subsection (b)(2), the Cooperative Threat Reduction funds transferred under subsection (b) for the program referred to in subsection (a) shall be available for activities as follows:

    (A) To design and construct, refurbish, or both, fossil fuel energy plants in Russia that

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    (B) To carry out limited safety upgrades of not more than three energy plants in Russia that produce weapons grade plutonium, provided that such upgrades do not extend the life of those plants.

    (2) Amounts available under paragraph (1) for activities referred to in that paragraph shall remain available for obligation for three fiscal years.

    (d) LIMITATION.--(1) Of the amounts authorized to be appropriated by this title or any other Act for the program referred to in subsection (a), the Administrator for Nuclear Security may not obligate any funds for construction, or obligate or expend more than $100,000,000 for that program, until 30 days after the later of--

    (A) the date on which the Administrator submits to the congressional defense committees, the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, a copy of an agreement or agreements entered into between the United States Government and the Government of the Russian Federation to shut down the three plutonium-producing reactors in Russia as specified under paragraph (2); and

    (B) the date on which the Administrator submits to the committees specified in subparagraph (A) a report on a plan to achieve international participation in the program referred to in subsection (a), including cost sharing.

    (2) The agreement (or agreements) under paragraph (1)(A) shall contain--

    (A) a commitment to shut down the three plutonium-producing reactors;

    (B) the date on which each such reactor will be shut down;

    (C) a schedule and milestones for each such reactor to complete the shutdown of such reactor by the date specified under subparagraph (B);

    (D) a schedule and milestones for refurbishment or construction of fossil fuel energy plants to be undertaken by the Government of the Russian Federation in support of the program;

    (E) an arrangement for access to sites and facilities necessary to meet such schedules and milestones;

    (F) an arrangement for audit and examination procedures in order to evaluate progress in meeting such schedules and milestones; and

    (G) any cost sharing arrangements between the United States Government and the Government of the Russian Federation in undertaking activities under such agreement (or agreements).

   SEC. 3152. REPEAL OF REQUIREMENT FOR REPORTS ON OBLIGATION OF FUNDS FOR PROGRAMS ON FISSILE MATERIALS IN RUSSIA.

    Section 3131 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 (Public Law 104-106; 110 Stat. 617; 22 U.S.C. 5952 note) is amended--

    (1) in subsection (a), by striking ``(a) AUTHORITY.--''; and

    (2) by striking subsection (b).

   SEC. 3153. EXPANSION OF ANNUAL REPORTS ON STATUS OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS PROTECTION, CONTROL, AND ACCOUNTING PROGRAMS.

    (a) COVERED PROGRAMS.--Subsection (a) of section 3171 of the Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (as enacted into law by Public Law 106-398; 114 Stat. 1654A-475; 22 U.S.C. 5952 note) is amended by striking ``Russia that'' and inserting ``countries where such materials''.

    (b) REPORT CONTENTS.--Subsection (b) of that section is amended--

    (1) in paragraph (1) by inserting ``in each country covered by subsection (a)'' after ``locations,'';

    (2) in paragraph (2), by striking ``in Russia'' and inserting ``in each such country'';

    (3) in paragraph (3), by inserting ``in each such country'' after ``subsection (a)''; and

    (4) in paragraph (5), by striking ``by total amount and by amount per fiscal year'' and inserting ``by total amount per country and by amount per fiscal year per country''.

   SEC. 3154. TESTING OF PREPAREDNESS FOR EMERGENCIES INVOLVING NUCLEAR, RADIOLOGICAL, CHEMICAL, OR BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS.

    (a) EXTENSION OF TESTING.--Section 1415 of the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 (title XIV of Public Law 104-201; 110 Stat. 2720; 50 U.S.C. 2315) is amended--

    (1) in subsection (a)(2), by striking ``of five successive fiscal years beginning with fiscal year 1997'' and inserting ``of fiscal years 1997 through 2013''; and

    (2) in subsection (b)(2), by striking ``of five successive fiscal years beginning with fiscal year 1997'' and inserting ``of fiscal years 1997 through 2013''.

    (b) CONSTRUCTION OF EXTENSION WITH DESIGNATION OF ATTORNEY GENERAL AS LEAD OFFICIAL.--The amendments made by subsection (a) may not be construed as modifying the designation of the President titled ``Designation of the Attorney General as the Lead Official for the Emergency Response Assistance Program Under Sections 1412 and 1415 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997'', dated April 6, 2000, designating the Attorney General to assume programmatic and funding responsibilities for the Emergency Response Assistance Program under sections 1412 and 1415 of the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 (title XIV of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997).

   SEC. 3155. COOPERATIVE PROGRAM ON RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND DEMONSTRATION OF TECHNOLOGY REGARDING NUCLEAR OR RADIOLOGICAL TERRORISM.

    (a) PROGRAM REQUIRED.--The Administrator for Nuclear Security shall carry out with the Russian Federation a cooperative program on the research, development, and demonstration of technologies for protection from and response to nuclear or radiological terrorism.

    (b) PROGRAM ELEMENTS.--In carrying out the program required by subsection (a), the Administrator shall--

    (1) conduct research and development of technology for protection from nuclear or radiological terrorism, including technology for the detection, identification, assessment, control, and disposition of radiological materials that could be used for nuclear terrorism; and

    (2) provide, where feasible, for the demonstration to other countries of technologies or methodologies on matters relating to nuclear or radiological terrorism, including--

    (A) the demonstration of technologies developed under the program to respond to nuclear or radiological terrorism;

    (B) the demonstration of technologies developed under the program for the disposal of radioactive materials;

    (C) the demonstration of methodologies developed under the program for use in evaluating the radiological threat of radiological sources identified as not under current accounting programs in the audit report of the Inspector General of the Department of Energy titled ``Accounting for Sealed Sources of Nuclear Material Provided to Foreign Countries'' (DOE/IG-0546);

    (D) in coordination with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the demonstration of methodologies developed under the program to facilitate the development of a regulatory framework for licensing and controlling radioactive sources; and

    (E) in coordination with the Office of Environment, Safety, and Health of the Department of Energy, the demonstration of methodologies developed under the program to facilitate development of consistent criteria for screening international transfers of radiological materials.

    (c) CONSULTATION.--In carrying out activities in accordance with subsection (b)(2), the Administrator shall consult with--

    (1) the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, and Secretary of Commerce; and

    (2) the International Atomic Energy Agency.

    (d) AMOUNT FOR ACTIVITIES.--Of the amount authorized to be appropriated by section 3101(a)(2) for the Department of Energy for the National Nuclear Security Administration for defense nuclear nonproliferation, up to $15,000,000 may be available for carrying out this section.

   SEC. 3156. MATTERS RELATING TO THE INTERNATIONAL MATERIALS PROTECTION, CONTROL, AND ACCOUNTING PROGRAM OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY.

    (a) RADIOLOGICAL DISPERSAL DEVICE MATERIALS PROTECTION, CONTROL, AND ACCOUNTING.--The Secretary of Energy may establish within the International Materials Protection, Control, and Accounting program of the Department of Energy a program on the protection, control, and accounting of materials usable in radiological dispersal devices. In establishing such program, the Secretary shall--

    (1) identify the sites and radiological materials to be covered by such program;

    (2) carry out a risk assessment of such radiological materials; and

    (3) identify and establish the costs of and schedules for such program.

    (b) REVISED FOCUS FOR MATERIALS PROTECTION, CONTROL, AND ACCOUNTING PROGRAM OF RUSSIAN FEDERATION.--(1) The Secretary of Energy shall work cooperatively with the Russian Federation to develop, as soon as practicable but not later than January 1, 2013, a sustainable nuclear materials protection, control, and accounting system for the nuclear materials of the Russian Federation that is supported solely by the Russian Federation.

    (2) The Secretary shall work with the Russian Federation to identify various alternatives to provide the United States adequate transparency in the nuclear materials protection, control, and accounting program of the Russian Federation to assure that such program is meeting applicable goals for nuclear materials protection, control, and accounting.

    (c) AMOUNT FOR ACTIVITIES.--Of the amount authorized to be appropriated by section 3101(a)(2) for the Department of Energy for the National Nuclear Security Administration for defense nuclear nonproliferation, up to $5,000,000 may be available for carrying out this section.

   SEC. 3157. ACCELERATED DISPOSITION OF HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM.

    (a) PROGRAM ON ACCELERATED DISPOSITION OF HEU AUTHORIZED.--(1) The Secretary of Energy may carry out a program to pursue with the Russian Federation options for blending highly enriched uranium so that the concentration of U-235 in such uranium is below 20 percent.

    (2) The options pursued under paragraph (1) shall include expansion of the Material Consolidation and Conversion program of the Department of Energy to include--

    (A) additional facilities for the blending of highly enriched uranium; and

    (B) additional centralized secure storage facilities for highly enriched uranium designated for blending.

    (3) Any site selected for the storage of uranium or blended material under paragraph (2)(B) shall undergo complete materials protection, control, and accounting upgrades before the commencement of the storage of uranium or blended material at such site under the program.

    (b) CONSTRUCTION WITH HEU DISPOSITION AGREEMENT.--Nothing in this section may be construed as terminating, modifying, or otherwise affecting requirements for the disposition of highly enriched uranium under the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation Concerning the Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium Extracted from Nuclear

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    (c) LIMITATION ON RELEASE FOR SALE OF BLENDED URANIUM.--Uranium blended under this section may not be released for sale until the earlier of--

    (1) January 1, 2014; or

    (2) the date on which the Secretary certifies that such uranium can be absorbed into the global market without undue disruption to the uranium mining, conversion, and enrichment industry in the United States.

    (d) AMOUNT FOR ACTIVITIES.--Of the amount to be appropriated by section 3101(a)(2) for the Department of Energy for the National Nuclear Security Administration for defense nuclear nonproliferation, up to $10,000,000 may be available for carrying out this section.

   SEC. 3158. STRENGTHENED INTERNATIONAL SECURITY FOR NUCLEAR MATERIALS AND SECURITY OF NUCLEAR OPERATIONS.

    (a) REPORT ON OPTIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL PROGRAM TO STRENGTHEN SECURITY.--(1) Not later than 270 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Energy shall submit to Congress a report on options for an international program to develop strengthened security for nuclear reactors and associated materials outside the United States.

    (2) In evaluating options for purposes of the report, the Secretary shall consult with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency on the feasibility and advisability of actions to reduce the risks associated with terrorist attacks on nuclear reactors outside the United States.

    (b) JOINT PROGRAMS WITH RUSSIA ON PROLIFERATION-RESISTANT NUCLEAR ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES.--(1) The Secretary shall pursue with the Ministry of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation joint programs between the United States and the Russian Federation on the development of proliferation-resistant nuclear energy technologies, including advanced fuel cycles.

    (2) Of the amount authorized to be appropriated by section 3101(a)(2) for the Department of Energy for the National Nuclear Security Administration for defense nuclear nonproliferation, up to $10,000,000 may be available for carrying out the joint programs referred to in paragraph (1).

    (c) ASSISTANCE REGARDING HOSTILE INSIDERS.--The Secretary may, utilizing appropriate expertise of the Department of Energy and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, provide technical assistance to nuclear reactor facilities outside the United States with respect to the interdiction of hostile insiders at such facilities in order to prevent incidents arising from the disablement of the vital systems of such facilities.

   SEC. 3159. EXPORT CONTROL PROGRAMS.

    (a) AUTHORITY TO PURSUE OPTIONS FOR STRENGTHENING EXPORT CONTROL PROGRAMS.--The Secretary of Energy, in coordination with the Secretary of State, may pursue in the region of the former Soviet Union and other regions of concern options for accelerating programs that assist the countries in such regions in improving their domestic export control programs for materials, technologies, and expertise relevant to the construction or use of a nuclear or radiological dispersal device.

    (b) AMOUNT FOR ACTIVITIES.--Of the amount authorized to be appropriated by section 3101(a)(2) for the Department of Energy for the National Nuclear Security Administration for defense nuclear nonproliferation, up to $5,000,000 may be available for carrying out this section.

   SEC. 3160. PLAN FOR ACCELERATED RETURN OF WEAPONS-USABLE NUCLEAR MATERIALS.

    (a) PLAN FOR ACCELERATED RETURN.--The Secretary of Energy shall work with the Russian Federation to develop a plan to accelerate the return to Russia of all weapons-usable nuclear materials located in research reactors and other facilities outside Russia that were supplied by the former Soviet Union.

    (b) FUNDING AND SCHEDULES.--As part of the plan under subsection (a), the Secretary shall identify the funding and schedules required to assist the research reactors and facilities referred to in that subsection in--

    (1) transferring highly enriched uranium to Russia; and

    (2) upgrading the materials protection, control, and accounting procedures at such research reactors and facilities until the weapons-usable nuclear materials in such reactors and facilities are returned in accordance with that subsection.

    (c) COORDINATION.--The provision of assistance under subsection (b) shall be closely coordinated with the International Atomic Energy Agency.

   SEC. 3161. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON AMENDMENT OF CONVENTION ON PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS.

    (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.--It is the sense of Congress that the President should encourage amendment of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials in order to provide that the Convention shall--

    (1) apply to both the domestic and international use and transport of nuclear materials;

    (2) incorporate fundamental practices for the physical protection of such materials; and

    (3) address protection against sabotage involving nuclear materials.

    (b) CONVENTION ON THE PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL DEFINED.--In this section, the term ``Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials'' means the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, With Annex, done at Vienna on October 26, 1979.

   SEC. 3162. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON PROGRAM TO SECURE STOCKPILES OF HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM AND PLUTONIUM.

    It is the sense of Congress that the Secretary of Energy should, in consultation with the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense, develop a comprehensive program of activities to encourage all countries with nuclear materials to adhere to, or to adopt standards equivalent to, the International Atomic Energy Agency standard on The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225/Rev.4), relating to the security of stockpiles of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium (Pu).

   Subtitle D--Other Matters

   SEC. 3171. INDEMNIFICATION OF DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY CONTRACTORS.

    Section 170 d.(1)(A) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2210(d)(1)(A)) is amended by striking ``until August 1, 2002,'' and inserting ``until December 31, 2004,''.

   SEC. 3172. SUPPORT FOR PUBLIC EDUCATION IN THE VICINITY OF LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY, NEW MEXICO.

    (a) SUPPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2003.--From amounts authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary of Energy by this title, $6,900,000 shall be available for payment by the Secretary for fiscal year 2003 to the Los Alamos National Laboratory Foundation, a not-for-profit foundation chartered as described in section 3167(a) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 (Public Law 105-85; 111 Stat. 2052).

    (b) USE OF FUNDS.--The foundation referred to in subsection (a) shall--

    (1) utilize funds provided under this section as a contribution to the endowment fund for the foundation; and

    (2) use the income generated from investments in the endowment fund that are attributable to the payment made under this section to fund programs to support the educational needs of children in the public schools in the vicinity of Los Alamos National Laboratory, New Mexico.

    (c) REPEAL OF SUPERSEDED AUTHORITY AND MODIFICATION OF AUTHORITY TO EXTEND CONTRACT.--(1) Subsection (b) of section 3136 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 (Public Law 107-107; 115 Stat. 1368) is amended to read as follows:

    ``(b) SUPPORT FOR FISCAL YEARS 2003 THROUGH 2005.--Subject to the availability of appropriations, the Secretary may provide for a contract extension through fiscal year 2005 similar to the contract extension referred to in subsection (a)(2).''.

    (2) The amendment made by paragraph (1) shall take effect on October 1, 2002.

    (d) REPORT.--(1) The Secretary of Energy, in consultation with the Administrator for Nuclear Security, shall conduct a study of options for funding the contract extension authorized by subsection (b) of such section 3136 (as amended by subsection (c)) other than through annual appropriations. The study should also include options for providing cost of living adjustments to teachers in the public schools in the vicinity of Los Alamos National Laboratory, New Mexico, other than through such contract extension.

    (2) Not later than December 31, 2003, the Secretary shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on the study conducted under paragraph (1). The report shall set forth the findings and conclusions of the study, together with any recommendations as a result of the study.

   SEC. 3173. WORKER HEALTH AND SAFETY RULES FOR DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NUCLEAR FACILITIES.

    (a) WORKER HEALTH AND SAFETY RULES.--The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 is amended by inserting after section 234B (42 U.S.C. 2282b) the following new section:

   ``SEC. 234C. WORKER HEALTH AND SAFETY RULES FOR DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NUCLEAR FACILITIES.

    ``a. REGULATIONS REQUIRED.--

    ``(1) IN GENERAL.--The Secretary shall promulgate regulations for industrial and construction health and safety at Department of Energy facilities that are operated by contractors covered by agreements of indemnification under section 170 d. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, after public notice and opportunity for comment under section 553 of title 5, United States Code (commonly known as the `Administrative Procedure Act'). Such regulations shall, subject to paragraph (3), provide a level of protection for workers at such facilities that is substantially equivalent to the level of protection currently provided to such workers at such facilities.

    ``(2) APPLICABILITY.--The regulations promulgated under paragraph (1) shall not apply to any facility that is a component of, or any activity conducted under, the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program provided for under Executive Order No. 12344, dated February 1, 1982 (42 U.S.C. 7158 note) (as in force pursuant to section 1634 of the Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1985 (Public Law 98-525; 42 U.S.C. 7158 note)).

    ``(3) FLEXIBILITY.--In promulgating the regulations under paragraph (1), the Secretary shall include flexibility--

    ``(A) to tailor implementation of such regulations to reflect activities and hazards associated with a particular work environment;

    ``(B) to take into account special circumstances at a facility that is, or is expected to be, permanently closed and that is expected to be demolished, or title to which is expected to be transferred to another entity for reuse; and

    ``(C) to achieve national security missions of the Department of Energy in an efficient and timely manner.

    ``(4) NO EFFECT ON HEALTH AND SAFETY ENFORCEMENT.--This subsection does not diminish or otherwise affect the enforcement or the application of any other law, regulation, order, or contractual obligation relating to worker health and safety.

    ``b. CIVIL PENALTIES.--

    ``(1) IN GENERAL.--A person (or any subcontractor or supplier of the person) who has entered into an agreement of indemnification

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    ``(2) CONTINUING VIOLATIONS.--If any violation under this subsection is a continuing violation, each day of the violation shall constitute a separate violation for the purpose of computing the civil penalty under paragraph (1).

    ``c. CONTRACT PENALTIES.--

    ``(1) IN GENERAL.--The Secretary shall include in each contract with a contractor of the Department who has entered into an agreement of indemnification under section 170 d. provisions that provide an appropriate reduction in the fees or amounts paid to the contractor under the contract in the event of a violation by the contractor or contractor employee of any regulation promulgated under subsection a.

    ``(2) CONTENTS.--The provisions shall specify various degrees of violations and the amount of the reduction attributable to each degree of violation.

    ``d. COORDINATION OF PENALTIES.--

    ``(1) CHOICE OF PENALTIES.--For any violation by a person of a regulation promulgated under subsection a., the Secretary shall pursue either civil penalties under subsection b. or contract penalties under subsection c., but not both.

    ``(2) MAXIMUM AMOUNT.--In the case of an entity described in subsection d. of section 234A, the total amount of civil penalties under subsection b. and contract penalties under subsection c. in a fiscal year may not exceed the total amount of fees paid by the Department of Energy to that entity in that fiscal year.

    ``(3) COORDINATION WITH SECTION 234A.--The Secretary shall ensure that a contractor of the Department is not penalized both under this section and under section 234A for the same violation.''.

    (b) PROMULGATION OF INITIAL REGULATIONS.--

    (1) DEADLINE FOR PROMULGATING REGULATIONS.--The Secretary of Energy shall promulgate the regulations required by subsection a. of section 234C of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (as added by subsection (a)) not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act.

    (2) EFFECTIVE DATE.--The regulations promulgated under paragraph (1) shall take effect on the date that is one year after the promulgation date of the regulations.

    (c) PROHIBITION.--The Secretary of Energy shall not participate in or otherwise support any study or other project relating to a modification in the scope of the regulations enforceable by civil penalties under section 234A or 234C of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, or the responsibility of the Secretary to implement and enforce such regulations, until after the date on which the regulations for such purposes under such section 234C take effect in accordance with subsection (b).

   SEC. 3174. EXTENSION OF AUTHORITY TO APPOINT CERTAIN SCIENTIFIC, ENGINEERING, AND TECHNICAL PERSONNEL.

    Section 3161(c)(1) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 (42 U.S.C. 7231 note) is amended by striking ``September 30, 2002'' and inserting ``September 30, 2004''.

   SEC. 3175. ONE-YEAR EXTENSION OF PANEL TO ASSESS THE RELIABILITY, SAFETY, AND SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES NUCLEAR STOCKPILE.

    Section 3159 of the Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 (42 U.S.C. 2121 note) is amended--

    (1) in subsection (f), by striking ``atomic energy defense activities'' and inserting ``the National Nuclear Security Administration'';

    (2) in subsection (g), by striking ``three years'' and all that follows through the period at the end and inserting ``April 1, 2003.''; and

    (3) by adding at the end the following new subsection:

    ``(i) FOLLOW-UP REPORT.--Not later than February 1, 2003, the panel shall submit to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives a follow-up report assessing progress toward meeting the expectations set forth by the panel for the United States stockpile stewardship program, and making recommendations for corrective legislative action where progress has been unsatisfactory.''.

   SEC. 3176. REPORT ON STATUS OF ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT INITIATIVES TO ACCELERATE THE REDUCTION OF ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS AND CHALLENGES POSED BY THE LEGACY OF THE COLD WAR.

    (a) REPORT REQUIRED.--The Secretary of Energy shall prepare a report on the status of those environmental management initiatives specified in subsection (c) that are being undertaken to accelerate the reduction of the environmental risks and challenges that, as a result of the legacy of the Cold War, are faced by the Department of Energy, contractors of the Department, and applicable Federal and State agencies with regulatory jurisdiction.

    (b) CONTENTS.--The report shall include the following matters:

    (1) A discussion of the progress made in reducing such risks and challenges in each of the following areas:

    (A) Acquisition strategy and contract management.

    (B) Regulatory agreements.

    (C) Interim storage and final disposal of high-level waste, spent nuclear fuel, transuranic waste, and low-level waste.

    (D) Closure and transfer of environmental remediation sites.

    (E) Achievements in innovation by contractors of the Department with respect to accelerated risk reduction and cleanup.

    (F) Consolidation of special nuclear materials and improvements in safeguards and security.

    (2) An assessment of the progress made in streamlining risk reduction processes of the environmental management program of the Department.

    (3) An assessment of the progress made in improving the responsiveness and effectiveness of the environmental management program of the Department.

    (4) Any proposals for legislation that the Secretary considers necessary to carry out such initiatives, including the justification for each such proposal.

    (c) INITIATIVES COVERED.--The environmental management initiatives referred to in subsection (a) are the initiatives arising out of the report titled ``Top-to-Bottom Review of the Environmental Management Program'' and dated February 4, 2002, with respect to the environmental restoration and waste management activities of the Department of Energy in carrying out programs necessary for national security.

    (d) SUBMISSION OF REPORT.--On the date on which the budget justification materials in support of the Department of Energy budget for fiscal year 2004 (as submitted with the budget of the President under section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code) are submitted to Congress, the Secretary shall submit to the congressional defense committees the report required by subsection (a).

   Subtitle E--Disposition of Weapons-Usable Plutonium at Savannah River, South Carolina

   SEC. 3181. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:

    (1) In September 2000, the United States and the Russian Federation signed a Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement by which each agreed to dispose of 34 metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium.

    (2) The agreement with Russia is a significant step toward safeguarding nuclear materials and preventing their diversion to rogue states and terrorists.

    (3) The Department of Energy plans to dispose of 34 metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium in the United States before the end of 2019 by converting the plutonium to a mixed-oxide fuel to be used in commercial nuclear power reactors.

    (4) The Department has formulated a plan for implementing the agreement with Russia through construction of a mixed-oxide fuel fabrication facility, the so-called MOX facility, and a pit disassembly and conversion facility at the Savannah River Site, Aiken, South Carolina.

    (5) The United States and the State of South Carolina have a compelling interest in the safe, proper, and efficient operation of the plutonium disposition facilities at the Savannah River Site. The MOX facility will also be economically beneficial to the State of South Carolina, and that economic benefit will not be fully realized unless the MOX facility is built.

    (6) The State of South Carolina desires to ensure that all plutonium transferred to the State of South Carolina is stored safely; that the full benefits of the MOX facility are realized as soon as possible; and, specifically, that all defense plutonium or defense plutonium materials transferred to the Savannah River Site either be processed or be removed expeditiously.

   SEC. 3182. DISPOSITION OF WEAPONS-USABLE PLUTONIUM AT SAVANNAH RIVER SITE.

    (a) PLAN FOR CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION OF MOX FACILITY.--(1) Not later than February 1, 2003, the Secretary of Energy shall submit to Congress a plan for the construction and operation of the MOX facility at the Savannah River Site, Aiken, South Carolina.

    (2) The plan under paragraph (1) shall include--

    (A) a schedule for construction and operations so as to achieve, as of January 1, 2009, and thereafter, the MOX production objective, and to produce 1 metric ton of mixed-oxide fuel by December 31, 2009; and

    (B) a schedule of operations of the MOX facility designed so that 34 metric tons of defense plutonium and defense plutonium materials at the Savannah River Site will be processed into mixed-oxide fuel by January 1, 2019.

    (3)(A) Not later than February 15 each year, beginning in 2004 and continuing for as long as the MOX facility is in use, the Secretary shall submit to Congress a report on the implementation of the plan required by paragraph (1).

    (B) Each report under subparagraph (A) for years before 2010 shall include--

    (i) an assessment of compliance with the schedules included with the plan under paragraph (2); and

    (ii) a certification by the Secretary whether or not the MOX production objective can be met by January 2009.

    (C) Each report under subparagraph (A) for years after 2009 shall--

    (i) address whether the MOX production objective has been met; and

    (ii) assess progress toward meeting the obligations of the United States under the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement.

    (D) Each report under subparagraph (A) for years after 2017 shall also include an assessment of compliance with the MOX production objective and, if not in compliance, the plan of the Secretary for achieving one of the following:

    (i) Compliance with such objective.

    (ii) Removal of all remaining defense plutonium and defense plutonium materials from the State of South Carolina.

    (b) CORRECTIVE ACTIONS.--(1) If a report under subsection (a)(3) indicates that construction or operation of the MOX facility is behind the applicable schedule under subsection (a)(2) by 12 months or more, the Secretary shall submit to Congress, not later than August 15 of the year in which such report is submitted, a plan for corrective actions to be implemented by the Secretary to ensure that the MOX facility project is capable of meeting the MOX production objective by January 1, 2009.

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    (2) If a plan is submitted under paragraph (1) in any year after 2008, the plan shall include corrective actions to be implemented by the Secretary to ensure that the MOX production objective is met.

    (3) Any plan for corrective actions under paragraph (1) or (2) shall include established milestones under such plan for achieving compliance with the MOX production objective.

    (4) If, before January 1, 2009, the Secretary determines that there is a substantial and material risk that the MOX production objective will not be achieved by 2009 because of a failure to achieve milestones set forth in the most recent corrective action plan under this subsection, the Secretary shall suspend further transfers of defense plutonium and defense plutonium materials to be processed by the MOX facility until such risk is addressed and the Secretary certifies that the MOX production objective can be met by 2009.

    (5) If, after January 1, 2009, the Secretary determines that the MOX production objective has not been achieved because of a failure to achieve milestones set forth in the most recent corrective action plan under this subsection, the Secretary shall suspend further transfers of defense plutonium and defense plutonium materials to be processed by the MOX facility until the Secretary certifies that the MOX production objective can be met.

    (6)(A) Upon making a determination under paragraph (4) or (5), the Secretary shall submit to Congress a report on the options for removing from the State of South Carolina an amount of defense plutonium or defense plutonium materials equal to the amount of defense plutonium or defense plutonium materials transferred to the State of South Carolina after April 15, 2002.

    (B) Each report under subparagraph (A) shall include an analysis of each option set forth in the report, including the cost and schedule for implementation of such option, and any requirements under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.) relating to consideration or selection of such option.

    (C) Upon submittal of a report under paragraph (A), the Secretary shall commence any analysis that may be required under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 in order to select among the options set forth in the report.

    (c) CONTINGENT REQUIREMENT FOR REMOVAL OF PLUTONIUM AND MATERIALS FROM SAVANNAH RIVER SITE.--If the MOX production objective is not achieved as of January 1, 2009, the Secretary shall, consistent with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 and other applicable laws, remove from the State of South Carolina, for storage or disposal elsewhere--

    (1) not later than January 1, 2011, not less than 1 metric ton of defense plutonium or defense plutonium materials; and

    (2) not later than January 1, 2017, an amount of defense plutonium or defense plutonium materials equal to the amount of defense plutonium or defense plutonium materials transferred to the Savannah River Site between April 15, 2002 and January 1, 2017, but not processed by the MOX facility.

    (d) ECONOMIC AND IMPACT ASSISTANCE.--(1) If the MOX production objective is not achieved as of January 1, 2011, the Secretary shall, from funds available to the Secretary, pay to the State of South Carolina each year beginning on or after that date through 2016 for economic and impact assistance an amount equal to $1,000,000 per day, not to exceed $100,000,000 per year, until the later of--

    (A) the date on which the MOX production objective is achieved in such year; or

    (B) the date on which the Secretary has removed from the State of South Carolina in such year at least 1 metric ton of defense plutonium or defense plutonium materials.

    (2)(A) If, as of January 1, 2017, the MOX facility has not processed mixed-oxide fuel from defense plutonium and defense plutonium materials in the amount of not less than--

    (i) one metric ton, in each of any two consecutive calendar years; and

    (ii) three metric tons total,

   the Secretary shall, from funds available to the Secretary, pay to the State of South Carolina for economic and impact assistance an amount equal to $1,000,000 per day, not to exceed $100,000,000 per year, until the removal by the Secretary from the State of South Carolina of an amount of defense plutonium or defense plutonium materials equal to the amount of defense plutonium or defense plutonium materials transferred to the Savannah River Site between April 15, 2002, and January 1, 2017, but not processed by the MOX facility.

    (B) Nothing in this paragraph may be construed to terminate, supersede, or otherwise affect any other requirements of this section.

    (3) If the State of South Carolina obtains an injunction that prohibits the Department from taking any action necessary for the Department to meet any deadline specified by this subsection, that deadline shall be extended for a period of time equal to the period of time during which the injunction is in effect.

    (e) FAILURE TO COMPLETE PLANNED DISPOSITION PROGRAM.--If on July 1 each year beginning in 2020 and continuing for as long as the MOX facility is in use, less than 34 metric tons of defense plutonium or defense plutonium materials have been processed by the MOX facility, the Secretary shall submit to Congress a plan for--

    (1) completing the processing of 34 metric tons of defense plutonium and defense plutonium material by the MOX facility; or

    (2) removing from the State of South Carolina an amount of defense plutonium or defense plutonium materials equal to the amount of defense plutonium or defense plutonium materials transferred to the Savannah River Site after April 15, 2002, but not processed by the MOX facility.

    (f) REMOVAL OF MIXED-OXIDE FUEL UPON COMPLETION OF OPERATIONS OF MOX FACILITY.--If, one year after the date on which operation of the MOX facility permanently ceases, any mixed-oxide fuel remains at the Savannah River Site, the Secretary shall submit to Congress--

    (1) a report on when such fuel will be transferred for use in commercial nuclear reactors; or

    (2) a plan for removing such fuel from the State of South Carolina.

    (g) DEFINITIONS.--In this section:

    (1) MOX PRODUCTION OBJECTIVE.--The term ``MOX production objective'' means production at the MOX facility of mixed-oxide fuel from defense plutonium and defense plutonium materials at an average rate equivalent to not less than one metric ton of mixed-oxide fuel per year. The average rate shall be determined by measuring production at the MOX facility from the date the facility is declared operational to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission through the date of assessment.

    (2) MOX FACILITY.--The term ``MOX facility'' means the mixed-oxide fuel fabrication facility at the Savannah River Site, Aiken, South Carolina.

    (3) DEFENSE PLUTONIUM; DEFENSE PLUTONIUM MATERIALS.--The terms ``defense plutonium'' and ``defense plutonium materials'' mean weapons-usable plutonium.

1F) Condemning the DPRK for Violation of NPT
H. Con. Res. 517. A concurrent resolution condemning the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for its failure to comply with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework of 1994; referred to the Committee on International Relations.

Remarks: Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to discuss a very serious issue--the failure of North Korea to comply with a number of non-proliferation treaties, agreements, and resolutions, and the absence of any well-defined U.S. policy with that country.

The history of nuclear weapons proliferation in North Korea is a lengthy one, going back over a decade and a half when North Korea signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty. When it signed that treaty in 1985, North Korea agreed not to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons, and also agreed that the International Atomic Energy Agency could conduct inspections to verify fulfillment of those obligations.

When that Agency discovered anomalies in North Korea's nuclear facilities in 1993, inspectors were no longer allowed into the country.

Seeking to end the stalemate, the U.S. and North Korea signed the Agreed Framework in October, 1994. Under the terms of the Agreed Framework, the U.S. created an international consortium, which would provide North Korea with alternative sources of energy in the form of heavy fuel oil and a modern nuclear power plant. In return, North Korea pledged to freeze its existing nuclear program and allow inspectors back into the country.

• Shortly after the Framework was signed, the consortium, the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, was created. Despite the fact that the U.S. and its allies have spent over $1.3 billion to finance reactor construction and provide heavy fuel oil to North Korea annually, they have consistently failed to allow inspections of its nuclear facilities.

Then last month, North Korea admitted that it has been operating a covert nuclear weapons program.

The existence of a North Korean nuclear weapons program poses a real and imminent threat to the populations of South Korea, Japan, and North Korea, and to the U.S. Armed Forces stationed in that region.

The time has come for the U.S. to establish an effective policy regarding U.N. member states and their obligations towards world peace and disarmament.

Today, I am introducing a resolution, condemning the government of North Korea for its failure to comply with the non-proliferation treaty and the Agreed Framework.

First, my resolution calls on North Korea to honor its commitments under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Agreed Framework. Those commitments include freezing its nuclear programs and allowing the IAEA to carry out inspections.

It also commends the members of the KEDO international consortium for honoring and upholding their commitments to advance the implementation of the Agreed Framework.

Second, my resolution calls on the IAEA to report to the U.N. General Assembly, one year from the date of the Resolution, on the status of North Korea's compliance with inspections.

If the IAEA report indicates that North Korea has still not allowed inspections, members of KEDO are called on to suspend all funding for construction, suspend construction of the light water reactor, and suspend shipment of heavy fuel oil.

And finally, the Resolution calls on the leaders of Russia, China, Japan, South Korea, and other concerned nations to support that potential suspension.

I believe that this Resolution is an important first step in achieving the non-proliferation treaty goal of nuclear disarmament.

I do not recommend, as many have suggested, simply declaring the Agreed Framework null and void. I believe that ``suspending'' our participation until North Korea complies with its obligations sends an important message. That message is--we honor our commitments, we expect you to honor yours, and we believe that diplomatic and peaceful solutions, with the full support of other concerned nations, are the optimum means for attaining the objectives outlined in the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Realize, this is only the first step on what will be a long and arduous path. This Resolution allows diplomatic discussions and negotiations to continue, it also allows our Secretary of State to garner support from members of the U.N. Security Council and other concerned nations to join in commitments to the non-proliferation treaty.

I have specifically not included any language in the Resolution on actions that might be taken after one year if inspectors are still not allowed into North Korea. It is more appropriate to leave that decision to the member nations on the U.N. Security Council.

There are nearly 38,000 U.S. Armed Forces currently stationed on the Korean peninsula, and another 40,000 stationed in Japan. We have a lot at stake as a nation in ensuring a peaceful solution to this issue. At the same time, we must take steps to overcome this impasse. It is not reasonable for the United States to continue unilateral compliance with a bilateral Agreement.

I urge my colleagues to support this resolution.

I believe this resolution will guide our nation towards implementing a policy that is achievable, and attainable, and supportable.

1G) Improve the Safety of Nuclear Waste Transportation
S. 3162. A bill to amend title 49, United States Code, to enhance the security of transporting high-level nuclear waste and spend nuclear fuel, and for other purposes; referred to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.

Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce legislation to improve the safety of nuclear waste transportation across our Nation. This bill, the Nuclear Waste Transportation Security Act of 2002, seeks to address the concerns raised by the Congress' decision earlier this year to transport spent nuclear fuel to Yucca Mountain, NV, for underground storage. Joining me in its introduction are Senators CLELAND, EDWARDS, and NELSON.

   I voted in favor of moving nuclear waste to Yucca Mountain. My decision was not a simple one; rather its ramifications required serious consideration. At that time, I predicated my `yes' vote on the waste being transported safely and securely through my home State of Illinois and across our Nation, and I indicated that I would introduce legislation to improve that safety and security. This is that legislation.

   The Transportation to establish a comprehensive transportation safety program that considers terrorist threats and other potential dangers to the safe transportation of this spent fuel. The Department of Transportation, the regulator of these shipments, will consult with numerous cabinet and sub-cabinet offices, including the soon to be created Department of Homeland Security, to develop this program. After one year, the Secretary will deliver a progress report to Congress on the program's development and implementation.

   To better assist State, local, and tribal governments in implementing this program, our bill establishes a grant program at DOT related to the transportation of nuclear spent fuel. First responders will be eligible for these grants, which will emphasize frequently used routes. The grants will be used for infrastructure improvements, drills and training, and other activities as determined by the Secretary. DOE and the Federal Radiological Preparedness Coordinating Committee, FRPCC, of FEMA will consult on the grant program. For this purpose, the bill authorizes $3,000,000 for fiscal year 2003 and additional funds as necessary for fiscal years 2004 through 2012.

   A key component of spent nuclear fuel transportation is ensuring the safety and security of routes nationwide. Much of this fuel is likely to be transported through my own State of Illinois, right through the center of Chicago and Springfield, our State capitol. I want to be certain that its transport does not endanger my constituents in any way. The Department of Energy ranks Illinois seventh in truck shipments under what is called the ``mostly truck scenario,'' and sixth in rail shipments in the ``mostly rail scenario.'' Nearly half of Illinois' electricity is generated from nuclear power. With seven nuclear power plants and two nuclear research reactors Illinois produces more nuclear waste than any other State and is home to some of the busiest transportation corridors in the Nation. The safety of Illinoisans is at stake. These stakes are too high for us to gamble. Safety must be a top priority.

   To ensure this safety, my bill requires that the DOT consult with State governments in establishing routes and provide 14-days' notice to governors of shipments through their States. The bill requires dedicated trains for the waste with trained guards stationed at the front and rear ends of each train. The bill provides the Secretary of Transportation and the Director of Homeland Security with waiver authority for national or homeland

   security. Under my legislation, trains must be equipped with communication systems providing continuous access to first responders and must be equipped with the best available technology, including appropriate health monitoring systems. Finally, to ensure the safe transportation of passengers and shippers on our nation's waterways, nuclear waste shipments may not be made via the inland waterways or on the Great Lakes unless waived for national or homeland security purposes. This is critical to adequately protect these important natural resources.

   Once the infrastructure is established and the routing determined, employees must be certified to handle any such emergencies that may result from this transportation and to mitigate their impact on local populations. My bill amends certification requirements for hazmat employees, requiring that certification be renewed every three years. Currently, this certification, without renewals, is required by regulation but not codified in statute.

   The bill directs hazmat employers to submit training programs to DOT for review and approval and expands the definition of covered employees to include those who may be among the first responders to an accident but who do not receive training under current regulations. To provide funding for this additional training, the bill reauthorizes the training grant program for hazmat instructors who train hazmat employees, and enables it to cover hazmat employee training as well. Appropriations are authorized at $3,000,000 for fiscal year 2003 and for such sums as necessary for fiscal years 2004-2012.

   The maximum civil penalties for violating hazmat laws regarding radioactive materials are increased from $25,000 to $100,000.

   As a means of involving the public in these decisions affecting safety and security, the bill establishes a public outreach program to protect public health and safety. The program will be developed by FEMA in coordination with other agencies. In addition, the bill requires the EPA and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to conduct a study and report to Congress regarding the effects on public health of routine transportation of nuclear waste and accidents involving its transportation. The report is due one year after the date of enactment.

   Especially important to my legislation is the establishment of requirements for casks. Also known as packages, these casks contain the spent nuclear fuel that is being shipped. The bill requires the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which has authority over the casks, to execute a comprehensive testing program in conjunction with DOT and DHS, and requires them to conduct a survey of potential terrorist and other threats that may be posed to casks. The NRC and DOT must jointly certify the safety of the casks, which must be designed to handle head-on collisions at any speed at which they will be transported, attempted puncture by armor-piercing ammunition, falls of the maximum distance to which the package could fall on likely routes, submersion in water to the maximum depth to which the package could be submerged, continuous exposure to the maximum temperature to which the package is likely to be subjected in an event involving fire, and other threats that may be identified. The agencies involved in this effort must report to Congress every two years on these activities.

   Finally, the bill amends current statute to exclude DOT and NRC contractors from participating on the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board and enables the Board to review the activities of the DOT and NRC and to obtain documents from them as part of its existing investigative powers. This provision will prevent any conflicts of interest between the reviewers and implementers of this law. The Board's termination date is extended from one year after nuclear waste begins to be deposited at a national repository to 10 years after such waste begins to be deposited.

   I believe that our legislation alleviates many of the concerns of shippers, hazmat employees, the federal government, and affected citizens regarding the transportation of nuclear spent fuel across our Nation. In the course of its development, we consulted with shippers, railroads, labor unions, the nuclear industry, federal regulators, the environmental community, and our colleagues in the Senate. The bill seeks to address the real threats we face and to take economic and safety concerns into account, with the primary goal of increasing the safety and security of these materials during their transportation to Yucca Mountain. I appreciate the assistance that these groups have provided. I remain open to their further input and look forward to working with them to enact this critical legislation.

2A) Missile Defense Provisions
TITLE II--RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION

Subtitle C--Ballistic Missile Defense.

SEC. 221. REPORT REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAMS.

(a) ANNUAL SUBMISSION OF CURRENT PERFORMANCE GOALS AND DEVELOPMENT BASELINES.--(1) The Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees each year the performance goals and development baselines--
(A) for those ballistic missile defense systems under development by the Missile Defense Agency that could be fielded; and
(B) for any other ballistic missile defense program or project that has been designated by Congress as a special interest item.
(2) Such performance goals and development baselines shall be provided for each block of each such system.
(3) The performance goals and development baselines under paragraph (1) shall be included annually with the defense budget justification materials submitted in support of the President's budget submitted to Congress under section 1105 of title 31, United States Code.

(b) RDT&E BUDGET JUSTIFICATION MATERIALS.--The budget justification materials submitted to Congress for any fiscal year in support of a request for the authorization and appropriation of funds for research, development, test, and evaluation for ballistic missile defense systems shall include a funding profile for each block of each such system that could be fielded that reflects the development baseline submitted pursuant to subsection (a) for that fiscal year.

(c) REVIEW OF MDA CRITERIA IN RELATION TO MILITARY REQUIREMENTS.--(1) The Joint Requirements Oversight Council established under section 181 of title 10, United States Code, shall review cost, schedule, and performance criteria for missile defense programs of the Missile Defense Agency in order to assess the validity of those criteria in relation to military requirements.
(2) The Secretary shall include the results of such review with the first annual statement of program goals submitted to the congressional defense committees under section 232(c) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 (Public Law 107-107; 10 U.S.C. 2431 note) after the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 222. RESPONSIBILITY OF MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY FOR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION RELATED TO SYSTEM IMPROVEMENTS OF PROGRAMS TRANSFERRED TO MILITARY DEPARTMENTS.
Section 224(e) of title 10, United States Code, is amended--
(1) by striking ``before a'' and inserting ``for each'';
(2) by striking ``is''; and [Page: H8102]
(3) by striking ``roles and responsibilities'' and all that follows through the period at the end and inserting ``responsibility for research, development, test, and evaluation related to system improvements for that program remains with the Director.''.

SEC. 223. LIMITATION ON OBLIGATION OF FUNDS FOR THEATER HIGH ALTITUDE AREA DEFENSE PROGRAM PENDING SUBMISSION OF REQUIRED LIFE-CYCLE COST INFORMATION.
(a) LIMITATION PENDING SUBMISSION OF CERTIFICATION.--Not more than 85 percent of the amount specified in subsection (b) may be obligated until the Secretary of Defense submits to the congressional defense committees the estimated total life-cycle cost of the Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) program as required for programs in engineering and manufacturing development by section 232(d) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 (Public Law 107-107; 10 U.S.C. 2431 note).
(b) FUNDS SUBJECT TO LIMITATION.--Subsection (a) applies to the amount authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2003 for the Missile Defense Agency for the Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) program.

SEC. 224. PROVISION OF INFORMATION ON FLIGHT TESTING OF GROUND-BASED MIDCOURSE NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM.
(a) INFORMATION TO BE FURNISHED TO CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.--The Director of the Missile Defense Agency shall provide to the congressional defense committees information on the results of each flight test of the Ground-based Midcourse national missile defense system.
(b) CONTENT.--Information provided under subsection (a) on the results of a flight test shall include the following matters:
(1) A thorough discussion of the content and objectives of the test.
(2) For each such test objective, a statement regarding whether or not the objective was achieved.
(3) For any such test objective not achieved-- (A) a thorough discussion describing the reasons that the objective was not achieved; and (B) a discussion of any plans for future tests to achieve that objective.

SEC. 225. REFERENCES TO NEW NAME FOR BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE ORGANIZATION.

(a) IN GENERAL.--Any reference to the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization in any provision of law, regulation, map, document, record, or other paper of the United States shall be considered to be a reference to the Missile Defense Agency.

(b) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.--(1) Title 10, United States Code, is amended as follows:
(A) Sections 203, 223, and 224 are each amended by striking ``Ballistic Missile Defense Organization'' each place it appears and inserting ``Missile Defense Agency''. (B)(i) The heading for section 203 is amended to read as follows:``§203. Director of Missile Defense Agency''. (ii) The item relating to section 203 in the table of sections at the beginning of subchapter II of chapter 8 is amended to read as follows: ``203. Director of Missile Defense Agency.''.
(2) The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 (Public Law 107-107) is amended as follows: (A) Sections 232 (115 Stat. 1037; 10 U.S.C. 2431 note), 233 (115 Stat. 1039), and 235 (115 Stat. 1041) are each amended by striking ``Ballistic Missile Defense Organization'' each place it appears and inserting ``Missile Defense Agency''. (B) The heading for section 232 is amended to read as follows: ``SEC. 232. PROGRAM ELEMENTS FOR MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY.''.
(3) Section 3132 of the Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (as enacted into law by Public Law 106-398; 114 Stat. 1654A-455; 10 U.S.C. 2431 note) is amended--
(A) by striking ``Ballistic Missile Defense Organization'' each place it appears and inserting ``Missile Defense Agency'';
(B) in subsection (c), by striking ``BMDO'' and inserting ``MDA''; and
(C) by amending the heading to read as follows: ``SEC. 3132. ENHANCED COOPERATION BETWEEN NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION AND MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY.''.
(4) The following provisions are each amended by striking ``Ballistic Missile Defense Organization'' each place it appears and inserting ``Missile Defense Agency'':
(A) Section 233 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 (Public Law 105-85; 10 U.S.C. 223 note).
(B) Section 243 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 (Public Law 103-160; 10 U.S.C. 2431 note).

SEC. 226. ONE-YEAR LIMITATION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR NUCLEAR ARMED INTERCEPTORS.
(a) LIMITATION.--None of the funds described in subsection (b) may be obligated for research, development, test, or evaluation, or for procurement, of a nuclear armed interceptor as a component of a missile defense system.
(b) COVERED FUNDS.--Subsection (a) applies to funds made available to the Department of Defense pursuant to an authorization of appropriations in this title or title I or to the Department of Energy pursuant to an authorization of appropriations in title XXXI.

2B) Missile Defense in Defense Authorization for FY 2003
Mr. LEVIN. I thank the Chair. I yield myself 5 additional minutes. There are a number of other important initiatives in this bill we will enact into law shortly. Here are just a few of them.

In the area of missile defense, the conference report, such as the Senate bill, authorizes the President to reallocate $814 million, should he choose, from missile defense expenditures which, at least to some of us, appears to be unjustified or duplicative in combating terrorism. And he can reallocate the $814 million to the effort to combat terrorism. Again, that is left to his discretion. But this bill does, this year, require that he identify whether or not he has made that choice.

The bill also would ensure better oversight and management of missile defense programs in a number of ways. We are going to require programmatic information on ballistic missile defense programs with the budget justification materials that come to Congress. We are going to require the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, the so-called JROC, to perform a review of the cost, schedule, and performance criteria for ballistic missile defense programs so that the validity of those criteria in relationship to military requirements can be assessed. We are going to require the Department of Defense to establish a more disciplined process for the evolutionary acquisition and spiral development of major defense acquisition programs, including missile defense programs, by issuing guidance and instituting a process for the approval of acquisition plans.

Second, in the area of nuclear weapons, we have taken a number of steps to ensure that the Department of Defense and the Department of Energy do not take any precipitous actions to develop new nuclear weapons.

First, we rejected a House provision that would have repealed the current law prohibiting the research, development, and production of low-yield nuclear weapons.

Second, we included a Senate provision that would require the Secretary of Energy to specifically identify any funds requested for new or modified nuclear weapons. If there is such a request, it cannot be buried in some other subject. It has to be identified as such in the budget material.

Third, we prohibited the Secretary of Energy from spending any funds for the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator unless and until the Secretary of Defense submits a report setting forth the requirements for such a system and the employment policy behind such a system, as well as the potential for conventional alternatives to that Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator.

And finally we prohibited the use of any funds authorized in the bill for nuclear-tipped missile defense interceptors.

2C) China's Military Threat Against Taiwan
Mr. HILLIARD. Mr. Speaker, it seems Beijing is applying a two-pronged Taiwan policy. On one hand, Beijing talks peace about Taiwan. It demands Taiwan accept their ``one country, two systems'' formula of unification. This is their soft prong. If Taiwan is unwilling to negotiate peace under this formula, there is the hard prong--Beijing continuing to conduct military exercises around Taiwan. In fact, in recent months, Beijing has deployed 400 tactical guided missiles on China's eastern coast, less than 200 miles from Taiwan. As sophisticated weapons, these missiles can hit targets in Taiwan easily.

Beijing's undisguised military intimidations against Taiwan pose a serious threat to the well-being of the 23 million people on Taiwan. After all, Republic of China President Chen Shui-bian has assured Chinese leaders that he wants a structured, constructive cross-strait relationship, setting no preconditions for resumption of talks. He has continued to express his good will, exercising utmost restraint to avoid provoking China while liberalizing restrictions on socioeconomic ties between Taiwan and China.

Unfortunately China has chosen to ignore President Chen's overtures, continued its efforts to interfere with democratic elections on Taiwan, suppressed Taiwan's activities in the international community and threatened Taiwan with military force.

I, however, hope that China will realize that it is good for people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait to live in peace, that China should allow Taiwan to be an equal partner in trade and commerce to China, since both China and Taiwan are now members of the World Trade Organization and that any military action against Taiwan will lead to chaos and destruction for many countries in the region.

For peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, I urge China to withdraw its missiles and reduce its stockpile. This is a constructive step to avert an arms race and military confrontation. I am pleased to see that the European Parliament has taken steps to urge China to de-escalate tension in the Taiwan Strait, and I hope other countries and other members of Congress will issue similar pleas to China.

3A) WMD Terrorism Civil Support Provisions
SEC. 1403. ADDITIONAL WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION CIVIL SUPPORT TEAMS.

(a) ESTABLISHMENT OF ADDITIONAL TEAMS.--The Secretary of Defense shall--
(1) establish 23 additional teams designated as Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams, for a total of 55 such teams; and
(2) ensure that of such 55 teams, there is at least one team established in each State and territory.

(b) PLAN.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit to Congress a plan, in furtherance of subsection (a), for establishing at least one Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Team in each State and territory that does not have such a team as of the date of the enactment of this Act. The plan shall include the following:
(1) A schedule and budget for manning, training, and equipping the new teams as rapidly as is possible without jeopardizing the attainment of full effectiveness by the new teams.
(2) A discussion of whether the mission of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams should be expanded and, if so, how.

(c) DEFINITIONS.--For purposes of this section:
(1) The term ``Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Team'' means a team of members of the reserve components of the Armed Forces that is established under section 12310(c) of title 10, United States Code, in support of emergency preparedness programs to prepare for or to respond to any emergency involving the use of a weapon of mass destruction.
(2) The term ``State and territory'' means each of the several States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands.

3B) Continuation of Emergency with Regard to WMD
CONTINUATION OF EMERGENCY REGARDING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION--MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES (H. DOC. NO. 107-280) -- (House of Representatives - November 12, 2002)

The SPEAKER pro tempore laid before the House the following message from the President of the United States; which was read and, together with the accompanying papers, without objection, referred to the Committee on International Relations and ordered to be printed:

To the Congress of the United States: Section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)) provides for the automatic termination of a national emergency unless, prior to the anniversary date of its declaration, the President publishes in the Federal Register and transmits to the Congress a notice stating that the emergency is to continue in effect beyond the anniversary date. In accordance with this provision, I have sent the enclosed notice, stating that the emergency posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems declared by Executive Order 12938 on November 14, 1994, as amended, is to continue in effect beyond November 14, 2002, to the Federal Register for publication. The most recent notice continuing this emergency was published in the Federal Register on November 13, 2001 (66 FR 56965).

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means of delivering them continues to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States. Therefore, I have determined the national emergency previous declared must continue in effect beyond November 14, 2002.

George W. Bush.

4A) Chemical and Biological Weapons Provisions
TITLE I--PROCUREMENT

Subtitle A--Authorization of Appropriations

SEC. 106. CHEMICAL AGENTS AND MUNITIONS DESTRUCTION, DEFENSE.

There is hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2003 the amount of $1,490,199,000 for--
(1) the destruction of lethal chemical agents and munitions in accordance with section 1412 of the Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1986 (50 U.S.C. 1521); and
(2) the destruction of chemical warfare materiel of the United States that is not covered by section 1412 of such Act.

Subtitle E--Other Programs

SEC. 141. DESTRUCTION OF EXISTING STOCKPILE OF LETHAL CHEMICAL AGENTS AND MUNITIONS.
(a) PROGRAM MANAGEMENT.--The Secretary of Defense shall ensure that the program for destruction of the United States stockpile of lethal chemical agents and munitions is managed as a major defense acquisition program (as defined in section 2430 of title 10, United States Code) in accordance with the essential elements of such programs as may be determined by the Secretary.
(b) REQUIREMENT FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER) ANNUAL CERTIFICATION.--Beginning with respect to the budget request for fiscal year 2004, the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) shall submit to the congressional defense committees on an annual basis a certification that the budget request for the chemical agents and munitions destruction program has been submitted in accordance with the requirements of section 1412 of the Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1986 (50 U.S.C. 1521).

4B) Smallpox Compensation
Mr. Waxman. . . .Now, I want to talk about one of the hidden provisions we found buried in this massive bill today. Section 304 severely restricts the abilities of persons killed or injured by the small pox vaccine to receive any form of compensation. In fact, if you do not take the vaccine, but are disfigured or blinded because of your contact with someone who did, your ability to receive compensation is severely curtailed. Now think about this for a minute. This was not in the House-passed bill. This was not in the bill considered on the Senate floor. Suddenly this bill appears with this provision in it.

Now, I authored the vaccine compensation system that compensates children who may be injured when they get a vaccine where there is a bad result. But what we are saying in this hidden provision in the fine print is if you are hurt, you are out of luck. The vaccine manufacturer is going to be protected. The vaccine manufacturer for all practical purposes is going to be immune from liability.

Now this may be a legitimate decision on which we can have a disagreement, but I would feel differently had it been brought up honestly, up front, debated. I cannot believe that more than 10 people in the Congress even know that this provision is in the bill to create a Department of Homeland Security. I feel that this is a special interest provision and should not have been brought up in this particular way.

Another new provision reverses the policy adopted overwhelmingly by the House that prohibited the new Department from contracting with expatriate companies that have fled the United States to avoid paying their taxes. There was an overwhelming vote in the House, a bipartisan vote, to say to those companies that fled this Nation to act as if they are a foreign nation so they would not have to pay taxes would not be permitted to contract with the Department of Homeland Security. Well, now we got this bill and that provision is missing.

Moreover, the most egregious special interest provisions from the House bill remain in this legislation. The bill gives immunity to companies that make faulty bomb detectors, gas masks, or other homeland security products even if they engage in intentional wrong doing. Can you imagine that? The bill also allows large campaign contributors to lobby the new Department for special favors in absolute secret. We used to have a Freedom of Information Act that could get this information out before the public, and now we have a new exception created to the Freedom of Information Act that would allow these secret negotiations.

While the fine print of the bill contains loopholes and special amenities for corporate America, Federal workers take it on the chin. Their right to engage in collective bargaining is eliminated. They are no longer guaranteed the right to appeal grievances to the Merit System Protection Board.

I do not know what we are thinking. This new Department, this new bureaucracy will not work without dedicated Federal workers. Yet this bill treats them like second-class citizens, and this bill also rebuffs the families of the victims of September 11. All they asked for was an independent commission to examine what happened on September 11. But although this commission won overwhelming bipartisan support in the Senate, it was suddenly dropped from the bill.

There is an old adage that those who do not remember the past are condemned to repeat it, but that is what we are doing today. The Department of Energy was created 25 years ago, and it is still dysfunctional. The Department of Transportation was created 35 years ago, but it still has major structural problems; and it took nearly 40 years for the reorganization of the Department of Defense to work.

When we consider a bill like this, there is a temptation to ignore the defects and just vote for it; and perhaps, most likely, that is what will happen tonight. But voting against this bill could be politically damaging sometime in the future. But some things are more important than politics. Genuinely enhancing our national security is more important than politics, and getting this bill right is more important than politics.

Mr. Speaker, we should come back next year and make sure we create this new Department in the best way possible.

4C) Chemical Security Act of 2002
SA 4926. Mr. CORZINE (for himself and Mr. JEFFORDS) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed to amendment SA 4901 proposed by Mr. THOMPSON (for Mr. GRAMM (for himself, Mr. MILLER, Mr. THOMPSON, Mr. BARKLEY, and Mr. VOINOVICH)) to the bill H.R. 5005, to establish the Department of Homeland Security, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

    At the end of title II, add the following:

   SEC. 241. SHORT TITLE.

    This subtitle may be cited as the ``Chemical Security Act of 2002''.

   SEC. 242. FINDINGS.

    Congress finds that--

    (1) the chemical industry is a crucial part of the critical infrastructure of the United States--

    (A) in its own right; and

    (B) because that industry supplies resources essential to the functioning of other critical infrastructures;

    (2) the possibility of terrorist and criminal attacks on chemical sources (such as industrial facilities) poses a serious threat to public health, safety, and welfare, critical infrastructure, national security, and the environment;

    (3) the possibility of theft of dangerous chemicals from chemical sources for use in terrorist attacks poses a further threat to public health, safety, and welfare, critical infrastructure, national security, and the environment; and

    (4) there are significant opportunities to prevent theft from, and criminal attack on, chemical sources and reduce the harm that such acts would produce by--

    (A)(i) reducing usage and storage of chemicals by changing production methods and processes; and

    (ii) employing inherently safer technologies in the manufacture, transport, and use of chemicals;

    (B) enhancing secondary containment and other existing mitigation measures; and

    (C) improving security.

   SEC. 243. DEFINITIONS.

    In this subtitle:

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    (1) ADMINISTRATOR.--The term ``Administrator'' means the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency.

    (2) CHEMICAL SOURCE.--The term ``chemical source'' means a stationary source (as defined in section 112(r)(2) of the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7412(r)(2))) that contains a substance of concern.

    (3) COVERED SUBSTANCE OF CONCERN.--The term ``covered substance of concern'' means a substance of concern that, in combination with a chemical source and other factors, is designated as a high priority category by the Administrator under section 244(a)(1).

    (4) EMPLOYEE.--The term ``employee'' means--

    (A) a duly recognized collective bargaining representative at a chemical source; or

    (B) in the absence of such a representative, other appropriate personnel.

    (5) SAFER DESIGN AND MAINTENANCE.--The term ``safer design and maintenance'' includes, with respect to a chemical source that is within a high priority category designated under section 244(a)(1), implementation, to the extent practicable, of the practices of--

    (A) preventing or reducing the vulnerability of the chemical source to an unauthorized release of a covered substance of concern through use of inherently safer technology;

    (B) reducing the vulnerability of the chemical source to an unauthorized release of a covered substance of concern through use of well-maintained secondary containment, control, or mitigation equipment;

    (C) reducing the vulnerability of the chemical source to an unauthorized release of a covered substance of concern by implementing security measures; and

    (D) reducing the potential consequences of any vulnerability of the chemical source to an unauthorized release of a covered substance of concern through the use of buffer zones between the chemical source and surrounding populations (including buffer zones between the chemical source and residences, schools, hospitals, senior centers, shopping centers and malls, sports and entertainment arenas, public roads and transportation routes, and other population centers).

    (6) SECURITY MEASURE.--

    (A) IN GENERAL.--The term ``security measure'' means an action carried out to increase the security of a chemical source.

    (B) INCLUSIONS.--The term ``security measure'', with respect to a chemical source, includes--

    (i) employee training and background checks;

    (ii) the limitation and prevention of access to controls of the chemical source;

    (iii) protection of the perimeter of the chemical source;

    (iv) the installation and operation of an intrusion detection sensor; and

    (v) a measure to increase computer or computer network security.

    (7) SUBSTANCE OF CONCERN.--

    (A) IN GENERAL.--The term ``substance of concern'' means--

    (i) any regulated substance (as defined in section 112(r) of the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7412(r))); and

    (ii) any substance designated by the Administrator under section 244(a).

    (B) EXCLUSION.--The term ``substance of concern'' does not include liquefied petroleum gas that is used as fuel or held for sale as fuel at a retail facility as described in section 112(r)(4)(B) of the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7412(r)(4)(B)).

    (8) UNAUTHORIZED RELEASE.--The term ``unauthorized release'' means--

    (A) a release from a chemical source into the environment of a covered substance of concern that is caused, in whole or in part, by a criminal act;

    (B) a release into the environment of a covered substance of concern that has been removed from a chemical source, in whole or in part, by a criminal act; and

    (C) a release or removal from a chemical source of a covered substance of concern that is unauthorized by the owner or operator of the chemical source.

    (9) USE OF INHERENTLY SAFER TECHNOLOGY.--

    (A) IN GENERAL.--The term ``use of inherently safer technology'', with respect to a chemical source, means use of a technology, product, raw material, or practice that, as compared with the technologies, products, raw materials, or practices currently in use--

    (i) reduces or eliminates the possibility of a release of a substance of concern from the chemical source prior to secondary containment, control, or mitigation; and

    (ii) reduces or eliminates the threats to public health and the environment associated with a release or potential release of a substance of concern from the chemical source.

    (B) INCLUSIONS.--The term ``use of inherently safer technology'' includes input substitution, catalyst or carrier substitution, process redesign (including reuse or recycling of a substance of concern), product reformulation, procedure simplification, and technology modification so as to--

    (i) use less hazardous substances or benign substances;

    (ii) use a smaller quantity of covered substances of concern;

    (iii) reduce hazardous pressures or temperatures;

    (iv) reduce the possibility and potential consequences of equipment failure and human error;

    (v) improve inventory control and chemical use efficiency; and

    (vi) reduce or eliminate storage, transportation, handling, disposal, and discharge of substances of concern.

   SEC. 244. DESIGNATION OF AND REQUIREMENTS FOR HIGH PRIORITY CATEGORIES.

    (a) DESIGNATION AND REGULATION OF HIGH PRIORITY CATEGORIES BY THE ADMINISTRATOR.--

    (1) IN GENERAL.--Not later than December 31, 2002, the Administrator, in consultation with the Secretary and State and local agencies responsible for planning for and responding to unauthorized releases and providing emergency health care, shall promulgate regulations to designate certain combinations of chemical sources and substances of concern as high priority categories based on the severity of the threat posed by an unauthorized release from the chemical sources.

    (2) FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED.--In designating high priority categories under paragraph (1), the Administrator, in consultation with the Secretary, shall consider--

    (A) the severity of the harm that could be caused by an unauthorized release;

    (B) the proximity to population centers;

    (C) the threats to national security;

    (D) the threats to critical infrastructure;

    (E) threshold quantities of substances of concern that pose a serious threat; and

    (F) such other safety or security factors as the Administrator, in consultation with the Secretary, determines to be appropriate.

    (3) REQUIREMENTS FOR HIGH PRIORITY CATEGORIES.--

    (A) IN GENERAL.--Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, the Administrator, in consultation with the Secretary, the United States Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, and State and local agencies described in paragraph (1), shall promulgate regulations to require each owner and each operator of a chemical source that is within a high priority category designated under paragraph (1), in consultation with local law enforcement, first responders, and employees, to--

    (i) conduct an assessment of the vulnerability of the chemical source to a terrorist attack or other unauthorized release;

    (ii) using appropriate hazard assessment techniques, identify hazards that may result from an unauthorized release of a covered substance of concern; and (ii) as appropriate, submit to the Administrator any changes to the assessment or plan.

    (4) PROTECTION OF INFORMATION.--

    (A) DISCLOSURE EXEMPTION.--Except with respect to certifications specified in paragraphs (1) through (3) of this subsection and section 245(a), all information provided to the Administrator under this subsection, and all information derived from that information, shall be exempt from disclosure under section 552 of title 5, United States Code.

    (B) DEVELOPMENT OF PROTOCOLS.--

    (i) IN GENERAL.--The Administrator, in consultation with the Secretary, shall develop such protocols as are necessary to protect the copies of the assessments and plans required to be submitted under this subsection (including the information contained in those assessments and plans) from unauthorized disclosure.

    (ii) REQUIREMENTS.--The protocols developed under clause (i) shall ensure that--

    (I) each copy of an assessment or plan, and all information contained in or derived from the assessment or plan, is maintained in a secure location;

    (II) except as provided in subparagraph (C), only individuals designated by the Administrator may have access to the copies of the assessments and plans; and

    (III) no copy of an assessment or plan or any portion of an assessment or plan, and no information contained in or derived from an assessment or plan, shall be available to any person other than an individual designated by the Administrator.

    (iii) DEADLINE.--As soon as practicable, but not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall complete the development of protocols under clause (i).

    (C) FEDERAL OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES.--An individual referred to in subparagraph (B)(ii) who is an officer or employee of the United States may discuss with a State or local official the contents of an assessment or plan described in that subparagraph.

   SEC. 245. ENFORCEMENT.

    (a) REVIEW OF PLANS.--

    (1) IN GENERAL.--The Administrator, in consultation with the Secretary, shall review each assessment and plan submitted under section 244(b) to determine the compliance of the chemical source covered by the assessment or plan with regulations promulgated under paragraphs (1) and (3) of section 244(a).

    (2) CERTIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE.--

    (A) IN GENERAL.--The Administrator shall certify in writing each determination of the Administrator under paragraph (1).

    (B) INCLUSIONS.--A certification of the Administrator shall include a checklist indicating consideration by a chemical source of the use of 4 elements of safer design and maintenance described in subparagraphs (A) through (D) of section 243(6).

    (C) EARLY COMPLIANCE.--

    (i) IN GENERAL.--The Administrator, in consultation with the head of the Office, shall--

    (I) before the date of publication of proposed regulations under section 244(a)(3), review each assessment or plan submitted to the Administrator under section 244(b); and

    (II) before the date of promulgation of final regulations under section 244(a)(3), determine whether each such assessment or plan meets the consultation, planning, and assessment requirements applicable to high priority categories under section 244(a)(3).

    (ii) AFFIRMATIVE DETERMINATION.--If the Administrator, in consultation with the head of the Office, makes an affirmative determination under clause (i)(II), the Administrator shall certify compliance of an assessment or plan described in that clause without requiring any revision of the assessment or plan.

    (D) SCHEDULE FOR REVIEW AND CERTIFICATION.--

    (i) IN GENERAL.--The Administrator, after taking into consideration the factors described in section 244(a)(2), shall establish a schedule for the review and certification of assessments and plans submitted under section 244(b).

    (ii) DEADLINE FOR COMPLETION.--Not later than 3 years after the deadlines for the submission of assessments and plans under paragraph (1) or (2), respectively, of section 244(b), the Administrator shall complete the review and certification of all assessments and plans submitted under those sections.

    (b) COMPLIANCE ASSISTANCE.--

    (1) DEFINITION OF DETERMINATION.--In this subsection, the term ``determination'' means a determination by the Administrator that, with respect to an assessment or plan described in section 244(b)--

    (A) the assessment or plan does not comply with regulations promulgated under paragraphs (1) and (3) of section 244(a); or

    (B)(i) a threat exists beyond the scope of the submitted plan; or

    (ii) current implementation of the plan is insufficient to address--

    (I) the results of an assessment of a source; or

    (II) a threat described in clause (i).

    (2) DETERMINATION BY ADMINISTRATOR.--If the Administrator, after consultation with the Secretary, makes a determination, the Administrator shall--

    (A) notify the chemical source of the determination; and

    (B) provide such advice and technical assistance, in coordination with the Secretary and the United States Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, as is appropriate--

    (i) to bring the assessment or plan of a chemical source described in section 244(b) into compliance; or

    (ii) to address any threat described in clause (i) or (ii) of paragraph (1)(B).

    (c) COMPLIANCE ORDERS.--

    (1) IN GENERAL.--If, after the date that is 30 days after the later of the date on which the Administrator first provides assistance, or a chemical source receives notice, under subsection (b)(2)(B), a chemical source has not brought an assessment or plan for which the assistance is provided into compliance with regulations promulgated under paragraphs (1) and (3) of section 244(a), or the chemical source has not complied with an entry or information request under section 246, the Administrator may issue an order directing compliance by the chemical source.

    (2) NOTICE AND OPPORTUNITY FOR HEARING.--An order under paragraph (1) may be issued only after notice and opportunity for a hearing.

    (d) ABATEMENT ACTION.--

    (1) IN GENERAL.--Notwithstanding a certification under section 245(a)(2), if the Secretary, in consultation with local law enforcement officials and first responders, determines that a threat of a terrorist attack exists that is beyond the scope of a submitted prevention, preparedness, and response plan of 1 or more chemical sources, or current implementation of the plan is insufficient to address the results of an assessment of a source or a threat described in subsection (b)(1)(B)(i), the Secretary shall notify each chemical source of the elevated threat.

    (2) INSUFFICIENT RESPONSE.--If the Secretary determines that a chemical source has not taken appropriate action in response to a notification under paragraph (1), the Secretary shall notify the chemical source, the Administrator, and the Attorney General that actions taken by the chemical source in response to the notification are insufficient.

    (3) RELIEF.--

    (A) IN GENERAL.--On receipt of a notification under paragraph (2), the Administrator or the Attorney General may secure such relief as is necessary to abate a threat described in paragraph (1), including such orders as are necessary to protect public health or welfare.

    (B) JURISDICTION.--The district court of the United States for the district in which a threat described in paragraph (1) occurs shall have jurisdiction to grant such relief as the Administrator or Attorney General requests under subparagraph (A).

   SEC. 246. RECORDKEEPING AND ENTRY.

    (a) RECORDS MAINTENANCE.--A chemical source that is required to certify to the Administrator assessments and plans under section 244 shall maintain on the premises of the chemical source a current copy of those assessments and plans.

    (b) RIGHT OF ENTRY.--In carrying out this subtitle, the Administrator (or an authorized representative of the Administrator), on presentation of credentials--

    (1) shall have a right of entry to, on, or through any premises of an owner or operator of a chemical source described in subsection (a) or any premises in which any records required to be maintained under subsection (a) are located; and

    (2) may at reasonable times have access to, and may copy, any records, reports, or other information described in subsection (a).

    (c) INFORMATION REQUESTS.--In carrying out this subtitle, the Administrator may require any chemical source to provide such information as is necessary to--

    (1) enforce this subtitle; and

    (2) promulgate or enforce regulations under this subtitle.

   SEC. 247. PENALTIES.

    (a) CIVIL PENALTIES.--Any owner or operator of a chemical source that violates, or fails to comply with, any order issued may, in an action brought in United States district court, be subject to a civil penalty of not more than $25,000 for each day in which such violation occurs or such failure to comply continues.

    (b) CRIMINAL PENALTIES.--Any owner or operator of a chemical source that knowingly violates, or fails to comply with, any order issued shall--

    (1) in the case of a first violation or failure to comply, be fined not less than $2,500 nor more than $25,000 per day of violation, imprisoned not more than 1 year, or both; and

    (2) in the case of a subsequent violation or failure to comply, be fined not more than $50,000 per day of violation, imprisoned not more than 2 years, or both.

    (c) ADMINISTRATIVE PENALTIES.--

    (1) PENALTY ORDERS.--If the amount of a civil penalty determined under subsection (a) does not exceed $125,000, the penalty may be assessed in an order issued by the Administrator.

    (2) NOTICE AND HEARING.--Before issuing an order described in paragraph (1), the Administrator shall provide to the person against which the penalty is to be assessed--

    (A) written notice of the proposed order; and

    (B) the opportunity to request, not later than 30 days after the date on which the notice is received by the person, a hearing on the proposed order.

   SEC. 248. NO EFFECT ON REQUIREMENTS UNDER OTHER LAW.

    Nothing in this subtitle affects any duty or other requirement imposed under any other Federal or State law.

   SEC. 249. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

    There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as are necessary to carry out this subtitle.

5A) National Emergency with Respect to Iran

Message 1:

NOTICE STATING THAT THE EMERGENCY DECLARED WITH RESPECT TO THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN ON NOVEMBER 14, 1979 IS TO CONTINUE BEYOND NOVEMBER 14, 2002--PM 118 -- (Senate - November 12, 2002)

   The PRESIDING OFFICER laid before the Senate the following message from the President of the United States, together with an accompanying report; which was referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs:

To the Congress of the United States:

   Section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)) provides for the automatic termination of a national emergency unless, prior to the anniversary date of its declaration, the President publishes in the Federal Register and transmits to the Congress a notice stating that the emergency is to continue in effect beyond the anniversary date. In accordance with this provision, I have sent the enclosed notice, stating that the Iran emergency declared by Executive Order 12170 on November 14, 1979, is to continue in effect beyond November 14, 2002, to the Federal Register for publication. The most recent notice continuing this emergency was published in the Federal Register on November 13, 2001, (66 FR 59666).

   Our relations with Iran have not yet returned to normal, and the process of implementing the January 19, 1981, agreements with Iran is still underway. For these reasons, I have determined that it is necessary to continue the national emergency declared on November 14, 1979, with respect to Iran , beyond November 14, 2002.

   George W. Bush.

   THE WHITE HOUSE, November 12, 2002.

Message 2:

PERIODIC REPORT RELATIVE TO THE NATIONAL EMERGENCY WITH RESPECT TO IRAN WHICH WAS DECLARED IN EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 12170--PM 120 -- (Senate - November 12, 2002)

[Page: S10842]  GPO's PDF
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   The PRESIDING OFFICER laid before the Senate the following message from the President of the United States, together with an accompanying report; which was referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs:

To the Congress of the United States:

   As required by section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. 1641(c), and section 204(c) of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. 1703(c), I transmit herewith a 6-month periodic report prepared by my Administration on the national emergency with respect to Iran that was declared in Executive Order 12170 of November 14, 1979.

   George W. Bush.

   The White House, November 12, 2002.

5C) Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002
Mr. LoBIONDO. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

   Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002. I would first like to thank the members of the conference committee who have provided the leadership and vision to create this landmark legislation, especially the gentleman from Alaska (Chairman YOUNG), the ranking member, the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. Oberstar), Senator Hollings, and Senator McCain and Senator Lott.

   The Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 establishes a comprehensive national system to increase transportation security for our ports and waterways. This legislation was developed to prevent a terrorist attack along our Nation's largest and perhaps most vulnerable border, consisting of 95,000 miles of coastline with hundreds of ports. The United States maritime industry contributes $742 billion to the gross domestic product each year, and a ripple effect of an attack on an American port would be absolutely devastating.

   The goal of S. 1214 is to deter terrorist attacks against ocean shipping without adversely affecting the flow of U.S. commerce through our ports. Striking this balance has been a key and essential element of my approach to this issue, and I believe that this bill achieves this goal.

   S. 1214 requires the Coast Guard to conduct vulnerability assessments of our United States ports. The results of the assessments will be used to implement a national maritime transportation security planning system, consisting of a comprehensive national plan, specific area plans, and local vessel and marine facility plans.

   S. 1214 also establishes a requirement for the Coast Guard to assess the effectiveness of security systems in certain foreign ports and to deny entry to vessels from ports that do not maintain effective security. Under S. 1214 individuals who enter secure areas on vessels or facilities will be required to have background checks and transportation security cards that will be issued by the Federal Government.

   The Maritime Transportation Security Act authorizes grants for enhanced facilities security at U.S. ports for the next 6 fiscal years. These grants will help cover the costs of port security improvements and fund research and development projects to determine which technologies will best improve port security.

   I have personally visited ports located in and around my home State of New Jersey and have seen the security challenges facing these facilities. Securing our ports is a critical Federal responsibility and the grant program is helping ports around America increase security and deter any would-be attackers.

   Shipping containers are particularly adaptable to use by a terrorist, and S. 1214 contains several provisions to improve the securities of our containers. The bill requires the Secretary of the Department in which the Coast Guard is operating to maintain a cargo tracking, identification and screening system for shipping containers shipped to and from the United States.

   Finally, the bill requires the establishment of performance standards to enhance the physical security of shipping containers, including standards for container seals and locks.

   Mr. Speaker, this bill contains other important security enhancements concerning enhanced vessel crew member identification, Coast Guard sea marshals and vessel transponders to track the movement of vessels in United States waters.

   Equally significant, the bill contains several additional security enhancements and other Coast Guard provisions previously passed by the House. The Coast Guard, as one of the Nation's five armed services, has a key role in homeland security, particularly as it relates to port security and defense readiness. These provisions strengthen the authority of the Coast Guard to confront the terrorist threat facing us today. Strong maritime homeland security requires a strong Coast Guard with the resources it needs to protect the country from a terrorist attack.

   During my chairmanship of the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, I have long said that the Coast Guard needs three things, essentially, to be successful: More money, more manpower, and more modern assets. Fortunately, this measure addresses all three needs and will help the Coast Guard to keep serving America both proudly and successfully. The bill authorizes expenditures for the United States Coast Guard for fiscal year 2003. Title V of the bill authorizes approximately $6 billion for Coast Guard programs and operations for fiscal year 2003. The bill funds the Coast Guard at levels requested by the President of the United States. An injection of $550 million in additional operating resources will also allow the Coast Guard to address chronic budget shortfalls. The bill fully embraces the President's call for an additional 2,000 Coast Guard personnel.

   Many of the Coast Guard's most urgent needs are similar to those experienced by the Department of Defense, including spare parts shortages and personnel training deficits. Title V authorizes $725 million for Coast Guard acquisitions. This funding will help support the recapitalization of the Coast Guard's vital assets, especially the Coast Guard's deep water program, which is so long overdue.

   Immediately following the events of September 11, 2001, the Coast Guard launched the largest home port security operation since World War II. And as part of operation Noble Eagle and Operation Enduring Freedom, the Coast Guard established ports and coast line patrols with 55 cutters, 42 aircraft, and hundreds of small boats. Over 2,800 Coast Guard reservists were called to active duty to support maritime homeland security operations in 350 of our Nation's ports. The Coast

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   The Coast Guard now requires a 96-hour advance notice for all ships entering U.S. ports. I want to commend the Coast Guard for their rapid response to the September 11 attacks and thank them for their tremendous service to our Nation. Fortunately, we have already provided the Coast Guard with broad legal authorities to implement the necessary security measures within U.S. ports. However, without substantial additional Coast Guard resources, we are not going to be able to significantly enhance maritime security.

   Mr. Speaker, I want to take this opportunity to commend the men and women of the Coast Guard who, as I said before, have done such an exceptional job in service to their country. America benefits from a small Coast Guard that is equipped to stop terrorists and drug smugglers and support the country's defense to respond to national emergencies. We must now act to put the Coast Guard on a sound financial footing to be ready to respond to increasing homeland security demands and to carry out other critical missions.

   Finally, Mr. Speaker, I would like to take this opportunity to thank the hard working House staff members who really have made this bill possible. Both from the House and Senate side the staff members worked extremely hard with long hours on this bill. An accomplishment of this magnitude is in large part due to their efforts.

   I would like to single out one person in particular, Rebecca Dye, who I have had the pleasure of working with as my tenure as chairman of the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, who has worked tirelessly throughout the 2 years that I have been chair and especially worked tirelessly on this bill. She will be leaving us shortly, and I want to take the opportunity to say what is our loss will be the gain for the United States of America. I thank Rebecca very much for her service to this committee, and I wish her the best of luck in the future.

   Mr. Speaker, I urge all Members to support this conference report.

   Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

   Ms. BROWN of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

   Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong support of the conference report on S. 1214, the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002.

   The events of September 11, 2001 has changed America forever. Every Member of Congress has examined the programs and policies within their committee to determine what they need to do to help protect the people of the United States from terrorists. The conference report we are considering today will provide the framework to secure our seaports and coastal communities from terrorist actions.

   Each year 95 percent of the U.S. imports and exports are moved by ships. U.S. consumers are dependent upon foreign oil for the gas they use in their cars. U.S. manufacturers are dependent upon the just-in-time delivery system of the container ships to resupply their manufacturing line.

   We have recently seen the impact that a shutdown of the marine transportation system can cause when the West Coast waterfront employees locked out the longshoremen from unloading ships in port. A terrorist attack in our ports could have had an even more devastating impact on our Nation's economy.

   Each year thousands of Americans enjoy cruises out of Florida ports. Cruise terminals and ships must ensure that cruises are not just enjoyable but also safe. The cruise ship industry is already working closely with the Coast Guard to protect the vacationing public. This legislation will help make the working relationship even closer.

   On October 3, 2001, I introduced H.R. 3013, the Ports and Maritime Security Act of 2001. This legislation is very similar to the conference report we are considering today. They both require port vulnerability assessments of our Nation's ports, they both require terminal security plans, and they both establish a new grant system to help ports and terminal operators pay for security improvement. I believe that S. 1214 will lead to major improvements in securing the international maritime transportation system from threats of terrorists and from being used to deliver a weapon of mass destruction to the United States.

   Section 70105 restricts access to secure areas of terminals to individuals that have a biometric security card that have passed a background investigation. Only those individuals that have unescorted access to a secure area, such as those people that have access to open containers or cargo manifests, will need a card.

   Two provisions in S. 1214 are in particular interest to my home Port of Jacksonville and the 12 other ports throughout the Nation that have tremendous importance in times of war. In awarding the security grants established under Section 70107, the Secretary is directed to make it a priority for ports that have great defense importance, such as the Port of Jacksonville, to receive funds. Without securing these military load center ports, our troops that are deployed overseas may not receive the vital supplies they need.

   We are contemplating military action in Iraq. Funding for these specific ports is vital, not only for the security of the soldiers protecting our freedom, but for the citizens and communities who proudly support these important ports.

   The second provision ensures that the Secretary can award grants to ports for securing measures they have already taken since September 11, 2001.

   In addition, S. 1214 contains the text of H.R. 3507, the Coast Guard Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003. This act contains many provisions to improve housing for Coast Guard personnel, to provide compensated leave for Coast Guard personnel that are in isolated duty locations, and to improve maritime safety.

   I would like to thank the gentleman from Alaska (Chairman YOUNG), the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. LoBiondo), and the ranking member, the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. Oberstar) for the bipartisan effort they have used to develop this legislation.

   Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

   Mr. LoBIONDO. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Alaska (Mr. Young), the chair of our full committee, who has done such a great job in helping pull this together.

   (Mr. YOUNG of Alaska asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

   Mr. YOUNG of Alaska. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me time.

   Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. LoBiondo) for his great work as chairman of the subcommittee. I run my committee a little different than most of the other chairmen. I like to have my subcommittee chairmen that handle the bill to do the work, and I deeply appreciate what an outstanding job he has done with the Coast Guard. And he has Coast Guard facilities in his district and represents the Coast Guard quite well and the ports, which is something that I think this bill will help take care of.

   We have a serious problem, which I think we have met in this bill, and that is the importation of product without screening. We do that. We really think that this will make sure that something cannot, it could happen, but cannot readily happen because of the passage of this legislation, product damaging to the Nation through our ports, and we will be ability to make sure that does not occur. Of course, the Coast Guard plays an immense role in that.

[Time: 22:00]

   Mr. Speaker, I know that the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. LoBiondo) has done this before; but I, too, would like to acknowledge Rebecca Dye, who has not only been a staffer for me for many, many years on the committee, her husband worked for the government; and even better, Rebecca is going to move on. This is her last presentation. She has been nominated by the President to serve as a commissioner on the Federal Maritime Commission, and I expect her nomination to be approved by the Senate very shortly. I am very proud of her actions

[Page: H8811]

   I would also like to thank Patty Seeman for her hard work, and Ed Lee for his hard work, and of course Liz Megginson, chief of staff.

   This bill has been a long time coming. We had to work with Senator Hollings, and I love him to death; but working with Senator Hollings can sometimes be difficult. Working with Senators always is difficult, and I know that I am not supposed to say that. The next rule change, we will be able to do that.

   Mr. Speaker, I think this is a good piece of legislation. I know the hour is late and this is a so-called lame duck session; but this is one part of this lame-duck session we should be proud of. It protects our Nation, supports the Coast Guard, and helps our ports. I am extremely proud of this legislation. I urge my colleagues to vote for this legislation, if we have a recorded vote. I thank all Members who have worked together on a bipartisan basis, particularly the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. Oberstar), the ranking member. We have done a good job on this legislation.

   ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE

   The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Whitfield). The Chair reminds Members to avoid improper references to the Senate.

   Ms. BROWN of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Scott).

   Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the bill, which I believe will go a long way towards securing our ports against potential terrorist threats.

   The events of 9-11, as devastating as they were, exposed our vulnerability to terrorist attacks. None of us believe future threats will be restricted to the tools of war used on that day, so it is important for all of us to closely examine all of our security issues, particularly our port security.

   My district includes the port of the Hampton Roads, the second busiest port on the eastern seaboard. There is military and commercial presence in the port. It is the home of the Navy's Atlantic fleet, and the port is used for numerous maneuvers and military exercises. It is also one of the largest commercial container ports in the United States. Almost 800,000 containers moved through the port last year. Keeping this area secure from terrorist attacks is important to all of us, so we went to work.

   Along with other Members, I toured the West Coast and local ports, including the one in Richmond, Virginia, and convened the First Responders and Homeland Security Task Forces in my district to seek advice. The Democratic Homeland Security Task Force also came up with recommendations. This legislation contains many of the ideas and recommendations from those efforts.

   For example, the legislation requires the new Department of Homeland Security to perform vulnerability assessments on all of our U.S. ports. It requires the development of national, area, and individual port facility anti-terrorism plans. Individual vessels and shore facilities that may be targets of terrorist attacks are required to prepare individual anti-terrorist security plans. This legislation also requires the new Department of Homeland Security to develop and maintain an antiterrorism cargo identification, tracking and screening system for containerized cargo shipped through the United States ports, and to develop performance standards for the physical security of shipping containers. And it establishes a matching grant program so the Federal Government can help share the costs of increased security.

   The port of Hampton Roads has already adopted many initiatives to address the potential threats, and the bill will make additional improvements possible.

   Many of these ideas originated with our local first responders, and I thank them for participating in this process. This bill is a vital step in making certain that our country's ports and those who live and work nearby are kept safe from terrorism. I urge my colleagues to support the bill.

   Mr. LoBIONDO. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

   Ms. BROWN of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

   Mr. Speaker, we have a good bill with lots of important provisions, including new matching grants to improve port security, a national security card for port workers and truck drivers, antiterrorism response teams and sea marshals, and Coast Guard authority to block ships for nonsecure ports.

   We still have a lot of work to do, but this is a great start; and I strongly urge my colleagues to support the passage of the conference report of Senate 1214, the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002.

   I also want to thank staff, and in particular John Cullatner. Against all odds, they did an excellent job.

   Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

   Mr. LOBIONDO. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

   Mr. Speaker, I would like to thank the gentleman from Alaska (Mr. Young), who has led us in this effort, the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. Oberstar), the gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. Brown), and our entire staff.

   We have outlined why this is such a critical and important bill, and I would like to take a moment to reemphasize the job that the Coast Guard is doing for the Nation.

   On September 10, 2001, the Coast Guard was dedicating about 2 percent of its resources to port and homeland security. On September 12, 2001, that percentage rose to 60 percent. They have been doing a magnificent job in protecting our ports and deploying for homeland security. Many Members have expressed their strong support for the Coast Guard and the job that they have done, but it is time for us to recognize by more than words and saying thank you, that they need more operational dollars, more acquisition dollars, and more personnel.

   With the provisions outlined in this piece of legislation for authorization of almost $6 billion, honoring the request of the President of the United States, we are taking a large step towards making sure that the Coast Guard will have the assets that they need to continue to do a great job. ]

• [Begin Insert]

   Mr. HORTON. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of S. 1214, the Port and Maritime Security Act of 2002 Conference Report. As many of you know, I have been privileged to represent the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach for the past 10 years. Each day these ports receive cargo from points around the globe. The San Pedro Bay port complex is the third largest seaport in the world. These ports are responsible for over 30 percent of all U.S. waterborne trade with an estimated value of $162 billion a year. The bulk of these imports arrive in 20- or 40-foot containers aboard some of the world's largest cargo ships. Additionally, our ports handle millions of cruise passengers annually. Insuring the safety of containers and passengers entering and exiting the ports of this country is a daunting task. Currently, only about 2 percent of the shipping containers entering the country are inspected. This simply will not do. Passing this comprehensive port security legislation will insure that more containers are inspected and that our ports are properly protected.

   I am particularly pleased that section 203 of this legislation incorporates a bill that I introduced in the 106th Congress. This section authorizes the Secretary of Transportation to make grants to the American Merchant Marine Veterans Memorial Committee to construct an addition to the American Merchant Marine Memorial Wall of Honor in San Pedro, California. Thus far, the Committee has already raised well over $500,000 to begin construction on the second phase of this memorial. Plans for the addition to the memorial call for panels to list the names of those who died while serving in the U.S. Merchant Marine.

   Since 1775, the maritime community has played a critical role in gaining and preserving American freedom. The Merchant Marine served as our first Navy and defeated the British Navy in our fight for independence. We owe much to the brave mariners past and present who have served in the Merchant Marine. The American Merchant Marine Memorial Wall of Honor located in San Pedro, California, is a symbol of the debt we owe those who have served so bravely.

   Many of my colleagues will remember how the Merchant Marine secured its place in American history during the Second World War. During that conflict, the 250,000 men and women in the U.S. merchant fleet made enormous contributions to the eventual winning of the war, keeping the lifeline of freedom open to our troops overseas and to our allies.

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   The members of the U.S. Merchant Marine faced danger from submarines, mines, armed raiders, destroyers, aircraft, ``kamikaze,'' and the elements. At least 6,800 mariners were killed at sea and more than 11,000 were wounded at sea. Of those injured, at least 1,100 later died from their wounds. More than 600 men and women were taken prisoner by our enemies. In fact, one in 32 mariners serving aboard merchant ships in the Second World War died in the line of duty,

   suffering a greater percentage of war-related deaths than all other U.S. services.

   Since that time, the U.S. Merchant Marine has continued to serve our nation, promoting freedom and meeting the high ideals of its past members. It is fitting to honor the past and present members of the U.S. Merchant Marine. This is why I introduced legislation in the previous Congress that would provide additional federal funding for the memorial wall in San Pedro. Twice the House has approved legislation authorizing funds for this worthy memorial, today I am pleased that the House and Senate are moving to approve this authorization in the port security conference report.

   Throughout the development of the conference report, I have sought to provide the greatest protection for ports and the communities that surround them against terrorist attacks. I am pleased that the conferees have included port security grants and research and development grants that will encourage the development and use of state-of-the-art technology. Like the conferees, I believe it is important to encourage the private sector to continually advance the state of the art as a means of enhancing detection capabilities and thus enhancing deterrence over time.

   When he is reviewing project proposals and awarding grants, I encourage the Secretary of Transportation to give preference to those projects that incorporate technologies that are capable of automatically detecting shielded nuclear weapons, liquid and other explosives, and chemical and biological agents weapons in fully loaded cargo containers without the need for humans to open the containers to manually inspect them. Based on testimony received by the Congress, it would appear that pulsed fast neutron technology is capable today of meeting this need. As a result, I hope that this technology and other technologies will be identified, developed, and installed in our ports as part of the ongoing process of enhancing port security through this legislation.

   Long Beach State's Center for the Commercial Deployment of Transportation Technologies (CCDoTT) has been developing maritime technology for many years, and has recently turned their attention to port security technology as well. In the FY03 Defense Appropriations bill CCDoTT was granted $4.3 million for continuation of their important work to develop more efficient cargo handling in ports, high-speed ship designs, and port security research. This funding will allow the center to continue assessing cargo inspection technologies that can help meet the needs of agencies such as the U.S. Customs Service and the Coast Guard.

   Section 70107 of the accompanying report authorizes an additional $15 million for fiscal years 2003 through 2008 for research and development grants for port security. I am pleased that report language for the Port and Maritime Security Act of 2002 particularly notes the importance of the research being done at Long Beach State's Center for the Commercial Deployment of Transportation Technologies. This language encourages the Secretary of Transportation and the Secretary of Defense to obligate any current and prior year appropriations under the continuing cooperative agreement. The Center is sponsored by the U.S. Martitime Administration and U.S. Department of Defense and I am certain it will continue to provide invaluable research for America's maritime interests. Again, I am pleased with, and strongly support, this timely port security legislation.

   Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I rise to support S. 1214, Maritime Transportation Antiterrorism Act. Commercial vessels continued to experience an increased threat of criminal attack. Vessels seem to bear the brunt of these attacks which manifest themselves in the form of sea robbery, hijacking, terrorism, and piracy.

   A complex set of security issues threaten the maritime industry and the movement of cargo in international trade. Those threats include terrorism, piracy, smuggling of stowaways and drugs, cargo theft and fraud, bribery and extortion. Enacting requisite port security measures and coordination, cooperation, and communication with government and maritime industry components are necessary.

   In my home District, the Port of Houston Authority is a dynamic port that has helped to fuel the Houston area's development as a center of international business and trade. Companies that do business internationally also find Houston attractive because of its well-developed industrial and financial infrastructure; skilled work force; and diverse population. Ample space and favorable conditions for industrial development, as well as for cargo handling, makes the Port of Houston an excellent choice location for industry.

   Port security is an essential part for a safe, secure, and competitive operation of the maritime transportation system. It promotes the development of commerce and is an essential element in maritime trade competitiveness, which cannot be achieved merely by modernizing port infrastructure and increasing operating productivity.

   Consequently, port security can surface as a significant issue in trade negotiations and government and industry courses of action should be coordinated to facilitate effective solutions. Port authorities should develop the means for exchanging current information on port security issues and for the dissemination of intelligence to the commercial industry. We must protect our ports from criminal attacks and allow them to maintain their trade and commerce.

   S. 1214 helps to protect our ports, such as the Port of Houston. This bill directs the Secretary of Transportation to (1) assess port vulnerability; (2) prepare a National Maritime Transportation Antiterrorism Plan [the Plan] for deterring catastrophic emergencies; and (3) review and approve Area, vessel, and facility antiterrorism plans.

   Further, S. 1214 requires that the Plan to (1) coordinate Federal, State, and local efforts, including Coast Guard maritime antiterrorism teams and Federal Maritime Antiterrorism Coordinators; (2) identify security resources; and (3) include a system of surveillance and notice to ensure earliest possible identification of emergencies. The bill requires the Secretary to establish a system of antiterrorism response plans for vessels in coordination with the Federal Emergency Management Agency. The bill requires that there be transportation security cards for entry to any antiterrorism secure area of a vessel or facility. The bill requires the Under Secretary of Transportation for Security to develop and maintain an antiterrorism cargo identification and screening system, including performance standards for seals and locks of shipping containers.

   Moreover, S. 1214 requires that Federal Maritime Antiterrorism Coordinators develop, update, and integrate Area Maritime Transportation Antiterrorism Plans, as needed. The bill also requires owners or operators of vessels or facilities to prepare an antiterrorism plan for deterring a catastrophic emergency, including the identification of the plan implementor, the availability of antiterrorism measures, training and drills.

   S. 1214 directs the Secretary to establish maritime antiterrorism teams to protect vessels, ports, facilities, and cargo in U.S waters. Also, S. 1213 directs the Secretary to assess the effectiveness of antiterrorism measures maintained at specified foreign ports and make recommendations for improvements, if necessary.

   The bill authorizes the Secretary to prescribe conditions of entry for or to deny entry into the United States to vessels arriving from foreign ports with ineffective antiterrorism measures. In addition, S. 1214 requires the advance electronic transmission of passenger and crew manifests from commercial vessels arriving in the United States from a foreign port.

   The increasing nature and international scope of the maritime security issues, which threatens our port, requires participation and response from all levels of government. The lack of a secure trade corridor can hamper the economic growth of a port and possibly the country itself. A viable maritime security program is good business. A much bigger economic interdependency exists within the entire transportation network. Ports are committed to developing effective maritime security programs based on the recognition of ports as interchange hubs of commerce, critical to international trade.

   In addition to the benefits that this bill will bring to the security of nation's ports, this measure also makes important changes to our nations maritime policy that will help us compete in the global marketplace and gives needed resources and flexibility to the Coast Guard and the men and women that make up this great agency, allowing it to better protect our nation's shores. I strongly support S. 1214. This bill is good for the Port of Houston and good for American ports. Therefore, I strongly urge my fellow members to support this bill.

   Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong support of the Conference Report on S. 1214, the ``Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002''. Last year, Congress enacted landmark legislation to help protect the aviation industry from terrorist attacks. Today, we finalize legislation to help secure U.S. ports, vessels, and our intermodal transportation system from terrorist attack.

   More than six million containers arrive in the United States each year from foreign ports

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   Yet this transportation system can also be used as a means of delivering a weapon of mass destruction to the heartland of America. It is far easier for a country to put a nuclear bomb in a container and ship it to the United States and have it detonated by a Global Positioning System receiver than it is to build a missile system to deliver a nuclear warhead.

   Securing America's seaports and the cargo we import from being used by a terrorist is a daunting task. There are more than 95,000 miles of coastline in the United States. One only has to look at the volume of drugs imported each year by sea to see just how porous our borders are. However, it is a challenge we must address.

   The Conference Report on S. 1214 is modeled after the successful Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA). OPA established a strong command and control system--and clarified that the Coast Guard has the ultimate authority to determine how best to clean up an oil spill. S. 1214 establishes a similar system to develop and implement plans to deter terrorist attacks on our ports and on vessels operating in and out of our ports. The system includes development of national plans, area security plans, facility security plans, and vessel security plans.

   To help ports, local governments, and facility operators pay for these security improvements, S. 1214 establishes a port security grant program to provide a 75 percent matching grant for security measures that are implemented to address vulnerabilities identified by the Coast Guard. Many ports and facilities in the United States have made security improvements since September 11, 2001. S. 1214 allows the Secretary to make grants to reimburse these entities for any security improvements they have made since that date that are consistent with their facility security plans.

   However, protecting the United States must begin overseas. By the time that a weapon of mass destruction in a containership reaches a U.S. port, it is too late. S. 1214 requires the Secretary to review security standards in foreign ports and intermodal transportation systems. If foreign governments do not address their vulnerabilities and provide adequate security for cargoes that are being shipped to the United States, the Secretary may prevent ships from those countries from entering the U.S.

   S. 1214 also helps protect our marine terminals by establishing a transportation security card system for those individuals that have ``unescorted access'' to secure areas of marine facilities (e.g., areas with open containers or areas where individuals have access to cargo manifests). The Department of Transportation currently envisions four levels of security access that can be granted by the card. For example, Level 1 Access identifies a person as someone who has unescorted access to the unsecure areas of a terminal. A Level 4 Access means that person has had a security background check to ensure that he or she is not a ``terrorist security threat'' and may have access to areas in a terminal that could cause a transportation security incident. On vessels such as a passenger vessel, the bridge and engine room areas may be designated as secure areas to ensure that passengers do not try to take over the control of the vessel.

   Other security provisions in S. 1214 include:

   Directing the Secretary to develop enhanced standards for identifying crewmembers on foreign-flag vessels entering the United States and urging the Secretary to undertake the negotiation of a new international agreement on seafarer identification.

   Directing the Secretary to implement a new system to collect, integrate, and analyze maritime intelligence concerning vessels operating on or bound for U.S. waters.

   Requiring all self-propelled commercial vessels more than 65 feet in length to carry position-indicating transponders and electronic charts to make it easier to track their movements in U.S. waters.

   Authorizing the Secretary to develop a long-range vessel tracking system using the satellite communication system on all ships.

   Expanding the Deepwater Port Act to allow for the licensing offshore facilities for offloading of Liquefield Natural Gas (LNG). This provision will help ensure that new LNG offloading facilities are built offshore--not in coastal cities such as Boston and Charleston.

   Allowing Coast Guard personnel to be assigned as sea marshals on vessels that pose a risk to U.S. communities such as tankers.

   Establishing a port security training program at the U.S. Maritime Academy, the six state maritime academies, and the Appalachian Transportation Institute to help provide training and standards for maritime security professionals.

   Requiring the Secretary to develop and maintain security standards related to cargo identification, tracking, screening, and the physical security of containers including standards for seals and locks.

   S. 1214 also contains the Coast Guard Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003.

   After a three-year struggle, we have reached agreement with the Other Body to reauthorize the Coast Guard and enact many changes to improve maritime safety and the quality of life for the men and women who serve in the Coast Guard.

   These changes include:

   Extending Coast Guard Housing Authorities from 2001 to 2007.

   Allowing the Secretary to grant extra leave to Coast Guard personnel serving at isolated duty stations.

   Allowing for the accelerated promotion of officers when a selection board finds to be of particular merit.

   Increasing the amount that the Coast Guard may borrow from the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund to pay for the removal cost of removing oil from a spill from $50 million to $100 million.

   Requiring tug boats escorting vessels though facilities owned by the U.S. Government to be U.S.-flag vessels.

   Establishing standards for working conditions and hours-of-service limitations for Coast Guard personnel working in Search and Rescue Centers.

   Requiring the Commandant to ensure that all Coast Guard personnel are equipped with adequate safety equipment, including hypothermia protective clothing, when performing search and rescue missions.

   Allowing mortgages and other financial instruments used to finance ships to be filed with the Coast Guard electronically.

   Establishing whistle-blower protection for seamen on board vessels when the seaman believes that a serious injury may occur if he performs his duties as ordered by his employer.

   Extending the period of time during which the Coast Guard can issue a

   recall for a recreational vessel from five years after the date of construction to ten years after that date.

   Requiring the Coast Guard to publish on the internet all major marine casualty reports immediately and all other casualty reports within two years.

   Allowing the Secretary to suspend the payment of retired pay of former Coast Guard personnel if the person has left the United States to avoid criminal prosecution or civil liability.

   As I mentioned earlier, Mr. Speaker, S. 1214 establishes a new transportation worker biometric security card system including background checks, an appeals process, and protection of an individual's private information from his or her employer. Many of these security enhancement and worker protection provisions were not included last year in the USA Patriot Act that requires all commercial truck drivers who haul hazardous materials to undergo a criminal background check before receiving their Commercial Drivers License hazmat endorsement. Because the provisions enacted in the Patriot Act leave behind a vague and confusing regime, many states have not begun to implement the requirements. Even the U.S. Department of Transportation has acknowledged that a problem exists in Section 1012 of the USA Patriot Act and has advised state motor vehicle departments that these provisions ``cannot be implemented without rulemaking by DOT.''

   I believe that the provisions in S. 1214 that provide an individual with the right to appeal the denial of a security card and the protection of information collected during that person's background investigation should be extended to commercial truck drivers that are subject to the Patriot Act. These standards have been developed on a bipartisan basis with the support of labor and employers. If the Department of Transportation fails to include these standards in the regulations they prescribe to implement the Patriot Act by the end of the year, we should move forward with legislation to correct these problems early next year.

   Finally, I would like to thank Chairman YOUNG, Mr. LOBIONDO, and Ms. BROWN for the cooperative effort that they have put forth to develop this bipartisan port security legislation. Together, we have succeeded crafting meaningful legislation to improve the security of the marine transportation system against terrorist acts.

   I urge my colleagues to support the Conference Report on S. 1214.

   Mr. SHAW. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this legislation, which represents the next crucial step in improving America's transportation security. This bill coordinates various federal law enforcement efforts with local port authorities, develops uniform standards, and helps pay for technology upgrades and other security infrastructure at our ports. I am very pleased that this bill authorizes $6 billion for the Coast Guard, an agency that is severely overworked and underfunded.

   This legislation is of particular importance to the State of Florida and its 14 publicly owned deepwater seaports, including Port Everglades, Port of Palm Beach and Port of Miami

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   Florida seaports represent some of the busiest bulk cargo and container ports in the nation, and improved security at our seaports is critical for protection of the state's citizens and millions of visitors, as well as the state's continued economic vitality.

   The treat of terrorism and other crimes to Florida seaports is well documented. A 1999 state-commissioned study found that the Florida port are highly vulnerable and recommended comprehensive security plans at each Florida seaport. In 2002, the State of Florida enacted legislation mandating that such action be undertaken.

   As the Chairman of the Florida Congressional Delegation, I am pleased that this bill does not penalize the Florida ports that have been pro-active in taking the necessary steps to improve security. A shining example of such a port is Port Everglades in my district. Even before September 11, Port Everglades has laid out a comprehensive security improvement plan. Since that day, the port has expedited its efforts, turning a 48 month plan to improve security into an impressive, 18 month, $37 million plan that is now near completion. I commend the Broward County Board of County Commissioners for their foresight. The fine work they've done should serve as a model for ports around the nation.

   As one of the first Members of Congress to introduce comprehensive seaport security legislation, along with my friend and colleague Senator BOB GRAHAM, I am gratified that we are finally completing our work on this most important issue. It is overdue.

   Mr. BORSKI. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to support the U.S. Coast Guard's Armed Drug Interdiction (HITRON) Mission. The HITRON Mission is a unique and important weapon in the arsenal against illegal drugs and counter-terrorism. The MH-68A armed helicopter, which was designed, assembled and maintained in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, is an integral part of the HITRON mission. I thank the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. COBLE, for his leadership on this matter. The gentleman from North Carolina and I have been deeply concerned that the short-term lease for the MH-68A expires in January of 2003, potentially jeopardizing the HITRON mission if the lease is not extended in a timely fashion. The Integrated Coast Guard Systems Group (ICGS--led by Lockheed Martin-Northup Grumman) has recommended the Coast Guard fashion a permanent Deep Water airborne use of force (AUF) program and test a heavier multipurpose helicopter for the drug and terrorist intervention mission. While this is certainly a reasonably approach, there must be no interruption in the program before a permanent fleet is fully deployed. I am pleased that the Coast Guard has agreed that there must be no interruption and is executing the lease extension. I join in congratulating the Coast Guard on a successful program.

5D) Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order, there will be 60 minutes for debate on the conference report, with the time to be equally divided and controlled between the chairman and ranking member of the Commerce Committee.

The Senator from South Carolina is recognized.

Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, first, I ask for the yeas and nays on the conference report.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there a sufficient second?

There appears to be a sufficient second.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from South Carolina.

Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, the American public is most familiar with airline, highway and rail transportation. But perhaps the most vulnerable link in our transportation system is the component that few Americans ever see: our major seaports.

Our 361 sea and river ports handle 95 percent of U.S. international trade. These ports annually transfer more than 2 billion tons of freight--often in huge containers from ships that discharge directly onto trucks and railcars that immediately head onto our highways and rail systems. But less than 2 percent of those 5 million containers are ever checked by customs or law enforcement officials.

That is a gaping hole in our national security that must be fixed. That is why the Senate passed The Port and Maritime Security Act of 2001 in December of 2001 and the House and Senate have filed the conference report on the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002.

Before discussing the specifics of this conference report, I want to discuss the vulnerabilities at America's seaports:

Lloyd's List International reported that a NATO country's intelligence service has identified 20 merchant vessels believed to be linked to Osama bin Laden. Those vessels are now subject to seizure in ports all over the world. Some of the vessels are thought to be owned outright by bin Laden's business interests, while others are on long-term charter. The Times of London reported that bin Laden used his ships to import into Kenya the explosives used to destroy the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.

;A suspected member of the al-Quida terrorist network was arrested in Italy after he tried to stow-away in a shipping container heading to Toronto. The container was furnished with a bed, a toilet, and its own power source to operate the heater and recharge batteries. According to the Toronto Sun, the man also had a global satellite telephone, a laptop computer, an airline mechanics certificate, and security passes for airports in Canada, Thailand and Egypt.

In October, a French-flagged tanker was attacked by terrorists in a manner very similar to the speed boat attack on the USS Cole in 2000. The attack caused 60,000 tons of oil to be released into the waters off Yemen and killed one crew member.

These stories really bring home this issue of seaport security. Except for those of us who live in port cities like Charleston, people often do not think about their ports--the ports that load industrial and consumer goods onto trucks and railroad cars heading directly to their hometowns. But making these ports more secure is vital to protecting our national security. The destruction that can be accomplished through security holes at our seaports potentially exceed any other mode of transportation. And yet we have failed to make seaport security a priority.

Most Americans would be surprised to discover that until the provisions in this bill there has been no unified federal plan for overseeing the security of the international borders at our seaports. And that's what seaports are: international borders that must be protected as well as our land borders with Canada and Mexico.

The U.S. Coast Guard and U.S. Customs Service are doing an outstanding job, but they are outgunned. In the year 2000, we imported 5.5 million trailer truckloads of cargo. Due to that volume, the U.S. Customs Service is only able to inspect between 1 to 2 percent of containers. In other words, potential terrorists and drug smugglers have a 98 percent chance of randomly importing illegal and dangerous materials.

Senator BOB GRAHAM a few years ago convinced President Clinton to appoint a commission to look at seaport security. At the time, the main focus of port security was stopping illegal drugs, the smuggling of people, and cargo theft. While those problems still exist, the new--and very real--threat of terrorism strikes right at the heart of our national defense.

The Interagency Commission on Crime and Security at U.S. Seaports issued a report a year ago that said security at U.S. seaports ``ranges from poor to fair.'' Let me repeat that: 17 federal agencies reviewed our port security system and found it in poor shape.

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According to the Commission:

Control of access to the seaport or sensitive areas within the seaports is often lacking. Practices to restrict or control the access of vehicles to vessels, cargo receipt and delivery operations, and passenger processing operations at seaports are either not present or not consistently enforced, increasing the risk that violators could quickly remove cargo or contraband. Many ports do not have identification cards issued to personnel to restrict access to vehicles, cargo receipt and delivery operations, and passenger processing operations.

The report said:

At many seaports, the carrying of firearms is to restricted, and thus internal conspirators and other criminals are allowed armed access to cargo vessels and cruise line terminals. In addition, many seaports rely on private security personnel who lack the crime prevention and law enforcement training and capability of regular police officers.

The report also found that port-related businesses did not know where to report cargo theft and other crimes, and that federal, state and local law enforcement agencies responsible for a port's security rarely meet to coordinate their work.

That is what our legislation does--it creates mechanisms to integrate all these different security agencies and their efforts to improve the security of our seaports, and the railways and

highways that converge at our seaports. Our seaport security bill also directly funds more security officers, more screening equipment, and the building of important security infrastructure.

Each agency is good at what they do individually. But they will be even stronger working together, sharing information and tactics, and coordinating security coverage at our seaports. More teamwork between these federal, state and local agencies--along with our security partners in the private sector--will produce a more secure seaport environment that is stronger than the sum of each agency's individual efforts. To foster that teamwork, our bill sets up a National Maritime Security Advisory Committee responsible for coordinating programs to enhance the security and safety of U.S. seaports.

Most important in the bill are the requirements to implement security plans that will provide for efficient, coordinated and effective action to deter and minimize damage from a transportation security incident. The plans will be developed as a national plan, a regional area plan, and facility and vessel plans. The National and Area Security Plans will be developed by the Coast Guard and will be adequate to deter a transportation security incident to the maximum extent possible. The facility and vessel plans are for the individual waterfront facilities and vessels and must be consistent with the federal and area plans. The Secretary of Transportation will conduct an initial assessment of vessels and facilities on and near the water. The assessment will identify those facilities and vessel types that pose a high risk of being involved in a transportation security incident. These assessments will identify the vulnerable assets and infrastructure as well as the threats to those assets and infrastructure.

Within a year the initial assessments will be made, interim security measures will be implemented, and more detailed assessments will be conducted, from which vessel and facility security plans will be devised. These plans will be based on the Coast Guard vulnerability assessments and security recommendations. The plans will be submitted to the Coast Guard by port authorities, waterfront facilities, and vessel operators. All ports, waterfront facilities and vessels are required to operate under approved security plans that are consistent with the Federal and Area Security Plans.

To further enhance law enforcement cooperation, we will require the establishment of Area Security Advisory Committees at each port to coordinate security plans among all the involved agencies: law enforcement, intelligence agencies, Customs, Coast Guard, Immigration, port authorities, shipping companies, and port workers. The bill also creates new programs to professionally train port security personnel. Certification and training of maritime security personnel will be crucial in increasing the professionalism of our federal, state, local, and private sector security personnel.

To address the immediate risk of terrorist activities at or through our seaports, the bill directs the Secretary of Transportation to immediately establish domestic maritime safety and security teams to respond to terrorist activity, criminal activity, or other threats. The units will be composed of officers trained in anti-terrorism, drug interdiction, navigation assistance, and facilitating response to security threats. I would like to thank Senator EDWARDS for his work on this provision. The bill also creates a Sea Marshal program to more specifically authorize the Coast Guard to board vessels in order to deter, prevent, or respond to acts of terrorism. These Sea Marshals will ride along aboard some vessels entering U.S. ports as a deterrent against hijacking or other criminal activity. I would like to thank Senator JOHN KERRY and Senator JOHN BREAUX for working on the Sea Marshal initiative. I also commend Senator BREAUX for all his work on seaport security. He is the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Surface Transportation and Merchant Marine, he has toured throughout the nation reviewing security at our seaports and has done a yeoman's job helping to pass this bill.

The bill will require ports to limit access to security-sensitive areas. Ports also will be required to limit cars and trucks, coordinate with local and private law enforcement, and develop an evacuation plan. Port areas will have increased security with specific area within the port being designated as controlled access where only those with the appropriate credentials will be allowed. The bill also will require criminal background checks of employees with access to ocean manifests or access-controlled areas of a port or terminal. These background checks are designed to ensure that individuals with access to our terminals and cargo facilities are not a terrorism security threat. A system of appeals and waivers will be provided to ensure that port workers are given full and adequate opportunity to explain mitigating factors justifying any waiver requests.

This bill will require for the first time that we know more in advance about the cargo and crew members coming into the United States. The more we know about a ship's cargo--and where it originated--the better our Customs agents and other law enforcement officers can target the most suspicious containers and passengers. I am also pleased that we established performance standards for the locking and sealing of containers. It is vitally important that we ensure that shipping containers are adequately designed and constructed and that we check that they are securely locked for shipment.

The bill modifies a rulemaking requirement for advanced cargo information. The original requirement was included in the Senate passed version of the bill. The rulemaking was then included in the Trade Act, and S. 1214 makes modifications to the Trade Act to incorporate additional changes. I would like to thank the Finance Committee for their cooperative spirit in our effort to enhance cargo security.

Perhaps most importantly, we will give port authorities and local entities support in implementing and paying the costs of addressing Coast Guard identified vulnerabilities. We are dealing with an issue of national security--and we will treat it as such. It would be great if we could simply declare our ports to be more secure. But it takes money to make sure these international borders at our seaports are fully staffed with customs, law enforcement, and immigration personnel. It takes money to make sure they have modern security equipment, including the newest scanners to check cargo for the most dangerous materials. And it takes money to build the physical infrastructure of a secure port.

For seaport security infrastructure, the bill directly authorizes amounts sufficient to upgrade security infrastructure such as gates and fencing, security-related lighting systems, and remote surveillance systems, equipment such as security vessels and screening equipment. I had hoped that we would have an agreement on a dedicated funding mechanism to ensure that state, local and private sector entities that are required to comply with federal security mandates would have the necessary funds to aggressively pursue compliance with security requirements. Unfortunately, I was not able to

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convince all of the conferees that this was the proper course of action. I was happy that we did reach an agreement to have the Administration report on how to pay for the federal portion of the seaport security responsibility. I will be following this very closely to ensure that we have some sort of agreement to allow for the aggressive pursuit of a new system of seaport security.

U.S. Customs officers must be able to screen more than just 2 percent of the cargo coming into our seaports. We cannot expect to screen every marine container entering the United States, but there must be some expectation of inspection to deter cargo smugglers. While we spend billions of dollars on an anti-ballistic missile defense system, we fail to see perhaps even a greater threat to our national security coming through our ports. A cargo container can be delivered to anywhere in the United States for less than $5,000. The enemies of America can afford $5,000 to import a container of explosive or hazardous materials much more easily than millions of dollars to launch a rocket.

Investing in new screening technologies will help human screeners inspect more cargo, and detect the most dangerous shipments. To increase the amount of cargo screened, the bill directly grants and authorizes $90 million in research and development grants to be awarded to develop methods to increase the ability of the U.S. Customs Service to inspect merchandise carried on any vessel that will arrive in the United States; develop equipment to detect nuclear materials; improving the tags and seals used on shipping containers, including smart sensors for tracking shipments; and tools to mitigate the consequences of terrorist attack. The research and development funds are intended to fund any enhancements that are necessary to enhance technology at U.S. Seaports.

The destruction that can be accomplished through security holes at our seaports potentially exceeds any other mode of transportation. We all know the damage that can be caused by one truck bomb. But one ship can carry thousands of truck-sized containers filled with hazardous materials. A hijacked tanker holding 32 million gallons of oil or other explosive material that is rammed into a port city like Boston, New York, Miami, Los Angeles or Seattle could potentially kill thousands of people and destroy many city blocks.

That vulnerability is magnified by the type of facilities along our coasts and rivers. There are 68 nuclear power plants located along U.S. waterways. Along the 52-mile Houston Ship Channel, there are 150 chemical plants, storage facilities and oil refineries. The Baltimore Sun reported that ``within a mile of the Inner Harbor of Baltimore is a major East Coast import and export hub for a broad range of dry and liquid chemicals. If ignited, many are capable of producing ferocious fires, explosions and clouds of noxious fumes--immediately adjacent to such densely populated row house neighborhoods as Locust Point, Highlandtown, and Canton.''

Most of the security procedures and infrastructure improvements contained in our bill have long been practiced at our airports and land border crossings. But, for some unfathomable reason, we don't take these preventive steps at our seaports--where most of our cargo arrives, and where we are most vulnerable.

Our agents at the Mexican border near Tijuana will tear the seats out of a car to search for drugs--while a crane just up the coast in Los Angeles lifts thousands of truck-sized cargo containers onto the dock with no inspection at all.

For the first time we will require federal approval of seaport security plans, better coordination and training of law enforcement, more information about cargo, and directly fund more Coast Guard personnel, U.S. Customs agents and security screening equipment to protect against crime and terrorism threats.

Prior to September 11, 2001 we already faced security problems at our seaports related to smuggling, drugs, and cargo theft. But now we face the even greater threat of terrorism--a threat that requires us to immediately tighten security at our seaports, the most vulnerable part of our international border, in the defense of our nation.

This landmark bill also incorporates a Coast Guard authorization bill--the first Coast Guard authorization bill that has passed Congress since 1998. The Coast Guard provisions in the bill reflect the provisions of S. 951, the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2001, which was reported out of the Commerce Committee last year.

The bill provides increased authorization levels for appropriations in fiscal year 2003, as well as increased personnel. The bill authorizes approximately $6 billion for the Coast Guard's total budget for fiscal year 2003. This is approximately $1 billion higher than the amount appropriated in the FY 2002 Transportation Appropriations bill, and is approximately $200 million higher than the $5.8 billion of total enacted amounts in FY 2002, which includes two supplemental appropriations.

The bill also increases the maximum end-of-year strength to 45,500 active duty military personnel, up from about 35,500, and includes personnel incentives.

The authorizations of appropriations in this bill include $725,000,000 for capital investments, to ensure that the multi-year Deepwater program and the overhaul of the National Distress and Response System (NDS), or ``Maritime 911,'' are adequately funded in 2003.

Ensuring that the Coast Guard has sufficient personnel and capital resources could not come at a more important time. Since the tragic events of September 11, far greater demands have been placed on the Coast Guard in the area of homeland security. Traditionally, the Coast Guard invested only 2 percent of its operating budget into seaport security; this climbed to over 50 percent of its total operating budget after September 11. Now, approximately 22 percent of the budget is envisioned for seaport security.

The Coast Guard has unique missions not covered by any other federal agency. It has the primary responsibility of enforcing U.S. fisheries laws, carrying out drug interdiction at sea, search and rescue operations, and protecting the marine environment against pollution.

   With the new responsibilities for port security, combined with the traditional role the Coast Guard plays in other mission areas, it is critically important that the Coast Guard has a vision for how to achieve the ``new normalcy,'' wherein it carries out all of its traditional and new missions, as well as the means to ensure its ability to carry out such functions.

   This bill requires the Coast Guard to examine and report to Congress its expenditures by mission area before and after September 11, and the level of funding need to fulfill the Coast Guard's additional responsibilities. The bill also requires the Coast Guard to provide a strategic plan to Congress identifying mission targets for 2003, 2004 and 2005 and the specific steps necessary to achieve those targets.

   Even prior to 9/11, there were serious concerns about the Coast Guard's ability to carry out its core missions. For example, the Coast Guard's 30-year-old National Distress and Response System (NDS), also known as ``Maritime 911,'' is breaking down, and has 88 gaps in its geographical area of coverage. Failure to retain experienced crew has plagued the Coast Guard for years. The lack of experienced personnel has resulted in tragedy, with unanswered calls for help leading to the loss of lives at sea. In 1997, all four passengers of the sailboat Morning Dew, three of them children, drowned outside of Charleston Harbor as a result of a failed search and rescue system.

   The bill requires the Coast Guard to establish and implement standards for the safe operation of all search and rescue facilities. These include standards for the length of time an individual may serve on watch, and acquisition of equipment to achieve safety in the interim, as the entire system is upgraded.

   Since the events of September 11, our demands on the Coast Guard have risen dramatically. We must ensure that the Coast Guard is equipped with all of the tools and resources that it needs to protect our seaports, and to carry out all of its traditional missions. I am pleased that we have reached a successful result in the Conference with the House, and that by enacting a Port Security bill, we will at the same time be

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passing a Coast Guard authorization bill this year.

   Mr. President, the morning news reports that Osama bin Laden is alive and well and al-Qaida operates. Four years ago, we started working on this measure, because it was just prior to that time that one of al-Qaida's tankers pulled into Mombassa, the port at Kenya, and the terrorist crew jumped off and blew up the embassy at Nairobi and then Dar Es Salaam's embassy in Tanzania. Lloyds of London reports Osama bin Laden has actual ownership of some 10 oil tankers, and he has control of some other 10 cargo tankers.

   I point this out because it is the real threat. Yes, we have maybe a hijacking threat, but the real threat now, as we see it develop, is with respect to our seaports. That is why we started in the committee, some 4 years ago, with respect to seaport security.

   Only, last year in Italy we found a suspected al-Qaida terrorist network was operating, coming in through containers. There are some 5 million containers that come into the United States of America each year with 2 billion tons of freight. Only 2 percent of those containers are inspected at this time.

   But that one particular suspected terrorist had a bed and a toilet; he had his own power source and everything else like that ready to operate. He could just as easily have come, and may have, unbeknownst to us, into the United States of America.

   But let's go right to just last month, the oil tanker off of Yemen, the French tanker with some 60,000 tons of oil. As they blew up the USS Cole, they blew up this particular tanker. One can easily foresee that a regular tanker could come up the Delaware River with a suicidal al-Qaida group in operation or in control, where they throw the captain overboard and run it right into an oil tank farm there in Philadelphia, blowing the whole thing up, closing down the eastern seaboard.

   So we worked very hard on this legislation. I commend the Senate itself because it was last year at this time, and both sides of the aisle, under the leadership and working with my distinguished colleague, Senator McCain--the soon-to-be chairman again--we worked and unanimously reported out a port security bill from our Commerce Committee. We passed it in the Senate 100 to 0.

   It languished on the House side for some months. And it was in June that they finally passed it. And we have been with the staff.

   I must emphasize the outstanding work of our staff in this particular regard. We worked all summer long. We thank particularly our colleague Mr. Oberstar who worked with us as diligently as he could. In any event, now we have the conference report. It is not complete in the sense that it is not funded. We provide in here certain sums as is necessary to be reported to us in the Congress within 6 months.

   We tried to get funding. The Senate had approved a user fee. They called it a tax, and we had some effort over the summer working it out to make sure it was a user fee. Then they said it was an origination problem. Thereupon we said: All right. Just take the conference report. You introduce it. We are not proud of its origin particularly. And you put it in, and we will approve it on the Senate side. So that caused a great delay, but now it's ready to go.

   The Maritime Transportation Security Act will provide for the first time a national system for securing our maritime borders. Heretofore, we have known every plane that approaches the continental limits of the United States. They have transponders. We have the radar. We track them. But we couldn't tell what ship was coming, when it was coming, or how. We moved some weather satellites to repair that particular deficiency. We now know, with the Coast Guard working overtime, of the ships approaching. But we now have a secure system for our maritime borders.

   We have to first ask that the Secretary of Transportation conduct an assessment of all vessels and facilities on or near the water and identify the risks of being involved in an incident. Then we develop a port and area security plan.

   Let me emphasize, you have the Coast Guard. You have Customs. You have DEA. You have local law enforcement. You have the Immigration and Naturalization Service. When everybody is in charge, nobody is in charge. Under the present law, the captain of the port is in charge. We haven't changed that, but we have given him assistance.

   We have the Coast Guard authorization bill also in this particular conference report, increasing the Coast Guard amounts and authorizations some $1 billion this fiscal year 2003 over 2002. So we are beginning now to upgrade the wherewithal of the Coast Guard itself that has been doing an outstanding job.

   The plans are based on the Coast Guard security recommendations, which they will make within 1 year, of all ports, facilities, and vessels determined to be vulnerable. They then have the local port security committees, which will coordinate the Federal, State, and local and private enforcement efforts.

   We have been doing this, I know in the ports of Charleston and several others on the eastern seaboard. They have just been awaiting this legislation to make sure we are working in lockstep with the Federal requirements. But then when I say they have to have the private efforts, think about it. If you went down to the Rio Grande, to the border, and to the State of Arizona and told a rancher down there: Wait a minute, there are some illegal immigrants coming across the border in the nighttime, and what you have to do is not only put a barbed wire enclosure around your particular ranch, but you have to turn the lights on at night and everything else like that, this is a private ranch, he would look at you and laugh. He would say: What are you talking about?

   That is what we are doing with respect to many of the ports that are operated privately. The Danes operate the Port of New

   York; the Chinese operate the Long Beach Port; the union operates the Seattle Port; the State of South Carolina operates our ports. So you can see this particular task has to be a comprehensive and coordinated effort.

   We then develop secure areas in the ports as part of the security plans. That is approved by the Department of Transportation. There is a grant program here of allocations to the different ports authority, the size, the threat, and whatever else is there. There is $90 million in research grants to be awarded to develop the methods to increase the ability of the U.S. Customs to inspect the merchandise. There is a $33 million program intended for the development of security training.

   There is an established maritime intelligence system to work with this new Department of Homeland Security. They have to take all of this information, not just from the FBI, CIA, NSA, and Secret Service, but the DEA in large measure furnishes intelligence.

   We will have transponders on the various vessels coming in. Within that year, we will have a certified system of transportation that is a secure system of transportation allowing for secure maritime borders. They will have to be screened prior to entry.

   The transportation oversight board will establish a security program to develop the secure areas as well as the standards. People working in those secure areas will be required to have background checks. Not everybody coming there delivering the Cokes for the Coke machine or whatever will need it, but there will be secure areas, and people working in them will have to have background checks. We have established a sea marshal program that the maritime folks have wanted for quite a while.

   We have an assessment of the foreign antiterrorism measure. And let me commend Mr. Bonner, the Director of Customs, who has already gone overseas and coordinated this. What we are doing is establishing assessment and check methods and secure methods for the ports of the cargo being loaded into the containers before they leave, let's say, the Port of London. We are going to have to do the same things to facilitate delivery when it comes into the United States.

   I emphasize the Coast Guard authorization bill. We haven't had one since 1998. We have been struggling with that. But now everybody has in their minds front and center the Coast Guard, the magnificent job it has been doing, even as it has been understaffed and underfunded. We are going to build that up.

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   I yield such time as is necessary to the distinguished Senator from Arizona.

   The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Arizona.

   Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, let me start by, once again, thanking Chairman Hollings for his leadership in addressing identified safety and security problems at our Nation's seaports. I applaud his leadership and steadfastness as we finally bring this important piece of legislation to completion.

   The conference report we are considering today is an important step forward and will provide both the guidance and funding authorization needed to improve maritime and port security. It is past time to send this legislation to the President for his signature.

   The old adage, ``a chain is only as strong as its weakest link,'' is very true when it comes to securing our homeland. Today, our Nation's seaports remain a weak link in border security. This conference agreement will go a long way in strengthening that link.

   Both the Hart-Rudman Report on Homeland Security and the Interagency Commission on Crime and Seaport Security found our seaports to be vulnerable to crime and terrorism. While there is no way to make our Nation's seaports completely crime free and impenetrable to terrorist attacks, this conference report will undoubtably advance port security and help strengthen overall national security.

   The report by the Interagency Commission on Crime and Seaport Security, also known as the Graham Commission, in recognition of Senator GRAHAM's efforts to establish such a commission,was a catalyst 2 years ago for the Commerce Committee's initial efforts to address crime and security issues at our Nation's seaports.

   The committee held a number of hearings in Washington focused on seaport security issues and the Subcommittee on Surface Transportation and Merchant Marine also held field hearings on the west coast in Seattle, WA, and Portland, OR, and on the southeast and gulf coast in Port Everglades, FL, New Orleans, LA, Houston, TX, and Charleston, SC. The input from numerous witnesses contributed significantly to the development of this agreement.

   As I have mentioned many times during the past year, it is widely reported that transportation systems are the target of 40 percent of terrorist attacks worldwide. This conference agreement would provide for increased security at our Nation's seaports, helping to reduce crime and protect vessels and vital transportation infrastructure from terrorist attacks.

   The conference agreement includes a number of important provisions. It requires coordination among the many entities that play a role in security at our Nation's seaports and on our navigable waterways, including the Coast Guard, the Customs Service, and the many other Federal, State, local, and private agencies. It directs these entities to work together to establish security plans aimed at decreasing vulnerabilities and reducing threats to our ports and maritime transportation system. These plans will help define specific responsibilities and secure our seaports.

   The conference agreement also requires the Secretary to establish incident response plans that explain the role of each agency and how their efforts are to be coordinated in the event of an attack on our Nation's maritime transportation system. In addition to providing guidance on how to respond in the event of an attack, it is expected the detailed planning called for in the agreement will help deter terrorist attacks and other criminal acts aimed at our seaports.

   The conference agreement further requires the Secretary to establish a grant program to provide much needed funding to ports and facilities to help defray the compliance costs associated with both area and facility security plans. The Secretary will also be required to establish a program to provide grants to look at new and existing technologies that can be used to better secure and protect our Nation's maritime transportation system.

   The conference agreement takes into account not only the wide range of threats and crimes surrounding our seaports, but also the unique nature of our ports. A ``one-size-fits-all'' approach will not work. The planning process established in the conference agreement requires the Secretary to consider the fact that our Nation's seaports are complex and diverse in both geography and infrastructure.

   While there are still many questions regarding how far we must go to secure our ports and waterways, I am confident that the compromise reached with our House colleagues will create a safer and more secure maritime transportation system in the United States and allow the flow of commerce to continue.

   Mr. President, this conference agreement also includes the provisions from our Coast Guard authorization. The Coast Guard has been operating without an authorization since 1998, and the resources and personnel benefits provided in this measure for the men and women serving in the Coast Guard are long overdue.

   This agreement authorizes funding for the Coast Guard for fiscal year 2003 at the levels requested by the President for six accounts: one, operation and maintenance expenses; two, acquisition, construction, and improvement of facilities and equipment, AC&I; three, research, development, testing, and evaluation, RDT&E; four, retirement pay; five, environmental compliance and restoration; and six, alteration or removal of bridges. It also authorizes end-of-year military strength and training loads to ensure that the Coast Guard will have the flexibility to respond to its ever growing missions.

   The provisions from the Coast Guard authorization bill include numerous measures which will improve the Coast Guard's ability to recruit, reward, and retain high-quality personnel. The conference agreement addresses various Coast Guard personnel management issues such as promotions, retention, housing authorities, and education, along with measures that grant the Coast Guard parity with its Department of Defense counterparts.

   Additionally, this legislation provides a number of changes to U.S. maritime laws and Coast Guard authorities such as extending the time for recreational vessel recalls, and increasing penalties for negligent vessel operations. This bill also provides much needed advance funding authority for the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund which will allow the Coast Guard to better respond to the ever increasing costs of environmental cleanups.

   In closing, Mr. President, I want to commend the conferees for their work to reach a compromise on this important legislation. I urge my colleagues to support final passage of this legislation.

   Again, I thank Senator Hollings for his dedicated and deeply involved work on this legislation, including conduct of field hearings throughout the United States, including the important port of Charleston, SC.

   Mr. President, I know the Senator from Texas, Mrs. Hutchison, wishes to speak on the conference report. I yield the floor.

   Mr. HOLLINGS. Momentarily our distinguished colleague from Florida will speak. It was Senator Graham of Florida who persuaded President Clinton to appoint the investigating commission with respect to seaport security.

   I wish to add a couple comments with respect to the Coast Guard authorization. As I have stated, it is the first authorization since 1998, and it increases the Coast Guard budget $1 billion, with 10,000 additional active duty military personnel. They have been understaffed. I know of a tragic situation of search and rescue that did not work in Charleston, SC, my backyard. There are provisions in this legislation so we have adequate personnel manpower there.

   The Coast Guard is to examine and report to Congress its expenditures and missions by September of next year. We want to get in lockstep as they increase their effort from 2 percent of the budget to some 22 percent of the budget with respect to seaport security.

   I can point out many other provisions, but I will yield such time as is necessary to the distinguished Senator from Florida.

   The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Florida is recognized.

   Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. President, first, I wish to extend my congratulations to the Senator from South Carolina and the Senator from Arizona, who have

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been working on this issue for many months and have carried the position of the Senate in the conference committee. I commend you for the success we have achieved today and for the battles we both recognize will be required in the future in order to fully realize the goals of this legislation.

   Mr. HOLLINGS. I thank the Senator.

   Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. President, I am very pleased to rise in support of the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002.

   This legislation will secure one of our Nation's greatest vulnerabilities, our seaports.

   This bill not only ensures that our ports remain a driving force in the American economy, it also commences the closing of the floodgates of vulnerability to the terrorist threat to American seaports.

   Mr. President, there is much work that remains to be done.

   For this legislation to be effective, it must have a predictable and sustained funding source for the agencies tasked with maintaining the security of our maritime borders.

   It was in December of 2001, almost a year ago, that the Senate unanimously passed a comprehensive seaport security bill. The House of Representatives passed its own version in June of 2002. This legislation has been in conference for 4 months. Valuable time has been passing while an important part of our homeland economy, as well as our homeland security and the Nation's 360 seaports, have remained extremely vulnerable.

   I am pleased a final agreement has been reached and the bill is completed and it will soon go to the President for his signature.

   To quote the Florida Ports Council:

   Seaport security must be addressed in a comprehensive, intelligent, practical manner by the Federal Government--now, not in 2004 or 2006, or 2008.

   The security of our borders is a national responsibility. No matter how good our State processes and practices are--without the Federal Government requiring realistic security plans and standards--the public domain will remain at risk.

   I am pleased we are doing that today and starting to fulfill our Federal responsibilities.

   We live not only in a democracy but also in a nation that allows its citizens and visitors the freedom to travel throughout our great country.

   The United States thrives on global trade and global travel.

   But support for democracy and freedom must go hand-in-hand with strong protection of our maritime borders.

   Fortunately, our seaports have not yet been attacked. Fortunately, as of today, one of those container cargoes, 16,000 of which arrive at America's seaports every day, has not been used as the means by which a weapon of mass destruction will be delivered within the United States.

   This means instead of looking at the security of America's seaports through the rearview mirror, as we have been doing since the events affecting airlines and airports as a result of September 11, 2001, we are looking at seaport security through the windshield, albeit a foggy windshield. We not only have a responsibility but an opportunity to take steps to avoid the head-on collision at America's seaports that has not yet occurred.

   Since September 11, there has been a lot of discussion about connecting the dots, what could have been pieced together, the things we should have seen before that tragic day. And, like 9/11, information about our seaports presents a disturbing array of dots. But from these, there is a clear pattern of vulnerability at our seaports and the cargo containers which they deliver.

   Many of these dots are available only in classified form, which are not disclosed for national security reasons. But there are many instances of security breaches at seaports that have been publicly disclosed--in open sources--that paint a stunning portrait of our maritime vulnerabilities. Weekly, I read newspaper accounts of stowaways and narcotics arriving in our country, and of security lapses at our ports.

   I have several articles I would like to bring to the attention of my colleagues, and I ask unanimous consent that they be printed in their entirety in the RECORD immediately following my remarks.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

   (See exhibit 1.)

   Mr. GRAHAM. On May 13, 2001, Fox News and the Associated Press reported that 25 Islamic extremists, hidden on commercial freighters as stowaways, illegally entered the United States. These individuals reportedly entered the United States through four seaports in Miami; Port Everglades, Fort Lauderdale; Savannah; and Long Beach. Where have these men gone and, more importantly, what are their intentions?

   The Washington Times, in a January 22, 2002, article entitled ``Seaports Seen as Terrorist Target,'' reported al-Qaida ``shipped arms and bomb-making materials via Osama bin Laden's covertly owned freighters.'' These explosives were later used to blow up the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.

   What if these ships were making port calls at a port in the United States of America?

   Further, in a front page article dated February 26, 2002, USA Today reported that in October of 2001, a month after 9/11, port authorities in Italy opened a suspicious container and found an Egyptian-born Canadian person, equipped with a satellite phone, laptop, false credit cards, and security passes for airports in Egypt, Thailand, and Canada. What if this container and person made a successful, undetected entry into the United States?

   On June 16, 2002, the Washington Post reported that three men captured by CIA and Morrocan authorities told interrogators they escaped Afghanistan and came to Morocco on a mission to use bomb-laden speedboats for suicide attacks on U.S. and British warcrafts in the Strait of Gibraltar.

   On October 6, 2002, the French-flagged supertanker Limberg

   was attacked and holed by a small boat packed with explosives, possibly a remote-controlled boat, off the coast of Yemen. This attack is now widely believed to be the work of al-Qaida operatives.

   Yemen is, of course, the same location as the USS Cole bombing of 2 years earlier.

   On October 29, 2002, as seen on national television, a 50-foot coastal freighter with 234 Haitians and 2 Dominicans landed close to Miami, in Biscayne Bay, Florida. How did this boat manage to get so close to a major American city? This vessel was not detected by the Coast Guard until the last few hours of its voyage.

   Finally, less than 2 weeks ago, November 4, 2002, The Houston Chronicle reported 23 stowaways to Honduras who were captured at the port, 16 on the barge and 7 more who had tried to swim ashore.

   Mr. President, the current assessment from the U.S. intelligence community is that 19 of the 35 State Department-designated foreign terrorist organizations have access to maritime conveyances, or are directly associated with maritime terrorism.

   Since 1991, there have been 131 maritime attacks. This includes 19 ship hijackings, bombings, armed attacks, or kidnappings in the 4-year period between January 1996 and December of 2000.

   Clearly, both our seaports and maritime borders and their vulnerability to terrorists remain a primary U.S. security concern.

   In 1998, I asked former President Bill Clinton to establish a Federal commission to evaluate both the nature and extent of crime in our seaports. I have become aware of the extensive and expanding use of seaports for a variety of criminal activities.

   In response to this request, President Clinton established the Interagency Commission on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports on April 27, 1999.

   The three distinguished cochairs of the commission were Raymond Kelly, then commissioner of the U.S. Customs Service, now head of the New York City police department; James Robinson, then assistant Attorney General; and Clyde Hart, then administrator of the Maritime Administration.

   In October of 2000, the commission issued its final report. This report outlined many of the common security problems that were unearthed at U.S. seaports. The commission made 20 findings and included recommendations to respond to these threats. Our seaport security bill addresses many of them directly.

   For example; the Commission reported a ``need for a more comprehensive and definitive statement of the

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specific federal responsibilities,'' including the ``lead agencies'' of Customs for international cargo and Coast Guard for seaport security.

   Our seaport security bill provides new authorities for both of these agencies.

   The Commission also noted that:

   Comprehensive interagency crime threat assessments *.*.* currently are not conducted at seaports and that the federal government should establish baseline vulnerability and threat assessments for terrorism at U.S. seaports.

   The seaport security bill requires the Coast Guard to survey all ports, prioritize them, and then conduct detailed port and vessel type vulnerability assessments.

   The Commission called for a ``comprehensive initiative to improve cargo import procedures,'' noting that ``vessel manifest information, import and export, is sometimes deficient'' and ``is more easily utilized *.*.* if it is received in electronic data formats before the arrival of the vessel.''

   The seaport security bill requires vessel and cargo data to be submitted in advance and in a format to be prescribed by the Secretary of Transportation.

   The Commission was concerned that ``no minimum security standards or guidelines exist for seaports and their facilities.''

   The seaport security bill would require security standards and provide federal grants for these improvements.

   These are but a few of the many vital provisions in this seaport security bill.

   On September 11, 2001, four commercial airliners were hijacked and turned into weapons of mass destruction, crashing into three symbols of American strength. The fourth airliner was destined for yet another symbol of American strength but for the courageous passengers and crew who intervened. We were not able to prevent these hijackings before they happened.

   After that tragic day, Congress quickly responded and introduced the Aviation Security Act on September 24. It was signed into law on November 19, 2001. This law requires safer cockpits, air marshals, Federal oversight of all the airport security operations, advanced anti-hijacking training for all flight crews, establishment of a security fee, and background checks for flight school students.

   On September 21, 2001, 10 days after the attack, Congress approved a relief package for the airline industry. This included $5 billion of immediate cash infusion for U.S. air carriers and $10 billion in loan guarantees.

   We responded because we had been hit. The challenge of this legislation is: Are we prepared to respond before we are assaulted?

   I believe we are beginning to answer that question in the affirmative with the adoption of this legislation.

   The threat to our seaports is urgent and real. When a cargo container arrives on our shores, it is quickly loaded into a truck or a train, leaving all Americans, not just those who are located close to a seaport, vulnerable to a security lapse which occurs at the seaport because the seaport is the last point at which that container can reasonably be checked and evaluated to determine if it represents a threat to the American people.

   While our bill is a step in the right direction, we must fully commit to our seaports as we have to our airports, which includes a steady stream of funding.

   As my colleagues may be aware, the primary reason this seaport security bill was in conference for 4 months was the inability of Members to reach agreement on how to fund these security measures. So what we are passing today is essentially an authorization bill. We are providing the basic architecture of the security, but the challenge to provide the plumbing and the electrical systems that will bring this architecture to life is yet to be faced.

   My preference was to pass a bill which would have contained that plumbing and electrical system in the form of user fees, as we have already done for airports and airlines, giving our ports an immediate influx of money to quickly address the security lapses that have been identified.

   Why is this so important? If we do not have a dedicated stream of user-generated revenue, our commitment to seaport security may be viewed as temporary and piecemeal.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time reserved for the Senator from South Carolina has expired. The Senator from Arizona controls the balance of the time.

   The Senator from Arizona.

   Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, how much time do I have remaining?

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Eighteen and a half minutes.

   Mr. GRAHAM. I ask the Senator from Arizona for a minute to close.

   Mr. McCAIN. Certainly. I yield 3 minutes to the Senator from Florida.

   Mr. GRAHAM. As chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, over the past 2 years, I have worked with the committee on a 5-year plan of enhancing technology and human skills within the intelligence community.

   It is our expectation that these investments will yield rich dividends in the intelligence community, to understand the terrorist threat to our Nation, better inform decisionmakers on policies that can defend against these threats, and take direct action against the terrorists.

   It should be no different at our Nation's seaports. Investing in security along our maritime borders is as vital as investing in our intelligence capabilities or our Nation's airports. But I am troubled by the prospects. The administration has shown no willingness to request any funding for our seaports.

   The administration's fiscal year 2002 and 2003 budgets contained no funding for seaport security. To date, all funding for enhancing security at our seaports has been as a result of congressional action on supplemental appropriation bills.

   Illustrative of this gap between congressional funding and the administration's funding is the fact that only $93 million was available from the Transportation Security Administration for over $700 million of seaport security grant requests.

   While this funding has aided some ports, comprehensive security improvements for all ports will cost significantly more.

   Based on a survey of just 52 large ports by the American Association of Port Authorities, the improvement costs totaled over $2.2 billion.

   In addition, the United States needs a consistent policy on how much of the additional security costs are the responsibility of the Government and how much by industry and its consumers. We need to fairly apply this policy across all parts of the industries and economy.

   Ultimately, it should be similar to our approach, and response to, the aviation industry. Undoubtedly, funding security improvements at our ports must be a major task and priority for the 108th Congress.

   Seaports are an important economic engine. They are the major gateway to America for cargo and consumer goods.

   Annually, the U.S. marine transportation system handles 2 billion tons of freight, 3 billion tons of oil, and 7 million cruise ship passengers. Over 800 ships make more than 22,000 port visits per year in the United States.

   One terrorist incident at a seaport could impact an entire coast or the entire economy of the United States. The financial impact of the closing of our seaports would be devastating.

   As reported last September in USA Today and numerous other publications, the closure of 29 seaports on the west coast due to labor issues reportedly cost $1 billion a day.

   I ask my colleagues, what would happen if we had to close all of our 361 seaports? Factories and plants would quickly be out of parts and be forced to shut down. Commodity hoarding would begin and prices would rise. The stock market would undoubtedly be shaken. Energy and oil prices would rocket upwards.

   On April 1, 2002, Business Week magazine observed that ``if a disruption at one of the country's 361 ports leads the U.S. Government to shut them down the way it grounded air traffic in September, it would bring some $2 billion a day in seaborne trade to a dead stop and instantly cripple the domestic economy.''

   The issue of seaport security is not going away.

   Foreign trade accounts for over one-fourth of the total U.S. gross domestic product.

   According to the U.S. Coast Guard, by 2020, one-third of all container ships

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will be massive vessels termed ``mega-ships,'' oil imports will increase to two-thirds of our consumption, and liquefied natural gas imports will increase by nine-fold.

   The Customs Service estimates that by 2020 the volume of imported cargo will more than double.

   While we have passed this important bill, we now have a responsibility to finding funding for these need security improvements.

   I urge my colleagues to make the security of our ports a priority and to pass, and later fund, this legislation.

   We must not leave our maritime industry vulnerable to the potential use by a terrorist organization. The possibilities are horrific: The possibility of major loss of life, the possibility of major economic damage, or the possibility of the delivery of a weapon of mass destruction.

   We have take the first steps forward in aviation. Why would we leave our seaports and the maritime industry behind? The action that we take today is a beginning.

   For this beginning to realize its promise of substantially enhanced security at America's seaports, within the flood tide of cargo containers that arrive each day, further action is required.

   Working with the House of Representatives, it is my hope that, early in 2003, we will take the next step, providing a permanent and sufficient funding source for today's legislation.

   An appropriate place to start the discussion is using the model of airports and aviation security, where funding is provided by the industry and its customers and the general public.

   The President will recommend in his budget for 2004 what he considers the appropriate level for seaport security.

   I urge him to be more forthcoming than in the last two budget submissions.

   With the President's level of general revenue support, the Congress will be in a better position to determine what level of user fee will give Americans assurance of security at our Nation's seaports.

   We understand the threat and the horrible outcomes from terrorism so much better than 1 year ago.

   After the terrorist attacks, Congress took quick action to restructure our aviation security program, in order to better protect our country and prevent another attack.

   We need to strengthen our seaports, with the same intensity demonstrated at our airports. We must guard our maritime borders against obvious weaknesses and their potential use as a terrorist target.

   Our seaports are a vital national asset.

   I close by saying we have work to do, and the primary focus of that work is going to be to arrive at a sustainable, reliable funding source for these important security measures. We will have an early indication of what portion of this the President is going to recommend be paid through general tax revenue when we see his budget for the year 2004.

   This legislation also requires the President, within 6 months of enactment, to submit a funding proposal on a permanent basis to the Congress. It is my hope that funding proposal will use as its starting point what we have already done for the airline industry where we have made some decisions as to how much of the security costs should be borne by general taxpayers and how much should be borne by the users and the industry. It seems to me we should strive to have a parity and balance of allocation of financial responsibility across our transportation systems. If we are committed, as the action today indicates, to providing security for our seaports before they are attacked and will not await a 9/11 to arrive at a city in the United States through a cargo container with a weapon of mass destruction, which 48 hours earlier had come through a seaport, if we are committed to security without having to be awakened through an assault, then we should also be committed to recognize this is not going to be cheap and it is not going to be a temporary commitment. It will be expensive and it will be sustained and we should provide the revenue to meet those realities.

   Exhibit 1

[From USA Today, Feb. 26, 2002]

   Shipping Containers Could Hide Threat to U.S.

(By Fred Bayles)

   CHARLESTON, S.C.--The odd noises that came from the 40-foot shipping container at Gioia Tauro, Italy, harbor in October demonstrated the danger facing officials at ports around the world. When port authorities opened the suspect container, they found Amir, Farid Rizk, 43, an Egyptian-born Canadian equipped with satellite phone, laptop, false credit cards and security passes for airports in Egypt, Thailand and Canada.

   Officials charged Rizk with terrorism but later released him after his lawyers argued he was fleeing religious and legal persecution in Egypt and was not a terrorist.

   Rizk's choice of transportation highlighted a security problem that has troubled U.S. officials since well before Sept. 11.

   More than 6 million shipping containers arrive here at Wando Welch yards in Charleston and other U.S. ports annually. Only 2% are inspected. The rest remain sealed as they are shipped throughout the country. It would be easy, some fear, to take a container, stuff it with explosives, a chemical weapon or a nuclear device and inject it into the nation's economic bloodstream. Security experts had thought about the massive flow of unchecked containers before the attacks on New York and Washington. In the November 2000 issue of Foreign Affairs, Coast Guard Cmdr. Stephen Flynn, a security expert with the Council on Foreign Relations, offered this scenario.

   Suppose, he wrote, Osama bin Laden loaded a biological weapon into a container and shipped it through foreign ports to the USA. The container, unnoticed in the day-to-day bustle of trade, could then be put on a rail car at Long Beach destined for Newark, N.J. Somewhere along the 2,800-mile route, it is detonated.

   As bad as the destruction such an attack might cause, the chaos that would follow could devastate the nation's economy.

   The nation's shipping system could shut down, as airports did after Sept. 11. ``The economic damage would be incalculable,'' Flynn says. ``It would accomplish what a terrorist group wants to do, which is to disrupt this country's economic structure.''

   So what can be done? Looking inside each of the 6 million containers from abroad would disrupt the flow of goods. Technological solutions, including x-ray machines, are costly, expensive and not infallible. The answer may lie in better surveillance at the container's point of origin. Instead of inspecting every container upon arrival, sophisticated computer and intelligence systems are being established to identify suspicious containers before they leave foreign ports.

   ``You want to do something that doesn't wait until the container is offloaded here,'' U.S. Customs Commissioner Robert Bonner says. ``The big idea is to think about how to push the border back.''

   WANDO WELCH

   In South Carolina, the blur of movement at the port of Charleston's Wando Welch Terminal vividly shows the shipping business's need for speed. Massive cranes lift cargo containers off merchant ships arriving from around the world. The containers are stacked like giant Lego pieces across the 237-acre facility.

   The activity at this, the nation's third-busiest, container facility is a tribute to the efficiency of the ``intermodal'' transportation system, which makes possible the quick transfer of seaborne containers to railcars and trucks without unloading and reloading their contents. The system touches every facet of the economy. Each state receives goods from an average 15 different ports every day, according to the American Association of Port Authorities.

   That is why the industry balks at inspecting every container coming into the country. Several members of Congress, including Sen. Charles Schumer, D-N.Y., have proposed such steps.

   At the Wando yards, the time a Customs inspector needs to examine a single container illustrates the challenge. One container, singled out because its manifest listed a cargo of ``human aids,'' turns out to have been filled with bundles of used clothing bound from Italy to Bolivia. It took the inspector and a civilian crew most of the day to offload and inspect the bundles, then reload the container and send it back to the shipping yards.

   ``It would be very difficult to search every container without severely disrupting the flow of goods,'' Bonner says.

   A glimpse of that kind of disruption came in late 1999. The nation's Western rail system slowed dramatically as it adjusted to a merger of two railroads, a booming economy and other factors.

   The slowdown created havoc for weeks. Christmas items did not arrive to stores on time. Perishable goods rotted. Factories closed because needed parts were delayed.

   ``It was only temporary, but it created big headaches,'' says John Foertsch, the Southeast operations manager for OOCL (Orient Overseas Container Line), a major container shipper based in Hong Kong. ``It's hard to imagine the chaos that would come if delays like that became the routine.''

   TECHNOLOGY SOLUTIONS

   Some look to technology as a solution. Last summer, Customs agents at busier ports began using drive-through mobile X-ray units that can scan containers as they are driven past a checkpoint, much like luggage through an airport screening station.

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   Sitting in the cab of such a unit on the Charleston docks, Customs Inspector Eddie Basham peers at a computer screen displaying the shadowy interiors of passing containers. ``Tires,'' he says, pointing to a stack of spirals filling one container. On the next, he notices a dark, irregular shape and sends it to the side for inspection.

   Occasionally, the equipment hits immediate pay dirt. ``There's a few times I've seen people standing in the inside of a container,'' Basham says. Police took the illegal immigrants into custody.

   Other screening devices are being tested and deployed. In Norfolk, Va., Virginia International Terminals is installing radiation detectors on cranes, which will screen each container as it is offloaded. As of now, Customs agents use pager-sized radiation monitors that warn of excessive radiation as they walk by rows of containers. Some estimates put the cost of equipping all major ports with large scanners at $5 billion.

   BETTER INTELLIGENCE

   Some say the solution would be to inspect all U.S.-bound containers before they leave a foreign port. But the difficulty of doing that may be too great.

   ``No one can argue against vetting cargo before it is shipped, but you need the political will and resources to do it,'' says John Hyde, general manager for security with Maersk Sealand, one of the world's largest shipping companies. ``When you're talking about putting requirements on other sovereign nations, you can never be sure of what the reaction will be.''

   Many in industry and government, argue that there is no need to check each of the thousands of containers that arrive daily. They note that only 1,000 < less than 1% < of the 450,000 shippers who send cargo to the USA, account for nearly 60% of all containers shipped to this country. A majority of containers come from well-known and trusted companies that make regular weekly runs to U.S. ports. ``It is impossible to inspect everything, but you don't need to inspect everything,''Bonner says. ``We are pretty good at being able to sort out what needs to be inspected.''

   To that end, the Coast Guard has joined with Customs, the Immigration and Naturalization Service and several intelligence agencies to begin sorting out information about containers before they arrive. After Sept. 11, the Coast Guard initiated the Ship Arrival Notification System, the nation's first centralized database on the movement of cargo ships.

   Before this system, the Coast Guard captain in charge of security at each port only had to be notified of a shipment 24 hours before a cargo ship was due to arrive. Now that same information arrives 96 hours in advance at the Coast Guard's computer center in West Virginia. Information about the ship, its containers and crew is entered into a database that can be cross-referenced with immigration, FBI and Customs data.

   The database allows many agencies to track the movement of cargo around the world. Officials hope it will help zero in on unknown shipping companies or a sudden shift in business practices or cargoes that makes no sense. ``If a ship leaves Genoa, Italy with palm oil bound for a port that normally doesn't import palm oil, you might take a closer look,'' says Capt. Tony Regalbutto, the Coast Guard's director of port security.

   Flynn sees this as the first step to a system that will track individual containers as they are loaded overseas and sent to U.S. ports. ``People have compared this to a needle in a haystack problem,'' he says. ``But if you develop good intelligence about what is a threat and what isn't, you get the information down to a manageable number of targets. ''

--

[From Business Week, Apr. 1, 2002]

   Commentary: Freight Transport: Safe From Terror?

(By Lorraine Woellert)

   With its heavy traffic and massive chemical-storage tanks, the Port of Houston would seem a tempting target for terrorists. Touring the site in January, Senator John Breaux (D-La.) asked what had been done to protect the 25-mile-long seaway. A Coast Guard official assured him that the harbor had been declared a security zone. Breaux was unimpressed. ``That's like putting a `No Trespassing' sign on a nuclear reactor,'' he said.

   In the wake of the September 11 attacks, Washington scrambled to shore up aviation security with tough new passenger- and baggage-screening laws and criminal-background checks on airport workers. But half a year later, U.S. land and sea borders remain almost as vulnerable as ever. Lawmakers hot to jump on the homeland-security bandwagon a few months ago have succumbed to inertia, leaving the nation's most at-risk transportation systems unprotected. ``There has been a gross lack of focus,'' says Edward Wytkind, executive director of the AFL-CIO's transportation-trades division.

   Altogether, trains, trucks, and ships move more than $1 trillion worth of freight--about 99% of all U.S. cargo--into the country every year. Seaports, which handle some $700 billion of that cargo, are the first line of vulnerability. If a disruption at one of the country's 361 ports leads the U.S. government to shut them down the way it grounded air traffic in September, it would bring some $2 billion a day in seaborne trade to a dead stop and instantly cripple the domestic economy.

   Today, port ``security'' means little more than a few miles of fencing and the occasional container search. Despite stepped-up patrols by Coast Guard and Customs agents after September 11, ships sail freely in and out of the nation's inland and coastal ports. The network relies on an honor system: It's up to carriers to announce their arrivals and disclose their hauls. Federal agents search only about 2% of the 11 million containers that make their way through the U.S. maritime system each year--double the pre-September 11 rate but still frighteningly low. ``You have a ship with 7,000 containers on it, and what do we do? Check the manifest,'' laments Representative Don Young (R-Ala.), chair of the House Transportation & Infrastructure Committee, which is working on a port-security bill. ``We're taking containers from Pakistan, and we don't know what's in them.''

   Lawmakers may be indignant, but their efforts to plug security gaps have been few and ill-fated. In December, the Senate, led by Commerce Committee Chairman Earnest F. Hollings (D-S.C.), passed a $4 billion wish list of grants and loans to buy equipment to search more incoming cargo containers. Hollings' bill also would toughen hiring standards by requiring maritime workers to pass a criminal-background check similar to one imposed on nearly all airport workers.

   However, the idea of eliminating felons from the workforce, a provision that sailed through Congress as part of an aviation-security bill last year, has come under fire from labor, including the Teamsters and the AFL-CIO-affiliated longshoremen. They say requiring no felony convictions as a prerequisite to holding a job amounts to double jeopardy for workers who have already paid their dues to society.

   Industry has its own problems with the idea. As a major player at U.S. ports, the American Trucking Assn. supports criminal-background checks but fears its members could be sued by disgruntled job applicants denied work because of something that showed up on their record. The ATA wants protection from liability. It also worries that a background check involving multiple agencies will prove time-consuming and costly.

   In the House, Young has labeled the Hollings measure ``stupid'' because it puts the onus on the U.S. government to search every incoming vessel instead of forcing overseas transportation centers such as China and Panama to boost their own security. But Young's vision has problems of its own. He is seeking to establish an entirely new cargo-information tracking system under the Transportation Dept., duplicating work already being done by Customs and adding another layer to the multi-agency bureaucracy that now regulates container traffic. ``Neither shippers, carriers, nor the government would be served by competing cargo-information systems,'' says Christopher L. Koch, president and CEO of the World Shipping Council in Washington.

   Lawmakers--lacking the attention span or the willpower necessary to sort out freight's complexities--seem inclined to settle on politically expedient legislation that emphasizes high-tech gadgetry, spot container searches, and other piecemeal fixes. Such an approach could derail container-traffic flow as dramatically as a terrorist attack. ``It would grind the U.S. economy to a halt,'' says Jonathan Gold, trade-policy director at the International Mass Retailers Assn.

   As Congress treads water, the next-best option is emerging in the U.N., where the Coast Guard is pushing new international standards for container inspection, worker licensing, sea marshals, and a long-overdue system for tracking ships at sea. It's an ambitious goal, and one that requires U.S. cooperation. ``If we ask these foreign ports to put security measures in place, then we have to be prepared to do the same thing here,'' Fold says. Whether it's motivated by fear or by shame, Congress must push harder for secure transportation systems.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.

   Mr. McCAIN. It is my understanding from leadership that the vote is now going to take place at 11:15. I ask unanimous consent that the remaining time be equally divided between now and 11:15.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is so ordered.

   Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Alaska such time as he may consume.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alaska.

   Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, the Aviation Security Act of 2001 came in the immediate wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks and we may soon send to the President for his signature the bill creating the Department of Homeland Security. The Maritime and Transportation Security Act of 2002 is another important piece of national security legislation that will provide the organizational structure, coordination and planning needed to safeguard our Nation's ports. I thank Senator Hollings, Senator McCain and Congressman DON YOUNG for their tireless efforts to move this legislation through Congress.

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   Under the Act, initial vulnerability assessments will be made to determine vessels and ports that pose a high risk of being involved in a marine transportation security incident. Attention will be given to deterring and responding to such incidents, and an overall evaluation will be provided on the potential threat level of maritime terrorist attacks.

   This port security assessment is imperative for our State of Alaska, which has roughly one-half the coastline in the United States. Alaska's economy and quality of life are directly related to the functionality of it's numerous ports. The majority of our Alaskan communities, including Juneau our State Capital, are not on the road system and depend almost exclusively on marine trade for the delivery of basic goods. A terrorist attack at a port in Alaska, or anywhere on the West Coast, would cause significant interruptions in maritime service to our State, greatly affecting our way of life.

   In addition, there are several other ports in Alaska vital to Alaska and the rest of the Nation. This is especially true of the Port of Valdez, which is the southern terminus of the 800 mile long Trans-Alaska oil pipeline. Valdez is an important off-loading terminal for our Nation's domestic energy supply. A terrorist incident here would impact U.S. oil production, without any question, and have a devastating effect on Alaska's fisheries. Dutch Harbor is consistently the top commercial fishing port in America, processing and shipping product to the rest of the world. Kodiak has the largest Coast Guard presence in the Nation and the Island of Kodiak has launch facilities that make it an important staging area for future military and NASA operations that are vital to our Nation's national missile defense system.

   The Maritime and Transportation Security Act of 2002 also includes Coast Guard authorization for fiscal year 2003. This is extremely important for the continued success of the Coast Guard in its ever evolving and expanding role in securing our Nation's coastal boundaries.

   I commend the chairman and the future chairman of the Commerce Committee for bringing this bill to the floor, and I support its immediate passage.

   I yield the floor.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.

   Mr. REID. Will the Senator yield?

   Mr. HOLLINGS. Yes.

   Mr. REID. For purposes of notifying Members of the Senate, there has been a train accident. I hope it is not serious, but we have a couple of people on the train. We are now in the process of working out a unanimous consent agreement to have the vote maybe 45 minutes later than scheduled.

   Mr. HOLLINGS. We scheduled the vote for 11 a.m.

   Mr. McCAIN. Actually, 11:15.

   Mr. REID. It may be later than that.

   Mr. HOLLINGS. I yield such time as he may consume to the distinguished Senator from Louisiana.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Louisiana is recognized.

   Mr. BREAUX. Mr. President, I thank my distinguished chairman of the Commerce Committee for his involvement and his leadership in bringing this legislation to the floor, as well as the ranking member of the Commerce Committee, the Senator from Arizona, and everyone really who has been involved in this legislation.

   Suffice it to say, the conditions in the world, and in the United States in particular, have changed dramatically since the events of 9/11. Things we took for granted, things we did not pay a great deal of attention to, are no longer the status quo. The Commerce Committee, to the credit of the leadership of our committee and Senator Hollings, had taken up the concept of making sure our ports were more secure even before 9/11.

   The Commerce Committee in August of 2001, before 9/11, passed a seaport security bill by a unanimous vote. The committee was clearly on top of potential problems before 9/11. But certainly after the events of 9/11 it became clear we needed to do more even than we originally had done in the legislation.

   I have the privilege of chairing, under the Commerce Committee, the Subcommittee on Surface Transportation. At the suggestion of the chairman, it was determined we should have field hearings around the United States. We had field hearings in six different port cities in the country. We had hearings in the chairman's hometown of Charleston, SC, and the home of the Senator from Texas, the Port of Houston. We had hearings in the Port of New Orleans. We had hearings in Fort Lauderdale. We had hearings on the west coast. We had hearings on the gulf, Atlantic, and Pacific, to learn the conditions of the ports of the United States regarding security.

   We found when everyone is in charge, no one is in charge. In a number of ports, the sheriff's department was involved in security. In some ports they had port security police partially in charge. In some areas they depended totally on the U.S. Coast Guard to do all the work--which they cannot do. Some had very lax security on the perimeter, on the shore surrounding the ports.

   Every day, literally thousands and thousands of men and women drive trucks loaded with containers into port facilities. We need to know who they are. We need to know what their purpose in being there is. We need to know as much as we can about who comes and who exits these international ports.

   It is very interesting how commerce works. One container can carry as much as 60,000 pounds of whatever you want to put in it. There are ships entering our ports and laying alongside the docks containing as much as 3,000 separate containers on one ship. Each container carried as much as 60,000 pounds of whatever someone wants to put in them.

   The USS Cole had a small vessel pull alongside of it and blow a hole in the side of it, killing American sailors; one relatively small boat pulled right alongside the USS Cole, a military naval warship. At the same time, remember what happened in Oklahoma City. Approximately 15,000 pounds of explosives blew down the Federal Building with drastic consequences to human life and to the stability of that city, shaking the confidence of this Nation. One person with 15,000 pounds of explosives knocked down an entire Federal building.

   One container has 60,000 pounds of product that can be put into a ship that may have 3,000 containers. The potential for damage if a terrorist wants to target one of the ports of this country by placing explosives in one of these containers is great.

   We had the example of one Egyptian who took a container and practically made an apartment out of it. He got a container in the Middle East, had himself equipped with a cell phone, food, a bunk to sleep in, and literally was transported from the Middle East, through Italy, destined for Canada, and ultimately to the United States. Who knows what he was intent on doing? Again, one ship, with 3,000 containers; how do we determine what is in each container?

   Some of our large container vessels pull alongside our

   ports. We saw in Houston, in the Port of New Orleans at the hearings we held, the Port of south Louisiana, the Port of Baton Rouge--there are miles and miles of ports--some of these ports have, right alongside them, a liquefied natural gas facility. Next to the liquefied natural gas facility there could be an oil and gas refinery. Imagine the damage that could occur with one container loaded with explosives in a ship docked alongside an LNG facility, which is next to an oil and gas refinery, which may be followed by several other chemical plants. One container exploding could set off a chain reaction with a great deal of damage and a great loss of life.

   Some of our ports are located in urban areas. The Port of Houston, the Port of New Orleans, the Port of New York, the Port of New Jersey, the Port of Fort Lauderdale, the Port of Savannah, the Port of Charleston they are all located in urban areas. There is a grave potential for damage.

   The point I make is that things have changed since 9/11. A port manager was asked: How do you secure vessels pulling alongside these LNG facilities? How do you assure they know what they are doing? How do you secure the area? This individual said: Well, we have a sign posted that says ``No Trespassing.'' I doubt a person intent on blowing up a city or doing grave damage to one of our ports will be deterred by a sign that says ``No Trespassing.'' They will not pay any attention to it.

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S10984]

   The fact is we have to have people involved in security. We have to have people in a chain of command, people who know what they are doing, who is doing it, and what is the responsibility of each particular segment of law enforcement operations.

   This legislation will help do that. This legislation for the first time will say every port in the United States of America will have to develop a comprehensive port security plan. Some of them have plans in place now, but I don't think they are as comprehensive as they need to be, and some have almost nothing. A comprehensive port security plan under the U.S. Coast Guard, working with the local port and local law enforcement officials, can design a plan that fits a particular port. What may be necessary in the Port of Savannah may not be necessary in the Port of Houston. What is necessary in the Port of Houston may not fit in the Port of Charleston. Each port has to have a plan designed to meet the needs of that particular area.

   Not only do the operations along the water's edge have to be better secured, the entire facility has to be secured. As I said, we have literally thousands of incoming and outgoing trucks loaded with containers. We need to know who those people are bringing in the containers, what their purpose is. No longer can a port be a tourist attraction. No longer can someone say let's go to the port and see the ships. Unfortunately, times have changed. We need better security, better perimeter protection, better knowledge about the cargo on the ships, better knowledge of the crew on the ships.

   We have transponders on airplanes. We have GPS systems in automobiles. There is no reason every ship that comes into an American port will not have a GPS system on it, an identification system on it, an automatic identification signal that can transport to the port authorities where that ship is at all times--not just when it comes in, but when it actually reaches the floor, while it is in port.

   Senator Graham, who has been instrumental in helping pass this legislation, raised at the press conference yesterday the concern about the vessel that came in from Haiti. That vessel did not just come close to the U.S. shores, it actually landed on the beaches of Key Biscayne, FL. As Senator Graham has pointed out, instead of being a group of refugees, suppose it was a same-sized vessel, loaded with explosives, with a terrorist who was willing to commit suicide, who instead of dropping off several hundred refugees had pulled alongside one of the large buildings in the Port of Miami, or pulled alongside one of the cruise vessels loaded with passengers, and blew up his vessel and the vessels surrounding his vessel. That cannot be allowed to happen.

   This legislation will help the ports do the job they need to do. Unfortunately, we do not have any funding other than a grant program to the local ports. Most of the cost will have to be borne by the U.S. Coast Guard.

   I say to Senator Hollings and those on the Appropriations Committee, it is going to be their great task to make sure we adequately fund the Coast Guard to carry out those plans, because they are going to cost more. We have to do a better job. It is going to cost money. What about the local ports? We talked about a user fee, which I thought was a better idea, to spread the cost across society. It would be very small if we did it that way, but that's not part of this bill. There are local grants that ports can apply for, because it is going to cost to do the security they need. I am hopeful that program will be sufficient in order to allow our ports to do the work that is needed.

   This is a good piece of legislation. It can go a long way toward securing U.S. ports, which today are very vulnerable, which today, I would add, are potential targets. This legislation, when in place, will go a long way to providing the security of which we can all be proud.

   I yield the floor.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

   The Senator from Texas is recognized.

   Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I would first like to thank Senator Hollings and Senator McCain for helping us get this bill through the committee. Senator Breaux's remarks were right on target. I hosted Senator Breaux's hearing in Houston. He toured the Port of Houston with me. We saw firsthand what some of the problems are.

   I have to say, I was very impressed with what the Port of Houston is doing on its own. Using its own resources, it has beefed up its patrols and its security guards. Certainly, the Coast Guard is more involved in checking manifests and the ships that come into the Port of Houston. But the fact is, the Port of Houston is the largest port in America in terms of foreign tonnage. It handles more than half of the Nation's petrochemical capacity. We certainly need Federal funding and support to make sure a port like this one, which is vulnerable, and presents such a risk, has a fully implemented security system.

   I thank Senator Breaux for coming to see firsthand this great port in my State, for looking at what they are doing on their own, and then realizing the need to give them added help through this port security bill. I am very pleased that we are taking this first step.

   Due to the volume of hazardous materials, a terrorist attack in the Port of Houston could result in the loss of millions of lives. Of course, it would also interrupt our Nation's energy supplies, delivering a huge blow to our economy at a time when we certainly cannot afford any more economic disturbances. However, there are other ports as well in my

   State, and smaller ports throughout our Nation.

   In my State of Texas we have Corpus Christi, Brownsville, Port Lavaca, Galveston, Freeport, and Texas City. They each have different challenges. Some have to safeguard cruise ships. Cruise ships are a new, burgeoning tourist industry that is working particularly in Galveston. We are very happy about this, but it means we have to safeguard these cruise ships by taking similar security measures.

   Texas City, on the other hand, faces the security challenge of screening cargo containers and shipping vessels on a shoestring budget. We have Brownsville and Corpus Christi that are becoming very important ports for Central and South American goods coming in. We are very pleased about that, but they too need security.

   So this is a compromise bill. It lays the foundation for a port security system under the Transportation Security Administration. It requires security plans for every port, background checks for employees with access to secure areas, and improved identification technology for both individuals and vessels traveling in United States waters. The proposed Homeland Security Department would also be tasked to assess potential threats presented by security practices at foreign ports, so that we are able to find out if a foreign port is particularly lax. Then we would have to take extra steps for ships coming into the United States from that port, whether it is the port of origin or whether it is a through-port.

   I think those are the steps we need to take. I support this compromise because certainly it is important to take these immediate first steps. However, I do not think the bill goes far enough. I am an original cosponsor, with Senator Feinstein, of the Comprehensive Seaport and Container Security Act that would provide more resources and greater emphasis on port security. Our bill requires profiling of cargo containers and scrutiny of high-risk shippers.

   We are not closing the book on port security with the passage of this compromise bill, but we are taking a major first step. I look forward to working with Senator McCain, Senator Hollings, Senator Breaux, and others who are very concerned about the whole port security issue. In the next session, I look forward to really addressing the container cargo and other high-risk port needs, and to assure we do not have a void in our port areas. Senator Stevens was saying the other night that 50 percent of the American people live within 50 miles of a port. That is a very important statistic. We have to check our ports, our people, and the goods coming into this country.

   I am very pleased we have taken this first step, because what we have done in aviation certainly has been a huge improvement. Are we finished with aviation? No, we are not. But are our airports safer today than they were on 9/10/01? Yes, they are.

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   I travel as much as anybody in America, commuting back and forth to my home State every week. I see a significant difference in the quality of screening with the new Transportation Authority personnel. They are trained. They are polite. They are doing their jobs in a professional way and I am very proud of that. We need to do more and, hopefully, we are going to address some of the other aviation needs in the very near future. But right now we are addressing a major area of responsibility for our country and that is the security of our ports, the people, and the cargo that comes through our ports.

   I yield the floor.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware is recognized.

   Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I will be brief. I came over from my committee meeting for two reasons. One is to compliment the chairman, the Senator from South Carolina. Frankly, were it not for his consistent and persistent efforts on security--port security and, I might add, rail security--we would not be standing here today. There is much to say about this legislation and I am not going to take the time now.

   I do want to add one other point. I am sorry many more of my colleagues, understandably, are in committee meetings right now and are not here to hear this. We are taking the action that is necessary to deal with a legitimate and real security concern for America's ports. I might add there is more traffic up and down the Delaware River into Philadelphia, with oil traffic in particular, than I think almost any other place in the country. There are a number of refineries in my State and in the neighboring State of Pennsylvania and ports in New Jersey and Pennsylvania and Delaware. So this is very important to us.

   But equally important to us is rail security. My friend, the Presiding Officer, a former Governor, knows about security, what the CIA indicated. I can publicly indicate it. They indicated the most likely target is going to be rail. Since 9/11, my friend from South Carolina passed out very significant rail security legislation--$1.2 billion. It is a clearly documented need and an overwhelming concern, listed by the CIA as a likely target for terrorists--and we have done nothing on it. We have done nothing.

   I realize it is a bit of a broken record. I have been on the floor many times speaking to this. But I just say we are going to rue the day we failed to take the action that has been documented which we need to take to enhance the security of our rail system.

   Let me give you again two examples. Then I will cease. But I want the RECORD to show every day we wait, we are putting thousands of lives in jeopardy. When you say thousands of lives, what are you talking about, Senator? Right now, as we speak, there are more people in a tunnel on a train under New York City--at this moment--than there are on five full 747 aircraft. Those tunnels were built at the turn of the century. They have no escape. They have no lighting. They have no ventilation. Immediately after the Civil War, the Baltimore tunnel was built for freight and passengers.

   You may remember that a little over a year ago there was a fire in the Baltimore tunnel--just a regular old fire--no terrorist act. It shut down Baltimore. In that tunnel, there is nothing. It was cut through granite in 1869. Nothing has been done to that tunnel. Even its signal systems are not adequate. We know this. Contracts have already been let. We already have the design. There is no need for design work. It has already been done. We could literally start tomorrow.

   My friend from South Carolina has documented all of this in his hearings. He has laid it out in spades. He has made it clear to everybody. But somehow we just think, OK, rail transportation is not very much. It is the ultimate stepchild, both in terms of our transportation network and in terms of security.

   It has been over a year since my friend from South Carolina reported out a $1.2 billion piece of legislation on security. I am not even talking about Amtrak--just basic security needs. We don't even have dogs available to sniff luggage in cars. There is nothing. There is virtually nothing at all.

   I just want to say I am not going to be here saying I told you so, because that would be unfair. But we are making a serious mistake, totally ignoring what the CIA has publicly pointed out is a targeting concern, and what everybody knows; that is, the threat of terror and the richness of the targets available on the rail system.

   I am all for this port security bill. I think it is a very positive step forward. But I just say to my friends we are making a tragic mistake having held up now for the better part of a year the rail security legislation that was passed out of committee and for which I think there is a consensus. We can't get a vote on it. I think it is a tragic mistake.

   Again, this is not in any way suggesting my State is very much impacted by this port security legislation. We have thousands upon thousands of containers coming into my little State. We have major export and import of automobiles coming in the Port of Wilmington. We are within the shadow of the Port of Philadelphia in Camden. More oil comes up the Delaware River than I think any other estuary, taking care of the Delaware Valley where there are over 10 million people.

   I am in no way suggesting we shouldn't be doing what we are doing. I am suggesting we are making a tragic mistake by not acting on rail security.

   I yield the floor.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.

   Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I yield myself such time as I

   may take.

   I am very surprised by the comments made by the Senator from Delaware. The fact is we did pass out a rail security bill. The Senator from Delaware wanted to add on billions of dollars for all kinds of assistance to railroads, which has had very little to do with security. I am all for security. But the Senator from Delaware and I are known for our differences of opinion about Amtrak and how much of American tax dollars should be spent on Amtrak. In fact, it has been about $20 billion to $30 billion in the last few years. We are still subsidizing rail routes to the tune of $200 to $300 per passenger.

   But the fact is the reason we don't have a rail security bill is because of the desire to add on the bill billions and billions that have nothing to do with rail security.

   If the Senator from Delaware wants to pass our version of the bill which has nothing to do with the additional billions that are the subject of debate on the transportation bill and other bills, that is fine. But the reason we are making a tragic mistake here is because we didn't move forward just rail security. There was a strong desire by supporters of Amtrak to lard onto it billions of dollars of additional spending having nothing to do with rail security.

   I look forward to working with the Senator from Delaware. They should be separated. Subsidization forever of Amtrak is not something this Senator will ever support when we subsidize rail routes, in the case of a line in Wisconsin--recently terminated, thank God--at $2,000 per passenger. There is something wrong with the way Amtrak is being subsidized.

   I look forward to working with the Senator from Delaware. But let us have no doubt as to why rail security didn't pass this floor with this Senator's endorsement, which is because of the additional billions of dollars that were going to be added onto it.

   Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, that has nothing to do with rail security. And as incoming chairman of the committee, I will be glad to review this issue of Amtrak. We will get the GAO up again, and the GAO will talk about the incredible subsidization of Amtrak which costs American taxpayers billions and billions of dollars per passenger. That is the subject of another day of debate.

   But to come on this floor and say that we are making a ``tragic mistake,'' in the words of the Senator from Delaware, by not passing the rail security bill, I say it is a tragic mistake to add billions of dollars of pork onto rail security when rail security should have been the primary and only focus of a rail security bill.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware is recognized.

   Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I agree this is not the moment for debate on that. Let me respond very briefly.

   The bill was $1.2 billion and $900 million was for the tunnels, period. I don't know where the additional billions of

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dollars come from. OK, $1.2 billion. Subtract $900 million. You are then talking about $300 million. Of that, the money went to a lot of things that relate to dogs, sniffers, and a whole range of additional Amtrak police. We can argue about rail signal systems and other things, which I think are essential. Let us get the numbers straight. We are talking about $1.2 billion. Usually what we do when we have billions like this is we disagree. We at least bring them up and debate them on the floor. We can't even get the bill brought up and debated on the floor.

   If my friend from Arizona--and he is my friend--is correct about billions of dollars of subsidization to Amtrak, then I am sure he will prevail when we talk about a security bill. But I respectfully suggest that is not the case.

   No. 2, this really is for another day. I will just take 2 minutes.

   We talk about, for example, the Wisconsin line. We do airports. We pay $150 million a year. I think we added another $100 million--don't hold me to that--to go into something like 350 cities where nobody wants to fly, nobody wants to go. We pay the airlines. We subsidize them to go into Bemidji, MN. I don't know where they go--places that no one wants to fly into or out of. We subsidize them with 150 million bucks. We do that. We just roll over. That is no problem.

   At any rate, that is for another day. But in the meantime, I hope we will at least be able to get to the point where we can debate on the floor here the rail security legislation and not prevent it from being discussed on the floor unless we have what individual Members want in a bill before it even gets to the floor.

   I yield the floor.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Republican leader is recognized.

   Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I would like to briefly speak in support of this legislation.

   I come from a coastal area. When I was in the House of Representatives, I served on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee and was a member of the Commerce Committee. I pay close attention to the maritime industry and what is happening with our ports and our ships and shipping industry.

   I am very pleased to see this legislation has been brought to the floor. I commend the chairman of the committee, Senator Hollings, and the ranking member, Senator McCain, as well as others who were involved in working through some of the difficulties to produce results. Senator Stevens was involved in that, and Congressman Young on the House side. I had more than one conversation with Senator Thomas and Senators Baucus and Grassley.

   A lot of people worked to help make the production of this legislation possible. I must say, I am amazed it took that kind of a heave because this is such necessary legislation. We probably could have and should have done it last summer. There is no use reviewing all of what went into that, but there is no doubt in my mind that we need to pay attention to port security. That is a place where we could have vulnerability.

   I believe we are making progress in using sophisticated technology to begin to address those threats, but, still, we need to pay attention to this area and make sure we are doing all we can to protect the American people from terrorist attack or exploitation in our ports.

   The vast majority of the U.S. international trade flows through our ports. And I have worried that some enterprising terrorist could put some very devastating material on a tramp steamer or a boat that would come into South Carolina, New York, Baltimore, or Pascagoula, MS, and have a devastating impact on those communities. So we need to think through this.

   Over the past few decades, international and domestic port transportation systems have responded to ever-increasing volumes of two-way trade by increasing their efficiency at moving cargo. The challenge before us, though, is to take steps to find out what is on those ships, what is in that cargo. We have to look at the port of demarcation. How do we deal with them on the high seas? How do we make sure a threat is properly checked into or assessed? What do we do once they get into the ports?

   So this is important legislation. It is not to diminish the threat in all the areas of transportation. We have to think about and review all of them: aviation, trucking, automobiles, points of entry on land. But this is one area in which we need to take action, and that is what the legislation does.

   The administration took immediate steps to increase the security for our maritime transportation system. The Coast Guard dedicated increasing resources to protecting our ports. The Customs Service initiated programs to improve its awareness of all cargo movements into the United States and to push its inbound cargo screening efforts out to foreign ports.

   The Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, that we are considering now, provides new direction to the administration and additional authority so we can deal with this area in a comprehensive manner.

   The bill establishes a system of national, area, port, and waterfront facility and vessel security and response planning and involves the State officials, local officials, and Federal officials and industry representatives.

   The bill improves the authority for the Customs Service to collect cargo information. It promotes the sharing of intelligence information among agencies involved in maritime transportation security and close coordination of security planning and operations among those agencies.

   To me, it is unfathomable that they could not do that anyway; that is, exchange information and get information. This bill will make sure that authority is there.

   The bill establishes a national transportation security card system to control personnel access to secure maritime terminal areas, including performing background checks on applicants. Again, I cannot believe we actually did not already have a system such as this in place. I hope the administration will, and I urge them to, work closely with the

   maritime industry, especially in those sectors with frequent personnel turnover, such as the inland waterway towing vessel industry, to address their needs for quick approval of employee access to these secure areas. We do not want to become another bureaucratic nightmare and maze of delay, but this system needs to be put in place.

   So I do believe this bill will help us to assess the effectiveness of our antiterrorism measures at foreign ports and to work with those ports to improve those measures. It will provide additional funds in this area. It will give the Coast Guard more authority and authorizes more assistance as they deal with marine safety and the maritime policy improvements.

   So this bill is a good achievement. I am glad we are getting it done. It may wind up being one of only four or five conference reports on which we do complete action before we leave at the end of this session, but this is one of which we should be proud.

   I commend the chairman, once again, for being willing to take my calls and sit down and say: Can't we just work together? We did and we got the results. So I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

   Mr. HOLLINGS. Will the Senator yield?

   Mr. LOTT. I yield to the Senator from South Carolina.

   Mr. HOLLINGS. I was asked at a news conference yesterday, did we capitulate on account of the elections? I said no. Under Senator Lott's leadership, we capitulated before the election. You got us together, and I really thank the Senator on behalf of all of us.

   Mr. LOTT. I yield the floor.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

   Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, I yield such time as is necessary to the Senator from New York.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New York is recognized.

   Mr. SCHUMER. Mr. President, I thank our distinguished chairman, our distinguished now minority leader, and our distinguished ranking member for this legislation of vital importance to my community of New York, one of the largest ports in the world.

   We all know what the bill does. And all of these things are good steps forward. I particularly thank Chairman HOLLINGS for his steadfastness on this bill.

   All of us probably would have wanted a little more in this bill, and in a

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minute I am going to talk about one particular area of importance to me. But one of our jobs here is not to let the perfect be the enemy of the good.

   We need to do so much in our ports, and this is a good first step. The idea of assessing what our problems are, the idea of having a security identification card, background checks, and all of these other things I think are extremely important in terms of getting the needed technology because the terrorists are going to look for our most vulnerable pressure points.

   We are doing the job on tightening up air security. I flew in from New York this morning. I saw the new Federal people there. It is better. I do not know if it is good enough yet, but it is better. But with our ports, we have virtually done nothing. This bill is a very good first step. And, again, I thank our chairman.

   I want to talk about one area, and that is, the authorizing language is in the bill we worked on, but, unfortunately, not

   all the money is there to do it. I will try to alert my colleagues to this.

   My great nightmare, as I think of how the terrorists would come back and strike us again--it might be al-Qaida; it might be Iraq; but who knows, it could be someone else, Chechens, East Timorese--but someone takes a nuclear weapon and smuggles it into one of the containers that come into one of our ports over our northern or southern borders and then detonates it in a huge population area. As horrible as 9/11 was--and, believe me, I know that horror--this would be much worse.

   So we should be doing everything we can to make sure our ports are secure and to prevent nuclear weapons from being smuggled into our country, particularly in one of the large containers that come, by the thousands, to our ports on the east coast and west coast and the containers that come over our borders.

   I have talked to experts, and they have said there is good news. The good news is that every nuclear device emits gamma rays, and gamma rays go through almost everything, so they are detectable. Only lead can stop it. And that can be dealt with by having an x-ray detector there as well.

   The good news, in addition, was that at our national energy labs, such as Brookhaven and Argonne Forest, have such detection devices that work 50 or 60 feet away. Unfortunately, the bad news is the only practical commercial device is a Geiger counter. A Geiger counter works from 2 or 3 feet away. And it is virtually impossible for us to send personnel on to every container that comes to our ports or across our borders and hold that Geiger counter a couple of inches from each of the scores of crates that are on each container.

   As I talked further to these experts, they said, for a relatively small sum, they could take the radiation detectors that now exist in our cyclotrons and can detect radiation 50 or 60 feet away and make them practical; namely, they have to make them smaller because they are very large, and they have to make them less delicate because they could bounce around. But imagine if we had such detectors. We could put them on every crane that loads or unloads a container. We could put them on every tollbooth that a truck, over the Mexican border or Canadian border, drives by and prevent a nuclear weapon from coming in. And even if these terrorists were so sophisticated that they surrounded the bomb in lead, we put an x ray next to it, and the x ray could detect the lead, and we know something is up, and we inspect the crate.

   I brought this to the attention of my friend from Virginia, Senator Warner, and we introduced legislation that would do just this. We worked long and hard to try to get it as part of the homeland security bill, but that did not happen. But the knight on the white horse in this area was the chairman from South Carolina because he put the language that we devised, with some suggestions by the Senator from Arizona and some by his own folks, in this bill.

   We are now authorized to do research to figure out a way to detect nuclear devices from 50 or 60 or 70 feet away to prevent--God forbid--somebody from bringing in a device.

   There is only one problem. I regret to bring this up, but it is true. The Senator from South Carolina has made the fight. We need about $250 million to come up with such a device. Unfortunately, only $90 million is authorized for the entire research and development section of this bill. This is not a frivolous expenditure. This is not pork. This is vital to our security.

   I am supportive of this bill. I am grateful to the chairman. He made the fight. I don't care if the Government or the private sector pays for this; somebody should be paying for this research because we don't want to wake up one morning and find a device smuggled into our country when we can stop it. That is the frustrating thing. We can stop it. This is not one of those things like cancer where we can put billions of dollars in and hope and pray that research finds a cure and stops the disease.

   We know if we put in the money, these devices, which already exist, can be practicalized so they can be put on every crane and on every toll booth where a truck with a container comes over our borders.

   I hope when we come back next year--this is hardly a partisan issue; as I said, it was the Senator from Virginia and myself who spearheaded this--that we will put new effort into authorizing and appropriating a few more dollars so the research that needs to be done to make us nuclear secure is done.

   I supported our President's motion for the war on Iraq. One of the reasons I did was I was afraid that Iraq would develop nuclear weapons down the road, and we couldn't allow them to do that because they might be smuggled in here. It is not going to be just Iraq. In our brave new world, our post-9/11 world, other groups can come up with these devices. It is our solemn obligation to do everything we can to prevent them from being smuggled in.

   The bill the chairman has sponsored is a great first step. I hope with his leadership and that of the Senator from Arizona, who made many suggestions to this part of our bill, that next year we will move forward to appropriate the necessary dollars to get this done quickly and make our country safe.

   I yield back the time to the Senator from South Carolina.

   Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I rise today to speak on the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002.

   I applaud Senator Hollings, Chairman of the Commerce Committee, Senator McCain, the Ranking Member, and other members of the Port Security Conference Committee for their efforts, but I believe this legislation can best be summed up as ``too little, too late.''

   The Senate passed Port Security Legislation last December, yet only now, almost a year later, is the Congress sending this bill to the President. Moreover, once this legislation passes, it will be years before the Department of Transportation and the Department of Homeland Security implement effective security measures at our 361 seaports.

   I would have preferred seeing the Conferees embrace other ideas to improve port security such as the legislation I introduced with Senators Kyl, Snowe, and Hutchison. Instead, the Conferees rejected many proposals on port security and slimmed down the Senate Bill so that it is now one part security and three parts Coast Guard authorization language that has nothing to do with security.

   I believe Congress ``missed the boat'' with this legislation and squandered an opportunity to take aggressive action to erect a formidable barrier at our seaports.

   We know ports present optimal targets to terrorists. And we know al-Qaida operatives are coming after us. As CIA director George Tenet said recently before the Intelligence Committee, of which I am a member: ``al-Qaida is in an execution phase and intends to strike us both here and overseas; that's unambiguous as far as I am concerned.''

   And this week we learned of a new tape that seems to be by Osama bin Laden, which made clear al-Qaida intends to go after us again soon.

   The October 2002 report by Gary Hart and Warren Rudman demonstrates that our ports remain especially vulnerable even more than a year after September 11. The report points out, ``Only the tiniest percentage of containers, ships, trucks, and trains that enter the United States each day are subject to

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examination, and a weapon of mass destruction could well be hidden among this cargo.''

   The Hart-Rudman report recommends revising transportation security because ``the vulnerabilities are greater and the stakes are higher in the sea and land modes than in commercial aviation. Systems such as those used in the aviation sector, which start from the assumption that every passenger and every bag of luggage poses an equal risk, must give way to more intelligence-driven and layered security approaches that emphasize prescreening and monitoring based on risk-criteria.''

   Since we cannot inspect every ship and every container, I introduced the ``Comprehensive Seaport and Container Security Act'' earlier this year to establish a system for container profiling. The Feinstein-Kyl-Snowe-Hutchison Port Security Bill would also push U.S. security scrutiny beyond our Nation's borders to intercept cargo before it arrives near America's shores.

   This complements the strategy Customs Commissioner Robert C. Bonner is in the process of implementing. To prevent a weapon of mass destruction from getting to the U.S. in the first place, Customs has entered into formal agreements with a handful of foreign governments to station U.S. inspectors at ports overseas to profile high risk cargo and target suspicious shipments for inspection.

   The Customs Service is working to put groups of U.S. experts at the top 20 ports as soon as possible and they are moving at an impressive pace.

   Hitting the 20 port threshold is essential because together, these ports account for approximately 70 percent of the 5.7 million containers shipped by sea to the U.S. annually.

   We have known for a long time that America's ports needed an extensive security strategy and upgrade. In the fall of 2000, a comprehensive report was issued by the ``Interagency Commission on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports.'' I testified before the Commission and I believe the group's report serves as a very thorough primer on seaport security issues.

   While often out of the public eye, ports across the United States are our nation's economic gateways. Every year U.S. ports handle over 800 million tons of cargo valued at approximately $600 billion. Excluding trade with Mexico and Canada, America's ports handle 95 percent of U.S. trade. Two of the busiest ports in the nation are in California, at Los Angeles / Long Beach and at Oakland.

   S. 1214, the Senate-passed bill written by Chairman HOLLINGS and members of the Commerce Committee, was drafted before the September 11 terrorist attacks to incorporate the recommendations made by the Interagency Commission into law. While changes were made to this legislation before the Senate passed it in December of 2001 to focus more on antiterrorism, I believe the Conferees could have taken more aggressive action to improve the bill.

   I would like to cite a few examples to show how this Conference Report is weaker than the Comprehensive Seaport and Container Security Act I have introduced.

   The Feinstein-Kyl-Snowe-Hutchison port security bill establishes a comprehensive risk profiling plan for the Customs Service to focus their limited inspection capabilities on high-risk cargo containers.

   However, the only mention of such a plan in the Maritime Security Act conference report is this paragraph of report language: ``A vessel screening system which provides shipping intelligence and analysis can be utilized to identify those vessels requiring close inspection by the Coast Guard and other agencies. We urge the Coast Guard and port authorities to include vessel risk profiling in their enhanced security procedures.''

   The Feinstein-Kyl-Snowe-Hutchison port security bill strengthens U.S. security scrutiny beyond our Nation's borders to monitor and inspect cargo and containers before they arrive on America's shores.

   However, the conferees of this Maritime Transportation Security Act only required foreign ports to be evaluated and authorized a program for U.S. officials to train foreign security officers abroad.

   The Feinstein-Kyl-Snowe-Hutchison port security bill imposes steep monetary sanctions and criminal penalties for incorrect cargo manifest information or failure to comply with filing requirements.

   However, the conferees of this Maritime Transportation Security Act only authorized civil penalties of up to $25,000 for a violation.

   The Feinstein-Kyl-Snowe-Hutchison port security bill requires the Transportation Security Administration to set standards to ensure each port has a secure perimeter, secure parking facilities, controlled points of access into the port, sufficient lighting, buildings with secure doors and windows and an alarm.

   However, the conferees of this Maritime Transportation Security Act only required vulnerability assessments and a National Maritime Transportation Security Plan.

   The Feinstein-Kyl-Snowe-Hutchison port security bill requires the use of high security seals and electronic tags on all containers coming into the U.S. and requires empty containers destined for U.S. ports to be sealed.

   However, the conferees of this Maritime Transportation Security Act only mandated the development of performance standards for seals and locks on cargo containers.

   I have pointed out several areas where I believe the Conferees could have taken more aggressive steps, but I do want to endorse many of the security measures in this conference report such as the requirement for all workers in a secure area of the port to have a transportation security card and I support the $15 million annual authorization for 5 years to fund research and development efforts.

   I thank Senator Hollings, Senator McCain, and other members of the Commerce Committee for the work they have done on this important issue.

   I look forward to continue to work with the chairman and ranking member of the Commerce Committee to address the threats to our ports. I believe additional legislation will be essential to follow up on this security bill. We must be better prepared for a terrorist attack than we were last year.

   Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I would like to take this opportunity to congratulate Senator HOLLINGS and Senator MCCAIN the Chairman and Ranking Member of the Commerce Committee for reaching an agreement with the House on the Maritime Transportation and Security Act of 2002, S. 1214. I am proud to have served as a conferee on this very important legislation that will significantly improve security in our Nations seaports. In addition the bill would reauthorize the Coast Guard, a major component in improving security in our ports and harbors.

   As Chairman of the Oceans, Fisheries and Atmosphere Subcommittee, I had the opportunity to chair an oversight hearing on the Coast Guard's role in improving maritime security after the terrible attacks of September 11. As Senators HOLLINGS and MCCAIN well know, even before September 11, our maritime and port security was in sorry shape.

   I wish to thank Chairman HOLLINGS for including three provisions from S. 1587, the Port Threat and Security Act, which I introduced last year in order to improve safety and security in our nations ports.

   The first provision requires an annual report to the Congress that would list those nations whose vessels the Coast Guard has found would pose a risk to our ports, or that have presented our government with false, partial, or fraudulent information concerning cargo manifests, crew identity, or registration of the vessel. In addition the report would identify nations that do not exercise adequate control over their vessel registration and ownership procedures, particularly with respect to security issues. We need hard information like this if we are to force ``flag of convenience'' nations from providing cover to criminals and terrorists. This is very important as Osama bin Laden has used flags of convenience to hide his ownership in various international shipping interests. In 1998, one of bin Laden's cargo freighters unloaded supplies in Kenya for the suicide bombers who later destroyed the embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.

   Also included from S. 1587, was my proposal on Sea Marshals. Sea Marshals would be authorized to be used on

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vessels as well as shore facilities both private and public to ensure safe transportation of high interest vessels into our ports, such as liquefied natural gas tankers and cruise ships. In Boston we have an LNG facility in the middle of Boston Harbor. Obviously we need increased security each time an LNG tanker offloads natural gas. Prior to September 11 these vessels were escorted by Coast Guard vessels into the port but no armed guards were present on the vessel. I strongly believe that having armed personnel, such as sea marshals, on these high interest vessels is very important and will considerably increase security in our Nation's ports, including Boston. The ability of terrorists to board a vessel and cause a deliberate release of LNG or gasoline for that matter is very real. Sea marshals will make it much more difficult for this to happen. In addition, this legislation would require a feasibility study to determine the potential to use other Federal, State or local law enforcement personnel as well as documented United States Merchant Marine personnel as sea marshals in the future.

   Finally, this legislation includes a provision that would require the administration to begin a vigorous foreign port threat assessment program. Inspectors would evaluate the effectiveness of security practices in both cargo and passenger terminals around the world. This legislation allows the United States to prohibit any vessel from entering the United States if the vessel has embarked passengers or cargo from foreign ports that do not have adequate security measures as determined by our port threat assessment teams. Last year, inspectors in Italy checking a container bound for Canada discovered a member of the al-Qaida terrorist organization hiding in a shipping container equipped with a bed and makeshift bathroom. The suspect, an Egyptian in a business suit, had with him a Canadian passport, a laptop computer, two cell phones, airport maps, security passes for airports in three countries and a certificate proclaiming him an airplane mechanic. We simply cannot allow any country to have such poor security such that terrorists can stow away in a shipping container.

   As I mentioned earlier this bill would also reauthorize the Coast Guard. The events of September 11 resulted in a new normalcy for the Coast Guard as port security and homeland defense missions rose to the forefront and our country realized the security shortcomings in our ports. This legislation recognizes this fact and authorizes nearly $6 billion for the Coast Guard in 2003. Obviously this country needs a viable and robust Coast Guard to safeguard our ports, and to ensure that commerce and trade can continue to occur in our ports, safely, efficiently and most importantly without terrorist incident.

   At the same time, the Coast Guard also has unique missions not covered by any other federal agency. It is the only U.S. military service with domestic law enforcement authority. It has the primary responsibility of enforcing U.S. fisheries laws, carrying out drug interdiction at sea, and protecting the marine environment against pollution. I want to make it clear that all of these missions are important. And these traditional missions are suffering from resource constraints.

   This bill would also increase authorization for Coast Guard personnel from approximately 35,000 today, which is roughly the size of the New York City Police Department to 45,500 by the end of this fiscal year.

   This bill would authorize $4.3 billion for operating expenses in FY2003. Operating expenses cover all of the various activities of the Coast Guard, from boater safety and drug interdiction to port security, and adequate authorization is necessary to ensure that all of these Coast Guard operations can be carried out effectively.

   This bill would also authorize $725 million in FY2003 for acquisition, construction, and improvement of equipment and facilities. Most of this funding will be used to fund the Deepwater Project, a long overdue modernization of the Coast Guard's Deepwater assets. The Coast Guard is the world's 7th largest navy yet they operate a fleet of ships that rank 39th in age out of the world's 41 maritime fleets. The Coast Guard is operating World War II-era cutters in the deepwater environment to perform crucial environmental protection, national defense, and law enforcement missions. In addition, Coast Guard aircraft, which are operated in a maintenance-intensive salt water environment, are reaching the end of their useful lives as well. Besides high operating costs, these assets are technologically and operationally obsolete. The Deepwater program will not only reduce operational and maintenance costs, but will significantly improve upon current command and control capabilities in the deepwater environment. I am delighted to see this program moving forward.

   Every day on average, the Coast Guard saves 14 lives, seizes 209 pounds of marijuana and 170 pounds of cocaine, and saves $2.5 million in property. Through boater safety programs and maintenance of an extensive network of aids to navigation, the Coast Guard protects thousands of other people engaged in coastwise trade, commercial fishing activities, and recreational boating. In addition, the Coast Guard has a role to play in Homeland Defense. It is vitally important that we adequately fund and staff all of the missions of the Coast Guard. This legislation, while not as generous as many of us would like, is a step in the right direction.

   Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, I rise today in support of the legislation before the Senate which is designed to overhaul port security in this Nation. Port security is a national imperative in the wake of September 11. Frankly, I think it is regrettable that it has taken us this long to get to this point. After all, like aviation security, port security is national security, and it must now be viewed as such. We have to assume that every facet of our transportation system remains a target for terrorism. Last year, we moved swiftly in an effort to close many of the gaps in our aviation security system, but we still have a long way to go on port and maritime security.

   We cannot underestimate the importance of this issue. A terrorist attack at a major port could cost countless lives and have a devastating impact on the national and global economy. As U.S. Customs Service Commissioner Robert Bonner said recently, ``if terrorists used a sea container to conceal a weapon of mass destruction and detonated it on arrival at a port, the impact on global trade and the global economy could be immediate and devastating--all nations would be affected.'' At the same time, the 2000 interagency commission report found the state of security in U.S. seaports generally ranges from poor to fair.

   Remember, our ports link us to the world. They serve a crucial purpose. They give us access to global markets. Ships carry goods totaling 95 percent of our foreign trade, excluding that with Canada and Mexico. Furthermore, the volume of goods passing through our ports is expected to double in the next 20 years. United States waters also sustain a $24 billion commercial fishing industry and a $71 billion recreational and tourism industry.

   As a member of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation and the port security conference committee, I am aware of the important responsibility we have to turn this situation around. And we can only achieve this with a comprehensive, exhaustive approach that recognizes that the entire system is only as strong as its weakest link.

   The conference report before us today represents a multifaceted approach that runs the gamut and sets the stage for a complete reevaluation of port security from the ground up. We have an incredible amount of collective talent and experience in this country, and I hope that it can all be brought together to effect the kind of changes we need to fix the deficiencies brought tragically home by 9/11.

   First and foremost, it is vital that we ensure that the sum total of the knowledge and resources of Federal, State, and local governments are brought to bear to both prevent disasters and respond to them. In that light, coordination is critical, and the measure before us today provides for greater coordination in this regard. In the wake of the September 11 attacks, we saw outstanding responses at the local level, but these actions were ad hoc--there were no national, standardized directives that could have been quickly disseminated and uniformly understood

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and applied--in contrast to the FAA directive to ground all planes, which was enormously successful.

   Well, I do not think there is any doubt we can no longer afford such a piecemeal approach--if we are talking about our national security, which we are, we are talking about the need to establish a national response.

   To confront the challenge of terrorism aimed at our maritime sector, we need better information, better information sharing, and more coordination. We need to enhance our ability to track cargo, and know what is being moved, with more inspectors, and improved technology. And we need stringent international standards, so we stop terrorist plots before they reach our shores.

   Security coordination between Federal, State, and local authorities has been one of my top priorities in the aftermath of September 11, and I am pleased that the conference report greatly enhances coordination with respect to port security. The bill requires comprehensive security and incident response plans for the Nation's 361 commercial seaports. It also establishes a national maritime security committee and local maritime security committees at each local port to better coordinate efforts and share critical information and intelligence.

   I am particularly pleased that the conference report includes provisions that build on legislation I introduced last fall to require ships to electronically send their cargo manifests to a port before gaining clearance to enter. The port security conference report expands on cargo security measures contained in the Trade Act of 2002 by requiring that cargo and crew member information be relayed to port security authorities prior to a cargo carrier's arrival in the United States. The U.S. Customs Service would determine how far in advance to require such pre-arrival information.

   The bill will also provide grants to local port security authorities, as well as $15 million annually during fiscal years 2003 through 2008 for

   research and development grants for port security. I have seen firsthand how important these port security grants are. In my home State of Maine, the city of Portland recently received a Federal grant of $175,000 for port security upgrades. However, the fact is that ports in Maine and across the country still need additional security-related funding.

   The conference report also addresses the complex issue of access to secure areas of a port by requiring the Secretary of Transportation to design a comprehensive credentialing process for port workers. The bill establishes a national standard for biometric security cards for transportation workers, and would allow the Secretary to determine whether an individual posed enough of a security risk to be denied an identification card.

   Finally, as ranking member of the commerce Committee's Subcommittee on Oceans, Atmosphere, and Fisheries, I am please that this conference agreement includes provisions from my Coast Guard authorization bill. The conference report will provide the Coast Guard with the funding and personnel authorization levels it needs as well as over 30 other provisions important to the Coast Guard and the maritime community. This is the first time the Coast Guard has had an authorization bill since 1998 and it was drafted to provide the Coast Guard with the tools it needs to operate in our post-September 11 reality.

   The legislation provides a 1-year authorization for the Coast Guard to reflect the agency's changing priorities since September 11, including authorization for $1 billion in new funding, as President Bush proposed in Portland, ME in February, and the authority to hire 5,500 new personnel to meet both its new homeland security needs as well as carry out its other traditional missions.

   This bill also includes numerous measures which will improve the Coast Guard's ability to recruit, reward, and retain high-quality personnel. It addresses various Coast Guard personnel management and quality of life issues such as promotions, retention, housing authorities, and education.

   Last year alone, the Coast Guard responded to over 40,000 calls for assistance, assisted $1.4 billion in property, and saved 3,355 lives. These brave men and women risk their lives to defend our borders from drugs, illegal immigrants, and other national security threats. In 2001, the Coast Guard seized a record 132,920 pounds of cocaine and 50,000 pounds of marijuana, preventing these substances from reaching our streets and playgrounds. they also stopped 4,210 illegal migrants from reaching our shores. They conducted patrols to protect our vital fisheries stocks and they responded to over 11,000 pollution incidents.

   And in the wake of September 11, the men and women of the Coast Guard have been working harder than ever in the service's largest peacetime port security operation since World War II. These operations are all critical to defending our country, protecting our borders, preserving our environment, saving lives, and ensuring commerce moves safely through our waters.

   As a conferee on this bill, I am proud of the work we have done, and that we are sending a strong and meaningful port security bill to the President. We know full well that the world has changed, and seaport security cannot be taken for granted. We also know that our transportation system must be secure if we are to move the Nation forward, and also ensure that we are in a position of strength to be able to wage the kind of war necessary to eradicate terrorism.

   So I urge all my colleagues to offer a strong show up support for this important legislation.

   Mr. WYDEN. Mr. President, I rise to express my strong support for the important agreement that my fellow conferees and I achieved in the conference on the Port and Maritime Security bill. For many months, our staffs have worked tirelessly to help us reach an agreement that meets the needs of security while allowing commerce to flourish. This bipartisan legislation strikes a good balance between security and trade, and I'm glad to see that it will be headed for the President's desk.

   This legislation, of which I am an original cosponsor, aims to protect U.S. ports against terrorist attacks. The safer Oregon's ports are, the more prosperous they will be. I am also pleased to see that many programs important to Oregon will continue to thrive. These programs play a critical role in supporting Oregon's commerce and ports, which support 1 in 7 jobs in the State. The Maritime Fire Safety Association on the Lower Columbia will continue its important work along with the important Coast Guard stations that maintain safety and manage fisheries for communities on the Columbia River and along Oregon's coast.

   In addition to safeguards for Oregon businesses, I am also pleased that the agreement recognizes the important environmental laws that help maintain our State's environmental treasures and will continue to protect Oregon's ocean and coastal environment.

   I especially want to commend Chairman HOLLINGS for his perseverance on this legislation, and I thank my fellow conferees for their hard work on this important bill.

   Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, today, the Senate will consider and approve a final agreement on maritime and seaport security. This important legislation will address critical security issues at America's seaports, and I rise to applaud the efforts of Chairman HOLLINGS and my other colleagues who served on the conference committee that brokered this historic agreement.

   Conference negotiations always involve a delicate dance of give-and-take. In this case, the conferees have been true to the intent and spirit of the originally passed legislation. They have retained important improvements, including a requirement that ports develop terrorism response plans; the creation of a coordinated maritime intelligence system; and a mandate that the U.S. Department of Transportation conduct background checks of port workers and require worker identification cards. As important, the agreement reflects some of the priorities I advanced in my own port security legislation--including enhanced requirements for the electronic submission of cargo information and the development of a uniform system for securing containers destined for the United States. This legislation, while not a cure-all, constitutes a substantial improvement over the current security situation at many of our Nation's ports, and I proudly cast my vote in favor of it.

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   That said, passage of this legislation should not lessen our resolve to remain vigilant in our efforts to protect America's seaports. Each year, an estimated 11 million containers worldwide are loaded and unloaded at least 10 times. The U.S. marine transportation system alone moves more than 2 billion tons of domestic and international freight and imports 3.3 billion tons of oil. Surprisingly, notwithstanding the magnitude of cargo transported by sea, there exists no uniform or mandatory standards for security at leading facilities, no uniform or mandatory system of sealing containers, and no independent checks to ensure that basic safeguards are undertaken.

   In order to remedy these gaps in our current security scheme, there remains much work to be done. As I have suggested, we should recalibrate our transportation agenda to focus more sequarely on threats to sea and land. We should adopt stiffer criminal penalties, including

   enhanced penalties for noncompliance with certain reporting requirements; continue to explore policies and technologies that will ensure container security--shockingly, as an independent task force recently observed, most containers are now seated with a 50-cent lead tag--make sure that border agents are trained and equipped to detect threats like nuclear devices, which would easily be concealed in the mass of uninspected cargo that enters the United States each day; work in partnership with the trade community to ensure appropriate data security; and provide for proper data collection and reporting systems that capture the magnitude of serious crime at seaports and related facilities.

   Let there be no doubt about it: this legislation provides no reprieve from our obligation to safeguard the homeland. The task will be difficult and requires dogged perseverance, but the building blocks are before us. Moreover, we know what we must do: first, we must have solid intelligence to identify and track our enemies; second, we must erect the proper barriers and preventive strategies to keep weapons and other instruments of destruction out of their hands; third, if those strategies fail, we must be prepared and able to stop any threat before it arrives on our shores; and fourth, as a fail-stop measure, we must have the capacity to detect and destroy any threat that makes its way to our borders. No matter what your political stripe or special interest, those basic principles must guide our fundamental strategy. And this legislation moves us substantially in that direction. I am committed to continuing to work aggressively on these issues in the 108th Congress and invite my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to join me.

   Mr. NELSON of Florida. Mr. President, I rise in support of the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002. Of all of the important legislation we have worked on this year to protect our Nation from further acts of terrorism, I consider this bill to be one of utmost importance.

   Most terrorist attacks around the world target transportation, and the Nation's 361 seaports, 14 of which are in Florida, are especially vulnerable. Our seaports are open and exposed to acts of terrorism as well as to drug trafficking, cargo theft, and especially important to Florida, the smuggling of illegal immigrants. The fact that many of our ports are located in and around large urban areas makes the security of the seaports of paramount importance. The extreme vulnerability of the urban areas in and around seaports was underscored recently by the fishing boat that eluded Coast Guard interdiction and arrived just off the shores of Key Biscayne, FL, carrying a large number of Haitian immigrants. Had this boat carried terrorists or dangerous cargo, a tragedy might have occurred.

   A terrorist attack at our seaports would produce devastating effects both in terms of loss of life and in economic disruption. Florida's seaports play a critical role in our national, State, and local economies. Florida's seaports are major gateways of commerce for the flow of goods and passengers along the Nation's and Florida's transportation corridors of commerce. Florida ranks fourth in the Nation's total container movements, and is home to four of the major container ports in the country.

   Florida has the top three busiest cruise ports in the world. Approximately twelve million passengers embarked or disembarked at Florida seaports during 2001 and approximately 80 percent of those passengers were U.S. citizens. The security of the Nation's seaports is crucial to the future of the cruise tourism industry.

   Although Florida has the largest international water border in the continental U.S., and thus the largest Federal maritime domain of any State in the continental U.S., Florida's seaports receive very limited Federal law enforcement resources, and no Federal funding for security infrastructure to provide the security controls necessary to protect themselves from threats of large-scale terrorism, cargo theft, drug trafficking, and the smuggling of contraband and aliens. The increased threat of terrorism at our borders demands that action be taken immediately.

   This legislation lays out important security measures that must be taken to ensure the safety and security of our seaports. It significantly increases funding for the Coast Guard to $6 billion in fiscal year 2003. It also authorizes $90 million in research and development grants to improve our ability to screen cargo for dangerous contraband, to detect unauthorized people or goods from entering through seaports, and to secure access to sensitive areas of our ports. This bill also mandates the development of standards for training Federal, State, and private security professionals and provides funding to carry out that training and education. It also mandates for the first time, the development by ports, facilities, and vessels, of comprehensive security and incident response plans.

   Unfortunately, the final version of this legislation does not include a dedicated funding source necessary to carry out the needed security measures. The grant program it establishes will help fund some of the security enhancements, but there must be more funding allocated to individual seaports. Florida has already spent more than $7 million securing our 14 deepwater seaports. Florida needs more Federal funding to comply with the mandated security measures of this bill. We must also ensure that ports that have already spent substantial amounts of funding on security measures are reimbursed for those improvements. Without a dedicated funding source, it is hard to see how we will achieve the high level of security at our seaports envisioned by this bill.

   No one deserves more credit for the passage of this important legislation than my good friend and colleague Senator BOB GRAHAM. It is an important step forward to securing our seaports and making our nation safer. But, as Senator BOB GRAHAM has said, we have much more to do. I look forward to working with him and my colleagues on the Commerce Committee to take the next steps in making our seaports safe.

   Mr. McCAIN. How much time remains on both sides?

   The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BINGAMAN). The Senator from South Carolina controls 17 minutes; the Senator from Arizona, 11 1/2 .

   Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I am glad to yield some of my time to the Senator from South Carolina, if he needs it.

   Mr. HOLLINGS. I appreciate it.

   Let me thank the distinguished Senator from New York. He is right as rain. We did not get adequate funds. That was a struggle over on the House side. That was the Gordian knot broken by our distinguished minority leader, Senator TRENT LOTT. But we are going to have to find not only the money for the research, we will have to find about $4 billion at least to implement this measure.

   I thank the Senator from New York. I particularly thank the Senator and chairman of our subcommittee, Senator Breaux. We had those six field hearings. We had the Director of Customs there. We had the Commandant of the Coast Guard. They were very comprehensive hearings with limited time. I can tell you now, we saw at one particular port a Ford pickup truck back out of that container, and another container that we happened upon had a bunch of mahogany desks from Mexico that we didn't see at the particular time. But later on up in Delaware, the Philadelphia area, it was opened up. It was all full of cocaine. So we made a good raid at one of those hearings.

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   Otherwise, the chairman on the House side, Mr. DON YOUNG, and his ranking member, JIM OBERSTAR, worked around the clock. They had to feel like we had over on the Senate side to take care of this with the user fee. But we just couldn't get the support on the House side. We are only here on account of the leadership of Chairman YOUNG and Congressman OBERSTAR. We had Senator TED STEVENS reconciling a good bit of the differences from time to time. And in the financial area, we had Senator BOB GRAHAM and Chairman CHUCK GRASSLEY of the Finance Committee who worked with us.

   I think we ought to understand that this, for the first time, requires a national maritime security plan. As part of

   the plan, each regional area would be required to have a security plan. It requires for the first time ever that all waterfront facilities and vessels have a security plan that would have to be reviewed and approved by the Coast Guard. It requires for the first time ever that the Government will do assessments of security at our ports, and these reports would be the basis for port security planners. The security requirements will be implemented instantly after review by the Coast Guard, and the act would be fully implemented within 1 year.

   We have background checks on all of the employees. We have the development of technology for seaport security, the maritime intelligence system; that requires tracking of vessels through satellite legal authority over territorial waters, advanced reporting requirements for vessels and cargo. And one final word: We did work with the unions in this particular measure. The White House, the unions, the Republicans, the Democrats, the House, the Senate worked out those background checks on union employees. So when we got together and much has been said that on the homeland security bill that was the holdup--we worked out a very comprehensive system that was approved by all and will give security to our port facilities.

   I thank the distinguished Senator from Arizona for his courtesy in yielding and his leadership on this particular measure.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona controls the remainder of the time.

   Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I want to go back for a moment to the discussion I had with the Senator from Delware concerning rail security.

   First of all, I agree with the Senator from Delaware. We need absolutely to pass that legislation, particularly now that we have acted on airport and port security. Rail security is obviously a very critical item. My point was that there are two bills: One is S. 1550, the rail security bill, which provides $1.7 billion, $515 million for Amtrak systemwide security, and then $998 million for tunnel life safety projects in New York, Baltimore, and Washington, DC, which comes up to $998 million, and $254 million for safety and security improvements.

   That bill I supported and worked through the committee and would support it, even though over 50 percent of it goes for just three areas: New York, Baltimore, and Washington, DC. But that is where tunnels that need work are located.

   I was referring also to S. 1991, which is the Amtrak reauthorization, which calls for $4 billion annually and also includes the provisions of S. 1550. Holds were put on S. 1550. I do not support S. 1991 because it authorizes as much as $4 billion annually.

   The Senator from Delaware always talks about the fact that we subsidize aviation projects. We do. We do primarily through user fees. There are no user fees that are imposed on the railways of America and Amtrak.

   I am pleased with some of the actions that have been taken by the new regime over at Amtrak. The new chairman is doing a much better job in making some very tough decisions.

   I look forward to working with the Senators from Delaware. The junior Senator from Delaware, Mr. Carper, has been very committed and involved in the project. I look forward to working with him and Senator Hollings. A top priority will be, in my view, rail security; we should pass it.

   I want to make it clear I don't believe other extraneous projects should be associated with it. The Amtrak reauthorization should be taken up on its merits or demerits. But I hope we can move forward with S. 1550, the rail security bill. Holds have been put on the bill. It has received my support, as well as that of the distinguished chairman of the committee.

   The issue of Amtrak rail security is of prime importance. The issue of the future of Amtrak is also of significant importance--not as important as that of rail security. I look forward to working with Senator Hollings and the Senators from Delaware and the members of the committee, including Senator Breaux, as we try to work through this whole issue of the future of Amtrak. There are a number of different kinds of proposals, and Mr. Ken Mead of GAO, under whose responsibilities Amtrak lies, is one to whom all of us pay a great deal of attention.

   Finally, I again thank Senator Hollings for his leadership on this very important legislation. I don't think there is any doubt in the minds of most safety and security experts that port security is an area of significant vulnerability. We hold no illusions there will be immediate confidence that we can have security in the airports of America, but I am confident that the implementation of this legislation, over time, will provide Americans, to a large extent, with the security and safety that is necessary in the ports of America.

   In some ways, you can argue that the way the ports operate in America, the challenges are even greater than at the airports, or even rail security, given the hundreds of thousands of containers that come through these ports on a daily basis, and how vital they are to the economy of the United States, as we found out in the slowdown/strike in the west coast ports recently.

   So I again thank all involved. I also thank our friends in the other body, the House, and also for the involvement of the administration.

   Mr. President, I yield whatever remaining time I have to the Senator from South Carolina.

   Mr. HOLLINGS. I thank the distinguished Senator from Arizona. I am glad to hear him say we are going to work together on port security and the reauthorization of Amtrak because that is vital. I think if the leader here, the Senator from Nevada, and the other side are ready, we can yield back time and proceed to the vote. I yield back any time I may have. I thank the Senator from Arizona.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nevada.

   Mr. REID. The Senator from Arizona and the Senator from South Carolina yielded back their time. I think it is appropriate to start the vote a couple minutes early.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. If all time is yielded back, the question is on agreeing to the conference report. The yeas and nays have been ordered. The clerk will call the roll.

   The legislative clerk called the roll.

   Mr. REID. I announce that the Senator from Hawaii (Mr. INOUYE), the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. KENNEDY), the Senator from Louisiana (Ms. LANDRIEU), and the Senator from New Jersey (Mr. TORRICELLI) are necessarily absent.

   Mr. NICKLES. I announce that the Senator from North Carolina (Mr. HELMS) is necessarily absent.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. CARPER). Are there any other Senators in the Chamber desiring to vote?

   The result was announced--yeas 95, nays 0, as follows:

[Rollcall Vote No. 243 Leg.] YEAS--95

   Akaka

   Allard

   Allen

   Barkley

   Baucus

   Bayh

   Bennett

   Biden

   Bingaman

   Bond

   Boxer

   Breaux

   Brownback

   Bunning

   Burns

   Byrd

   Campbell

   Cantwell

   Carnahan

   Carper

   Chafee

   Cleland

   Clinton

   Cochran

   Collins

   Conrad

   Corzine

   Craig

   Crapo

   Daschle

   Dayton

   DeWine

   Dodd

   Domenici

   Dorgan

   Durbin

   Edwards

   Ensign

   Enzi

   Feingold

   Feinstein

   Fitzgerald

   Frist

   Graham

   Gramm

   Grassley

   Gregg

   Hagel

   Harkin

   Hatch

   Hollings

   Hutchinson

   Hutchison

   Inhofe

   Jeffords

   Johnson

   Kerry

   Kohl

   Kyl

   Leahy

   Levin

   Lieberman

   Lincoln

   Lott

   Lugar

   McCain

   McConnell

   Mikulski

   Miller

   Murkowski

   Murray

   Nelson (FL)

   Nelson (NE)

   Nickles

   Reed

   Reid

   Roberts

   Rockefeller

   Santorum

   Sarbanes

   Schumer

   Sessions

   Shelby

   Smith (NH)

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   Smith (OR)

   Snowe

   Specter

   Stabenow

   Stevens

   Thomas

   Thompson

   Thurmond

   Voinovich

   Warner

   Wyden

NOT VOTING--5

   Helms

   Inouye

   Kennedy

   Landrieu

   Torricelli

   The conference report was agreed to.

   Mr. HOLLINGS. I move to reconsider the vote.

   Mr. BYRD. I move to lay that motion on the table.

   The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania.

END



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