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1A) The So-Called Moscow Treaty
THE SO-CALLED MOSCOW TREATY -- (Senate - March 04, 2003)

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   Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I understand that perhaps today or tomorrow we will have a so-called Moscow Treaty brought to the floor of the Senate for debate. It is a treaty that has its origin in some discussions between our Presidents and the leader of Russia about the issue of nuclear arms and the reduction of nuclear arms.

   I want to say I will vote for this treaty, although I must say it is not much of an agreement and not much of a treaty at all. I don't see any reason someone would vote against it. But I make the point that this is an agreement between two countries--both of which have large stocks of nuclear weapons--to reduce their number of nuclear weapons by taking some and putting them in warehouses and storage facilities and at the end of the process both countries can keep the same number of nuclear weapons they had when they started.

   No nuclear weapons under this agreement will be destroyed, dismantled, or defused.

   And This treaty deals with only strategic nuclear weapons, not theater nuclear weapons. There are thousands and thousands of theater nuclear weapons, such as the nuclear weapons that go on the tips of artillery shells. That is not part of this agreement. It has nothing to do with this agreement.

   Strategic nuclear weapons are the very large warheads that one would put on the tip of an ICBM, for example, or to have in the belly of a bomber, or perhaps on the tip of a missile that is in a submarine.

   Those are the strategic nuclear weapons.

   Between our country and Russia, there are perhaps 10,000, maybe 11,000, strategic nuclear weapons. So you have thousands on each side. Should we be reducing them? Of course. Absolutely.

   But we have a circumstance now where there is a treaty, or an agreement, with Moscow in which, between now and the year 2012, we all the US and Russia have to do is take nuclear weapons and put them in storage. So each side, in the year 2012, can keep if it wants exactly the same number of nuclear weapons. Not one nuclear weapon that exists today needs to be destroyed in the next 9 years--none.

   I do not understand that. I guess it is fine to have agreements just for the sake of having agreements, but of what value?

   We have had examples of effective reductions of nuclear weapons and also delivery vehicles. I have mentioned them in the Chamber on many occasions. Let me do so again.

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   There is a program called the Nunn-Lugar Program, which is named after former Senator Sam Nunn and our current distinguished colleague, Senator Lugar. It is a program that I very strongly support. It makes a great deal of sense. That program actually destroys nuclear warheads and delivery systems that are made excess through the various arms control treaties.

   For example, in my desk I have a piece of metal which I would like to show by unanimous consent.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

   Mr. DORGAN. This piece of metal belonged to a Soviet bomber. This was part of a wing strut on a Soviet bomber. Presumably, this bomber, belonging to the Soviet Union, carried nuclear weapons that could have been dropped on a target here in the United States of America.

   How is it that a Senator on the floor of the Senate has a metal piece from a Soviet bomber? Well, simple. This bomber had its wings sawed off and its fuselage destroyed. How? The U.S. paid for it. We did not shoot the bomber down. This was not the result of hostilities. This was the result of an agreement between our country and the old Soviet Union, now Russia, to actually reduce delivery vehicles, bombers, missiles, submarines, and to actually reduce the number of nuclear weapons.

   So that is how I come to hold in my hand a piece of metal that belonged to a Soviet bomber, and then Russian bomber, that would carry nuclear weapons that would have threatened this country.

   Mr. President, I show you this little tube of ground copper. This used to be in a submarine that carried nuclear weapons on behalf of the old Soviet Union and then Russia. Those nuclear weapons were all aimed at this country, thousands of them. Well, this submarine does not carry nuclear weapons anymore. It was dismantled and destroyed. And I have here, on the floor of the Senate, a piece of ground up copper from the wiring of an old Soviet submarine.

   That makes a lot of sense to me. We are actually reducing the threat by reducing the number of delivery vehicles, bombers, submarines, missiles, and dismantling the number of warheads.

   We have been engaged in that for the last 10 years or so. And I would like to especially say my colleagues, Senator Lugar and Senator Nunn, proposed a program by which we did not have to sink a Soviet submarine and we did not have to shoot down a Soviet bomber in order to destroy weapons of mass destruction

   and their delivery vehicles. We paid for their destruction with large circular saws and with devices in shipyards that destroyed their submarine by agreement.

   By contrast, the agreement that comes to the floor of the Senate this week is kind of a marshmallow. It does not do anything. It is full of air. It says: Oh, let's have each side put more of their nuclear weapons in storage and then pretend we have reduced the number of nuclear weapons. Well, I thought pretend was all about children's books; it is not about the serious business of nuclear arms control.

   There was a rumor, some long while ago, that a terrorist organization had stolen a nuclear weapon and was set to detonate it in a U.S. city. The interesting thing about that rumor was that the intelligence community did not view it as incredible that a nuclear weapon could have been stolen. After all, there where thousands and thousands and thousands in the world, most possessed by two countries--ours and also now Russia.

   So our intelligence community did not believe it was an incredible threat. They believed it was entirely possible someone could have stolen a weapon, particularly from the Russian arsenal that does not have great command and control, I have heard and I have been told. And secondly, it was not something beyond the bounds of reality that, having stolen a nuclear weapon, a terrorist organization would know how to detonate it or could detonate it.

   If ever there needed to be a sober moment, that was it.

   For us to think that the potential stealing of one nuclear weapon, and put in the wrong hands--the hands of terrorists--would threaten this country, or any city in this country, ought to lead us to understand that if we are worried about one nuclear weapon, we ought to be worried about thousands and thousands and thousands of nuclear weapons.

   With both strategic and theater nuclear weapons, there are perhaps as many as 25,000 to 30,000 nuclear weapons in this world. And what are we going to do this week? We are going to come and talk about how we shuffle the inventory of nuclear weapons from one place to another, destroying none of them, and then saying: We have an agreement. What a great agreement. By the year 2012, we will have moved nuclear weapons into storage facilities. And the world is safer.

   Oh, really? How?

   At the same time all of this is occurring, there is a fundamental shift occurring, in addition, with respect to the discussion about nuclear weapons. This administration says: We do not want to continue the antiballistic missile treaty--which has been the center pole of the tent of arms control.

   Instead, this administration says: We want to talk about and consider the possibility of developing new designer nuclear weapons; for example, bunker buster nuclear weapons.

   This administration, and many in this Congress--too many in this Senate--said: We do not support the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty--despite the fact that we have not tested a nuclear weapon for well over a decade.

   There is a fundamental shift going on. This administration has said: We have not ruled out the use of nuclear weapons in certain circumstances. I will not go into them, but they have been in the newspapers.

   I think our responsibility--of all countries in the world--is to be a leader in trying to reduce the number of nuclear weapons in this world, and to try to convince everyone and anyone that no one shall ever again explode a nuclear weapon in anger.

   Pakistan and India both have nuclear weapons. They do not like each other. They have been exchanging weapons fire across the border with respect to Kashmir. Both have nuclear weapons. Do we want, in any way, to signal that the use of nuclear weapons, in any circumstance, is appropriate? Do we want to signal that we actually have a desire to begin producing new types of nuclear weapons, such as bunker buster nuclear weapons?

   I think this country has chosen the wrong path with respect to these policies. We ought to be debating on the floor of the Senate something that has grip to it, something that says: Look, as a world leader, it is our determination to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, and to stop the spread now. And we are going to do that.

   We ought to be saying: It is our judgment that we want to reduce the stockpile of nuclear weapons in this world. And we want to be a leader in doing that. We just have to assume that leadership responsibility.

1B) Time for America to Slow Down and Consider Its Options
Mr. BLUMENAUER. Mr. Speaker, the recent cavalcade of events surrounding the actions of the United States in Iraq and other foreign affairs has compounded the apprehension that many have felt these last 8 months. It is time for the United States collectively to slow down, take a deep breath, step back and consider our options.

   Comments I have received from constituents at home, from my Web site, as well as just simply reading the many conflicting poll results, suggest that most Americans would appreciate a reflective pause.

   Terrorism is the greatest threat to Americans at home and abroad, despite the recent obsession with Iraq . Notwithstanding the performance by the Department of Homeland Security, which resembled a ``Saturday Night Live'' skit with talk of duct tape and plastic, terrorism is still serious business.

   I am not opposed to the United States using force when appropriate. I think most of us now wish we had done so to deal with the genocide in Rwanda. Previously, I supported military action in the Balkans when some of the

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   It is clear that we have mishandled the northern situation; that we have been less than diligent with Pakistan; that we have missed opportunities to retire weapons and nuclear material from the former Soviet Union. Moreover, the administration clearly did not provide adequate money for reconstructing Afghanistan in its most recent budget.

   It is in an effort to highlight this situation that I have chosen to cosponsor a resolution offered by my colleague, the gentleman from Oregon (Mr. DeFazio), to rescind Congress' authorization of force passed last year. Even though this proposal is unlikely to be approved by the House, it is important to send the right signal to the administration. It is not too late to be more strategic and to learn from our past mistakes.

   Most important, especially if we are going to follow the route the administration is pursuing, a proper foundation is critical. If we expect multilateral cooperation and accountability from our friends, allies, and other world powers, we must demonstrate those characteristics ourselves. It would be outrageous if, as part of a deal with Turkey to secure their support, we end up selling out the Kurds in Iraq , the only people that have a modicum of self-determination.

   Should we go to war, the American people are unprepared by the administration for the probable consequences of the inevitable United States short-term victory. Even supporters of the Bush policy admit that a post-Saddam situation in Iraq will very likely resemble Yugoslavia without Tito. There, after hundreds of thousands of lives were lost and billions of dollars spent, we still have 20,000 troops in the Balkans and the region remains a basket case. Our past actions should give people pause.

   The United States gains little by rushing to war with Iraq . We should continue to work with our allies, pursue a program of coercive inspections, and marshall a much broader coalition in support of our effort.

   Just as critically, we must try to stop the situation with North Korea from spinning out of control while reconnecting with South Korea. More time and money and effort should be expended on the Nunn-Lugar program to invest in decommissions of weapons of mass destruction in the former Soviet Union. Pakistan and its activities with the North Koreans and potential links to terrorists need to be elevated in our awareness and policy issues. Nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction are much less likely to come from Iraq than they are from North Korea, from dissident elements in Pakistan, or remnants of the former Soviet Union.

   Most important, we need to acknowledge that the threats posed to America at home and abroad come primarily from terrorism. We should provide resources for the cash-strapped States and localities that have been dealing every day since September 11 with the consequences and potential for terrorism at home. This is beyond homeland security, this is hometown security, and deserves priority.

   Our actions overseas should be appraised carefully as to the impact on our efforts to track down terrorists and prevent future attacks. It is important that the administration and Congress level with the American people that this is an expensive, arduous, complex task. It will require money, commitment, and, most important, patience over the long haul.

   We certainly should be clear about the costs of any action in Iraq , and prepare the American public for the likely consequences our policy will have in that volatile part of the world. Americans may be conflicted about Iraq and anxious as to terrorism, but I know they are willing, as never before in my lifetime, to come together for the protection of their communities and the greater good of our country and peace in the world. Should we not take advantage of their interest and intention, we will regret this lost opportunity for years to come.

1C) Compliance Report on Moscow Treaty
SA 250. Mr. DURBIN proposed an amendment to the resolution of ratification for Treaty Doc. 107-8, The Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions, Signed at Moscow on May 24, 2002; as follows:

    At the end of section 2, add the following new condition:

    (3) COMPLIANCE REPORT.--Not later than 60 days after the exchange of instruments of ratification of the Treaty, and annually thereafter on April 15, the President shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate a report on the compliance of the President with the requirements of condition (a)(8) of the resolution of ratification of the Treaty on Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, with Annexes, Protocols, and Memorandum of Understanding, signed at Moscow on July 31, 1991 (START Treaty), which states that ``[in] as much as the prospect of a loss of control of nuclear weapons or fissile material in the former Soviet Union could pose a serious threat to the United States and to international peace and security, in connection with any further agreement reducing strategic offensive arms, the President shall seek an appropriate arrangement, including the use of reciprocal inspections, data exchanges, and other cooperative measures, to monitor (A) the numbers of nuclear stockpile weapons on the territory of the parties to [the START Treaty]; and (B) the location and inventory of facilities on the territory of the parties to [the START Treaty] capable of producing or processing significant quantities of fissile materials''.

1D) Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions
THE TREATY ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE REDUCTIONS -- (Senate - March 05, 2003)

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   Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I understand that the remaining time is Republican time. I am going to go ahead and start making some comments. We are doing some checking. Maybe I will ask unanimous consent to get some time for my colleague from Oregon. In the meantime, I will go ahead and start my comments.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Colorado is recognized.

   Mr. ALLARD. I thank the Chair. I appreciate the opportunity to add my thoughts to this body's consideration of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions, otherwise known as the Moscow Treaty. My understanding is that this afternoon it will be brought before the Senate. We are at a pivotal moment in our country's history. In many ways, the Senate's advise and consent to this treaty will mark the end of an era of hostility and the beginning of an age of cooperation.

   It is more than a document; it is a signal to the world that the United States and Russia have moved beyond a relationship of conflict and brinkmanship to a relationship of mutual respect and shared values.

   We all remember the super-power rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union, which lasted over 45 years. I believe it is important for this debate to recall the tension and hostility that accompanies that time so that we may fully appreciate what this treaty symbolizes for the future of U.S.-Russian relations.

   In 1947, a little-known foreign service officer named George Kennan under the pseudonym `X' wrote an essay that was published in Foreign Affairs journal that was to define our approach to the Soviet Union for the next fifty years. In his essay, he described the Soviet ideology as the belief in the ``basic badness of capitalism, in the inevitability of its destruction, in the obligation of the proletariat to assist in that destruction and to take power into its own hands.''

   This ideological bent would manifest itself, Mr. Kennan predicted, in an ``innate antagonism'' between the Soviet Union and Western world. He said that we should expect secretiveness, a lack of frankness, duplicity, a wary suspiciousness, and the basic unfriendliness of purpose. Mr. Kennan warned us that the Soviet government might sign documents that might indicate a deviation from this ideology, but that we should regard such actions as a ``tactical maneuver permissible in dealing with the enemy (who is without honor) and should be taken in the spirit of caveat emptor''. As we discovered in the decades following, Mr. Kennan was right.

   The Soviet Union did indeed devote itself to exporting its ideology around the world. Its foreign policy was marked by antagonistic rhetoric and provocative actions. It signed arms control agreements and then violated them. The Soviet Union invaded its neighbors, launched proxy wars, and encouraged revolution and instability. It repeatedly proved capable of exploiting weakness and political divisions. And it was successful at taking advantage of geopolitical realities. As a result, Angola, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Cuba, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras, Granada, Vietnam, Korea, Somalia, Yemen, Greece, and Turkey all become Cold War battlegrounds.

   For the most part, the United States followed Mr. Kennan's advice. We strove to contain Soviet expansionist tendencies. We forced back Soviet advances. We were firm. We were patient. And, in 1991, with the fall of the Soviet Union, our patience paid off.

   It is important that we recognize that the Russia of today is nothing like the Soviet Union of yesterday. Under the leadership of President Putin, economic and political reforms are being enacted. Russia is no longer bound by a defunct ideology. The country has stepped away from its past and has worked with sincerity to help resolve many of the challenges facing the international community.

   Russia has also sought to improve its relationship with the Western world. It went eventually along with inclusion of the Baltic states into the NATO Alliance, despite harboring deep concerns. Russia accepted our withdrawal from the Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty. After September 11, Russia assisted the United States in the war against terrorism by sharing intelligence information and raising no objection to the stationing of U.S. troops in the former Soviet states in Central Asia. Once inconceivable, it is now possible to imagine Russia joining the World Trade Organization and even NATO in the near future.

   Another sign of improved relations between the U.S. and Russia is the treaty currently before us. The Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions is much different from arms control treaties agreed to during the Cold War. The text of treaty epitomizes this new relationship. Both parties pledge to:

   Embark upon the path of new relations for a new century and committed the goal of strengthening their relationship through cooperation and friendship.

   Believe that new global challenges and threats require the building of a qualitatively new foundation for strategic relations between the Parties.

   Desire to establish a genuine partnership based on the principles of mutual security, cooperation, trust, openness, and predictability.

   The Joint Declaration by Presidents Bush and Putin that accompanied the treaty further expounds upon this new relationship. Let me read a couple of pertinent sections from that declaration:

   We are achieving a new strategic relationship. The era in which the United States and Russia saw each other as an enemy or strategic threat has ended. We are partners and we will cooperate to advance stability, security, and economic integration, and to jointly global challenges and to help resolve regional conflicts.

   We will respect the essential values of democracy, human rights, free speech and free media,tolerance, the rule of law, and economic opportunity.

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   We recognize that the security, prosperity, and future hopes of our peoples rest on a benign security environment, the advancement of political and economic freedoms, and international cooperation.

   What is most notable about the Moscow Treaty as submitted to this body is the absence of certain provisions that normally marked Cold War era arms control treaties. Those provisions were based on distrust and antagonism. Instead, this treaty utilizes confidence-building measures based on trust and friendship.

   For instance, the treaty does not establish interim warhead reduction goals or provide a detailed schedule for the reductions. The absence of such goals or schedules gives both sides flexibility over the next nine years to reduce their warheads at a pace of their own choosing.

   Another missing element is precise counting rules. The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty of 1991 provided such complex counting rules that it frequently resulted in overcounting and undercounting. Minor disparities in deployed and ``counting'' forces are no longer a significant issue given the confidence building measures included in the treaty and our positive relationship with Russia.

   It should be noted that the Moscow Treaty does continue the START I verification regime, which permits on site inspections and continuous monitoring. The Moscow treaty also creates a new Bilateral Implementation Commission that will be used to any raise concerns that might arise about treaty compliance and transparency. These measures, plus our own technical means, will provide the U.S. government with significant confidence that it can monitor Russia's activities.

   The Moscow Treaty is similar to previous arms control agreements in one significant way: it does not require the dismantlement of warheads. Neither Russia nor the United States sought the dismantlement for two reasons. First, the dismantlement in the past has been considered inherently unverifiable. There is no established process for dismantling warheads that can provide assurance to each party.

   Second, the U.S. intends to keep some warheads in ``ready reserve.'' Such a reserve is essential if we are to retain the capability to respond to changes in the security environment and quickly replace dysfunctional warheads.

   I also think it is instructive to look at the process by which the Moscow Treaty was put together and how different these negotiations were from negotiations that occurred during the cold war. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld remarked on the difference during a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing last July. Here is what he said:

   ..... it's significant that while we consulted closely and engaged in a process that had been open and transparent, we did not engage in lengthy adversarial negotiations in which U.S. and Russia would keep thousands of warheads that we didn't need, as bargaining chips. We did not establish standing negotiating teams in Geneva with armies of arms control aficionados ready to do battle over every colon and every comma....... An illustration of how far we have come is the START treaty....... It is 700 pages long, and it took nine years to negotiate....... The Moscow treaty ..... is three pages long and it took five or six months to negotiate.

   Let's take a few moments to review some of the Moscow treaty's provisions. The treaty requires the reduction of strategic nuclear warheads by each party to a level of 1,700-2,200 by the end of 2012. Each side currently has about 6,000 warheads. This treaty means a reduction of over 8,000 nuclear warheads.

   The treaty allows both parties to restructure their offensive forces as each sees fit, within the prescribed numerical limit. This provision gives each flexibility to meet the deadline and permit each party to determine for itself the composition and structure of its strategic offensive arms.

   The Treaty mandates that the parties will meet at least twice a year as part of a Bilateral Implementations Commission.

   The Treaty allows each party, in exercising national sovereignty, the ability to withdraw from the treaty upon three months written notice.

   As you can see, the treaty is simple, straight-forward, and gives each party maximum flexibility.

   Last summer, the Senate Armed Services Committee held two important hearings on the national security implications of the treaty. Witnesses included: Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Richard Myers; Combatant Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, Admiral James Ellis; and Deputy Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration of the Department of Energy, Dr. Everet H. Beckner. The witnesses at the Committee hearings unanimously supported ratification of the Moscow Treaty. The Chairman of the Joint chiefs, General Myers said,

   The members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and I all support the Moscow Treaty. We believe it provides for the long-term security interests of our nation. We also believe that it preserves our flexibility in an uncretain strategic environment.

   Admiral Ellis added that,

   This treaty allows me, as the Commander of the nation's Strategic Forces, the latitude to structure our strategic forces to better support the national security pillars of assuring our allies, dissuading those who might wish us ill, deterring potential adversaries and, if necessary, defending the nation....... [I]n my judgment, this treaty provides me the ability to prudently meet those national security needs and to provide a range of deterrent options to the Secretary and the President for their consideration should the need arise.......

   I believe it is important to recognize the flexibility that this treaty gives the United States. While the U.S. nuclear stockpile may contain a large number of warheads, we only have six types of warheads, and none of these have been tested in over a decade. The average age of warheads in the U.S. stockpile is approaching 20 years--and some warheads are much older. Despite the improved effectiveness of the stockpile stewardship program, problems in the stockpile do occur. Having the responsive reserve, as envisioned by the administration, enables us to address problems in the stockpile without compromising our national security interests. This treaty is simple, flexible, and makes sense. It is a signal that the hostility of the cold war has been buried and forgotten. It has been 12 years since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and clearly it is time to move one.

   As we consider this treaty, we should also keep the future in mind. I share Secretary Rumsfeld's vision for future negotiations with Russia as he described it at July 26 Armed Services Committee hearing. He said,

   We are working towards the day when the relationship between our two countries is such that no arms control treaties will be necessary. that's how normal countries deal with each other. The United States and Britain both have nuclear weapons, yet we do not spend hundreds of hours negotiating the fine details of mutual reductions in our offensive systems. We do not feel the need to preserve the balance of terror between us. It would be a worthy goal for our relationship with Russia to evolve along that path.

   I could not agree more with the Defense Secretary's vision. Russia and the United States are no longer adversaries and therefore should not treat each other as such.

   I understand that my good friend, Senator JOHN WARNER, Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, has written to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee expressing his strong support for the Moscow treaty. I join him in that support. I believe the Senate should provide its advice and consent to the ratification of the treaty with no further changes or additional conditions to the resolution of ratification.

   Some of my colleagues may offer well-intentioned amendments that might attempt to add reservations, understandings, or declarations. I appreciate their desire to amend the treaty, but I think we should keep in mind that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee unanimously approved this treaty without amendment, and the resolution of ratification before us today has only tow modest conditions. The President has indicated his opposition to any amendment to the resolution. Therefore, I encourage my colleagues to oppose all amendments. I believe it would be best for our nation security interests if this treaty remained unencumbered by items that will complicate the treaty and reduce our flexibility.

   Mr. President, I thank you for the opportunity to share my views on this important treaty. I look forward to a healthy debate on this issue. I yield the floor.

   I suggest the absence of a quorum.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

   The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

   Mr. WYDEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. ALLARD). Without objection, it is so ordered.

   Mr. WYDEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak for up to 15 minutes on the time the Democrats have with respect to the Estrada nomination.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

   Mr. WYDEN. Thank you very much, Mr. President, for your courtesy earlier in the morning.

1E) Moscow Treaty

   Mr. FRIST. Madam President, the treaty we consider today, known officially as the treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on strategic reductions, is truly remarkable in many respects.

   The treaty is, of course, remarkable because it encompasses the most dramatic reductions in strategic nuclear weapons ever envisioned between two nuclear powers. It is also worth noting that not since 1954 have the two parties held such a low number of strategic nuclear weapons as that which will be enforced by the agreed numerical limits of this treaty.

   Many have observed the extraordinary ease by which this treaty was negotiated and compare its three short pages--indeed, it is just three short pages--to the many thousands of pages of documents negotiated between the United States and the Soviet Union during the cold war.

   This last point is, for me, the most significant of all, for as important as the substance of this treaty is, it is the form--the trust between the United States and Russia--that most shines through.

   Perhaps this treaty should be known by the epitaph: ``Cold War RIP,''

   for it is not unreasonable to hope that this treaty represents and indeed reflects the close of a long era of hostility between these two nations.

   In the past few weeks, I and many of my colleagues have had the opportunity to meet with a variety of Russian Government officials who have become regular and welcome visitors in

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   The United States and Russia are entering a new era of relations. Our two nations confront many of the same challenges in today's world, and we have found common cause in responding to the immediate threat of international terrorism. Intelligence sharing and joint action between our two governments has made both of our countries much safer. We seek broader cooperation between our institutions of government, and to that end, I am hopeful the Senate will be able to enter into a deep and longstanding relationship with the upper House of the Russian legislature, the Federation Council. This indeed will build on the excellent work that was initiated and done by my distinguished colleague in the Senate, Senator Lott from Mississippi.

   Finally, we seek to advance the growing economic relationship between our two countries. Toward that end, I will strongly support legislation to permanently remove the Russian Federation from the Jackson-Vanik agreement.

   I thank Senators LUGAR and BIDEN for their fine efforts to bring this treaty to the Senate floor in a timely manner. When this treaty was submitted to the Senate, the administration set the not unreasonable expectation that the resolution of ratification not exceed the treaty in length. The committee has indeed met that goal in providing the Senate with a well-crafted resolution of ratification that nonetheless addresses several key elements of Senate prerogative.

   I congratulate Chairman LUGAR and Senator Biden for their fine work.

   Finally, I trust that all Senators have indeed had time to review the committee report on the treaty. It is my hope those who wish to discuss it will do the managers the courtesy of coming forth to speak. Although amendments are in order, I think it would be a worthy tribute to the work of the Foreign Relations Committee to support this resolution in its current form. I look forward to its approval.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.

   Mr. LUGAR. Madam President, I thank the distinguished majority leader for his thoughtful commendation of the work of our committee. I appreciate especially the strong endorsement he has given to the treaty and to the procedures that have brought us to this day.

   On behalf of the Committee on Foreign Relations, I am honored to bring the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions, better known as the Moscow Treaty, to the floor for Senate consideration and ratification. The treaty was signed on May 24, 2002, and was transmitted by President Bush to the Senate on June 20, 2002. It reduces operational deployed strategic nuclear warheads to a level of between 1,700 and 2,200 by December 31, 2012.

   This is truly a tremendous accomplishment and deserves the full support of the Senate and the Russian Duma. I believe this treaty is an important step toward a safer world.

   The Foreign Relations Committee held four hearings and numerous briefings on the treaty, starting in July of last year, under the chairmanship of Senator JOE BIDEN. I thank Senator Biden and his staff for the timely consideration the treaty received and for the many opportunities provided to members of the committee to hear testimony and to engage in conversation with experts from the administration and from the private sector.

   Moreover, during the last 2 months, Senator Biden has been an indispensable partner in constructing this resolution of ratification. Its provisions reflect our mutual efforts to construct a bipartisan resolution that could be broadly supported by the Senate.

   The resolution, in fact, was approved unanimously by the Foreign Relations Committee. We are hopeful of a very strong vote on the Senate floor.

   During the course of the committee's consideration of the Moscow Treaty, we received testimony from Secretary of State Colin Powell, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Richard Myers. Each expressed a strong desire for an overwhelming vote of approval. In addition to administration witnesses, we heard from the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Ken Adelman; from the former commander in chief of U.S. Strategic Command, GEN Gene Habiger; and our former colleague, Sam Nunn; as well as numerous representatives of think tanks and interest groups.

   In addition to efforts undertaken in the Foreign Relations Committee, Senators LEVIN and WARNER and the Committee on Armed Services conducted two hearings examining the military implications of the treaty and shared analysis of their findings with us. These letters have been made a part of the record and our committee report.

   Furthermore, the Intelligence Committee conducted a thorough review of the treaty's verification procedures through numerous members only and staff briefings. The Committee on Foreign Relations appreciates the expertise of our colleagues on the Intelligence Committee and what they have lent to this process.

   President Bush and President Putin have assigned a high priority to the timely ratification of the Moscow Treaty. Both point to the treaty as evidence that the U.S.-Russian relationship has turned the corner. Areas of disagreement clearly remain, but we are attempting to develop a partnership in the war against terrorism, and both Russians and Americans believe that political and economic cooperation can increase dramatically in the coming decade.

   On May 1, 2001, in a speech at the National Defense University, President Bush called for a new strategic framework to transform our relationship with Russia ``from one based on a nuclear balance of terror to one based on common responsibilities and common interests.''

   Less than 8 months later, President Bush announced his intention to reduce our nuclear levels unilaterally and invited President Putin to implement similar reductions. This was the beginning of a process that led to a treaty signing during the summit in Moscow last year.

   The Moscow Treaty is unlike arms control agreements we have considered in the past. I remember vividly, as do many of our colleagues, visiting the START I and START II treaty negotiations. The United States and the Soviet Union faced off against each other, against conference tables. They met for years. These negotiations produced extensive treaties and verification annexes that described in detail the requirements mandated by the treaties.

   To be sure, the treaty before us today could have been more expansive, rigid, and demanding. The negotiators could have followed the cold war template for arms control negotiations and entered into a multiyear discussion process.

   That procedure did not serve the best interest of either side. Both sides, Americans and Russians, wanted to move quickly to capitalize on the opportunity to sharply reduce strategic weaponry.

   The agreement benefits not only the cause of arms control, but also the broader United States-Russia relationship. In my opinion, President Bush was wise to conclude the treaty quickly in this form rather than enter into a more lengthy and uncertain negotiation process.

   Russian strategic and nuclear forces are declining. Russian leaders have indicated they would prefer warhead levels to be less than 2,200 by 2012. In fact, Moscow pushed for a limit of 1,500 nuclear warheads and settled for a range of 1,700 to 2,200. It would appear that Moscow is reluctant to accept the resource tradeoffs necessary to maintain a larger force. President Putin inherited a force structure that already was moving toward the deep reductions necessary for START II implementation. Faced with continued resource constraints, he decided to limit further spending on strategic forces while seeking a new treaty to limit the United States and Russian forces in a predictable manner.

   In the past, most critics of strategic arms control treaties objected to the constraints these treaties placed on U.S. forces. They often alleged the treaties would expose U.S. security to unnecessary risk. Critics of the Moscow Treaty, however, have made the opposite complaint. They have said the treaty's constraints do not go far enough. Various analysts have suggested the treaty should include a

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   I share some of the concerns expressed by these critics, but the treaty is an important step forward because it maintains the momentum of an arms control process that has been successful.

   The treaty provides a mutual framework for continuing the destruction of offensive nuclear weapons whose purpose was to target the United States of America. It also underscores the importance of the United States-Russia relationship at a time when we are depending on Russian support for the war on terrorism.

   Nevertheless, important questions remain and will be discussed during this debate. What happens to the nuclear warheads taken from dismantled Russian delivery systems? I have confidence in the United States storage procedures and appreciate the flexibility the treaty permits in our strategic systems, but I am concerned with the parallel Russian process. We must work with Russia to make certain that these dangerous weapons do not fall into the wrong hands. However, there are readily available means to address these deficiencies.

   The primary vehicle for cooperation in reducing warheads to levels set by the Moscow Treaty and addressing the threat posed by warhead security is the Nunn-Lugar cooperative threat reduction program. Without Nunn-Lugar, it is unlikely that the benefits of the treaty will be realized.

   During consideration of the treaty, the committee heard testimony from Secretary Powell asserting that increased Nunn-Lugar assistance would serve as a foundation for the cooperation necessary to meet Russian obligations under the treaty and as additional means of verifying that those obligations are met.

   My concerns about treaty implementation are compounded by the impasse we experienced over the Nunn-Lugar certification

   process last year. Each year, our President is required by law to certify that Russia is ``committed to the goals of arms control.'' In 2002, the administration requested a waiver to this condition, pointing out that unresolved concerns in the chemical and biological arenas made this difficult. Meanwhile, existing Nunn-Lugar activities and projects were permitted to continue, but no new projects were initiated and no new contracts were finalized.

   President Bush requested a permanent annual waiver to the Nunn-Lugar legislation so we could continue with important work. But some in Congress preferred just a 1-year waiver or no waiver at all. Without a permanent waiver, the President would be forced to suspend dismantling assistance each year pending congressional action to waive the requirement. This could lead to delays of up to 6 months or more, just as we experienced last year.

   Let me assure my colleagues, this is not a hypothetical situation. It just happened to us. For more than 6 months, submarines on the Kola Peninsula awaited destruction. Regiments of SS-18 missiles loaded with 10 nuclear warheads apiece were left standing in Siberia, and almost 2 million rounds of chemical weapons in relatively transportable shells awaited elimination at Shchuch'ye. But the Nunn-Lugar program was powerless to address these threats because of congressional conditions drafted over a decade ago.

   American dismantlement experts in Russia were forced to wait and watch as these dangerous weapons systems sat in their silos, docks, or warehouses while the conference committee process between the two Houses of Congress dragged on through the summer.

   Without the changing of congressional conditions on the legislation or the granting of a permanent Presidential waiver, the current situation could reoccur in the years ahead. To say the least, this would delay full implementation of the Moscow Treaty far beyond the envisioned 10-year time period; namely, 2012.

   Let me be clear. The Moscow Treaty alone is insufficient to meet our security needs. The treaty is part of the answer, but without cooperative threat reduction, dismantlement, and warhead security projects, the agreement will not reach its potential in a timely manner.

   Critics of the Moscow Treaty suggest this lack of a new verification regime is a weakness that must be rectified. Some have gone so far as to suggest the treaty be shelved until verification is strengthened. But this point of view sees the treaty through a cold war prism when cooperative threat reduction programs did not exist and both sides were trying to maximize strategic nuclear force levels.

   The Bush administration has been forthright in its recognition of the lack of a verification provision in the Moscow Treaty, including statements in the President's letter of transmittal and the testimony of Secretary Powell before the Foreign Relations Committee.

   The administration's views on verification of the treaty are based upon three basic assumptions: First, the United States and Russia have moved beyond cold war tensions, and the United States would have undertaken these reductions of nuclear warheads regardless of Russia's view--unilateral disarmament. Second, the national security interests of the United States are better served through the flexibility of the Moscow Treaty. And third, Russia is unlikely to have the means or the incentives to violate or withdraw from this agreement.

   I believe the level of verification of the Moscow Treaty is sufficient. American verification experts will have the START I treaty verification procedures in place throughout at least 2009. But perhaps more importantly, the Nunn-Lugar program has placed American dismantlement teams and equipment on the ground in Russia now.

   These teams work on a daily basis with their Russian counterparts to safely dismantle weapons systems. For example, at Surovatika, U.S.-provided equipment is routinely dismantling four ICBMs per month. It is hard to imagine a more complete means by which to verify the dismantlement of weapons than the systematic work occurring under cooperative threat reduction at Surovatika.

   Senator BIDEN and I met with President Bush last June to discuss Senate consideration of the treaty, just after the President returned from his visit at the Moscow Summit. We committed to moving the treaty forward in a responsible, bi-partisan, and expeditious manner. The resolution before us today is a product of close cooperation and consultation. I am pleased to report that it enjoys the strong support of the administration.

   The resolution of ratification contains two conditions and six declarations. I would like to describe each of these provisions for the Senate.

   The first condition requires the President to submit to the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees an annual report on the amount of Nunn-Lugar cooperative threat reduction assistance that Russia will need to meet its obligations under the Treaty. As I mentioned earlier, without U.S. assistance, Russia cannot meet the timetable of its obligations under this treaty. Without the Nunn-Lugar program, it is likely the benefits of this treaty will be postponed or never realized.

   The second condition requires the President to report to the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees on important items related to the treaty, including: 1, Strategic force levels; 2, planned offensive reductions; 3, treaty implementation plans; 4, efforts to improve verification and transparency; 5, status of START I treaty verification extension; 6, information regarding the ability of either side to fully implement the treaty; and 7, any efforts proposed to improve the effectiveness of the treaty.

   The report contained in this condition must be submitted within 60 days of the exchange of instruments of ratification of the Treaty and by April 15 of each following year. The extensive nature of this report protects our critical Senate role in oversight of implementation and ensures that this body will remain an integral part of the process throughout the treaty's life.

   The first declaration has been in each resolution of ratification for arms control treaties since the INF Treaty's resolution of ratification in 1988. It is known to colleagues here as the Byrd-Biden Condition. The condition articulates the Constitutional principles on which the common understanding of the terms of a treaty will be based.

   The second declaration encourages the President to continue efforts to

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   The treaty establishes a Bilateral Implementation Commission, as a diplomatic consultative forum to discuss issues related to implementation of the Treaty. The resolution's third declaration calls on the Executive Branch to provide briefings before and after meetings of the commission concerning: 1, issues raised during meetings; 2, any issues the United States is pursuing through other channels; and 3, Presidential determinations with regard to these issues. This provision has been included to ensure that we remain fully aware of the activities of the Bilateral Implementation Commission.

   During the hearings on the treaty, Secretary Powell and Secretary Rumsfeld testified that non-strategic nuclear weapons remain an important issue and expressed a strong interest in working closely with Russia to reduce associated threats. The resolution's fourth declaration is meant to underscore the threat posed by tactical nuclear weapons. It urges the President to work closely with Russia and to provide assistance on the full accounting, safety, and security of the Russian tactical nuclear weapon stockpile.

   In 1991, President George H. W. Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev announced the removal of their deployed nonstrategic nuclear weapons. In Helsinki in 1997, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed to begin talks on these weapons, but negotiations have failed to materialize.

   Secretary Powell has reported that the inclusion of tactical nuclear weapons was not possible in the Moscow Treaty. Thus far, Russia has declined to engage in discussions on the future of non-strategic systems. This declaration is meant to communicate the Senate's concerns about the threats associated with non-strategic weapons. It is our hope that there will be further dialogue and, if possible, greater efforts to secure these systems.

   The fifth declaration encourages the President to accelerate U.S. reductions where feasible and consistent with U.S. national security requirements so that reductions may be achieved prior to December 31, 2012.

   The final declaration has been included in an attempt to address concerns put forward by some Senators regarding the treaty's withdrawal clause in Article IV. This text follows up on Secretary Powell's commitment to consult with the Senate should the President consider the utilization of the withdrawal provision.

   The Foreign Relations Committee asked the Secretary: ``What role will the Congress have in any decision to withdraw from this treaty?''; and ``Will the administration agree to at least consult closely with this committee before making any such decision?'' The Secretary responded that: ``While it is the President who withdraws from treaties, the administration intends to discuss any need to withdraw from the treaty with the Congress, to include the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, prior to announcing any such action.''

   While I am sympathetic to arguments from Senators regarding the need to maintain Senate prerogatives, the process governing termination and withdrawal is a point of Constitutional debate. Although the Constitution assigns a specific role for the Senate in the treaty ratification process, it is silent on the is due of treaty termination. Furthermore, nothing in the Constitution restricts the President from terminating or withdrawing from a treaty on his own authority.

   Presidents have consistently terminated advice and consent treaties on their own authority since 1980. Twenty-three of the thirty treaties terminated during this period were bilateral; seven were multilateral. Prior to 1980, Senator Barry Goldwater challenged Presidents Carter's termination of the Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan. Senator Goldwater's challenge failed and the treaty was terminated. Since that time, objections have been raised only with respect to Presidents Bush's withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.

   The White House Legal Advisor has long argued that the President is the principle spokesman of the nation in foreign affairs and restrictions on the power have been strictly construed.

   Given the absence of a textual basis conferring the termination power on another branch or an established practice derogating from the President's termination power, it is difficult to envisage such a role for the Senate.

   Proponents of a Senatorial role in this process will often respond by suggesting that the President cannot on his own authority terminate a treaty because it is the ``law of the land.'' Again, the White House suggests this is a fallacy. A terminated treaty no longer has effect in much the same way that a provision of a law or treaty found by the courts to be unconstitutional no longer has effect. However, in neither case is the law repealed.

   Historically there is evidence of only one instance in which the Senate sought by a resolution of advice and consent to limit the President's constitutional power to terminate a treaty. The first condition to the 1919 proposed resolution of advice and consent to ratification of the Versailles Treaty would have provided: ``notice of withdrawal by the United States may be given by a concurrent resolution of the Congress of the United States.'' Vice President Thomas Marshall, addressing the Senate before the vote, called the condition an unconstitutional limitation on the President's powers--a view with which a number of leading scholars of the day concurred. However, the resolution failed to receive the required two-thirds vote and the question has remained moot for the better part of a century.

   Beyond the legal issues which underlie this debate, some have expressed concern that Article IV differs from previous arms control agreements in that it only requires three months notice and permits withdrawal based upon issues related to national sovereignty. Critics point out that the START Treaty allows a Party to withdraw, after giving 6 months' notice and only ``if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests.''

   I do not view the withdrawal provisions as a weakness in the treaty. Instead, I believe it is another manifestation of the improved U.S.-Russian relationship. It should also be pointed out that our bilateral relationship provides us with some confidence that the time and reasons for withdrawal would not necessarily relate to the agreement. As the Secretary of State told the Committee: ``The Moscow Treaty's formulation for withdrawal reflects the likelihood that a decision to withdraw would be prompted by causes unrelated either to the Treaty or to our bilateral relationship. We believe this formulation more appropriately reflects our much-improved strategic relationship with Russia.''

   Mr. President, in performing its constitutional responsibilities with respect to treaties and international agreements, the Senate has to reach a judgment as to whether, on balance, U.S. acceptance of the obligations contained in the treaty serves the national interests of the United States.

   The Moscow Treaty is not without blemishes. The Senate should not be surprised that the treaty is not perfect or that it does not cover every desired area of bilateral arms control. But that is not the point. The proper question is whether on balance, the Moscow Treaty serves the national security of our nation.

   For some, no arms control treaty is good enough. Indeed, the very high stakes of the cold war and the fact that arms control cheating by the Soviet Union represented a potential threat to the survival of the United States led to a legitimate focus on treaties with high standards, especially for verification and the ability to detect even minor violations.

   The cold war is over, and treaty requirements must suit U.S. national interests as they exist today. The Moscow Treaty charts a course towards greater security for both the United States and Russia. I urge my colleagues to ratify this treaty and approve the resolution of ratification without amendment.

   I suggest the absence of a quorum.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Hagel). The clerk will call the roll.

   The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

   Mr. BIDEN. I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

   Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I am pleased to join our esteemed chairman, Senator Lugar, in presenting the Senate this resolution giving the Senate's advice and consent to ratification of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions, known in the vernacular as the Moscow Treaty. Let me state flatly at the outset, I urge my colleagues to support the treaty.

   On February 5, as Senator Lugar noted, the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee approved this resolution unanimously. The committee did so, in my view, for two very good reasons.

   First, the Moscow Treaty should be ratified and implemented. It is true that there is much that the Moscow Treaty does not do, which I will discuss at some length. But virtually all of the witnesses at our hearing recommended the ratification of the treaty because its implementation would be a step toward a more secure world. Reducing each nation's deployed strategic warheads from approximately 6,000 to between 1,700 and 2,200, in my view, will move us further away from the cold war era and may--I emphasize may--and I hope promote a United States-Russian relationship based upon mutual cooperation.

   Second, in my view, while the resolution does not include everything we may want, it does address many of our concerns. It requires significant annual reporting by the executive branch on implementation of the treaty so that the Senate can oversee and support that implementation. These are important gains from an administration that first opposed any treaty at all and then pressed for a clean resolution of ratification. The administration has agreed to support and implement this resolution before the Senate. I think the country will benefit from that.

   But there is much the Moscow Treaty does not do. So in the spirit of not engaging in false advertisement, I think we should speak about that a little bit. It is very unusual, at least in my 30 years as a Senator working on many arms control agreements from the Senate perspective, that an arms control agreement by any standard be put forward the way in which this one has.

   In our hearings, the Secretary of Defense proudly compared the three pages of this treaty to the roughly 300 pages of the START treaty signed by the first President Bush. But that is just the beginning. Traditional arms control agreements usually involve the negotiated level of arms to which the parties will be held. They usually require the destruction of some weapons. Often they specify milestones that must be achieved in reducing those arms and bar withdrawal from the treaty unless there is a good reason to withdraw and the President gives or the other side gives 6 months notice.

   For decades, there has been emphasis on verifying that each party is complying with its obligations. We remember the famous phrase uttered by former President Reagan: Trust but verify.

   In addition, the United States worked to ban MIRV ICBMs in the START II treaty. I know the Presiding Officer knows, but for those who may be listening, the MIRV'd ICBM is a single missile, a single rocket upon which multiple nuclear warheads sit and when the rocket goes off and the head of the missile comes off, it contains more than one nuclear warhead, and you can independently target each of those nuclear warheads, in the vernacular.

   So we have thought for years and years, these are the most destabilizing weapons that existed, and we worked very hard, and the first President Bush worked very hard, to eliminate either side being able to possess these multiple warhead missiles with independently targeted warheads. It was contained in the START II treaty.

   We were hoping in START III to control tactical nuclear weapons. They are the weapons that are shorter range and are used at shorter distances, referred to as tactical nuclear weapons. We had hoped to have a de-alerting of weapons slated for later elimination.

   That is, the purpose we initially started off with was: Look, if we are agreeing we are going to get rid of these weapons, while we are going through the process of destroying them or taking them out of the silos or out of the bellies of submarines or out of the bellies of bombers, what we will do is we will de-alert them. That is, we will pull the plug. They will sit there, but they will not be aimed at anybody. They will not be on alert.

   So for the longest time our objective, for stability reasons and for security reasons, was to get rid of multiple warheads, to make sure we move to include tactical nuclear weapons which are destabilizing so we begin to reduce them and, third, to say while we are getting ready to destroy these weapons, or take them out of the inventory, we will de-alert them. That is, not keep them on a hair trigger.

   None of these objectives was achieved, or for that matter attempted, in the Moscow Treaty we are about to ratify--I hope ratify.

   For starters, the United States unilaterally set this treaty's arms control levels before any negotiation. Indeed, the administration saw no particular reason for this treaty in the first place. Initially they said they would not do it as a treaty.

   According to the Secretary of State:

   We concluded before the Moscow Treaty was negotiated that we could and would safely reduce to 1,700 to 2,200 operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads, regardless of what the Russians did.

   Secretary Powell reports that President Bush then told President Putin:

   This is where we are going. We are going there unilaterally. Come with us or not, stay where you are or not.

   In short, the Moscow Treaty does not codify an agreement. Rather, it codifies two unilateral decisions to reduce strategic forces. That is not a bad thing, but it is not such a significant thing.

   Another way in which the Moscow Treaty differs from previous arms control agreements is that it does not require the elimination of any missiles, any bombers, any submarines, or any warheads. As a result, each party is free to stockpile its officially reduced weapons.

   We used to fight with our conservative friends on this floor who said we could not support such-and-such arms control treaty proffered from President Nixon through to President Ford and President Reagan and President Bush--we could not do it unless we were certain that the missile was destroyed, the warhead was destroyed, the submarine was destroyed. We used to hear what is going to happen is they are going to take these missiles and they are going to hide them in barns and they are going to hide them in the woods and they are going to hide them in camouflaged areas.

   Let's be clear what this treaty does. It says you have to get down to 1,700 to 2,200 of these within the next 10 years or so, but all you have to do is take them out of commission. You don't have to destroy them. You can stockpile them. You can put them in a warehouse. You can pile them up in a barn for ready reload. You can take them back out. You don't have to destroy anything. That is in fact what the United States plans to do with many of its reduced weapons. They are reduced, not destroyed.

   Trident submarines that are taken off nuclear patrol will be converted to other purposes--and could presumably be reconverted to carry strategic nuclear weapons, although at some cost.

   Bombers will also be converted; actually, their re-conversion to strategic nuclear uses might be rather difficult.

   According to recent press stories, the United States might use ICBMs to deliver conventional payloads. That would leave the missiles still available for use with nuclear warheads instead.

   And the administration says that about three-quarters of the reductions may be made simply by ``downloading''--that means by removing bombs and warheads from bombers and missiles, while leaving the delivery vehicles in service.

   What happens to those ``downloaded'' warheads? Of the thousands of warheads that will be ``reduced'' by the United States, many--perhaps almost all--would be retained in some form of reserve status, available to be returned

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   The Secretary of State did not indicate that some warheads would be dismantled. But the administration has yet to earmark a single type of warhead for dismantlement.

   For years, now, the Air Force has been prepared to give up the W-62 warheads on its Minuteman Three missiles.

   They will be replaced by the W-87 warheads that are removed from the Peacekeeper missile, which is to be retired. But the Defense Department seems incapable of letting go of the old warheads.

   I will move on. The Secretary of State did indicate, though, that some warheads would be dismantled, but the administration is yet to earmark a single type of warhead that we are going to dismantle. My support for ratification of this treaty is based in part on the administration's assurances for the record that ``some warheads are to be removed and will be destroyed or dismantled.''

   Since the statement was made, however, there has been no action by the executive branch to turn this into a reality. I expect the administration to live up to Secretary Powell's commitment. If it should fail to do so, this would endanger the process by which the Senate gives advice and consent to the ratification of not only this treaty but every treaty in the future.

   An equal concern for me is the question of what the Russians will do with its reduced weapons. If it follows the lead of the United States, it will try to retain as many missiles and bombers as possible, and it will stockpile its downloaded nuclear weapons rather than dismantling them and disposing of the excess fissile material.

   Under this treaty, Russia can do whatever it wants with its so-called reduced weapons. But we have a stake in Russia's decision on this. That is because of the risk that Russia will not adequately protect the weapons and nuclear materials it has stockpiled.

   It is one thing for us to decommission, reduce our nuclear weapon and stockpile it. We have exceedingly tight security on such material.

   The Russians have incredibly, incredibly insecure facilities because they lack the money to be able to maintain these secure facilities. I worry that if Russia does not destroy them, that they will find themselves--and we will find ourselves--susceptible to the clandestine sale or the actual stealing of these materials, and they will fall into the hands of people who do not have our interests at heart.

   The only threat to our very existence is the accidental launch of Russian missiles, and that is why I still worry about the MIRV'd ICBMs. But perhaps the worst other threat to America is that some Russian nuclear weapons, or material with which they make them, could be stolen or diverted to rogue states or terrorist groups. The more weapons Russia stockpiles, the greater the risk not all of them will be properly safeguarded.

   To combat that danger, our chairman cofounded the Nunn-Lugar program to assist the Soviet Union--and now its successor states--in meeting their arms control obligations.

   Related programs in the Energy Department and the State Department help Russia to safeguard its sensitive materials, and to find civilian careers for its thousands of weapons scientists.

   These programs will have a major role to play in the years to come. With Nunn-Lugar, we can enable Russia to destroy its old delivery vehicles rather than mothballing them. Russian officials have already decided they want to move in that direction.

   Let me put something in focus, by the way. The entire budget for Russia for this fiscal year is roughly $40 billion. The entire Russian military budget is $9 billion.

   My neighboring States of Pennsylvania and New Jersey have budgets bigger than all of Russia. I suspect if you added up all their law enforcement and prison-related budgets, it probably exceeds the entire defense budget of Russia.

   Our defense budget, and I make no apologies for it, is between $350 and $400 billion. So I want us to keep this in focus. The ability of Russia to maintain and/or take the money to destroy this fissile material and mothball nuclear capacity is very limited, increasing the need for Nunn-Lugar, the threat reduction money, to be spent on American scientists with American contractors to go to Russia to destroy these weapons for them because they do not have the money to do it.

   U.S. assistance can also help Russia to secure and dispose of its excess fissile material. That is the stuff that makes nuclear explosions. That is the stuff that is the product from which chain reactions, nuclear chain reactions start.

   That is an urgent and continuing task, with or without this treaty.

   I think the administration understands this. The Secretary of State has laid it out:

   U.S. assistance helps to improve the security of Russia's nuclear weapons by improving their physical protection (fencing, sensors, communications); accounting (improved hardware and software); personnel reliability (better screening); and guard force capabilities (more realistic training).

   These improvements are particularly important because Russia faces a difficult threat environment--political instability, terrorist threats, and insider threats resulting from financial conditions in Russia.

   Translated: The Russian Mafia; translated: Departments seeking money to keep their folks employed doing things that are not in the interest of Russia, and clearly not in the interest of the United States.

   The Secretary of State also assured the Committee that:

   . . . we intend to continue to work with Russia, under the Cooperative Threat Reduction, CTR program, when and to the extent permitted by law, to make its warhead storage facilities more secure.

   Such U.S. assistance will also increase the security of the Russian warheads made excess as provided in the Moscow Treaty.

   The Secretary of State continued:

   If requested by the Russian Federation, and subject to the laws related to CRT certification, the Administration would be prepared to provide additional assistance for removing, transporting, storing, and securing nuclear warheads, disassembling warheads and storing fissile material, dismantling surplus strategic missiles, and disposing of associated launchers.

   I am pleased that the administration accepts the need to use Nunn-Lugar and related programs in implementing this treaty, and that the 2004 budget request has a 9-percent increase for Nunn-Lugar.

   That increase is probably spoken for, however, by the cost of building--belatedly--a chemical weapons destruction facility at Shchuch'ye. So I wonder, at least, whether enough fund are budgeted for Nunn-Lugar; I hope they are but I don't think they are.

   And I hope that the President will prevail upon his own party in the House to give him more than temporary authority to waive certification requirements for these programs.

   Nunn-Lugar efforts cannot achieve their maximum effectiveness if every year or so the funds dry up for months at a time, while waiting for Congress to permit another presidential waiver.

   The laissez-faire nature of the Moscow Treaty is also evident in the timing of its reduction requirement.

   This is very unusual. Under Article I of the Treaty, the reductions must occur ``by December 31, 2012.'' Until that date, there is no reduction requirement. Indeed, until that date, there is nothing barring each party from increasing its force levels.

   A party could even have more weapons than it has today, so long as it does not exceed START Treaty levels before that treaty expires in 2009. I don't expect that, of course, but there is nothing to prohibit it.

   And what happens on December 31, 2012. The treaty expires.

   If a party fails to achieve the reductions required by this treaty, the other party will have little recourse. The treaty codifies legally binding promises, but provides no way to make the Parties live up to them.

   This is a very unusual treaty.

   Most curious of all, perhaps, is the withdrawal provision in Article IV of the treaty. You might think that, with no obligations until the very last day of this treaty's existence, there would be little reason ever to withdraw from it. That is certainly what I think.

   Just in case, however, the treaty has what is probably the most liberal withdrawal clause in any arms control treaty. A party can withdraw with only 3 months' notice.

   There is no need for withdrawal to be due to ``extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this treaty [that]

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   Indeed, there is no requirement in this treaty to state any reason for withdrawal.

   I hope the administration is correct in its view that we no longer need verification. The Secretary of State said, ``in the context of this new relationship, a treaty with a verification regime under the Cold War paradigm was neither required nor appropriate.''

   It may be that we need not care what Russia does. That might explain why the Moscow Treaty leaves it to each party to decide what weapons it is reducing and how it will do that, and sets no benchmarks for measuring progress between now and December 31, 2012.

   To this day, the Russian Federation has yet to say how it defines the term ``strategic nuclear warheads,'' or how its reductions will be made.

   We can only hope that his laissez-faire approach to arms control obligations will not lead to misunderstandings down the road. With no agreed definitions and no benchmarks, I respectfully suggest that there is lots of room for quarrels over whether a party will really be in compliance by December 31, 2012.

   Perhaps voluntary transparency by each party will assure the other that arms reductions are proceeding properly.

   I applaud the decision to establish a transparency committee under the U.S.-Russia Consultative Group on Strategic Security.

   But I am not reassured by the Secretary of State's statement that ``specific additional transparency measures are not needed, and will not be sought, at this time.''

   It may be that continuing U.S. assistance to Russia under the Nunn-Lugar program and other assistance programs will give us such visibility into Russian forces that we will have no need of verification.

   But if we are to rely on that window, then--as I noted earlier--President Bush ought to persuade House Republicans to let him waive the certification requirements that periodically stall the funding of our programs for months at a time

   because if there is no verification and no ability through the threat reduction program to look inside what Russia is doing, then we are operating in the blind.

   When the President requested that authority to waive provisions allowing him to move forward with Nunn-Lugar, it was people in his own party in the House who refused to make that authority permanent.

   Previous Presidents gave special attention to the need to do away with MIRVed ICBMs. The first President Bush achieved that in the START II Treaty.

   But Russia refused to let that treaty enter into force unless we continued to adhere to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. When the current President Bush pulled us out of the ABM Treaty, START II died.

   Why worry about MIRVed ICBMs? A MIRVed missile has multiple warheads. It's cheaper to put several warheads on a single missile than it is to build, house and launch several missiles.

   But if I put 6 or 10 warheads on a missile, and you can take that missile out with only 1 or 2 warheads by attacking first, then my military planners are going to be nervous.

   And that is precisely what can happen if my missile is an ICBM in a fixed silo. It may be powerful, but it is also a sitting duck.

   So my military planners are going to say to me: We need to be able to fire our missiles before the attacking missiles land on them. The nuclear theologians call this: ``Use 'em or lose 'em.'' Put another way, if Russia has MIRV'd ICBMs sitting in silos, and we get to a point--hopefully, that will never happen--in the next year, decade or two decades, and they know that one of our warheads can take out that multiple warhead ICBM they have on the ground, their military planners are going to say: You better strike first with that missile because if you don't, it will be taken out. And we are going to sit here and say: We know that is what their military planners are going to do, so we better take that missile out first.

   That is called destabilizing. That does not lend security or a sense of security. That is why the first President Bush, and every other President before him, said it was important, of any missile you get rid of, to do away with MIRVed warheads because they were destabilizing, they were on a hair trigger.

   This ``use 'em or lose 'em'' strategy is still in play. I will use radars and satellites to tell when somebody is attacking me. My command and control system will allow me to order a launch of my nuclear-tipped missiles within 10 minutes because that is all the time I will have between the warning of a possible attack and when the warheads will start falling on my MIRVed missiles.

   Now, if I am the United States, that works. But if I am Russia, my missile warning network is made of Swiss cheese. Some of my satellites do not even work if I am Russia. I lost some radars when the Soviet Union broke up. And worse yet, my rocket force troops are so poorly paid, so ill-housed, that sometimes they even go berserk and shoot each other. This is not a joke. They really do. So there are risks in basing our deterrent force on MIRVed ICBMs. And if Russia's nuclear-tipped missiles are ever launched in error, we in the United States are the ones most likely to suffer.

   But the administration is confident that none of this will happen. The Secretary of State told the Foreign Relations Committee:

   We cannot conceive of any credible scenario in which we would threaten to launch our strategic forces at Russia. The scenario ..... of Russia believing it faced a ``use it or lose it'' situation with its force of MIRVed ICBMs is therefore not a credible concern.

   As a former press secretary of mine used to say--Evelyn Lieberman--``My lips to God's ears.'' Hopefully, that is true.

   As a result, President Bush felt at liberty to tell President Putin:

   [Y]ou can do whatever you think you have to do for your security. You can MIRV your missiles, you can keep more, you can go lower. Do what you think you need.

   I sincerely hope the relationship between the United States and Russia has truly been transformed and that, as President Bush wrote in his letter of transmittal, ``Russia is not an enemy, Russia is a friend''--a friend, I might add, that is not with us right now on the Security Council and not with us with regard to Iraq, but that is a parenthetical note.

   Most of all, I hope that Russia feels the same way. If President Putin fears a U.S. attack, then it won't matter what President Bush has as his intent.

   If the Russian military fears a U.S. attack, their missiles may stay on a ``hair trigger'' alert even if President Putin does not share their fears.

   In short, the Moscow Treaty is a treaty that is long on flexibility accorded to each party and short on provisions intended to ensure compliance. That emphasis on military flexibility is the hallmark of this administration. It is an understandable response to dangerous times, but I think it is also a vision that ignores many of the political risks.

   This administration has also promoted a nuclear weapons policy that speaks of the use of new ``bunker-buster'' weapons against deeply buried targets, treating nuclear weapons as a handy tool just as any other weapon, and thus lowering the threshold for nuclear war.

   This administration also speaks of possible new nuclear weapons tests. This administration speaks of the possible use of nuclear weapons against states that neither have such weapons nor are allied with states that have them, contradicting previous American statements that we made in order to maintain other countries' support for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

   This administration has indicated possible preemptive attacks, perhaps with nuclear weapons, on states that we fear are preparing to do us harm--again, perhaps even if those states do not have nuclear weapons.

   I do not doubt that if we went through this list, issue by issue, we would find that the administration has understandable reasons for its actions. But in foreign affairs, understandable reasons are not enough. We need a sensible strategy. We need statecraft that offers what Thomas Jefferson called ``a decent respect to the opinions of mankind.''

   In that respect, we risk alienating ourselves from those who could be of

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   The fact is, we cannot take these unilateral positions irrespective, in my view, of world public opinion and then not expect to pay for it down the road somewhere. I would respectfully suggest, parenthetically, I think we are paying for some of that right now in the United Nations Security Council.

   This fixation with military power extends to the Moscow Treaty as well. How should we handle a treaty that calls for significant force reductions but also allows each party to keep its powder dry?

   Retired Senator Sam Nunn, former chairman of the Armed Services Committee, has a good term for the Moscow Treaty. He calls it, not ``the Moscow Treaty,'' but the ``good-faith treaty.'' Senator Nunn adds:

   It expresses--and relies upon--good faith in our common interests and the common vision of our leaders.

   I think it is a pretty good way to characterize this treaty.

   But when he testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Sam Nunn added a very important point about the treaty. He said:

   If it is not followed with other substantive actions, it will become irrelevant at best--counterproductive at worst.

   Let me read that again. He said: ``If it is not followed with other substantive actions''--he means actions in terms of arms control and verification, and the like--``it will become irrelevant at best--counterproductive at worst.'' I share his view.

   I support the Moscow Treaty because, on balance, it enhances our national interests. Put another way: To reject this treaty, in my view, would harm our national interest and, as I said at the outset, the relationship between the United States and Russia.

   The arms reductions in it do not go far enough, in my view, but they are better than nothing. There is no verification provisions, but good faith, information from START verification activities, and Nunn-Lugar may be a good substitute for verification.

   There is a risk that the Russians will rely upon MIRVed ICBMs that raise the threat of an accidental war, but there is also a chance that Russia will destroy those missiles as fast as they can pay for their destruction.

   The flexibility built into this treaty could undermine each party's commitment to reductions and its confidence that the other side will achieve them,

   but the Bush-Putin relationship, which is now being somewhat strained on North Korea and on Iraq, could lead to new patterns of cooperation that make further formal agreements unnecessary.

   May all the good outcomes come to pass, but they require a leap of faith. In the meantime, however, I worked with Chairman Lugar to draft a resolution of ratification that keeps Senator Nunn's admonition in mind. We must build on this treaty in order to ensure its success.

   The resolution before us strengthens congressional oversight of the Moscow Treaty implementation and highlights some of the areas on which the administration should build on the treaty to secure a safer world for ourselves and future generations. The resolution includes two conditions and six declarations. Let me briefly go through them.

   Condition (1) requires an annual report to the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees on how U.S. cooperative threat reduction and nonproliferation assistance to Russia can best contribute to enabling Russia to implement its side of the bargain. Reports subsequent to the initial report will be due on February 15 so that the Senate can take them into account as it considers the budget for programs for which the administration is calling. This is vital because U.S. assistance can bring about the weapons dismantlement the Moscow Treaty fails to achieve.

   Condition (2) requires an annual report to the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committee on U.S. and Russian strategic force levels; each party's planned reductions for the current year; each party's plans for achieving the full reductions by December 31, 2012. Further, it requires reporting on any measure, including verification or transparency measures, taken or proposed by a party to assure each party that the other will achieve its reductions by December 31, 2012.

   Condition (2) also requires information relevant to the treaty learned through START verification, and the status of consideration of extending the START verification regime beyond December 2009 when the START treaty is scheduled to expire; anything calling into question either party's intention or ability to achieve the full Moscow Treaty reductions by December 31, 2012; and any action taken or proposed by the parties to address such concerns. This report will provide a strong foundation for Senate oversight of the treaty's implementation.

   The first declaration in the treaty reaffirms the Biden-Byrd condition on the authoritative nature of executive branch representations to the Senate and its committees during the ratification process insofar as they are directed to the meaning and legal effect of the treaty.

   In other words, it says the President--this President or a future Democrat or Republican President--cannot reinterpret the treaty, cannot give it a meaning different than was suggested to us as what it meant.

   There is a second declaration. It encourages the President to continue strategic offensive reductions beyond those mandated by this treaty to the lowest possible levels consistent with national security requirements and alliance obligations of the United States. Declarations, I might note, for the Presiding Officer, who knows this well, are nonbinding. But this one makes clear that the Moscow Treaty should not be the end of arms control.

   President Bush also issued a joint declaration on May 24, 2002, with Russian President Putin that declared ``their intention to carry out strategic offensive reductions to the

   lowest possible levels consistent with our national security requirements and alliance obligations and reflecting the new nature of their strategic reductions.''

   The joint declaration went on to call the Moscow Treaty a major step in this direction--not the final step, only a major one. The clear implication is that further reductions may follow. This declaration gives the arms reduction process the Senate's blessing, just as we did when considering ratification of START and the START II treaties.

   The third declaration states the Senate's expectation that the executive branch will offer to brief the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees on issues raised in the bilateral implementation commission, which is part of this treaty, on Moscow Treaty issues raised in other channels, and on any Presidential determination regarding such issues.

   Given the lack of verification or transparency provisions in the Moscow Treaty, the bilateral implementation committee established by article III of the treaty may play a major role in assuring that each party knows what the other party is doing and retains confidence that the reductions required by article I will be completed on time--a very important point, on time. Remember, there are no drop-dead dates here.

   The fourth declaration urges the President to engage Russia with the objective of, one, establishing cooperative measures regarding the accounting and security of nonstrategic--that is, or tactical--nuclear weapons, and two, providing U.S. and other international assistance to help Russia improve its accounting and security of these weapons. The first meeting of the U.S.-Russian Consultative Group on Strategic Security established a committee to examine these issues. The administration witnesses listed this as a top priority. This declaration, in my view, adds the Senate's encouragement to pursue the issue of tactical nuclear weapons. It does not call for bilateral agreement on reductions of those weapons because several outside witnesses said no Russian agreement to such reductions was likely.

   The fifth declaration before us encourages the President to accelerate U.S. force reductions where feasible and consistent with U.S. national security and alliance obligations. The Treaty's intended reductions may be achieved prior to December 2012. To me, the wisdom of faster reductions is clear. It will reassure the world of our commitment to reduced nuclear forces to a reasonable level as speedily as we can. They will also ease any possible

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   The Congressional Budget Office report on the treaty cites specific concerns in that regard. But those concerns relate to an effort to complete all reductions by the year 2007.

   I believe in the years after 2007, when the transfer of Peacekeeper warheads to the Minuteman III missile will have been completed, faster reductions will be much more feasible.

   There is declaration 6. It urges the President to consult with the Senate prior to actions relevant to article IV, paragraph 2, which relate to extending or superseding a treaty, or paragraph 3, which relate to withdrawal from the treaty. This declaration builds on the statement of the Secretary of State that ``the administration intends to discuss any need to withdraw from the treaty with the Congress, to include the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, prior to announcing any such action.''

   The Secretary's statement could mean only that the administration would discuss with the Senate the need to withdraw when the decision has already been made. This declaration we have in the resolution goes further,

   by urging the President to consult with the Senate. One may discuss after the decision has been made, but one can only consult before a decision has been taken. The latter is what the Senate expects if this treaty is passed, and this expectation extends beyond the withdrawal issue to cover actions relevant to extending or superseding the treaty. It is vital that the executive branch consult with us when it is considering changes in a treaty. That way, Senators can raise any concern before decisions are made that might jeopardize the chances of securing our advice and consent to ratification.

   The resolution of ratification before us was recommended unanimously by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. I believe it will make a real contribution to the success of this treaty, and I urge all of my colleagues to support it.

   To be sure, the resolution does not address every issue we could raise. It clearly does not speak to every declaration that I think should be included in this treaty, but neither is it the only venue in which to raise those issues. For example, consider what the Foreign Relations Committee's report of the treaty says about the proposal by GEN Eugene Habiger, former commander of U.S. Strategic Command:

   Members of the committee ..... share General Habiger's view that options for reducing alert status should be evaluated by those with significant expertise on the specific weapons systems in question. If the President does not order preparation for such analyses, Congress could require the analyses or establish a commission of weapons systems experts to undertake this task. Such commissions have been created before, some under the auspices of the National Academy of Sciences, and have proven useful in considering issues of such a technical nature.

   Senator Lugar and I do not think this resolution of ratification is a proper vehicle through which to establish such a commission, but unless something has changed, which I know it has not, we will continue to pursue this proposal in a venue other than this treaty.

   The committee's report also addresses two other issues we were unable to incorporate in the resolution of ratification. On verification and transparency, our report says:

   The committee believes that the absence of verification provisions in the Moscow Treaty makes confidence and transparency a high priority issue....... The United States should not only practice transparency, but also promote it, in close coordination with the Russian Federation.

   Our report goes on to say:

   The committee urges the President to use implementation of the Moscow Treaty as a means to foster ..... mutual confidence in the national security field.

   The report also calls attention to the Congressional Budget Office's estimate that further drawdowns in strategic delivery vehicles after 2007 could save some $5 billion.

   Our report adds:

   The committee recommends that the President give particular attention, as the Moscow Treaty implementation proceeds, to the possibility that modest further reductions in strategic delivery systems after 2007 could lead to significant cost savings without endangering the national security.

   The Armed Services Committee and the Foreign Relations Committee can pursue both of these issues as they oversee the implementation of the treaty in the coming years, and I am committed to doing so, and I believe the chairman is as well.

   Some of my colleagues are concerned about still other issues. Several amendments may be proposed today. Some of them are amendments I would like to support, but I will not support any additional amendments because I think it is fair to say, speaking for myself, but I think it reflects the view of the chairman--he may have already mentioned it--we believe that in order to get the cooperation we had to add the total of eight declarations or conditions to this treaty, we would, in fact, oppose other amendments, some positive, some, in my view, very negative. So it will be my dubious distinction of possibly voting against some amendments that I think are useful because I think if that were to happen and we started to load this up, we might very well lose this treaty. I think it is very important.

   It is a mild exaggeration to suggest, but not very far off, that my view is that the value of the treaty is exceeded only by the danger of failing to ratify this treaty, and there is a danger, in my view, of failing to ratify this treaty. This is not a treaty, were I in charge of negotiation--as my Grandfather Finnegan used to say, this is not the whole of it--this is not all of what I would like to have seen in this treaty. I sincerely hope this further changes the atmosphere in the positive direction it has been changing, that this administration and the Russian administration will conclude we should be dealing with MIRV missiles, we should be dealing with tactical nuclear weapons, and we should be dealing with other genuine mutual concerns that we have. I am confident if we reject this treaty, if we bog it down and it does not get the necessary supermajority required, then it will make those possibilities impossible in the near term.

   So in each case, as these amendments are put forward, if they are, I will be guided also by the need to maintain administration support and Senate consensus regarding the resolution of ratification as a whole.

   I say to my Democratic colleagues on my side of the aisle, I do not presume to speak for them all. Generally, I do not think it is appropriate for the chairman or a ranking member to commit his or her party to a single position that that chairman or, in this case, the ranking member takes.

   I respect my colleagues who may come forward with amendments, but I hope they understand my rationale and why I will not be supporting those amendments, even the good ones, because there is no amendment I can see that is so significant that it would cure all the defects or all the things this treaty fails to address. The risk I am concerned about is bogging this treaty down.

   It is a good resolution, I say to the Presiding Officer, who knows that as well as or better than anyone present--he is one of the most informed people in this body on foreign relations and arms control issues. I think it will be implemented. The reporting it requires, I think, will enable us to do our constitutional duty of watching over the treaty in the coming years.

   Let's pass it and then work together to make it a success and work together to take the next steps we have to take.

   I would note to my chairman that there may be a resolution unrelated to any amendment to this treaty calling for the Senate to go on record in a much more forceful way to support a comprehensive non-proliferation strategy and Nunn-Lugar cooperative threat reduction efforts. As I said in the chairman's absence, without verification, there are only two things that give me real solace, and they are the insight we get from the Nunn-Lugar initiatives and cooperative threat reduction, as well as the remaining verification process that exists within the START treaty which will expire three years before this treaty expires.

   But it will not, I assure my colleague, be as an amendment. It will not be as a declaration which we cannot amend. It will not be as a condition to this treaty.

   I thank my colleagues for their indulgence. I do not plan on speaking on

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   I thank the Chair and yield the floor.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Vermont.

   Mr. JEFFORDS. Mr. President, I commend the chairman and ranking member for the work they have done. I can only agree wholeheartedly with the ranking member's comments about the problems this treaty has, although I also intend to vote for it.

   I came to the Senate in 1989. At that time, Vermont was a leader in the effort to reduce nuclear weapons. I, therefore, became very interested in what we could do to reduce the threat of nuclear war.

   In November 1990, I traveled with seven Members of Parliament from the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union. We went to the capital of each of our countries. We worked as hard as we could to raise awareness of the dangers of nuclear war and discuss what could be done to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

   In England, we spoke with people who were involved with nuclear issues. We had a very memorable time with the Speaker of the House of Lords and also the House of Commons and gained insight into the British perspective on these issues.

   We then traveled to Moscow on the evening Soviet President Gorbachev gave his annual economic speech. We were amazed when, following the speech, he spent a great deal of time with us discussing the nuclear issue. He stated that the Soviet Union would certainly welcome a prohibition on nuclear testing. At the end of that meeting, there was one light moment. I brought him a pint of maple syrup. I offered it to him and said that if he were to give a teaspoonful of this to someone, why, they would immediately seek peace. He responded: Do you have a liter? I said: No, but I will get you one. It was an interesting time.

   We flew from there to Washington and met with National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft.

   This is an issue I have followed for many years. I agree with my predecessor, the ranking member, that this treaty is far from perfect. We are engaged in a global struggle to confront the terrorist threat and to curtail the dangers posed by the prospect of nuclear materials in the hands of so-called rogue nations.

   While I will vote for this treaty, I cannot help but feel that the Moscow Treaty represents a tragic waste of opportunity. Instead of capitalizing on the Russian desire to reach agreement on deep cuts in nuclear warheads and instead of seeking destruction of warheads to ensure that Russian nuclear materials never fall into the hands of America's enemies, the Bush administration's distaste for arms control agreements--indeed, for any sort of internationally binding agreement--has prevented it from seizing the opportunity to make the American people more secure.

   There is nothing inherently wrong with the Moscow Treaty. It requires the United States and Russia to reduce their operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons to between 1,700 to 2,200 warheads.

   In a small way, it will make the United States, Russia, and the world a safer place--a very small way. It also is consistent with the previous administration's recommendations in the 1994 Nuclear Posture Review.

   The shame of the Moscow Treaty is not in what it does, but in what it does not do. The treaty represents a lost opportunity. The Bush administration's scorn for arms control blinded it to a golden opportunity presented by negotiation of the Moscow Treaty to address bigger nonproliferation and counterterrorism concerns of the United States.

   The Bush administration came into this negotiation only reluctantly. It repeatedly declared its opposition to the negotiation of a legally binding treaty text, asserting that less formal agreements or statements would suffice.

   Press reports are replete with examples of conflict between the Pentagon, which opposed any limitations on its offensive nuclear weapons and wanted the flexibility to increase nuclear forces, and the State Department, which supported the negotiation of a legally binding agreement.

   In the end, the State Department got its legally binding agreement, and the Pentagon got an agreement that is notable not only for its brevity, but also for its lack of lasting impact.

   While the treaty calls for each side to ``reduce and limit'' its strategic nuclear warheads to within the 1,700 to 2,200 range, the United States made clear early in the negotiation that it would interpret this phrase to apply only to ``operationally deployed'' warheads. In other words, there is no obligation to destroy even a single warhead under the Moscow Treaty.

   Warheads can be removed from their delivery vehicles and stored close by and still count as a ``reduction'' under the treaty. The United States has made clear that it plans to dismantle some warheads, put some in deep storage, and store others as spares.

   The absence of any obligation to destroy warheads leads to one of the treaty's most striking anomalies. The deadline for the reduction of operationally deployed warheads to within the 1,700 to 2,200 range is December 31, 2012. Unless otherwise agreed, the treaty expires the very same day. So the reduction in operationally deployed warheads, which are the only reductions in strategic nuclear weapons required by the treaty, lasts for only 1 day.

   On January 1, 2013, each party will be free from Moscow Treaty constraints on deployment of its strategic nuclear warheads. Moreover, if either the United States or Russia decides at any time in the interim that it wants to redeploy its warheads, it need only provide 90 days notice of withdrawal, and it will be free to do so.

   On May 13, 2002, the President stated that he was ``pleased to announce that the United States and Russia have agreed to a treaty which will substantially reduce our nuclear arsenals to the agreed-upon range of 1,700 to 2,200 warheads. This treaty will liquidate the legacy of the cold war.''

   This statement provides one more example of the President's rhetoric not matching reality. The treaty does not reduce our nuclear warhead arsenals to the range of the 1,700 to 2,200 warheads. Far from it. The White House refused to agree to such reductions. The treaty merely removes warheads from operational deployment. There is no reduction in nuclear arsenals. The legacy of the cold war lives on. It just sits a short distance from our missiles, bombers, and submarines rather than in a deployed posture.

   Faced with the opportunity to lock in reductions of Russian strategic nuclear warheads, the President let ideology get in the way of meaningful agreement. Despite well-publicized concerns over Russia's ability to control its nuclear materials, he passed on an opportunity to assist global efforts against proliferation and terrorist attack by helping Russia deal with its nuclear stockpiles.

   There are a host of additional steps that could have been taken in connection with the negotiation of the Moscow Treaty.

   The President could have acted upon Russian desires to make true reductions in our offensive strategic nuclear weapons. He refused, despite the fact that destruction of Russian nuclear warheads would have eliminated their vulnerability to theft or diversion to terrorists.

   The President could have agreed to Russian proposals for negotiation of a verification regime to track progress toward the 2012 limits on deployed warheads.

   He refused, despite the confidence it would have instilled in the reduction process.

   The President could have expanded the negotiation to cover tactical nuclear weapons.

   He refused, despite the fact that thousands of such weapons exist in Russia and the United States without any sort of monitoring or control by an arms control regime.

   Because of their small size and battlefield application, these weapons are extremely attractive to terrorist organizations, and relatively vulnerable.

   The United States is currently unable to determine the precise number of Russian tactical nuclear weapons, and therefore unable to determine the nature of Russian control over such weapons and whether some might already have been lost or stolen.

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   The President also could have expanded the negotiation to cover the problem of multiple independently targeted warheads known as MIRVs.

   Refusal to do so by the President leaves the American people vulnerable to the loss of several sites from a single missile launch.

   Steps of this sort truly would have matched the President's rhetoric, and they would have made this world far safer for our children.

   The opportunities presented by the Moscow Treaty are now lost. Other opportunities exist, however, to work with Russia and others around the world to fight the proliferation of nuclear weapons, material, and knowledge.

   Such work is critical to our efforts to combat terrorism and to halt the spread of nuclear weapons and know-how to countries such as North Korea, Iran, and Iraq.

   It is my sincere hope that in the future the President will reconsider the narrow approach taken toward the Moscow Treaty, and to other agreements such as the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

   The fight against terrorism and the spread of nuclear weapons must be fought on several fronts.

   Half-hearted efforts like the Moscow Treaty will not meet the needs of the American people and the world.

   Mr. LUGAR. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mrs. DOLE). The clerk will call the roll.

   The assistant bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

   Mr. HAGEL. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

   Mr. HAGEL. Madam President, I rise today to support the resolution of ratification of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions--or, as we call it, the Moscow Treaty--now before the Senate.

   The Moscow Treaty represents a shared commitment by the United States and Russia to step back from the cold war policies of nuclear confrontation and enter into a new era of cooperation. This is to assure that our nuclear weapons no longer threaten either our peoples or our civilization.

   It was the bold vision of President Ronald Reagan, 17 years ago, at the Gorbachev summit in Reykjavik that set in motion this effort to make dramatic reductions in the nuclear weapons arsenals of the United States and then the Soviet Union. President Reagan's vision, once considered by some a fantasy or a negotiating ploy, is becoming the standard by which we should measure our success in arms control.

   The Moscow Treaty avoids the strategic gamesmanship and pitfalls of the SALT treaties, the ABM Treaty, and other negotiations of the cold war.

   The simplicity of this treaty, only three pages in length, betrayed its historic significance for United States-Russian relations and for global security. Its strength is the power of its objective, to dramatically reduce American and Russian strategic weapons.

   On November 13, 2001, President Bush announced that the United States would reduce its strategic nuclear arsenal by two-thirds, from approximately 6,000 nuclear weapons to between 1,700 and 2,200 operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons by December 31, 2012.

   The President made this determination independent of what Russia would do, knowing that these reductions would be in the overall strategic interest of the United States.

   President Putin determined that comparable reductions would also be in his country's own national security interest. On May 24, 2002, Bush and Putin agreed that their commitment to these reductions would take the form of a legally binding treaty.

   The negotiations over the Moscow Treaty did not fall into the traps of previous arms control agreements negotiated with the Soviet Union during the cold war. That is as much a testimony to the new spirit of U.S.-Russian relations and the realities of today's threats as it is to the strength of the treaty. For example, it took the United States Senate 3 years to ratify the START II treaty. It took the Russian Duma 7 years for ratification. And both sides put conditions unacceptable to the other side on the respective ratification agreements. As a result, that agreement never went into force.

   Instead of years of back and forth negotiations, with each side seeking a strategic advantage, the Moscow Treaty illustrates a turning point in America's relationship with Russia. It should provide an environment conducive to future arms control negotiations.

   The Resolution of Ratification before us today introduces just two straightforward conditions that complement rather than complicate the treaty. First, the administration must report to the Senate annually on how the United States plans to reach the required reduction goals. While this resolution does not set a rigid timetable, these reports will allow the Senate to oversee the implementation of this treaty.

   The second condition deals with the

   Cooperative Threat Reduction or Nunn-Lugar programs. Russia is committed to meeting these reductions, but the question remains if Russia has the resources to meet them. The Nunn-Lugar program has been successful in assisting the former states of the Soviet Union to help reduce their nuclear arsenals. The Resolution of Ratification rightly includes Nunn-Lugar programs as instrumental in achieving lasting and durable arms reduction.

   The Moscow Treaty should not be considered as the final chapter in U.S.-Russian arms control, but it is an important and historic step forward. The United States and Russia must do more to prevent the proliferation of dual use technology and weapons of mass destruction to Iran, North Korea, and other countries. The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction programs are crucial to our shared security interests in preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destructions. For us to succeed in making a safer world, Washington and Moscow must be strategic partners, not strategic adversaries.

   The Bush Administration, Chairman LUGAR, Senator BIDEN, and others who have framed the Treaty and the Resolution of Ratification deserve credit and thanks for their leadership and steady focus. I urge my colleagues to vote yes on the resolution without amendments, for the very reasons Senator BIDEN articulated just minutes ago, and to understand the broader context and significance of this treaty for U.S.-Russian relations and global security. I yield the floor.

   I suggest the absence of a quorum.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

   The senior assistant bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

   Mr. DORGAN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

   Mr. DORGAN. Madam President, I will speak briefly today about the treaty we are considering. I spoke about it in brief yesterday and said while I would vote for it, I think it is not much better than nothing with respect to arms control. I will explain a little bit about where I think we are and where I hope we might go on some of these issues.

   I note that Senator Lugar is in the Chamber, the chairman of the committee. He might or might not know that yesterday when I spoke on these issues, I spoke about the general issue of threat reduction. I spoke about the Nunn-Lugar, or Lugar-Nunn, programs by which we were actually using taxpayer money in this country to dismantle delivery systems and weapons in the old Soviet Union and in Russia, the very success of those programs, and how much I thought those programs have contributed to moving in the right direction.

   We may not agree. I do not know. I suspect there are some who think this Moscow Treaty actually advances our interests. I think it probably does not, but I do not think it hurts anything. It is an agreement by which the United States and Russia decide that a number of nuclear weapons will be taken off the active delivery systems and put in storage, but at the end of the time during which this transition takes place, in 2012, we will have exactly the same number of nuclear weapons in Russia and in the United States as we have today, at least as a result of this treaty.

   This treaty does not propose that any nuclear weapons be disassembled or destroyed. It is simply putting nuclear

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   While Senator Lugar is present, I want to mention, as I did yesterday, I have here a piece of a strut from a wing of a Soviet bomber. Some of my colleagues have been given pieces of this as a commemorative of a very successful effort we have made and continue to make with respect to arms reductions. I stress the word ``reductions'' of both nuclear weapons and delivery systems.

   I ask unanimous consent to use this old strut of a Soviet bomber to make the point.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

   Mr. DORGAN. The point is this: I hold in my hand a piece of metal that belonged to a bomber that presumably carried nuclear weapons that threatened every American. Did we shoot this bomber down? No, we did not. We sawed the wings off and destroyed the fuselage. How did we do that? Because we had a program called Nunn-Lugar, or Lugar-Nunn, that actually recognized it is a whole lot better to reach an agreement for arms reduction and then help pay for the destruction of a Soviet bomber or a Russian bomber, or the dismantlement of a missile or a submarine and the destruction of a warhead, than it is to exchange them or to try to shoot it down or to sink the submarine. So we appropriated taxpayers' money for this purpose. This is called peace.

   This is another item I showed yesterday: Ground-up copper from a dismantled Soviet submarine that carried missiles with warheads aimed at American cities. This is called progress. This submarine does not exist any longer. Why? Because we had the foresight, particularly by Senator Lugar and Senator Nunn,

   to say if we can have verifiable reductions in both delivery systems and nuclear weapons, and even help pay for that destruction, it is far better than having this continued standoff and actually having to fight at some point to try to knock down a Soviet bomber or destroy a Russian submarine. We are destroying them, all right, but peacefully, through a program that works.

   Because I think that is very important to understand, I made the point yesterday that there are thousands and thousands of nuclear weapons in this world. The bulk of them are contained in arsenals by Russia and the United States. Many of them are called theater nuclear weapons, lower yield, smaller nuclear weapons. Then there are strategic nuclear weapons, the larger nuclear weapons. There are thousands of each, and over time, through arms control agreements, we have reached some understanding that we want to reduce the number of warheads, the number of delivery systems. We have moved back and forth about exactly how we do that. In some cases, there has been great emphasis on dismantling or limiting the number of delivery systems, the missiles themselves, or the bombers or the submarines. They are mere delivery systems for a weapon of mass destruction. In some cases, we paid great attention to that. In other cases, we have paid attention to the number of warheads themselves.

   All of that is important. But I must say a treaty is not, at the end of the day, very important to us if it discontinues the effort to actually reduce the threat of war through dismantling weapons and delivery systems. We have made some progress in arms control, progress that I think is very important to the American people, but there is so much more to be done.

   A rumor that someone had stolen one nuclear weapon some many months ago caused great concern in this country. The loss of one nuclear weapon to a terrorist could hold hostage an entire American city or, for that matter, much of a country, and there are thousands and thousands of these weapons.

   It seems to me, if we wish to make this a safer world for our children and grandchildren, it is our job to aggressively stop the spread of nuclear weapons.

   God forbid other countries will become part of the nuclear club or that terrorists and terrorist organizations will acquire weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons. We will stop the spread of nuclear weapons. And we must be the leader to do that. This country must be in the lead. It is our job. This responsibility falls on our shoulders at this time.

   No. 2, in addition to stopping the spread, we must systematically, over a period of time, begin reducing the stockpiles. We must do that.

   I have been disappointed for some long while on arms control issues. I don't believe we should disarm. I don't want our country to be weak. But I believe it is in our country's best interests to stop the spread of nuclear weapons and to have a mutually agreed upon reduction in the number of nuclear weapons.

   In October of 1999, this Senate rejected the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty. That was a terrible disappointment, certainly for me and for many around the world. We have not tested nuclear weapons for nearly a decade, yet we send a message to the rest of the world that we do not want a Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, one that much of the world has already embraced. That was a terrible setback. Since that time, by the way, the reports by former Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Shalikashvili and the National Academy of Sciences have endorsed the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty and concluded that the treaty can be verified adequately, adversaries cannot significantly advance their nuclear weapons by cheating, and the United States can maintain confidence in its nuclear stockpile without testing. We made a horrible mistake in rejecting that treaty.

   This country, in December 2001, announced it would unilaterally withdraw from the ABM Treaty with Russia. In my judgment, that was a significant mistake. That treaty was the center pole of nuclear arms reduction agreements, talks, and discussions.

   In January 2002, the administration released its Nuclear Posture Review, and it said the United States needs to keep a very substantial nuclear force for 20 years. It set out what that nuclear force would be. But that Nuclear Posture Review blurred the lines between conventional and nuclear weapons, calling for a new generation of smaller, easy-to-use nuclear weapons, including smaller bunker buster weapons--the wrong thing for our country if we are going to be a leader in trying to say to another nation, let's never see a nuclear weapon used again anywhere in this world. And yet we are talking about perhaps designing new bunker buster nuclear weapons--moving exactly in the opposite direction, in my judgment.

   The Nuclear Posture Review called for increasing our readiness to resume testing of nuclear weapons. I don't understand that.

   All of these, together, represent movement in exactly the wrong direction for this country. We have very serious challenges in the world that require our leadership. India and Pakistan don't like each other. They are shooting at each other at the border, over Kashmir. They both have nuclear weapons. It was not too many months ago we had a very serious, very tense time with respect to India and Pakistan.

   The message we send as the world leader, the strongest military power in the world, is critically important. Our message ought to be that we want to make this a safer world by beginning the long process of reducing the stockpile of nuclear weapons, not by putting them in warehouses someplace. We should

   be really reducing the number of nuclear weapons and making sure that our efforts as the United States of America are used to try to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to any other country in the world, any other group in the world--that is our responsibility. It is what we must be about. If that mantle of world leadership is not borne by us, that leadership will not exist. I fear our future will not be a particularly good future with more and more countries becoming a part of the nuclear club.

   As I indicated, the Moscow Treaty does not require a single missile silo, submarine, bomber, missile, or bomb, for that matter, to be eliminated. Compare this with previous treaties. The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty required the destruction of an entire class of ballistic missiles with ranges from 2,000 to 3,000 miles.

   I had a picture in the Senate one day of a few acres of sunflowers. This few

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   The fact is, these agreements, these treaties that we have had, have worked. The treaties require irreversible action by requiring the destruction of delivery vehicles and warheads.

   As I indicated, the Moscow Treaty does not require a single nuclear warhead to be destroyed. It limits the number of strategic nuclear weapons that each side can deploy, from 1,700 to 2,200.

   Admittedly, previous arms treaties did not require the destruction of warheads, but at the Helsinki summit Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed to a framework of SALT III negotiations for destruction of warheads. During treaty negotiations, Russia insisted that it require the elimination of nondeployed warheads, but our country resisted because we wanted to keep warheads removed from deployment in storage.

   So now we have a Moscow Treaty that says we are going to keep these warheads in storage but we will count them as a reduction in warheads because they are no longer active with respect to the ability to put them on an airplane or submarine or on the tip of a missile. Frankly, it does not reduce the number of nuclear warheads in a significant way, and in my judgment, we ought to be doing that.

   We have the START treaty. We have a whole series of efforts that have occurred over a long period of time that give us a roadmap on how to succeed with respect to what I think our obligation is in these areas. There is nothing particularly objectionable about this treaty, but it does not really provide any progress for us. One can hardly object to something that does not do anything, except that my wish would be that we would engage in a manner that would allow us to make some progress.

   I intended to offer an amendment. I say to my colleague from Indiana that I am not going to offer an amendment. I have the amendment, but I will not offer it because my understanding is that the ranking member would be obligated to vote against it based on an agreement the chairman and the ranking member have reached. But let me read my amendment and state what I hope this country will do at some point.

   My amendment would have added a section (7):

   FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS.--The Senate urges the President to build upon the foundation of the Treaty by negotiating a new treaty with the Russian Federation that would enter into force upon the termination of the Treaty on Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, with Annexes, Protocols, and Memorandum of Understanding, signed at Moscow on July 31, 1991 (START Treaty), and would require deep, verifiable, and irreversible reductions in the stockpiles of strategic and non-strategic nuclear warheads of the United States and the Russian Federation.

   The purpose of this would be to say that future negotiations which should occur, and should occur now, should have as an objective to reduce the stockpile of nuclear weapons contained both in Russia and the United States. I do not propose disarmament. I do propose that in circumstances where each of us has thousands and thousands and thousands of nuclear weapons--perhaps as many as 25 to 30,000 between both countries, if you include both theater and strategic nuclear weapons--I do propose we find a way to reduce the stockpiles on both sides in an irreversible way.

   Then, as I indicated previously, my fervent hope and prayer is that the leadership of this country will exert itself to try to do everything it can to be a world leader to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. This country's future depends on it.

   Let me conclude by saying I have great admiration for Senator Biden, who has had a world of experience in these areas, and for Senator Lugar. I have already spoken of Senator Lugar. I will not go on at great length. But his work has been extraordinary. Senator Biden's work, as well, contributes a great deal to this Senate and to this country.

   I know he believes, as I do, that we have seen many missed opportunities in recent years to don the mantle of world leadership that we must assume dealing with these areas. While I will vote for this treaty, I am confident that Senator Lugar and Senator Biden understand, perhaps even if this administration does not, based on their past actions and based on the things they have supported previously, this is a step, even if a baby step, that must be followed by very large strides, vigorous, aggressive approaches to do what we know needs to be done: A real reduction in the stockpile of nuclear weapons and a major effort on behalf of America to stop the spread of nuclear weapons in the rest of the world.

   I yield the floor.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois.

   AMENDMENT NO. 250

   Mr. DURBIN. Madam President, the resolution of ratification we have before us on the treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions, also known as the Moscow Treaty, is a step forward but in many ways it is a very modest step. The treaty is a three-page document signed by Presidents Bush and Putin on May 24, 2002, to reduce deployed strategic nuclear weapons to between 1,700 and 2,200 warheads by December 31, 2012.

   The treaty actually calls for no warheads or delivery vehicles to be destroyed. They can simply be stored. There are no verification provisions, other than those still in effect through 2009 from the START treaty, and the reductions in deployed warheads have to occur by December 31, 2012, the very same day the treaty expires.

   However, once the reductions in deployed warheads are met, it means a large number of warheads will not be ready to launch at a moment's notice. That is a positive thing, even if no warheads are dismantled and no delivery vehicles are destroyed.

   When nonnuclear countries agreed to forgo nuclear weapons in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, an essential part of the grand bargain was that nuclear countries, like the United States and the Russian Federation, were to control and reduce their nuclear weapons. Because this treaty is an effort to control and reduce the number of deployed warheads, I will vote for the resolution of ratification.

   From the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty flowed all the

   various efforts of U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms control, including the SALT and START treaties. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was renewed in 1995, but it required a lot of arm twisting by the United States because nonnuclear countries have accused the nuclear powers of not being serious about nuclear arms control and reduction. A major reason nonnuclear states agreed to renew the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is because the United States signed and agreed to pursue ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, which sadly, this body, the Senate, rejected on October 13, 1999.

   The failure of the Senate to meet its obligation and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty left us with little or no leverage to keep Asia from a spiraling arms race in India, Pakistan, China, and perhaps even other countries. Pakistan and India are in a tense nuclear standoff that came to the brink of nuclear war over Kashmir and easily could again. North Korea, we all know, already has nuclear weapons and is likely to build more. Libya, Iran, and Iraq, may be seeking to acquire or develop nuclear weapons.

   For those who think nuclear arms control is just a quaint leftover of the cold war, let me say we are facing a major round of nuclear proliferation with destabilizing effects that we may have no way to stop.

   Let me at this point pay special tribute to the Senator from Indiana, Mr. Lugar. Several weeks ago I went to a breakfast at which Senator Lugar spoke relative to the issue of nuclear proliferation. Since the days of Nunn-Lugar, with Senator SAM NUNN of Georgia, DICK LUGAR of Indiana has been a leader, a global leader, on the question of nuclear proliferation. I hope more Members of the Senate on both sides of the aisle will pay particular heed to his warnings about proliferation and about the need for the

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   Some of the examples he gave us from his own life experience, visiting the former Soviet Union, were chilling--chilling because we are this close to the proliferation of weapons, weapons in the hands of countries that will not deal with them in a responsible way.

   Having said that, though, I am still very concerned about the policies of this administration that could, in fact, further fray the fabric of the grand bargain struck with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and actually create an incentive for current nonnuclear states to acquire nuclear weapons--exactly the opposite of what we want to see in the world of tomorrow. This country has to do more to deal with the crisis in North Korea, do more to secure fissile materials in other countries, and do more to secure a broad international coalition against proliferation.

   I have cosponsored a resolution with Senator TOM DASCHLE, which will be introduced today, calling for a more vigorous nonproliferation policy.

   I am particularly concerned this administration's policy of preemption, combined with a new policy of first use of nuclear weapons, is an incentive, an invitation to proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons. I have introduced a resolution of my own on that subject today.

   Let me elaborate with just a few points. Press reports about the December 31, 2001, Nuclear Posture Review indicated that the United States might use nuclear weapons to discourage adversaries from undertaking military programs or operations that could threaten U.S. interests; that nuclear weapons could

   be employed against targets able to withstand nonnuclear attack, and that setting requirements for nuclear strike capabilities, North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Libya are among the countries that could be involved in so-called contingencies. The September 17, 2002, national security strategy of the United States stated:

   As a matter of common sense and self defense, America will act against such emerging threats before they are fully formed.

   It went on to say:

   To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively.

   The U.S. Under Secretary of State for Arms Control, John Bolton, recently announced this administration's abandonment of the so-called ``negative security assurance,'' the pledge to refrain from using nuclear weapons against nonnuclear weapons, which was outlined in 1978, restated in 1995, and in 2002 in the context of gaining the support of other nations for the nonproliferation treaty. Press reports indicate that in a classified document, National Security Directive 17, the President may have made explicit what had been usefully ambiguous before--a threat to use nuclear weapons in response to an attack with chemical or biological weapons. Making that threat explicit may mean that leaders of other countries that fear a United States attack will think they have to have nuclear weapons to deter the United States, leading to even more proliferation.

   What we have here is an escalation of rhetoric, where we have moved beyond ``no first use of nuclear weapons,'' to the point where this administration is saying we can use nuclear weapons against those who do not have them. And now we have a new policy of preemption where the use of those weapons does not even require an imminent danger, imminent threat against the United States.

   This rhetoric and this policy cannot help but escalate the situation, leading to more proliferation. That is why I think it is sad that this U.S. Congress has been so passive, while this President has sought to dramatically radicalize and change the foreign policy which has guided this Nation for decades.

   The United States is currently engaged in the expansion of research and development of new types of nuclear weapons such as the so-called bunker busters, or small nuclear weapons intended to destroy underground facilities or buried chemical or biological weapons caches.

   These policies and actions threaten to make nuclear weapons appear to be useful, legitimate, offensive first-strike weapons, rather than a force for deterrence,

   and therefore this policy undermines an essential tenet of nonproliferation.

   The cumulative effect of the policies announced by President Bush is to redefine and broaden the concept of preemption, which has been understood to mean anticipatory self-defense in the face of imminent attack, and the right of every state to include preventive war without evidence of an imminent attack in which the United States may opt to use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear states.

   We don't know where this dangerous policy may lead. But it is hard to imagine it will lead to a safer world. It is hard to imagine that a nonnuclear power can look at the new Bush foreign policy and say with any degree of confidence that forestalling the development of nuclear weapons is in their best interests in the long term. I am afraid the President has created an incentive for proliferation of nuclear weapons--exactly the opposite of what this world needs.

   Turning back to the treaty before us today, I am going to offer an amendment, and a number of colleagues will as well. It is my hope we will be able to make constructive and responsible improvements to the Resolution of Ratification that will address some of the weaknesses.

   When the Senate considered the Resolution of Ratification of the START treaty in 1992, it approved a condition that requires the President to seek a cooperative monitoring and verification arrangement in any future agreement.

   I am offering an amendment to this Resolution of Ratification that requires the President to report to relevant Senate committees on how he is complying with that requirement.

   The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty--also known as the Moscow Treaty--does not contain any verification measures other than those already required by the START treaty, which expires in 2009.

   The President's position is that our new cooperative relationship with Russia means no verification is necessary. Certainly our relationship with the Russian Federation is quite different than it was during the dark and dreary days of the cold war. The preamble to the treaty makes reference to this new relationship saying the two parties desire ``..... to establish a genuine partnership based on the principles of mutual security, cooperation, trust, openness, and predictability.''

   I believe a series of cooperative measures, inspections, data sharing and other verification measures are appropriate even in a relationship based on trust, cooperation, openness, and predictability.

   I am sorry to remind my colleagues on the Republican side of the aisle that it was their President, Ronald Reagan, who said, ``Trust but verify.'' He was negotiating a START treaty at the time with the Soviet Union. I think his words still apply. Verification builds trust.

   As British Foreign Secretary, Lord Palmerston said in 1848--and it has become an often-quoted maxim in foreign affairs--``We have no eternal allies and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow.'' In this case, the interests of both countries are served by reducing deployed warheads, but interests can change with the circumstances.

   President Bush has said several times--in fact, he said it in a conversation that I was a party to--that he has developed a relationship of trust with the Russian President, Vladimir Putin. In a joint press conference with the Russian President in June, 1991, President Bush said: ``I looked the man in the eye. I found him to be very straightforward and trustworthy. We had a very good dialogue. I was able to get a sense of his soul. ..... The Cold War said loud and clear that we're opponents and that we bring the peace through the ability for each of us to destroy each other. ..... Friends don't destroy each other.''

   This may well be so, but the fact is that both countries still both have, at the push of a few buttons, the capability to destroy each other, and to destroy the world. There can be no more serious matter.

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   President Bush and President Putin may have the best of trusting relationships, but we cannot know what the future will bring or who will be President of either country over the life of this treaty, or what kind of relationship those Presidents may have.

   Condition 8 of the resolution of ratification of the START treaty requires that in connection with any subsequent agreement reducing strategic nuclear weapons, the President shall seek appropriate monitoring measures. I want to read the entire condition, because I believe it is very important for my colleagues to hear what the Senate required in 1992:

   (8) NUCLEAR STOCKPILE WEAPONS ARRANGEMENT.--In as much as the prospect of a loss of control of nuclear weapons or fissile material in the former Soviet Union could pose a serious threat to the United States and to international peace and security, in connection with any further agreement reducing strategic offensive arms, the President shall seek an appropriate arrangement, including the use of reciprocal inspections, data exchanges, and other cooperative measures, to monitor--

   (A) the numbers of nuclear stockpile weapons on the territory of the parties to this Treaty; and

   (B) the location and inventory of facilities on the territory of the parties to this treaty capable of producing significant quantities of fissile materials.

   This condition, originally offered to the START Resolution of Ratification during committee consideration, was offered by the Senator from Delaware, Mr. Biden, who is in the Chamber today and has been a leader, as well as Senator Lugar, in developing the kind of arms control which can make a safer world. Senator Biden offered an excellent condition that reflected deep concern about nuclear warheads and fissile material falling into the hands of terrorists and irresponsible states, and anticipated that future treaties would require cooperative measures to monitor and verify reductions in strategic weapons in a post-cold-war context.

   In fact, measures to monitor what becomes of the thousands of warheads to be taken off of operational deployment is one of the most important steps the United States and the Russian Federation can take to be sure those weapons or fissile materials are secured.

   The START treaty contains an extremely complex verification regime. Both countries collect most of the information to verify compliance through ``National Technical Means of Verification,'' in other words, satellites and remote sensing devices. START also allows intrusive measures, such as on-site inspections and exchanges of data.

   But these measures under START apply to the retirement and destruction of nuclear weapons launchers and not the warheads themselves. START has a complex way of limiting nuclear forces--rather than counting warheads, it attributes a certain number of warheads to each kind of missile or bomber.

   The treaty before us does not require the destruction of launchers, or warheads. There is simply no way to verify what may happen to the thousands of warheads that are to be taken out of operational deployment.

   When Senator Lugar came to our breakfast a few weeks ago, he told a story of visiting the submarine facility at Minsk--I am sure he can fill in the details--and seeing the long line of nuclear submarines that used to be part of the Soviet Navy. He raised a serious and important question about what would happen to the nuclear payload or the nuclear materials in those submarines. Will they be taken out to sea and scuttled, or dismantled and sold? It is a serious concern.

   Think about the materials we are talking about. I have seen Senator Biden many times come to the floor with materials no longer than a saucer, and easily transported in terms of their size. Now we are talking about a treaty before us which does not include verification procedures so that we are not certain that the Russian Federation is actually dealing with these fissile materials and nuclear weapons in a fashion to guarantee that they won't be the subject of proliferation.

   Doesn't it make sense for us to have a reciprocal obligation on the part of both the United States and the Russian Federation to make certain this treaty works? To say the President of the United States and the President of Russia have a trusting working relationship is a good thing for world peace. But who knows what tomorrow will bring? Who knows where we will be or where the Russian Federation will be? And who knows who the leaders will be?

   It is important for us, if we are ratifying a resolution for a treaty that will affect the United States for 9 or 10 years, that we at least consider the possibilities that things may not end up as smoothly as we hoped. It is far better for us to build into this resolution a verification procedure to make sure both sides live up to the terms of the treaty. As President Reagan said, ``Trust but verify.''

   I believe that it makes sense for new verification measures to be negotiated. A Bilateral Implementation Commission and the Consultative Group for Strategic Security have both been established in connection with the treaty, and verification and transparency measures may be discussed in these fora. Secretary of State Colin Powell said in his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the Administration will ``consider whether to pursue expanded transparency'' at meetings of the Consultative Group.

   My amendment reminds the Executive Branch that it is already required to seek an arrangement on such issues by Condition 8 of the START treaty, and simply requires a report on what it has done to comply with the requirements of that condition.

   I believe this change, although small, is important. It is a change that states to every Member of the Senate and to the American people we represent and to future generations that this is more than just words on paper. It is more than just a blink of an eye and a relationship.

   There is a verification procedure to make sure that the nuclear weapons that are to be set aside and not menace the rest of the world are actually set aside, verification procedures which we can trust and the Russians can trust as well. That is not too much to ask. To do anything less is to perhaps jeopardize the good, positive relationship we have today, by leaving unsaid and unmet our obligation for verification.

   Madam President, I send this amendment to the desk.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.

   The legislative clerk read as follows:

   The Senator from Illinois [Mr. Durbin] proposes an amendment numbered 250.

   Mr. DURBIN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

   The amendment is as follows:

    At the end of section 2, add the following new condition:

    (3) COMPLIANCE REPORT.--Not later than 60 days after the exchange of instruments of ratification of the Treaty, and annually thereafter on April 15, the President shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate a report on the compliance of the President with the requirements of condition (a)(8) of the resolution of ratification of the Treaty on Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, with Annexes, Protocols, and Memorandum of Understanding, signed at Moscow on July 31, 1991 (START Treaty), which states that ``[in] as much as the prospect of a loss of control of nuclear weapons or fissile material in the former Soviet Union could pose a serious threat to the United States and to international peace and security, in connection with any further agreement reducing strategic offensive arms, the President shall seek an appropriate arrangement, including the use of reciprocal inspections, data exchanges, and other cooperative measures, to monitor (A) the numbers of nuclear stockpile weapons on the territory of the parties to [the START Treaty]; and (B) the location and inventory of facilities on the territory of the parties to [the START Treaty] capable of producing or processing significant quantities of fissile materials''.

   Mr. DURBIN. Madam President, I have shared a copy of this amendment with Senator Lugar, and I hope Senator Biden's staff has a copy as well. If not, we will provide it to them immediately.

   At this point, I do not know if Senator Lugar would like to respond to the filing of the amendment or to engage me in a conversation about the nature of the amendment. I would welcome that.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.

   Mr. LUGAR. Madam President, I thank the Senator for his very thoughtful and generous remarks about cooperative threat reduction and

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   The Senator from Illinois has been a very strong supporter of nonproliferation in this country as we have worked with the Russians or we have tried to direct our own programs. It is always difficult to oppose an amendment of someone who has been so generous in mentioning cooperation we have had together.

   I will oppose the amendment because I believe that, in fact, the Senator's objectives are being realized in many ways. Some are known to the Senator; some I would like to discuss presently.

   But, first of all, I would say that in arguing in favor of the Moscow Treaty, Senator Biden and I have pointed out that the President had already made a determination that we were going to unilaterally destroy a good number of weapons. And the Russians, for their own reasons, had decided they wanted to do so.

   This is why it is a very short and simple treaty without extensive verification protocols that have characterized other treaties. But it comes with the START I verification procedures that last through 2009. In our hearings, we have pointed out 2009 is short of 2012, which is the timetable for the total treaty to be consummated. But, at the same time, there is all of the strictness the Senator from Illinois has mentioned in previous treaties incorporated in this one.

   The second point of verification is the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, the Nunn-Lugar program. This has people from our country working with Russians on the ground in Russia. They are verifying precisely what they are doing.

   I want to mention the extent of this reporting and verification by pointing to the CTR report which was just published for the year 2002. It has, on the front, so that all Senators will be able to see, the CTR logo, and says: ``Cooperative Threat Reduction annual report, Fiscal Year 2002.''

   Now, page by page, the report goes through a description of cooperative threat reduction activities carried out in fiscal year 2000 in the nuclear, chemical, and biological areas, project by project and objective by objective. It discusses the 5-year plan for destruction or containment, security of each of these materials or weapons systems.

   I mention this simply because that has been the objective of those of us who have tried to foster this Cooperative Threat Reduction Program; that in fact there be very close congressional scrutiny, dollar for dollar, area by area, all the way through.

   Now, Senator Biden was prescient in his amendment that the Senator from Illinois has cited. But this clearly influenced the subsequent work under cooperative threat reduction, and does to this day.

   The objectives that the Senator from Illinois has suggested that are especially important--and those were also mentioned

   by the distinguished Senator from North Dakota, Mr. Dorgan, early on--we are concerned about the tactical nuclear weapons. We have raised the question to Secretary Powell as to why this was not included. In essence, this is not a quote from the Secretary, but he said: It is a bridge too far. We raised this with the Russians. They are not prepared to come to agreement.

   Now, other countries are deeply interested in the Russians coming to agreement, the G-8 countries that have come together in the so-called 10 plus 10 over 10 program, which means $10 billion for each of 10 years from the countries in the G-8 other than the United States, thus matching essentially what we are doing under cooperative threat reduction.

   One of the objectives of the early meetings was clearly: What about the tactical weapons? These are very close to the Europeans. They are not long-range ballistic missiles. They are missiles on the continent in proximity to countries worried about their security.

   So we have friends, in a multilateral way, who are helping to pursue this situation. I have some confidence--because Secretary Powell and Secretary Rumsfeld, in their testimony, indicated this is a high priority for them, they will continue to raise it with the Russians--we will make some headway. But we have not thus far.

   I would just say to the distinguished Senator from Illinois, whether spurred by the Biden amendment years ago or various other activities, our activities as Members of the Senate and the House and on the ground in Russia have been vigorous.

   I think the Senator cited perhaps some of my trips. But one recently, last August, was an attempt to go to the biomilitary plant at so-called Kirov 200. I sought to go there because it was identified as one of four bioweapons facilities of which we believe the Russians are simply still in denial. They are not prepared to work with us, even though at 14 other sites we do now have active programs.

   Under the ISTC Program, the International Science and Technology Program, we are giving stipends to Russian scientists who now have left the weapons field and are working on HIV/AIDS or other ways to combat chemical weapons poisoning.

   I would simply say that the Kirov 200 situation, for me, was almost a bridge too far, even though I thought arrangements were available for our U.S. Air Force plane to convey me and the party out there. At the airport that morning, we were informed we would not be able to land. We could fly, but we were not going to land. So we began to work our way through the bureaucracy of the foreign office of Russia, unwilling to take no for an answer. In due course, we did fly the aircraft, and we did land in Kirov.

   Having gotten there, I would say that I did not see everything that I wished to see. But what I did find were retired Russians, retired at 55, who had come, from the plant that was denied to me, down to our activities and who, in essence, told me everything they were doing at either.

   So I think we have a pretty good insight. I just mention this because even as we legislatively will some things to happen, they do not happen without persistence and sort of doggedly pursuing those objectives. I am just testifying that is occurring, sometimes to the discomfort of our relationship with the Russians. But in this particular case, I reported all my activities to the defense minister, Mr. Ivanov, and at least mildly admonished him we ought to be beyond this. The whole idea of the Moscow Treaty should be a new relationship, a new trust between President Putin and our President Bush. And all of us on both sides need to be fostering that.

   So my response to the Senator from Illinois is to say that I think we are on the same side in pursuing congressional oversight, more vigor with regard to everything we are now doing, although I think it is fully reported annually by the Department of Energy, quite apart from CTR, and with goals to go where we have not been; namely, tactical weapons and future destruction.

   Mr. DURBIN. Will the Senator yield for a question?

   Mr. LUGAR. Yes, I yield for a question.

   Mr. DURBIN. Am I right in my premise that this SORT treaty, this Moscow Treaty, does not destroy the nuclear warheads but simply calls for them to be stored, set aside, not in a deployable mode, so they, frankly, are at least within the grasp of either country to be reactivated? Is that accurate?

   Mr. LUGAR. The Senator is correct. The treaty does not call for the destruction of warheads.

   Mr. DURBIN. May I also ask the Senator from Indiana, since we live in the 21st century in fear that fissile material and nuclear weapons will be transferred either openly or covertly to countries that will misuse them, why would the Senator from Indiana believe that a verification procedure which spotlights the location and number of these weapons in both countries would not be in the best interest of reducing the likelihood of proliferation?

   Mr. LUGAR. I would not disagree, in response to the distinguished Senator, that it would be ideal for this verification to occur, but I would simply respond that although we have been negotiating such verification for some time, the Russians have not agreed to do this. In other words, one reason that is not in this treaty is the negotiators have found resistance. I have found resistance. Other people have found resistance.

   These things open up tediously, sort of one by one. For example, after great pressure, I was taken on a small Russian aircraft to a plant where in fact

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   The difficulty--and the Senator knows this--is these warheads are unstable sometimes in terms of their chemical composition. They may not lie there in peace forever, like a sporting goods store situation of inert matter. That is the problem for the Russians. At some point they will have to move the warheads. So they already have a railway station secured. They have procedures because they know that at some stage they will have to take the warhead out and disassemble it, a very dangerous predicament and one that then leads to problems of storage of the fissile material. So in another Nunn-Lugar program we are trying to work on the storage facilities for thousands of these warheads because, for the moment, there is not adequate storage for the fissile material itself after it is taken as plutonium or highly enriched uranium from the warhead. The Russians would like to pursue that.

   So we asked the logical question the Senator has asked: Why can't we work together to verify where all these warheads are, what status they are in. We are interested in that. We don't want an accidental nuclear event in Russia. And the Russians have been resistant, in the fullness of time perhaps less resistant, but I would just say, once again, that was probably a bridge too far for this treaty. Our negotiators found the Russians not to be prepared.

   Mr. DURBIN. Will the Senator yield for another question?

   Mr. LUGAR. Of course.

   Mr. DURBIN. Is the Senator aware that the amendment I offer calls on the President to report to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate not later than 60 days after the exchange of instruments of ratification, annually thereafter on April 15, on the progress toward verification, and we go on to say that we are seeking the same type of verification as in the START treaty, the numbers of nuclear stockpiled weapons in the territories of the parties and the location and inventory of the facilities?

   I ask the Senator from Indiana, if we have not reached the stage we want to in verification, is it not of some value for this Senate to say as part of the agreement that we are going to ask this President, and any subsequent President affected by the treaty, to continue to report on an annual basis to the Senate the progress that is being made to reach verification?

   I would think that would have real value to spur this administration on to keep negotiating, keep trying to reach agreement with the Russians. And absent that, I am afraid

   there would be a disincentive for that sort of thing to occur. I ask the Senator if that is a reasonable interpretation of my own amendment.

   Mr. LUGAR. I think it is a reasonable interpretation, I respond to the Senator, but I would also say that in fact the President, at least through the Department of Defense, in the CDR report I have in front of me, is doing that each year. These are annual reports. Likewise the Secretary of Energy is making his own reports on the nuclear accountability issues. So it appears to me that generally the objective of the Senator is being fulfilled in current reports.

   What is not being fulfilled and what the Senator and I both wish was being fulfilled is more progress toward the destruction of the warheads themselves and more openness on the part of the Russians to what their problem clearly is and one in which we could help if we had more access. Before I got into this particular vault I am talking about, General Habiger, who has been mentioned in this debate, was the last American ever to get there. This is not openness or transparency. So even though property threat reduction brings a lot of Russians and Americans together, there are areas in which we have not come together, these bioweapons plants, the four of them, for example, and some of these vaults that we have not seen.

   Every year we are reporting, however, our deficiencies or our inability to reach agreement. It is a checkoff list with the Russians.

   I say, on behalf of those who are in the field with the CDR, they work at it all the time, working with their compatriots out in the hinterland of Russia to see what might open up this year.

   Mr. DURBIN. If I might say, by way of a question in closing so that we don't prolong this debate, I hope the Senator from Indiana will view this amendment as instructive and as friendly and not as adversarial to his goals. I took heart from the statements he made in meetings I attended about the need for all of us to be more sensitized to the problem of proliferation of nuclear weapons. What I am seeking to do is to get an ongoing relationship with the President and the Senate so that we can continue to monitor the progress being made and the incentive is there for this President and any other President in the Russian Federation or the United States to continue to move forward on this track so we can reduce the likelihood of proliferation of nuclear weapons.

   I ask my colleague from Indiana if he will consider this amendment I am offering in that light, as a positive, supportive effort, a friendly effort to add something that may be of value to the conversation.

   Mr. LUGAR. In response to the Senator, of course, I see it in that light. My only argument with the Senator today is that I do not believe it ought to be part of the treaty. I believe clearly the fulfillment is already occurring in terms of the reporting, with considerable vigor, but at the same time, as I have admitted to the Senator, the objectives we both seek by getting the President to indicate energy and so forth also requires the Russians to reciprocate. This particular treaty still has to be ratified by the Duma. We have our own debate here, but they will have theirs, too.

   Senator Biden and I in our opening comments indicated we would resist amendments simply because we believe we have at least in a very general way covered territory of what we ought to be doing in terms of oversight but in ways that would not in any way be objectionable to the Russians who have to ratify the treaty and thus at least preserve the spirit in which Presidents Putin and Bush negotiated, admittedly, a limited treaty. I would ask the Senator at least for his thoughts as to whether he would be sufficiently assured by the vigor of my response to withdraw the amendment, understanding that we will continue to pursue these reports.

   I will try to make available to Senators the CDR message if they do not have it which really reviews in detail the gist of what the Senator is requesting. But beyond that, it is a pledge of vigor in proceeding where we have not been, these bridges too far that I have described that are very important.

   Mr. DURBIN. May I ask the Senator from Indiana a followup question? Would the Senator be willing to join with me and perhaps Senator Biden in a letter to the administration relative to this verification procedure, asking that the administration move forward to at least establish on an informal basis a reporting with the Senate so we can see the progress being made? I would consider that to be a step in this direction which moves us to the same goal.

   Mr. LUGAR. I respond to the Senator that I would be pleased to work with the Senator on a letter which affirms, once again, the importance of the debate we are having, the interest of Members who are signing the letter, but others literally in the subject matter of what we are talking about who would acknowledge perhaps that some reports are being made and maybe ask for more vigor in being more complete. I would like to work with the Senator in that project.

   Mr. DURBIN. I ask my colleague from Delaware, since I am taking his language from the START treaty and have venerated it, deified it, given it all of the credence any Senator could ask, whether he would be kind enough to join me.

   Mr. BIDEN. The answer is yes. I think what the Senator is attempting

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   Condition 8 that has been referred to in the START treaty was a very new and important idea when we enacted it 10 years ago. It led the Clinton administration to use the Nunn-Lugar program to achieve a measure of transparency into the Russian fissile stockpiles in the mid-1990s.

   In recent years, the United States has helped Russia to conduct a census of its civilian fissile material, but I doubt that either side is now prepared to allow access to the weapons stockpiles that are not on the civilian side of this equation.

   It would be my expectation that a report called for on the activities pursuant to condition 8 to the START treaty resolution of ratification would only tell us there are no negotiations toward a bilateral agreement, even though there are useful efforts underway on the Nunn-Lugar related programs.

   We already have a condition to the resolution before us that requires the Nunn-Lugar report; in other words, progress on Nunn-Lugar initiatives. We are required to have a report. While I will join the Senator in a letter, and I agree with what the Senator is trying to do, I honestly--not out of pride of authorship of what we came up with, but I honestly believe that what we did as a condition on the Nunn-Lugar programs on this treaty is, quite frankly, more effective than going the route of the condition 8 requirements in the START treaty. I hope I made that clear.

   Again, there is no disagreement I have with the Senator from Illinois. The bottom line is that what he has pointed out is, in my view, a real deficiency in this treaty overall. His legitimate attempt to take condition 8 of START and use it as a vehicle to stand in for the absence of a verification requirement in this treaty is useful.

   I honestly think, though, I say to Senator Durbin, the way we did it in the resolution is a more effective way of accomplishing what the Senator is trying to do than through condition 8 of the START treaty.

   I will conclude by saying, as I said in a necessarily lengthy statement laying out my interests, concerns, and the assets and deficiencies of this treaty when the chairman brought it to the floor, the treaty, as former Senator Sam Nunn said, in an overall context, can either be moderately helpful or it can be mischievous. I am paraphrasing.

   The absence of a verification provision worries me not so much because I think we are going to be put in jeopardy if they do not do what they are supposed to do, but because it is going to allow a future administration or Members of the Senate to do what they did when we had a verbal agreement on tactical nuclear weapons in the first Bush administration.

   It is going to allow some of our friends on the right, who are not going to like it when things are not going so smoothly with Russia, to say: See, these guys are liars. These guys do not keep their agreements. These guys are not doing what they said because we cannot verify that they have done what they said they were going to do.

   It leads to distrust because there is always, as my friend from Illinois knows, whether in the House or the Senate--and he has been here a long time--there is always a group in this body that trusts no agreement, none whatsoever, no arms control

   agreement, no matter how loosely structured.

   As Senator Helms, my good friend and the predecessor of the Presiding Officer, used to say: There is never a war we have lost or a treaty we have won. So it is axiomatic on the part of some, in the very conservative elements of our party, but clearly in the Republican Party, who say all treaties are bad ideas, they are just bad ideas.

   Absent verification provisions, we allow for misunderstanding to creep in over the next 10 years to what is basically a good-faith agreement until December 31, 2012, the drop-dead date when we know what has happened.

   I wish to make one other point because I think it will affect other legitimate points of view and amendments that are brought to the floor that I would be inclined to support.

   I remind everyone who may be listening--and I know my colleagues on the floor fully understand this--the President started off with a flat assertion that this would not be a treaty, the Moscow agreement. As a matter of fact, the day on which we had the police memorial service on The Mall--and I am part of that process--I was up on the stage, and the President, who has a great sense of humor and is really an engaging guy, walked up on the stage, grabbed my arm, and said: You owe me one, Joe.

   I looked at him joking and said: How is that, Mr. President?

   He said: You got your treaty.

   He was kidding about my owing him one. But the generic point was well taken. He never wanted this to be a treaty in the first place. The Senator from Indiana--I will not say the Senator from Indiana--the Senator from Delaware was vocal, vociferous privately and publicly with the President personally and on this floor that it had to be a treaty.

   The backdrop to all of this is, in terms of additional conditions that may or may not be added to this resolution, that if push comes to shove, I am convinced this President would not be disappointed if we did not vote for this. Let me restate that--he would be disappointed if we did not vote for it. But I am worried that, if certain amendments were added that he did not like, I do not think he would have any trouble saying, I would rather not have it as a treaty, and I will keep the verbal agreement, the executive agreement with Mr. Putin, rather than have it as a treaty and have to accept these conditions.

   It is very important this stay as a treaty as--flawed is the wrong word--but as incomplete as it happens to be. The Senator--I am not being solicitous--points out a deep and serious deficiency in this treaty, and I think the mechanism he chose to try to remedy it is, quite frankly, sound; but the remedy we chose to deal with the deficiency I think is a more likely way to achieve what we are seeking than condition 8 of the START treaty.

   Having said all of that, I will be happy to join the Senator in a letter, as strong as he would like to make the letter. I have already sent a few missives down to the President on my views on some of these issues, for what they are worth. I would be happy to join the Senator and sign with him a letter along the lines he has been talking about.

   Mr. DURBIN. I thank the Senator from Delaware.

   Madam President, because I am convinced of the genuineness and commitment of both the Senator from Indiana and the Senator from Delaware to the issue of nonproliferation, of transparency in our agreement with any nation when it comes to nuclear weapons, I am going to defer to their judgment. But I will also add, were I to send a letter by myself, I am not sure what it might mean, but if they will join me in this correspondence to the administration, I am certain it will carry more weight and be a reminder that we are mindful of the need for real verification, to make certain these nuclear weapons do not end up in the wrong hands and, in fact, they are set aside so they will not be a threat to any other nation.

   AMENDMENT NO. 250, WITHDRAWN

   For that reason, with the assurance of Senator Lugar, as well as Senator Biden, I ask unanimous consent to withdraw the amendment I filed.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has the right to withdraw the amendment, and the amendment is withdrawn.

   Mr. DURBIN. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. SUNUNU). The clerk will call the roll.

   The senior assistant bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

   Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER (Ms. MURKOWSKI). Without objection, it is so ordered.

   Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senator from Virginia be allowed to proceed as in morning business for such period of time as he may require.

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   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

   (The remarks of Mr. WARNER are printed in today's RECORD under ``Morning Business.'')

   Mr. LIEBERMAN. Madam President, if I may paraphrase Winston Churchill, the ``only thing worse than this treaty would be not having this treaty at all.'' So I rise this afternoon in support of this treaty--a good but ultimately insufficient treaty--and in support of my colleagues' amendments to it.

   I rise also to lend my voice to a related resolution that I drafted with the minority leader and several of my colleagues, which enunciates the beginnings of a coherent non-proliferation strategy.

   A little over one decade ago we awoke to the sound of freedom. The Berlin Wall had fallen; brothers and sisters who had been kept forcibly apart were able, once more, to take up the rights which are enshrined in our own Declaration of Independence, rights which we all too often take for granted. The Soviet empire was no more. It was the beginning of a new era. The threat of nuclear war, at least between two great superpowers, had lifted. It soon became clear that the newest threat to our security, the increased chance of proliferation wrought by the fall of the Soviet empire, was perhaps an even greater challenge. The sword had slipped from the giant's hand. We knew then and we know now, that we had no choice but to take action and prevent those who would do us harm by picking the sword up again.

   We in the Congress and our President acted with resolve. We moved to strengthen international institutions and systems designed to prevent the spread of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. And we were successful. The nuclear capable states of the former Soviet Union, one by one, renounced the use and possession of nuclear weapons and returned them to Russia. We had a few setbacks along the way, but overall we have managed to contain proliferation. But now I fear that this President has lost his way, and is undoing the good progress of previous administrations.

   The fact is, the events of September 11, 2001 should be a rallying cry for non-proliferation--we can imagine all too well the results if those who masterminded the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, had access to weapons of mass destruction. Yet since then, the Bush administration has unwisely led our Nation and the international community down a meandering path of policy choices with only one clear outcome: the increase of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In doing so, their choices have raised more questions instead of settling them.

   Why has the administration failed to engage North Korea, the prime proliferator of missiles and the greatest threat for immediate nuclear proliferation in direct talks?

   Why has the President chosen to ignore the advice of General John Shalikashvili, the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and instead actively pursued new uses for, and types of, nuclear weapons, when such action will erode the nuclear firebreak?

   Why has the administration failed to meet the Baker-Cutler funding benchmarks for nonproliferation and arms control programs?

   Why has the administration failed to fully invest in the Nunn-Lugar program?

   Where is the long-term strategy to diplomatically engage proliferating nations?

   I agree with President Bush that ``history will judge harshly those who saw this coming and failed to act.'' However, at a time when the international community needs leadership and guidance on this issue, the administration is virtually silent. Too often on arms control and non-proliferation, America has become a colossus that oscillates between pouting and shouting. In contrast, the resolution that my colleagues and I are introducing today gives this nation a strong, clear, and constructive voice on these critical issues. Here and now we call for the administration to rebuild the broad international coalition against proliferation that it has permitted, and even encouraged, to deteriorate over the past two years. We call for the full funding of all Federal non-proliferation and arms control programs to the levels prescribed by the Baker-Cutler report. We call for engaging North Korea in direct and full talks. We call for the expansion of the Cooperative Threat Reduction program to include additional states willing to engage in bilateral efforts to reduce their nuclear stockpiles. These would be acts of strength by the strongest nation in the history of the world and they would be acts of wisdom because these acts would increase our security.

   The bottom line: the United States must start now to rebuild the international community's consensus on stopping proliferation in its tracks. The measures outlined in our resolution will begin to do just that.

   On September 11, 2001, in a single fell blow, we learned just how vulnerable we may be if we do not act with foresight and urgency on containing weapons of mass destruction. Today, I believe everyone in this chamber understands that we cannot speak of homeland security without addressing non-proliferation.

   We cannot debate national security without including arms control. This Nation requires a coherent non-proliferation policy, and a clear voice on the matter in the international community. This resolution is the start.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi.

   Mr. LOTT. Madam President, I rise in support of the ratification of the Moscow Treaty. I would like to begin by thanking Senators LUGAR and BIDEN who have done very good work in this instance, and I believe they are going to provide very dynamic leadership on the Foreign Relations Committee in the Senate. These Senators have been working in this area for many years.

   I remember specifically the work of the distinguished Senator from Indiana after the dissolution of the Soviet Union as we had Russia and other countries grow out of that. We had the Nunn-Lugar legislation. Quite frankly, some of us were a little leery of how that program would work and whether it was the right thing to do. But looking back on that time in history, there is no question but that was a really dynamic leadership effort that needed to be made. It has been helpful. It has not been perfect, of course. But I think it has helped our relationship with Russia, and I think it has also helped to control the escape of and the misuse of some of those nuclear weapon capabilities. I want to recognize Senator Lugar's past leadership in this area and thank him for working to get this Moscow Treaty ready.

   I had occasion last year to go to Russia, to St. Petersburg and Moscow, with a delegation of Senators to meet with foreign policy leaders, defense leaders, members from the Duma, members of the Russian Federation Council, and the chairman of the foreign relations committee there in the Federation Council. It was very interesting and very informative.

   I believe there is a growing opportunity for the United States to have a close working relationship with Russia. It has to be one of truths. It has to be one that covers the entire sphere of not only trusting each other when it comes to arms and treaties but also the economy and trade, foreign policy, and international issues such as the one we are working on right now.

   We see today that the vote of Russia and what they do at the Security Council is going to be important as we prepare to deal with the situation in Iraq. So we need to have a growing relationship and friendship with this important country.

   I think this treaty is a good one. It is one that certainly is timely.

   Russia's transformation to a market economy still faces a number of challenges, obviously--its interests, and the people there. Also, the United States is working to get through problems. There are still problems we are trying to deal with. But our strategic relationship with Russia provides a strong foundation of cooperation on issues regarding nuclear weapons reduction and security.

   Since 1992, the United States has spent over $3 billion in Cooperative Threat Reduction Program funds to help Russia dismantle nuclear weapons and ensure the security of its nuclear weapons, weapons-grade fissile material, and other weapons of mass destruction. This has been a very big program. It is one that I think has been very important.

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   In 1998, both countries agreed to share information upon detection of a ballistic missile launch anywhere in the world and to reduce each country's stockpile of weapons-grade plutonium. As Russia and the United States continue to reduce the stockpile, we must stay vigilant in our collective effort to ensure that weapons-grade nuclear materials stay under lock and key. It is easy to say, but it is not a question of just turning the lock. There has to be an ongoing effort, there has to be verification, and there has to be a lot of cooperation.

   The Moscow treaty builds upon the spirit of cooperation between the United States and Russia. It serves the interests of both nations and both peoples, and makes the world a safer place. The treaty is just one element of a growing relationship between the U.S. and Russia that includes several new opportunities for cooperation including trade, energy, and economic development.

   There has been some concern, noted by the opposition, that the Moscow Treaty is not substantive enough--that it is only 3 pages long--much shorter than the several hundred pages of the START treaty--that is doesn't deal with actual warheads. First, we need to recognize that the Moscow Treaty does not take the place of the START treaty. The Moscow Treaty is separate from the START treaty--the START treaty is still in full force and effect.

   Perhaps more important than laying out comprehensive steps of reduction, these important three pages of the Moscow Treaty fundamentally approach Russia as a friend, not as an adversary. I believe that is a relationship that is going to grow and become more and more important in the years ahead.

   This is a historic achievement. With the document we will be voting on in the next day or two, both the United States and Russia will be making a commitment to reduce the quantity of operationally deployed warheads. Undeniably, it is in the best interests of both of our countries to destroy as many warheads as possible. Both sides continue to be challenged by warhead destruction in any given year because it is a very complex process. It is not a matter of just using a bulldozer.

   However, we must also not allow the complexity of the process to prevent us from our commitment to progress in this warhead reduction. Although not intended to be a detailed roadmap to accomplish that reduction, the Moscow Treaty lays out a high-level framework that is both workable and flexible.

   I am greatly encouraged by the level of developing cooperation between the United States and Russia that is embodied in this treaty. I am encouraged by the prospect now of having exchanges between leaders of the Duma and the Federation Council and leaders of the House and the Senate. I think it is important that we have those ongoing relationships. Under the leadership of Senator Lugar and Senator Biden, I believe we will see that continue to develop.

   By bringing forth the ratification of this treaty, I think it makes good sense for our Nation. It is important for the future security of the world, and I think it will help our friendship grow so that we will have not an adversary, as we had for so many years, but a friend in Russia.

   I wanted to come to the floor and endorse this treaty. I think it is an important signal of our feelings, and it is very important in a timely sense also.

   I yield the floor.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.

   Mr. WARNER. Madam President, if it is agreeable to the managers of the bill, I would be pleased to address my remarks at this time to the important matter before the Senate--the treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reduction.

   I rise to express my strong support for the ratification of the treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reduction, more commonly known as the Moscow Treaty.

   In my career as a public servant, I have had a number of opportunities to work with the former Soviet Union and with the current Russian Federation.

   I remember when I was Secretary of the Navy, I was asked to negotiate over a period of 2 years an executive agreement in the years 1970 to 1972 between the United States of America and the then Soviet Union. That executive agreement applied to the naval forces which I was privileged to be associated with at that time as Secretary of the Navy. It was a very important executive agreement. It is still in existence today. It has been used as a pattern for other nations for executive agreements between themselves and other countries. It related to how we operated our ships and aircraft in the international waters of the world--operated them in a manner that provided the maximum degree of safety to the vessel or aircraft itself and, of course, the crews who operated those platforms.

   We had experienced, in those days, incidents not unlike the one provoked by North Korea just days ago--where one of our aircraft, on a routine mission, in international airspace, operating under clearances given by the international programmers of airspace--when we were broached upon, as we use that phrase in the military, by North Korea's fighter aircraft. And, indeed, that broaching took the form of actions that bordered on literally hostile actions, in my judgement. But time will settle out that event.

   I just mention this chapter of history as showing my support for the people of Russia and the need for our two nations to work together. I still look upon Russia as a superpower, certainly in the arena of diplomacy, the arena of world economics. Indeed, I have profound respect for their armed forces today, even though those armed forces are somewhat significantly reduced in size.

   But against that background, I remember so well a number of trips to the Soviet Union. I remember so well one with the distinguished senior Senator from West Virginia, Robert Byrd, when he put together a delegation. We were the first Members of Congress to meet with then-President Gorbachev. It was a momentous day for all of us, having traveled those long distances, and then waiting in the anteroom, and then being escorted in to see that figure of history, a very important figure of history for Russia. I have a lot of respect for President Gorbachev.

   I remember another codel with Robert Dole, again, leader of the Senate, as was Senator Byrd. We went to visit President Yeltsin. At this time, I note, the delegations to visit President Putin certainly have not been large in number. I am not so sure that is for the good of our two nations. I would hope that Russia might look more favorably upon delegations of the Senate to come and visit with their leaders of today.

   In any event, I commend Senators LUGAR and BIDEN for their leadership on this issue. It has been exemplary. I think this Chamber can take rightful pride in each of those individuals--one the former chairman and one, of course, Senator Lugar, the current chairman of the distinguished Foreign Relations Committee.

   I certainly commend President Bush for his vision and leadership in negotiating this treaty and establishing a new strategic relationship with Russia. It is truly remarkable how our country's relations with Russia have evolved and deepened over the past 2 years. Groundbreaking U.S.-Russian cooperation on the war on terrorism has been critical to our success in Afghanistan and more broadly in our efforts to root out terrorism and deny terrorist groups safe havens and access to money and destructive weapons.

   On the subject of destructive weapons, the Nunn-Lugar program, I have had a strong interest and support for that program from the very day it was conceived. I remember Sam Nunn had a small breakfast and sat down. What an audacious concept. We stood there in awe, as the cold war was very much in evidence in those days. But I think the bold foresight of Senators Nunn and Lugar to envision this program has reaped a great deal of mutual benefit for both nations and, indeed, perhaps the world at large, to further limit the proliferation of not only weapons of mass destruction but the materials by which those weapons are made.

   Equally remarkable is President Bush's success in implementing the bold vision he set forth in his May 2001 speech at the National Defense University for a new strategic

   relationship with Russia. President Bush decided to move the U.S.-Russian relationship beyond the cold war not incrementally,

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   President Bush set out to break the cold war linkage of restraints on missile defense to reductions in nuclear weapons, and he did so in a way that caused no harm to U.S. relations with Russia. No harm--I would say, indeed, it brought about a strengthening of those relations. This was a remarkable accomplishment. There were many who thought it could not be done. But their fears proved unfounded. President Bush deserves our respect and admiration for leading the world out of its conventional cold war mindset.

   Russian President Putin shares in that credit. He, too, exercised admirable vision and leadership when he understood and convinced doubters in his own country that U.S.-Russian relations had evolved to the point where the ABM Treaty was no longer critical to Russian security. Because the United States and Russia no longer threatened each other, the ABM Treaty was no longer a necessary linchpin in regulating what used to be a U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms race.

   If I might just digress a minute, again, in my years of 1969 to 1974, being the Navy Secretary, and my early years in the Senate, when we experienced so many periods of tension with regard to the cold war, there was always an underlying theme, which I will describe as follows. I remember President Reagan used to say, ``Trust but verify''--a very magical phrase that captured the relationship between our two nations. But there was the feeling among the professional military who were responsible for these awesome weapons of mass destruction--and I think a feeling among those who negotiated, as did I in a very minor way on the Incidents at Sea Agreement--that the bottom line, the Russian Government, the Russian military were always there with a measure of prudent, sensible realization of these weapons, and there was an inherent responsibility in all of those individuals, both in Russia and in the United States, and their respective Governments, to exercise that judgment.

   The concept of deterrence, the concept of massive retaliation always had the underlying theme that individuals had sound judgment as to any final decision, and that sound judgment would be exercised.

   That is not true today with Saddam Hussein. We cannot find, in the history of his dictatorship over Iraq, that level of sensible responsibility as it relates to weapons of mass destruction. And I question whether that exists with North Korea today. I am not here to use any words of condemnation, but underlying the cold war period was that sense of some security with regard to the ability of those in possession of weapons to use good judgment, even in the times of the greatest of tensions.

   President Bush's readiness to negotiate a legally binding nuclear reduction agreement was instrumental in persuading President Putin that the new strategic framework proposed by President Bush--including withdrawal from the ABM Treaty--would serve Russian interests. The result: A treaty that was negotiated in record-breaking time, will bring sweeping mutual reductions in deployed nuclear weapons, and will enhance the national security of both the United States and Russia.

   The Moscow Treaty is unlike any treaty we have had before. It is the first arms control treaty to embrace the new Russian-U.S. strategic relationship. In negotiating this treaty, both sides consciously rejected the cold war mentality of distrust and hostility that previously had required lengthy negotiations and extensive legal structures and detailed verification regimes to ensure that both sides would abide by their treaty obligations.

   This simplicity puts the focus where it belongs--quickly achieving deep, equitable reductions in deployed nuclear weapons.

   This breakthrough treaty will reduce the United States and Russian nuclear arsenals from their present levels of approximately 6,000 strategic warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200 operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads over the next decade. These reductions, which amount to about two-thirds of the warheads in the Russian-United States arsenals, are the most dramatic in the history of arms control agreements. Such reductions are clearly in our national security interest. Russia is no longer perceived, or in actuality, an enemy. Our strategic arsenals, swollen by the cold war, no longer need to be sustained at such high levels.

   Another great strength of this treaty is the flexibility it accords our leaders to meet the uncertainties both in the international security environment and in the technological status of our nuclear stockpile. September 11 was a vivid reminder that we are vulnerable to attack in ways we never imagined. It is critical to our national security that our leaders retain the maximum flexibility to respond to emerging threats and changes on the world scene.

   The witnesses who testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee during our committee's review of the military implications of the treaty unanimously supported ratification of the Moscow Treaty. General Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated:

   The members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and I all support the Moscow Treaty. We believe it provides for the long-term security interests of our nation. We also believe that it preserves our flexibility in an uncertain strategic environment.

   Throughout its history, the Senate Armed Services Committee has played a critical role in assessing the national security impact and military implications of arms control agreements negotiated by the executive branch. Based on the hearings conducted by the Armed Services Committee and subsequent analysis, I am convinced that the Moscow Treaty advances the national security interests of the United States and deserves the Senate's unqualified support.

   I strongly urge my colleagues to join all of us in giving our advice and consent favorably to ratification of the Moscow Treaty.

   Mr. President, I see others about to address the Senate. I am happy to yield the floor.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia.

   Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from Virginia, the senior Senator, who is a gentleman. The old saying is: ``He is a gentleman and a scholar.'' I have known him and worked with him, confided in him and with him for these many years. I cherish his friendship.

   Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

   Mr. BYRD. Yes.

   Mr. WARNER. I thank him for those remarks. I made reference to my distinguished colleague from West Virginia moments ago in addressing this treaty and recalled when he led a delegation of which I was privileged to be a member----

   Mr. BYRD. Yes.

   Mr. WARNER [continuing]. To meet with President Gorbachev. I remember that day as if it were yesterday.

   Mr. BYRD. Yes.

   Mr. WARNER. And President Gorbachev said, we have this amount of time. And you very graciously, as the leader of the delegation--Senator Thurmond was with us as well----

   Mr. BYRD. Yes.

   Mr. WARNER. Anyway, it was a brilliant dissertation between yourself and at that time President Gorbachev, and it was a historic meeting. I said on the floor moments ago, I only wish we could do more of that with President Putin because I felt those delegations--I went on two delegations to the Soviet Union with the distinguished senior Senator from West Virginia.

   Mr. BYRD. The Senator is correct, yes.

   Mr. WARNER. They were very meaningful and helpful.

   Mr. BYRD. Yes. I believe on that occasion former Senator Sam Nunn was with us.

   Mr. WARNER. Yes. The Senator from Rhode Island, Mr. Pell.

   Mr. BYRD. Yes. And Senator Mitchell.

   Mr. WARNER. Senator Mitchell, Senator Sarbanes.

   Mr. BYRD. Yes. It was a fine delegation.

   Mr. WARNER. Yes, it was, but it was under your leadership. You were the first Member of Congress to go and meet with President Gorbachev.

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   Mr. BYRD. That was the first Senate delegation to go and meet with him, yes, it was.

   Mr. WARNER. I thank my colleague.

   Mr. BYRD. I thank the Senator for remembering that occasion.

   NORTH KOREA

   Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, while the United States continues its relentless march to war against Iraq, a crisis that is potentially far more perilous is rapidly unfolding halfway around the world on the Korean peninsula.

   While Saddam Hussein hunkers down in Baghdad, under the thumb of the United Nations weapons inspectors, and is being forced to begin destroying some of his most prized missiles, North Korean leader Kim Jong II is aggressively taunting the United States and moving full speed ahead toward restarting his nuclear weapons program.

   Over this past weekend, the North Koreans took their defiance and contempt of the United States to a new level when four North Korean fighter jets intercepted an unarmed U.S. reconnaissance plane in international airspace over the Sea of Japan.

   According to news reports, the armed North Korean jets came within 50 feet of the American plane and shadowed it for 22 minutes. Initial reports suggest that one of the North Korean pilots may have engaged his radar in preparation for firing an air-to-air missile moments before the U.S. aircraft aborted its mission and returned safely to its home base in Kadena, Japan.

   This latest action by North Korea is a marked escalation of the recent tensions between the U.S. and North Korea. Not since it shot down an unarmed U.S. surveillance plane in 1969--more than 30 years ago--has North Korea engaged in aerial confrontation with the United States. That last weekend's provocation by the North Koreans ended without incident is a relief, but it is not a reprieve from concern. Given the hostility and volatility of the North Korean government, this latest confrontation could easily have ended in disaster--a major disaster.

   The White House branded North Korea's actions as ``reckless behavior,'' and the Pentagon promptly dispatched 24 long-range bombers to Guam in a move that was seen by some as a not-so-subtle warning to Kim Jong Il that a military response to North Korea's increasing bellicosity is not outside the realm of possibility. But the President has given no indication that he is willing to address the North Korean crisis head-on by engaging North Korea diplomatically in an effort to defuse tensions. To the contrary, the White House appears determined to continue to proceed in its no-talk policy toward North Korea while it focuses the vast weight of its energy and resources on preparing for war with Iraq.

   I am increasingly alarmed that this administration's military and diplomatic fixation on waging war with Iraq is serving to overshadow and possibly eclipse the mounting crisis in North Korea.

   Benign neglect is a dangerous policy to apply to North Korea. The nation is isolated and its people are starving. Kim Jong Il is hostile, erratic, and desperate for cash. He is also armed and heavily fortified. In open testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on February 12, CIA Director George Tenet noted that ``the United States faces a near-term ICBM (Intercontinental Ballistic Missile) threat from North Korea.''

   According to intelligence estimates, North Korea already has one to two nuclear weapons and continues to develop the Taepo Dong-2 missile, which has the capability of reaching the United States with a nuclear-weapon-sized payload.

   Recent relations between the United States and North Korea were far from good to begin with, but since October, when it was revealed that North Korea had a secret program to produce enriched uranium, the resulting nuclear standoff between the United States and North Korea has gone from bad to worse.

   In a period of just over 4 months, North Korea has moved swiftly and boldly to take the necessary steps to resume the production of nuclear weapons. Following the disclosure of its covert nuclear program in October, North Korea in December expelled U.N. inspectors from its nuclear facilities at Yongbyon, removed U.N. monitoring seals and cameras, and announced it would reactivate the facilities. In January, a month before last, North Korea announced its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and appeared to begin moving its stockpile of nuclear fuel rods out of storage. Just last week, on February 27, American intelligence sources concluded that North Korea had, indeed, reactivated the Yongbyon facility. The significance of starting up the reactor is that it could, over time, provide a continuing source of plutonium for nuclear weapons, which North Korea could either stockpile or sell. If North Korea also begins reprocessing its nuclear fuel rods, some U.S. intelligence officials have concluded that it could begin producing bomb-grade plutonium within a matter of weeks, a process that could yield enough plutonium for five to seven bombs by this summer.

   In other words, North Korea could begin grinding out the essential components of nuclear weapons for its own use or for sale to the highest bidder even before the first volley is fired in Iraq.

   At the same time that it has been ratcheting up its nuclear activity, North Korea has also been ratcheting up its rhetoric and its military saber-rattling. In February, a North Korean MiG fighter jet crossed briefly into South Korean air space for the first time in 20 years. On February 24, North Korea rattled the inauguration of South Korea's new president by test firing an anti-ship missile into the sea. Earlier, North Korea threatened to abandon the armistice that ended the Korean War.

   And just this week on March 3, Kim Jong Il warned that nuclear war could break out if the U.S. Government attacks North Korea's nuclear program, while President Bush explicitly raised the possibility of using military force against North Korea as a ``last resort'' if diplomacy fails.

   The pattern of increasingly hostile words and actions on the part of North Korea, coupled with the moves it appears to be taking toward building up its nuclear arsenal, make North Korea one of the most volatile and dangerous spots on Earth today. The Bush Administration's inattention to the problem and its unwillingness to engage in diplomacy with North Korea are only exacerbating an already precarious situation.

   Under the circumstances, North Korea presents a far more imminent threat than Iraq to the security of the United States. It is ironic that the President has made it clear that a military response to the crisis in North Korea would be considered only as a last resort at the same time that he is massing forces in the Persian Gulf region to launch a preemptive military strike, possibly within a matter of weeks, if not days, against a much less potent threat to the United States.

   What is particularly frustrating is that the North Korean crisis might never have reached the proportions it has reached had President Bush taken a different tack with respect to North Korea when he came into office. Today's nuclear standoff with North Korea is, in many ways, a replay of a similar crisis in 1994, when North Korea pushed the envelope on its nuclear program, nearly precipitating a military response from the United States. That crisis was resolved when the Clinton administration reached an agreement, called the Agreed Framework, to freeze nuclear production in North Korea in exchange for fuel oil

   and light-water reactors. Unfortunately, when he took office, President Bush put relations with North Korea in the deep freeze by heaping suspicion and disdain on the North Korean Government, branding Kim Jong Il a ``pygmy'' and including North Korea in the ``axis of evil.''

   Even so, the current crisis might well have been defused weeks ago, before the two leaders started exchanging threats of war, had the United States agreed to talk directly to North Korea, as our allies in the region have been pleading with us to do. Instead, the administration drew a line in the sand, insisting that the United States would not be blackmailed into one-on-one talks with North Korea. As a result, the Americans and the North Koreans have been talking past one another for the past 4 months, and the progress has been all downhill.

   It has come to the point that, whether by accident or design, the situation in North Korea could rapidly disintegrate from a war of words and gestures

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   Stalemate and neglect are not effective tools of foreign policy. Wishful thinking is not an effective tool of foreign policy. The situation in North Korea is a crisis, and the United States must come to grips with it. We must open a dialog with North Korea.

   To ignore the peril presented by North Korea and its nuclear ambitions is to court--to court--disaster.

   Frankly, the longer the United States procrastinates and lets North Korea set the agenda, the harder it will be to deal with the situation diplomatically. If we do not act quickly, we may inadvertently paint ourselves into a corner as we have done in Iraq.

   It does not have to be that way. It is time for both nations to stop posturing and start talking. It is time for the United States to deal with the crisis in North Korea. I call on this administration to address the growing peril in North Korea, and to fully engage in a diplomatic effort to resolve what may well become an international problem of epic proportions. We can, and must, be firm, but we cannot remain aloof. We can, and should, insist that other nations with a stake in the future of North Korea be at the table, including China, Russia, Japan, and South Korea, but we can wait no longer for those nations to take the lead.

   The situation in North Korea is serious, but it is not yet desperate. The window to initiate diplomacy is not yet closed, but the longer the United States drags its feet, the narrower that window becomes. It is time to start talking to the North Koreans. If the United States takes the lead, our allies in the region are likely to follow. But it is the United States that must lead the way. The only practical way to solve the crisis in North Korea, before it erupts into chaos, is with patience, skill, and determination at the negotiating table. Let us begin now, before it is too late.

   Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, will the Senator entertain a question?

   Mr. BYRD. I would be glad to.

   Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, over my years in the Senate, I have had the privilege many times of working with my distinguished colleague. I have listened very carefully to his remarks. The bulk of the facts the Senator relates with regard to how North Korea has violated the framework agreement are accurate. I think his assessment of the potential threat as to how they address the serious issue of nuclear weapons is correct. But I respectfully say I believe this administration has been pursuing a policy--now my colleague may differ--of diplomacy to resolve this dispute. Our President recognizes the seriousness.

   As the Senator said, the bombers were promptly dispatched. My understanding was that that mission of those bombers had been in the planning for some time and, coincidentally, they were dispatched right after the eve of this very serious incident by which the hostile aircraft broached our unarmed aircraft. The Senator was dead accurate in his characterization of that serious incident.

   The point I wish to make is that I think our President has taken the correct tack at this time in diplomacy of saying that there may come a time in the future on bilateral talks, but at this juncture of this serious situation--and our President fully recognizes and I think shares with my colleague from West Virginia the seriousness of it--the multilateral approach; namely, that the talk should initiate with a table at which Russia, of course, South Korea, Japan, and China are there to participate. That is the way this administration quite appropriately desires to approach it.

   I believe Secretary of State Powell, in his most recent trip to the region not more than 10 days to 2 weeks ago, clearly said that out of that multilateral approach could evolve the situation whereby bilateral talks between the United States and North Korea would follow.

   Am I correct in my summary of how the President is approaching this? The Senator may have differences with it, but at least for the basis of our debate, I think I am correct.

   Mr. BYRD. I think the Senator is correct.

   Mr. WARNER. We have clearly not had the opportunity to fully exhaust the potential of a preliminary round of multinational talks such that these nations believe they are a partner with the United States. Now we may take the lead, but so often our Nation is criticized that we are the ones who are saying, you do this, you do that. Rather, in this crisis I think our country is saying that we want to work together with other nations as partners in addressing this issue before the possibility of bilateral talks.

   Mr. BYRD. I think that is a good approach normally, if there is time and if there is an indication that those other nations are going to take that lead. That is one thing. But there is not time here. There is not the indication that the other nations are going to take that lead.

   So I say we need to act more expeditiously. I do not think we can afford to wait. This is a crisis that is developing, and developing quickly, and there is every indication that if we continue to wait, Kim Jong Il is going to take additional steps. I understand he may have one or two nuclear weapons now, and he is fast getting into the position where he will be able to manufacture a weapon a month and then faster. We do not have the luxury of waiting until

   these other nations finally decide they want to do this.

   They seem to be reluctant. They have not shown any dexterity in moving in to fill this void up to now. I do not think we can afford to wait.

   In addition, yes, other nations have thought we acted too fast. They have done that in spades with respect to Iraq. We have gone hellbent into that. It seems the President has been determined to conduct a war in Iraq from the beginning almost. I would say as far back as last August he had said there were no plans. That was the response we received from all of the people in the administration. I know once before the Appropriations Committee, Secretary of State Powell, in answer to a question from me, said: There are no plans.

   The administration and its functionaries must have taken Members of Congress as fools when the administration continued to at that time say, well, the President has no plans. Anybody could see through that. He may not have plans today. He may not have plans on his desk. That was the way it was phrased: He had no plans on his desk. It takes only a fool not to be able to see through that. Perhaps he does not have plans on his desk, but there may be plans on some other desk somewhere that the President knows about, or the President may have plans tomorrow. He is certainly not immune to knowledge of what is going on all around him. After all, he is the Commander in Chief, the top man in the executive branch; he is supposed to know what is going on.

   So while we were fed that line by the administration, they simply did not want to tell us, and they do not want to tell us yet. It is not that they do not want to--that other nations have a right to complain about this administration moving pellmell into a situation without waiting for other nations, without wanting to wait for other nations. Not only that, but the administration treats us the same way in the Congress.

   The administration does not want to tell us what the cost of this was is going to be. They say it is such a range of costs that it might change from day to day. They do not want to say what it will be now because, who knows, maybe tomorrow it will be different. Well, of course, that is to be expected. But I think the administration ought to be honest, upfront, and sincere with the elected representatives of the people in Congress,

   and say now this is the situation today, Senator, as we see it. We think the range would be somewhere between A and B. That can change, Senator. Mr. Chairman, that can change. It can change tomorrow. But as of today, we cannot pinpoint the exact figure, but it would appear that it would be thus and so.

   Now, if the war lasts longer than a week, lasts longer than 2 weeks, 10 days, or 3 weeks, it may cost more. Of course, if we win the war, and win it quickly, it will not cost much. But then there is the problem of the morning after. What is the cost going to be

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   If the administration would come before the Appropriations Committee and address it like that--we understand that any administration would find it difficult; it would be impossible to be sure as to what the costs would be. But if an administration sits down with the congressional committee and says: Here is the situation; we estimate it to be thus and so, because we think the war will not last more than a week, or 10 days, or 2 weeks, or a month; if it lasts longer, it will cost more--that is being honest and forthright with the elected representatives of the people. We understand that. We were not born yesterday. But to just say, ``We do not know exactly,'' what does the administration think that Members of Congress are fools?

   We can see all that. We know all that. We know these things are difficult to figure. But when we also know that estimates are being kicked around internally, we believe we are entitled, on behalf of the people, to know what those estimates are.

   Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, if I might reply to my good friend, first on the issue of diplomacy, I do believe our President has worked very hard with the Prime Minister of Great Britain and other heads of state of the nations willing to proceed on the diplomatic route.

   Today we had a speech by the Secretary of State. I don't know if my colleagues had an opportunity to read it as I have. But it clearly says we are on a diplomatic course. No decision has been made to go to war.

   What little success the diplomats have had to date--and I frankly think Resolution 1441 was a high water mark of this whole controversy--is owing to the fact that this President had the courage to put our troops in forward deployments to back up the words of the diplomats and to send a signal to Saddam Hussein and others that we have a commitment to those men and women there, 200,000 of them in that gulf region. I visited the gulf region just 10 days ago. They are there as a symbol of our commitment to make diplomacy work.

   I recognize the Senator and I were with Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld the other day when my good friend from West Virginia expressed, as he has done now, the question of cost estimates. But the Secretary of Defense said he believed at this time he could not give those projections which would enable, I think, some very serious and finite parameters to be established.

   My good friend might recall President Clinton one time--I am not here to be political--said about the Balkans, we would be home in a year. I think the Senator remembers that because he and I collaborated on an amendment to require the other

   nations to come forward with their allocation of commitments to try to resolve some of the problems in that region. I remember we stood toe to toe on that.

   Here we are, 8 years later, and we are still in the Balkans with a not insignificant force. We have learned from that and experienced the need to exercise caution with regard to the questions of casualities. How well I remember being in the Chamber in 1991. The projected casualities we might encounter in the gulf war of 1991 were in the estimates of the tens of thousands. We thank the dear Lord that it did not in any way near approach that amount, although this country did lose brave soldiers, sailors, and airmen, and experienced the wounding of others in that very important conflict.

   The better side of prudence is being demonstrated here by the President and his Secretaries who are entrusted with dealing with the Congress. I printed in the RECORD earlier today, I say to my good friend, a recitation of a number of hearings the Senate Armed Services Committee, on which I am privileged to say my colleague serves, has conducted. That committee has, in connection with our debates on Iraq, held a number of briefings and so forth, in which I have been in attendance, on Iraq. Those are helpful for the public in its important debate now, and which I respect the diversity of opinions on Iraq, as I respect the opinions of my colleague from West Virginia. Nevertheless, I think our Senate has taken a constructive role in addressing that conflict.

   Mr. BYRD. I thank the Senator.

   I think we are going pretty far from the subject that I started out with today. I was talking about the fact that we are not paying the kind of attention that should be paid; we are not addressing the real crisis that is developing. We are not looking at the real peril that is facing this country; namely, North Korea. We are being distracted by the developing situation in Iraq, which, as far as I am concerned, does not present to this country anything near the peril, the danger, that we are confronted with in North Korea.

   Now, if the distinguished Senator wishes to engage in a freewheeling debate on the whole subject matter, fine, we will do that another day. But I am addressing the Senate on the need to open talks with North Korea and not wait for other nations to take the lead. We need to take the lead ourselves. Every day counts. Every 24 hours counts. We are already seeing this situation advance quickly. As long as Kim Jong II thinks we are going to be distracted with Iraq, he is likely to take further advantage of the situation. That is the issue I am addressing.

   Mr. WARNER. I thank the Senator. We did start out on that subject, but I wished to make reference to other statements the Senator made.

   Going back to the question of Korea, I think your concerns are important, as are mine. I simply say I think our President is vigorously trying to exercise leadership in world diplomacy with a multilateral approach with the nations of Russia, China, South Korea, and Japan at this point, and I have not read into any of the statements or actions that would say that after the full exploration of the multilateral approach, hopefully participation by those nations as partners, possibly of a bilateral approach--indeed, the Secretary of State has made an offering of food to care for the tragic situation of starvation in the North Korean section of that peninsula.

   Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I say to my friend, I hope the President will display this kind of desire to engage in multilateralism more so than he has with respect to Iraq. This is the approach I favored all along. We should get the United Nations, be sure the opinion of the world is with us in Iraq, and get the support of the United Nations.

   I have a resolution I introduced some time ago urging we seek a second U.N. resolution. If the President would show more interest in a multilateral approach to that situation, I think many would feel better. I recall his saying, I think, to the U.N.: If you don't do it, we will. If the U.N. doesn't do this, I will--or we will.

   That kind of an attitude has not been to my liking, certainly, and it does not show enough concern about the opinions of other nations, and it does not show enough desire to have the support of other nations.

   But this President is determined, apparently, to have a war in Iraq, even if he has to go it alone. That has been the impression I received thus far. When he says to the U.N., if you don't do it, I will, or we will, that doesn't show any great inclination to wait on other nations to help join in that situation.

   Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I think we have somewhat debated this issue. I believe the President has made strong overtures to the international community. Certainly he gave a brilliant speech in the U.N. He is working within the Security Council. Our Secretary of State has addressed the issue today. Perhaps at another time I would very much be privileged to engage our distinguished colleague in a debate on the subject. I thank my colleague.

   Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator. I think we certainly need, more and more, to debate this situation. I think we have not debated it enough. I believe that where we missed the boat was last fall when this Congress turned over to the executive branch the authority, by a resolution, virtually to declare war. I think Congress was wrong in doing that. I voted against that resolution. I am proud of the vote that I cast at that point. I think Congress, under the Constitution, has the authority to declare war, and I think we shift aside our responsibilities and our duties under the Constitution when we attempt to shift

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   The time for debate was then. It is not too late to debate it now. I have been attempting to say a good bit from time to time on this matter, and will continue to, if we have much time left. But time is closing in on us, as I see our troops massing on the borders of Iraq. I don't think there is much time left to debate. But as long as that time remains, I think we ought to utilize it. We ought to tell the American people what their losses are going to be and what the cost is going to be to them.

   That is where I think the administration is falling down. It ought to let the American people know the sacrifices they may have to make and what the cost of this war is going to be in terms of money, in terms of lives, and in terms of our image before the world--what it is costing us there. So let's have more from the administration on this point.

   Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, if I might say in conclusion, to those who perhaps take views different from I and others, I hope that debate would include very clearly a message to Saddam Hussein in Iraq that his lack of cooperation is the root cause of the problem today.

   So I thank my colleague for this opportunity. Maybe at a later date we can get into a further discussion.

   Mr. BYRD. Of course there are always two sides to issues. Preston County, WV, is a great buckwheat flour-growing area. They make fine buckwheat cakes. But there is no buckwheat cake so thin that there isn't two sides to it. So there are two sides.

   It seems to me we have just been recreant in not telling the American people what this is going to cost. I have a feeling they don't know very much, from the lack of debate that has gone forward, and from the fact that this administration has not come forward with the facts and told the American people what the cost may be to them. And all the while we see our young men and women

   being shipped out, as the National Guard goes forth and takes our schoolteachers, our policemen, our firefighters, our lawyers, and our churchmen. It takes people from all walks of life and sends them overseas--for how long we do not know. We don't know. They don't know what the duration will be. They don't know whether they will come back, of course. And I am sure their salaries are suffering when they go over as National Guardsmen.

   The people are entitled to know more than this administration has been willing to tell them. So I hope the Senator will join me in urging the administration to come forward with the facts and tell the American people, his constituents and mine, what they may have to pay.

   Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I share those concerns. My State has likewise contributed many reservists and guardsmen. As a matter of fact, I have been working with colleagues today on a question relating to that.

   Were it not for the sacrifices of those individuals, the reservists, active duty, and many others, we would not be where we are trying to solve this problem diplomatically.

   Say what you want about this President, I have seen a measure of courage in this fine man that I have not seen in others. He has all along said: The buck stops on my desk, and I accept responsibility.

   I thank my colleague.

   Mr. BYRD. I say to the Senator, courage is fine. I don't think the President lacks courage. Nobody is questioning his courage. But whether he has wisdom or vision or exercises good judgment along with courage is something else. I am simply saying this administration has not been forthright with the American people and has not been forthright with the Congress. We can debate that as long as you wish, but that is the way I see it. At some future time, if the distinguished Senator wishes to debate that, I will be happy to accommodate him.

   Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I accept that challenge. I thank my friend.

   Mr. BYRD. I thank the Senator.

   Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Crapo). The clerk will call the roll.

   The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

   Mr. AKAKA. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Alexander). Without objection, it is so ordered.

   Mr. AKAKA. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak for 10 minutes.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

   Mr. AKAKA. Mr. President, I acknowledge my friend, the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Lugar, who is in the Chamber.

   Today the Senate is engaged in an important and historic debate on the Moscow Treaty. President Bush and President Putin signed the Moscow Treaty on May 24, 2002, to limit strategic offensive nuclear weapons. Unlike arms control treaties of the past, this treaty does not include definitions of terms, counting rules, elimination procedures, or monitoring and verification provisions--all conditions considered in the past as essential to an effective agreement. As President Reagan once said, ``trust but verify.''

   The administration believes that the lack of these features is an asset and indicative of a new age in American-Russian relations. In the words of President Bush, it is time that the United States ``complete the work of changing our relationship from one based on nuclear balance of terror to one based on common responsibilities and common interests.''

   The treaty reflects American and Russian intent to reduce strategic nuclear warheads to between 1,700 to 2,200 by December 31, 2012. Each party is free to define for itself its ``strategic nuclear warheads'' and to determine how to reduce them. The treaty does not provide for the destruction of warheads or delivery systems. Nor does it place any restrictions on either party's force structure over the next ten years. Both sides can keep warheads for testing, spare parts, and possible redeployment.

   The administration plans to meet treaty requirements by moving an undefined number of warheads to a reserved force, some to storage, and dismantling others. The Russians will make similar force structure changes. Russia intends to continue to reduce weapon platforms and warhead levels and dismantle weapon systems with U.S. assistance under the important Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program.

   However, the Moscow Treaty leaves many issues unresolved and many questions unanswered. For example, Article I of the treaty specifies that each party shall ``determine for itself the composition and structure of its strategic offensive arms.''

   The United States has defined this to be ``operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads,'' and has defined operationally deployed to mean ``reentry vehicles on intercontinental ballistic missiles in their launchers, reentry vehicles on submarine-launched ballistic missiles in their launchers onboard submarines, and nuclear armaments loaded on heavy bombers or stored in weapons storage areas of heavy bomber bases.''

   Congress will have to wait to see how many warheads are destroyed and stored. Likewise, we will have to wait to see how Russia defines ``strategic offensive arms.'' Russia may move to redeploy multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicles, or MIRVs.

   Article II of the treaty states that the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, START, will remain in force. During the signing of the Joint Declaration, Presidents Bush and Putin stated that the provisions of START ``will provide the foundation for providing confidence, transparency, and predictability in further strategic offensive reductions.''

   But START expires in 2009. If START is not extended, we do not know how the parties will provide confidence and transparency between 2009 and 2012.

   Article III of the treaty establishes a Bilateral Implementation Commission but does not establish guidelines, procedures, or even responsibilities of the Commission. We do not know if the Commission will focus on monitoring and verification of agreed reductions.

   When President Bush signed the Moscow Treaty nearly a year ago, he assured the American people that he would continue to work on a separate political declaration that would create a strategic framework for the United States and Russia.

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   This document was to be broader in scope and would address other security and arms control issues aside from strategic reduction, including non-proliferation, counter-proliferation, anti-terrorism, and missile defenses. We have yet to receive that document.

   We need a better vision and a better strategy of how to make America safer and more secure from attack with weapons of mass destruction.

   I fear that the President is moving us toward a world of greater insecurity besieged by fears of nuclear weapons proliferation. Today's Washington Post indicates that the administration is willing to accept a North Korea with nuclear weapons. This is astounding, and, if true, threatens stability in northeast Asia. In addition, the administration has sought funding for new battlefield nuclear weapons that are more ``useable.''

   Until now, U.S. non-proliferation policy has been based on reducing the number of nuclear weapons states, controlling the spread of nuclear weapons technology, and eliminating nuclear weapons. We need to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction and establish with the rest of the world a system that deters both countries and terrorist groups from gaining access to these dangerous technologies.

   The resolution intended to be introduced by Senator Daschle and others, which I am proud to cosponsor, lays out the type of comprehensive non-proliferation policy that we need to make the world a safer place for future generations. I urge my colleagues to support it, and I urge the administration to adopt its recommendations.

   Mr. President, I yield the floor, and I suggest the absence of a quorum.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

   The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

   Mr. NELSON of Florida. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

   The Senator from Florida is recognized.

   Mr. NELSON of Florida. Mr. President, I rise today to address the Senate on the treaty being considered for ratification, the Moscow Treaty. I want to praise the hard work of our chairman, Senator Lugar, and the ranking member, Senator Biden, and their staffs, for the diligent efforts on this treaty. Their hard work on this treaty will ultimately enhance U.S. security.

   This treaty describes what both the United States and Russia hope to do in a new era, and that is to reduce our respective strategic offensive nuclear weapons stockpile and to reduce it quite dramatically. Considering how strategic nuclear weapons policy has changed since the time I first came to Capitol Hill, to the House of Representatives, way back in 1978, this new Moscow Treaty is a significant accomplishment but one that failed to maximize the opportunity to provide the world with the real destruction of weapons. It is clearly a major step in the right direction, but I do not think it has gone far enough.

   During this debate today, we have heard about the weaknesses of this treaty, and there are some. I regret, for example, that the treaty merely de-alerts nuclear weapons. It does not require their destruction.

   The treaty also is weak in its timetable for reaching the lowering of the target inventories, the inventories of warheads on top of the ICBMs. The treaty brings the target down from multiples of thousands to a range between 1,700 and 2,200 weapons. But it does not offer a specific timetable for how that will occur over these next several years. I believe we can remove these weapons more rapidly, and I hope the administration will do so.

   I also regret the treaty does not address tactical nuclear weapons, nor does it include verification procedures beyond those of the START I treaty.

   I remember when I was in the House of Representatives at the time President Reagan was President, he kept saying over and over: ``Trust but verify.'' I think we could have some more of that in this treaty.

   Despite all of those weaknesses, reductions in our strategic offensive weapons are appropriate, and are a major step in the right direction. Our relationship with Russia has evolved into an important partnership, and we hope that partnership is going to be strengthened. As we continue to move in this century to develop a relationship under the premise that Russia is not an enemy, then that is a step in the right direction.

   The Presiding Officer is from the South. I am from the South. We are accustomed to seeing two strange dogs approach each other.

   They are very leery of each other. And pretty soon they are sniffing around each other, and pretty soon those dogs decide it is OK, they can be friends. So as we start sniffing around with this former adversary, one that we hope will be a future solid partner, we must work to build mutual trust so our nations can cooperate on other important issues of common concern to our collective security, such as fighting terrorism, and such as economic reform and development.

   Clearly, one of the areas we have had a very cooperative relationship in is our respective space programs.

   I will never forget in the midst of the cold war there was a little bit of thought when an American astronaut crew rendezvoused and docked with a Soviet crew of cosmonauts. They lived together in space for 9 days in the Apollo-Soyuz historic mission of 1975. That started the contacts between our two space programs. That ultimately led to the joint venture we have now where the Russians are a partner of ours and they are helping us. They are our partner as we build the International Space Station. By virtue of this recent tragedy with the Space Shuttle Columbia, the way we can save those three humans on board should we not be able to get another space shuttle to the space station is the fact that there is a former Soviet--now Russian--spacecraft, Soyuz, that is docked to the International Space Station that can bring that crew of two Americans and one Russian home if they need to.

   This relationship with Russia has extended to NATO. We look forward to cooperating with Russia on issues affecting the security of Europe and our allies. But there is one area in which the United States can provide assistance to Russia while enhancing U.S. security. In this context of the Moscow Treaty, this is critically important. Earlier today Senator Biden said we must continue to move forward and provide adequate funding to the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program and related nonproliferation programs in the Departments of Energy and State.

   These programs collectively facilitate the destruction of nuclear weapons. They bolster the security of the facilities containing weapons-usable and fissile material. And these programs provide for retraining of scientists.

   These programs are very valuable. Yet they have not been adequately funded. This administration has not come forward with the adequate request for funding for the Nunn-Lugar cooperative threat reduction program.

   I will tell you, there is no one I have a greater respect for than my chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator DICK LUGAR. I think he will tell you the same thing. The spread of nuclear weapons and associated materials is a real threat. It is one particularly evident as we weigh the options available to us to deal with so many of the threats around the globe. Look at North Korea. It is one of those threats.

   We must provide resources to these programs to try to stop the spread and the proliferation of nuclear materials because they enhance our security by ensuring the adequate disposal of these weapons and their fissile material.

   Certainly now when we are engaged in this war against terrorists, when we are trying to prevent al-Qaida sympathizers and other terrorists from acquiring such deadly weapons, we should not lack in any resources.

   I again make a pitch to my colleagues in the Senate to adequately fund the Nunn-Lugar cooperative threat reduction program.

   These programs were evaluated in a report released in

   January 2001 by our former colleague and now the Ambassador to Japan--Howard Baker from the State of the Presiding Officer--and his partner in that report, Lloyd Cutler. Their report clearly said these threat reduction programs are being underfunded. They call the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

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   That is what Howard Baker and Lloyd Cutler said in their report to the Congress in 2001.

   That report was before an agreement was reached on the Moscow Treaty for reducing our nuclear arsenals.

   Now with so many new nuclear weapons coming out of service, we must consider significant action to reduce proliferation to ensure that the American people and our friends and allies around the world will be safe. The most obvious way is to bolster the Nunn-Lugar programs.

   I want to also speak on the subject of nuclear weapons, and I want to mention North Korea.

   I was very troubled to see the report that the Bush administration is slowly accepting North Korea's status as a nuclear power. This is an unconscionable abdication of leadership by this administration. North Korea has taken provocative steps. I don't know why we weren't raising Cain--I mean shaking the rafters--when those fighter aircraft buzzed our observation aircraft--our surveillance aircraft--just 2 days ago. North Korea has taken some very provocative steps hostile to the United States.

   It is likely they already have, according to our estimates, between one and three nuclear weapons because North Korea cheated on several international and bilateral agreements over the past decade. Since that time, they have renounced the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. They have renounced the International Atomic Energy Agency and their monitors who were there present by international agreements. They have renounced the 1994 Agreed Framework with the United States. They have been moving spent fuel rods to a reprocessing plant. Then, of course, this inexcusable incident with fighter jets to harass a U.S. reconnaissance flight in international airspace.

   Now, lo and behold, the President of North Korea is overtly threatening a nuclear war if the United States leads any effort to isolate them.

   With all of this belligerence, we have to have a plan. I would suggest that the Bush administration start working to diplomatically sit down with North Korea to start reducing tensions.

   We cannot and must not allow the North Koreans to develop an effective nuclear weapons arsenal.

   A year ago, the President, in his State of the Union Address, referred to North Korea as an ``Axis of Evil.'' Does he think that they are evil? I think he does. Do I think that they are evil? I certainly do.

   But is this the best way, diplomatically, to approach someone that we are trying to contain from becoming a nuclear power? We want them to stop their brutal actions against their own population, and we want to stop their proliferating technologies relating to weapons of mass destruction.

   So in that regard, the President was correct. But we have started to see what the consequences of that speech are. Instead of, as Theodore Roosevelt would say, ``speaking softly and carrying a big stick,'' the President made a judgment to speak harshly. And I want to know, where is the policy to back it up?

   This pronouncement did not cause the North Koreans to begin bad behavior and cheat on their agreements with the U.S. and the international community, but it did embolden them to harden their position and to spurn the international community and begin in earnest to openly pursue more nuclear weapons. This is now the situation in which we find ourselves. And we have to get out of it.

   I want this administration to have success because I think North Korea, with, a short way behind them, the country of Iran, poses the next major threat behind the threat that we are engaged in, which is, the war against terrorists.

   I think the United States needs some clear action. U.S. leadership is needed to get the world's declared nuclear powers to work together through the United Nations Security Council on a common response to the danger, not only in North Korea, but in Iran as well. If we fail to do so, the nightmare scenario of North Korea selling its nuclear weapons to terrorist groups and other rogue states, even their enriched uranium that they are trying to produce, all of that could become a reality. That is not good for anybody on planet Earth.

   I believe we ought to approach a policy where we must make North Korea understand that building an arsenal of nuclear weapons will not be tolerated and that all options to combat this threat, including the military options, have to be on the table. At the same time, we must work to form a viable regional solution with China and Russia and Japan and South Korea, but not to the exclusion of bilateral dialog with North Korea.

   I think all of us here are disappointed that China did not respond favorably to Secretary of State Colin Powell's recent appeals for assistance and involvement during his recent trip there. China, and other members of the Security Council, have a lot at stake. They must live up to their commitments of trying to prevent nuclear proliferation.

   No policy that we pursue can possibly work unless it is carried out in concert with key countries. But we are getting to the point that we cannot wait. We are going to have to devise workable policy options that the United States and North Korea may take to de-escalate this situation.

   So I call upon our colleagues here and our friends in the administration to begin a dialog with North Korea immediately. Each day that passes is a day that the danger notches up one more level.

   Again, I thank Senators LUGAR and BIDEN for their strong leadership on these critical security issues facing our Nation. I thank them for their sponsorship of this Moscow Treaty. I will support the Moscow Treaty on the final result at the end of the day when we pass it. It is clearly in the interests of the United States. Indeed, it is in the interests of planet Earth.

   Mr. President, I yield the floor.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Utah.

1F) Proposed Modifications to the Moscow Treaty
SA 251. Mrs. FEINSTEIN (for herself, Mr. LEAHY, Mr. WYDEN, and Mr. HARKIN) proposed an amendment to the resolution of ratification for Treaty Doc. 107-8, The Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions, Signed at Moscow on May 24, 2002; as follows:

    At the end of section 3, add the following new declaration:

    (7) STAND-DOWN FROM ALERT STATUS OF FORCES COVERED BY TREATY.--Noting that the Administration has stated that ``[t]he first planned step in reducing U.S. operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads will be to retire 50 Peacekeeper ICBMs, remove four Trident Submarines from strategic service, and no longer maintain the ability to return the B-1 to nuclear service,'' the Senate--

    (A) encourages the President, within 180 days after the exchange of instruments of ratification of the Treaty, to initiate in a safe and verifiable manner a bilateral stand-down from alert status of all United States and Russian Federation nuclear weapons systems that will no longer be operationally deployed under the Treaty, but which the United States and the Russian Federation may keep operationally deployed under the Treaty until December 31, 2012; and

    (B) expects a representative of the executive branch of the Government to offer regular briefings to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate regarding--

    (i) the alert status of the nuclear forces of the United States and the Russian Federation;

    (ii) any determination of the President to order a stand-down of the alert status of United States nuclear forces; and

    (iii) any progress in establishing cooperative measures with the Russian Federation to effect a stand-down of the alert status of Russian Federation nuclear forces.

   SA 252. Mr. LEVIN. (for himself, Mr. Feingold, Mr. Akaka, and Mr. Kennedy) proposed an amendment to the resolution of ratification for Treaty Doc. 107-8, The Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions, Signed at Moscow on May 24, 2002; as follows:

    At the end of section 2, add the following new condition:

    (3) NOTICE AND CONSULTATIONS PRIOR TO WITHDRAWAL OR EXTENSION.--(A) Prior to taking any action relevant to paragraphs 2 or 3 of Article IV of the Treaty, and except as provided in subparagraph (B), the President shall--

    (i) provide not less than 60 days advance notice of such action to the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and

    (ii) consult with the Senate on such action.

    (B) The President may waive a requirement in subparagraph (A) if the President--

    (i) determines that national security needs prevent the President from meeting the requirement; and

    (ii) submits to the committees of the Senate referred to in subparagraph (A) a written notice of the waiver, including a description of the national security needs and the reasons justifying the waiver.

    In section 3, strike declaration (6).

   SA 253. Mr. FEINGOLD proposed an amendment to amendment SA 252 proposed by Mr. LEVIN (for himself, Mr. Feingold, Mr. Akaka, and Mr. Kennedy) to the resolution of ratification for Treaty Doc. 107-8, The Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions, Signed at Moscow on May 24, 2002; as follows:

    At the end of the proposed condition, add the following:

    (C) Prior to taking any action relevant to paragraphs 2 or 3 of Article IV of the Treaty, the President shall obtain the approval of two thirds of the Senators present.

   SA 254. Mr. AKAKA proposed an amendment to the resolution of ratification for Treaty Doc. 107-8, The Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions, Signed at Moscow on May 24, 2002; as follows:

    At the end of the last sentence of condition 1 in section 2, strike the period and insert the following: ``, and shall include--

    ``(A) an estimate of the funding levels required in the fiscal year following the year of the report to implement all Cooperative Threat Reduction programs and other nonproliferation programs relevant to the Treaty and ensure that nuclear weapons, materials, technology, and expertise in the Russian Federation are secure from theft and diversion; and

    ``(B) a description of any initiatives proposed by the President to address any matter covered by subparagraph (A) in order to improve the implementation or effectiveness of the Treaty.''.

   SA 255. Mr. KERRY proposed an amendment to the resolution of ratification for Treaty Doc. 107-8, The Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions, Signed at Moscow on May 24, 2002; as follows:

    At the end of section 2, add the following new condition:

    (3) ANNUAL REPORTS ON MONITORING CAPABILITIES.--(A) Not later than 60 days after the exchange of the instruments of ratification of the Treaty, and annually thereafter on May 1, the President shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate an estimate, prepared by the Director of Central Intelligence, on the capability of the United States to monitor the compliance of the Russian Federation with the requirements of the Treaty.

    (B) Each estimate shall meet the requirements of a national intelligence estimate under section 103(b)(2)(A) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(b)(2)(A)), and shall include--

    (i) an estimate, for each strategic nuclear weapons system of the Russian Federation, of the confidence of the United States, whether low, medium, or high, in the capability of the United States to monitor the deployed warheads on such system;

    (ii) an assessment of the capability of the United States to monitor the compliance of the Russian Federation with the requirements of the Treaty--

    (I) under the verification measures of the verification regime under the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, with Annexes, Protocols, and Memorandum of Understanding, signed at Moscow on July 31, 1991 (START Treaty); and

    (II) after the verification regime expires upon termination of the START Treaty; and

    (iii) additional mechanisms to ensure United States monitoring of the compliance of the Russian Federation with the requirements of the Treaty, including--

    (I) further agreements between the United States and the Russian Federation;

    (II) mutual data exchanges between the United States and the Russian Federation;

    (III) improvements in the transparency of strategic offensive reductions under the Treaty;

    (IV) improvements to existing monitoring technologies; and

    (V) other appropriate mechanisms.

    (C) Each estimate shall be submitted in both classified and unclassified form.

   SA 256. Mr. LEVIN (for himself, Mr. DASCHLE, Mr. AKAKA, and Mr. NELSON of Florida) proposed an amendment to the resolution of ratification for Treaty Doc. 107-8, The Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions, Signed at Moscow on May 24, 2002; as follows:

    In section 2, in paragraph (2)(F), strike ``; and'' and insert a semicolon.

    In section 2, redesignate paragraph (2)(G) as paragraph 2(H).

    In section 2, after paragraph (2)(F), insert the following new subparagraph:

    (G) with respect to the strategic offensive reductions described pursuant to subparagraph (B) for a calendar year, a listing of--

    (i) the total number of each type of strategic offensive nuclear warhead that will be in the nuclear weapons stockpile of the United States during the calendar year, and the total number of each type of strategic offensive nuclear weapon that will be operationally deployed by the United States during the calendar year;

    (ii) the number and type of nuclear warheads in the United States that were dismantled during the previous calendar year; and

    (iii) to the extent possible, the total number of each type of strategic offensive nuclear warhead that will be in the nuclear

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   SA 257. Mr. FRIST (for Mr. LAUTENBERG) proposed an amendment to the concurrent resolution S. Con. Res. 13, condemning the selection of Libya to chair the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, and for other purposes; as follows:

   On page 8, strike line 21 and insert ``(10) objects''
Statements on Proposed Amendments

   Resolution of Ratification to Accompany Treaty Document 107-8, Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from California is recognized.

   AMENDMENT NO. 251

   (Purpose: To provide an additional declaration)

   Mrs. FEINSTEIN. I send an amendment to the desk on behalf of Senators LEAHY, WYDEN, HARKIN, and myself.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.

   The legislative clerk read as follows:

   The Senator from California [Mrs. FEINSTEIN], for herself, Mr. Leahy, Mr. Wyden, and Mr. Harkin, proposes an amendment numbered 251.

   Mrs. FEINSTEIN. I ask unanimous consent the reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

   The amendment is as follows:

    At the end of section 3, add the following new declaration:

    (7) STAND-DOWN FROM ALERT STATUS OF FORCES COVERED BY TREATY.--Noting that the Administration has stated that ``[t]he first planned step in reducing U.S. operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads will be to retire 50 Peacekeeper ICBMs, remove four Trident Submarines from strategic service, and no longer maintain the ability to return the B-1 to nuclear service,'' the Senate--

    (A) encourages the President, within 180 days after the exchange of instruments of ratification of the Treaty, to initiate in a safe and verifiable manner a bilateral stand-down from alert status of all United States and Russian Federation nuclear weapons systems that will no longer be operationally deployed under the Treaty, but which the United States and the Russian Federation may keep operationally deployed under the Treaty until December 31, 2012; and

    (B) expects a representative of the executive branch of the Government to offer regular briefings to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate regarding--

    (i) the alert status of the nuclear forces of the United States and the Russian Federation;

    (ii) any determination of the President to order a stand-down of the alert status of United States nuclear forces; and

    (iii) any progress in establishing cooperative measures with the Russian Federation to effect a stand-down of the alert status of Russian Federation nuclear forces.

   Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I rise today to offer this amendment. I recognize that the leadership is not accepting amendments. I accept that. I am a supporter of the treaty, and I am happy to cast my vote for it.

   But there is one significant omission from this treaty, and I want to point out that omission. That omission is that we have literally thousands of nuclear missiles on hair trigger alert. The Russian Federation has thousands of nuclear missiles on hair trigger alert. This treaty does not take that into consideration and does not urge or does not certify a reduction of the alert status of these missiles. I believe if we fail to address this issue, we risk the lives of millions of people over what may turn out to be a simple miscalculation.

   People hearing me might say, how can that possibly happen? I would like to explain how it can happen.

   On the morning of January 25, 1995, the Russian military initially interpreted the launch of a U.S. weather rocket from Norway as a possible nuclear attack on the Russian Federation. That is just 8 years ago. Thankfully, the true nature of the launch became known and a catastrophic mistake was averted. Nevertheless, then-President Yeltsin and his advisers had only minutes to decide whether the launch of a weather rocket was a surprise attack because Russia, like the United States, maintained and continues to maintain thousands of nuclear weapons on high alert status, ready to be launched at a moment's notice.

   This was not the only instance in which both countries have come close to the unthinkable. On at least two occasions in the United States and at least one occasion in Russia, false alarms could have led to the accidental launch of nuclear weapons.

   Today, Russia and the United States are entering into a new era of relations. We do so with the advent of this treaty. A deliberate nuclear strike by either side is unthinkable. In fact, the administration states the brevity of the Moscow Treaty and the lack of verification, timetables, and a list of specific weapons to be destroyed, is due to the fact that Russia and the United States are no longer strategic competitors but today we are strategic allies. So fear and suspicion have been replaced by trust, cooperation, and friendship.

   It is surprising, then, that the United States and Russia continue to maintain their nuclear arsenals on this high

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   the dangers of high alert status and the need to reevaluate our nuclear weapons. As a candidate, he stated in a speech on May 23, 2000:

   Keeping so many weapons on high alert may create unacceptable risks of accidental or unauthorized launch.

   Experts on nuclear weapons issues have expressed similar concerns. In his testimony on the Moscow Treaty before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, former Senator Sam Nunn stated that the alert status:

   ..... may well be more important to stability and security than the actual number of nuclear weapons.

   He likened the issue to two families who have agreed to reduce the number of high-powered automatic weapons aimed at each other in several years' time but in the meantime decide to keep the weapons loaded with a finger on the trigger.

   Former Secretary of Defense William Perry testified that the Moscow Treaty's failure to address the alert status of the United States and Russia's nuclear weapons represented a significant missed opportunity. He concurred with retired Air Force GEN Eugene Habiger, former commander in chief of the U.S. Strategic Command, who recommended that the United States take a first step by immediately standing down all nuclear weapons systems that will not be operationally deployed under the Moscow Treaty.

   If you will note, the amendment I have sent to the desk does not say this should be unilateral, on our part only; it says a bilateral reduction of alert status of operational nuclear weapons deployed today.

   I believe we should take the words of the general, of the very respected Senator Nunn, and former Defense Secretary Bill Perry and take some action. A miscalculation, in Senator Nunn's scenario, would result in the loss of a few lives from these automatic weapons in a family feud situation, but a miscalculation between Russia and the United States could result in the loss of millions of lives. De-alerting will give the leaders of the United States and Russia sufficient time to evaluate fully a situation before making a decision on a nuclear response in a matter of minutes or seconds, and it would greatly reduce the possibility of an accidental nuclear launch due to false alarm and miscalculation.

   The amendment I sent to the desk encourages the President, within 180 days of exchange of instruments and ratification, to initiate in a safe and verifiable manner a stand-down from alert status of all nuclear and Russian nuclear weapons systems that will not be operationally deployed under the treaty.

   In other words, the treaty calls for removing the operational deployment. But in the meantime all these missiles remain on high alert status--hair trigger alert status.

   The amendment would urge the President to call on the Russian Federation to reciprocate in kind, and the amendment asks that a representative of the executive branch of the Government offer regular briefings to the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate on three specific topics: First, the alert status of the nuclear forces of the United States and Russia; second, any determination of the President to order a standdown of the alert status on the U.S. nuclear forces; third, any progress in establishing cooperative measures with Russia to effect a standdown of Russia's nuclear forces.

   There is a precedent for de-alerting our nuclear weapons and prompting the Russians to do likewise. In 1991, as the Soviet Union began to crumble, then-President Bush ordered a unilateral standdown of the U.S. strategic bombers and de-alerted some missiles scheduled for deactivation under the START treaty. Soviet President Gorbachev at that time reciprocated with similar measures, and the world breathed a little easier during those turbulent times. So there is precedent for their de-alerting missiles. And I believe that this Moscow Treaty, which is based on friendship, trust, and cooperation, necessitates an increased de-alerting status of the literally thousands of nuclear weapons that remain in their silos on a hair trigger alert.

   The amendment is simple and straightforward. We can take it very easily. I very much regret that we are in a no-amendment scenario. What I hope to do and my cosponsors hope to do is enter into a colloquy in the RECORD indicating support for this measure and, second, we will draft a letter and try to get as many signatures from other Senators as we can.

   I believe this treaty, which should be ratified by this Senate today, has this significant oversight. I believe that to leave these missiles on hair trigger alert status when we enter into this treaty really downgrades the treaty. If we truly trust, if we truly want to be cooperative, and if we truly are friends, friends don't aim loaded guns at each other with the triggers pulled back.

   I am hopeful that the administration would respond and begin a discussion between President Putin and President Bush to see if we cannot reach a bilateral de-alerting of the literally--probably more than--10,000 missiles that will remain with nuclear warheads on hair trigger alert.

   AMENDMENT NO. 251 WITHDRAWN

   I ask unanimous consent that the amendment be withdrawn.

   I yield the floor.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendment is withdrawn.

   Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

   The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

   Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

   Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, I take the opportunity to make some comments regarding the ratification of the Moscow Treaty. I do it with some reservation. I think the treaty is both a ``good news'' and ``bad news'' story.

   Right now, roughly speaking, the United States and Russia each deploy 6,000 nuclear warheads. The treaty would require the U.S. and Russia to reduce these levels to 1,700 to 2,200 ``operationally'' deployed strategic nuclear weapons on each side by December 2012.

   The good news is that this treaty is a positive step--long overdue, but a positive step nonetheless. Over 10 years ago, in January of 1992, when U.S.-Russian relations were the warmest in years, President Yeltsin of Russia proposed that the U.S. and Russia reach a strategic arms control agreement that set the levels at 2,000-2,500 in a START II agreement.

   If former President Bush had agreed back then, we could be close to the levels today that the Moscow Treaty envisions for 10 years from now.

   At the time former President Yeltsin made his proposal for deep reductions, Defense Department officials, especially Defense Secretary CHENEY--now our Vice President--opposed them.

   As a result, the START II agreement, signed in January 1993, only limited the number of strategic nuclear warheads to 3,000 to 3,500 on each side. And due to wrangling over national missile defense the START II agreement never entered into force.

   So I am glad to see that the administration and Vice President CHENEY now support cuts to levels first proposed by President Yeltsin in January 1992. This support for stronger strategic arms control steps is long overdue but welcome.

   A second chance to achieve greater reductions came 6 years ago in 1997. President Clinton agreed with President Yeltsin at Helsinki that a future START III agreement would entail reductions to 2,000-2,500 strategic warheads on each side. Most likely, the START III agreement would have overlapped with the START II agreement, finishing implementation at the end of December 2007.

   The START III levels of 2,000 to 2,500 are essentially the same as those embodied in the Moscow Treaty. The START III would have counted several hundred warheads on systems in overhaul; the Moscow Treaty will not.

   Unfortunately, because START II never entered into force, START III negotiations never began.

   In addition, after 1994, our Republican colleagues deliberately made it more difficult to make progress on reducing strategic nuclear arms.

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   Starting with the fiscal year 1995 Defense authorization bill, a provision was regularly added forbidding the President from reducing U.S. strategic forces below the START I levels of 6,000 strategic nuclear warheads. In time for this treaty, this provision has been repealed.

   So I am pleased to see that my Republican colleagues now support cuts to the levels envisioned by President Clinton and President Yeltsin in March 1997. It is a welcome change of heart, even though it is long overdue.

   The bad news, however, as many have noted, is that the treaty is but a modest step forward. Many have argued it has several major shortcomings.

   First, the 10-year implementation period is too long and includes no benchmarks for progress or verification measures. Theoretically, as the treaty now stands, both sides could wait until the last moment to make their reductions, right before the treaty expires.

   Second, only some of the warheads removed from missiles and bombers will be dismantled. The rest would merely be put into storage, where they could be redeployed. Thus, there will not be a real reduction in the United States or Russian strategic nuclear arsenals. Moreover, the security of thousands of stored weapons will remain a matter of major concern, especially during this era of heightened terrorism.

   Third, the treaty could have reduced the strategic arsenals of the United States and Russia even further.

   Fourth, the treaty does not cover the thousands of small tactical nuclear weapons that are a major concern for theft by terrorist groups. And they are weapons of great power, great destructive capability.

   Since this treaty is so long overdue, and such a modest accomplishment, we must work hard through the Bilateral Implementation Commission to improve it in the coming years. We also need to take steps beyond the scope of this treaty to reduce our nuclear arsenals even more.

   So I strongly endorse the call in the Foreign Relations Committee Resolution of Ratification for the President to ``accelerate'' U.S. strategic force reductions so they can be achieved before December 31, 2012. We should aim to accomplish this by the end of 2007.

   We should also seek to dismantle the 4,000 or so warheads that will be removed from launchers--not just put them in storage. Otherwise, this treaty is more of a nuclear ``shell game'' than a true disarmament measure. Warheads taken off missiles today could be put back tomorrow.

   We should begin new discussions to reach new lower levels of strategic nuclear weapons. I strongly support the Resolution of Ratification's call for the President to continue reductions in strategic nuclear warheads. President Putin wanted each side to decrease to levels of 1,500 warheads. There isn't any reason we can't reduce to levels of 1,000 to 1,500 in the next 5 to 10 years.

   There are other problems relating to tactical nuclear weapons and transparency and security of nuclear arsenals that need to be addressed and that many have touched upon today. The Senate needs to be active in addressing these questions. I look forward to seeing the reports required by the Resolution of Ratification so we can monitor the progress of the treaty and act accordingly.

   We have waited too long for this treaty. We cannot let the long implementation time of the treaty sweep these important questions from our agenda for the next 10 years.

   With the assumption that the Senate will remain active on these questions and the administration will follow through with the provisions of the Resolution of Ratification, I give my reluctant advice and consent to this treaty and look back and see how much more we could have accomplished. Nevertheless, let's get on with what we have in front of us and start reducing the size of the nuclear forces out there.

   With that, Mr. President, I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

   The senior assistant bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

   Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. GRAHAM of South Carolina). Without objection, it is so ordered.

   Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, I wanted to come to the floor just to give our colleagues a brief report on the status with regard to amendments to the treaty legislation. Senator Byrd has indicated he wishes to offer an amendment. Senator Conrad has an amendment. Senator Feingold may have an amendment. We are trying to verify whether he still intends to offer it. And then Senator Levin has an amendment.

   I had indicated to the distinguished majority leader that we felt we could accommodate these amendments today and vote on final passage tonight.

   He has indicated that if that were the case there would be no votes tomorrow.

   I hope our colleagues can accommodate that schedule to come over and offer their amendments, and perhaps we can even agree to a timeframe within which these amendments can be considered. We have been in a quorum call now for about an hour. Obviously, if we want to finish at a reasonable hour today, it would be very helpful if our colleagues could come to the floor to offer their amendments. We will have to do it sometime today. It seems to me the sooner we get on with this debate, the sooner we can offer those amendments and the sooner we can complete our work and do so in a way that will accommodate other schedules which I know Senators have tonight and tomorrow.

   I make that report. I make that plea. I hope our colleagues can allow us to finish our work on this legislation so that we can move on to other matters.

   I thank the Chair. I yield the floor.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.

   Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Democratic leader for his thoughtful comments. I encourage amendments to be offered as soon as possible and that we be prepared to debate those amendments and work with both leaders to finalize actions on the Moscow Treaty today. I appreciate very much the specific amendments that are out there. I hope we can identify those amendments and work with the offerers of the amendments.

   Mr. President, while I have the floor, I would simply indicate that the Moscow Treaty before the Senate today is very important for several reasons. Some of these were outlined by Senator Biden, myself, and others yesterday.

   But let me reiterate the fact that this treaty arose from a very important meeting that President Bush had with President Putin of Russia last May. During the course of that time, both leaders identified the fact that both countries were in the process of thinking through how to reduce the number of nuclear warheads that are still on missiles aimed at each other. These leaders identified thousands of such warheads and the dangers of leaving things where they were. Our President has indicated that he had already reached a determination with his advisers. It would be in our best interests, if necessary, to unilaterally change our situation; that is, to think through carefully how many warheads the United States needs to defend itself against all potential adversaries and to move to that number. That would save a great deal of expense for the taxpayers in perpetuity--every year that these warheads were no longer required. Furthermore, and more obviously, it would relieve the anxiety of people all over the world who see the cold war still manifested in a very large number of nuclear weapons on missiles that could convey them.

   The Russians have had the same idea. They have budget stringencies that are much more severe than our own. Therefore, the two leaders came to a conclusion that an agreement was useful, and, furthermore, it would illustrate what both characterized as a new relationship between Russia and the United States in a very visible and tangible way.

   Some advisers of both President Bush and President Putin may have believed all of this might be done without a treaty; that is, both countries simply taking action would seem to be in the self-interest of the two countries. Others clearly believed it would be best to codify this in as simple an agreement as possible. The Moscow Treaty was the product of that effort. It is a short treaty, as many have pointed out.

   As I mentioned yesterday, many of the critics believe it is far too short;

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   We will do this on our own schedules, and we will have the protocols of START before us through 2009 and the cooperative threat reduction activity--at least the very visible form of cooperative activity and verification--through that means.

   I mention all of that because some Senators have asked both

   on the floor and off the floor, Is this important to President Bush now? Why is the Moscow Treaty coming up at this particular moment?

   I would respond to those questions by saying from the very first meeting the President had with Senator Biden, then-chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, and me, he encouraged us to move as rapidly as prudent. And we have done so. We pledged to the President that day that hearings would be held. In fact, they were held last year. They were extensive. We have mentioned that hearings were held also in the Armed Services Committee and there were behind-closed-door hearings in the Intelligence Committee, and that both of the other committees shared with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee the product of those hearings.

   Senators have been on the floor of the Senate as members of those committees and have already testified to the efficacy and the importance of the treaty.

   This is the first period of time available on the calendar of the Senate. The majority leader has given this time to our committee with the full cooperation of Senator Daschle and Democratic leaders of the Senate. I treasure that fact because I think it is important and it is keeping the faith not only with our President but with the relationship that our President and President Putin have been attempting to forge.

   I would simply point out that we have just concluded in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee another extensive hearing on North Korea. There we talked about the importance of a relationship between Russia and the United States. That is a very important relationship. The United States is counting upon Russian friends to be forthcoming with regard to their understanding of the risks that are involved in the Korean peninsula, the risk to Russia, the risk to the United States, and the risk with regard to nuclear weapons throughout the world in which Russia and the United States have perhaps the greatest responsibility and the greatest stake.

   The Moscow Treaty is timely with regard to dialog and diplomacy with the United States and Russia with regard to North Korea. Many hope it may be relevant still with regard to our dialog on the question of Iraq and Resolution 1441 at the United Nations or its successor.

   I mention those aspects not with prediction but simply with the relevancy and the timeliness of this debate. I think it is important for us to proceed, if we can, to have a successful conclusion of the debate and a vote on the Moscow Treaty today.

   The distinguished Democratic leader has indicated that he perceives this as in the best interests of the Senate. I know our leader feels the same. I simply invite Senators to come to the floor to come forward with their amendments, and we will try to proceed.

   I finally add, both Senator Biden and I indicated yesterday it would be our hope that amendments would not be adopted to the text of the treaty or its annexes at this point. We believe passage by the Duma, as well as passage by the Senate, in a timely manner is very important.

   We understand there are many Senators who wish the treaty had been longer, more extensive, more intrusive with regard to Russian procedures as well as our own, but we have attempted to achieve a great deal. We have much further to go as we negotiate with our Russian friends. Therefore, I hope Senators will not call for bridges that are too far on this treaty and thus jeopardize both its passage here and its implementation by both countries.

   I thank the Chair and yield the floor.

   Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

   The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

   Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

END

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Idaho.

   Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, I believe we are considering the Moscow Treaty.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.

   Mr. CRAIG. I ask unanimous consent to speak as in morning business for no longer than 10 minutes.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

   Mr. CRAIG. I see my chairman here. I want to make sure it is OK with him. It is.

   (The remarks of Mr. CRAIG are printed in today's RECORD under ``Morning Business.'')

   Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

   The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

   Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

   AMENDMENT NO. 252

   Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, in a few moments, I will send an amendment to the desk. Before I do so, I will make some general comments on the Moscow Treaty which is before the Senate.

   I first wish to congratulate and commend our good friends from Indiana and Delaware for their great work on this treaty. As on so many other issues, they have worked together well in the national interest. The document which is before us, as well as the Resolution of Ratification, represents a lot of significant work on their part. I applaud them for it.

   The treaty before us is a modest but a positive step in the United States-Russia relationship. It is particularly important we have this treaty. At some point it was suggested the agreement not be in the form of a treaty. As a matter of fact, the administration finally decided--I think wisely so, and I believe with the support of the chairman and ranking member of the Foreign Relations Committee--that we have a legally binding treaty rather than relying on unilateral steps that are not binding on future administrations and can be easily changed.

   Having a treaty ensures that the Senate is going to be able to fulfill its constitutional role, giving due consideration of any treaty and providing advice and consent before ratification.

   I view this treaty as a starting point for further nuclear arms reductions and a useful boost to our new and developing and evolving relationship with Russia. There is much more work to be done to continue to improve our mutual security with Russia, and that work includes further reducing our reliance on nuclear weapons, reducing nuclear proliferation dangers, and improving confidence, transparency, and cooperation with Russia on nuclear weapon matters.

   This treaty, while important, is also somewhat unusual. Its central obligation is that both nations will reduce their operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to a level between

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   Contrary to numerous media reports, this treaty does not require reductions in nuclear warhead stockpiles or delivery systems. In fact, it does not require the elimination of a single warhead. Under this treaty, both sides can simply remove warheads from land-based or submarine-based missiles and from bombers. Both sides are free to keep every warhead so removed and to store these warheads indefinitely for possible redeployment. The only limitations that will bind the United States and Russia are the limitations on nuclear weapon delivery systems under START I, and that is at least until 2009.

   After December 5, 2009, when the START I treaty is scheduled to expire, it is not clear what will happen. At least in the case of START I, the delivery systems must be destroyed.

   As the Senate fulfills its constitutionally mandated role in the treaty process and considers whether to provide its advice and consent to the ratification of the Moscow Treaty, there are a number of questions about the proper role of the

   Senate in the treaty-making process. These are questions to which I know our managers--our chairman and ranking member of the Foreign Relations Committee--have given a great deal of time, attention, and thought, and many others in the Senate have as well.

   Some of these questions are as follows:

   Do we want to agree to ratify a treaty if the executive branch does not clearly commit itself to submitting a substantive change in that treaty as an amendment to the Senate for its advice and consent? And do we want to approve a treaty where there is doubt that the executive branch could extend or withdraw from the treaty without even notifying or consulting with the Senate, without that guarantee, that commitment being written into a Resolution of Ratification?

   These are highly significant questions that apply to the treaty-making power and to the advice and consent power of the United States. I want to address those issues in the amendments that I have to offer this afternoon.

   The first amendment deals specifically with the question of whether the Resolution of Ratification should provide that the Senate must be notified and consulted prior to the withdrawal from that treaty or the agreement to extend that treaty by the President of the United States.

   Article 4, paragraph 2 of the treaty states that this treaty shall remain in force until December 31, 2012, and may be extended by agreement of the parties or superseded earlier by a subsequent agreement.

   Paragraph 3 of article 4 states:

   Each Party, in exercising its national sovereignty, may withdraw from this Treaty upon three months written notice to the other Party.

   These are somewhat unusual provisions, as are the administration's statements about them. Previously, extending a treaty was considered something that would require Senate advice and consent.

   In the seminal study written in 2001 by the Congressional Research Service for the Foreign Relations Committee called ``Treaties and Other International Agreements: The Role of the United States Senate,'' the issue of extending treaties is clearly presented:

   Modifying and extending an international agreement amount to the making of a new agreement that should be done by the same method as the original agreement. For treaties, this means with the advice and the consent of the Senate.

   In its article-by-article analysis of the Moscow Treaty, the administration asserts that ``Extension of the Treaty is not automatic and must be done by agreement of the parties.''

   The article-by-article analysis continues, with the administration writing:

   Since such an extension is authorized by Treaty, it would constitute an agreement pursuant to the Treaty and would accordingly not be subject to Senate advice and consent.

   That is the extension issue.

   On the matter of treaty withdrawal, the administration's article-by-article analysis states:

   Unlike some other arms control agreements, this withdrawal clause is not tied to a party's determination that extraordinary circumstances jeopardizing its supreme national interests exist. Rather, the Moscow Treaty includes a more general formulation that allows greater flexibility for each party to respond to unforeseen circumstances.

   So the withdrawal clause permits either party to withdraw from the treaty for any reason short of a supreme national interest.

   The Resolution of Ratification addresses this issue of withdrawal or extension with a declaration numbered 6, which:

   Urges the President to consult with the Senate prior to taking actions relevant to paragraphs 2 or 3 of article IV of the treaty.

   So the resolution before us, and before my amendment is considered, simply urges the President--it is precatory language that says, Mr. President, we urge you, whether it is you or your successor, to consult with the Senate prior to taking the actions relevant to paragraphs 2 or 3, the extension or the withdrawal from a treaty.

   The declaration urges the President to consult with the Senate, but it does not protect the interests of the Senate because it is not binding. A President--this President or his successor--could simply decide to extend or withdraw from this treaty without notice or consultation with the Senate.

   The U.S. should not either enter into a treaty or withdraw from a treaty lightly and either action--either entering into a treaty, withdrawing from a treaty, or extending a treaty's operations--should be done only with the involvement of the Senate. We have to give our advice and consent to permit ratification in the first place.

   We, the Members of this Senate, have the responsibility to assure that involvement. That constitutional responsibility rests in our hands, and we should not leave that constitutional mandate and responsibility up to the discretion of the executive branch. We want the executive branch to consult, and we are going to urge them to consult in a Resolution of Ratification. The question is whether we are going to require that resolution. Barring some circumstances, which I will describe in a minute, we are going to require a chief executive to consult with this body, to give us notice, and to consult, not to seek ratification--that is a second-degree amendment which my friend from Wisconsin will be offering in a moment--but the proposal in my amendment is that we simply require there be notice and consultation of the Senate before there is withdrawal from a treaty which we have ratified, or extension of a treaty which we have ratified. That is the least we can do. That is a middle course, short of saying we have to ratify an extension or withdrawal, which I think is also an appropriate course of action which has been much debated over the years. Short of that, which it seems to me is a matter which is going to be of some debate between the executive and legislative branch, I think a middle course, which we all ought to be able to agree upon, is that a Resolution of Ratification require there be notice to the Senate so we can exercise whatever action we decide to take at that point--no guarantee that we would have to ratify it before it actually occurs but assurance we will be given notice and an opportunity to give our advice, or take whatever action we want, prior to the withdrawal from a treaty or prior to the life of the treaty being extended.

   The amendment I am going to be offering is very straightforward. I do not know if this amendment is at the desk. If not, I will send it on behalf of myself, Senator Feingold, and Senator Akaka, and ask for its immediate consideration.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.

   The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

   The Senator from Michigan [Mr. LEVIN], for himself, Mr. Feingold, and Mr. Akaka, proposes an amendment numbered 252.

   Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

   The amendment is as follows:

    At the end of section 2, add the following new condition:

    (3) NOTICE AND CONSULTATIONS PRIOR TO WITHDRAWAL OR EXTENSION.--(A) Prior to taking any action relevant to paragraphs 2 or 3 of Article IV of the Treaty, and except as provided in subparagraph (B), the President shall--

    (i) provide not less than 60 days advance notice of such action to the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and

    (ii) consult with the Senate on such action.

    (B) The President may waive a requirement in subparagraph (A) if the President--

    (i) determines that national security needs prevent the President from meeting the requirement; and

    (ii) submits to the committees of the Senate referred to in subparagraph (A) a written notice of the waiver, including a description of the national security needs and the reasons justifying the waiver.

    In section 3, strike declaration (6).

   Mr. LEVIN. I will explain it at this point. This amendment is straightforward. It says that prior to taking any action to extend or withdraw from this treaty, the President shall provide not less than 60 days' notice to the Senate and shall consult with the Senate.

   Now, what happens if there is some national security need which prevents the President from providing such notice or consultation? The amendment foresees that possibility and has a waiver provision in case there is some unforeseen national security need that would prevent the President from immediately requiring to notify and consult with the Senate. So there is considerable flexibility given to the President if it is needed for national security reasons.

   There has been a lot written about whether or not the Senate must actually ratify a withdrawal from a treaty. There has been much debate on that subject. In a Congressional Research treatise on treaties, written in 1993 and then republished more recently with the same language, this is what the Research Service says about the issue of withdrawal from a treaty and the Senate role in that process, that the U.S. Constitution is silent with respect to the power to terminate treaties. The matter is not discussed in the debates of the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia. Briefly:

   While the Constitution tells us who can make treaties, the President shall have the power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties.

   It does not say who can unmake them. As a consequence of the Constitution's silence in this regard, there has been some confusion of doctrine upon this point and a variety in practice.

   A little later on in this study, the Congressional Research Service says the same: Whether the President alone can terminate a treaty's domestic effect remains an open question. As a practical matter, however, the President may exercise this power since the courts have held that they are conclusively bound by an executive determination with regard to whether a treaty is still in effect. The same result may apply to a congressional termination, particularly if it is regarded as a declaration of war.

   So according to the Congressional Research Service, the issue of whether the President alone can terminate a treaty is an open question. This amendment does not intend to resolve that question. A second-degree amendment, however, will be offered which will address that issue. My amendment does not. My amendment simply says--and it seems to me this is a very modest amount of protection for the Senate's constitutional responsibility in the treaty-making process--unless there is some national security reason why you cannot give notice to the Senate that you are intending to withdraw or extend the treaty, give us 60 days' notice so we can take whatever action we deem is appropriate, so we can give consultation and advice on the question of withdrawal or extension. It does not prevent the administration from extending or withdrawing from the treaty. It does not--``it'' being my amendment--require Senate approval of extension, even though that is the policy and practice to date often as elaborated by that study.

   It does not require Senate approval of withdrawal from a treaty. It simply says the President shall notify and consult with the Senate before extending or withdrawing from the treaty.

   This amendment is consistent with what the Foreign Relations Committee wrote in its report about the treaty relative to the issue of consultation on arms control treaties. It is a very thorough report. The committee that we have before us, on page 22, says the following:

   The Senate and this committee have an institutional interest in the close observation of arms control negotiations and the successful implementation of resulting agreements. Past administrations have recognized that consultations with the Senate prior to taking actions relating to assigning, amending, or withdrawing from such agreements may avert serious disagreements.

   On the specific question of withdrawal, the committee report says: Should it become necessary for a party to withdraw from the treaty, article 4 provides for 3 months' notice of such a decision. Events can well occur between submissions of the annual report required in condition 2 that would warrant informing and consulting with the Senate. In any circumstance, the Senate would desire notification and consultation.

   So the parties, the two countries involved, must give each other 3 months' notice prior to the withdrawal. But relative to the Senate, the report simply says the Senate would desire notification and consultation.

   I could not agree more with that statement: ``desire.'' But it is not enough to say we desire a consultation. If we are going to protect the constitutional responsibilities of this body, we must assure our constitutional responsibility and the operation of treaties is going to be protected and our role under the Constitution is, in fact, honored--not just honored in the breach but in the actual life of the treaty. I believe this is the minimum we should do.

   We should write into our Resolution of Ratification a requirement in the absence of some national security reason that the President, whoever the President might be at the time, do give us the notice and give us the opportunity to take whatever action or consult as we deem might be appropriate relative to the issue of withdrawal or extension of this treaty prior to the administration making that decision giving that notice to the other party to this treaty.

   The amendment is consistent with what the administration says it is willing to do. Secretary Powell stated: While it is the President who withdraws from treaties, the administration intends to discuss any need to withdraw from the treaty with the Congress, to include the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, prior to announcing any such action.

   That is a welcome statement of intent. We should incorporate that assurance. We should enshrine that assurance. We should embody that assurance. Intentions and administrations change. The obligation of this body to the Constitution endures. It is a solemn responsibility. It does not change. The intention of the President or a new President with new intentions changes. Language of the Constitution, relative to what this body's responsibility is relevant to treaties, is unchanging.

   This amendment simply requires notification and consultation which Secretary Powell and the committee indicate they want and would expect would happen. It simply assures that, in fact, in the absence of some national security need, which is unexpected, which would permit a waiver of the notice requiring that a President would notify this body before withdrawal or extension of a treaty would occur.

   The committee report concludes that: Declaration (6), while not binding on the President, is a formal request that the executive branch maintain the consultation policy enunciated in the Secretary of State's answer to the question--which I gave above that the administration intends to discuss. That is what the committee report says Declaration (6) provides, which is in the Resolution of Ratification. It is a request to the executive branch. That is not strong enough in terms of our obligations to the Constitution and to our responsibility relative to the treaty-making power.

   If we want to really assure what we are requesting is, in fact, part of the operation of this treaty, we should include in this Resolution of Ratification a condition which my amendment offers, which is that the President would

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   I yield the floor.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin.

   AMENDMENT NO. 253 TO AMENDMENT NO. 252

   Mr. FEINGOLD. I compliment the Senator from Michigan for his tremendous leadership on this issue.

   I rise today to add my thoughts to the debate on the first arms control treaty between the United States and Russia during the 21st century, and to offer an amendment that will reaffirm the role of the Senate in the treaty extension and withdrawal process.

   When the Senate adopts this resolution of ratification, as I expect that it will be a wide margin, the Moscow Treaty will be on its way to becoming the law of the land, and the Senate will have fulfilled its constitutional responsibility to provide advice and consent to its ratification.

   As a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, I believe that we covered a lot of ground in the series of hearings that the Committee had to examine this brief, 3-page document last year, and that we explored a number of the concerns that I and a number of members of the Committee and of the Senate have regarding the issues of compliance and verification, the lack of a timetable for the reductions required by the treaty, the fact that this treaty does not require that any nuclear warheads actually be destroyed, and a number of other important issues.

   I continue to be troubled by the language contained in article IV of the Moscow Treaty regarding the process by which one of the Parties may withdraw from this treaty. I am concerned that either of the Parties would be able to withdraw with only 3 months' written notice and without a reason. And unlike other arms control treaties, the Moscow Treaty does not require that the Parties cite ``supreme national interest'' upon announcing withdrawal. In fact, this concept is not even mentioned in article IV.

   As my colleagues may recall, I found the President's decision to unilaterally withdraw the United States from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty last year troubling on both policy and constitutional grounds. I discussed this issue at some length with Secretaries Powell and Rumsfeld during the Foreign Relations Committee's hearings on this treaty last year, and I am troubled by the administration's contention that consultation with and approval by the Senate would not be required to withdraw from the Moscow Treaty.

   I agree with the Senator from Michigan. The Senate has a constitutional role to play in treaty withdrawal, and I am concerned that the administration is not taking seriously our role in this process.

   While I recognize that Declaration (6) in the resolution before the Senate today urges the President to consult with this body prior to withdrawing from the Moscow Treaty, I am concerned that there is no specific requirement for such consultation.

   So, Mr. President, I send a second-degree amendment to the desk and I ask for its immediate consideration.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.

   The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

   The Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. FEINGOLD] proposes an amendment numbered 253 to amendment No. 252.

   Mr. FEINGOLD. I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

   The amendment is as follows:

    At the end of the proposed condition, add the following:

    (C) Prior to taking any action relevant to paragraphs 2 or 3 of Article IV of the Treaty, the President shall obtain the approval of two thirds of the Senators present.

   Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, the second-degree amendment that I offer today would add to the underlying Levin amendment a provision that would require the President to obtain the approval of two-thirds of the Senate before withdrawing from or extending this treaty.

   Mr. President, Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution states that the President ``shall have the Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided that two thirds of the Senators present concur.......''

   The Senator from Michigan pointed out in his remarks that the Constitution is silent on the process by which the United States can withdraw from a treaty, and the record in the Congress and the executive branch is mixed. However, I believe and I think many others believe the intent of the Framers as explained by Thomas Jefferson is clear. In section 52 of Jefferson's Manual, he writes:

   Treaties are legislative acts. A treaty is the law of the land. It differs from other laws only as it must have the consent of a foreign nation, being but a contract with respect to that nation.

   Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution states that the President shall:

   take Care that the laws be faithfully executed. .....

   Jefferson continues:

   Treaties being declared, equally with the laws of the United States, to be the supreme law of the land, it is understood that an act of the legislature alone can declare them infringed and rescinded. This was accordingly the process adopted in the case of France in 1798.

   It is worth noting, that four signers of the Constitution were serving in Congress when this first treaty termination occurred--by an Act of Congress--in 1798, just 11 years after the Constitutional Convention.

   It is clear to me, as it was to Thomas Jefferson, that the Senate has a constitutional role to play in terminating treaties. Since the advice and consent of the Senate is required to enter into a treaty, this body should at a minimum be consulted before the President makes the decision to withdraw this country from a treaty, and especially from a treaty of this magnitude.

   As Jefferson noted, a treaty is equal with a law. A law cannot be declared to be repealed by the President alone. Only an Act of Congress can repeal a law. Action by the Senate or the Congress should be required to terminate a treaty. Anything less could tip the scale dangerously in favor of the executive branch.

   That said, I recognize it is unlikely that my amendment would be adopted, or that the President would agree to move forward with this process if my amendment were included in this resolution of ratification,

   but I very much thought we ought to make this point on the floor of this body that is charged by the Constitution with this responsibility. It is a responsibility which I believe was intended by the Founders, that we act specifically with a two-thirds vote to withdraw from a treaty.

   AMENDMENT NO. 253 TO AMENDMENT NO. 252, WITHDRAWN

   In light of the reality here, I now withdraw my amendment.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has that right. The amendment is withdrawn.

   Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I regret that this Treaty will move forward without a requirement for a Senate vote on its abrogation or extension, but I do express my support for the amendment offered by the Senator from Michigan, Mr. LEVIN, of which I am pleased to be a cosponsor. I also want to thank the Senator for his work on this important issue.

   The Levin amendment is consistent with my view that the Senate should--at a minimum--be consulted if the President decides to withdraw from or extend this treaty in the future. I believe that this is a step in the right direction, and I urge my colleagues to support the Levin amendment.

   I yield the floor.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.

   Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I rise in opposition to the amendment offered by the distinguished Senator from Michigan. I do so reluctantly because of my high regard for the Senator and his work on arms control, which has been indefatigable. His wisdom I respect.

   As a rule, we are on the same side. I, however, wish to oppose the amendment for the reasons I will relate in this testimony. I read, in my opening statement yesterday, words that the Foreign Relations Committee addressed to this issue in the Resolution of Ratification. The Senator has referenced that fact.

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   It was drafted by us in an attempt to address concerns put forward by the Senator from Michigan, the Senator from Wisconsin, and others regarding the treaty's withdrawal clause contained in article 4.

   Our text is based on Secretary Powell's commitment to consult with the Senate should the President consider the utilization of the withdrawal provision.

   It is worth repeating, especially in light of the amendment offered today, the answer Secretary Powell submitted for the record on the issue of treaty withdrawal. The Foreign Relations Committee asked the Secretary:

   What role will the Congress have in any decision to withdraw from this treaty?

   Will the administration agree to at least consult closely with this committee--

   That is the Foreign Relations Committee--

   before making any such decision?

   The Secretary responded:

   While it is the President who withdraws from treaties, the administration intends to discuss any need to withdraw from the treaty with the Congress, to include the Senate Foreign Relations Committee prior to announcing any such action.

   This was a carefully considered answer of Secretary Powell for the record.

   Past Senate consideration of this issue has resulted in the view that one of the bases on which a President may terminate a treaty without congressional participation is when a decision to withdraw is taken in conformity with the provisions of the treaty. The Moscow Treaty, as it stands, provides for this.

   I am aware of Senators' concerns and arguments about the need to insert the Senate into the process. Many of the arguments we have heard about withdrawal stem from President Bush's decision to withdraw from the ABM Treaty. That decision was taken in full compliance with the terms of the ABM Treaty. The President made no secret about his desire to do so, and Congress held innumerable hearings and public statements about the need to take the action.

   I am sympathetic to arguments from Senators regarding the need to maintain Senate prerogatives. The process governing termination and withdrawal is a point of constitutional debate. Although the Constitution assigns a specific role for the Senate in the treaty ratification process, it is silent on the issue of treaty termination. Furthermore, nothing in the Constitution restricts the President from terminating or withdrawing from a treaty on his own authority.

   Presidents have consistently terminated advice and consent treaties on their own authority since 1980. Twenty-three of the thirty treaties terminated during this period were bilateral; seven of these treaties were multilateral, all of them terminated by the President.

   Prior to 1980, Senator Barry Goldwater of Arizona challenged President Carter's termination of the Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan. Senator Goldwater's challenge failed and the treaty was terminated.

   The White House legal adviser has long argued that the President is the principal spokesman of the Nation in foreign affairs, and restrictions on that power have been strictly construed. Given the absence of a textual basis conferring the termination power on another branch or an established practice derogating from the President's termination power, it is difficult to envision such a role for the Senate.

   Proponents of a senatorial role in this process will often respond by suggesting that the President cannot, on his own authority, terminate a treaty because it is the law of the land. Again, the White House suggests this is a fallacy. A terminated treaty no longer has effect in much the same way that a provision of a law or treaty found by the courts to be unconstitutional no longer has effect. However, in neither case is the law repealed.

   Historically, there is evidence of only one instance in which the Senate sought by a resolution of advice and consent to limit the President's constitutional power to terminate a treaty. The first condition to the 1919 proposed resolution of advice and consent to ratification of the Versailles Treaty would have provided:

   Notice of withdrawal by the United States may be given by a concurrent resolution of the Congress of the United States.

   On that occasion, the Vice President of the United States, Thomas Marshall, addressing the Senate before the vote, called the condition an unconstitutional limitation on the President's powers, a view with which a number of leading scholars of the day concurred. The resolution failed to receive the required two-thirds vote and the question has remained moot for the better part of a century--I might say, until today.

   Beyond the legal issues that underlie this debate, some have expressed concern that article 4 differs from previous arms control agreements in that it only requires 3 months' notice and permits withdrawal based upon issues related to national sovereignty. Critics point out the START treaty allows the parties to withdraw after giving 6 months' notice, and only ``if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interest.''

   The withdrawal clause is reflective of the changed nature of our relationship with Russia, not a desire to rob the Senate of its role in the treaty-making process. As the administration's article-by-article analysis sent to the Senate with the treaty states--this is the analysis by the administration as it submits the treaty:

   Unlike some other arms control agreements, the withdrawal clause is not tied to a Party's determination that extraordinary circumstances jeopardizing its supreme national interests exist. Rather, the Moscow Treaty includes a more general formulation that allows greater flexibility for each Party to respond to unforeseen circumstances.

   Indeed, as we have related in this debate, the Moscow Treaty arose from a desire on the part of the United States unilaterally to destroy its nuclear weapons and likewise a similar desire by the Russians. Finding these coincident interests, they have joined in this treaty; nevertheless, there is no timetable. Some critics have pointed out that the nature of this treaty is substantially different. It is one that comes from the volition of the two without specific verification procedures.

   I do not view the withdrawal provisions as a weakness in the treaty. Instead, I believe it is another manifestation of the improved U.S.-Russian relationship. It should also be pointed out that our bilateral relationship provides us with some confidence that the time and reasons for withdrawal would not necessarily relate to the agreement. As the Secretary of State told the Committee: ``The Moscow Treaty's formulation for withdrawal reflects the likelihood that a decision to withdraw would be prompted by causes unrelated either to the Treaty or to our bilateral relationship. We believe this formulation more appropriately reflects our much-improved strategic relationship with Russia.''

   In sum Mr. President, I was hopeful that our resolution of ratification would have resolved this issue. For the benefit of the Senate let me again read the text of our resolution of ratification.

   Given the Senate's continuing interest in the Treaty and in continuing strategic offensive reductions to the lowest possible levels consistent with national security requirements and alliance obligations of the United States, the Senate urges the President to consult with the Senate prior to taking actions relevant to paragraphs 2 or 3 or Article IV of the Treaty.

   This text was negotiated closely with Administration officials with the goal of striking a compromise that would preserve Senate prerogatives while not infringing upon the power provided to the President by the Constitution. I believe we succeeded in doing so.

   For these reasons, I oppose the amendment, and I urge my colleagues to do so as well.

   I yield the floor.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. CORNYN). The Senator from Delaware.

   Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, let me begin by saying I agree with the Senator from Michigan as well as my colleague from Wisconsin in that I believe--and, as the old joke goes, I have history to prove it--that the Senate has in the treaty power in the treaty clause of the U.S. Constitution an equal responsibility with the President of the United States.

   As the old joke goes, if you want to learn a subject, teach it. For the last 10 years, I have been teaching a three-credit course at the Widener University Law School on Saturday mornings on separation of powers issues. In one of

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   I will, unless we are ready to go to a second amendment, be happy to take a few minutes and go through what I believe to be constitutional law and history on this point.

   Let me cut through that for a moment and go to the place where I think it is not worth the fight on this particular treaty. I believe this treaty is so open ended and so, in some sense, amorphous and rests so much upon not merely the goodwill--I assume goodwill on the part of the administration--but on the intensity with which the administration believes this treaty should come to fruition that a provision that marginally increases the substance of the possibility of a substantive outcome which I support--which is getting down to 1,700 or below 2,200--that to jeopardize this treaty that rests on an awful lot on good faith over a genuinely serious constitutional fight which I think someday has to be resolved, that it is not worth the candle on this treaty and may in fact in turn, if we were to prevail--and I don't think we have the votes to prevail, but if we did prevail on this--would be sufficient in my view for this administration to not pursue through the treaty mechanism this agreement.

   I want to remind everybody, the administration made it clear from the outset that they did not want a treaty. They did not want to have to come back to us with this treaty.

   Because of the steadfastness of Senator Helms, we agreed on the principle that we would insist that any agreement--we knew it was being negotiated in Moscow--be brought back before the Senate.

   So my concern is that this agreement, which the administration unilaterally and bilaterally supports--that is, with the Russians or without the Russians, and they don't really much care what we think about it anyway, whether it be in terms of a treaty--that they would be prepared to walk away from this over a genuine, legitimate, significant, constitutional issue and debate.

   White House Counsel in this administration and in Democratic administrations who have suggested that Senator Feingold, Senator Levin, and I are wrong about the prerogative of the Senate, I suggest, would be inclined to say to the President: You are going to do this anyway unilaterally--that is, move down to these ranges--you have said you are going to do it anyway; the treaty is so loose, it doesn't bind you much at all anyway; forget the treaty; just proceed on this course, and don't sign onto this principle on this fight.

   I was asked by the press how I could not be willing to go to the wall on this issue since I was the guy who went to the wall that resulted in the so-called Biden condition on interpretation of treaties, which was initially added to the INF Treaty in 1988. There was a simple reason. There was a lot more at stake in that treaty in terms of the substantive impact upon the strategic balance and doctrine.

   We also had a circumstance where the administration very much wanted that treaty. And it was an opportunity to set in law, in principle, the principles of treaty interpretation.

   So it was worth the fight, the stakes were high enough, and the administration was not likely to reject the underlying treaty if it passed, which it did. That is the practical distinction I would make.

   But let me speak just another 5 minutes or so to the constitutional side of this argument. Although it is not specified in the Constitution, I believe there is a concurrent power both the President and the Senate have; and that is, the power with regard to the termination of a treaty.

   Our history for over 200 years of practice is, though, decidedly mixed. At various times in our history, the Congress has directed or authorized the President to terminate a treaty.

   On a few occasions, the Senate alone has done that, terminated a treaty. The President has terminated a treaty without prior congressional authorization but then received subsequent approval by the Congress and the Senate. And the President has terminated treaties unilaterally.

   For example, Presidents have done so with several commercial treaties in the first half of the 20th century. President Lyndon Johnson gave notice of his intent to have the United States withdraw from a multilateral treaty on international aviation known as the Warsaw Convention. Although this notice was subsequently withdrawn, the Foreign Relations Committee held hearings on the treaty at issue, and did not challenge President Johnson's power to withdraw from it.

   More recently, President Carter unilaterally terminated the Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan in connection with diplomatic recognition of the People's Republic of China. President Carter also gave notice of the termination of several other treaties, most related to immigration. President Clinton withdrew from multilateral agreements, including our membership in the United Nations's Industrial Development Organization.

   The question of who has the power to terminate a treaty has never been definitively resolved by the Supreme Court. President Carter's decision to terminate the Taiwan Treaty was challenged by several of our Republican colleagues, and that case reached the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court decision, though, does not provide much legal precedent, though perhaps it gives us some guidance as to how the Court might rule today.

   In Goldwater v. Carter--that was the case about withdrawing from the Taiwan Treaty, when we recognized the People's Republic of China--the Supreme Court vacated a decision of the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia Circuit, a decision which had affirmed the President's power to unilaterally terminate a treaty.

   By vacating the lower court ruling, though, no legal precedent was left to stand. The Supreme Court decision commanded no majority. Four Justices invoked what I know my colleagues on the floor and the Presiding Officer fully understand; they invoked what is called the Political Question Doctrine and thereby decreed the case not a matter for the courts.

   The fifth Justice held the case should not be before the Supreme Court because it was not ripe for judicial review.

   The only Justice who addressed the merits of the case, Justice Brennan, held for the President's power in that case because he thought termination of the treaty with Taiwan was an act that necessarily flowed from the recognition of the People's Republic of China. He argued further that recognition power is clearly held by the President within the Constitution.

   The leading scholarly authority on the subject, the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law, of which the noted scholar, Columbia Law Professor Lou Henkin was a chief reporter, states: ``The President has authority unilaterally to suspend or terminate'' a treaty ``in accordance with its terms, or to make the determination that would justify ..... terminating or suspending an agreement because of its violation by another party or because of supervening events.'' The Restatement concludes that this power of the President is based upon his constitutional power to conduct foreign relations.''

   The Restatement concedes, however, that the Senate has

   concurrent authority, and it could circumscribe the President's power by conditioning its consent--which is what I understood in the withdrawn amendment by my friend from Wisconsin--by conditioning its consent to that treaty on a requirement that the termination clause only be exercised with the consent of the Senate, which I happen to think we have the power to do as well.

   But without turning this into a seminar--which all of my colleagues understand this full well; I am not educating anybody on this floor as to something they do not already know--without going into any more of it, I believe the Senate has concurrent power it could exercise.

   I believe there will come a treaty which is of such consequence that the Senate will determine it must exercise that power. But whether it is wise to do so as is done in the Levin-Feingold amendment is another matter, in my view.

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   In closing, I think Senators LEVIN and FEINGOLD raise important legal and substantive concerns. I think it would prompt, in this case--because it goes, in a sense, beyond this treaty the precedent we would be establishing--I think it would prompt--and obviously I don't know--strong executive branch opposition, and all done at this point to make a legal point. No matter how much I agree with it, it is to make a legal point that does not substantively have much impact here. I think it is really better made for a treaty of more substance and consequence than this one.

   Let me make it real clear what I mean by that. I do not want to belittle this treaty. I do not mean to imply it is of no value. But I think, quite frankly, if we are to go to the point to take this to the wall, and we were to pass this amendment--and I realize it has been changed now; it is not as consequential as both the Senators would have liked, because the Feingold provision has been withdrawn, and as much as I would like it if we were going to set down a principle here, I think the consequence of its passage, if it resulted in this administration walking away from this treaty, would do much more harm than any possible good could be done by our adopting this amendment.

   The point made by the chairman is we are no worse off constitutionally on this unresolved, substantive issue because of the language unanimously added in the committee. So essentially what we are saying here--what I am saying here, and I think the chairman--and I am not suggesting he should associate himself with my remarks as to what the President's and the Senate's power is--but we are basically saying we have agreed to fight this fight another day

   on another treaty at another time.

   How do you define in treaty language what ``consult'' means? In declaration 6, we use the term ``consult,'' but it needs much less specificity there because it is even more vague. So I think you build in confusion, difficult to define, in even adding the Levin language.

   This is an uncomfortable position for me to be in, both intellectually and politically, to be not supporting this amendment. I want my colleagues to understand why. I want to make it clear, even though I agreed with the chairman that I would not, as the ranking member, support amendments beyond what we had agreed to in order to get this done, I want to make it clear to my Democratic colleagues, I am not in any way asking anyone to be bound by that. I am not trying to speak for the Democrats on that issue. I am giving my best advice as to how I think, for what it is worth, we can enhance the prospect that we really will, through this treaty, accomplish a momentum that relates to reducing the number of nuclear weapons each side has at its disposal.

   And ultimately, hopefully by the provisions we have in some of the declarations, we will not stop at this treaty. We will not stop at this methodology. We will try to move on to everything, including tactical weapons at some point down the road.

   That is my reasoning, for what it is worth. I am not going to support even the less constitutionally controversial provision of the Levin-Feingold amendment for the reasons I have stated.

   I pledge to my colleagues, assuming I am around and assuming we have the opportunity, God willing, to be able to establish this principle on a really significant agreement that we make, a mutual agreement or multilateral agreement with other parties in the world that promotes everything from arms reduction to our interest, this fight has to be made at some point. I just don't think it is worth the candle on this at this moment.

   I yield the floor.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.

   Mr. LEVIN. Let me thank my colleagues for their comments. Some of what they say frankly amazes me and startles me.

   How the administration could possibly walk away from this treaty because a Resolution of Ratification contains the requirement that they give us 60 days' notice before withdrawing, when in fact they say they are intending to give us that notice, amazes me. The administration has represented to the Senate by Secretary Powell that it is their intention to discuss any need to withdraw from the treaty with the Congress. That is their intention.

   How it can be suggested they are going to walk away from a treaty which simply puts into our ratification resolution and embodies what they intend to do, anyway, is a complete mystery to me. It raises the question, are they serious about that intention? Can't we take them seriously? Can't we assure ourselves that maybe the next administration, because it might not have the same intention, should be bound by us? Do we have to leave this requirement to give notice of withdrawal from a treaty up to the absolute discretion of an executive branch? That is not protecting the constitutional role and requirement and obligation and responsibility of the Senate.

   The question was raised by my dear friend from Delaware about what the word ``consult'' means in the amendment. It means the same thing as in the language which the Foreign Relations Committee has given us. In declaration 6 of the resolution, it says the Senate urges the President to consult with the Senate. We define ``consult'' in the way the Foreign Relations Committee defines it.

   Mr. BIDEN. If the Senator will yield.

   Mr. LEVIN. I am happy to.

   Mr. BIDEN. The difference is the declaration is not binding.

   Mr. LEVIN. That is the important difference. But the word is the same word.

   Mr. BIDEN. It is the same word, but the need for precision in a nonbinding declaration is a lot less important, in a judicial sense, than it is in a binding provision. That is the only point I was making.

   Mr. LEVIN. The important fact is it is not binding.

   Mr. BIDEN. Yes.

   Mr. LEVIN. That is what it comes down to. This is not an issue as to who has the power to withdraw from a treaty. Both the Senator from Indiana and the Senator from Delaware make arguments about that issue. That is not resolved in this amendment. Both of their remarks address that issue, as did my remarks. I am the first one to acknowledge that as a matter of fact the Constitution is silent with respect to the power to terminate treaties. That is the quote I used before that came from the Congressional Research Service. The Constitution is silent. There has not been a resolution of this issue.

   There is the Goldwater case that can be interpreted as the Senator from Delaware did. We do not resolve that issue in this amendment. This amendment does not remove from the President, nor does it purport to remove from the President, the power to terminate or extend a treaty. That issue is a major constitutional issue.

   I cannot believe, and I did not hear that either of our colleagues suggested, that there is a constitutional problem with my amendment because my amendment does not require the President to get the advice and consent of the Senate to withdraw from the treaty. My amendment simply says: Before you exercise your right to withdraw, give 60 days' notice to the Senate. I don't think there is the slightest constitutional infirmity in simply providing what the President says he intends to do and what the committee says is desirable be done in the language of the committee ratification resolution, that we urge a formal request that the executive branch consult with the Senate of the United States.

   There is no constitutional issue with my amendment. With the Senator from Wisconsin's second-degree amendment, which has been withdrawn, there was a very serious constitutional issue, one which we could spend days on in the Senate, as to whether or not we can require in a ratification resolution that the President obtain our consent to the withdrawal from a treaty. That is a major, massive constitutional issue. That one has resonated around the country for a couple hundred years. That was not going to be resolved in this Resolution of Ratification. I hope some day it is resolved in a lengthy debate.

   But what I am proposing is simply the most modest step to give some protection to the obligation and responsibility of this institution relative to treaty-making power, which is that we just be given notice, 60 days' notice, and consultation prior to a decision of

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   I have not heard today, and I don't believe that there is, a serious argument that my amendment raises constitutional issues. As a matter of fact, almost by definition, it cannot, since the President says he is intending to consult with us and since the committee says it is desirable that he do so.

   I have not heard that argument. Again, I don't believe it could be a serious argument, that we could simply not do what this amendment does, which is to require that there be 60 days' notice and consultation.

   But how the suggestion could be made that the President would walk away from this treaty if the Resolution of Ratification contains language that embodies what the intention of the administration is to do anyway, and what the committee is urging the administration to do anyway, is a complete mystery to me. That one befuddles me--the idea that this administration, which has proposed and signed this treaty, would walk away from the treaty if the Senate says in a ratification resolution that the administration will give us the same notice that the administration says it intends to give us. That one, it seems to me, is not a credible argument.

   So there is going to be disagreement as to whether or not the Senate has the power to put in a ratification resolution a provision that the President must, before extension or withdrawal, get the approval of the Senate. If that were part of my amendment, I could understand why there would be a massive debate over that issue--mainly between the White House, which I think would say no way, and many Members of the Senate would say that is the only way we can protect the constitutional obligation of the Senate. But that is not this amendment. That was the Feingold amendment, which was withdrawn.

   This amendment walks a middle road and says we want to get a commitment in this resolution that we be given the notice and consultation which the administration says it intends to give us. It cannot bind future administrations. This administration--I don't have any doubt--intends to do what it says it intends to do. Secretary Powell says he intends to give notice. I take him at his word. He is an honorable man. But administrations come and go and intentions change with future administrations. That is the relevance of this amendment--to put in our ratification resolution what the committee says is desirable, and what the committee says it urges the administration to do, and what the administration says it intends to do, and about which I have not heard a constitutional argument, for good reason, because here we are not limiting the power of the President to withdraw from a treaty.

   The President has the same power to withdraw from a treaty before or after my amendment is defeated or accepted. That power doesn't change. What changes, however, with this amendment, would be to say that the Senate, as part of its treaty obligation and responsibility, wants to be informed prior to the withdrawal from or extension of a treaty that the executive branch enters into.

   That is, again, a summary of the amendment. I hope, even though obviously the leaders of the Foreign Relations Committee oppose this for the reasons they give--and I don't think there are two Members of the Senate for whom I have greater respect than these two Members. We have worked together on these issues. Senator Lugar, Senator Biden, and I have worked together on so many issues over the years that I have lost count. My respect and regard for them is boundless. But I think this is an issue of important principle that the Senate should address--whether or not we want to be given notice before a President withdraws from this treaty that we are about to ratify, hopefully.

   Mr. President, I yield the floor.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana is recognized.

   Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, again, I will simply say that in our Resolution of Ratification--and this is what we have before the Senate now:

   Given the Senate's continuing interest in the treaty and in continuing strategic offensive reductions to the lowest possible levels consistent with national security requirements and the alliance obligation of the United States, the Senate urges the President to consult with the Senate prior to taking action relevant to paragraphs 2 or 3 of article 4 of the treaty.

   It seems to me the language is clear. We have spelled it out. In addition, we have had testimony and have queried Secretary Powell regarding his interpretation of the role of the Congress, and he has assured us that there would be consultation.

   Mr. LEVIN. Will the Senator yield for a question?

   Mr. LUGAR. Yes.

   Mr. LEVIN. This is a procedural inquiry. We are trying to determine--to assist a colleague who has an urgent, unusual need--if we can set a time on this amendment at 4:05; would that be amenable? I hate to interrupt my friend.

   Mr. LUGAR. Yes, that would be very satisfactory. In fact, I even will propose a time sooner than that if that is in the realm of the possible.

   Mr. LEVIN. That is what is difficult. The earlier we are able to set a time, the earlier we will be able to vote. If we set it 10 minutes from now, it would have to be 4:15 instead of 4:05.

   Mr. LUGAR. Let me make a proposal and, in fact, offer a unanimous consent at this time to that effect.

   I ask unanimous consent that the vote in relation to the Levin amendment No. 252 occur at 4:05 today, and that the time until then be equally divided in the usual form; further, that no second-degree amendments be in order prior to the vote.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

   Without objection, it is so ordered.

   Mr. LUGAR. I thank the Senator from Michigan for that suggestion.

   I will conclude by indicating that the Senator from Michigan and the Senator from Wisconsin proposed a serious constitutional issue. At the initiation of this debate, I indicated that this is not a settled law. I also argue that this is not the treaty on which to attempt to settle. There has been precedent--at least in terms of activity that both the distinguished Senator from Delaware and I have decided. I pointed out 30 treaties terminated by the President since 1980. This is a lot of treaties. That has been the regular practice.

   I referred to a debate on this issue indicated in 1919 on the Versailles Treaty on which the Vice President of the United States addressed the Senate. The Senate did not come up with a two-thirds vote to change the fact that the Constitution is silent.

   I accept the fact that the Senator from Michigan pointed out at some point in our history--and I think the Senator from Delaware made the same point--we may want to have this debate, but I hope not on this treaty at this time, given the assurance by the Secretary of State, and likewise by the committee, in our article 4 to this treaty.

   For the benefit of Senators, there are about 26 minutes left and, essentially, we will leave it to the Chair how that should be divided.

   I yield the floor.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

   Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I have a minor point, but the RECORD should be clarified. When I was referring to what my friend from Michigan said about the difference between the declaration and his condition--one being binding, one not--I referred to the word ``consult.'' It goes beyond that. The ambiguous language really is in the declaration. In his proposal is ``any action relevant'' to paragraphs 2 or 3 of article 4 of the treaty, which is the action relevant to the extension or withdrawal--that is the language that was taken by him, properly so, from the declaration, and that is the part that is ambiguous, not the word ``consult.''

   At any rate, it is a distinction without a great difference.

   I suggest the absence of a quorum.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair advises the Senator from Delaware does not control the time and cannot suggest the absence of a quorum. The Senators from Indiana and Michigan control time under the order.

   Mr. LUGAR. I suggest the absence of a quorum equally divided.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

   The senior assistant bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

   Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

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   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

   AMENDMENT NO. 252, AS MODIFIED

   Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I believe the yeas and nays have not been ordered. I modify my amendment by striking the word ``any'' on line 5 and striking the word ``relevant'' on line 5 and substituting the word ``pursuant'' for the word ``relevant'' on line 5. The modification is at the desk.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendment is so modified.

   The amendment (No. 252), as modified, is as follows:

   At the end of section 2, add the following new condition:

   (3) NOTICE AND CONSULTATIONS PRIOR TO WITHDRAWAL OR EXTENSION.--(A) Prior to taking action pursuant to paragraphs 2 or 3 of Article IV of the Treaty, and except as provided in subparagraph (B), the President shall--

   (i) provide not less than 60 days advance notice of such action to the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and

   (ii) consult with the Senate on such action.

   (B) The President may waive a requirement in subparagrah (A) if the President--

   (i) determines that national security needs prevent the President from meeting the requirement; and

   (ii) submits to the committees of the Senate referred to in subparagraph (A) a written notice of the waiver, including a description of the national security needs and the reasons justifying the waiver.

   In section 3, strike declaration (6).

   Mr. LEVIN. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

   The senior assistant bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

   Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

   Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent Senator Kennedy be added as a cosponsor to the amendment, and I ask for the yeas and nays.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

   Is there a sufficient second?

   There is a sufficient second.

   The question is on agreeing to the amendment. The clerk will call the roll.

   The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.

   Mr. FRIST. I announce that the Senator from New Mexico (Mr. DOMENICI), the Senator from Kentucky (Mr. MCCONNELL), and the Senator from Oregon (Mr. SMITH) are necessarily absent.

   Mr. REID. I announce that the Senator from West Virginia (Mr. BYRD), the Senator from Florida (Mr. GRAHAM), and the Senator from Georgia (Mr. MILLER), are necessarily absent.

   I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from West Virginia (Mr. BYRD) would vote ``aye''.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER (Ms. COLLINS). Are there any other Senators in the Chamber desiring to vote?

   The result was announced--yeas 44, nays 50, as follows:

   Akaka

   Baucus

   Bayh

   Bingaman

   Boxer

   Breaux

   Cantwell

   Carper

   Clinton

   Conrad

   Corzine

   Daschle

   Dayton

   Dodd

   Dorgan

   Durbin

   Edwards

   Feingold

   Feinstein

   Harkin

   Hollings

   Inouye

   Jeffords

   Johnson

   Kennedy

   Kerry

   Kohl

   Landrieu

   Lautenberg

   Leahy

   Levin

   Lieberman

   Lincoln

   Mikulski

   Murray

   Nelson (NE)

   Pryor

   Reed

   Reid

   Rockefeller

   Sarbanes

   Schumer

   Stabenow

   Wyden

   Alexander

   Allard

   Allen

   Bennett

   Biden

   Bond

   Brownback

   Bunning

   Burns

   Campbell

   Chafee

   Chambliss

   Cochran

   Coleman

   Collins

   Cornyn

   Craig

   Crapo

   DeWine

   Dole

   Ensign

   Enzi

   Fitzgerald

   Frist

   Graham (SC)

   Grassley

   Gregg

   Hagel

   Hatch

   Hutchison

   Inhofe

   Kyl

   Lott

   Lugar

   McCain

   Murkowski

   Nelson (FL)

   Nickles

   Roberts

   Santorum

   Sessions

   Shelby

   Snowe

   Specter

   Stevens

   Sununu

   Talent

   Thomas

   Voinovich

   Warner

   Byrd

   Domenici

   Graham (FL)

   McConnell

   Miller

   Smith

   Mr. LUGAR. Madam President, I move to reconsider the vote and move to lay that motion on the table.

   The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

   AMENDMENT NO. 254

   Mr. AKAKA. Madam President, I have an amendment I send to the desk.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.

   The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

   The Senator from Hawaii [Mr. AKAKA] proposes an amendment numbered 254.

   Mr. AKAKA. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that further reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

   The amendment is as follows:

    At the end of the last sentence of condition 1 in section 2, strike the period and insert the following: ``, and shall include--

    ``(A) an estimate of the funding levels required in the fiscal year following the year of the report to implement all Cooperative Threat Reduction programs and other nonproliferation programs relevant to the Treaty and ensure that nuclear weapons, materials, technology, and expertise in the Russian Federation are secure from theft and diversion; and

    ``(B) a description of any initiatives proposed by the President to address any matter covered by subparagraph (A) in order to improve the implementation or effectiveness of the Treaty.''.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Hawaii.

   Mr. AKAKA. Madam President, this amendment is the result of several hearings I chaired in the Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on International Security and Proliferation on the importance of Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction assistance to national security.

   The collapse of the Soviet Union left stockpiles of nuclear weapons and materials vulnerable to theft and diversion. The Nunn-Lugar legislative initiative of 1991 established several threat reduction programs in the Departments of Defense and Energy to help dismantle weapons of mass destruction or improve their security. These programs, along with others in the State Department, are critical to preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or the diversion of material to terrorists.

   U.S. nonproliferation activities have accomplished a great deal. With American assistance, all nuclear weapons have been removed from Ukraine, Kazakstan, and Belarus. Our nonproliferation programs also prevent the recruitment by terrorists or other countries of WMD scientists and engineers.

   The CTR and other nonproliferation programs are making progress but face a new set of responsibilities in light of the Moscow Treaty. The Russian Federation intends to reduce and destroy various weapons systems with U.S. assistance under the CTR and other nonproliferation programs.

   I strongly support language in the Moscow Treaty that directs the President to ``submit to Congress ..... a report and recommendations on how United States Cooperative Threat Reduction assistance to the Russian Federation can best contribute to enabling the Russian Federation to implement the Treaty efficiently. .....''

   In November 2001, President Bush and President Putin met to discuss historic cuts to the nuclear stockpiles in the U.S. and in Russia. This discussion led to the Moscow Treaty before us today.

   After the first day of that summit, President Bush remarked that:

   [o]ur highest priority is to keep terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction ..... we will strengthen our efforts to cut off every possible source of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons material and expertise.

   The CTR and other nonproliferation programs are the primary means we have to prevent weapons, weapon-usable materials, and expertise in the Russian Federation from falling into the hands of terrorists. Secretary of State Powell said, in testimony before the Senate, that the CTR program will be used to ``make warhead storage facilities more secure. Such U.S. assistance will also increase the security of the Russian warheads made excess as provided in the Moscow Treaty.''

   The goals of the CTR and other nonproliferation programs are vital to national security. Getting there will be difficult. We must provide these programs with the funding necessary to

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   I have joined my friend and colleague, Senator Lugar, in supporting adequate funding and high-level administration support for these programs for years. For this reason, my amendment would ensure funding estimates are included in this annual report on CTR contributions to Russian implementation of the Moscow Treaty. It is important that Congress know how the CTR and nonproliferation programs can be used to help the Russian Federation with its treaty obligations. It is equally important for Congress to know what these programs require to realize their full potential for enhancing security.

   AMENDMENT NO. 254, WITHDRAWN

   Madam President, I have had discussions with the distinguished chairman concerning my amendment. He has given me assurances that the intent of my amendment will be covered in the report mentioned in condition 1 and other reports already required by Congress. For this reason, I withdraw my amendment, and Senator Lugar and I will enter into a colloquy on this issue.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The amendment is withdrawn.

   The Senator from Indiana.

   Mr. LUGAR. Madam President, I thank the distinguished Senator from Hawaii for his very important thoughts about threat reduction and about our mutual quest and support.

   Mr. AKAKA. I thank my friend, the Senior Senator from Indiana, for this opportunity to discuss with him the Cooperative Threat Reduction and other non-proliferation programs and their importance to effective implementation of the Moscow Treaty.

   I have chaired several hearings in the Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services, and undertaken several studies, on the importance of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction. Because of this work it was my intent today to offer an amendment to the Moscow Treaty to expand the report on Cooperative Threat Reduction and non-proliferation programs contained in the recommended resolution of ratification by including funding requirements.

   As my colleague knows, the collapse of the Soviet Union left stockpiles of nuclear weapons and materials vulnerable to theft and diversion. The Senate and the Nation have benefited from the Senior Senator's leadership in the Nunn-Lugar legislative initiative of 1991 that established threat reduction programs in the Departments of Defense and Energy to help dismantle weapons of mass destruction or improve their security. These programs, along with others in the State Department, are critical to preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or the diversion of material to terrorists.

   My amendment would amend Condition One in the Resolution of Ratification so that the annual report on non-proliferation programs includes two important pieces of information. First, the report would include an estimate of funding levels necessary for the CTR and other non-proliferation programs relevant to the Treaty to ensure that nuclear weapons, materials, technology, and expertise in the Russian Federation are secure from theft and diversion. Second, the report would include a description of any initiatives proposed by the President for the CTR or other non-proliferation programs that will improve the implementation or effectiveness of the Treaty. I understand through my conversation with the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee that, while he appreciates my concerns and reasons behind my amendment, it should not be included in the resolution before us.

   U.S. non-proliferation activities have accomplished a great deal. With American assistance, all nuclear weapons have been removed from Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. Our non-proliferation programs also prevent the recruitment by terrorists or other countries of WMD scientists and engineers.

   Mr. LUGAR. I agree with my friend. The CTR and other non-proliferation programs are making progress but face a new set of responsibilities in light of the Moscow Treaty. The Russian Federation intends to reduce, destroy, and account for various weapons systems, materials, and

   expertise with U.S. assistance under the CTR and other non-proliferation programs. For this reason, the Foreign Relations Committee included Condition One to the Treaty to require the President to submit to Congress an annual report and recommendations on how Cooperative Threat Reduction assistance can best help the Russian Federation implement the Treaty efficiently and maintain the security and accurate accounting of its nuclear weapons and weapons-usable components and material.

   Mr. AKAKA. I strongly support this language. The Committee Report on the Moscow Treaty states that this report will include ``the role of Cooperative Threat Reduction and nonproliferation assistance.'' Am I correct in my interpretation that the annual report will include the contribution of both the Department of Defense CTR program and other programs that are relevant to Treaty implementation and security and accounting of nuclear weapons and materials?

   Mr. LUGAR. Yes, this report is intended to establish the rationale for all U.S. non-proliferation programs insofar as they can be used to help Russia dismantle weapons or assure the security of those weapons and of the fissile material in them. The report also will include the amount of CTR assistance that the Russian Federation will need to meet its obligations under the Treaty.

   Mr. AKAKA. That is good to hear. I have joined with my friend in advocating for adequate funding and high-level administration support for these non-proliferation programs for years. For this reason, I was considering offering an amendment to include funding estimates needed to assist Russia meet its obligations under the Moscow Treaty. It is important that Congress know how the CTR and non-proliferation programs can be used to help the Russian Federation with its Treaty obligations and how best to fund these programs to meet Treaty obligations. Does my colleague believe it would be useful if such information was provided to Congress?

   Mr. LUGAR. Yes, I agree that such information is useful. However I believe that this information already is provided as part of the overall CTR annual report to Congress by the Department of Defense and annual reports by other non-proliferation programs. Specifically, the CTR annual report contains funding levels for individual projects as well as five-year cost estimates.

   I understand my colleague's concern that this report does not address Treaty-specific programs. The report required in the resolution of ratification could lay the groundwork for future cost and program requirements for non-proliferation that perhaps can be addressed in the Defense authorization bill.

   Mr. AKAKA. As a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, I look forward to the opportunity to work with you in defining the amount and extent of information we need to adequately fund and support these important programs. I also understand your desire to keep paperwork and reporting requirements to a minimum for the small but hardworking staff of the CTR program. Accurate and timely reporting of this information is crucial for proper congressional oversight of these programs. It is my hope that the administration understands my concerns.

   In November 2001 President Bush remarked that ``[o]ur highest priority is to keep terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction ..... we will strengthen our efforts to cut off every possible source of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons material and expertise.'' I know my friend shares my respect for the CTR and other non-proliferation programs that are the primary means we have to prevent weapons, weapons-usable materials, and expertise in the Russian Federation from falling into the hands of terrorists.

   The goals of the CTR and other non-proliferation programs are vital to national security. Getting there will be difficult. I know that by working together we can provide these programs with the funding necessary to accomplish their important and challenging task.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Rhode Island.

   Mr. REED. Madam President, I rise to express my support for the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty, otherwise known as the Moscow Treaty, which

[Page: S3231]

   Presently, the United States has approximately 6,000 nuclear weapons and the Russian Federation has almost 5,500 nuclear weapons. The Moscow Treaty is a step forward, reducing the danger of large numbers of operationally deployed nuclear weapons. This treaty is a good step, but it is only a small step. Much more must be done. Russia entered into negotiations seeking a legally binding document that would limit strategic nuclear warheads, and in their words ``provide transparency and predictability'' by containing definitions, and counting and elimination rules that resembled those in the START Treaties. Ultimately, Russia wanted to ensure that this process would be irreversible; in their words, that it would ensure the ``irreversibility of the reduction of nuclear forces.''

   This administration, however, had different goals. Russia had to convince the United States to sign a legally binding document rather than a less formal exchange of letters. The United States rejected any limits and counting rules that would have required the elimination of delivery vehicles and warheads, stating that it wanted flexibility to reduce its forces at its own pace and to restore warheads to deployed forces if conditions warranted. So while this treaty changes the status of some operationally deployed warheads, it does not require the dismantling of a single weapon. Once this treaty is fully implemented, the United States will still have approximately 6,000 nuclear weapons. There will just be more weapons in storage. And similarly, the Russians could have approximately 5,500 nuclear weapons, but they would be nonoperational according to the lines of this treaty.

   The treaty does not bind either party to any schedule for deactivation. It only requires that cuts be completed by December 31, 2012, the day the treaty expires. This means that either side can stop or even reverse the reduction process over the decade as long as both parties comply by the final date of the treaty.

   The treaty does not specifically address the problems of tactical nuclear weapons or MIRV'd ICBMs. The number of Russian tactical nuclear weapons is believed to be between 8,000 and 15,000, while the United States has approximately 2,000. Russian tactical nuclear weapons are subject to fewer safeguards and are more prone to theft and proliferation. These are the proverbial suitcase weapons, often discussed in the press, which are the ones that are most mobile, most difficult to trace and detect. And the treaty does not deal with these weapons at all.

   In addition, the Moscow Treaty effectively ends START II, which I will discuss in more detail later, which means that Russia will likely keep its weapons MIRV'd, meaning they will have multiple warheads on their weapons. Since MIRV'd weapons are fewer and more vulnerable, it increases the perceived need for a first strike.

   Another shortcoming of the Moscow Treaty is that it includes no verification procedures. START I verification procedures will remain in place until 2009. But there was never agreement between the parties about which, if any, procedures could be used in the Moscow Treaty. Discussion of verification procedures is supposed to continue, but the administration recently stated: We have determined that specific additional transparency measures are not needed and will not be sought at this time.

   I also believe the treaty withdrawal provisions are too lax. Parties can withdraw from the Moscow Treaty with 3-months notice without giving any reason. This means a party needs no compelling reason to stop complying with the terms of this treaty.

   Finally, the terms of this treaty must be met by December 31, 2012, but that is the day the treaty expires. It is possible that it could be extended, but another agreement would have to be reached to do that. On the other hand, it could also lapse so the parties could raise the numbers of operationally deployed warheads above 2,200 on January 1, 2013. In effect, they could go through the term of the treaty without significant reductions, let the treaty lapse, and nothing would have been affected by the treaty. I hope certainly that doesn't happen.

   I commend my colleagues on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Lugar and Senator Biden. They have done a remarkable job of adding some detail to the treaty.

   The resolution we are considering today contains two important conditions. The first condition requires a report and recommendation on how cooperative threat reduction assistance to the Russian Federation can best contribute to the efficient implementation of the treaty and maintain the security and accurate accounting of Russia's nuclear weapons and materiel. As I will discuss in detail later, the CTR program is the most effective tool to counter proliferation, and we must do all we can to maintain it.

   Secondly, the resolution requires an annual implementation report which will include, among other items, a listing of strategic nuclear weapons force levels for both parties, a detailed description on strategic offensive reductions planned by each party for the current year, and how these reductions will be achieved, verification and transparency measures taken or proposed by each party, and actions taken or proposed to improve the implementation and effectiveness of the treaty.

   There are also several nonbinding declarations, most of which request reports to Congress and encourage the President to continue to work to reduce nuclear weapons. These conditions and declarations make the treaty more substantial and, I believe, more effective.

   I will support this treaty strengthened by this resolution. I want to say to the administration, however, that this is simply not enough. The rise of rogue nations and rogue nonstate actors, has made the threat of proliferation even more urgent. One of the legacies of the cold war is the abundance of nuclear weapons and fissionable material that is no longer under the clear control of the Russian Federation or other former states of the Soviet Union. Moreover, many of these nuclear weapons are housed in nations which are struggling economically and are susceptible to offers from rogue actors to acquire these materials.

   As Graham Allison of Harvard, former dean at the Kennedy School, stated:

   The single largest threat to American lives and liberties going forward for the next decade is terrorism, particularly terrorism with weapons of mass destruction. The one that I have been most concerned about is loose nukes.

   We must do everything possible to counter proliferation through protection, containment, and interdiction. In 1991, former Senator Sam Nunn and Chairman RICHARD LUGAR recognized the risk presented by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. They created--history will record this--one of the most important initiatives that has been seen in this Senate, in this country in many years; that is, the counterproliferation program, the cooperative threat reduction program.

   The programs they established in the Department of State, the Department of Energy, and the Department of Defense, have had significant success in preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Through these programs, the United States has secured tons of nuclear materials in the former Soviet Union;

   helped deactivate, dismantle, or destroy thousands of Russian nuclear weapons and delivery systems; and helped provide employment for hundreds of Russian scientists and engineers with expertise in building nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, who otherwise might be tempted to sell their expertise to unfriendly nations or terrorist organizations. This is an extraordinary accomplishment, but so much needs to be done in addition.

   Even though only about $1 billion of the $400 billion defense budget is annually allocated to support these programs, they have been among the most successful of all nonproliferation efforts undertaken by this country.

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   I also want to add my voice to those of my many colleagues who believe the United States and the international community are capable of doing, and must do, much more in this regard. Let me quote once again from the expert, Senator Lugar, who in his article in the December 2002 issue of Arms Control Today, said:

   It is critical that the United States lead in establishing a global coalition capable of exerting pressure on states to cooperate with the safeguarding, accounting, and (where possible) destruction of weapons and materials of mass destruction. Given that a war is being contemplated with Iraq over the question of their weapons programs, it is reasonable to ask why more is not being done on a global scale to control other proliferation risks.

   I agree with the chairman. I also agree with his statement:

   We must not only accelerate dismantlement efforts in Russia, we must broaden our capability to address proliferation risks elsewhere and build a global coalition to support such efforts.

   Clearly, undeniably, there is a lot of work to be done in these programs, not the least of which is to make up for time lost to these programs over the past 2 years.

   The Bush administration put most of the nonproliferation programs on hold during fiscal year 2001, in order to conduct a review to determine the validity of the programs. Luckily, most of the programs survived the review, and some were even strengthened; but little progress was made as very little work was done during this yearlong review.

   Then, at the completion of the review, the fiscal year 2002, and all previous years, funds for the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program were frozen for over a year because the Bush administration failed to make the required certification to spend the money.

   Just recently, these funds have been released as a result of waiver authority included in the fiscal year 2003 Defense Authorization Act. This is waiver authority that the Republicans in the other body wanted to severely restrict and limit to 1 year, but luckily, in the end, the Senate was able to prevail and provide an unrestricted waiver for 3 years.

   These two events, the program review and the inability to certify, effectively stopped the Nunn-Lugar programs for approximately 2 years. The effectiveness of some of these programs has clearly been inhibited, if not damaged. The challenge now is to work to regain and then increase their effectiveness.

   The sheer magnitude of the problem of proliferation

   dictates that we must find an international consensus and work through multilateral arrangements.

   Despite the bureaucracy and delay that accompanies international cooperation, I believe it is necessary, especially in the area of arms control regimes, to have a multilateral approach.

   A report by the Rand Corporation to the then-President-elect Bush pointed out:

   Without our democratic allies, many emerging global issues will likely prove to be beyond our ability to manage, but together with them, the United States will gain unparalleled ability to respond to tomorrow's demands and shape the future.

   Regrettably, the Bush administration has demonstrated a distrust of international organizations.

   Since President Bush took office, the administration has withdrawn from the ABM Treaty and walked away from meaningful negotiations concerning START II.

   Indeed, in the preamble and article 2 of the Moscow Treaty, the first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty is referred to as START, not START I. START II is evident only in its absence from this treaty.

   Assistant Secretary of Defense J. D. Crouch has said:

   I think we have sort of moved beyond START II.

   Many Russian officials have recognized what appears to be the inevitability of this and indicated they are considering START II dead--meaning that Russia is no longer obligated to eliminate its MIRV'd ICBMs.

   We must recognize that in many areas, including arms control, the United States cannot go it alone, and we have to not only encourage but actively work to create an international coalition, particularly with respect to proliferation of these weapons and nuclear materials.

   I am also concerned that recent actions by the United States seems to indicate that while we talk about nonproliferation in principle, in practice we seem to be somewhat ambivalent. This is exacerbated when it appears that the U.S. is increasing the importance of nuclear weapons in our defense policy.

   While the nonproliferation programs were being held up, the administration was working on a new nuclear posture review that would put more emphasis on nuclear weapons. The December 2001 Nuclear Posture Review laid out a framework which includes maintaining the current size of the nuclear weapons stockpile, not reducing it; blurring the distinction between nuclear offensive strike and conventional offensive strike; introducing the notion that new nuclear weapons might be needed to meet changing security requirements; holding open the possibility of resuming nuclear weapons testing, either to develop nuclear weapons, or to maintain the current stockpile; supporting a robust nuclear weapons complex, not just to implement the stockpile stewardship program, but to manufacture hundreds of new plutonium pits per year, and to be able to design a new weapon if needed; and increase ``test readiness''--the level of readiness to conduct a nuclear weapons test, reducing that time period from 36 months to 18 months, essentially leaning further forward to the possibility of resuming nuclear tests. In addition, the Bush administration sought $15.5 million in its fiscal year 2003 request for a robust nuclear earth penetrator to use against hardened and deeply buried targets. This RNEP would modify an existing nuclear weapon with yields up to a megaton. Despite the fact that the fiscal year 2003 National Defense Authorization Act requires a report of the plan for this

   weapon before funds are released, there is an additional $15 million requested for this program in the fiscal year 2004 budget, indicating that the administration is still determined to try to develop this new variety of nuclear weapon.

   There has also been a renewed interest in the development of small nuclear weapons. Even though there is clearly no military requirement for such a weapon, again in its fiscal year 2004 legislative proposal, the Department of Defense seeks the total repeal of a current ban on research and development that could lead to production of a low-yield nuclear weapon.

   DOD states that this law, in their words, ``has negatively affected U.S. Government efforts to support the national strategy to counter weapons of mass destruction and undercuts efforts that could strengthen our ability to deter, or respond to, new or emerging threats.''

   Frankly, this adds up to a very disturbing path of legitimizing the use of nuclear weapons in a world in which we are dramatically concerned with the possibility that Iraq is attempting to obtain nuclear weapons, a world in which the North Koreans are beginning to flaunt their ability to produce nuclear weapons, in which India and Pakistan are on the brink of conflict with nuclear weapons. The idea that we are lowering our own threshold to deploy, to use, to consider in our doctrine the use of nuclear weapons is, I think, an unfortunate and very dangerous approach. These continued efforts, both in the posture review, in requests for new weapons, in requests to investigate and do research on new types of nuclear weapons, and this legitimacy for the use of nuclear weapons, will have profound and detrimental consequences throughout the world.

   It is extraordinarily difficult, if not impossible, to urge other nations to forswear the development and use of nuclear weapons if we are so routinely talking about the development and use of nuclear weapons.

   This is a very disturbing development.

   We have to look at nonproliferation as part of our overall defense policy. Advocating new or usable nuclear weapons destroys, inhibits, and damages the credibility of the United States as we seek to restrain the development and deployment of nuclear weapons. I hope that message comes through in not only today's discussions, but in this treaty.

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   I am also concerned with another aspect of the current situation. We are talking about our approach to Iraq as a need to disarm Saddam before he acquires nuclear weapons. Yet we have moved rather gingerly and pushed over to the United Nations the problem of North Korea which is on the verge of beginning to operate its reprocessing facilities, with the capability of building nuclear devices within months, if not weeks.

   I think this leads many people, and not just those who follow these policy debates but most ordinary Americans, to wonder what is the difference. Why is the situation in Iraq so compelling, even though there is little evidence that Saddam is on the verge of producing a nuclear weapon, that we engage in a military conflict, while, on the other hand, when there is glaring evidence of the ability of the North Koreans to produce such a weapon, we have moved this along into the category of not a crisis, something the U.N. can handle? That intellectual dilemma is puzzling many people throughout this country.

   I believe there is a crisis in North Korea, and I believe it is a crisis that requires the prompt attention of the President. If one looks at the strategic vision we have to embrace, it can perhaps be divided into several major tasks.

   The first is to preempt terrorists and, indeed, we saw this week an effective use of our military and intelligence forces and our allies in Pakistan. Then we have to interdict, contain, and stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

   The North Koreans, in my mind, pose a much more difficult challenge to us than the Iraqis at the moment. Not only are they on the verge of producing a nuclear weapon because they have the nuclear material, they also have a history of selling anything to anyone because their major cash crop is selling weapons to anyone who will buy them.

   We are here today to conclude a very small but a very important step forward with the support of the Moscow Treaty, but we have much more to do when it comes to particularly supporting efforts by our country in an international coalition to preempt, to interdict, to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction, and I think to reexamine carefully and thoroughly the new emphasis we are putting on the development and use of nuclear weapons in our inventory.

   I believe we will regret the day we give legitimacy to the potential use of nuclear weapons by any power, including the United States.

   I thank the Chair and yield the floor.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. CORNYN). The Senator from Massachusetts.

   AMENDMENT NO. 255

   Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.

   The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

   The Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. KERRY) proposes an amendment numbered 255.

   Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

   The amendment is as follows:

    At the end of section 2, add the following new condition:

    (3) ANNUAL REPORTS ON MONITORING CAPABILITIES.--(A) Not later than 60 days after the exchange of the instruments of ratification of the Treaty, and annually thereafter on May 1, the President shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate an estimate, prepared by the Director of Central Intelligence, on the capability of the United States to monitor the compliance of the Russian Federation with the requirements of the Treaty.

    (B) Each estimate shall meet the requirements of a national intelligence estimate under section 103(b)(2)(A) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(b)(2)(A)), and shall include--

    (i) an estimate, for each strategic nuclear weapons system of the Russian Federation, of the confidence of the United States, whether low, medium, or high, in the capability of the United States to monitor the deployed warheads on such system;

    (ii) an assessment of the capability of the United States to monitor the compliance of the Russian Federation with the requirements of the Treaty--

    (I) under the verification measures of the verification regime under the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, with Annexes, Protocols, and Memorandum of Understanding, signed at Moscow on July 31, 1991 (START Treaty); and

    (II) after the verification regime expires upon termination of the START Treaty; and

    (iii) additional mechanisms to ensure United States monitoring of the compliance of the Russian Federation with the requirements of the Treaty, including--

    (I) further agreements between the United States and the Russian Federation;

    (II) mutual data exchanges between the United States and the Russian Federation;

    (III) improvements in the transparency of strategic offensive reductions under the Treaty;

    (IV) improvements to existing monitoring technologies; and

    (V) other appropriate mechanisms.

    (C) Each estimate shall be submitted in both classified and unclassified form.

   Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty that has been under consideration for a couple of days, also known as the Moscow Treaty, is, in my judgment, in the 18 years I have been here thinking about arms control and certainly as part of the debate in the Foreign Relations Committee and on the floor in the ratification of treaties, as flimsy a treaty as the Senate has ever considered. I believe its faults are many. At best, its defenders contend that it does no harm, but I find fault even in that assessment, and I find fault ultimately in this treaty.

   The Moscow Treaty promises to reduce the deployed offensive weapons of the United States and Russia to a range of between 1,700 to 2,200 each by December 31, 2012. As far as the treaty goes, that is the highlight.

   I think, under certain circumstances, one would certainly say that reducing its own number of deployed missiles is a worthy goal and something we want to achieve, but in the world we live in today, simply reducing their deployment, where they are sometimes under better control than they are going to be if they are not deployed, it may, in fact, be taking a dangerous situation and perhaps lending itself to the greater dangers of this particular moment of history.

   In my assessment, regrettably, the treaty amounts to little more than a series of missed opportunities. Let me be precise about that point.

   It does not mandate a reduction in total warheads. None must be dismantled. The treaty merely requires both parties to reduce the number of warheads in their operationally deployed arsenals. It provides no timetable for the planned reductions in deployed forces prior to the treaty's 2012 target date. It never requires the destruction of a single launcher.

   In effect, the treaty allows each side to upload, download, and mix weapons in and out of storage. It contains no verification procedures, and the vast stockpiles of nuclear warheads in this country and in Russia remain unchanged.

   Nuclear weapons, as we all know, are the legacy of the cold war, the most pressing single threat that we face today as we contemplate dealing with Saddam Hussein and as we wish we were dealing with North Korea. The most pressing threat, however, is really that nuclear weapons, or their lethal components, might fall into the hands of terrorists or irresponsible governments at the head of rogue regimes. This fact makes the provisions of this treaty even more troubling.

   Instead of requiring the dismantlement of warheads or launchers, the treaty simply requires that on one day in 2012, the sides are to have no more than the 1,700 or 2,200 operationally deployed nuclear weapons. The remaining thousands of weapons will be held in reserve, stockpiled for some other unforeseen need, a need, I might say, in the context of the threats we are looking at in the year 2003 that is extraordinarily hard to explain, particularly when those stockpiled weapons become the risk of stolen, bartered, sold, or blackmailed materials. By their continued existence, they present a tempting target for thieves and for terrorists.

   It is no secret that there are those who are eager to capitalize on a deadly market for weapons-usable nuclear materials. The GAO has documented numerous failed attempts to smuggle nuclear materials out of Russia. I say to

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   I will tell my colleagues from my experience as a law enforcement official that if you know you caught 20 and you know you are operating with limited capacities to detect, anyone ought to be asking the question, How many did we miss and how many will we miss in the future?

   The great security challenge of our day is to keep nuclear weapons out of the hands of those who would do us harm, but this treaty only expands the stockpile of nondeployed warheads in Russia, and in this country for that matter. It may advance some old cold war calculus for arms control, but it is not a part of a broader comprehensive approach to our nuclear relationship with Russia, particularly in the area of threat reduction, and there I think the treaty runs the risk of increasing the danger of nuclear theft by stockpiling thousands of warheads.

   Obviously, it is the task of all of us to try to make the world more secure, not less secure. As I have said previously, we need to revitalize the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program by giving it the sustained leadership, attention, and funding it deserves.

   Over the last decade, the United States has spent about $7.5 billion to deactivate 6,000 warheads and destroy thousands of delivery vehicles. Why would we spend $7.5 billion to deactivate and destroy and then bring a treaty to the floor of the Senate which does neither? We have to make good on our pledge of $10 billion over the next 10 years to the G-8 threat reduction partnership, and we need to encourage the good faith participation of our allies. But we know that even those efforts are not going to be enough.

   In 2001, the bipartisan Baker-Cutler commission concluded that for our efforts to secure Russia's nuclear weapons materials and expertise to succeed, we will have to spend $30 billion over the next 10 years. That is a challenge we ought to be meeting as a primary goal prior even to the implementation of this treaty.

   The treaty's supporters have noted that its brevity is important, as if the length of a treaty somehow constitutes a real accomplishment, and that provisions in it are a reflection of our new relationship with Russia.

   My question is, if we are in a new environment with Russia, then why not include verification and transparency measures that reflect that new environment? The treaty does not mandate the dismantlement or destruction of warheads or launchers. Yet the provisions of this treaty turn upon themselves and the very logic underpinning the treaty as argued by its proponents. For instance, they argue, as Secretary Rumsfeld did before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last summer, that no arms control treaty in the history of our country has ever required the destruction of warheads.

   Well, if this treaty is based on the conclusion that we live in a different time, if this treaty is based on the conclusion that the cold war is really over, if this treaty is based on the conclusion that we have a new and better relationship with Russia and that we therefore can look to a new period, why then keep these warheads in storage for another day when the numbers we are reducing to under any SIOP or any warfighting plan we have ever seen are sufficient to destroy the world several times over? It simply does not make sense.

   Why expand the stockpiles of stored nuclear warheads and materials when we know to a certainty, as the CIA tells us, we do not have the capacity today to safeguard those materials? Why would we do that when we are prepared to go to war against Iraq to prevent Iraq from illicitly receiving the very kinds of materials that we are about to encourage the capacity for others to seek out in the same way as we have seen others do in those 20 examples I cited a few moments ago?

   The logic escapes anybody who stops to really think about

   what we are doing with this treaty. If we have really entered a new age and a new relationship with Russia--and I believe we have in fact--then neither Russia nor the United States should hedge on a commitment to real and meaningful arms reduction to an agreement that addresses in its very fabric the new and real threat of proliferation by theft or diversion. By doing so, we would send a signal to Saddam Hussein and to the rest of the world that we are not hedging our bets; that, in fact, we are serious and we are setting an example, and that the rest of the world is earning the justification for moving to disarm another nation for moving to nuclearization.

   Those same supporters who say we need to hold on to vast stockpiles of nuclear warheads ironically argue that the profoundly changed nature of the relationship with Russia means we need not have negotiated verification regimes for this treaty.

   There are still those in this country, as surely there are some in Russia, who continue to view our former cold war adversary with some measure of suspicion and distrust.

   This treaty had the potential to deepen Russian-American cooperation and confidence building. If it had included verification measures, the treaty would have silenced skeptics of our new relationship by demonstrating mutual weapons reductions through inspection and verification. But, regrettably, it does not. Both sides understand that each has the potential to redeploy all of these weapons unless we can verify, at a minimum, their location. So by this feature alone, this treaty contains the seeds of future doubt and suspicion.

   Verification ought to be a crucial aspect of our effort to secure nuclear weapons and materials, and if we cannot be certain that the numbers of deployed warheads have been reduced, we will not be certain of the magnitude of the challenge of securing those materials.

   Since the height of the arms control negotiations, now almost two decades ago, the cry of many of my colleagues on the other side of this aisle--which I remember well for years as we tried to move through various arms control treaties--was appropriately, as Ronald Reagan said, ``trust but verify.''

   This treaty exhibits a lot of trust but no verification. Accordingly, I am offering an amendment to help address the critical issue of verification. It is a very simple amendment, and it really ought not to present a problem to colleagues. If we are to have more confidence in this treaty, we should be working with the Russians now to achieve a viable regime to verify that reductions are indeed taking place on both sides and that they are taking place in a way that safeguards those materials. In the absence of any mutually agreed upon verification regime, we are left to rely on national means and methods to determine whether or not Russia is making the reductions promised on a reasonable schedule to meet the December 2012 target date.

   My amendment adds a new condition to the Resolution of Ratification requiring an annual report prepared by the intelligence community on our ability to monitor Russia's compliance with the Moscow Treaty. For all those who have worried about trusting, verifying, and knowing what is happening, this is a very simple requirement, that we learn from our own intelligence community about our capacity to safeguard the interests of the United States of America. This national intelligence estimate must also provide an assessment of the ability of the United States to monitor compliance with the SORT treaty through the verification regime of the START I treaty and our ability to monitor compliance after the START I verification regime terminates in 2009.

   Perhaps most notably, under my amendment the intelligence community is required to inform us of the mechanisms they need to verify treaty compliance with a high degree of confidence, including consideration of further agreements between the United States and the Russian Federation, mutual data exchanges between the two countries, improvements in the transparency of reductions that are called for in this treaty, technological improvements, and other appropriate mechanisms.

   I have long viewed this treaty's lack of verification measures as a source of grave concern. I spoke out in the Foreign Relations Committee on each occasion that this treaty was considered. Last summer, when the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held hearings on

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   While I understand that we cannot mandate the dismantlement of warheads or the security of nuclear materials without renegotiating this treaty, it is critical we have an understanding, in order to protect the security interests of our country, of our own ability to monitor Russian compliance,

   where that ability might fall short and to understand a perspective on what we simply do not know. Without meaningful verification, there is a great deal that we will not know. And in this case, what we don't know can, indeed, hurt us in this dangerous world that we live in today.

   Last month, I voted in committee to bring the treaty to the full Senate but not without reservation. At that time, I registered my serious concern about the treaty's lack of verification measures, about the lack of milestones or targets other than the 2012 date, and about the peculiarity of a treaty that expires on the very same day that it reaches its intended goal.

   The amendment I offer today is intended to drive at the heart of the verification issue. I know several of my colleagues have offered or talked about other important fixes to address the shortcomings of this treaty, and I applaud their efforts, but at its heart this treaty represents a missed opportunity. It almost represents a treaty for the sake of a treaty without regard to the longer term security interests and strategic interests of the United States.

   We missed an opportunity to help make the world safer for our children in the long term. We missed an opportunity to eliminate thousands of nuclear weapons for the long term, and not just to reduce deployed weapons for the short term. We missed an opportunity to advance American-Russian relations in a way that, in fact, builds a stronger foundation of trust between our two great countries.

   By addressing the verification issue as envisioned in my amendment, I believe we can at least learn from our own intelligence community--which we ought to be willing to trust--what more needs to be done to provide the transparency and verification so essential to any agreement of this nature. If we are to make America safer, and we must, it will take more than cosmetic treaties that leave Russia's nuclear arsenal in place. As Ronald Reagan told the Nation, ``History has shown that peace will not come, nor will our freedoms be preserved, by good will alone.''

   We have work still to be done to meet today's challenges, and I believe one of those challenges is to fix the Moscow Treaty.

   I yield the floor.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.

   Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, let me respond to the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts by reviewing, once again, the origins of the Moscow Treaty. At the time that President Putin and President Bush met in May of last year, Russia had made the decision that the distinguished Minister of Defense of Russia, Sergei Ivanov, announced that the Russians would be destroying warheads in a matter of course, dismantling them from missiles. President Bush had indicated that as a matter of fact, unilaterally, the United States was prepared to do the same. For a variety of reasons--some economic, some safety--both countries had decided upon a course of action. When the two Presidents came together to formulate their joint announcement, the Moscow Treaty was formed.

   As has been pointed out, first it was not clear that a treaty would be formulated, but ultimately both leaders decided that was the best course. That is why the treaty is simple. It, clearly, does not cover all of the objectives of arms control that can be covered in further negotiations, and many of us hope there will be further negotiations, not only in the nuclear area but in the biological area where in the course of this we have pointed out there is still a lack of transparency on the part of the Russians, as we perceive it at certain military facilities.

   In the case of the amendment offered by the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts as a way of shoring up a treaty that he has criticized, let me say that the major verification procedure now in place is the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, very specifically. At Surovatika, Senators and Members of the House have witnessed four missiles coming into that plant each month. They are destroyed. Clearly, the warheads have been separated from the missiles prior to that destruction. That four-a-month situation is going to continue unless for reasons of our own parliamentary procedure we stop the funding.

   Clearly, you can verify the missiles. In my last visit to the site, I was accompanied by the governor of the territory, the mayors of various towns and radio stations in Russia. Why? Because this is a jobs issue. Russians employ people destroying missiles. Nothing very secret about it; they are swarming around. A television station from Indianapolis, channel 13, accompanied me on that occasion, took pictures of the entire process and put it on a remarkable documentary on Indianapolis television.

   We need to catch up with where verification is in the world. It is on the ground, with Americans working in cooperative threat reduction with Russians.

   The missiles that come in are interchangeable SS-17s, SS-18s, and SS-19s. We visited with plant officials about their further planning on SS-24s and 25s. This is the comprehensive scope of what we are talking about. These are, in fact, the missiles on which the warheads were located and from which they have been separated.

   In a future treaty the United States and Russia may decide they wish to go much further with regard to the destruction of the warheads themselves. That point has been made by many Senators that the treaty does not call for the destruction of warheads. But, in fact, warheads are being destroyed by Russia and by the United States.

   In terms of both of our countries, we have decided not to have transparency to the point that both nations are inspecting that process, but we are able to verify the results. I point out that the intelligence report that perhaps the Senator is calling for may be covered in large part by the cooperative threat reduction annual report to Congress. This one is for fiscal year 2002, a detailed summary not only of nuclear dismantlement and demolition but, likewise, anything we are doing in chemical and biological, too.

   I admit there are areas, as I have said earlier, that we are not into yet, and we wish we were. My hope is we will be successful as two nations in seeing eye to eye on movement in that direction.

   When it comes, however, to the verification of this Moscow Treaty, it flows from the fact that both nations of their own will want to destroy the missiles and separate the warheads and thus reduce the viability of these situations. We have indicated at our own time, at our own speed, we will do that. And the linchpin from the beginning, it seems to me, is the fact not only of the START requirements that do expire in 2009 but the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program on the ground which has no expiration unless Congress decides to terminate it. That is a different debate and a different set of decisions.

   I am hopeful Senators will understand that. I appreciate the fervent plea for verifiability for all of us. As I say, I admit, I wish we had a better insight into the disposition of all of the warheads, but even here both Russians and Americans indicate in the fullness of time that these warheads have to be destroyed.

   In large part that is because sometimes the fuel components in them are unstable. They become a danger for the nation that is simply holding them.

   This is not a sporting goods situation of inert matter on shelves. These, unfortunately, are far too living, viable, dynamic instruments. This is why we have worked with Russia on the fissile material that comes from the destruction of these warheads; to provide storage for that. It is a whole new set of problems.

   Some arms control people have suggested that while the warhead is on the missile, you do not have the problem of fissile material that might get loose and be bought or sold. It is contained. That is still true while it is in the warhead. As it comes out of the warhead, a whole new set of problems is created--

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   For these reasons, I oppose the amendment of the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts. I hope other Senators will oppose it. It appears to me to be unnecessary. I would say, simply, other criticisms of the treaty are certainly a matter of the opinion of the Senator, but it was a modest treaty. It came from the volition and the will of both countries coming together at their own time, at their own speed, and with procedures that seem to me to offer an adequate amount of verifiability, much of it on the site and through the eyes of the Russian press, as well as our own.

   I thank the Chair.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.

   Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, as the chairman of the committee knows, I have so much respect for him. We rarely have disagreements.

   In essence, he sort of made my case just now. I have never argued about the destruction of some of the missiles that are going in. I talked about the warheads and fissionable material. Fissionable material is not in the missile; it is in the warhead. The distinguished chairman just said, I wish we had a better sense of the disposition of those warheads. I wish we had a better sense of the disposition of those warheads.

   All I am asking for is that we ask our intelligence communities. Is the Senate scared of asking its own intelligence community for a report on our capacity to know where those materials are and what is happening? That is all I am asking.

   On the floor of the Senate, I cannot go into what we have heard in private, in classified sessions. But this amendment is based on my knowledge of what our intelligence community is concerned about and what I believe we ought to be concerned about in this country. So as the chairman says, I wish we had a better sense of what is happening to those warheads.

   If we are willing to go to war in Iraq because we think it is dangerous for that man to have nuclear warheads, and we know that 15 out of some 20 efforts to transfer this material has come from Russia, we better be concerned about these warheads. That is what this is about. That is precisely what involves the security of the people of the United States of America, and that is what this amendment is about.

   I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

   The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

   Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

   Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the vote in relation to the Kerry amendment, No. 255, occur at 5:40 today, and the time until then be equally divided in the usual form, provided that no further second-degree amendment be in order to the amendment prior to the vote.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

   Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I add one final argument, and that is the actual text of the amendment of the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts requires these intelligence reports on the capability of the United States to monitor the compliance of the Russian Federation to the requirements of the treaty.

   The treaty does not require insight into the warhead destruction. That is a desirable aim, and I have indicated in due course we may be able to negotiate that, but that is not a part of this treaty. Therefore, the report that is being asked for really asks for information that is not covered by the treaty.

   I repeat, the information that is covered by the treaty, it seems to me, is really adequately monitored by the cooperative threat reduction personnel.

   I yield the floor.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

   Mr. LUGAR. I yield to the distinguished Senator from Delaware.

   Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I will be very brief. Let me, as we say in this body, associate myself with the remarks of my colleague and say it in a slightly different way. The Senator is asking us to have the intelligence community monitor something that there is no capacity to monitor because there is no provision in the treaty requiring the monitoring. It is a little bit like saying we would like the President to report to us, on a yearly basis, the cost of the destruction or dismantling or taking off of alert or removing from a silo every missile that is removed by the Russians.

   That would be great, but it is not in the treaty. There is no provision.

   Regarding the ultimate criticism, the primary criticism the Senator from Massachusetts makes of the treaty is accurate. There is not much to this treaty. There is not much to it. As I said in my very long opening statement, the administration, when they testified before the committee, said: Look, we were going to do this anyway. We were going to do this anyway. So we told the Russians, in effect paraphrasing the Secretary of State, we told the Russians if you want to come along, come along; if you don't, you don't.

   The whole rationale of this administration is the bet that the cold war is over, it is truly and forever behind us. I hope they are right. This treaty affords few protections in the event of a heightened mistrust that develops, or a crisis. It doesn't have any protections. So we are not kidding each other, between now and 2012 the Russians could go out, if they were capable of doing it financially, and build 10,000 more nuclear weapons. They could dig 40,000 more holes for silos, if they had the money. There is nothing in this treaty that prevents that.

   I know we are all railing against what the treaty should have been; what, if we personally were negotiating it, we would have done. But, unfortunately, I say to my friend from Massachusetts, he has a tough call the rest of us must make. If you don't like what is in it, and there is a great deal that is not in it that we would like to have in it, vote against it. Vote against it. But you can't fix something that is not broken, in effect--the treaty has no verification. It has no requirement the warheads be destroyed. There is no requirement they be accounted for. There is no requirement that there, in fact, be any progress shown until December 31, 2012.

   If you view all of these deficiencies as fatal flaws, then vote no, just flat vote no because you cannot fix them. You cannot fix them.

   The only way I think we could fix them is if we get the administration and Russia and the United States on a positive track here. We have them on a track. The track is that upon which we have agreed. As Sam Nunn said, this is a good-faith treaty. That is the bottom line.

   The reason I am for this treaty is failure to ratify it, I believe, will be read as bad faith. Ratifying it demonstrates good faith, and our hortatory language--the message we have sent personally in terms of each individual Senator speaking to the administration--the language in our declarations and conditions and the amendments on the floor makes it clear to the administration that there is clearly a majority of Members of the Senate who would like to see more done. We are not criticizing what has been done. We just would like more done.

   I understand the frustration. Believe me. I understand the frustration. The greatest concern--and I think we have taken care of it--is if, in fact, the Russians do not have the engineering and/or financial capability of meeting the commitment they have made to reduce their deployed forces, we will help them. That is the best thing we can do. That is what we have done.

   I suggest we should support this treaty and we should oppose this amendment.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.

   Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I appreciate the comments of the distinguished ranking Member. Let me be very clear. I am not asking for anything to be done here that isn't monitoring of this treaty. If you look on page 2 of my amendment, it says I am looking for ``an estimate, for each strategic nuclear weapons system in the Russian Federation, of the confidence of the United States, whether low, medium, or high, in the capability of the United States to monitor the deployed warheads of such systems.''

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   I am looking for ``an assessment of the capability of the United States to monitor the compliance of the Russian Federation with the requirements of the Treaty.''

   This is to make sure we can see that this treaty, as the minority ranking Member has called it, as limited as it is--I am trying to making sure we can comply and know that we have the ascertainment of our intelligence community with respect thereto.

   That is precisely what my amendment does.

   I yield my time.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.

   Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?

   There is a sufficient second.

   The clerk will call the roll.

   The legislative clerk called the roll.

   Mr. FRIST. I announce that the Senator from New Mexico (Mr. DOMENICI), the Senator from Kentucky (Mr. MCCONNELL), and the Senator from Oregon (Mr. SMITH) are necessarily absent.

   Mr. REID. I announce that the Senator from Florida (Mr. GRAHAM) and the Senator from Georgia (Mr. MILLER) are necessarily absent.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. COLEMAN). Are there any other Senators in the Chamber desiring to vote?

   The result was announced--yeas 45, nays 50, as follows:

   Akaka

   Baucus

   Bayh

   Bingaman

   Boxer

   Breaux

   Byrd

   Cantwell

   Carper

   Clinton

   Conrad

   Corzine

   Daschle

   Dayton

   Dorgan

   Durbin

   Edwards

   Feingold

   Feinstein

   Harkin

   Hollings

   Inouye

   Jeffords

   Johnson

   Kennedy

   Kerry

   Kohl

   Landrieu

   Lautenberg

   Leahy

   Levin

   Lieberman

   Lincoln

   Mikulski

   Murray

   Nelson (FL)

   Nelson (NE)

   Pryor

   Reed

   Reid

   Rockefeller

   Sarbanes

   Schumer

   Stabenow

   Wyden

   Alexander

   Allard

   Allen

   Bennett

   Biden

   Bond

   Brownback

   Bunning

   Burns

   Campbell

   Chafee

   Chambliss

   Cochran

   Coleman

   Collins

   Cornyn

   Craig

   Crapo

   DeWine

   Dodd

   Dole

   Ensign

   Enzi

   Fitzgerald

   Frist

   Graham (SC)

   Grassley

   Gregg

   Hagel

   Hatch

   Hutchison

   Inhofe

   Kyl

   Lott

   Lugar

   McCain

   Murkowski

   Nickles

   Roberts

   Santorum

   Sessions

   Shelby

   Snowe

   Specter

   Stevens

   Sununu

   Talent

   Thomas

   Voinovich

   Warner

   Domenici

   Graham (FL)

   McConnell

   Miller

   Smith

   The amendment (No. 255) was rejected.

   Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote and I move to lay that motion on the table.

   The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan is recognized.

   AMENDMENT NO. 256

   Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I expect to take just a few minutes. I will be offering an amendment and then having a colloquy. I send an amendment to the desk on behalf of myself, Senator Daschle, Senator Akaka, and Senator Nelson of Florida.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.

   The senior assistant bill clerk read as follows:

   The Senator from Michigan [Mr. LEVIN] for himself, Mr. Akaka, Mr. Daschle, and Mr. Nelson of Florida, proposes an amendment numbered 256.

   Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that further reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

   The amendment is as follows:

   In section 2, in paragraph (2)(F), strike ``; and'' and insert a semicolon.

   In section 2, redesignate paragraph (2)(G) as paragraph 2(H).

   In section 2, after paragraph (2)(F), insert the following new subparagraph:

   (G) with respect to the strategic offensive reductions described pursuant to subparagraph (B) for a calendar year, a listing of--

   (i) the total number of each type of strategic offensive nuclear warhead that will be in the nuclear weapons stockpile of the United States during the calendar year, and the total number of each type of strategic offensive nuclear weapon that will operationally deployed by the United States during the calendar year;

   (ii) the number and type of nuclear warheads in the United States that are dismantled during the previous calendar year; and

   (iii) to the extent possible, the total number of each type of strategic offensive nuclear warhead that will be in the nuclear weapons stockpile of the Russian Federation during the calendar year, and the total number of each type of strategic offensive nuclear weapon that will be operationally deployed by the Russian Federation during the calendar year.

   Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, condition 2 of the Resolution of Ratification requires the President to submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Armed Services Committee an annual report that would include, among other things, the following: A, a listing of the strategic nuclear weapons force levels of the United States and a best estimate of the strategic nuclear weapons force levels of the Russian Federation as of December 31 of the preceding calendar year; B, a detailed description, to the extent possible, of strategic offensive reductions planned by each party for the current calendar year.

   The purpose of this amendment is to clarify that those elements of the report should include certain important information on operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads.

   I have discussed this matter with Senators LUGAR and BIDEN, and I think we can address the issue satisfactorily with a colloquy between myself and Senators LUGAR and BIDEN.

   My question of Senator Lugar is the following: Will the committee urge the administration to include under the annual reporting requirements required by conditions 2(a) and 2(b), that the Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services would receive information on the following: During the calendar year of the report, the specific number and type of warheads that are planned to be no longer operationally deployed; secondly, during that current calendar year, the planned total size and makeup of the stockpile of strategic nuclear warheads by number and by type; and as to the past year, the report would then, hopefully, include and be urged to include by Senators LUGAR and BIDEN the total number and type of any warheads that were dismantled during the preceding calendar year?

   Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I am pleased to respond to the distinguished Senator from Michigan. Our report does not require information on those warheads that are not operationally deployed. We would urge the administration to provide this information.

   Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, if I may respond to my colleague, I am not sure whether condition 2 requires the executive branch to list force reductions or force levels by warhead types. But I certainly think it is a good idea to do so, and I would urge the administration to do so.

   In addition, I think the administration should make a decision on warhead dismantlement. Quite frankly, my support for ratification of this treaty is based in part on the administration's assurance before our committee that at least some warheads removed under the treaty will be destroyed or dismantled, and I fully expect the administration to live up to this. So I think the Senator is making a very valid point.

   Mr. LEVIN. I thank both Senators for the assurance that they will urge the administration that the reporting provided for under the Resolution of Ratification would hopefully include the information I have just outlined.

   AMENDMENT NO. 256, WITHDRAWN

   Mr. President, I now withdraw the amendment.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has that right. The amendment is withdrawn.

   ALERT STATUS OF U.S. RUSSIAN NUCLEAR FORCES

   Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I wish to ask the Senator from Delaware and the Senator from Indiana some questions about one of the issues that was raised during the hearings conducted by his committee on this treaty, and one of the questions not addressed by this treaty that I believe to be critical to reducing the danger of accidental or unauthorized nuclear war: the alert status of U.S. and Russian nuclear forces.

   Like me, I know that they are concerned that the current alert status of

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   I was pleased to note that the report of the Foreign Relations Committee on this treaty addresses the concerns that the alert status issue creates for crisis stability raised by former Senator Nunn, and the suggestion made by Gen. Eugene Habiger, the former Commander in Chief of U.S. Strategic Command that ``We may have to find a way to move more weapons off alert status''.

   What are the views of the Senator from Delaware and the Senator from Indiana on this issue, and the desirability of moving nuclear weapons off alert status?

   Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I think that the new relationship between the United States and Russia can only be improved by taking nuclear weapons off alert status. By giving decision makers more time to react to disturbing information, this would lower the risk of a nuclear war caused by one side's mistaken belief that the other was attacking it. I am especially impressed, moreover, by the fact that Gen. Eugene Habiger, former Commander in Chief of the U.S. Strategic Command feels that the time has come to do this. I would note, however, that General Habiger warned that existing specific de-alerting proposals were often not viable.

   Mr. LUGAR. During our hearings on the treaty, a number of witnesses expressed concern about the alert status of U.S. strategic nuclear warheads. As the United States and Russia enter a new era of friendship and cooperation, we must take a close look at what we can do, in a safe and effective manner, to take nuclear weapons off alert status and prevent an accidental nuclear launch due

   to a false alarm or a miscalculation. I know our friend and former colleague Senator Sam Nunn expressed hope in our hearings that we might address the cold war-era nuclear postures of the United States and Russia as a critical next step following ratification of the Moscow Treaty.

   Mrs. FEINSTEIN. In addition to recommending an ``immediate standdown'' in the alert status of the nuclear forces reduced under this treaty, it is my understanding that in his testimony, General Habiger also suggested that a system to take weapons off alert status in ways that make sense, are transparent, and do not compromise our security be designed by teams by people who actually build the weapons.

   Given this commonsense recommendation--and the failure of the treaty to address this question--I would like to ask the Senator what action he would recommend the Senate take to make General Habiger's suggestion a reality? What measures, if any, does he plan to address this issue in an appropriate manner this Congress?

   Mr. BIDEN. The Foreign Relations Committee's report encourages the President to establish a commission of weapon system experts to undertake the review that General Habiger proposed. It adds that if the President does not do so, Congress could usefully act on its own, either to establish such a commission or, perhaps, to commission the National Academy of Sciences to set up such a group.

   Mr. LUGAR. The Senator from Delaware is correct, and while we have not determined precisely how to proceed, I expect that we will want to encourage action by the President before we move on our own. Such a measure could be offered as an amendment to major legislation such as the Department of State authorization bill.

   I can say with confidence that Senator Biden and I are agreed that we should continue to pursue this initiative in ways that will provide productive results.

   Mrs. FEINSTEIN. I thank the Senator from the Delaware and the Senator from Indiana for their leadership and hard work on this issue, and I look forward to continuing to work with him, on additional legislation, if need be, to pursue this initiative.

   Mr. CONRAD. Mr. President, I rise to engage the distinguished leadership of the Foreign Relations Committee in a colloquy.

   Mr. President, for the past several years I have been increasingly concerned about the ``loose nuke'' threat presented by the Russian Federation's arsenal of non-strategic or ``tactical'' nuclear warheads. Unlike strategic nuclear forces, intermediate range nuclear forces, or even conventional forces in Europe, tactical nuclear arms are not covered by any arms control treaty. There are no formal negotiated limits of any kind, no way to hold current and future Russian leaders to the unfulfilled promises of steep reductions made by former Soviet President Gorbachev and former Russian President Yeltsin more than a decade ago. In fact, we do not even have a good estimate of how many tactical warheads Russia has because the United States has no inspection rights. Unclassified estimates of the current Russian stockpile have ranged widely, from 7,000 warheads to 18,000 warheads--four to eleven times as many as the United States. I am very troubled by the insufficient security at Russian nuclear warhead storage facilities and al Qaida's known interest in acquiring these horrific weapons. Am I right to understand that my colleagues share this concern?

   Mr. LUGAR. I share the concern voiced by the senior Senator from North Dakota on the potential proliferation threats posed by non-strategic nuclear weapons in Russia. As the Senator knows, the United States has voiced serious concerns about the safety and security of these dangerous weapons stored at multiple locations around Russia. I believe the Russian tactical nuclear weapons arsenal represents an area of concern and needs attention.

   Mr. BIDEN. I agree with the Senator from North Dakota and the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator LUGAR. During hearings last year on the Treaty of Moscow now before the Senate, several of our distinguished witnesses mentioned Russia's tactical nuclear stockpile, including former Senator Nunn. The smaller size and greater number of these weapons puts them at higher risk for theft by, or illicit sale to, terror networks such as al-Qaida.

   Mr. CONRAD. I thank my colleagues, who perhaps remember that in 1998 I authored legislation passed by Congress that identified Russia's tactical nuclear stockpile as a serious proliferation threat and called for United States pressure on Russia for real reductions. I was therefore disappointed that a requirement for Russian tactical warhead dismantlement and United States inspection rights were not part of the Treaty of Moscow. The disconnect between the ability of the United States to maintain current strategic force levels almost indefinitely, and Russia's inevitable strategic nuclear decline due to economic realities, gave our side enormous leverage that I believe we should have used to win Russian concessions on tactical nuclear arms. While I am encouraged that the resolution of ratification before us includes a declaration on

   accurate accounting and security, it does not mention Russian tactical nuclear reductions. I have prepared a corrective amendment and would welcome the support of the chairman and ranking member of the Foreign Relations Committee.

   Mr. LUGAR. I thank the Senator from North Dakota for his work on this important issue and his thoughtful invitation. I would ask that the Senator from North Dakota withhold his amendment with the understanding that the Foreign Relations Committee will make a serious effort to elevate the matter of Russian tactical nuclear weapons to a top priority on our Nation's arms control and threat reduction agenda.

   Mr. CONRAD. Would the chairman and ranking member be willing to hold hearings in the coming months focusing on the threats associated with Russia's tactical nuclear stockpile? Furthermore, would the chairman and ranking member be willing to join me in urging the President to develop a comprehensive plan to reduce the Russian tactical threat, including making Russian tactical warhead reductions a priority in our dealings with the Russian Federation?

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   Mr. LUGAR. The ranking member and I have plans to hold hearings on the continued proliferation challenges in Russia. Clearly the threat posed by tactical nuclear weapons would be an important topic to be discussed and investigated in that forum. I believe that tactical nuclear warhead reductions should be a top United States priority in our new relationship with Russia.

   Mr. CONRAD. Would the chairman and ranking member consider sharing their views on the threats posed by the proliferation of tactical nuclear weapons with the administration? Might I propose a letter indicating our shared concerns and our hopes that this issue will be a high priority for the administration in future discussions with Russia?

   Mr. LUGAR. I thank the Senator for his thoughts. This issue was raised repeatedly during our hearings on the Treaty. I am confident of the administration's efforts to engage Russia on this issue. I would be happy to reinforce the committee's views on these issues with the appropriate Administration officials.

   Mr. BIDEN. Let me echo the comments on the chairman. After entry into force of the Moscow Treaty, getting a handle on Russian tactical nuclear weapons must be a top arms control and non-proliferation objective of the United States Government. I look forward to joining the chairman in holding hearings on this matter and in writing to the administration with the Senators from Indiana and North Dakota. A comprehensive approach to this problem, as the senior Senator from North Dakota suggests, is sorely needed.

   Mr. CONRAD. I thank my colleagues for their concern about this clear and present ``loose nuke'' threat and for their supportive statements today. We cannot afford for this blind spot in our non-proliferation efforts to go uncorrected. With the assurances of the chairman and ranking member, I withdraw my amendment and yield the floor.

   Mr. BURNS. Mr. President, the treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions also known as the ``Moscow Treaty'' obligates each side to reduce the number of its strategic offensive nuclear warheads to a range of 1,700 to 2,200 by the end of 2012. This treaty is a good beginning and I congratulate the President for making a complete break with past arms control approaches by placing reliance on deterrence and missile defense. The enemies of American must clearly understand that they cannot attack or threaten us with impunity and that our Nation will have a national missile defense in place as soon as possible.

   President Reagan coined the phrase ``trust but verify,'' This phrase could have no greater meaning than when it is applied to the Moscow Treaty.

   I recently returned from Moscow where I was deeply impressed by the dramatic transformation underway in that huge country. While there is no doubt that Russia is on the track towards democracy and a free market economy, it is equally clear to me that the Russians are not at the stage where they can be given a blank check to implement the Moscow Treaty. Congress has authorized more then $4.7 billion for U.S. programs aimed at helping Russia and other newly independent states to reduce the threats from their weapons of mass production. The Moscow Treaty does not expressly deal with the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program but the objectives of the treaty cannot be achieved without extending this assistance to Russia. The only certainty about future costs to implement this treaty is that the costs are uncertain and that the uncertainty goes toward how much higher costs will be. According to a GAO report issued this week, ``. . ..a pilot facility to destroy 14 percent of Russia's chemical weapons over an 11-year period would cost the United States almost $890 million--an increase of about $150 million from the estimate . . .'' Higher program cost uncertainty is compounded by Russia's apparent inability to pay for its agreed-upon share of project costs.

   Another problem with an effective reduction of weapons of mass destruction is that Russia is not always willing to provide access to its sensitive national security sites. Access is essential to verify that the Parties are living up to their part of the agreement. According to the same GAO report, U.S. inspectors do not have access to the sites in Russia where 90 percent of the materials used in weapons of mass destruction are stored. Access issues largely revolve around trust, and, frankly, this treaty highlights the need for access; it does not solve the problem.

   Despite its obvious incompleteness and inadequacies, the Moscow Treaty is a step in the right direction of reducing and limiting strategic nuclear warheads. Reliance on a START I verification regime as provided in the treaty is not, of course, satisfactory, but it can provide a block in the foundation for good faith implementation through a genuine verification scheme.

   President Bush is headed in the right direction in working to build a constructive partnership with Russia. American does not fight wars with democracies. While a reduction in nuclear weapons is an important element on both sides in building the trust and mutual dependence needed for a stable, long-term relationship, I want to stress the importance of maintaining the Nuclear Triad. Our land-base missile systems, in particular, play an essential role in ensuring this Nation's security. With 200 Minuteman III missiles, Malmstrom Air Force Base, in my State of Montana has and will continue to play a critical role in our national security.

   The Moscow Treaty deserves the advice and consent of the Senate so long as it is seen as the beginning and not the end of the long path we must follow to rid the earth of weapons of mass destruction and threats to our national security.

   Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, it is one of those ironies of history that the U.S. Senate began debate on the ratification of the latest and historic arms control treaty on the day that historians mark as the 50th anniversary of death of Stalin. Whether, in fact, Stalin died on this day, or whether he had been poisoned a few days before, is a fact that, like so many others of Soviet history, is clouded with uncertainty. But it is a fact that he was one of the most brutal dictators of the 20th century and he died at a time when the Soviet Union was a global foe of the United States.

   More interesting for this debate, Stalin's death in 1953 occurred at a time when our nations were just beginning a strategic competition that would see our nuclear stockpile grow to massive and frightening levels before we reached our first accommodations, nearly 20 years after Stalin's death.

   Today, while we still have many cultural and political differences with the Russian state, we cooperate on more issues than we compete, and we do not compete under the threat of nuclear annihilation.

   A decade ago, the Soviet Union went to the dustbin of history, and with it went an ideological enmity that locked us in a spiral of growing nuclear arsenals and the existential comfort of mutually assured destruction, a comfort that made sense to the strategic thinker, but left of lot of other people all over the world, including in our own societies, feeling quite insecure.

   After President Nixon initiated an era of arms control agreements with the first Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, or SALT, the pendulum began to swing the other way. And, as is often the case with historic pendulums, it far exceeded a sensible point. By the early 1980s, while strategic arms treaties had already reduced the aggregate megatonnage of our combined strategic arsenals, a school of arms control theology had been accepted that, as is often the case with the social science theology of the moment, threatened to overcome all rationale thinking on strategic issues. The answer to all arms control issues was always yet another treaty. Existing treaties were sacrosanct,

   with the wise old dictum so famously and wisely uttered by Bismarck in the 19th century ignored: ``At the bottom of all treaties is written in invisible ink, rebus sic stantibus''--Until circumstances change.

   Circumstances did change. Technologies barely imaginable in the 1960s, when the first strategic treaties were contemplated, became commonplace in the 1980s. An era of self-enforced vulnerability to mutually assured destruction, enshrined in the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, became anachronistic as physicists and engineers first

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   What bumpkins and dreamers, the conventional arms control theologians declaimed. Let us dismiss these simpletons and disparage their thinking as ``Star Wars,'' they said; as if the Strategic Defense Initiative had anything to do with stars or wars, but instead a more secure world here on earth.

   Today, it would be inaccurate to state that we have developed missile defense to a functionally deployable state. But, we are closer to a functional stage than those who dismissed it out-of-hand ever imagined. They were wrong and, today, our challenges to perfecting missile defense are largely in engineering, no longer scientific. A grateful Nation has President Reagan to thank for being able to transcend the conventional wisdom and believe in American creativity and technology to move us into a new strategic era.

   But the arms control lobby would not relent, or even reform, through the 1980s and 1990s. We had some good arms control agreements negotiated, signed and ratified--I supported the START treaties. We had some treaties that I believed did not enhance our security--and I voted against the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. While I have generally supported the idea that bilateral and verifiable reductions of the strategic arsenals of Russia and the U.S., preserving necessary strategic arsenals of Russia and the U.S., preserving necessary strategic force structures, was stabilizing and therefore in our interest, I have never believed that this world would be more secure if the U.S. handicapped its nuclear option.

   Circumstances changed. Our global foe of 30 years ago is not our primary threat today. The mutual assured destruction doctrine that held the world in nuclear check for nearly 50 years became suspect, an old strategic doctrine of vulnerability. New threats

   and new, vicious substate actors became the threats that brought us grief and anxiety.

   We saw technologies spread to a host of rogue nations, many of which hold explicitly antagonistic postures toward the U.S. In 1998, a congressionally mandated Commission To Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, chaired by Donald Rumsfeld, brought to light the fact that, ``concerted effects by a number of overtly or potentially hostile nations to acquire ballistic missiles with biological or nuclear payloads pose a growing threat to the U.S., its deployed forces and its friends and allies.'' Further, the report concluded that ``the threat to the U.S. posed by these emerging capabilities is broader, more mature and evolving more rapidly than has been reported in estimates and reports by the intelligence Community.'' Such clarity in assessment forced us to refocus the efforts of the Intelligence Community, and they responded.

   But it also forced us to continued to challenge the conventional wisdom on arms control at the time, and that required that we face up to fact that we needed to proceed with our research and development of a missile defense capability, and that, if we were serious about this, we had to recognize that we would need to abandon the ABM Treaty.

   One candidate for the 2000 presidential election shared the vision of President Reagan. He recognized that the ABM Treaty was not sacrosanct. In fact, he had read the test, which plainly allowed for the U.S. to withdraw. I don't know if President Bush knew the doctrine in international law of rebus sic stantibus, but President Bush certainly knew that the strategic situation had changed, and U.S. national security required that we not constrain our security for tomorrow by a concept from yesterday. Such an approach was to guarantee insecurity. And President Bush understood something fundamental about strategic doctrine: insecurity does not sustain stability.

   President Bush told us all that the days of the ABM were limited. And the arms control lobby went, to make a bad pun, ballistic. Abandoning the ABM Treaty with Russia would herald a new era of unrestrained nuclear competition, as both sides would try to outbid the other's arsenal with enough weapons to overwhelm, they declared with certainty bread of doctrinaire conviction.

   President Bush and his advisers didn't flinch in their thinking. But they did address the question: If the fear is that withdrawing from the ABM Treaty which we did--the U.S. withdrew from the Treaty on December 13, 2001 and the Treaty was effectively terminated 6 months later--then the U.S. will match our withdrawal from the ABM with a new proposal to lower the

   START II levels to historic new reductions.

   And on March 24 of last year, the Russian Federation and the United States concluded the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions, which will now be overwhelmingly passed as this body provides our advice and consent.

   This is a historic moment for nuclear arms reduction. It is, more importantly and in my opinion, a historic moment in the evolution of arms control doctrine.

   The treaty reduces operationally deployed warheads for both sides to a range of 1,700 to 2,200 by December 31, 2012. Today our arsenals are more than twice that level. The reductions are to be implemented based on the established START I verification regime and mechanism, which will be in place until 2009. The treaty allows for consultation and extension of verification mechanisms beyond that time.

   The Treaty allows either party to ``determine for itself the composition and structure of its strategic offensive arms,'' meaning that we will be able to configure our triad according to the evolving needs of our nuclear posture review. The treaty does not link the objectives to our continued Cooperative Threat Reduction program, appropriately known as the Nunn-Lugar programs, recognizing all of the work the current chairman of Foreign Relations Committee and our former Democratic colleague have committed in their careers toward the cause of disarmament. I commend my colleagues on the Foreign Relations and Armed Services committees for engaging the administration in extensive discussions about continued support for this program. I strongly approve the administration's commitment to this program, and I will continue to support their budget for this.

   Lord Palmerston said in the 19th century, ``We have no eternal allies and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual.'' Our interests evolve year-by-year, and the world remains a very hostile place. Russia competes with us geopolitically, but it does so in the Security Council, not in strategic arms.

   It is in the interests of the world that our two arsenals be reduced, and it is in the interests of both of our countries that we reduce them with transparency, and flexibility.

   These principles are enshrined in the Moscow Treaty. I commend the administration for concluding it with Russian administration, and I urge the Russian Duma to proceed with their own ratification, as I encourage my colleagues today to join me in support of this historic treaty.

   Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I rise today to express my support for ratification of the Moscow Treaty which will require the United States and Russia to reduce the number of strategic nuclear warheads to 1,700 and 2,200 each by December 31, 2012. This treaty marks an important step forward in the relationship between the United States and Russia and reduces the dangers posed by strategic nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, I am concerned that the treaty does not go far enough and I believe its flaws must be addressed if we truly want to make the threat of nuclear war a thing of the past.

   It should be pointed out that at one time the administration did not even want a treaty, preferring to reach a ``gentleman's agreement'' with Russia instead. I am pleased that President Bush changed course and recognized the value in committing the reduction of strategic nuclear warheads to a binding, legal document.

   That document now before us is welcome but its brevity--all of three pages--indicates that certain issues were left out or swept aside.

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   First, the treaty does not actually require the United States or Russia to destroy any nuclear warhead. Either side may comply with the provisions of the treaty simply by ``deactivating'' the warhead and placing it in storage for possible redeployment. And, each side reserves the right to decide what exactly ``deactivation'' means.

   This runs counter to the whole point of reducing the dangers of nuclear weapons by eliminating them once and for all. Have we really made a step forward in securing a better world for ourselves and future generations if both sides can re-arm at a moment's notice? And have we really made progress if the actual number of warheads destroyed is rather small?

   Russia, for one, simply can not afford to maintain its current number of strategic nuclear warheads. But I am concerned that if we do not actively destroy more of our strategic nuclear warheads, Russia may feel compelled to keep more of its own, thus diverting valuable resources away from more pressing needs. And, I think everyone recognizes that Russia's ability to safely and securely store any warheads is far less than our own and the potential that they may fall into the wrong heads much higher.

   Second, the treaty does not contain a detailed verification regime to judge compliance with its provisions. The treaty only mentions the creation of a Bilateral Implementation Commission that will meet twice a year. No more. The START Treaty, in contrast, contained provisions on detailed notifications, regular data exchanges, onsite inspections, and continuous monitoring of select facilities.

   President Reagan was found telling his Soviet counterparts that when it came to reducing the number of nuclear weapons, his motto was ``Trust, but verify.'' Though the Soviet Union is no more and Russia and the United States have a new relationship based on friendship and cooperation, I believe President Reagan's words still ring true.

   Eliminating nuclear warheads is serious business and it is beneficial and, necessary, even for friends, to closely monitor, and verify, the progress of each side. We will enhance and deepen the trust and cooperation between Russia and the United States by doing so. So, I would urge the administration to use the Bilateral Implementation Commission as a forum for negotiating a detailed verification regime.

   Third, there is no timetable for implementation and no mileposts to judge progress before the Treaty expires. The only date and milepost mentioned is the deadline to reach 1,700 to 2,200 strategic nuclear warheads by December 31, 2012.

   Thus, over a 10-year period, with no verification regime, we will have no indication on how Russia is achieving the goals of the treaty until the very day it is bound to reach those goals. And then the treaty expires unless both sides agree at some point to extend it.

   Again, trust and cooperation are built on verification and openness. I urge the administration to press for detailed timetables and mileposts to ensure that both sides are actively complying with the provisions of the treaty and will reach the final marker at the stated time.

   Fourth, the treaty does not address tactical nuclear weapons. As my colleagues know, there is a great deal of uncertainty about the number, location, and secure storage of Russian tactical nuclear weapons. Smaller and more portable than strategic nuclear weapons, they are vulnerable to theft or sale to terrorist groups. Yet, the treaty does not even mention them.

   This is a glaring oversight and the dangers posed by tactical nuclear weapons--especially now in the post-September 11 world of global terrorism--warrants the immediate attention and action by both Russia and the United States. I urge the administration to press for an accurate accounting of and adequate safeguards for tactical nuclear warheads and to work towards reducing their number.

   Finally, the treaty does not address the alert status of our nuclear forces. I offered, and withdrew, an amendment to address this issue earlier. Suffice to say that I am very concerned that in this era of a new relationship between the United States and Russia, we still keep our nuclear weapons on high alert or hair trigger status. This greatly increases the chances of an accidental or unauthorized launch or miscalculation which would result in unthinkable devastation.

   Clearly there are problems with this treaty but I will vote for ratification because it is a step forward towards the goal of reducing the dangers posed by strategic nuclear weapons.

   But there is a lot of work to be done to make this Treaty truly worthwhile. As our former colleague Senator Sam Nunn stated in hearing held by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the Moscow Treaty:

   If [the Treaty] is not followed with other substantive actions it will become irrelevant at best and counterproductive at worst.

   I hope the administration will take these words to heart and get to work on the important issues left out of the treaty so that we will be able to leave a world for future generations safer from the horror of nuclear war.

   Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I rise in strong support of this resolution of ratification for the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions, otherwise known as the Moscow Treaty.

   This treaty is a masterstroke. It represents, and, I am sure, will be sent as ushering in a wholly new approach to arms control for a wholly new era. The simplicity of this treaty is a marvel. It is extremely brief, indeed just three pages long. It is shorn of the tortured benchmarks, sublimits, arcane definitions and monitoring provisions that weighed down past arms control treaties.

   This is for a very good reason. The simplicity and brevity of this treaty reflect the simple fact that the US and Russia have moved beyond the enmity of the cold war era. The treaty recognizes this fact. It assumes a degree of trust between nations that are no longer on the precipice of war. Indeed, this treaty is the ultimate confirmation of the fact that arms control does not lead to real peace; rather, real peace--in this case made possible by a democratic transformation in russia--leads to arms control.

   The old cold war approach to arms control treaties is clearly outmoded. Can anyone truly believe that a 700-page behemoth like the START I treaty is relevant to today's situation? Clearly, such an approach would not reflect today's radically changed political and strategic environment. As such, it would not serve America's real security needs.

   This treaty does. The most important thing to remember about this treaty is that it was negotiated after the United States independently determined the number of strategic warheads that were needed for our security. The outcome of the negotiations with Russia simply ratified our own prior determination. This is in stark contrast to the old approach to arms control, whereby arms control agreements preceded and ultimately drove our military and strategic decisions.

   The long lead time for achieving reductions and the lack of sublimits and interim benchmarks in the treaty also serve our interests by preserving much needed flexibility. Looking at the fluid, almost chaotic, situation in the world today, with new threats having arisen in just the past year or so--attacks on our homeland, nuclear weapons developments in North Korea and Iran--one can foresee that circumstances could easily change over the next decade. If circumstances and threats change, so too might our strategic nuclear requirements. Thus, it is only prudent that we not box ourselves in. The drafters of this treaty in the Bush administration were wisely cognizant of that fact.

   Mr. President, this treaty--and the forward-looking, post-cold war mindset that serves as its basis--deserves our strongest support. I urge my colleagues to approve this resolution of ratification.

   Mr. BUNNING. Mr. President, I support ratification of the Moscow Treaty without any amendments or further conditions set upon it by the Senate. Ratifying this resolution as it was unanimously reported out of the Committee on Foreign Relations is the right thing to do.

   This treaty is a tremendous step forward in the effort to make this world a safer place. This is especially significant in light of all that is going on in the world with our fight against terrorism. It is especially important and

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   The Moscow Treaty reduces the aggregate number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to a range of 1,700 to 2,200 by the end of 2012. This is a tremendous accomplishment that deserves the full support of the Senate and the Russian Duma. President Bush and Russian President Putin hold this as a high priority in getting this treaty ratified in a timely manner.

   This treaty was considered in a deliberative and thoughtful manner by the Senate. The Foreign Relations Committee worked in conjunction and cooperatively with the Armed Services Committee and Intelligence Committee. As well, the insights, reservations and recommendations on this issue were solicited and received by Secretary of State Colin Powell, Secretary of Defense Don Rumsfeld, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Richard Myers.

   The Moscow Treaty is unlike any arms control agreement we have participated in with Russia or the former Soviet Union before. Previously, we spent decades with our counterparts in conferences and meetings to negotiate treaties. This agreement was concluded more quickly--with openness, trust, and verification prevailing in a new era of American and Russian relations.

   Traditionally, there have always been many objections to treaties such as these which limit our arms and possibly put the United States as risk. Now, we are hearing of some who have said this treaty is not strong enough. And there has been some legitimate debate about the verification system and reduction schedule which I and many of my colleagues share.

   But I do not believe these concerns rise to the level to oppose this treaty since it provides a mutual framework for pursuing the continued destruction of weapons and missiles whose sole purpose was to be used against the Untied States. This treaty is too important to oppose. It highlights and emphasizes the vitality of the new relationship between the United States and Russia. And with the ongoing war on terrorism, this is of utmost importance.

   Like the chairman and ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, I believe our storage procedures are sound and I am thankful for the flexibility within the treaty for our strategic systems. Yet I, like many others, do share some concerns on the Russian side. But these concerns are alleviated since the Treaty has avenues we can pursue which addresses these possible problems to ensure that weapons do not ever slip into the wrong hands. Also, I am thankful Russia is agreeable to work with the United States to ensure that these weapons never fall into the hands of terrorists or rogue states.

   Also, one certainly must pay attention to, and demand, a solid verification system for these weapons. Some point out that the treaty has a flawed verification system that must be watched closely. But this criticism has not reached the level of doubt and worry to scrap the treaty. As well, those critics are operating under the guise of a cold war mentality. But things have changed in our relationship with Russia.

   Secretary Powell has been upfront on this issue in regards to the verification system in the Treaty. On behalf of the administration, he has clarified the need to keep the verification process the way it is within the treaty. The administration points to the fact that the cold war is over and we must move beyond that thought process. Also, Secretary Powell argues that we are better served with flexibility and not rigidity under the treaty.

   I believe the level of verification in this treaty is what is needed. We do know that our American verification experts already have the START Treaty verification procedures underway. These experts and procedures will be around for another decade. So, we do have dismantlement teams and equipment from the United States in Russia. These teams have been and will continue to cooperatively--with verification--dismantle these Russian weapons.

   Overall, I believe this treaty is in the national interest of the United States, the Russian Federation, and the world. Of course there are those critics who say this treaty does not go far enough, and some may say it goes too far. The purpose of this treaty is not to put an umbrella over all arms policy for all countries all at once. These objectives and goals can be made through piecemeal approaches, and this is exactly what this treaty does.

   We have a new ally with the Russian Federation, and we must move ahead to strengthen our relationship with this new ally and make this world a safer place. I urge my colleagues to support the Moscow Treaty without further conditions being set upon it. It is the right thing to do.

   Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, I congratulate Senators Lugar and Biden on their efforts on this treaty. In their new roles as chairman and ranking member of the Foreign Relations Committee, they have gotten off to an impressive start.

   By holding a series of hearings on pressing foreign policy questions, including the looming war in Iraq, they have helped every Member of this body and every American.

   In addition, they have taken the Moscow treaty, a treaty that came to us with perhaps more questions than answers, and added some definition. Their collective labors on behalf of this treaty demonstrate what bipartisanship leadership on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee can accomplish.

   This treaty represents a positive step forward by calling on the United States and Russia to reduce their operational strategic nuclear weapons.

   But it is a step long overdue. Many in this body felt these kinds of cuts were possible years ago. Unfortunately, despite our best efforts for much of the last decade, Republican opposition prevented us from implementing the kind of cuts this treaty now recommends.

   To ensure that we derive the maximum security benefit possible from this treaty, the Administration will have to fill in a number of important holes.

   Though the administration has assured us that some nuclear warheads will be dismantled, the treaty itself does not require the destruction of any Russian or American nuclear warheads. At best, the treaty will put warheads out of reach, but, unfortunately, not out of use.

   Moreover, the treaty does not include a schedule that spells out when the deactivations must occur. In fact, the treaty language does not require the deactivation of a single weapon until December 31, 2012, the day the Treaty expires.

   Finally, the treaty also lacks any concrete commitments on verification, undermining longstanding, commonsense principle of our arms control policy.

   In years past during Senate discussion of other arms control treaties, some of my colleagues on the other side of the aisle based their opposition to these treaties on the lack of adequate verification provisions. Evidently, either verification is no longer as important to them or they are more willing to trust rather than verify.

   Notwithstanding these shortcomings and inconsistencies, Mr. President, I intend to vote for the Resolution of Ratification, and I do so because it points our country in the right direction.

   But at the same time I would like to send a message as loudly and clearly as I can to the administration and to my colleagues here in the Senate: our work to deal with the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction does not--in fact cannot--stop with this vote.

   Last fall, the President's National Security Strategy stated that:

   The gravest danger our nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology. Our enemies have openly declared that they are seeking weapons of mass destruction, and evidence indicates that they are doing so with determination.

   We need look no further than the steadily escalating crisis in North Korea to recognize that the President was right on that point.

   You will have to look much harder, however, to ascertain exactly what the administration proposes to do about this crisis, let alone the larger issue of proliferation worldwide.

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   That is why last night I joined with several of my colleagues, including Senators LIEBERMAN and BIDEN, to introduce S. Res. 77, a resolution that calls on the administration to devise a comprehensive strategy to confront the threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

   The Bush administration's policy to counter proliferation has suffered from inconsistency. It downplays immediate threats, such as North Korea, while emphasizing others. It puts together a coalition against terrorism, but has ignored allies and undercut international action against proliferation. In sum, the administration's actions have served to weaken the effort to establish a robust coalition against proliferation.

   Since taking office, the Administration has been deeply ambivalent about U.S. efforts to secure loose Russian nuclear weapons and materials and unemployed nuclear scientists. While focusing on Iraq, it has ignored looming problems elsewhere, such as North Korea and Iran. And rather than seeking ways to reduce the threat of nuclear weapons, it pursues doctrines that would effectively lower the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons, further compounding the threat of proliferation.

   This is too dangerous a situation to ignore any longer. Our resolution calls for a comprehensive strategy--not unhelpful actions or ad hoc reactions--to confront the threat proliferation presents to American citizens.

   Among other proposals, we urge the President to begin to build a coalition against proliferation, immediately and directly engage North Korea, vastly increase the funding for U.S. programs that secure loose nuclear weapons, and deliver sufficient homeland security funds to the state, local and tribal governments so they can prepare their first responders to respond against further terrorist attacks.

   The administration tells us that the Moscow Treaty represents a new kind of agreement, one that acknowledges we have emerged fully from the cold war era. We join the President in welcoming this new era.

   But we must take this opportunity to create a comprehensive strategy that recognizes we have entered a new and potentially dangerous era of proliferation.

   To date the administration has failed in that effort. But we cannot afford to delay any longer.

   Time is not on our side. The risks to our security mount with each day that passes without an administration strategy.

   Mr. LUGAR. My understanding is the distinguished majority leader has a statement.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader is recognized.

   Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, first of all, I thank Senators Lugar and Biden for their excellent work over the past 2 days. I appreciate their leadership on this very important Resolution for Ratification of the Moscow Treaty.

   The treaty is critically important to making the world a safer place and will lead to dramatic reductions in nuclear arsenals. I commend the chairmen. The next vote on the adoption of the Resolution of Ratification will be the last vote of the evening.

   In addition, there will be no rollcall votes during tomorrow's session, although the Senate will be in session to allow Members to speak in morning business. Many will be speaking on Iraq. If any Members are interested, I encourage them to come to the floor to do so tomorrow. The next rollcall vote will be on Monday at 6 p.m.

   I thank all Senators for their attention.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.

   Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on the Resolution of Ratification.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?

   There is a sufficient second.

   Is there further debate?

   If not, the question is on agreeing to the Resolution of Ratification with conditions and declarations to Calendar No. 1, Treaty Document No. 107-8, the Moscow Treaty. The clerk will call the roll.

   The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.

   Mr. FRIST. I announce that the Senator from New Mexico (Mr. DOMENICI), the Senator from Kentucky (Mr. MCCONNELL), and the Senator from Oregon (Mr. SMITH) are necessarily absent.

   Mr. REID. I announce that the Senator from Florida (Mr. GRAHAM) and the Senator from Georgia (Mr. MILLER) are necessarily absent.

   The yeas and nays resulted--yeas 95, nays 0, as follows:

   Akaka

   Alexander

   Allard

   Allen

   Baucus

   Bayh

   Bennett

   Biden

   Bingaman

   Bond

   Boxer

   Breaux

   Brownback

   Bunning

   Burns

   Byrd

   Campbell

   Cantwell

   Carper

   Chafee

   Chambliss

   Clinton

   Cochran

   Coleman

   Collins

   Conrad

   Cornyn

   Corzine

   Craig

   Crapo

   Daschle

   Dayton

   DeWine

   Dodd

   Dole

   Dorgan

   Durbin

   Edwards

   Ensign

   Enzi

   Feingold

   Feinstein

   Fitzgerald

   Frist

   Graham (SC)

   Grassley

   Gregg

   Hagel

   Harkin

   Hatch

   Hollings

   Hutchison

   Inhofe

   Inouye

   Jeffords

   Johnson

   Kennedy

   Kerry

   Kohl

   Kyl

   Landrieu

   Lautenberg

   Leahy

   Levin

   Lieberman

   Lincoln

   Lott

   Lugar

   McCain

   Mikulski

   Murkowski

   Murray

   Nelson (FL)

   Nelson (NE)

   Nickles

   Pryor

   Reed

   Reid

   Roberts

   Rockefeller

   Santorum

   Sarbanes

   Schumer

   Sessions

   Shelby

   Snowe

   Specter

   Stabenow

   Stevens

   Sununu

   Talent

   Thomas

   Voinovich

   Warner

   Wyden

   Domenici

   Graham (FL)

   McConnell

   Miller

   Smith

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Two-thirds of the Senators present having voted in the affirmative, the Resolution of Ratification is agreed to.

   The Resolution of Ratification agreed to is as follows:

   Resolved, (two thirds of the Senators present concurring therein),

   SECTION 1. SENATE ADVICE AND CONSENT SUBJECT TO CONDITIONS AND DECLARATIONS.

   The Senate advises and consents to the ratification of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions (T. Doc. 107-8, in this resolution referred to as the ``Moscow Treaty'' or ``Treaty''), subject to the conditions in section 2 and declarations in section 3.

   SEC. 2. CONDITIONS.

   The advice and consent of the Senate to the ratification of the Moscow Treaty is subject to the following conditions, which shall be binding on the President:

   (1) REPORT ON THE ROLE OF COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION AND NONPROLIFERATION ASSISTANCE. Recognizing that implementation of the Moscow Treaty is the sole responsibility of each party, not later than 60 days after the exchange of instruments of ratification of the Treaty, and annually thereafter on February 15, the President shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate a report and recommendations on how United States Cooperative Threat Reduction assistance to the Russian Federation can best contribute to enabling the Russian Federation to implement the Treaty efficiently and maintain the security and accurate accounting of its nuclear weapons and weapons-usable components and material in the current year. The report shall be submitted in both unclassified and, as necessary, classified form. (2) Annual implementation report. Not later than 60 days after exchange of instruments of ratification of the Treaty, and annually thereafter on April 15, the President shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate a report on implementation of the Treaty by the United States and the Russian Federation. This report shall be submitted in both unclassified and, as necessary, classified form and shall include

   (A) a listing of strategic nuclear weapons force levels of the United States, and a best estimate of the strategic nuclear weapons force levels of the Russian Federation, as of December 31 of the preceding calendar year;

   (B) a detailed description, to the extent possible, of strategic offensive reductions planned by each party for the current calendar year;

   (C) to the extent possible, the plans of each party for achieving by December 31, 2012, the strategic offensive reductions required by Article I of the Treaty;

   (D) measures, including any verification or transparency measures, that have been taken or have been proposed by a party to assure each party of the other party's continued intent and ability to achieve by December 31, 2012, the strategic offensive reductions required by Article I of the Treaty;

   (E) information relevant to implementation of this Treaty that has been learned as a result of Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) verification measures, and the status of consideration of extending the START verification regime beyond December 2009;

   (F) any information, insufficiency of information, or other situation that may call into

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   (G) any actions that have been taken or have been proposed by a party to address concerns listed pursuant to subparagraph (F) or to improve the implementation and effectiveness of the Treaty.

   SEC. 3. DECLARATIONS.

   The advice and consent of the Senate to the ratification of the Moscow Treaty is subject to the following declarations, which express the intent of the Senate:

   (1) TREATY INTERPRETATION. The Senate reaffirms condition (8) of the resolution of ratification of the Document Agreed Among the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) of November 19, 1990 (adopted at Vienna on May 31, 1996), approved by the Senate on May 14, 1997, relating to condition (1) of the resolution of ratification of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, approved by the Senate on May 27, 1988.

   (2) FURTHER STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS. The Senate encourages the President to continue strategic offensive reductions to the lowest possible levels consistent with national security requirements and alliance obligations of the United States.

   (3) BILATERAL IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES. The Senate expects the executive branch of the Government to offer regular briefings, including consultations before meetings of the Bilateral Implementation Commission, to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate on any implementation issues related to the Moscow Treaty. Such briefings shall include a description of all efforts by the United States in bilateral forums and through diplomatic channels with the Russian Federation to resolve any such issues and shall include a description of

   (A) the issues raised at the Bilateral Implementation Commission, within 30 days after such meetings;

   (B) any issues related to implementation of this Treaty that the United States is pursuing in other channels, including the Consultative Group for Strategic Security established pursuant to the Joint Declaration of May 24, 2002, by the Presidents of the United States and the Russian Federation; and

   (C) any Presidential determination with respect to issues described in subparagraphs (A) and (B).

   (4) NONSTRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS. Recognizing the difficulty the United States has faced in ascertaining with confidence the number of nonstrategic nuclear weapons maintained by the Russian Federation and the security of those weapons, the Senate urges the President to engage the Russian Federation with the objectives of

   (A) establishing cooperative measures to give each party to the Treaty improved confidence regarding the accurate accounting and security of nonstrategic nuclear weapons maintained by the other party; and

   (B) providing United States or other international assistance to help the Russian Federation ensure the accurate accounting and security of its nonstrategic nuclear weapons.

   (5) ACHIEVING REDUCTIONS. Recognizing the transformed relationship between the United States and the Russian Federation and the significantly decreased threat posed to the United States by the Russian Federation's strategic nuclear arsenal, the Senate encourages the President to accelerate United States strategic force reductions, to the extent feasible and consistent with United States national security requirements and alliance obligations, in order that the reductions required by Article I of the Treaty may be achieved prior to December 31, 2012.

   (6) CONSULTATIONS. Given the Senate's continuing interest in this Treaty and in continuing strategic offensive reductions to the lowest possible levels consistent with national security requirements and alliance obligations of the United States, the Senate urges the President to consult with the Senate prior to taking actions relevant to paragraphs 2 or 3 of Article IV of the Treaty.

   Mr. LUGAR. I move to reconsider the vote.

   Mr. REID. I move to lay that motion on the table.

   The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

   Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I express my appreciation to Senator Biden for his leadership and management of this treaty and to all Members of the Foreign Affairs Committee, including the distinguished occupant of the Chair, and also Senators who contributed constructively to, I believe, a very important achievement.

   I specifically mention staff Members who were most supportive and helpful: Tom Moore, Ed Levine, Jofi Joseph, Brian McKenan, Jason Hamm, Ken Myers, Sr., and Kenny Myers, Jr. We are appreciative of staff on both sides of the aisle for a remarkable piece of work.

   I yield the floor.

   Mr. REID. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

   The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

   Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

END

2A) Doctrine of Preemption

SRES 76 IS

Expressing the sense of the Senate that the policy of preemption, combined with a policy of first use of nuclear weapons, creates an incentive for the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons, and is inconsistent with the long-term security of the United States.

March 5, 2003

Mr. DURBIN submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

Expressing the sense of the Senate that the policy of preemption, combined with a policy of first use of nuclear weapons, creates an incentive for the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons, and is inconsistent with the long-term security of the United States.

Whereas press reports show that the December 31, 2001 Nuclear Posture Review states that the United States might use nuclear weapons to dissuade adversaries from undertaking military programs or operations that could threaten United States interests;

Whereas the Nuclear Posture Review, according to such reports, goes on to state that nuclear weapons could be employed against targets capable of withstanding non-nuclear attack;

Whereas the Nuclear Posture Review is further reported to state that, in setting requirements for nuclear strike capabilities, North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Libya are among the countries that could be involved in immediate, potential, or unexpected contingencies;

Whereas the September 17, 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States of America states that `[a]s a matter of common sense and self-defense, America will act against such emerging threats before they are fully formed,' and that `[t]o forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively';

Whereas the December 2002 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction states that `[t]he United States will continue to make clear that it reserves the right to respond with overwhelming force--including through resort to all of our options--to the use of [weapons of mass destruction] against the United States, our forces abroad, and friends and allies';

Whereas United States nuclear policy, outlined in 1978 and restated in 1995 and 2002, includes, in the context of gaining other nations' support for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, a `negative security assurance' that the United States would not use its nuclear force against a country that does not possess nuclear weapons unless that country was allied with a nuclear weapons possessor;

Whereas the Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, John Bolton, recently announced the Administration's abandonment of the so-called `negative security assurance' pledge to refrain from using nuclear weapons against non-nuclear nations;

Whereas reports about the Stockpile Stewardship Conference Planning Meeting of the Department of Defense, held on January 10, 2003, indicate that the United States is engaged in the expansion of research and development of new types of nuclear weapons;

Whereas this expansion of nuclear weapons research covers new forms of nuclear weaponry that threaten the limitations on nuclear weapons testing that are established by the unratified, but previously respected, Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty;

Whereas these policies and actions threaten to make nuclear weapons appear to be useful, legitimate, first-strike offensive weapons, rather than a force for deterrence, and therefore undermine an essential tenet of nonproliferation; and

Whereas the cumulative effect of the policies announced by the President is to redefine the concept of preemption, which had been understood to mean the right of every state to anticipatory self-defense in the face of imminent attack, and to broaden the concept to justify a preventive war initiated by the United States, even without evidence of an imminent attack, in which the United States might use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that the President's policy of preemption, combined with a policy of first use of nuclear weapons, creates an incentive for proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons, and is inconsistent with the long-term security of the United States.

3A) Troops in Iraq Will Be Exposed to Deadly Chemicals
TROOPS IN IRAQ WILL ONCE AGAIN BE EXPOSED TO DEADLY CHEMICALS -- (House of Representatives - March 05, 2003)

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   The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Washington (Mr. McDermott) is recognized for 5 minutes.

   Mr. McDERMOTT. Mr. Speaker, I am here to talk on behalf of three doctors and myself. I was a physician during the Vietnam War. I was in Long Beach. I saw the troops coming back from the Vietnam War, and I saw what the war did to them. I also have been in government since then and have seen how our government for many years denied that

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   In 1984 we settled a claim for all of the problems created by Agent Orange, which we finally admitted. Now we have a case before the Supreme Court at this very time where they are trying to reopen that claim on behalf of people who are suffering even 40 years after the war.

   It is for that reason that I raise the issue today of depleted uranium in Iraq. I was there. I was in Iraq in 1991, and I was there again this year; and the evidence is overwhelming of the impact of what Iraq has suffered from depleted uranium and what we, the United States, are about to suffer.

   Dr. Al-Ali said that before the Gulf War they had only three or four deaths a month from cancer. Now it is 30 to 35 patients dying every month, and that is just in his department. That is a 12-fold increase, 1,200 percent increase in cancer mortality. Studies indicate that 40 to 48 percent of the population in that area will get cancer in 5 years. That is almost half the population.

   A woman doctor, Dr. Ginan Hassen, said, ``I studied what happened in Hiroshima. It is almost exactly the same here. We have an increased percentage of congenital malformaties, an increase of malignancy, leukemia, brain tumors, and the rest.'' Under the economic sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council, now in its 14th year, Iraq is denied the equipment and expertise to decontaminate its battlefields from the 1991 Gulf War.

   These are two Iraqi doctors talking. Let me quote an American doctor, Dr. Doug Rokke, who was appointed by Norman Schwarzkopf to go in as a part of the decontamination team and clean up what we did. We dumped 300 tons of munitions with depleted uranium in this area that he was sent in to clean up. He says: ``I have 5,000 times the recommended level of radiation in my body. Most of my team are now dead.'' Eighteen out of 24 people, American soldiers sent in to clean that up, are now dead.

   Dr. Rokke says, ``We face an issue to be confronted by the people in the West, those with a sense of right and wrong.'' First, a decision by the United States and Britain to use weapons of mass destruction, depleted uranium. When a tank fired a shell, each round contains 4,500 grams of solid uranium. What happened to the Gulf was a form of nuclear war. That was 1991. We are about to do it again. People are talking about 3,000 missiles into Baghdad in the first day and 3,000 on the second day, all with depleted uranium on the point. Why is that used? Because it is so penetrating, when it explodes, it creates a white dust, uranium oxide, and people walk around, it gets in their lungs and reproductive organs. Children died. That is where those figures come from for the children. That is why we have so many malformations at birth among Iraqi women. It is to the point today where Iraqi women say, Is my child normal?

   Mr. Speaker, we did that once to them, and we are about to do it again. We are about to do it again, and we are about to do to our own troops, hundreds of thousands of them, what we did to Doug Rokke. Dr. Rokke marched in there and did his duty. I am here talking for the veterans of our country and for the women and men who are on the line for us out there. I do not want them sent into that.

   We are going to march troops right through the very place where this happened to the Iraqi people. Will our government admit what they are doing? No. They will not talk about what is going on with depleted uranium.

   Here is the issue. The Secretary of VA, Mr. Principi, remember the Bush administration, writes a letter to the Department of Defense and says please do preservice evaluations on all of the men and women so we can look at, when it is over, what the difference is.

   How can we send 300,000 American people into war that kills Iraqis left, right and center with impugnity? This is an unjust war. There are many reasons to be against this war; but this reason, the soldiers and Marines and sailors of the United States are the major reason we should not be doing it. We are exposing our own people to something that we will not admit we are doing.

3B) Homeland Security and Tax Hike Prevention Act of 2003

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

   SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Homeland Protection and Tax Hike Prevention Act of 2003''.

   SEC. 2. PURPOSES.

    The purposes of this Act are--

    (1) to ameliorate the hardships faced by millions of Americans as a result of State and local budget crises, including tax increases and cuts to education, health care, and other vital State and local programs;

    (2) to avoid the economic damage that would be caused by tens of billions of dollars in State and local tax increases and spending cuts that would further weaken the Nation's economic growth and job creation; and

    (3) to improve the Nation's readiness for a terrorist attack by providing financial assistance to assist States and cities to--

    (A) prepare first responders and emergency personnel;

    (B) implement anti-counterfeiting protections;

    (C) strengthen security at vulnerable targets, such as nuclear power plants and public transportation systems; and

    (D) address other homeland security priorities.

   SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.

    As used in this Act, the following definitions shall apply:

    (1) STATE.--Except as used in section 6, the term ``State'' means each of the several States of the United States, the District of Columbia, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.

    (2) METROPOLITAN STATISTICAL AREA.--The term ``metropolitan statistical area'' means a statistical geographic entity associated with at least 1 urbanized area that has a population of not less than 50,000, as identified by the Office of Management and Budget.

    (3) METROPOLITAN CITY.--The term ``metropolitan city'' means--

    (A) a central city within a metropolitan statistical area; and

    (B) any other city within a metropolitan statistical area that has a population of not less than 50,000.

    (4) UNIT OF GENERAL LOCAL GOVERNMENT.--

    (A) IN GENERAL.--The term ``unit of general local government'' means--

    (i) a county, parish, township, city, or political subdivision of a county, parish, township, or city, that is a unit of general local

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    (ii) the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the recognized governing body of an Indian tribe or Alaskan native village that carries out substantial governmental duties and powers.

    (B) TREATMENT OF SUBSUMED AREAS.--For purposes of determining a unit of general local government under this section, the rules under section 6720(c) of title 31, United States Code, shall apply.

   SEC. 4. HOMELAND SECURITY GRANTS.

    (a) GRANTS AUTHORIZED.--

    (1) IN GENERAL.--From the amount appropriated under subsection (d), the Secretary of Homeland Security (referred to in this section as the ``Secretary'') shall, as soon as practicable after the date of enactment of this Act, award grants to States and metropolitan cities, which have submitted an application in accordance with subsection (c) to accomplish the objectives described under subsection (b).

    (2) ALLOCATIONS TO STATES.--

    (A) POPULATION-BASED ALLOCATIONS.--The Secretary shall allocate $2,500,000,000 for grants to the States based on the relative population of each State.

    (B) RISK-BASED ALLOCATIONS.--Subject to paragraph (4), the Secretary shall allocate $2,500,000,000 for grants to the States based on--

    (i) the potential risk, as it pertains to chemical security, of each State;

    (ii) the proximity of each State to the nearest operating nuclear power plant;

    (iii) the proximity of each State to the nearest United States land or water port;

    (iv) the proximity of each State to the nearest international border; and

    (v) the proximity of each State to the nearest Disaster Medical Assistance Team.

    (3) ALLOCATIONS TO METROPOLITAN CITIES.--

    (A) POPULATION-BASED ALLOCATIONS.--The Secretary shall allocate $2,500,000,000 for grants to units of general local government within metropolitan cities based on the relative population of each metropolitan statistical area.

    (B) RISK-BASED ALLOCATIONS.--The Secretary shall allocate $2,500,000,000 for grants to metropolitan cities within metropolitan statistical areas based on--

    (i) the potential risk, as it pertains to chemical security, of each metropolitan statistical area;

    (ii) the proximity of each metropolitan statistical area to the nearest operating nuclear power plant;

    (iii) the proximity of each metropolitan statistical area to the nearest United States land or water port;

    (iv) the proximity of each metropolitan statistical area to the nearest international border; and

    (v) the proximity of each metropolitan statistical area to the nearest Disaster Medical Assistance Team.

    (C) METROPOLITAN CITIES.--The Secretary shall distribute the allocations under subparagraphs (A) and (B) to metropolitan cities based on the relative population of each such city.

    (4) CLARIFICATION OF RISK FACTORS.--In allocating funds to States and metropolitan statistical areas under paragraphs (2)(B) and (3)(B), the Secretary shall equally weigh each of the following risk factors:

    (A) POTENTIAL RISK AS IT PERTAINS TO CHEMICAL SECURITY.--If a State or metropolitan statistical area is within the vulnerable zone of a worst-case chemical release, as specified in the most recent risk management plans filed with the Environmental Protection Agency or another instrument developed by the Environmental Protection Agency or the Homeland Security Department that captures the same information for the same facilities, the ratio under paragraphs (2)(B)(i) and (3)(B)(i) shall be 1 divided by the total number of States or metropolitan statistical areas that are within such a zone.

    (B) PROXIMITY AS IT PERTAINS TO NUCLEAR SECURITY.--If a State or metropolitan statistical area is located within 50 miles of an operating nuclear power plant, as identified by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the ratio under paragraphs (2)(B)(ii) and (3)(B)(ii) shall be 1 divided by the total number of States or metropolitan statistical areas that are located within 50 miles of an operating nuclear power plant.

    (C) PROXIMITY AS IT PERTAINS TO PORT SECURITY.--If a State or metropolitan statistical area is located within 50 miles of 1 of the 100 largest United States ports, as stated by the Department of Transportation, Bureau of Transportation Statistics, United States Port Report by All Land Modes, or within 50 miles of one of the 30 largest United States water ports by metric tons and value, as stated by the Department of Transportation, Maritime Administration, United States Foreign Waterborne Transportation Statistics, the ratio under paragraphs (2)(B)(iii) and (3)(B)(iii) shall be 1 divided by the total number of States or metropolitan statistical areas that are located within 50 miles of a United States land or water port.

    (D) PROXIMITY TO INTERNATIONAL BORDERS.--If a State or metropolitan statistical area is located within 50 miles of an international border, the ratio under paragraph (2)(B)(iv) and (3)(B)(iv) shall be 1 divided by the total number of States or metropolitan statistical areas that are located within 50 miles of an international border.

    (E) PROXIMITY TO DISASTER MEDICAL ASSISTANCE TEAMS.--If a State or metropolitan statistical area is located within 50 miles of a Disaster Medical Assistance Team, as organized by the National Disaster Medical System through the Department of Public Health, the ratio under paragraphs (2)(B)(v) and (3)(B)(v) shall be 1 divided by the total number of States or metropolitan statistical areas that are located within 50 miles of a Disaster Medical Assistance Team.

    (b) USE OF FUNDS.--Grants awarded pursuant to subsection (a) may be used to--

    (1) support police, fire, health, and other emergency personnel by--

    (A) purchasing or upgrading communications systems, protective gear, or hazardous materials detection equipment;

    (B) providing training for emergency responses; and

    (C) providing for expenses related to retention of personnel and overtime;

    (2) improve safeguards against the counterfeiting of official State documents, including--

    (A) the improvement of procedures to obtain proof of identity before issuance of official identification cards; and

    (B) the implementation of biometric identifiers and holograms;

    (3) improve security at chemical plants by--

    (A) strengthening requirements for perimeter security and assisting in meeting such requirements; and

    (B) strengthening requirements for the use and handling of hazardous materials and assisting in meeting such requirements;

    (4) improve security in train and subway cars and stations, on bridges, in tunnels, and in arenas by installing and improving--

    (A) fire and blast protections;

    (B) ventilation systems;

    (C) entrance security;

    (D) sensors to detect chemical and biological weapons; and

    (E) emergency evacuation systems;

    (5) improve security at and around skyscrapers, public monuments, and other major buildings;

    (6) secure food and water supplies, reservoirs, water treatment plants, and distribution systems;

    (7) strengthen protections of other critical networks, including--

    (A) telecommunications;

    (B) electrical power plants and grids; and

    (C) computer networks and databases;

    (8) plan and prepare for a response for chemical or biological attacks, including--

    (A) purchasing, distributing, and storing treatments and preventive measures;

    (B) providing emergency training for health officials; and

    (C) developing public health surveillance systems to identify the disease outbreaks by monitoring ambulance calls, hospital admittance, and other measures;

    (9) establish systems to notify members of the public and appropriate agencies when a threat has emerged and any precautions the public should take;

    (10) establish programs that offer opportunities for members of the community to participate in terrorism preparation and prevention, including neighborhood watch groups; and

    (11) design, review, and improve disaster response systems, enhancing communities' ability to coordinate efforts and share information, and devise and implement a homeland security plan.

    (c) APPLICATION.--

    (1) IN GENERAL.--Each eligible entity desiring a grant under this section shall submit an application to the Secretary at such time, in such manner, and accompanied by such information as the Secretary may reasonably require.

    (2) CONTENTS.--Each application submitted pursuant to paragraph (1) shall--

    (A) describe the activities for which assistance under this section is sought; and

    (B) provide such additional assurances as the Secretary determines to be necessary to ensure that the grantee will use the proceeds of the grant in compliance with subsection (b).

    (d) AUTHORIZATION AND APPROPRIATION.--There are authorized to be appropriated, and are appropriated, $10,000,000,000 for fiscal year 2003 to carry out this section, which shall remain available through September 30, 2004.

   SEC. 5. BUDGET CRISIS RELIEF GRANTS.

    (a) GRANTS AUTHORIZED.--From the amount appropriated under subsection (c) for fiscal year 2003, the Secretary of the Treasury (referred to in this section as the ``Secretary'') shall, as soon as practicable after the date of enactment of this Act, allocate financial assistance to each of the States as follows:

    (1) GRANTS TO STATES.--

    (A) ALLOCATIONS BASED ON POPULATION.--The Secretary shall allocate $7,500,000,000 among the States on the basis of the relative population of each State, as determined by the Secretary on the basis of the most recent satisfactory data.

    (B) ALLOCATIONS BASED ON UNEMPLOYMENT.--The Secretary shall allocate $7,500,000,000 among the States on the basis of the relative number of unemployed individuals for calendar year 2002 in each State, as determined by the Secretary on the basis of the most recent satisfactory data.

    (2) GRANTS TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT.--

    (A) ALLOCATIONS BASED ON POPULATION.--The Secretary shall allocate an additional $7,500,000,000 among units of general local

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    (B) ALLOCATIONS BASED ON UNEMPLOYMENT.--The Secretary shall allocate an additional $7,500,000,000 among units of general local government within each State on the basis of the relative number of unemployed individuals for calendar year 2002 in each State and in each such unit within each State, as determined by the Secretary on the basis of the most recent satisfactory data.

    (b) MAINTENANCE OF EFFORT.--A State or unit of general local government, before receiving the proceeds of a grant under this section, shall certify that such State or unit of general local government--

    (1) will maintain its expenditures for elementary, secondary, and higher education at a level equal to not less than the level of such expenditures maintained by the State or unit of general local government for the fiscal year immediately preceding the fiscal year for which the grant is received; and

    (2) will not raise the net tuition, after scholarships and tuition waivers, at public colleges and universities by more than the inflation rate.

    (c) AUTHORIZATION AND APPROPRIATION.--There are authorized to be appropriated, and are appropriated, $30,000,000,000 for fiscal year 2003 to carry out this section.

   SEC 6. TEMPORARY STATE FISCAL RELIEF THROUGH INCREASE IN MEDICAID FMAP.

    (a) DEFINITIONS.--In this section, the following definitions shall apply:

    (1) FMAP.--The term ``FMAP'' means the Federal medical assistance percentage, as defined in section 1905(b) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1396d(b)).

    (2) STATE.--The term ``State'' has the meaning given such term for purposes of title XIX of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1396 et seq.).

    (b) PERMITTING MAINTENANCE OF FISCAL YEAR 2002 FMAP FOR LAST 2 CALENDAR QUARTERS OF FISCAL YEAR 2003.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, but subject to subsection (f), if the FMAP determined without regard to this section for a State for fiscal year 2003 is less than the FMAP as so determined for fiscal year 2002, the FMAP for the State for fiscal year 2002 shall be substituted for the State's FMAP for the third and fourth calendar quarters of fiscal year 2003, before the application of this section.

    (c) PERMITTING MAINTENANCE OF FISCAL YEAR 2003 FMAP FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, but subject to subsection (f), if the FMAP determined without regard to this section for a State for fiscal year 2004 is less than the FMAP as so determined for fiscal year 2003, the FMAP for the State for fiscal year 2003 shall be substituted for the State's FMAP for each calendar quarter of fiscal year 2004, before the application of this section.

    (d) GENERAL 2.45 PERCENTAGE POINTS INCREASE FOR LAST 2 CALENDAR QUARTERS OF FISCAL YEAR 2003 AND FISCAL YEAR 2004.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, but subject to subsections (f) and (g), for each State for the third and fourth calendar quarters of fiscal year 2003 and each calendar quarter of fiscal year 2004, the FMAP (taking into account the application of subsections (b) and (c)) shall be increased by 2.45 percentage points.

    (e) INCREASE IN CAP ON MEDICAID PAYMENTS TO TERRITORIES.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, but subject to subsection (g), with respect to the third and fourth calendar quarters of fiscal year 2003 and each calendar quarter of fiscal year 2004, the amounts otherwise determined for Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and American Samoa under subsections (f) and (g) of section 1108 of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1308) shall each be increased by an amount equal to 4.90 percent of such amounts.

    (f) SCOPE OF APPLICATION.--The increases in the FMAP for a State under this section shall apply only for purposes of title XIX of the Social Security Act and shall not apply with respect to--

    (1) disproportionate share hospital payments described in section 1923 of such Act (42 U.S.C. 1396r-4); or

    (2) payments under title IV or XXI of such Act (42 U.S.C. 601 et seq. and 1397aa et seq.).

    (g) STATE ELIGIBILITY.--

    (1) IN GENERAL.--Subject to paragraph (2), a State is eligible for an increase in its FMAP under subsection (d) or an increase in a cap amount under subsection (e) only if the eligibility under its State plan under title XIX of the Social Security Act (including any waiver under such title or under section 1115 of such Act (42 U.S.C. 1315)) is no more restrictive than the eligibility under such plan (or waiver) as in effect on September 2, 2003.

    (2) STATE REINSTATEMENT OF ELIGIBILITY PERMITTED.--A State that has restricted eligibility under its State plan under title XIX of the Social Security Act (including any waiver under such title or under section 1115 of such Act (42 U.S.C. 1315)) after September 2, 2003, but prior to the date of enactment of this Act is eligible for an increase in its FMAP under subsection (d) or an increase in a cap amount under subsection (e) in the first calendar quarter (and subsequent calendar quarters) in which the State has reinstated eligibility that is no more restrictive than the eligibility under such plan (or waiver) as in effect on September 2, 2003.

    (3) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.--Nothing in paragraph (1) or (2) shall be construed as affecting a State's flexibility with respect to benefits offered under the State medicaid program under title XIX of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1396 et seq.) (including any waiver under such title or under section 1115 of such Act (42 U.S.C. 1315)).

    (h) SUNSET DATE.--This section is repealed, effective October 1, 2004.

   By Ms. MIKULSKI (for herself, Mr. BOND, Mr. KENNEDY, Mrs. LINCOLN, Mr. BREAUX, and Mr. DODD):

4A) Looming War with Iraq
IRAQ

   Mr. President, I rise to talk about some of the events over the weekend as it pertains to the looming war in Iraq. I didn't listen to all of the talk shows, but if you listen to some of them and then you read some of the quotes in the paper by some of the people high up in this administration, particularly meaning Under Secretary Paul Wolfowitz and also Mr. Pearl, you come away with the feeling and the sense that they decided some time ago they were going to go to war against Saddam Hussein and Iraq, regardless. There is really nothing that could be done that would in any way turn away the full force and effect of the U.S. military from a full scale war in Iraq. Because no matter what happens, they have a counter, and they keep coming back to the fact that it is too little, too late, we can't wait any longer for disarmament. But the fact is, over the last 12 years, containment has worked. Even though we did not back it with as much force as we probably should have at that time and the fact that we did withdraw our inspectors in the latter part of the 1990s, when that never should have been done, the fact is, during those 12 years, Saddam Hussein never marched on another country, never started another war, and even though this administration has tried their darnedest, they have never made a link between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaida.

   Now they are talking about some guy who got injured in Afghanistan and he came to Baghdad to get his leg treated because he had his leg amputated. He is somewhere around Baghdad, we don't know where. We don't even know if he is there. They suspect he is there and that is proof that Saddam is working with al-Qaida.

   Perhaps one of the most outlandish statements was a couple weeks ago when this purported tape of Osama bin Laden came out. Secretary Powell said at that time that--I am paraphrasing--this just goes to show you, once again, the link between al-Qaida and Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein, when in fact on the tape whoever is speaking, whether it was Osama bin Laden or not, is basically saying, it is all right to use Saddam Hussein to defeat the Americans,

   but it is not all right to support Saddam Hussein because he, too, is an infidel, not a true Islamist. Somehow we just ignore that. But there has never been a proven link, even though they have tried awfully hard to find one. So----

   Mr. HATCH. Will the Senator yield on that point?

   Mr. HARKIN. Sure, I will yield for a question, without losing my right to the floor.

   Mr. HATCH. I have been listening to the Senator, and I will rebut his earlier remarks later.

   Is the Senator aware of Mr. Zarqawi, who is in Iraq right now, who is definitely connected with the al-Qaida people?

   Mr. HARKIN. I ask the Senator, is this the guy who went to get his leg amputated?

   Mr. HATCH. He is an operative working within Iraq----

   Mr. HARKIN. He was injured in Afghanistan. I don't remember the name.

   Mr. HATCH. This is the fellow known to be in Iraq right now--or at least has been in the last number of months--and who is one of the principal operatives for the al-Qaida group, and who has been organizing and doing other matters within Iraq itself, and who appears to have at least the go-ahead from the Iraqi Government.

   If the Senator is not aware of that, then I understand why he is making these comments. But that is only one illustration. Is the Senator aware that there may be other illustrations as well?

   Mr. HARKIN. Well, I have read about them and heard about them--that there may be some people in and out, or some who may have come in. The most I have heard is the one I think the Senator is talking about, but I think he came there to get his leg fixed or something. No doubt he was well connected with al-Qaida.

   But I say to my friend from Utah, the Government of Iraq said they cannot find this guy. Well, our people have said it is ridiculous; of course, you can find him. Well, we cannot find Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan. We have more spy satellites and listening equipment than Iraq ever dreamed of having. I don't know whether this guy is there or not. There have been some in and out of Iraq.

   Again, it is very tenuous as to whether or not there are any connections. I am sure the Senator from Utah also knows that there has been a longstanding feud between Osama bin Laden and his fundamentalists and the Iraqi dictator, Saddam Hussein. I say a pox on both their houses. But the fact is, in the eyes of Osama bin Laden and those fundamentalists, Saddam Hussein is a secular leader, not a true

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   I say to my friend from Utah, there is an interesting piece in the Sunday Washington Post. When they caught Khalid Sheik Mohammed, one of the most dangerous men in al-Qaida, they captured him in Pakistan. On page A-26, there was a picture of all the high-value targets, those who have been involved with al-Qaida. No. 1 is Osama bin Laden. And then there is Khalid Sheik Mohammed, the one they just caught. Then there is Abu Zubaida, still at large. Others have died or have been

   captured.

   What is interesting about all of this--tier 1, tier 2, tier 3, is Osama bin Laden is a Saudi. Zawahiri is Egyptian. Saif Al-Adil is Egyptian. Khalid Sheik Mohammed is Pakistani. Then down here is a Jordanian, a Palestinian, a Saudi, a Yemeni, an Indonesian, a Kuwaiti, and an Egyptian. One thing kind of leaps out at you: Not one of them is an Iraqi.

   You would think that if Iraq were so closely tied in with al-Qaida, they might have some operatives in there. Not one is Iraqi. So we are going to go kill a lot of innocent Iraqis, innocent civilians, women and children. Where are the Iraqis in that lineup? You would think, with that list, we would go to war against Egypt. Look at all the Egyptians--or even the Saudis. Look at all the people who are in tier 1, tier 2, and tier 3 of the high-value targets, and more than just a few are Saudis. Maybe that ought to be the target of our invasion.

   After all, we know it has been the Saudis who, with their deep pockets, have been funding the fundamentalists in their efforts in that part of the world. It is the Saudis, with their deep pockets, who have been buying and paying for Al-Jazeera television with all of the inflammatory tirades against the United States and Israel that come across that television station. Not Iraq. It wasn't Saddam Hussein paying for that. It was the Saudis paying for it.

   So over the weekend we have the capture of Khalid Sheik Mohammed, perhaps, as they say, the brains behind al-Qaida, and the brains behind September 11--the operations chief and mastermind. That is a great capture. I applaud the FBI agents, CIA agents, whoever was involved in tracking this guy down and getting him. They did a great job, and I hope they get whatever commendations and medals that is appropriate for that. But there is someone else that also helped capture Khalid Sheik Mohammed, and that is the Government of Pakistan.

   I have taken this floor many times in the past several years to talk about our relations with Pakistan and how through the years, clear back to the founding of Pakistan as a nation, they have been on our side in every war. There isn't one conflict in the world that the U.S. has been involved in that the Pakistani Government and troops have not been on our side. Even in Haiti we had Pakistani soldiers with us. In Korea. In Vietnam. In the gulf war in 1991, Pakistan was there with us. Every single time that we have had a capture and a turnover to us of a terrorist, it has been Pakistan that has helped us.

   The first bombers at the World Trade Center caught--almost a dozen years ago now--were turned over to us by Pakistan. The shooter at the CIA in the mid-1990s who killed so many people escaped and went to Pakistan. Pakistan caught him and turned him over to us. The bombers of the embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were caught by Pakistan and turned over to us. And now this is the latest in a long string of terrorists who have killed Americans here at home and abroad. Here is the latest. Khalid Sheik Mohammed was captured in Pakistan.

   Yes, with the help of our FBI and CIA, and I don't know what other intelligence agencies, but it mentions the FBI here,

   but also with the help of the Pakistani Government. It could not have happened unless President Musharraf and others came to our aid and assistance to capture this guy. Yet how do we treat Pakistani Americans? So many Pakistani Americans who are in this country, who have been working, many have children who are Americans, have provided health care in our country in many cases and in many situations. They are university professors, businesses entrepreneurs all over America. Yet we have told them they have to march into INS and get fingerprinted and do all this within a month. In other words, it is treating Pakistani Americans as if they are part of this network of Saudis, Yemenis, Egyptians, Jordanians, and everybody else. One might find a Pakistani in there someplace, I do not know.

   The Pakistanis have always helped us out, and they are continuing to help us out today. We need to help them to combat terrorism in their own country.

   After the war in Afghanistan was over, there were over a million refugees from Afghanistan and Pakistan. They now think it is probably between 1 and 2 million. We provided little--I can almost say no help to the Pakistanis to take care of these refugees, to help them get resettled, and, as far as I know, we are not doing anything to help them now to get back into Afghanistan to resettle. They remain a burden on the Pakistani Government.

   It makes one wonder sometimes just what our response is going to be if, in fact, we do have a war in Iraq and we have an occupation, when we see how we have treated the Pakistanis for all these years.

   There were a couple other interesting events this weekend. The Iraqi Government has continued to destroy some of the Al-Samoud missiles. I think it is up to 10 now. They said they destroyed six more missiles. There is an interesting quote in the paper this morning. It said:

   ``If it turns out at an early stage this month that America is not going to a legal way, then why should we continue?'' Saddam Hussein's scientific adviser, Lt. Gen. Amer al-Saadi, said Sunday.

   In other words, what he is saying is--I read the story--we are willing to destroy the missiles, it takes time, but if the United States is going to commit war on us anyway, why should we?

   A Senior U.S. official--

   There is always one of those--

   said today the White House remained unimpressed with Iraq's move. ``The standard for cooperation demanded by U.N. Resolution 1441 is full and immediate, not grudging and late,'' the official said. The resolution approved last fall authorized a new round of weapons inspections in Iraq.

   You wonder sometimes what the rush to judgment is. If we can continue with more inspectors and Iraq continues to destroy the missiles, and to continue the containment policy on Saddam Hussein, isn't that what we want?

   There is another unnamed military source that says these missiles have questionable accuracy anyway. I am told they went over the line by 26 miles.

   It was 100 kilometers, and they went over by 26 miles. I had a conversation this weekend with someone who said: These missiles could be used to hit Israel or hit Europe or maybe even America. That is not the case at all. They went 26 miles over the line. Again, it was more than what was allowed and they should be destroyed and they are being destroyed.

   I guess the point I am making is why are we in such a rush to say that is not enough; we are going to go to war anyway? As I said at the beginning of my remarks, every time I listen to Mr. Wolfowitz, it seems as if this man has made up his mind: We are going to war no matter what, unless, as I read between the lines of what he is saying, someone assassinates Saddam Hussein and they set up a government and invite us in to run operations, then maybe we will not go to war. That seems to me about the only scenario that would keep a war from happening, according to Mr. Wolfowitz and those around him.

   The other important event that happened this weekend was the vote in the Turkish Parliament. The vote was close. We lobbied heavily. We put up, I do not know, I am told $15 billion or $26 billion--take your pick--to get the Turkish Government to allow us to use their territory for our troops, for loading troops, the provisioning of troops, and the movement of troops across

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   Then I saw a poll--you can get a lot of information off the Web on the weekend when you are working on these issues--there was a poll taken in Turkey. I do not know, I have no knowledge of how accurate this poll is or who took the poll, but it was a public opinion poll that showed that 94 percent of Turkey's citizens were opposed to the war in Iraq--94 percent. Even if the poll is off a little bit, one can understand why the Turkish Parliament was so reticent even in the face of billions of dollars of U.S. money pouring in.

   Someone said on the floor last week, this is not the coalition of the willing; it is the coalition of the bought confronting Iraq. If we have to go to those measures, $26 billion is what I was told--I stand corrected if that is not right. Even if it is $15 billion or someplace in between, we are not funding education, we have a problem in Medicare, our deficits are going out of sight, but somehow we have $26 billion to give to Turkey to allow our troops to go across their territory. That should raise some real questions as to what is happening here.

   Lastly, one has to question what is it we are about underneath it all?

   Again, I read from a speech that President Bush gave last week to the American Enterprise Institute and some of the comments that were made regarding that issue. President Bush said in his speech that we are going to have an Iraqi Government that will be representative of the people and that we would ensure that happened.

   I went back because I wanted to check to make sure this was official, so I looked at the White House document that was sent to us on January 20, 2003. It is the report from the President required by the Iraqi resolution that was passed by Congress last fall.

   Of course, it was supposed to have been in in 60 days. It was just another 30 days overdue. I read it over. There is an interesting part in the report that President Bush signed and sent to us. I will venture to say that not many Senators have read this report. But it is called the ``Future of Iraq.'' It is in the report of the President sent to us on January 20. I am going to quote from it. It says:

   Should it become necessary for the United States and coalition armed forces to take military action against Iraq, the United States, together with its coalition partners--

   Who are getting fewer and fewer, by the way--

   will play a role in helping to meet the humanitarian, reconstruction, and administrative challenges facing the country in the immediate aftermath of a conflict. .....We will work to transfer authority as soon as practical to the Iraqis themselves, initially in an advisory role. .....The U.S. is fully committed to stay as long as necessary to fulfill these responsibilities, but is equally committed to leave as soon as the Iraqi people are in a position to carry out these responsibilities themselves.

   Interesting. ``The U.S. is fully committed''--I do not remember us ever having a debate about that commitment, that we are committed to stay as long as necessary to fulfill these responsibilities, but are equally committed to leave as soon as the Iraqi people are in a position to carry out these responsibilities themselves.

   The question is: Who decides that? Who decides when the Iraqi people are in a position to carry out these responsibilities themselves?

   There is a quote in the paper from Youssef Ibrahim from the Council on Foreign Relations. He said:

   I think Arabs almost without exception would welcome more democracy and more freedom of expression and to be liberated from the police states they all--in one form or another--live under.

   Mr. Ibrahim goes on:

   It does not follow that they would trust America to do this for them. The view over there is totally different from the view expressed here.

   Critics also warn that the Bush administration must overcome a credibility gap borne of long memories and unpopular U.S. policies.

   University of Maryland Professor Shibley Telhami warned that an invasion of Iraq and subsequent occupation by United States-led forces would feed an image of United States imperialism and undermine the very goals the administration has set.

   Keep in mind, if we do, in fact, go to war in Iraq and occupy Iraq and set up this military type of government for however long we want to, it will be the first time ever that the United States has occupied an Arab country, the first time ever that we will be seen by the Arabs as occupiers, as establishing some kind of colonial power in the Arab world. And I think that is going to have severe ramifications.

   Army Chief of staff Shinseki told the Senate Armed Forces Committee that several hundred thousand soldiers would be needed to secure postwar Iraq. Assistance from friends and allies would be helpful, he said.

   Well, I wonder how much help we will get.

   Mr. Wolfowitz is quoted as saying:

   If, when Iraq is liberated, it can come up with a representative government that treats its people decently, I think it can have significant effects throughout the Middle East.

   David Mack, vice president of the Middle East Institute, said they make it look like a no-brainer. Put me down as a skeptic. Americans are in such a hurry. The people in the region are not. They are worried that they are jumping over a precipice.

   By one estimate, 65 million adults in the Middle East cannot read or write, 14 million are unemployed, and 10 million school-aged children are not enrolled in class.

   When I listen to Mr. Wolfowitz and I read the report from President Bush of January 20--I have not seen the movie yet, but I have read the book a couple of times, and I looked at it again this weekend, ``The Quiet American'' by Graham Greene. You read that and you think about how we got into Vietnam--the same kind of thing. We were going to build a democracy in Vietnam. We were going to end all this internal fighting and take care of the north, and we were going to set up democratic forms of government. That was the first, and then there were several others that followed. How many thousands of Americans lost their lives there? What did it do to our country, for a generation?

   Now one goes to Vietnam and we have diplomatic relations. When we look at what is happening in Vietnam, we have to say, what was it all about? It was really about the misguided adventurism of, yes, well-meaning people in this country--I have no doubt that they meant well--to put a pax Americana, sort of a stamp of America, on a country in Southeast Asia, to set up a country that would look like us, mirror us. We were going to do it through military force.

   I am sorry, it did not happen then, and it is not going to happen in Iraq. It may happen in Iraq at some point. We can encourage that. But it is not going to come about through a war that is going to kill countless civilians through the establishment of a military occupation and through us trying to impose upon the Iraqis our sense of what good government is. If only that were true. But history shows it is not.

   We keep hearing from Mr. Wolfowitz and others what a grave threat Saddam Hussein is to us. They believe the war in Iraq will be quick, maybe 2 or 3 weeks and it will be over with. And that is probably true. I have no doubt that could possibly be true. Then one has to ask, if that is the case, are they really that big a threat?

   Iraq has no navy. It has no air force to speak of. Its military is really in shambles. What kind of a threat are they, especially if we can keep inspectors there?

   The other thing I wanted to check on was: Is there a limit on the number of inspectors U.N. Resolution 1441 permits? Or any previous resolution? Was there any limit by the surrender resolution in 1991 which first started the inspections? And the answer is no. There is no limit on the number of inspectors that the United Nations is allowed to have in Iraq. So why have 100? Why do we not have 500? Why do we not have 1,000 inspectors, duly trained and qualified, all over that country? Saddam Hussein cannot say, no, that is not allowed, because it is allowed. I submit, those 1,000 or 500 inspectors fully trained in Iraq, even if it takes the next 5 years, is cheaper monetarily than what the war is going to cost us, and certainly cheaper in terms of the loss of human life, both American lives and innocent lives in Iraq. Plus, I believe through that process we will have

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   A war in Iraq, I believe, will give the backup to the terrorists who are out there. I am not so naive to think that there are not terrorists even yet in this country, and in other parts of the world, who want to do us in. They are there, but it seems like right now they do not have a backup. There is not much of a backup. We are tearing up the network with the recent capture of Khalid Sheik Mohammed in Pakistan. We are destroying this network, and we should keep at it, too. But a war in Iraq then will give, I think, people in the Arab world who today are not feeling us any ill,

   will give them the reasons to support monetarily, through encouragement, through processors, those terrorists who are out there. It is one thing to be a terrorist by yourself someplace; it is another thing to be a terrorist backed up, backed up, and backed up, like countless other people who are willing to give money and support and intelligence to help in your terrorist activities. To me, that is what could happen if we go to war in Iraq.

   Lastly, the civilian causalities. I remember the pictures that came back from 1991 after the war in Kuwait against the Iraqi Army--tanks, trucks, vehicles bombed and burned out, bodies lying all over in the desert. That did not provoke any outpouring of ill-will in the Arab world. It did not provoke any outpouring of a sentiment that somehow all of those people who were killed were somehow innocent. They were not. These were soldiers. These were Iraqi troops, used to invade and plunder Kuwait.

   It will be different this time. This time it is not just the Iraqi Army. It will be innocent men and women in Baghdad who will get killed. And those are the pictures that will go around the Arab world. If we are just confronting the Iraqi Army, that is one thing. But with all the cruise missiles and the bombing and everything else that will go on in Baghdad, cruise missiles are very accurate, but sometimes they go astray and sometimes people are not where they are supposed to be. Sometimes they are in the wrong place at the wrong time. That is what will happen, the image of innocent women and children killed by the might of the American military in Baghdad.

   That is why the best course of action is to continue the inspections, and if we need to, make 500 inspections, make 1,000 inspections. And then continue the program: planned destruction of weapons of mass destruction and others that Saddam Hussein now possesses in his arsenal. It may take more than a week, it may take more than a month, it may take 6 months or a year or 2 years or 4 or 5 years.

   The article asked, what is the hurry? If it means less loss of human life, and it will certainly cost a lot less, it seems to me that would be the wise course of action.

   We have a gang down there at the White House, Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Pearle, Negroponte, Elliot Abrams, Poindexter--do these names conjure up memories of the past? Sure does. A lot of the misguided adventures we got into in the 1980s--in Iran, in Central America, places like that--all these names kept popping up at that time because they were all involved in the misguided adventures. Now they got the adventure that will save us all, it will save America in the future--war in Iraq. And occupy Iraq with several hundred thousand troops, stay there as long as necessary to set up a government that somehow looks like ours.

   I close my remarks by saying these people ought to go visit Vietnam. I have, several years ago, to find out how the people are getting along there. They seem to be getting along fine. I still may not approve of the kind of government they have. But the people seem to be getting along just fine. Saigon is bustling, Hanoi is bustling, the tourist industry is going up, manufacturing is going up. Again, it might not be the mirror image of our kind of government, but they seem to be doing all right.

   So go visit Vietnam, and then go down to this wall down on The Mall and remember the misguided adventures of well-meaning politicians of the past before we commit our military to a massive invasion of Iraq.

   I yield the floor.

4B) Acting Unilaterally is Not the Best Interests of the United States
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Hoeffel) is recognized for 5 minutes.

   Mr. HOEFFEL. Mr. Speaker, I rise this evening to state that unilateral military action by the United States against Iraq at this time is not in our best national interest.

   Certainly Saddam Hussein must be disarmed and Iraq must be rid of weapons of mass destruction . Equally clear is our power to act unilaterally and successfully against Iraq, or any other country for that matter. I am proud we have that power, and we must sustain it. But the question is not whether we will prevail against Iraq. We will, with or without help. The real question is whether it is in our best national interest to unilaterally use our awesome power against Iraq. I believe it is not.

   We may not need help to win a war, but we will need help the day after the war is won, and that help must come from a multinational or a United Nations effort. We need our friends to help with peacekeeping, with rebuilding and with international credibility, and that support will be absent if we take unilateral action.

   This is not about winning United Nations permission to protect ourselves. We do not need that permission. This is about winning United Nations support to protect all civilized countries from the Iraqi threat. President Bush must forge a strong coalition through continued diplomacy before using American military power. If he does not, we will be isolated and less secure, and that is not in our national interest.

   President Bush very skillfully won unanimous Security Council support last fall to restart the arms inspections, and he deserves great credit for that. After the initial success, however, the administration has not been able to maintain that unity and cannot even muster unity today among the five permanent nations of the Security Council.

   What is the problem here? We are talking about an isolated country with a fourth-rate military and a leader who is a murderous tyrant that has no support and no friends in the United Nations. Yet the Security Council is split. Why is that? I believe it is because of the inept, bungled, cowboy diplomacy of the President of the United States and his senior advisers.

   Six months ago, after a great deal of soul searching, I voted to give the President military authority to use force to rid Iraq of the weapons of mass destruction . The President asked for that authority and said he would exhaust all diplomatic options before using it. And his strategy worked. The inspections were restarted.

   I am convinced that while those inspections have not been met with enough cooperation, the inspectors' presence in Iraq has made Saddam Hussein less dangerous for the time being.

   The administration has had much less success since then, and the root cause is simple: cowboy diplomacy from this administration. Every diplomatic thrust has been met with rhetoric that belies and often contradicts the diplomatic efforts. Administration spokesmen speak nearly every day with rhetoric that implies we are bent on war, with or without U.N. support, with or without our traditional and closest allies. The implication is that diplomacy is just something to take up time and distract attention until all of our troops are in place.

   The Bush administration spent much of its pre-9-11 days acting unilaterally on a variety of fronts, the environment, the ABM Treaty and many other ways, even though promising a new foreign policy run with humility during the 2002 election campaign.

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   In that broader sense, it comes as no surprise that so many of our allies are not joining us now.

   Then last week, in the middle of this diplomatic standoff, the administration released its plans for a post-Saddam Iraq, which included the possibility of a civilian American government. I think that is a great mistake. It will certainly be necessary, if we invade Iraq, for there to be military occupation to keep people from murdering each other for a time. That occupation will be essential; but we should not impose an American civil government.

   We should be looking for a multinational or a United Nations program to provide an interim civil government, and certainly our goal has to be to establish a representative and stable Iraqi government itself. The Bush plan smacks of colonialism, and could give ammunition to those who question our motives in seeking to disarm Hussein in the first place.

   It is dangerous to conduct a unilateral invasion of Iraq. It will undermine our credibility and legitimacy that this country has built up over decades of global leadership. We must realize that when we question the motives of countries like Germany and France, they question ours. We must work with them.

   I call on the Bush administration to renew its efforts to secure a broad multinational coalition or U.N. mandate to disarm Iraq.

4C) Expressing Opposition to the War in Iraq
Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Mr. Speaker, I came to the House floor because I felt that I needed to come down here and speak before this body about my opposition to the war that seems to be pending in Iraq.

   I come to the floor today to say that war is not inevitable; that this great Nation, whose power and hegemony is not disputed, can assert its leadership without the terrible destruction of a preemptive all-out war.

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   I come to the floor today to pay tribute to the millions and millions of everyday people all around the world, including throughout the United States, who have expressed so clearly their conviction that a U.S.-led invasion of Iraq is not the answer.

   I come to pay tribute to the city of Chicago, one of about 100 U.S. cities whose elected leaders, responding to their citizens, voted ``no'' to a preemptive war. In Chicago it was by a vote of 46 to 1.

   We are on the brink of the first war in history started by the United States against a country that has not threatened violence against the United States. We are on the brink of implementing a new policy of preemptive war, and ushering in not a new world order but a world of unprecedented disorder.

   Let us examine the facts: Iraq is led by a tyrannical dictator, one who may have, who probably has, chemical and biological weapons; one who violates human rights and oppresses his people; the same tyrannical dictator, by the way, who was our ally in the 1980s when Iraq was at war with Iran; the same dictator to whom we sent chemical and biological materials in the eighties; the same dictator who we now charge with using chemical and biological weapons, but at the time, the United States refused to support a U.N. resolution condemning Iraq.

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   The same Saddam who was in place in 1998 when the Haliburton Company, led by Vice President DICK CHENEY, was doing business in Iraq. The same dictator that has onerous characteristics that can be applied to many other countries, many of which we call ally, friends and coalition partner. And can be applied to countries like North Korea and Iran, who pose an even greater danger to the United States.

   So why Iraq and why now? I stand here today as a patriot and particularly resentful, not only for myself, but all of my constituents who oppose this war because we deeply love this country. But we believe that this war fails to meet the threshold test. Will it make us citizens and residents of the United States safer? Will it make the Middle East, and of particular concern to me, Israel, safer? Will it make the world safer?

   I say the answer is, and I feel in my heart, a resounding no.

   The Central Intelligence Agency reports that Saddam is likely to use chemical and biological weapons only if we attack. Saddam and Iraq had nothing to do with September 11, or at the time, Osama bin Laden, despite desperate attempts by this administration to link them. But an attack on Iraq now could meld an unlikely coalition of terrorist organizations and fundamental Muslim organizations that will be a real threat to the United States and other countries around the globe.

   Most importantly, we have real options to disarm Saddam Hussein. The way this debate has been shaped is you are either for all-out war, or you are for nothing and that could not be further from the truth.

   Saddam Hussein must be disarmed and no one disagrees with that. And we have a structure for doing that. The United Nations was set up for that, is ready to do that and with the mighty leadership that the United States could exert, can do an even better job to make sure that Saddam Hussein who has, in fact, been violating resolutions, will comply now with disarmament. We can be part of a large and growing coalition of civilized nations who says that in this 21st century, where the technology allows for chemical and biological and even nuclear weapons to proliferate around the globe, and it will be hard given this century and this knowledge to stop that, unless we have a coalition of civilized nations that will surround and isolate rogue states and rogue nations.

   We should lead in developing that coalition. We do not have to go to war now. I say no war on behalf of my constituents and to this Congress.

4D) US-French Relations in Light of Iraqi Conflict
Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. Speaker, in the current international debate on Iraq, I have the very clear impression that the United States and France are talking past each other and not listening to each other. More particularly, that the United States is not listening to the very nuanced views expressed by the French. My assessment of the dialogue is that President Chirac and President Bush are in accord on the objective of disarming Iraq of weapons of mass destruction and the capability to deliver such weapons . The Bush administration, however, has concluded that the only way to achieve this objective is through military action. In contrast, the French and many other U.S. allies and friendly observers favor continued diplomacy in the firm belief that a vigorous, intensive weapons inspection program will attain the disarmament objective.

   It would be useful for the Bush administration to think more constructively about France's contributions to international dialogue and its distinguished record of multilateral peacekeeping as well as military intervention when justified.

   A few highlights would be instructive: France was a valuable partner for the United States during the Gulf War in 1991, deploying 10,000 troops and 100 aircraft in Operation Desert Storm. From 1991 through 1995, France was an active ally to secure the peace in Bosnia. During this important peacekeeping mission, 70 French soldiers were killed and more than 600 wounded. In 1999, France deployed the greatest number of aircraft and flew the largest number of sorties of any combatant in Operation Allied Force in Kosovo. France today is contributing the largest contingent of peacekeepers in the Balkans, more than any other nation, including our own.

   After September 11, French troops participated in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan where France continues to place its troops in harm's way to provide security in that critical region. French President Chirac was the first foreign leader to pay his respects to the United States in person following the September 11 attacks. This is a very significant record of valuable contributions that France has made where and when needed to combat terror and secure peace.

   Our foreign policy would be better served by respecting the historical reality of the U.S.-French relationship. We need to listen to the wise counsel of this longstanding friend of America which has learned how to deal with the Islamic terrorist threat from its own painful experience in Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco and the large Arabic-Islamic population among its own citizenry.

   Mr. Speaker, I include for the RECORD a New York Times op-ed piece on this very subject.

   A Warning on Iraq, From a Friend

   WASHINGTON.--Reading the papers from both sides of the Atlantic, I sometimes wonder whether the impending war is not between France and the United States. I would like to strongly reaffirm what, in the heart of the French people, is a longstanding reality: the friendship between France and America began in the early days of your fight for independence and has endured throughout the centuries.

   America rescued my country twice in the last century--something we will never forget. Today we stand side by side in many parts of the world, including Afghanistan. France is the largest contributor of troops to NATO operations. Our friendship is a treasure, and it must be maintained, protected, enhanced.

   However, the polls are clear: 78 percent of French people oppose a military intervention in Iraq. Polls are similar in most other countries, including in Eastern Europe. European governments may be divided over the use of force in Iraq, but public opinion is united.

   There are, in my view, three reasons the mood is so cautious. The first relates to our assessment of what is far and away the biggest threat to world peace and stability: Al Qaeda.

   French intelligence is clear that not since the Algerian war 40 years ago has my country been under such an immediate threat. Last May, 11 French citizens were killed in a suicide bombing in Karachi, Pakistan. In the fall a French tanker was attacked by Al Qaeda off Yemen. And in December, near Paris, we arrested several suspects who were suspected of close links to Al Qaeda and of planning terrorist attacks in France.

   Terrorist suspects have also been arrested elsewhere in Europe--in Britain, Spain and Italy--belonging to groups connected with networks active in Afghanistan, Chechyna, Algeria and Bosnia. Yet we haven't seen any evidence of a direct link between the Iraqi regime and Al Qaeda.

   A second reason for the reluctance of the French people is that Iraq is not viewed as an immediate threat. Thanks to the determination of President Bush and the international community--and to the inspections that destroyed more armaments between 1991 and 1998 than did the Persian Gulf war itself, and which have now been reinforced with stronger means and bigger teams--Saddam Hussein is in a box. And the box has been closed with the inspectors in it.

   Europeans consider North Korea a greater threat. Imagine what a sense of security we all would feel if, as in Iraq, 100 inspectors were proceeding with unimpeded inspections throughout North Korea, including the president's palaces.

   A third reason for the cautious mood relates to the consequences of a war in Iraq. We see Iraq as a very complex country, with many different ethnic groups, a tradition of violence and no experience of democracy. You can't create democracy with bombs--in Iraq; it would require time, a strong presence and a strong commitment.

   We also worry about the region--considering that no peace process is at work for the moment in the Middle East, that none of the great powers seem able to foster one, and that a war in Iraq could result in more frustration and bitterness in the Arab and Muslim worlds.

   People in France and more broadly in Europe fear that a military intervention could fuel extremism and encourage Qaeda recruitment. A war could weaken the indispensable international coalition against terrorism and worsen the threat of Islamic terrorism.

   The inspections should be pursued and strengthened, and Saddam Hussein must be made to cooperate actively. War must remain the very last option.

4E) IAEA and WMD Inspections

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   Mr. WARNER. Certainly. The Senator from Massachusetts has been most patient.

   I ask unanimous consent that morning business be extended to the hour of 1 o'clock, the time equally divided between myself and my colleagues on the other side.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. CORNYN). Without objection, it is so ordered.

   Mr. WARNER. With reference to two points that you make, Senator, first--I copied in my notes--you questioned was the United States ever genuinely engaged in the inspection process, some words to that effect.

   Mr. DODD. Before you put words in my mouth, my concern has been that the administration has not been terribly supportive of the inspections process. Numerous Administration officials have been very dismissive of the inspections effort. My colleague from Virginia may have a different one. But my impression is that the administration has never embraced the inspections process, endorsed it, or supported it with the kind of rhetoric that I would have assumed would have been the case since we certainly supported the resolution that established the inspections initiative.

   Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, we are entitled to an honest difference of opinion. My colleague and I debated last night in a public forum on this very issue. But I believe our Government has been very thoroughly engaged in the inspection process, trying to support it.

   I provide today some tangible evidence in the sense that I have a letter from the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, addressed to me with a copy to my distinguished colleagues, Senator Levin and Senator Roberts, in which they set out for the record exactly what we have done by way of giving the U.S. intelligence regarding likely sites where weapons of mass destruction could be in the process of being manufactured, stored, or otherwise. We have cooperated mightily in this effort.

   I think that corroborates the assertion of the Senator from Virginia that our Government is engaged. I just read one paragraph here, Tenet stating we, the United States:

   ..... have now provided detailed information on all of the high value and moderate value sites to UNMOVIC and the IAEA.

   That is in rebuttal to your comment about genuine engagement. I think that shows good faith.

   Second, this rush headlong?

   As the Senator well knows, 1441 was adopted on November 8. Immediately thereafter the United Nations began to put in place and formalize work that Blix had been doing for some period of time.

   As you well know, the United Nations contemplated that there could be a second inspection regime, and Blix was put in office and began his work some months before. Had he undertaken to go into Iraq as quickly as I think feasible from a logistics standpoint, and having with him trained individuals, and he has been there basically since the latter part of November, early December--am I not correct in that?

   The reason there has not been greater productivity by Blix--I think he has tried diligently--is the absolute lack of cooperation of Iraq, to which my colleague from Connecticut has agreed.

   Here we are now. Our President and the Prime Minister and other nations of the coalition of the willing, having called up their reserves, called up their guard, transported the forces and put them in place. I was visiting there with Senator Levin, Senator Roberts, and Senator Rockefeller 10 days ago. We have placed them there. As the Senator from Connecticut I think quite properly said, in fairness, their presence has, indeed, supported the diplomatic efforts undertaken by the President and others in the United Nations, which is still going on.

   Our President said last night that we will wait and see what the Blix report comes forth with. He has come forth again

   today. With due respect to Blix, he tends to be somewhat contradictory.

   In previous reports he quite actively deplored the fact that Iraq has not been more cooperative and that lack of cooperation has hindered his efforts. As the Senator well knows, the concept of this inspection was not that Blix and his team had to find the weapons; it was that Iraq was to cooperate and show where the weapons are so Blix could supervise their destruction.

   This thing got totally, as we say as sailors, off course because of the need for Blix to do both the destruction, which he is now supervising, of a modest cache of missiles, and at the same time trying to search, using U.S. intelligence and intelligence from other nations, for the sites.

   I say to the Senator, I see no basis for saying that this President, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, or others are rushing, as you said, headlong to try to utilize force as the final solution. We have been at this thing 12 years. Blix has been in business since November.

   Mr. DODD. Let me respond to your rather long question.

   Mr. WARNER. Yes.

   Mr. DODD. I presume there is a question there.

   Mr. WARNER. Yes.

   Mr. DODD. My response is the inspection teams were not at full strength until about the end of January.

   Obviously, we didn't think Saddam Hussein was a wonderfully truthful, reliable head of state last fall when the U.S. voted for U.N. Security Council Resolution 1441. We have known Saddam Hussein for a long time, and it therefore comes as no great surprise that it has taken international pressure to get results.

   It has only been about a month since the inspections team has been fully operational in Iraq. That is a fact. To expect somehow that within a month's period of time, or a little more than a month, an inspections team was going to be able to complete the job was naive.

   This morning U.N. Weapons Inspections chief, Mr. Blix--whom I think most people respect as being an honorable person and certainly one who has dedicated much of his career to eliminating weapons of mass destruction--reported that the inspections are making progress, that today inspectors are getting a lot more done than they did in the 1990s. We should listen to Mr. Blix and give his remarks serious consideration as we decide the next steps.

   My only point in taking the floor today is not to suggest, as some may, that we ought to under no circumstances in dealing with Iraq ever contemplate the use of force. I would disagree with that. I think having a threat of force is absolutely critical to achieving a desired result. The only point is that we ought not do this alone. I don't think it is necessary, and I think we ought to at least give this process time to work. I think the cost

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   I would argue differently about North Korea. I don't think we have that much time. I think every day we lose in dealing with North Korea raises the risks to this country and the world profoundly. I don't disagree with my colleague from Virginia at all about this except to the extent that the impression is we really are not going to give this the kind of time to prove it can work and then have the kind of support that I think we ought to have internationally.

   We only paid about 10 percent of the cost of the gulf war. The rest of the world which felt most threatened by Iraq contributed 90 percent of that cost.

   As I shared with my colleagues last evening a conversation which I had with one of the major European Commissioners, a great ally of ours, the Commissioner said: We have been delighted to support the effort in Afghanistan. I think the European Community contributed about $1 billion. He said: I would not anticipate any financial support under the present circumstances in winning the peace in Iraq if this is a unilateral effort on the part of the United States.

   That is a very troubling comment. This problem is a problem not just for us, it is a problem for the region, as my colleagues have said.

   I believe Saddam Hussein poses a global threat, and that certainly needs to be addressed. But we need to understand that diplomacy has value. And I think there are those who today are in positions of making a difference who don't appreciate that enough. That is my concern as I take the floor today.

   Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I see the Senator from Massachusetts.

   I ask unanimous consent that the time the Senator from Virginia consumed in this colloquy be charged to his allocation and the time consumed by the Senator from Connecticut be charged to the other side.

   I thank my colleague. I hope to have more to say on this.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

   The Senator from Massachusetts.

   Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, this morning we heard the most encouraging report so far on the recent developments in Iraq from the United Nations' chief weapons inspectors. Progress is clearly being made. Iraq is beginning to destroy its missiles. As a result of strong international pressure on Saddam, the inspectors are receiving greater cooperation from the Iraqi Government.

   Hans Blix, the chief United Nations weapons inspector, reported this morning that the international pressure is working. He says the inspectors are encountering fewer difficulties than when inspections occurred there a decade ago. The inspectors have free access to the entire country, and they can now conduct air surveillance throughout Iraq. The question is, For how long? Hans Blix says it will not take years or weeks, but months. So we are not talking about an endless process. Saddam knows he is on the clock at the United Nations. The eyes of the world are on him, and he must disarm.

   We all agree there is still much more to be done before full disarmament is achieved. But inspections are working and Saddam is being disarmed. Yet in its rush to war with Iraq, the Bush administration ignores this progress and rejects the wise words of caution from our allies.

   President Bush deserves great credit for the progress so far--both in the war against al-Qaida terrorism, and in disarming Saddam. Al-Qaida is on the run, and Saddam is disarming.

   But it is time for this President and this White House to pause before pushing aside the rest of the world and ordering an invasion of Iraq. Rash action will only place our troops in greater harm's way. As we unleash a firestorm of military might over Iraq, we could easily unleash a firestorm of hatred for America creating a far more dangerous world for Americans here at home and in many other countries.

   We are squandering the immense good will and support for America following the tragedy of 9/11. We are shattering the coalition that is effectively fighting the war against terrorism, and that is pursuing Osama bin Laden at this very moment. War now will inflame the Arab and Muslim world against us as never before, and generate intense new support for anti-American terrorists who will stop at nothing to do us harm.

   In recent days, Iraq has destroyed 34 of its 100 illegal missiles--a process which continues. Seven more scientists have been privately interviewed, and each day more come forward. The Iraqi government stepped up and revealed the location of previously destroyed biological weapons in order to enable the inspectors to verify their destruction.

   Many of us wish that this cooperation had occurred earlier, and that Iraqi officials were more forthcoming. No one ever said it would be easy to disarm Iraq. Even South Africa, which agreed to unilaterally disarm its nuclear program, required two full years of inspections to confirm that its nuclear capability was destroyed.

   Disarmament is a process--not a single simple event. Disarmament takes time. Progress comes step by step. But when progress does occur, it makes no sense to reject it out of hand. It makes no sense to start a war when we have a genuine chance to preserve the peace.

   The wisest course for America is to give the inspectors more time and to maintain the pressure on Saddam by keeping our troops in the region. It is better to pay the price of keeping our troops there to pressure Saddam than to pay the far greater cost of going to war.

   It is clear from the foreign ministers who spoke today at the Security Council that a majority of the world's governments still want to wait before pulling the trigger for war. Even the British are now asking for more time.

   This is a delicate and dangerous situation. We need allies to help us meet our goals, and to provide for the security of the American people. But surely we can have effective relationships with other nations without adopting a chip-on-the-shoulder, my-way-or-the-highway policy that makes all our other goals in the world more difficult to achieve. We cannot be a bully in the world schoolyard and expect cooperation, friendship, and support from the rest of the world.

   The threat of war may be tough talk that Saddam needs to hear. But continuing inspections is a tough-minded policy. It takes patience and perseverance. There is the chance that they will succeed in disarming Iraq. And inspections build international support if other steps are required.

   The goal is the disarmament of Iraq by peaceful means--not to use every opportunity to justify a war, as the administration is doing.

   All of us agree that Saddam is a despicable and deceitful dictator, but I am deeply concerned that such a war will make the world even more dangerous for Americans--not less dangerous. But as long as inspectors are on the ground and making progress, we must give peace a chance. War must always be a last resort.

   The question now is whether the Bush Administration will view Iraqi cooperation as a glass half empty, or a glass half full.

   At his press conference last night, President Bush still failed to offer adequate answers to the key questions on the minds of the American people about the issues at stake in this war and its aftermath. In his speech last week, he also painted a simplistic picture of the brightest possible future--with democracy flourishing in Iraq, peace emerging among all nations in the Middle East, and the terrorists with no place of support there. We have all heard of rosy scenarios, but that was ridiculous.

   War with Iraq runs the very serious risk of inflaming the Middle East and provoking a massive new wave of anti-Americanism in other countries that may well strengthen the terrorists, especially if the Muslim world opposes us. What if al-Qaida were to time the next terrorist attack to the day we go to war?

   A year ago, the Wall Street Journal quoted a dissident in Saudi Arabia who has turned his focus from his own government to the U.S. Government. He said the main enemy of the Muslims and the Arabs is America, and that they do not want us to impose on them.

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   The burning of the U.S. flag has become a common ritual in Arab capitals. Calling someone an American is now regarded as an insult in parts of the Arab world.

   What a tragic change in the support we had in the world after 9/11, let alone from the time when America stood as a beacon of hope and a model for freedom and democracy throughout the world.

   In a desperate effort to justify its focus on Iraq, the administration has long asserted there are ties between Osama and Saddam--a theory with no proof, and widely doubted by the intelligence experts.

   Two weeks after 9/11, Secretary Rumsfeld claimed we had ``bulletproof'' evidence of the link. But a year later, CIA Director Tenet conceded in a letter to the Senate Intelligence Committee that the administration's understanding of the link was still ``evolving'' and was based on sources of ``varying reliability.''

   In fact, the link is so widely doubted that intelligence experts have expressed their concern that intelligence is being politicized to support the rush to war.

   The Bush administration was wrong to allow the anti-Iraq zealots in its ranks to exploit the 9/11 tragedy by using it to make war against Iraq a higher priority than the war against terrorism.

   Al-Qaida--not Iraq--is the most imminent threat to our national security. Our citizens are asked to protect themselves from Osama with plastic sheeting and duct tape, while the administration prepares to send our Armed Forces to war against Iraq. Those priorities are wrong.

   There is also much more we need to do at every level of government to strengthen our defenses at home against terrorist attack, especially if we go to war alone against Iraq and inflame the Arab world. America is already on constant alert. There is no time to shortchange our security at home. Yet across the country the Bush administration is leaving local governments high and dry in the face of continuing threats at home. Despite promises of funding from Washington, our cities are not receiving the urgent help they need.

   If there is any lesson from September 11, it is that we cannot afford to fail to meet this threat. The cost in lives at home is too great. The war with al-Qaida is far from over, and war with Iraq may well make it worse.

   And what about the aftermath of war? We know a stable government will be essential in a postwar Iraq. But the administration refuses to discuss, in any real detail, how it will be achieved and how long our troops will need to stay. President Bush assumes everything will go perfectly.

   But war and its consequences hold enormous risks and uncertainties.

   As Retired General Anthony Zinni has asked, will we do what we did in Afghanistan in the 1970s--drive the old Soviet Union out and let something arguably worse emerge in its place?

   The administration has also tried to convince us the war will not be costly to the Treasury. If our national security were at stake, we would spare no expense to protect American

   lives. But the administration still owes the Nation a more honest discussion about the war costs we are about to face, especially if America has to remain in Iraq for many years, with little support from others.

   The vast majority of the Iraqi people may well want the end of Saddam's rule, but they may not welcome the United States to create a government in its own image. Regardless of their own internal disagreements, the Iraqi people still feel a strong sense of national identity and could quickly reject an American occupation force that tramples on local cultures.

   We must recognize that the day we occupy Iraq, we shoulder the responsibility to protect and care for its citizens. We are accountable under the Geneva Convention for public safety in neighborhoods, for schools, and for meeting the basic necessities of life for 23 million Iraqi civilians.

   This daunting challenge has received little attention from the administration. As the dust settles, the repressed tribal and religious differences of the past may come to the fore--as they did in the brutal civil wars in the former Yugoslavia, in Rwanda, and other countries. As our troops bypass Basra and other Iraqi cities on our way to Baghdad, how will we prevent the revenge bloodletting that occurred after the last gulf war in which thousands of civilians lost their lives? What do we do if the Kurds in northern Iraq claim an independent Kurdistan or the Shia in southern Iraq move toward an alliance with Iran, from which they have long drawn their inspiration?

   We have told the Government of Turkey that we will not support an independent Kurdistan, despite the fact the Kurdish people already have a high degree of U.S.-supported independence and have even completed work on their own constitution. Do we send troops again to keep Iraq united? This administration's record in postwar Afghanistan is not exactly the best precedent for building democracy in Iraq.

   Sixteen months after the fall of the Taliban government in Afghanistan, President Hamid Karzai is still referred to as the ``Mayor of Kabul'' because of the weak and fragile hold of his government on the rest of the nation. Warlords are in control of much of the countryside. The Afghan-Pakistan border is an area of anarchy and ominous al-Qaida cells.

   If we have not been able to get it right in Afghanistan, where we went in with strong international support and involvement, how do we expect to go it alone in Iraq? Everyone talked about a Marshall Plan for Afghanistan where there is a clear need to rebuild and get it right so the Taliban and al-Qaida cannot take over again.

   President Karzai was here last week at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, begging for the adequate support and resources his new government needs to take hold. To get it right in Iraq, we need the international community and a long-term commitment on the part of the United States. That is less likely to happen if we do not have the international community with us from the start.

   Depending on our welcome, it could take as many as 200,000 American troops, as General Shinseki told the Armed Services Committee just over a week ago, or even more, to stabilize Iraq. We already have 37,000 troops in South Korea, 8,000 in Afghanistan, 5,000 in the Balkans, and another 1,000 in the Philippines and Colombia. We need to know whether our Armed Forces are being spread too thin. We need to know how long they can keep up this pace.

   The large-scale mobilization of the National Guard and

   Reserves for Iraq is already having an effect on police, firefighters, and others who are needed on the front lines at home, especially if there are new terrorist attacks on the United States. We have called up 167,000 Guard and Reserve personnel for active duty. We know the effect on their families who are left behind. What is the effect on the economy in lost productivity as these jobs go unfilled?

   Can we meet all these obligations now, let alone shoulder the long-term costs of war with Iraq? These may well total hundreds of billions of dollars in the years ahead.

   One of the highest and worst costs of the war may be the humanitarian costs. Sixty percent of the Iraqi people rely on the United Nations Oil-for-Food Program for their daily survival. Food is distributed through 46,000 government distributors supplied by a network of food storage barns. A war with Iraq will disrupt this network. Many Iraqis, especially low-income families, have no other source of food. Women and children will be the most vulnerable victims of war. According to recent reports, 500,000 Iraqi children already suffer from malnutrition.

   Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks an excellent article in this morning's Washington Post by Ken Bacon and George Rupp.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

   (See exhibit 1.)

   Mr. KENNEDY. I will quote from the article.

   ..... The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, the world's first responder when people flee their countries, lacks the resources to prepare for a flood of refugees. .....

   Although the United States has spent $2.4 billion to send troops to the Persian Gulf region, it has spent less than $1 million to position relief agencies in the region. An official at the U.N. Office for the Coordination

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   We don't have the nongovernmental agencies that do humanitarian work in Iraq. We had them in Afghanistan. We have refused to permit them licenses to go in and set up some kind of system in the past months, although they have all desired to do so.

   Listen to this:

   Lack of preparedness by the [United Nations] and private relief agencies means the U.S. military will have to do most of the relief work, and this in turn could mean the suffering of the Iraqi people will be greater than necessary. Administration officials have done little to match the skills of relief agencies--some are specialists in medical care, others in water and sanitation projects, for instance--with projected needs.

   It is talking about the nongovernmental agencies. It continues:

   In modern warfare, precision bombs will limit civilian casualties during the conflict, so that most death and suffering occurs in the post-conflict period, when people are displaced, poorly fed or prone to disease because water sanitation and sewer systems have been disabled. This means that rapid humanitarian intervention is just as important to holding casualties and quick military victory.

   The United States may be ready for war, but it is not yet ready to help Iraq recover from war.

   This is Ken Bacon and the spokesman for the nongovernmental agencies that have worked so well historically on humanitarian needs. The U.S. military is far from equipped to handle the challenge. Our Government must have a plan in place to care for the population. Despite the immense need for help from relief organizations, we have had too few discussions with key nongovernmental agencies to provide the food, tents, medicines, and other supplies that will be needed. All we have to do is look in the newspaper and we find out where the preposition of every one of these aircraft carriers are, where the armored divisions are. Yet when you ask the Defense Department where are the prepositions on food, the tents, and medicines, we can't disclose those because those are secret.

   Are all these possible consequences acceptable to the American people? Are they manageable? Does the administration really have a plan that considers how we will reap--in the international community, in the Arab street, and in American families--what we sow in a war with Iraq.

   Finally, the President must explain why war with Iraq won't distract us from the more immediate and graver danger posed by North Korea. Something is gravely wrong at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue if we rush to war with a country that poses no nuclear threat, but won't even talk to one that brandishes its nuclear power right now. Any nuclear threat from Iraq is at least five years into the future. But the threat from North Korea exists now--today. CIA Director George Tenet recently informed the Senate Armed Services Committee, North Korean missiles can now reach American soil with a nuclear warhead.

   Look at this article from the Washington Post of March 4:

   The United States and Asian countries have begun to accept the idea of a nuclear-armed North Korea.

   I ask unanimous consent to print the article at the conclusion of my remarks.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

   (See exhibit 2.)

   Mr. KENNEDY. Continuing from the article:

   ``The administration has acquiesced in North Korea becoming a nuclear power,'' said a Senate source who was briefed last week on the administration's evolving policy.

   ``Our major fear is that North Korea would pass on fissile materials or other nuclear technology'' to ``rogue states'' or outlaw groups, Deputy Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage warned Congress last month. ``I don't think, given the poverty in North Korea, that it would be too long'' before such sales could take place, he said.

   In other words, they are willing to accept North Korea as a nuclear power that has sold missiles to Iran, to Syria, to other countries that have supported terrorism and not give that the first priority when we are talking about the security of the United States.

   This makes no sense.

   ``The total red line is the sale of nuclear weapons material,'' said [a spokesman for the administration] who follows the North Korea issue closely. ``Nuclear weapons transferred to the Iraqis would be tantamount to nuking Jerusalem.''

   You can have them, as long as you don't sell them, for a country that has already sold the technology of making nuclear weapons to Iran, to Syria, and other nations and has that capability itself.

   Experts--including professionals within our own government--have been ringing alarm bells for months about North Korea's pursuit of nuclear weapons. The views of the experts are brushed aside, despite the continually growing list of dangerous behavior by that government.

   This is a country that celebrated the inauguration day of South Korea's new president by test firing a missile into the nearby sea. Yet, last night, President Bush did not even mention North Korea in his statement.

   North Korea has long had advanced missiles which it sells to other countries. It has restarted its plutonium--producing reactor, kicked out the international inspectors, pulled out of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and threatened to break the Armistice agreement that has brought 50 years of peace to the Korean peninsula.

   Desperate and strapped for cash, North Korea is the greatest current nuclear danger to the United States, and it is clearly taking advantage of the situation in Iraq. It is the country most likely to sell nuclear material to terrorists, and has missiles that can strike our soil. How long can the Administration continue to ignore North Korea? How will a war with Iraq affect our ability to deal with this escalating danger?

   Just the other day, two North Korean Mig fighter jets tailed an American plane near the Korean Peninsula, in a further attempt to get the attention of President Bush.

   But in his zeal on Iraq, the President has refused to call the situation on the Korean peninsula what it is--a genuine crisis. He has refused to even talk directly to the North Koreans to try to end its nuclear program.

   The Administration may even have tried to conceal information about North Korea. Intelligence analysts at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California concluded in November 2001 that North Korea had begun construction of a plant to enrich uranium to use in nuclear weapons. Yet, the Administration did not reveal this information until eleven months later, in October 2002--after Congress had voted on the legislation authorizing the use of force in Iraq.

   Only the Administration knows if the timing of the release of the information on North Korea was by design or coincidence. But if the Administration did conceal its knowledge of North Korea's dangerous nuclear weapons program until after the Congressional vote on Iraq, it would represent a breach of faith by our government not seen since the Vietnam War.

   The very real danger is that the Administration is making it more likely that North Korea will provide nuclear material or even nuclear weapons to terrorists or nations supporting terrorists. Is war with Iraq worth that risk--not taking more time with inspectors?

   We are poised at a moment of truth in the stewardship of the President. If President Bush commits our men and women to war, then all of us will close ranks behind them, and pray for their safety and a swift end to the conflict.

   But with inspectors on the ground and stiff international pressure still possible, this is an unnecessary war. History will judge how well we meet the challenges of this new era and this new century. We should move forward as the great and honorable nation we are--with patience and perseverance--as we carry on the difficult work of build a better and more peaceful world for all its people.

   Exhibit 1

   Unready for the Aftermath

   Despite months of planning by the Bush administration to respond to the humanitarian challenges that could follow an attack against Iraq, preparations for dealing with displacement, injury, illness and food shortages remain inadequate. If current problems continue, the suffering caused by war could be amplified by lack of aid resources and coordination.

   The most urgent need could be food. The United States boasts that it has shipped 3 million humanitarian daily rations to the region to help feed Iraqis. But individual meal

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   More than a decade of U.N. sanctions has left approximately 16 million Iraqis dependent on government rations for their entire food supply under the U.N. Oil-for-Food program; most of the remaining 8 million Iraqis rely on government rations for a portion of their daily food basket. The U.N. Children's Fund estimates that more than 2 million Iraqi children will require therapeutic feeding in the event of a conflict.

   A break in the U.N. food pipeline could cause ``extremely grave'' conditions, Ramiro Lopes da Silva, director of the U.N. World Food Program office in Baghdad, told The Post. He estimates that 10 million people could run out of food within six weeks of the start of a war. ``After that we will have to feed 10 million people. Eventually, we'll have to feed the entire population,'' Lopes da Silva said. The World Food Program currently has enough food in the region to feed 900,000 people for 10 weeks.

   Preparations to deal with refugees and displace people also are behind schedule. The United Nations estimates that in the ``medium impact scenario''--a two- to three-month conflict involving ground troops--1.45 million refugees and asylum seekers would try to reach neighboring countries, and 900,000 people would be newly displaced within Iraq. Yet Ruud Lubbers says that his agency, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, the world's first responder when people flee their countries, lacks the resources to prepare for a flood of refugees.

   So far the U.N. refugee office has raised less than $20 million of the $60 million it is seeking for tents, stoves, blankets and other materials for refugee camps. Most of that money came from the United States. As a result, the agency has positioned only about 20 percent of the equipment it needs in the region.

   In a flurry of news conferences last week, administration officials admitted that the military may have to provide food and medical assistance during and immediately after a conflict, but they say humanitarian tasks would quickly be turned over to the United Nations and private relief agencies. Sadly, private relief agencies, most of which depend on government funding, aren't yet well prepared for the task.

   Although the United States has spent $2.4 billion to send troops to the Persian Gulf region, it has spent less than $1 million to position relief agencies in the region. An official at the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs recently told a conference that his biggest concern is the small number of private relief agencies ready to move quickly into Iraq.

   Lack of preparedness by U.N. and private relief agencies means the U.S. military will have to do most of the relief work, and this in turn could mean that the suffering of the Iraqi people will be greater than necessary. Administration officials have done little to match the skills of relief agencies--some are specialists in medical care, others in water and sanitation projects, for instance--with projected needs. One urgent unanswered question is: Who will care for Iraqis exposed to weapons of mass destruction? Humanitarian organizations lack the skills and equipment to handle this challenge.

   In modern warfare, precision bombs limit civilian casualties during the conflict, so that most death and suffering occurs in the post-conflict period, when people are displaced, poorly fed or prone to disease because water sanitation and sewage systems have been disabled. This means that rapid humanitarian intervention is just as important to holding casualties down as quick military victory.

   The United States may be ready for war, but it not yet ready to help Iraq recover from war.

--

   Exhibit 2

   Foes Giving In to N. Korea's Nuclear Aims

   TOKYO, March 4.--The United States and Asian countries have begun to accept the idea of a nuclear-armed North Korea, according to officials and analysts here and in Washington. Increasingly, the Bush administration is turning its attention to preventing the Communist government in Pyongyang from selling nuclear material to the highest bidder.

   Envoys for the new South Korean president, Roh Moo Hyun, shocked Bush advisers in Washington recently when they said they would rather have a nuclear North Korea than a chaotic collapse of the government there, according to sources in Seoul.

   And in Japan, located within missile range of North Korea, officials feel their neighbor cannot be stopped from producing a bomb. ``We need to be debating how to live with North Korea, with or without nuclear weapons,'' Taro Kono, a lawmaker from the ruling party, said in an interview.

   Washington had issued repeated warnings to North Korea not to begin reprocessing materials that could become fuel for a nuclear bomb, but administration officials have become resigned to North Korea taking that step sometime within the next two to four weeks. ``The administration has acquiesced in North Korea becoming a nuclear power,'' said a Senate source who was briefed last week on the administration's evolving policy.

   U.S. officials have begun to contend that a decision by North Korea to begin reprocessing spent nuclear fuel rods into weapons-grade plutonium will represent a diplomatic opportunity to swing international opinion to its side in the impasse over North Korea's nuclear ambitions, administration and congressional officials said today.

   The administration thinks the shock of a decision by Pyongyang to export nuclear materials would force Russia, China, South Korea and other nations to drop their reluctance to confront the Communist state. According to that view, they would go along with the United States in mounting a tough campaign to further isolate the North and possibly to try to interdict suspected shipments of nuclear materials.

   Production of plutonium that could flow abroad in clandestine sales ``fundamentally changes the equation,'' contends an administration official. ``Literally every city on the planet would be threatened.''

   During the last crisis over North Korea's nuclear ambitions, in 1994, the Clinton administration warned Pyongyang that reprocessing materials for a nuclear bomb could prompt a military strike. Many officials in Asia believe that Washington will now set new ``red lines'' that it will not tolerate North Korea crossing. But Bush and his senior advisers have refused to do that, publicly at least, saying it would only encourage North Korea to charge past them.

   North Korean already is a major source of missile technology, and an Iranian resistance group recently said that North Korean experts are assisting Iran in its pursuit of nuclear weapons. Now officials worry about a new kind of export.

   Even the Administration says North Korea's nuclear weapons are dangerous. ``Our major fear is that North Korea would pass on fissile material or other nuclear techology'' to ``rogue states'' or outlaw groups, Deputy Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage warned Congress last month. ``I don't think, given the poverty of North Korea, that it would be too long'' before such sales took place, he said.

   ``The total red line is the sale of nuclear weapons material,'' said Rep. Mark S. Kirk (R-Ill.), who follows the North Korea issue closely. ``Nuclear weapons transferred to the Iraqis would be tantamount to nuking Jerusalem.'' You can have them, as long as you don't sell them?

   The Senate source said the administration was playing ``a very dangerous game'' in not acting to stop reprocessing before it starts, because the resulting materials could be hidden in the country's network of caves awaiting export.

   But administration officials argue they have no good military options for eliminating North Korea's nuclear capability. A surgical strike might neutralize the plutonium plant, but the country's effort to enrich uranium is proceeding at another, unknown site.

   President Bush told reporters this week that he was still seeking a diplomatic solution and that a ``military option is our last choice.'' He also said that he would seek to ``accelerate the development of an anti-ballistic missile system'' to counter a potential threat from North Korean missiles.

   U.S. officials quietly dropped the phrase that the United States has ``no hostile intent'' toward North Korea in their talking points about a month ago, an official said ``It's clear North Korea has hostile intent to us,'' he said.

   ``I wouldn't rule out use of military coercion if North Korea crosses ..... red lines,'' said Michael A. McDevitt, a retired rear admiral and director of the Center for Strategic Studies in Washington. ``The one I am most worried about is if they produce enough plutonium to start hawking it on the open market.''

   An administration official said Chinese officials have told North Korea that China would consider any attempt to produce nuclear weapons a ``direct threat to Chinese national security.'' While the Chinese told U.S. officials that they made it clear to North Korea they would not accept such a step, the Chinese statement did not address reprocessing or foreign sales of the resulting materials.

   Many strategists have long asserted that the United States, China and Russia would not allow a nuclear-armed North Korea because it could dramatically alter the power structure in northeastern Asia and lead to an arms race as both Seoul and Tokyo demanded nuclear weapons.

   Increasingly, however, it appears that North Korea is determined to defy those wishes. ``In a way we are wasting our time to talk about dialogue with North Korea,'' said Masashi Nishihara, president of Japan's National Defense Academy. ``Only after they develop a nuclear program will they come to the table.

   Mr. KENNEDY. I see my friend and colleague, the chairman of the Armed Services Committee. I would like to maybe ask him a question.

   Mr. WARNER. Of course.

   Mr. KENNEDY. If I could ask unanimous consent to ask him a question and retain the right to the floor.

   I was interested in what our rules of engagement will be for our men and

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   I am wondering, in those circumstances, what will be the rules of engagement of American servicemen. Are they going to be called upon in terms of separating these blood feuds, which have been so much a part of these revolutions in Iraq? I want to know whether American servicemen are going to be instructed that they are to fire on the Iraqi people who are involved in these kinds of acts of violence. I am interested in what the rules of engagement will be for northern Iraq, if there should be a rush by the Kurds to go back to their old homes where, in many instances, families have lived for centuries and have been separated by Saddam Hussein. What are American troops going to be told to do when the Iraqi forces collapse and the Kurds make a rush to Kirkuk, for example, one of the great oil-producing areas? What are American service men and women going to be told to do? What will be the rules of engagement outside of just engaging with the Iraqi Army? What are going to be the rules of engagement in terms of maintaining civilian control?

   Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I welcome the question from my colleague. He is a very valued member of the Armed Services Committee.

   We had briefings this week by the Department of Defense, and indeed a representative from the Department of State, on the plans now being formulated by the Bush administration, should force be necessary, as to exactly what we would do with respect to the questions raised by my colleague.

   First and foremost, our forces, as they would move in, are responsible for the objective of trying to keep Iraq together and constituted as a nation, as it is today. It is the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and the consequent regime change that are the goals. Now, they are to provide first protection for the nongovernmental organizations which stand ready to assist our country. In other words, we will be making an effort to feed and care for the people of Iraq, as well as outsiders. That is the highest priority. So we are to provide a secure framework in which the people of Iraq can be cared for as best they can under wartime conditions.

   With respect to factions in Iraq and their desire to fight among each other, we are going to do our best to contain that. Our goal is to have Iraq as a nation, with its present boundaries, remaining intact. We are bringing in experts to put out any fires Saddam Hussein may set at the oil wells. We are bringing in people to establish, as quickly as possible, a secure framework in which the people of Iraq can begin to select their own leadership and government in due course. So there has been a lot of planning.

   As to the exact rules of engagement that commanders, as the Senator and I understand, will issue to their troops, at the moment I do not have those orders. But I assure the Senator that we are contemplating the challenge to maintain the integrity of Iraq as a nation. That could well involve stopping the civil strife between factions. But a lot of planning has been done.

   I think the administration has been subjected to undue criticism because the planning as yet has not been fully made public. But it is there, I say to the Senator.

   Mr. KENNEDY. I appreciate the Senator's response. This is enormously important because we have seen in Kosovo and other areas where servicemen did not protect local populations because they did not have what they call the ``orders'' and the appropriate rules of engagement to provide those protections.

   We are on notice about what is going to happen now in northern Iraq, with the desire of Kurd families returning to

   many of their home communities. We are on notice about the southern part of Iraq, where many of the Shia who have been denied their cities and communities want to reclaim them. It seems to me we ought to have some understanding about what our servicemen are going to be asked to do during those periods. I don't understand, for the life of me, why we cannot know that information and cannot have that information.

   One more word. Why can we not say, if we are going to have these circumstances, these are going to be the rules of engagement? At least we need to have some awareness and understanding that we are going to meet our responsibilities under the Geneva Convention. We have an international responsibility, obviously, in terms of protecting civilian populations. We have seen, in Kosovo and Serbia, where those populations were not protected in a number of instances because the rules of engagement were not proper.

   I say to the chairman of the committee, I hope prior to the time we go to war, we will have at least some understanding about what these instructions are. There is no reason they need to be kept secure. If we are interested in avoiding large bloodletting in that region of the country, we ought to know exactly what we are expecting of our service men and women. They are the best in the world, and they are trained to overcome any military force.

   Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I assure my colleague that we are greatly concerned about the safety of our service personnel as they undertake this mission, if it has to be done. I visited with them, together with Senators LEVIN, ROCKEFELLER, and ROBERTS. They are ready.

   The Senator raises, quit properly, the record we had first in Kosovo. I happen to have visited there during the early part of that securing of it by the United States and other forces. I assure the Senator that the rules of engagement were spelled out. I remember American servicemen guarding the Serbian churches from destruction. I remember instances where they would carefully respond to protect the Serbs, who were at that point in time in minority status, so to speak. So we performed that mission, and we did it admirably, together with a coalition of nations.

   We will have other nations assisting us in this engagement. Then you bring about Afghanistan. That is a country, historically, that has been fought over by factions. We visited there a week or 10 days ago. There is relative quietude there. There is no severe amount of factional strife today; that is, outbursts of actual casualties and the like. Tensions are present. We are trying to reconstitute an armed forces under the Government of Afghanistan now. So we have a good track record on that.

   Mr. KENNEDY. Does the Senator want to explain, on the reconstituting of the armed forces, how successful that has been?

   Mr. WARNER. Yes. We met with President Karzai. I assume you saw him when he visited here. Incidentally, the French are very active in the training of those forces, and the Germans are taking an active role in the training of those forces. It is coming together, I say to the Senator.

   Mr. KENNEDY. Well, my information is somewhat different from the Senator's, in terms of the recruitment and the ability to hold these individuals into any kind of a national army.

   I want to finish with this point. We are facing a variety of security challenges in this country. My belief is the No. 1, which is continuing, is al-Qaida and the dangers of terrorism. We have to look at everything. We know Saddam Hussein is a despot. We know progress is being made. We also have on the scene the danger of North Korea and the imminent threat they present. We ought to be making a judgment about our national security interests, our overall security--the security of the American people within the construct of the dangers of al-Qaida, the threat that is posed in North Korea, and whatever the current situation is with the inspectors in Iraq.

   On that kind of a situation, I draw the conclusion that we should give more time to the inspectors and work to try to galvanize the international community to support us in that effort.

   Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I would like to also--if I may, on my time--address points raised by my colleague from Massachusetts. Quite properly, the Senator raises the issue of North Korea. The President addressed that last night.

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   I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD his comments.

   There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

   The PRESIDENT. We, of course, are consulting with our allies at the United Nations. But I meant what I said, this is the last phase of diplomacy. A little bit more time? Saddam Hussein has had 12 years to disarm. He is deceiving people. This is what's important for our fellow citizens to realize; that if he really intended to disarm, like the world has asked him to do, we would know whether he was disarming. He's trying to buy time. I can understand why--he's been successful with these tactics for 12 years.

   Saddam Hussein is a threat to our nation. September the 11th changed the strategic thinking, at least, as far as I was concerned, for how to protect our country. My job is to protect the American people. It used to be that we could think that you could contain a person like Saddam Hussein, that oceans would protect us from his type of terror. September 11th should say to the American people that we're now a battlefield, that weapons of mass destruction in the hands of a terrorist organization could be deployed here at home.

   So, therefore, I think the threat is real. And so do a lot of other people in my government. And since I believe the threat is real, and since my most important job is to protect the security of the American people, that's precisely what we'll do.

   Mr. WARNER. These are in strong rebuttal of my colleague's comments. I will read what the President said with reference to North Korea:

   Well, I think it is an issue. Obviously, I am concerned about North Korea developing nuclear weapons, not only for their own use, but perhaps choose to proliferate them, sell them.

   The President is working in a national multilateral forum to try to address this problem because it is regional in that Russia, Japan, South Korea and, indeed, China have a heavy stake in seeing that the Korean peninsula does not become nuclearized.

   It is clear as that, I say to my friend, and I think the President, in a very responsible way, the initial approach to this, a multilateral approach, the approach my colleague is urging on the President with regard to Iraq, is applying in the Korean peninsula situation. It does not preclude possibly bilateral discussions at some later date and time.

   Second, on the issue of Iraq, the question is time, months. Time is not on our side. The President addressed this very explicitly last night in his remarks. He simply said that his concern--and I will put the text in the Record--his concern is, again, the question of proliferation.

   No one in this Chamber thus far, in the weeks and the months we have debated this issue, has denied Saddam Hussein has enormous caches of weapons of mass destruction which he has failed to declare and which the inspectors have failed to destroy because of the inability to locate them through lack of cooperation from Iraq.

   What is to prevent Saddam Hussein, if he has not already done it, from taking small amounts of these weapons and allowing an international terrorist organization, be it al-Qaida or others, to take this material and begin to carry it to places throughout the world, whether it be Europe or the United States, and dissemble it?

   I bring back the tragic aftermath of the discovery of anthrax sent to Members of this body. Postal employees lost their lives. One of our Senate office buildings was shut down. We suffered a severe blow as a consequence of an unopened envelope which contained but a few ounces, if that, of this material. And Saddam Hussein, it is documented, has tons of it, undeclared, not found, and all of this could have been achieved if he had cooperated with the inspection regime which was initiated in November of last year.

   Time is not on our side. The failure of the United States and the coalition of willing nations, principally Great Britain, not to act is not in our interest. The price of inaction is far greater than the price of action.

   As I listened to my colleague from Massachusetts--and he has spoken very eloquently on these subjects over the past several days. I admire his courage to get out and lead in this debate. It is an important debate. It is taking place across the Nation. But I cannot find in my colleague's comments where he specifically has a program whereby to force Iraq to cooperate. Why is it that he has not emphasized the need for Iraq to cooperate and what steps should our country, Great Britain, or others do to force that cooperation, other than the steps we have taken thus far, which have not proved fruitful?

   Yes, here and there Saddam Hussein steps up and does some little thing to buy time, but he would not have needed that time if he had cooperated and began that cooperation when the inspection regime began last November. Mr. President, wherein does the Senator lay out a program to compel Iraq to cooperate?

   Mr. KENNEDY. Let me answer, if I may, in this way. First of all, the administration was strongly opposed to inspections. I heard the exchange with my friend and colleague from Connecticut. That is very clear. Secretary Rumsfeld said it. They never believed in inspections, No. 1.

   Then they agreed to the inspection process at the United Nations. It is only today, evidently, when the CIA is giving the inspectors all the information we have.

   The Senator from Virginia attended the Armed Services Committee hearings that I attended where our colleague and friend from Michigan, Senator Levin, pointed out time and again

   that the administration and the CIA had still not provided all of the material on intelligence to the inspectors. But all during this time, the administration was saying: Let's go to war; let's go to war; let's go to war; Saddam isn't complying.

   Now the Senator--and I have not had a chance to look at the document--says the record is clear, and he put the document in the RECORD an hour ago, that finally we are giving everything to the inspectors. Today, we had the leader of the inspection team say he believes they can do the job not in weeks, not in years but in some months. The international community says: We will be with you if you can do that in a period of months.

   My position is, it is better to work the international community to try and do it in weeks--if we cannot, do it in months. It is cheaper in terms of treasure and human life to keep the necessary military force there to make sure it is done.

   That is my position, I say to the Senator. I know we differ on some aspects, but we do not differ on the willingness to give to the inspectors the intelligence information.

   Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I say to my good friend, a couple of letters are about to be handed to him. They are in the RECORD. He is mistaken in the facts. The letters cite what we have done over an extensive period of time--over the last 3 or 4 months. I personally, together with the former chairman, Senator Levin, now ranking member of the Armed Services Committee, have consulted with Director Tenet on this matter. We have been in a room with the actual person entrusted to convey on a daily basis to Hans Blix this information. It has been going on for months. It did not just start.

   Let me read one paragraph, and then I will yield.

   Statement for the record: The American intelligence community has--

   That is past tense--

   has provided extensive intelligence and other support to the United Nations on Iraq and WMD, and potential inspection sites for over 10 years. There is, therefore, a very strong common understanding of sites of potential interest to the inspectors, whether UNSCOM inspectors or UNMOVIC inspectors or IAEA inspectors. When the current round of inspections began, the Intelligence Community assembled several lists of suspect sites, which we combined into a common list in early January. This list consisted of high, moderate, and low value sites, depending on our assessment of recent activities suggesting ongoing WMD association or other intelligence information that the sites were worth inspecting.

   We have now provided detailed information on all of the high value and moderate value sites to UNMOVIC and IAEA.

   The letter continues to detail what has been done over a period of months, I say to the Senator. It just did not start yesterday.

   Mr. KENNEDY. Will the Senator yield on this point? First of all, I will put in the RECORD--and the Senator was there--the exchange between Senator Levin and Secretary Rumsfeld. The Senator from Virginia was at the Armed Services Committee meeting. I remember this meeting--it was 2 1/2 weeks ago--when Senator Levin said the briefing he had and the answers he

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   I am going to put that exchange in the RECORD, and that will stand in terms of 3 weeks ago.

   I want to draw attention to this letter. ``The American intelligence community has provided extensive intelligence''--extensive intelligence. It does not say ``all'' or ``complete intelligence.'' It says ``extensive intelligence.'' That is what my letter says.

   Mr. WARNER. Go on to the second paragraph.

   Mr. KENNEDY. I know, but why do they say--I will be glad to read this and go through it, Mr. President, but I want to stick with the facts I know about. The facts I know about are the testimony of the Secretary of Defense and the exchange that he had with Senator Levin in open session in the Armed Services Committee where Senator Levin had been told the evening before, and it was represented that a complete list of these sites had been provided, and he had the materials that demonstrated it had not been complete. Those are security matters, as the Senator well knows. That was 2 1/2 weeks ago.

   The point is, as to the intelligence given to the inspector, whatever has been given, is it the Senator's statement now as chairman of the Armed Services Committee that all of the information the intelligence agency has in terms of weapons has been given to the inspectors? Is that what the Senator is telling us?

   Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I think this letter answers Senator Kennedy's first statement: We have just begun to provide information.

   Mr. KENNEDY. I did not say ``just begun.'' No, the Senator is not correct. There was a provision, there was a filtering out of this material.

   It was very slow in January. We are getting close to classified. I remember the briefing we had from the deputy of the CIA at that time. It was clear they were cooperating. It was also clear there were a limited number of inspectors and they were going to provide more, and it would be soon. I think the Senator would remember that briefing. I remember it clearly. This has been a process of filtering out.

   The authority I have, I sat right next to Carl Levin, 2 1/2 weeks ago, when he looked in the eyes of the Secretary of Defense and they reviewed documents, and the Secretary of Defense leaned over and shared various documents. At the end of that, he had to agree with the position Senator Levin had, that all of the information had not been provided. I will put that in the RECORD.

   My point is, if we still, 2 1/2 weeks ago, had a ways to go with intelligence information that would be advantageous to the inspectors, it strengthens those who believe we should make sure our inspectors have all of the relevant material that will help them do the job which we all agree should be done.

   Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, in fairness, this letter is part of a very complex and long dialog between Senator Levin and various members of the administration. Were he here today, he would say he is still not satisfied with regard to this issue.

   At one point I recognized that one member of the administration said to him, Senator, I gave you incorrect numbers at one time and I am now correcting them. I think a good-faith effort has been made by the administration to resolve such differences as Senator Levin has had.

   Having been in most, if not all, of the discussions with Senator Levin at the time he raised these important questions, the preponderance of the facts shows unequivocally our Nation has cooperated fully on the matters of intelligence. I stand by that. I heard the National Security Adviser state that, the Director of Central Intelligence state that, and others. We have cooperated.

   Have there been some disjoints of timing and perhaps numbers? I cannot say it is perfect, but there has been overall sincere cooperation.

   We have had an excellent debate today. I thank my colleagues for joining me on the floor, both on my side of the aisle and the other side of the aisle. We have met the test of the Senate addressing this question.

   I suggest the absence of a quorum.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. SUNUNU). The clerk will call the roll.

   The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

   Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

END

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