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Congressional Record Weekly UpdateJanuary 13-17, 2003Return to the Congressional Report Weekly. 1A) Price-Anderson Act Mr. VOINOVICH. Mr. President, I rise today, as the Chairman of the Clean Air, Climate Change, and Nuclear Safety Subcommittee, to introduce a bill to reauthorize the Price-Anderson Act. While the Act was first passed in 1957 and has been renewed three times, the current authorization expired on August 1, 2002 for Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensees. The growth of nuclear power depends greatly on the reauthorization of this Act, which provides liability for damages to the general public from nuclear incidents. [Page: S295] It is important for the American public to understand how the Price-Anderson liability program works. The nuclear industry actually funds the program; it is not a Federal subsidy. Each nuclear power plant purchases liability insurance from private insurers to cover the first $200 million for immediate response in the case of an accident. If the damages amounted to more than this amount, a second level of financial protection would apply. In these cases, each of the U.S. licensed nuclear units would pay up to $10 million annually into a collective fund to cover the damages, with a maximum payment of $88.1 million per accident. This, together with the $200 million in insurance money, provides a total of about $9.3 billion in insurance coverage to compensate the public in the case of a nuclear accident. If more than this amount is needed, Congress could then go back to the industry and demand a larger contribution. This is an incredible system. I am not aware of any facility in the country or world that is insured for up to $9.3 billion. Neither do I know of any other industry in which all of the competitors agree up front to pay for the mistakes or acts of God that affect any one company. Furthermore, instead of fighting claims in court, the industry waives its traditional tort defense so that the fund begins making payments immediately. This means that if there were a nuclear disaster somewhere, the insurance companies would immediately start paying out claims. In fact, after the Three Mile Island incident, claims offices were on the site within 24 hours. This program provides extensive insurance coverage and provides it up front. The expiration of this program affects only new NRC licenses, not existing licensees. Without the program, a new nuclear facility would be unable to obtain the liability insurance that this program provides, making new licenses very improbable, if not impossible. Nuclear energy is important to our Nation's national security, economy, and environment. America's nuclear energy industry currently provides approximately 20 percent of our energy. It is a safe, reliable, and zero-emission source of energy. This has had a tremendous positive effect on the environment and public health. Since 1973, nuclear energy has prevented 62 million tons of sulfur dioxide, a key component of acid rain, and 32 million tons of nitrogen oxide, a precursor to ozone, from being released into the atmosphere. Arguably, nuclear power has contributed more to achieving a reduction in emissions than any other source of energy, except possibly solar, wind, and hydropower. Our Nation needs to do whatever it can to promote a safe and efficient nuclear energy industry and encourage the development of new nuclear reactors. Reauthorizing the Price-Anderson Act is a major step in that direction. During the previous administration, both the Department of Energy and the NRC issued reports to Congress recommending the reauthorization of Price-Anderson. Last Congress, I introduced legislation to reauthorize Price-Anderson, S. 1360, and included these provisions in an amendment that I proposed to the energy bill. My amendment, S. Amdt. 2983, was agreed to by a vote of 78-21 on March 7, 2002. This amendment reauthorized the program for both DOE contractors and NRC licensees. The amendment falls under the shared jurisdiction of both the Energy Committee for contractors and the Environment and Public Works Committee for NRC licensees. I look forward to working with the EPW Committee to pass this bill to reauthorize the Price-Anderson Act for 10 years for NRC licensees. I thank Senator INHOFE for joining me in cosponsoring this bill. The Price-Anderson Act is so vital to the future expansion of our nuclear energy industry. I urge the speedy consideration and passage of this bill. I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the RECORD. There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: S. 156 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the ``Price-Anderson Amendments Act of 2003''. SEC. 2. EXTENSION OF INDEMNIFICATION AUTHORITY. (a) INDEMNIFICATION OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEES.--Section 170c. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2210(c)) is amended-- (1) in the subsection heading, by striking ``LICENSES'' and inserting ``LICENSEES''; and (2) by striking ``August 1, 2002'' each place it appears and inserting ``August 1, 2012''. SEC. 3. REPORTS. Section 170p. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2210(p)) is amended by striking ``August 1, 1998'' and inserting ``August 1, 2008''. SEC. 4. EFFECTIVE DATE. The amendments made by this Act take effect on August 1, 2002. By Mr. CORZINE (for himself, Mr. Jeffords, Mrs. Boxer, Mrs. Clinton, and Mr. Lautenberg):
1B) Nonproliferation Education 2A) Senate Armed Services Committee to be Briefed Senator Levin and I have worked closely in the joint management of this committee, and I expressed to him, following the Christmas recess, the need that I perceived for Members to get a current briefing with regard to those issues relating to the Department of Defense, obviously one being the deployment to Iraq, the situation in Iraq, the situation in Korea, and other matters--generally speaking, the continuing war that the President is engaging against terrorist. I am about to read the letter we sent. I have been very much involved in these issues as a member of this committee. Senator Levin and I start our 25th year as Senators, and we have been together on that committee now this quarter of a century. We have worked together very closely in a trusting relationship, and that continues. We have had our strong differences, particularly when we manage the annual Defense authorization bill. We have taken the two desks of our respective leaders here and debated issues during those 25 years. We have our differences with regard to certain issues as they relate to Iraq. Interestingly enough, we planned a joint trip to Korea some 18 months ago, but that trip just could not be developed. I bring that background only to say this letter reflects a perfectly routine meeting that we have had through the years and the joint desire on behalf of the committee to have these two very important witnesses appear to bring us up to their current knowledge with regard to these issues. It is a routine matter. There is some concern that we have summoned the Secretary of Defense to be here tomorrow morning as a consequence of some publicity that has been put forward of recent regarding the relationships between the Congress and the administration and, most specifically, the Department of Defense. Some of that publicity relates to a conference Republican Senators held last week. I have always followed the rule-- [Page: S284] GPO's PDF Nevertheless, certain facts have emanated from the one held by the Republicans. Coincidentally, the morning after that conference, Senator Levin and I--just the two of us from the Senate--had a breakfast meeting with the Secretary of Defense and about, I would say, eight of his senior members to discuss a wide range of issues. At that meeting, we brought up the subject of this letter, and the Secretary said: Of course, let's schedule whatever time you want. I have the letter. I am ready to come. In fact, he had just briefed the House Armed Services Committee in a similar way. This letter is straightforward. I ask unanimous consent that this letter be printed in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. (See exhibit 1.) Mr. WARNER. It states in part:
Dear Mr. Secretary, we are writing to request that you or your Deputy, together with Joint Chiefs ..... testify before the Armed Services Committee next week, in both open and closed session--
We have now decided it will be just in closed session--
on current and potential U.S. military operations. .....
And the letter flows thereafter. It will be part of the RECORD. In no way is this to be construed as a summons to the Secretary by myself or Senator Levin with respect to our concerns about the consultation process between the Department of Defense and the Congress. To amplify on my concern about certain inquiries that have been received in my office in the last roughly 36 hours, I do feel very strongly about the situation in Iraq; likewise, the situation in Korea. I believe every Member of this body feels very strongly about it. Frankly, candidly, and proudly, I say that our President has exhibited the extraordinary leadership with regard to particularly the situation in Iraq and the manner in which he has taken steps in the international arena--the United Nations, the Security Council--working with the heads of state and governments of nations which are now and have been close friends and allies in trying to bring about peace in this world. I have said in this Chamber, and I will continue to say, that in my humble career, almost a quarter of a century in this body and some 5 years I spent in the Pentagon where I was exposed to international situations, foremost among them the war in Vietnam, Mr. President, the situation in Iraq is one of the most complex and serious situations I have ever witnessed in my professional career as a public servant. I think it requires the highest degree of attention that it is receiving by our President, that it has, is, and will be received by this august body, the Senate, and working with the House as a Congress as a whole. I think our President has received strong support with regard to the steps he has taken. I was proud with Senator McCain, Senator Bayh, and Senator Lieberman to draw up a resolution which was passed by this body on which, for the record--and it is in the Record--Senator Levin and I had disagreements, but there was a strong endorsement of the actions being taken by our President. In that context, I think the consultation process between the President and his principal Cabinet officers and others in the Congress has to be stronger than it has ever been because of the complexity of this situation. That is why I urged Senator Levin to have this hearing tomorrow. That is why I am taking other steps to see that our committee, the Senate Armed Services Committee, which presumably in the not too distant future I will be named chairman, receives the maximum amount of information, not only that it desires but that it needs to properly perform our oversight process, that it needs to properly not only relate to our constituents but to members of the administration to convey our feelings and views which indeed could be contrary in some respects to actions taken or that are about to be taken by the President and others as it relates to this situation. North Korea is a very special and complex situation. Again, I think our President is following the correct steps. Had I had the opportunity, I probably would have advised a greater relationship in terms of visitations and otherwise with the regime in North Korea, assuming the opportunity had been provided, but that government completely abandoned the commitments they had made earlier, and indeed the commitments which presumably they were continuing with this administration of President George Bush. I will not get involved in the various details there, but I am gravely concerned about the some 37,000 men and women in the Armed Forces who are essential on that border to show the resolve of this country to protect South Korea and to try to promote first the deterrence of any combat and then perhaps promote closer relationships between the North and the South. Those forces, together with other associated forces on standby, are in the area of North and South Korea for peaceful purposes. I do not know what will evolve from the efforts by the administration, which I think are very positive. The administration has sent a high-ranking official over there to see whether, in working with our principal allies on this matter--Japan, China, Russia--we can work together as a group of nations to once again bring back a course of action which will involve the cessation of the manufacture of weapons of mass destruction by North Korea and to foster a closer and more peaceful relationship with those two countries and North Korea as it relates to the neighboring countries in that area of the world, and hopefully to curtail the continued export by North Korea of weapons of mass destruction to other nations. I return to this whole subject of the consultation and its importance at this particular time because of the complexity and the difficulty of the American people to really fully grasp the seriousness of this situation in Iraq and the threat posed by Saddam Hussein. I saw where there is being planned what has been termed a peaceful march, a protest march, protesting the possibility of military engagement with Iraq at some point in time. I underscore that our President has made no decision about that and repeatedly says he has made no decision about it. For over 5 years during the war in Vietnam, I was privileged to serve in the Navy Secretariat. I remember so many times coming up to the Hill to testify. I remember the widening gap between the Congress of the United States and the administration in that period of time because of the different views with regard to that conflict. Who suffered the most? It was really the men and women of the Armed Forces who were courageously fighting in that war. I suppose at no time in the long public career which I have been privileged to have in this country have I had such heartfelt compassion for the men and women in the Armed Forces than in that period. They would come home on leave or come home wounded or tragically, in many cases, not come home as a consequence of being a casualty on the battlefields, battlefields which I visited on occasion, and the ships, and they would come home to a nation that did not understand what they were doing, a nation that was hostile to them individually and collectively, as well as to the families of those service persons. Strengthening the consultation between the Congress and the executive branch at this time is essential to see that that chapter in American history is never repeated. Today we have an all-volunteer force, and I think it is magnificent. I do not think we have to return to the draft--but I will save that for another day--because I experienced the draft periods. I was privileged to serve briefly in a very modest way in the Navy in the concluding months of World War II when the draft was on. I happened to volunteer at 17. Most of my age group at that time did volunteer for selective service. I served again in the Korean war, briefly again in Korea. Again, it was a draft situation. I do not want to return to those periods where men and [Page: S285] GPO's PDF I harken back to those periods of Vietnam, and I will watch very carefully what transpires in the next few days during this hopefully peaceful protest of the policies of the Government as they relate to the possible use of our troops in the war. I want to recount one other chapter which I will never forget. My recollection is it was Saturday afternoon and I was in my office and my beloved, dear friend John Chafee, who used to sit right at that desk, was Secretary of the Navy and I was Under Secretary, and Secretary Laird telephoned me and said: I would like to have you and John Chafee go down to The Mall and take a look at another demonstration--by the young men and women of that era--in protest to Vietnam and come back and have a talk with me. I remember so well that in those days we were all dressed up in our business suits even though it was a Saturday. We used to work pretty much 6 days a week during that war. We dispensed with our chauffeur-driven cars. We got in an old car and drove down to The Mall in some sort of cobbled together set of gym clothes, or whatever we had on. We blended right into that crowd. I can see it as clearly this moment as I did then. Estimates were there were close to a million--I want to repeat that--close to a million young men and women. There was no particular anger, but they were protesting the war in Vietnam and the impact that war was having on their lives, their future, and their loved ones or friends or otherwise who had suffered the consequences of serving in uniform in that period. I do not want to see a return to that. I remember we went back and talked to Secretary of Defense Laird about what we had seen, and I can see him now. He was very concerned because we did not have in place then a clear policy by which at some point in time we as a nation had to come to the conclusion that we had to basically make an honorable and dignified exit in that situation. That is for another day for historians to examine. It is emblazoned in my mind. I do not see nor do I sense among our people across the Nation today any feeling that such magnitude of a problem exists at this point in time with regard to Iraq. Nevertheless, those situations come about sometimes quickly. That is why I will always be an advocate--whether it is the Bush administration, whether it is the Clinton administration, the Carter administration, or the previous Bush administration; I have worked with them all; I have been privileged to work in this body a quarter of a century--why I have been a steadfast proponent for consultation. I will continue. I hope it is not misconstrued by way of criticism. It is constructive thinking and drawing upon my own, you might say limited, experiences in previous military conflicts in this country. I recall at the conclusion of World War II when those in uniform came home. They were welcomed with open arms. It is impossible in these few minutes to describe the gratitude of the Nation, of the world, for the participation of those upward 16 million who served in that conflict and how all doors were open when they came home. That was not present in Korea. It is why it is called the forgotten war. When they came back, there was no warm reception. We read something about it, but we were not entirely sure what it was they were fighting for over there. It is called the forgotten war. Over 50,000 men, and some women, from the United States of America gave their lives in that conflict. That is why it is called the forgotten war. Fortunately, today there are a number of things that have taken place to properly put in perspective the enormous sacrifice this country gave to secure for South Korea the freedoms they have enjoyed, the freedoms that have flourished. It is with a certain sense of sadness I read from time to time now that certain elements of the South Korean people resent our presence there. The principle focus of these remarks is to reflect in the quiet moments at the end of a long day in the Senate a subject I feel strongly about, the consultation between the executive branch--whatever President it would be--and his principal Cabinet and other officers with this body, particularly in times as stressful and as complex as we are now facing here with the Iraqi situation or with the Korean situation. I encourage the Department of Defense at the earliest point to release such statistics they keep with regard to the consulting process, the number of times that the Secretary of Defense has been up to brief the Congress--as they are going to do tomorrow. To the extent I can reflect on those brief remarks that I make to our conference, they were done in a constructive tone, a noncritical tone, and against the background that I briefly described of what I have experienced in my years as a public servant in times that are parallel, in many respects, to what we have now with the extraordinary tensions in this world as a consequence of terrorists, as a consequence of a despot such as Saddam Hussein. Much is unknown about the Government of North Korea and its principal leaders. That is, in itself, very difficult. We have so little insight into that regime and particularly the leader of that nation at this time. I conclude by saying I will continue to speak out. If I feel strongly enough I will criticize. I have been known to do it. At this time I am trying to provide an element of constructive leadership as it relates to my good friend and longtime friend. When I was in the Navy, Secretary Rumsfeld was on President Nixon's staff in the White House, and we have known each other from that period of time. We formed a friendship then and have seen each other in the intervening years. We remain trusting and good, close working colleagues. Now and then he has a few choice words about me about some of the things I have done over here. He was not entirely pleased with my efforts on TRICARE For Life and current receipts, but those are honest differences between public servants. In this instance, what I said at that conference was done in a heartfelt, constructive manner and it was not in any way directed it as a personal criticism against any of the President's Cabinet or the President himself. It was done simply to lay down a format for consultation with this body in the weeks and months to come, as we are continuing to lead as a nation to secure freedom in this world and a greater degree of peace for others. Tomorrow's hearing will be very important before the Senate Armed Services Committee. I am confident the Secretary will share such information that is essential for us to perform our functions. I yield the floor. EXHIBIT 1 U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, January 8, 2003.
DEAR MR. SECRETARY: We are writing to request that you or your Deputy, together with Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General Richard B. Myers, USAF, testify before the Armed Services Committee next week, in both open and closed session, on current and potential U.S. military operations. In particular, we request that you discuss the commitment of military forces in and around Afghanistan allocated to the global war on terrorism, the buildup of U.S. military personnel and equipment in the Persian Gulf region to confront the threat posed by Iraq, and potential military commitments in support of a diplomatic solution to the enhanced tensions on the Korean Peninsula. As the 108th Congress convenes, our nation is facing a broad range of national security challenges. Together with a large coalition of nations, our troops are engaged in the second year of operations in Afghanistan; on an almost daily basis, U.S. military forces are deploying to areas around Iraq; and for the past month, we have witnesses escalating tension over the North Korean nuclear weapons program. Our Committee last conducted hearings on Iraq in September of 2002, prior to the vote on the resolution to authorize the use of force against Iraq, followed by a briefing in December. We had comprehensive hearings on Afghanistan in July 2002, and North Korea in March 2002, when the combatant commanders responsible for those regions testified. As the new Congress convenes, and the Committee has a large number of new Members, it is essential to our oversight responsibilities to gain a timely update on vital national security issues in order to fulfill our constitutional responsibilities. Sincerely,
Mr. WARNER. I yield the fllor and suggest the absence of a quorum. [Page: S286] GPO's PDF The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. TALENT). The clerk will call the roll. The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll. Mr. FRIST. I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
WMD TERRORISM *************************** 3A) Chemical Security Act Mr. CORZINE. Mr. President, I rise today to reintroduce an important piece of legislation that I worked on in the 107th Congress, the Chemical Security Act. I am proud to be joined by Senators Jeffords, Boxer, Clinton, and Lautenberg in reintroducing this bill. Senators Jeffords, Boxer, and Clinton were all strong allies in the 107th Congress, and I thank them for their continuing support. And I am pleased to have Senator Lautenberg as a cosponsor. He has a long history of working to protect communities from all types of chemical threats. I particularly want to thank Senator Jeffords for his hard work on this legislation in the 107th Congress. As Chairman of the Environment and Public Works committee, he provided critical leadership in bringing this bill through the committee successfully. I thank him and his staff for their hard work and look forward to continuing to work with them on this important issue. I'll describe what the bill does in a minute. But first I want to briefly explain why I think this legislation is so important. September 11 shocked us into the realization that our assets can be turned against us by terrorists. If you are a New Jersey Senator, you don't have to think about that idea for too long before you realize that chemical plants and other facilities that have hazardous chemicals would be high on a terrorists' list. The fact is, that we have a lot of those types of facilities in my State, and because we're such a densely populated State, chemical releases from these facilities pose grave risks. In fact, according to EPA data, there are eight plants in my State where a worst-case release of toxic chemicals could threaten more than a million people. But this is not a parochial issue. The same EPA data shows that there are 110 plants nationwide where such a release could threaten more than a million people. These plants are located in 22 States. And there are 44 States that have at least one facility where such a release could threaten more than 100,000 people. I want to be clear that I am stating these facts here today in an effort to advance a measure that would protect workers and communities, not in an attempt to vilify our nations' chemical companies. Indeed, these companies are a key part of our industrial fabric, providing jobs and producing products essential to our lives. This is certainly true of my home State of New Jersey, as I have already indicated. But when you look at the numbers, as I have laid them out here today, you realize that we have a problem to deal with. I'm certainly not unique in recognizing this issue, EPA, the Justice Department, the Nuclear Regulatory Commissions, industry groups, and public safety groups all agree. In addition, the White House Strategy for Homeland Security recognizes the chemical and hazardous materials sector as an infrastructure protection priority. Governor Ridge amplified this point in his testimony before the Senate Environment Public Works committee on July 10 of last year. He said that:
The fact is, we have a very diversified economy and our enemies look at some of our economic assets as targets. And clearly, the chemical facilities are one of them. We know that there have been reports validated about security deficiencies at dozens and dozens of those.
I want to pick up on that last point that Governor Ridge made about security deficiencies, because it speaks to why I am putting this bill forward. [Page: S296] Some companies have taken actions and are continuing to work to implement security measures in light of the post-September 11 environments. Others, however, are not. That's one crucial reason why a Federal program is needed. We need to be able to assure our constituents that this major vulnerability is being addressed in a swift and effective manner. We also want to assure them that certain minimum standards are being met throughout the country. We already do that to address certain infrastructure vulnerabilities. Most notably, we require nuclear power plants to meet extensive security standards as a condition of their operating licenses. I think we ought to tighten those standards, but the fact is that we have no standards at all for our chemical facilities. Before I go into specifics, I want to outline the general organizational scheme of the bill. In my view, addressing the risk to communities from a terrorist-caused release of hazardous chemicals requires two fundamental components. The first is improving security, so that the likelihood of a successful terrorist attack is lowered. The second is reducing hazards so that the impact of a successful attack is minimized. This requires two fundamentally different types of expertise and skills. That's why the bill involves both the EPA and the Department of Homeland Security. EPA has the chemical hazard expertise, and the Department of Homeland Security has the security expertise. EPA has a lead role in most of the bill, because it already has relationships with chemical facilities through its existing accident prevention programs. As to the specifics of the bill, I think it is a common-sense approach to dealing with the issue. I want to note that this bill is nearly identical to the version of the bill that was reported out of the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee last July by a 19-0 vote. Two minor technical changes have been made to clarify the intent of the legislation, but it is otherwise exactly the same as the committee-reported bill that was acted on unanimously by the EPW committee last year. The heart of the bill is section 4. This section requires EPA and the Department of Homeland Security to identify ``high priority'' chemical facilities and then require those facilities to assess vulnerabilities and hazards, and then develop and implement a plan to improve security and use safer technologies. Section 4(a)(1) establishes the priority setting process, by which the EPA Administrator, in consultation the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, as well as States and local government entities, is directed to identify high priority chemical facilities, based on factors identified in section 4(a)(2). These factors include the severity of harm that could be caused by a chemical release, proximity to population centers, threats to national security or critical infrastructure, threshold quantities of substances of concern that pose a serious threat, and such other safety or security factors that the Administrator considers appropriate. Because of the way the bill is structured, this means that EPA and the Department of Homeland Security are directed to start with the facilities that are subject to EPA's Risk Management Program requirements. This program applies to approximately 15,000 facilities in the United States that use, produce or store large quantities of hazardous chemicals. By applying the factors I mentioned, the priority setting process is meant to shorten this list of 15,000 facilities considerably. But the bill leaves it up to the Administration to determine exactly how many facilities within this universe ought to be covered by the bill. So that's step one, setting priorities, and that has to be done within one year of enactment. At this point, I want to mention the first of the clarifying technical changes that I have made to the bill. It was never the intent, nor I believe the effect, of the bill to include propane retailers as potentially regulated entities under this bill. But there was some confusion about the point after the bill was marked up last July. So last fall, I worked with the National Propane Gas Association on language that eliminates this confusion, and it is included in this bill. So I again want to make clear that the same propane retailers who are not subject to the EPA Risk Management Program requirements will not be ``high priority'' facilities under this bill, and therefore will not be subject to its requirements. In addition to identifying high priority facilities within the first year, EPA and the Department of Homeland Security must also promulgate regulations to require the high priority facilities to take the following steps: conduct a vulnerability and hazard assessment within one year after the regulations are promulgated; prepare and implement a response plan that addresses those vulnerabilities within 18 months after the regulations are promulgated. I want to say more about the assessments and response plans, because these requirements are really the core of the amendment. First, the amendment requires chemical facilities to work with local law enforcement and first responders, such as firefighters, in developing the assessments and plans. The second of the clarifying technical changes that I referred to in the opening part of my statement is simply to make clear the firefighters are among the first responders that the bill is referring to. September 11 showed us how brave and important these our first responders are. Every day, they are willing to risk their lives to respond to terrorist attacks if they need to. So it makes sense that they ought to be a part of the process of developing vulnerability assessments and response plans, as this bill would require. The same goes for employees of the high priority chemical facilities. They're on the front lines, which means two things. First, they are most at risk in case of a terrorist attack on their plants. Second, because they work in the plants every day, they will have ideas about how to secure the facilities and reduce hazards. So employees are part of the process as well. As to the assessments and plans themselves, the requirements in the bill are fairly general. There are a variety of vulnerability assessment tools that have already been developed by groups such as Sandia laboratories and the Center for Chemical Process Safety. I would expect that EPA and DHS would take advantage of existing methodologies such as these, but the bill leaves it up to the experts to decide what types of approaches make the most sense. And that probably won't be the same for everyone, I'm not advocating a one-size-fits-all approach here. But I do want to be sure that all of the high priority chemical facilities do a credible vulnerability assessment. The response plan requirements are also fairly general. Each facility is required to prepare prevention, preparedness and response plan that incorporates the results of the assessments. The plan must include actions and procedures, including safer design and maintenance, to eliminate or significantly lessen the potential consequences of a release. What this means in simple terms is that each facility has to develop a plan and take steps to reduce both the likelihood of a successful attack and to the harm that would occur if an attack were successful. In other words, they have to look at traditional security measures, such as fences, alarms, and guards. But they also have to look at whether they can make the plant safer. In other words, can less hazardous chemicals be used? Can containment technology such as fans or scrubbers be improved or employed to contain chemicals that may be released? Chemical facilities ought to evaluate the full range of options, look at the tradeoffs among them, and go forward with the best mix of security and technology options. Facilities are then required to send their assessments and plans to the EPA. EPA and DHS must review those assessments and plans, and certify compliance with the regulations. Any deficiencies identified by EPA and DHS can be remedies by issuance of an order. But the order can only be issued after a deliberate process that includes notification, compliance assistance, and an opportunity for a hearing. The certification process is there to ensure the public that facilities are complying the law. Those certifications will be the only information [Page: S297] Freedom of Information Act. I don't take FOIA exemptions lightly. I believe strongly that, in general, the public has a right to information collected by the government. But I think it's pretty obvious that in the case of the information that would be submitted to the government under this bill, the vulnerability assessments and response plans, we simply can't allow the security details in these plans to be publicly available. But I think it does make sense that people who live near a chemical plant be able to find out from EPA and the DHS whether or not that plant has complied with the law. The bill goes even beyond FOIA exemptions to protect the assessments and plans. To ensure that the assessments and plans are properly safeguarded, the bill includes a requirement for EPA and Homeland Security to develop protocols to prevent unauthorized disclosure of those documents. And it attaches penalties to unauthorized disclosure. That's the essence of the bill. First, identify ``high priority'' chemical facilities. Second, require those facilities to assess vulnerabilities and hazards, and then develop and implement a plan to improve security and implement safer technologies. Third, EPA and the Department of Homeland Security review the assessments and plans, and they have the authority to require changes if deficiencies are identified. Fourth, assessments and plans are protected from unauthorized disclosure through a FOIA exemption and penalties that apply to unauthorized disclosure. The bill also includes an early compliance section that is designed to address concerns that the bill might slow ongoing voluntary security efforts. This provision enables companies to submit assessments and plans prior to promulgation of the regulations and have them judged by the standards in the Act. So companies don't have to wait for the regulations to come out to continue work or to submit plans. In conclusion, I think this is a balanced bill that puts common-sense requirements in place to deal with a significant problem. I think the bill has moved a long way from the introduced bill. It has accommodated many of the concerns that industry raised about the bill I introduced in the 107th Congress. It reflects intensive bipartisan negotiations, and I think it's a good bill. At the same time, I recognize that some of my colleagues have continuing concerns about the legislation. Last fall, I worked with Senators INHOFE, BREAUX, LANDRIEU and LINCOLN on these issues. I want them to know that I remain open-minded and committed to working with them, the rest of my colleagues and the Administration to resolve these issues so we can move quickly to protect Americans from the threat of attack on chemical facilities. And I want to extend the same commitment not only to the environmental and labor organizations that have supported the bill in the past, but also to the various industry groups that have worked on this bill. It's vital that we all find common ground quickly, and I stand ready to work with all interested parties. I want to close by expressing both my sense of urgency about this issue and my optimism that we will be able to move legislation quickly. Last fall, Governor Ridge and Administrator Whitman wrote to the Washington Post expressing their support for bipartisan legislation to deal with the chemical security threat. I ask unanimous consent that that letter be printed in the RECORD. I believe the letter was sincere, but the Administration has not yet engaged the Congress on this issue. I urge President Bush to provide leadership to ensure that his Administration works with us as the process moves forward. I am also encouraged that Senator INHOFE has identified chemical security as a legislative priority as he assumes the Chairmanship of the Environment and Public Works committee. I congratulate him on his new post, and again express my willingness to work with him on this important issue. With that, I yield the floor and urge my colleagues to support this important legislation. I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the RECORD. There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows: A Security Requirement The Bush administration is committed to reducing the vulnerability of America's chemical facilities to terrorist attack and is working to enact bipartisan legislation that would require such facilities to address their vulnerabilities [news story, Oct. 3]. We applaud voluntary efforts some in the industry have undertaken, but we believe that every one of the 15,000 chemical facilities nationwide that contain large quantities of hazardous chemicals must be required to take the steps the industry leaders are taking at their facilities; performing comprehensive vulnerability assessments and then acting to reduce those vulnerabilities. Voluntary efforts alone are not sufficient to provide the level of assurance Americans deserve. We will continue to work with Congress to advance this important homeland security goal. -- S. 157 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the ``Chemical Security Act of 2003''. SEC. 2. FINDINGS. Congress finds that-- (1) the chemical industry is a crucial part of the critical infrastructure of the United States-- (A) in its own right; and (B) because that industry supplies resources essential to the functioning of other critical infrastructures; (2) the possibility of terrorist and criminal attacks on chemical sources (such as industrial facilities) poses a serious threat to public health, safety, and welfare, critical infrastructure, national security, and the environment; (3) the possibility of theft of dangerous chemicals from chemical sources for use in terrorist attacks poses a further threat to public health, safety, and welfare, critical infrastructure, national security, and the environment; and (4) there are significant opportunities to prevent theft from, and criminal attack on, chemical sources and reduce the harm that such acts would produce by-- (A)(i) reducing usage and storage of chemicals by changing production methods and processes; and (ii) employing inherently safer technologies in the manufacture, transport, and use of chemicals; (B) enhancing secondary containment and other existing mitigation measures; and (C) improving security. SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS. In this Act: (1) ADMINISTRATOR.--The term ``Administrator'' means the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency. (2) CHEMICAL SOURCE.--The term ``chemical source'' means a stationary source (as defined in section 112(r)(2) of the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7412(r)(2))) that contains a substance of concern. (3) COVERED SUBSTANCE OF CONCERN.--The term ``covered substance of concern'' means a substance of concern that, in combination with a chemical source and other factors, is designated as a high priority category by the Administrator under section 4(a)(1). (4) EMPLOYEE.--The term ``employee'' means-- (A) a duly recognized collective bargaining representative at a chemical source; or (B) in the absence of such a representative, other appropriate personnel. (5) FIRST RESPONDER.--The term ``first responder'' includes a firefighter. (6) HEAD OF THE OFFICE.--The term ``head of the Office'' means the Secretary of Homeland Security. (7) SAFER DESIGN AND MAINTENANCE.--The term ``safer design and maintenance'' includes, with respect to a chemical source that is within a high priority category designated under section 4(a)(1), implementation, to the extent practicable, of the practices of-- (A) preventing or reducing the vulnerability of the chemical source to a release of a covered substance of concern through use of inherently safer technology; (B) reducing any vulnerability of the chemical source to a release of a covered substance of concern through use of well-maintained secondary containment, control, or mitigation equipment; (C) reducing any vulnerability of the chemical source to a release of a covered substance of concern by implementing security measures; and (D) reducing the potential consequences of any vulnerability of the chemical source to a release of a covered substance of concern through the use of buffer zones between the chemical source and surrounding populations (including buffer zones between the chemical source and residences, schools, hospitals, senior centers, shopping centers and malls, [Page: S298] (8) SECURITY MEASURE.-- (A) IN GENERAL.--The term ``security measure'' means an action carried out to increase the security of a chemical source. (B) INCLUSIONS.--The term ``security measure'', with respect to a chemical source, includes-- (i) employee training and background checks; (ii) the limitation and prevention of access to controls of the chemical source; (iii) protection of the perimeter of the chemical source; (iv) the installation and operation of an intrusion detection sensor; and (v) a measure to increase computer or computer network security. (9) SUBSTANCE OF CONCERN.-- (A) IN GENERAL.--The term ``substance of concern'' means-- (i) any regulated substance (as defined in section 112(r) of the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7412(r))); and (ii) any substance designated by the Administrator under section 4(a). (B) EXCLUSION.--The term ``substance of concern'' does not include liquefied petroleum gas that is used as fuel or held for sale as fuel at a retail facility as described in section 112(r)(4)(B) of the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7412(r)(4)(B)). (10) UNAUTHORIZED RELEASE.--The term ``unauthorized release'' means-- (A) a release from a chemical source into the environment of a covered substance of concern that is caused, in whole or in part, by a criminal act; (B) a release into the environment of a covered substance of concern that has been removed from a chemical source, in whole or in part, by a criminal act; and (C) a release or removal from a chemical source of a covered substance of concern that is unauthorized by the owner or operator of the chemical source. (11) USE OF INHERENTLY SAFER TECHNOLOGY.-- (A) IN GENERAL.--The term ``use of inherently safer technology'', with respect to a chemical source, means use of a technology, product, raw material, or practice that, as compared with the technologies, products, raw materials, or practices currently in use-- (i) reduces or eliminates the possibility of a release of a substance of concern from the chemical source prior to secondary containment, control, or mitigation; and (ii) reduces or eliminates the threats to public health and the environment associated with a release or potential release of a substance of concern from the chemical source. (B) INCLUSIONS.--The term ``use of inherently safer technology'' includes input substitution, catalyst or carrier substitution, process redesign (including reuse or recycling of a substance of concern), product reformulation, procedure simplification, and technology modification so as to-- (i) use less hazardous substances or benign substances; (ii) use a smaller quantity of covered substances of concern; (iii) reduce hazardous pressures or temperatures; (iv) reduce the possibility and potential consequences of equipment failure and human error; (v) improve inventory control and chemical use efficiency; and (vi) reduce or eliminate storage, transportation, handling, disposal, and discharge of substances of concern. SEC. 4. DESIGNATION OF AND REQUIREMENTS FOR HIGH PRIORITY CATEGORIES. (a) DESIGNATION AND REGULATION OF HIGH PRIORITY CATEGORIES BY THE ADMINISTRATOR.-- (1) IN GENERAL.--Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, the Administrator, in consultation with the head of the Office and State and local agencies responsible for planning for and responding to unauthorized releases and providing emergency health care, shall promulgate regulations to designate certain combinations of chemical sources and substances of concern as high priority categories based on the severity of the threat posed by an unauthorized release from the chemical sources. (2) FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED.--In designating high priority categories under paragraph (1), the Administrator, in consultation with the head of the Office, shall consider-- (A) the severity of the harm that could be caused by an unauthorized release; (B) the proximity to population centers; (C) the threats to national security; (D) the threats to critical infrastructure; (E) threshold quantities of substances of concern that pose a serious threat; and (F) such other safety or security factors as the Administrator, in consultation with the head of the Office, determines to be appropriate. (3) REQUIREMENTS FOR HIGH PRIORITY CATEGORIES.-- (A) IN GENERAL.--Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, the Administrator, in consultation with the head of the Office, the United States Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, and State and local agencies described in paragraph (1), shall promulgate regulations to require each owner and each operator of a chemical source that is within a high priority category designated under paragraph (1), in consultation with local law enforcement, first responders, and employees, to-- (i) conduct an assessment of the vulnerability of the chemical source to a terrorist attack or other unauthorized release; (ii) using appropriate hazard assessment techniques, identify hazards that may result from an unauthorized release of a covered substance of concern; and (iii) prepare a prevention, preparedness, and response plan that incorporates the results of those vulnerability and hazard assessments. (B) ACTIONS AND PROCEDURES.--A prevention, preparedness, and response plan required under subparagraph (A)(iii) shall include actions and procedures, including safer design and maintenance of the chemical source, to eliminate or significantly lessen the potential consequences of an unauthorized release of a covered substance of concern. (C) THREAT INFORMATION.--To the maximum extent permitted by applicable authorities and the interests of national security, the head of the Office, in consultation with the Administrator, shall provide owners and operators of chemical sources with threat information relevant to the assessments and plans required under subsection (b). (4) REVIEW AND REVISIONS.--Not later than 5 years after the date of promulgation of regulations under each of paragraphs (1) and (3), the Administrator, in consultation with the head of the Office, shall review the regulations and make any necessary revisions. (5) ADDITION OF SUBSTANCES OF CONCERN.--For the purpose of designating high priority categories under paragraph (1) or any subsequent revision of the regulations promulgated under paragraph (1), the Administrator, in consultation with the head of the Office, may designate additional substances that pose a serious threat as substances of concern. (b) CERTIFICATION.-- (1) VULNERABILITY AND HAZARD ASSESSMENTS.--Not later than 1 year after the date of promulgation of regulations under subsection (a)(3), each owner and each operator of a chemical source that is within a high priority category designated under subsection (a)(1) shall-- (A) certify to the Administrator that the chemical source has conducted assessments in accordance with the regulations; and (B) submit to the Administrator written copies of the assessments. (2) PREVENTION, PREPAREDNESS, AND RESPONSE PLANS.--Not later than 18 months after the date of promulgation of regulations under subsection (a)(3), the owner or operator shall-- (A) certify to the Administrator that the chemical source has completed a prevention, preparedness, and response plan that incorporates the results of the assessments and complies with the regulations; and (B) submit to the Administrator a written copy of the plan. (3) 5-YEAR REVIEW.--Not later than 5 years after each of the date of submission of a copy of an assessment under paragraph (1) and a plan under paragraph (2), and not less often than every 3 years thereafter, the owner or operator of the chemical source covered by the assessment or plan, in coordination with local law enforcement and first responders, shall-- (A) review the adequacy of the assessment or plan, as the case may be; and (B)(i) certify to the Administrator that the chemical source has completed the review; and (ii) as appropriate, submit to the Administrator any changes to the assessment or plan. (4) PROTECTION OF INFORMATION.-- (A) DISCLOSURE EXEMPTION.--Except with respect to certifications specified in paragraphs (1) through (3) of this subsection and section 5(a), all information provided to the Administrator under this subsection, and all information derived from that information, shall be exempt from disclosure under section 552 of title 5, United States Code. (B) DEVELOPMENT OF PROTOCOLS.-- (i) IN GENERAL.--The Administrator, in consultation with the head of the Office, shall develop such protocols as are necessary to protect the copies of the assessments and plans required to be submitted under this subsection (including the information contained in those assessments and plans) from unauthorized disclosure. (ii) REQUIREMENTS.--The protocols developed under clause (i) shall ensure that-- (I) each copy of an assessment or plan, and all information contained in or derived from the assessment or plan, is maintained in a secure location; (II) except as provided in subparagraph (C), only individuals designated by the Administrator may have access to the copies of the assessments and plans; and (III) no copy of an assessment or plan or any portion of an assessment or plan, and no information contained in or derived from an assessment or plan, shall be available to any person other than an individual designated by the Administrator. (iii) DEADLINE.--As soon as practicable, but not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall complete the development of protocols under clause (i) so as to ensure that the protocols are in place before the date on which the Administrator receives any assessment or plan under this subsection. (C) FEDERAL OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES.--An individual referred to in subparagraph (B)(ii) [Page: S299] SEC. 5. ENFORCEMENT. (a) REVIEW OF PLANS.-- (1) IN GENERAL.--The Administrator, in consultation with the head of the Office, shall review each assessment and plan submitted under section 4(b) to determine the compliance of the chemical source covered by the assessment or plan with regulations promulgated under paragraphs (1) and (3) of section 4(a). (2) CERTIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE.-- (A) IN GENERAL.--The Administrator shall certify in writing each determination of the Administrator under paragraph (1). (B) INCLUSIONS.--A certification of the Administrator shall include a checklist indicating consideration by a chemical source of the use of 4 elements of safer design and maintenance described in subparagraphs (A) through (D) of section 3(6). (C) EARLY COMPLIANCE.-- (i) IN GENERAL.--The Administrator, in consultation with the head of the Office, shall-- (I) before the date of publication of proposed regulations under section 4(a)(3), review each assessment or plan submitted to the Administrator under section 4(b); and (II) before the date of promulgation of final regulations under section 4(a)(3), determine whether each such assessment or plan meets the consultation, planning, and assessment requirements applicable to high priority categories under section 4(a)(3). (ii) AFFIRMATIVE DETERMINATION.--If the Administrator, in consultation with the head of the Office, makes an affirmative determination under clause (i)(II), the Administrator shall certify compliance of an assessment or plan described in that clause without requiring any revision of the assessment or plan. (D) SCHEDULE FOR REVIEW AND CERTIFICATION.-- (i) IN GENERAL.--The Administrator, after taking into consideration the factors described in section 4(a)(2), shall establish a schedule for the review and certification of assessments and plans submitted under section 4(b). (ii) DEADLINE FOR COMPLETION.--Not later than 3 years after the deadlines for the submission of assessments and plans under paragraph (1) or (2), respectively, of section 4(b), the Administrator shall complete the review and certification of all assessments and plans submitted under those sections. (b) COMPLIANCE ASSISTANCE.-- (1) DEFINITION OF DETERMINATION.--In this subsection, the term ``determination'' means a determination by the Administrator that, with respect to an assessment or plan described in section 4(b)-- (A) the assessment or plan does not comply with regulations promulgated under paragraphs (1) and (3) of section 4(a); or (B)(i) a threat exists beyond the scope of the submitted plan; or (ii) current implementation of the plan is insufficient to address-- (I) the results of an assessment of a source; or (II) a threat described in clause (i). (2) DETERMINATION BY ADMINISTRATOR.--If the Administrator, after consultation with the head of the Office, makes a determination, the Administrator shall-- (A) notify the chemical source of the determination; and (B) provide such advice and technical assistance, in coordination with the head of the Office and the United States Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, as is appropriate-- (i) to bring the assessment or plan of a chemical source described in section 4(b) into compliance; or (ii) to address any threat described in clause (i) or (ii) of paragraph (1)(B). (c) COMPLIANCE ORDERS.-- (1) IN GENERAL.--If, after the date that is 30 days after the later of the date on which the Administrator first provides assistance, or a chemical source receives notice, under subsection (b)(2)(B), a chemical source has not brought an assessment or plan for which the assistance is provided into compliance with regulations promulgated under paragraphs (1) and (3) of section 4(a), or the chemical source has not complied with an entry or information request under section 6, the Administrator may issue an order directing compliance by the chemical source. (2) NOTICE AND OPPORTUNITY FOR HEARING.--An order under paragraph (1) may be issued only after notice and opportunity for a hearing. (d) ABATEMENT ACTION.-- (1) IN GENERAL.--Notwithstanding a certification under section 5(a)(2), if the head of the Office, in consultation with local law enforcement officials and first responders, determines that a threat of a terrorist attack exists that is beyond the scope of a submitted prevention, preparedness, and response plan of 1 or more chemical sources, or current implementation of the plan is insufficient to address the results of an assessment of a source or a threat described in subsection (b)(1)(B)(i), the head of the Office shall notify each chemical source of the elevated threat. (2) INSUFFICIENT RESPONSE.--If the head of the Office determines that a chemical source has not taken appropriate action in response to a notification under paragraph (1), the head of the Office shall notify the chemical source, the Administrator, and the Attorney General that actions taken by the chemical source in response to the notification are insufficient. (3) RELIEF.-- (A) IN GENERAL.--On receipt of a notification under paragraph (2), the Administrator or the Attorney General may secure such relief as is necessary to abate a threat described in paragraph (1), including such orders as are necessary to protect public health or welfare. (B) JURISDICTION.--The district court of the United States for the district in which a threat described in paragraph (1) occurs shall have jurisdiction to grant such relief as the Administrator or Attorney General requests under subparagraph (A). SEC. 6. RECORDKEEPING AND ENTRY. (a) RECORDS MAINTENANCE.--A chemical source that is required to certify to the Administrator assessments and plans under section 4 shall maintain on the premises of the chemical source a current copy of those assessments and plans. (b) RIGHT OF ENTRY.--In carrying out this Act, the Administrator (or an authorized representative of the Administrator), on presentation of credentials-- (1) shall have a right of entry to, on, or through any premises of an owner or operator of a chemical source described in subsection (a) or any premises in which any records required to be maintained under subsection (a) are located; and (2) may at reasonable times have access to, and may copy, any records, reports, or other information described in subsection (a). (c) INFORMATION REQUESTS.--In carrying out this Act, the Administrator may require any chemical source to provide such information as is necessary to-- (1) enforce this Act; and (2) promulgate or enforce regulations under this Act. SEC. 7. PENALTIES. (a) CIVIL PENALTIES.--Any owner or operator of a chemical source that violates, or fails to comply with, any order issued may, in an action brought in United States district court, be subject to a civil penalty of not more than $25,000 for each day in which such violation occurs or such failure to comply continues. (b) CRIMINAL PENALTIES.--Any owner or operator of a chemical source that knowingly violates, or fails to comply with, any order issued shall-- (1) in the case of a first violation or failure to comply, be fined not less than $2,500 nor more than $25,000 per day of violation, imprisoned not more than 1 year, or both; and (2) in the case of a subsequent violation or failure to comply, be fined not more than $50,000 per day of violation, imprisoned not more than 2 years, or both. (c) ADMINISTRATIVE PENALTIES.-- (1) PENALTY ORDERS.--If the amount of a civil penalty determined under subsection (a) does not exceed $125,000, the penalty may be assessed in an order issued by the Administrator. (2) NOTICE AND HEARING.--Before issuing an order described in paragraph (1), the Administrator shall provide to the person against which the penalty is to be assessed-- (A) written notice of the proposed order; and (B) the opportunity to request, not later than 30 days after the date on which the notice is received by the person, a hearing on the proposed order. SEC. 8. NO EFFECT ON REQUIREMENTS UNDER OTHER LAW. Nothing in this Act affects any duty or other requirement imposed under any other Federal or State law. SEC. 9. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS. There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as are necessary to carry out this Act. By Ms. SNOWE (for herself and Mr. BOND): S. 158. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to expand the depreciation benefits available to small business, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Finance. Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the Small Business Expensing Improvement Act of 2003 on behalf of the Nation's millions of small businesses and self-employed individuals. I am pleased to be joining with my colleague in the House, Congressman WALLY HERGER, to move this important initiative for small business toward enactment. This legislation embodies a leading provision of the President's economic recovery package for small businesses and entrepreneurs in this country. By enabling small firms to expense more of the equipment they purchase, this bill provides a tailor-made incentive for the small business sector of our economy to invest in new technology and expand their operations. We should never under-state the role that small businesses play in our economy. They represent 99 percent of all employers, employ 51 percent of the private-sector workforce, provide about 75 percent of the net new jobs, contribute 51 percent of the private-sector output, and represent 96 percent of all exporters of goods. In short, size [Page: S300] The bill I introduce today recognizes the vitality of the small business and entrepreneurs in America. Regrettably, when we enacted stimulus legislation last year, we missed a tremendous opportunity to improve a provision of the tax law aimed directly at small firms, Section 179 of the Internal Revenue Code, which enables small businesses to write off the cost of new equipment, rather than depreciate it over a period of years. During the Senate's consideration of last year's stimulus bill, we approved an increase to the expensing limits by a vote of 90-2. Sadly, that provision was dropped from the final package that was sent to the President. As the incoming Chair of the Senate Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship, I intend to correct that error by responding to the calls from small businesses in my State of Maine and from across the country for greater expensing of new equipment. I applaud the President for making this issue a key part of his economic recovery proposal. By tripling the current expensing limit to $75,000, broadening the phaseout of this provision, and indexing these amounts for inflation, this bill will achieve two important objectives. First, qualifying businesses will be able to write off more of the equipment purchases today, instead of waiting five, seven or more years to recover their costs through depreciation. That represents substantial savings both in dollars and in the time small businesses would otherwise have to spend complying with the complex depreciation rules. Moreover, new equipment will contribute to continued productivity growth in the business community, which Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan has repeatedly stressed is essential to the long-term vitality of our economy. Second, as a result of this bill, more businesses will qualify for this benefit because the phase-out limit will be increased from the current $200,000 to $325,000 in new equipment purchases. At the same time, small business capital investment will be pumping more money into the retail-sector of the economy. Accordingly, this is a win-win for small business and the economy as a whole. I am confident that small businesses will lead us out of the current economic problems as they have in past downturns. We have a tremendous opportunity to help small enterprises succeed by providing an incentive for reinvestment and leaving them more of their earnings to do just that. I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting this important legislation as we work with the President to enact this bill into law. I ask unanimous consent that following my statement, the text of the bill and an explanation of its provisions be printed in the RECORD. There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:
3B) Port Security Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, the Senator from New York offered the next amendment on which the yeas and nays have been ordered. As I promised last night as we wound up, we have reviewed Senator Schumer's amendment, and he has drafted a modified amendment which he will offer and which we will accept. I want to call to the attention of Senators that there are some of these [Page: S1105] I yield to my friend from New York. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New York. Mr. SCHUMER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senators HOLLINGS, DORGAN, KENNEDY, GRAHAM of Florida, BIDEN, CLINTON, and LAUTENBERG be added as cosponsors of this amendment. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. AMENDMENT NO. 31, AS FURTHER MODIFIED Mr. SCHUMER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to further modify my amendment with the changes that I now send to the desk. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is so ordered. The amendment (No. 31), as further modified, is as follows: On page 719, strike ``,'' on line 14, and insert the following: Provided further, That, of such amounts provided herein, $150,000,000 shall be available for the Secretary of Homeland Security pursuant to the terms and conditions of section 70107(i) of Public Law 107-295 to award grants to national laboratories, private nonprofit organizations, institutions of higher education, and other entities for the support of research and development of technologies that can be used to secure the ports of the United States:
(At the request of Mr. DASCHLE, the following statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD.) Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I strongly support Senator Schumer's amendment to add $150 million for port security research grants to the omnibus appropriations bill for fiscal year 2003. I cannot be here for the vote, but if I were I would vote in favor of this amendment. We passed a comprehensive maritime security bill at the end of the last Congress because in the aftermath of September 11 it became apparent that our Nation's ports were vulnerable to terrorist attacks. Our bill provided for the creation of a port security infrastructure that will significantly increase the level of security at ports and maritime facilities across the country. However, the bill was not funded through the appropriations process and a funding mechanism has yet to be been decided. The Schumer amendment would immediately release grant money to laboratories and universities for the research and development of technologies which will help detect the presence of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons at our Nation's ports, something we addressed in the Maritime Security Act but have yet to implement. There is no doubt that we will need to develop new technologies and improve upon existing detection technology if we are to fully secure our ports against the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction. There are simply not enough customs inspectors to search every piece of cargo that comes into the United States. We will need to have equipment that can scan large cargo containers and detect explosives, chemical and biological agents, and any other substance that could conceivably cause harm. We will also need improved technology that will help officials track, and keep track, of cargo containers from their point of origin to their point of destination. Calling upon our scientists and educators to develop new security technologies is essential if we are to effectively wage the war on terrorism. Given the inadequacies that we know exist in our port security, I do not believe that we can afford to wait around to act. Senator Schumer's amendment is critical to the future of maritime security, and I urge my colleagues to vote for its passage. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alaska. Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, we are prepared to accept this amendment. What it does is it dedicates moneys that are already in the bill to the consideration of the process of developing the system of detecting items in cargo vans as they come into our country. It is a very vital subject, and we are pleased to work with the Senator from New York. I urge its adoption. I yield back the remainder of our time. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New York. Mr. SCHUMER. Mr. President, first, I thank the Senator from Alaska, as well as the Senators from South Carolina, Washington State, and Arizona for their help. Let me explain it quickly to my colleagues and how it is changed. As many of you know, something I have felt very strongly about is the ability to detect nuclear devices as they might be smuggled into this country by terrorists, either on ships in the large containers or over the Mexican or Canadian borders. The scientists at our energy labs tell us they can develop or perfect detection devices much better than Geiger counters, which is the only detection device we have now that can prevent such devices from being smuggled in, which could cause an unimaginable tragedy--if a nuclear device were smuggled into the country and exploded. The original amendment added $150 million for research. Through the good work of the chairman of the Appropriations Committee, we have now simply said that that money will come out of TSA. He has graciously agreed to protect that in conference. I think it is a happy compromise that solves the problem I have had getting research for this and the problem he has had making sure there are no new allocations. It tracks the language that Senator Hollings and Senator McCain put in the port security bill and now provides the funding without adding any additional funding. So I am glad we have a compromise and look forward to seeing this research proceed very quickly. We cannot afford to wait. Mr. President, I yield back the remainder of my time. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment, as further modified. The amendment (No. 31), as further modified, was agreed to. Mr. STEVENS. I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. SCHUMER. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alaska. Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, it is my understanding the Senator from West Virginia will offer an amendment. I would like to inquire from my good friend if we could put a time limit on this amendment. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia. Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, if I may respond to my friend, I am willing to enter into a time agreement. I think that is good. I wonder how many of my colleagues will want to have 2 or 3 or 5 minutes. I do not want to leave my friends out of the equation. As far as I am personally concerned, I could do with 45 minutes. Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that we have an hour on the amendment; 45 minutes for the Senator from West Virginia, 15 minutes for our side. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Mr. STEVENS. Is this the one on the across-the-board cuts? Mr. BYRD. Yes. Mr. STEVENS. Does the Senator wish to have no second-degree amendments? Mr. BYRD. That is fine, and an up-or-down vote. Mr. STEVENS. We agree, no second-degree amendments and an up-or-down vote. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is so ordered.
NORTH KOREA ********************* 4A) North Korea Democracy Act of 2003 S. 145. A bill to prohibit assistance to North Korea or the Korean Peninsula Development Organization, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Foreign Relations. Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the North Korea Democracy Act of 2003 be printed in the RECORD. There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: S. 145 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the ``North Korea Democracy Act of 2003''. SEC. 2. FINDINGS. Congress makes the following findings: (1) Under the Agreed Framework of October 21, 1994, North Korea committed to-- (A) freeze and eventually dismantle its graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities; (B) implement the North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, which prohibits the production, testing, or possession of nuclear weapons; and (C) allow implementation of its IAEA safeguards agreement under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) for nuclear facilities designated under the Agreed Framework and any other North Korean nuclear facilities. (2) The General Accounting Office has reported that North Korea has diverted heavy oil received from the United States-led Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization for unauthorized purposes in violation of the Agreed Framework. (3) On April 1, 2002, President George W. Bush stated that he would not certify North Korea's compliance with all provisions of the Agreed Framework. (4) North Korea has violated the basic terms of the Agreed Framework and the North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearlization of the Korean Peninsula by pursuing the enrichment of uranium for the purpose of building a nuclear weapon and by ``nuclearizing'' the Korean peninsula. (5) North Korea has admitted to having a covert nuclear weapons program and declared the Agreed Framework nullified. (6) North Korea has announced its intention to restart the 5-megawatt reactor and related reprocessing facility at Yongbyon, which were frozen under the Agreed Framework, and has expelled the IAEA personnel monitoring the freeze. (7) North Korea has announced its intention to withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London, and Moscow on July 1, 1968 (21 UST 483). SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS. In this Act: (1) AGREED FRAMEWORK.--The term ``Agreed Framework'' means the Agreed Framework Between the United States of America and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, signed in Geneva on October 21, 1994, and the Confidential Minute to that agreement. (2) IAEA.--The term ``IAEA'' means the International Atomic Energy Agency. (3) KEDO.--The term ``KEDO'' means the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization. (4) NORTH KOREA.--The term ``North Korea'' means the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. (5) NPT.--The term ``NPT'' means the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons done at Washington, London, and Moscow, July 1, 1968 (22 UST 483). SEC. 4. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE AGREED FRAMEWORK AND THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM. It is the sense of Congress that-- (1) the Agreed Framework is, as a result of North Korea's own illicit and deceitful actions over several years and recent declaration, null and void; (2) North Korea's pursuit and development of nuclear weapons-- (A) is of grave concern and represents a serious threat to the security of the United States, its regional allies, and friends; (B) is a clear and present danger to United States forces and personnel in the region and the United States homeland; and (C) seriously undermines the security and stability of Northeast Asia; and (3) North Korea must immediately come into compliance with its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and other commitments to the international community by-- (A) renouncing its nuclear weapons and materials production ambitions; (B) dismantling its nuclear infrastructure and facilities; (C) transferring all sensitive nuclear materials, technologies, and equipment (including nuclear devices in any stage of development) to the IAEA forthwith; and (D) allowing immediate, full, and unfettered access by IAEA inspectors to ensure that subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C) have been fully and verifiably achieved; and (4) any diplomatic solution to the North Korean crisis-- (A) should take into account that North Korea is not a trustworthy negotiating partner; (B) must achieve the total dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear weapons and nuclear production capability; and (C) must include highly intrusive verification requirements, including on-site monitoring and free access for the investigation of all sites of concern, that are no less stringent than those imposed on Iraq pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441 (2002) and previous corresponding resolutions. SEC. 5. PROHIBITION ON UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE UNDER THE AGREED FRAMEWORK. No department, agency, or entity of the United States Government may provide assistance to North Korea or the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization under the Agreed Framework. SEC. 6. LIMITATIONS ON NUCLEAR COOPERATION. (a) RESTRICTION ON ENTRY INTO FORCE OF NUCLEAR COOPERATION AGREEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT.--Section 822(a) of the Admiral James W. Nance and Meg Donovan Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2000 and 2001 (as enacted by section 1000(b)(7) of Public Law 106-113; 113 Stat. 1501A-472) is amended to read as follows: ``(a) IN GENERAL.-- ``(1) RESTRICTIONS.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law or any international agreement, unless or until the conditions described in paragraph (2) are satisfied-- ``(A) no agreement for cooperation (as defined in section 11 b. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2014 b.)) between the United States and North Korea may become effective; ``(B) no license may be issued for export directly or indirectly to North Korea of any nuclear material, facilities, components, or other goods, services, or technology that would be subject to such agreement; ``(C) no approval may be given for the transfer or retransfer directly or indirectly to North Korea of any nuclear material, facilities, components, or other goods, services, or technology that would be subject to such agreement; ``(D) no license may be issued under the Export Administration Act of 1979 for the export to North Korea of any item or related technical data which, as determined under section 309(c) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, could be of significance for nuclear explosive purposes or the production of nuclear materials; ``(E) no license may be issued under section 109 b. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 for the export to North Korea of any component, substance, or item that is subject to a license requirement under such section; ``(F) no approval may be granted, under the Export Administration Act of 1979 or section 109 b.(3) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, for the retransfer to North Korea of any item, technical data, component, or substance described in subparagraph (D) or (E); and ``(G) no authorization may be granted under section 57 b.(2) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 for any person to engage, directly or indirectly, in the production of special nuclear material (as defined in section 11 aa. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954) in North Korea. ``(2) CONDITIONS.--The conditions referred to in paragraph (1) are that-- ``(A) the President determines and reports to the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate that-- ``(i) North Korea has come into full compliance with its safeguards agreement with the IAEA (INFCIRC/403), and has taken all steps that have been deemed necessary by the IAEA in this regard; ``(ii) North Korea has permitted the IAEA full access to-- ``(I) all additional sites and all information (including historical records) deemed necessary by the IAEA to verify the accuracy and completeness of North Korea's initial report of May 4, 1992, to the IAEA on all nuclear sites and material in North Korea; and ``(II) all nuclear sites deemed to be of concern to the IAEA subsequent to that report; ``(iii) North Korea has consistently and verifiably taken steps to implement the Joint Declaration on Denuclearization, and is in full compliance with its obligations under numbered paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of the Joint Declaration on Denuclearization; ``(iv) North Korea does not have uranium enrichment or nuclear reprocessing facilities, and is making no progress toward acquiring or developing such facilities; ``(v) North Korea does not have nuclear materials or nuclear weapons and is making no effort to acquire, develop, test, produce, or deploy such weapons; and ``(vi) the transfer, approval, licensing, or authorization of any of such materials, components, facilities, goods, services, technologies, data, substances or production to, for or in North Korea is in the national interest of the United States; and ``(B) there is enacted into law a joint resolution stating in substance the approval of Congress of such action.''. (b) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.--Section 822(b) of such Act is amended by striking ``subsection (a)'' and inserting ``subsection (a)(1)''. [Page: S233] SEC. 7. APPLICATION OF UNITED STATES SANCTIONS. (a) AUTHORITY TO IMPOSE ADDITIONAL UNITED STATES SANCTIONS AGAINST NORTH KOREA.--The President is authorized to exercise any of his authorities under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the Arms Export Control Act, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, or any other provision of law to impose full economic sanctions against North Korea, or to take any other appropriate action against North Korea, including the interdiction of shipments of weapons, weapons-related components, materials, or technologies, or dual-use items traveling to or from North Korea, in response to the activities of North Korea to develop nuclear weapons in violation of North Korea's international obligations. (b) PROHIBITION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR EASING OF SANCTIONS AGAINST NORTH KOREA.--None of the funds appropriated under any provision of law may be made available to carry out any sanctions regime against North Korea that is less restrictive than the sanctions regime in effect against North Korea immediately prior to the September 17, 1999, announcement by the President of an easing of sanctions against North Korea. SEC. 8. PURSUIT OF MULTILATERAL MEASURES. The President should take all necessary and appropriate actions to obtain-- (1) international condemnation of North Korea for its pursuit of nuclear weapons and serious breach of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and other international obligations, and (2) multilateral diplomatic and economic sanctions against North Korea that are at least as restrictive as United Nations Security Council Resolution 661 concerning Iraq. SEC. 9. TREATMENT OF REFUGEES FROM NORTH KOREA. (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.--It is the sense of Congress that the United States should begin immediately to work with other countries in the region to adopt a policy with respect to refugees from North Korea that would-- (1) guarantee all such refugees safe arrival in a country of first asylum in which the refugees would stay on a temporary basis; and (2) promote burden-sharing of refugee costs between countries by providing for the resettlement of the refugees from the country of first asylum to a third country. (b) ELIGIBILITY FOR REFUGEE STATUS.-- (1) IN GENERAL.--In the case of an alien who is a national of North Korea, the alien may establish, for purposes of admission as a refugee under section 207 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, that the alien has a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion by asserting such a fear and asserting a credible basis for concern about the possibility of such persecution. (2) NOT TREATED AS NATIONAL OF SOUTH KOREA.--For purposes of eligibility for refugee status under section 207 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1157), or for asylum under section 208 of such Act (8 U.S.C. 1158), a national of North Korea shall not be considered a national of the Republic of Korea. (c) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.--There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out this section. SEC. 10. INCREASED BROADCASTING BY RADIO FREE ASIA. (a) IN GENERAL.--In making grants to Radio Free Asia, the Broadcasting Board of Governors shall ensure that Radio Free Asia increases its broadcasting with respect to North Korea to 24 hours each day. (b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.--There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out this section. SEC. 11. SENSE OF CONGRESS. It is the sense of Congress that the United States, in conjunction with the Republic of Korea and other allies in the Pacific region, should take measures, including military reinforcements, enhanced defense exercises and other steps as appropriate, to ensure-- (1) the highest possible level of deterrence against the multiple threats that North Korea poses; and (2) the highest level of readiness of United States and allied forces should military action become necessary. SEC. 12. PRESIDENTIAL REPORT. Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the President shall submit a report to Congress regarding his actions to implement the provisions of this Act. By Mr. DeWINE (for himself, Mr. GRAHAM of South Carolina, Mr. VOINOVICH, Mr. Ensign, Mr. BROWNBACK, Mr. ENZI, Mr. INHOFE, Mr. NICKLES, Mr. SANTORUM, and Mr. FITZGERALD): S. 146. A bill to amend titles 10 and 18, United States Code, to protect unborn victims of violence; to the Committee on the Judiciary. Mr. DEWINE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the RECORD. There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:
4B) North Korea Let me begin by saying that there have been attempts by people in the media to compare the threats between Iraq on one hand and North Korea on the other, sometimes I think in an effort to suggest that the President has misplaced his priorities. I would like to set the record straight. I think the administration has made it clear, and others are very clear, that there is a big threat from both Iraq and North Korea. Make no mistake about it, it serves no purpose to try to compare those threats in some theoretical way. Both have to be dealt with in their own way, and that also means in their own time. The reason the administration began dealing with Saddam Hussein and Iraq is because that was left over business from the gulf war of 11 years ago where Saddam Hussein said--promised--that he would do certain things: That he would, for example, not have weapons of mass destruction or seek to acquire nuclear capability; that he would dismantle his missile program, and so on. We know through our intelligence that he has failed time and again to comply with those requirements. He has even continued to shoot at our unarmed predator reconnaissance aircraft, as well as the manned aircraft we fly to do surveillance over the areas of Iraq we have been flying over, the so-called no-fly zones, ever since the end of the gulf war. I note that is a kind of inspection. When people at the United Nations say Iraq is cooperating with the inspections, I wonder how much those pilots think this cooperation is for them when they are being shot at by the Iraqis. Some cooperation. In any event, that is unfinished business with which we have to deal if international agreements are going to mean anything. The United Nations has resolutions. Saddam Hussein agreed to abide by them. He has not done so. The question is, At what point is the United Nations going to finally decide to enforce those resolutions? That is the point President Bush brought to the attention of the United Nations Security Council. They adopted a resolution that basically gave Saddam Hussein one last chance to show he was in compliance. In the judgment of virtually everyone who looked at the document filed by Saddam Hussein allegedly demonstrating his compliance, it is a false and fraudulent document and shows that he is in noncompliance rather than the other way around, a result of which, sooner or later, we are going to have to deal with Saddam Hussein. That is where the President found himself prior to the evolution of the North Korean crisis. In one respect it is timely for us to deal with Iraq because from a military standpoint, there is no question that we can deal with Iraq in a way that can minimize casualties, that does not involve a large threat that he will attack his neighbors. Fortunately, the Israelis have developed a missile defense program in the 11 years since the end of the gulf war and will probably be able to, through the Arrow missile defense system, handle any kind of Scud missile attack on them, and Saddam Hussein has not yet acquired a nuclear weapon, in our belief. As a result, he is not in a position to resist a U.S. effort to bring him into compliance with the U.N. resolution militarily in a way that we fear from a military standpoint. On the other hand, the crisis in North Korea has now broken out, and we are [Page: S333] GPO's PDF they have nuclear weapons, we believe, and they have a lot of weaponry just a few miles across the DMZ from Seoul, Korea, where something like 8 or 10 million people are located, including a large number of American troops. As a result, that situation has evolved beyond the point where we believe it is efficacious to use a military solution to deal with the crisis. It is a good illustration of why we should deal with those problems before they get to that point. Fortunately, Iraq does present the situation prior to that point that enables us to take military action there. Again, that crisis evolved, diplomacy failed, and it is a crisis ripe for resolution, if Saddam Hussein does not come clean for the world community and the United States, by military action. We are not at that point with North Korea yet. That situation arose relatively recently. We have known for some time there had been violations of the agreement that North Korea made not to produce fissile material. They finally confessed to Under Secretary Kelly back in September that they had, in fact, been developing a uranium enrichment program for nuclear weapons. They pointed out that they still had not, however, violated the agreement to keep their plutonium program frozen, but in the last few weeks--in the last week actually--they decided to unfreeze their plutonium program, as a result of which that fissile material can be produced in relatively short order for inclusion in nuclear weapons. It is our assessment that in a matter of a very short period of time North Korea could again begin producing a number of nuclear weapons. The threat to the world, obviously, is significant because Korea is the largest proliferator of weapons of mass destruction and missiles, and if they begin selling nuclear weapons, just imagine what the consequence would be if a Saddam Hussein or Muammar Qadhafi--someone like that--would purchase nuclear weapons from a country such as North Korea. The point is, that is another crisis with which we have to deal. I do believe it is a crisis, and I believe it is a serious threat, but, as I said, it is a different kind of threat from what we are presented in Iraq. The obvious solution is to do what the President suggested. North Korea has to meet a goal, and the goal is to dismantle its weapons program in a verifiable way. If it does not do so, it is going to have to face consequences. The President is willing to engage in a dialog with North Korea, but there has to be more than carrots at the end of that dialog to entice North Korea to come into compliance. North Korea also has to understand there can be consequences it will not like if it fails to reach an agreement that is enforceable, verifiable, and one that is acceptable to the rest of the international community. It now has removed itself from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. This is a very dangerous step. As a result, the United States and the other countries of the world need to take action. It would be possible to do so under chapters 6 and 7 of the U.N. Charter which provide for action by the United Nations in the event of a threat to international peace and stability. We could impose a resolution similar to that which applies to Iraq today, Resolution 661, which essentially has quarantined Iraq from export and import. We could do the same with North Korea saying no more would they be able to export weapons of mass destruction to generate hard currency or, by the way, illicit drugs, since their two biggest forms of making money are selling illicit drugs and weaponry which they should not be selling to countries. That would benefit the world. We would deny hard currency to North Korea and help prevent the further proliferation of these weapons of mass destruction. Those are actions we can take today. Senators McCain, Sessions, Bayh, and I introduced legislation Monday that provides a range of options of which the administration can take advantage. It ranges from dealing with the refugee crisis in North Korea to preventing repatriation of funds from other countries into North Korea--again denying hard currency--increasing the broadcasts of Radio Free Asia into North Korea, ensuring we are adequately prepared to provide a deterrent to military activity in the region. But probably the key to it is the reimposition of sanctions or imposition of new sanctions, such as Resolution 661 that applies to Iraq today. Those are all the kinds of action that North Korea should understand could come about if it does not cooperate in these discussions that the administration would like to have. It seems to us that it is important to put those kinds of points in place so that in addition to the carrots this administration has suggested exist, there are some sticks out there, too, because we have seen in the past that North Korea tends to violate the agreements it signs; it tends to negotiate from the posture of strength. If it has cards on the table, such as its nuclear weapons and the ability to proliferate these weapons around the world, then we need some cards on the table as well. Right now I do not think the rest of the international community has many cards on the table. In effect, we need to put an ``or else'' to the end of those negotiations so when we sit down and talk to them and they are intransigent, as they usually are, there is a point our negotiators can say: Look, you either do this or else, and the ``or else'' has to have some meaning. Dr. Kissinger made another important point, and that is the United States should not be in this alone. This is not our fight alone. South Korea, of all countries, has a stake in helping to resolve the situation, as does Japan, China, Russia, and other nations in the region. It is important that those nations be brought into this, and I am glad to see the Chinese are willing to host some kind of a meeting and that perhaps other countries are willing now to be brought into the process of discussion so that whatever agreements are reached, it is a product of the entire group and not only the United States. We should not put ourselves into the position of being the sole party to be blamed or for people to be looking to for enforcement of any agreement that may be entered into. We have recently seen on the streets of South Korea our friends, the South Koreans, telling us they do not want us in their country anymore. Now that is a very bad turn of events because we have been great allies. We are great allies. We mean only to help South Korea to provide security assurances for their people. What it does is tell Americans that if we are not wanted there, then perhaps we ought to leave. That is not the right message to be sending when stability in the region is so important to maintain. It would, of course, send the wrong signals to North Korea were we to begin pulling our troops out of South Korea. That is not the solution now. Perhaps someday it will be. If South Korea does not want the United States to remain, obviously we should not remain, but the right time to do this is after this crisis is resolved, not in the middle of the crisis. There is a lot hanging in the balance. It seems to me when we analyze the situation in Iraq and in Korea, we have to appreciate that they are two totally different situations. There are some parallels. Both countries are part of the axis of evil. Both represent threats to the United States and other nations in the world. They both have to be dealt with, but they have to be dealt with in different ways. There is no confusion in the administration policy in this regard. There is no conflict. This is not a matter of having disparate policies. It is merely a matter of recognizing that it is a complex world and what works in one particular place may not work in another particular place. That is why we have the two different policies, both of which I hope will involve the international community of nations. At the end of the day, the United States has to have a clear-eyed policy of its own, one that we are able to apply in a way that will help to protect our own national security. That is why I support what the administration and President Bush have been [Page: S334] GPO's PDF I yield the floor. The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mrs. DOLE). The Senator from Nevada.
4C) North Korea and Iraq The situation in North Korea has gone from bad to worse. They've thrown out the international inspectors. They've turned off cameras that tracked thousands of canisters of weapons grade plutonium. They've withdrawn from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. [Page: S1126] GPO's PDF The irony here is that the very rationale some in the administration cite for regime change in Iraq is an emerging reality in North Korea: A rogue regime and one of the world's worst proliferators is on the verge of becoming a plutonium factory. It will sell anything it develops to the highest bidder. We know it doesn't take much plutonium to make a nuclear threat real. You only need something the size of the bottom of a water glass, about an eighth of an inch thick, two pieces. With a crude operation to ram it together at high speed, you have a 1 kiloton bomb in a homemade nuclear device. My colleagues from New York will remember this: our national laboratories produced what could be a homemade nuclear weapon. They made it off the shelf with easily obtainable materials. Everything except the plutonium. I asked Senators Clinton and Schumer to bring that homemade weapon up to S. 407 and they walked it right in. The threat of proliferation exists in North Korea as we speak, right now, not tomorrow or next week or next month or next year, but right now. And by the way, if President Clinton had not completed the Agreed Framework, North Korea would already have material for dozens of nuclear weapons. If North Korea continues down this path, we also risk an arms race in Asia. Think about it. North Korea, South Korea, Japan. And if that happens, China will build up its nuclear weapons arsenal, India will get nervous and do the same, and Pakistan will follow suit. Everything we've been working to present for decades--a nuclear arms race in Asia and beyond--will become a reality. And that could have a terrible impact on economic stability, too. The regime in Pyongyang is first and foremost to blame for this crisis. But frankly, two years of policy incoherence on our part has not helped matters. We have see-sawed back and forth between engagement and name-calling. And the last two weeks of taking options off the table--especially talking--has made matters worse. It tied our own hands and added tension to our already strained relationship with a key ally, South Korea. We need a clear--and clear eyed--strategy for dealing with this danger. I'm pleased the administration now seems to be on the right track. As several of us have argued for weeks, direct talks are the best way out of this impasse. Some claim that talking is appeasement. Well, we know that not talking could result in North Korea having the material to build up to a half dozen nuclear weapons in six months--and dozens more in the months and years to follow. We know that taking out North Korea's plutonium program must be a course of very last resort. Pyongyang has more than 10,000 heavily protected artillery pieces just miles from Seoul--it could devastate the city, its inhabitants and many of our troops before we could respond. We know that for additional sanctions to bite, we would need the participation of South Korea and China, neither of whom so far, wants to pursue that path. And we know that talking is not appeasement. It is the most effective way to tell North Korea what it must do if it wants more normal relations with us. In fact, in dealing with an isolated regime and a closed-off leader, talking clearly and directly is critical if we want to avoid miscommunication and miscalculation. We cannot and should not buy the same carpet twice. We won't if we insist on getting more from North Korea than we got last time. This should include giving up the plutonium and spent fuel it already has produced and forsaking the production of plutonium and uranium in the future--all of this verified by international inspectors and monitoring. In turn, we should hold out the prospect of a more normal relationship, including energy assistance, food aid and a ``no hostility pledge.'' IRAQ As we contend with Korea, we also must deal with Iraq. The administration was mistaken to suggest North Korea could be put on the back burner. But so are those who suggest Iraq is not a major problem. It is, and we must continue to deal with it on its own merits, but on our own timetable. It's no secret that the State Department, the Defense Department, and the Joint Chiefs of are at odds on the best course of action in Iraq. We have Hans Blix and the IAEA saying that the inspectors need more time to accomplish their mission--that they will have to stay in Iraq much longer to get the job done. Secretary Rumsfeld is saying, if we get ourselves locked in for four more months we will lose our weather window and be forced to wait until the fall. Secretary Powell is saying, look, we must make it a priority to maintain the support of the French and the Germans and everyone else, not to mention the American people. The President was right to make Iraq the world's problem, not just our own. Let's keep it that way. In my view, the President has shown restraint on Iraq. He has gone to the United Nations. He has allowed inspectors to begin. Now he must allow them to take their course. I would say to the President, keep it going. In the eyes of the world, you're doing it right. Inspectors are not a permanent solution and neither is our massive troop presence. But so long as the inspectors are doing their work in Iraq, backed up by the threat of our forces, it is highly unlikely Iraq could pursue a nuclear program undetected or would run the risk of selling chemical or biological weapons to terrorists. And we will sustain international support. Meanwhile, the pressure will build on Saddam. Unlike in North Korea, times is on our side, not his. Of course, this massive deployment is costly and hard on our men and women in uniform. But going to war would be far more costly in terms of troops and treasure. It must remain a last resort. If we do go to war, we better be absolutely certain that our friends and allies are all in the game at the outset. Not because we cannot prevail against Saddam Hussein without them. We can--though it certainly makes sense to spread the risk and share the cost. But because without the support of other nations, we will be left with a political, financial, and, potentially, a regionally destabilizing burden after we take down Saddam. We will have to deal with the ``day after'' Saddam--or more accurately the decade after--on our own. In the weeks ahead, if we move to war, I hope the President will tell the American people what he has not yet told them: How much will the war cost? How will the balance his guns and butter rhetoric with the bottom-line budget realities we face? How many troops will have to stay in Iraq after Saddam and for how long? How much will it cost to rebuild Iraq? Who will help us foot the bill? The American people deserve answers to these and other key questions? The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senator from Kansas has 5 minutes.
4D) Sense of the Senate Regarding North Korea
At the appropriate place, insert the following: SEC. __. SENSE OF THE SENATE WITH RESPECT TO NORTH KOREA. (a) FINDINGS.--The Senate makes the following findings: (1) Under the Agreed Framework of October 21, 1994, North Korea committed to-- (A) freeze and eventually dismantle its graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities; (B) implement the North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, which prohibits the production, testing, or possession of nuclear weapons; and (C) allow implementation of its IAEA safeguards agreement under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) for nuclear facilities designated under the Agreed Framework and any other North Korean nuclear facilities. (2) The General Accounting Office has reported that North Korea has diverted heavy oil received from the United States-led Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization for unauthorized purposes in violation of the Agreed Framework. (3) On April 1, 2002, President George W. Bush stated that he would not certify North Korea's compliance with all provisions of the Agreed Framework. (4) North Korea has violated the basic terms of the Agreed Framework and the North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula by pursuing the enrichment of uranium for the purpose of building a nuclear weapon and by ``nuclearizing'' the Korean peninsula. (5) North Korea has admitted to having a covert nuclear weapons program and declared the Agreed Framework nullified. (6) North Korea has announced its intention to restart the 5-megawatt reactor and related reprocessing facility at Yongbyon, which were frozen under the Agreed Framework, and has expelled the IAEA personnel monitoring the freeze. (7) North Korea has announced its intention to withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London, and Moscow on July 1, 1968 (21 UST 483). (b) SENSE OF THE SENATE REGARDING THE AGREED FRAMEWORK AND THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM.--It is the sense of the Senate that-- (1) the Agreed Framework is, as a result of North Korea's own illicit and deceitful actions over several years and recent declaration, null and void; (2) North Korea's pursuit and development of nuclear weapons-- (A) is of grave concern and represents a serious threat to the security of the United States, its regional allies, and friends; (B) is a clear and present danger to United States forces and personnel in the region and the United States homeland; and (C) seriously undermines the security and stability of Northeast Asia; and (3) North Korea must immediately come into compliance with its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and other commitments to the international community by-- (A) renouncing its nuclear weapons and materials production ambitions; (B) dismantling its nuclear infrastructure and facilities; (C) transferring all sensitive nuclear materials, technologies, and equipment (including nuclear devices in any stage of development) to the IAEA forthwith; and (D) allowing immediate, full, and unfettered access by IAEA inspectors to ensure that subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C) have been fully and verifiably achieved; and (4) any diplomatic solution to the North Korean crisis-- (A) should take into account that North Korea is not a trustworthy negotiating partner; (B) must achieve the total dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear weapons and nuclear production capability; and (C) must include highly intrusive verification requirements, including on-site monitoring and free access for the investigation of all sites of concern, that are no less stringent than those imposed on Iraq pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441 (2002) and previous corresponding resolutions. (c) SENSE OF THE SENATE.--It is further the sense of the Senate that the United States, in conjunction with the Republic of Korea and other allies in the Pacific region, should take measures, including military reinforcements, enhanced defense exercises and other steps as appropriate, to ensure-- (1) the highest possible level of deterrence against the multiple threats that North Korea poses; and (2) the highest level of readiness of United States and allied forces should military action become necessary. (d) FURTHER SENSE OF THE SENATE.--It is further the sense of the Senate that the Broadcasting Board of Governors should ensure that Radio Free Asia will increase its broadcasting with respect to North Korea to 24 hours each day. (e) DEFINITIONS.--In this section: (1) AGREED FRAMEWORK.--The term ``Agreed Framework'' means the Agreed Framework Between the United States of America and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, signed in Geneva on October 21, 1994, and the Confidential Minute to that agreement. (2) IAEA.--The term ``IAEA'' means the International Atomic Energy Agency. (3) NORTH KOREA.--The term ``North Korea'' means the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. (4) NPT.--The term ``NPT'' means the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons done at Washington, London, and Moscow, July 1, 1968 (22 UST 483).
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