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1A) Vietnam Nuclear Weapons Report
Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, in the mid-1960s, during the height of the Vietnam War, the Department of Defense commissioned a study to determine the feasibility and advisability of the use of tactical nuclear weapons in that conflict. A copy of that 1967 study, ``Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Southeast Asia'', has just been declassified, and lays out in terrifying detail what might have happened if the United States had used tactical nuclear weapons during the Vietnam war.

   The bottom line of the study is that the use of nuclear weapons in Vietnam--to block the Ho Chi Minh trail, kill large numbers of enemy soldiers, or destroy North Vietnamese air bases and seaports--would have offered no decisive military advantages to the United States but would have had grave repercussions for US soldiers in the field and US interests around the world.

   The study was prepared by four physicists associated with the Jason Division of the Institute of Defense Analyses, a group of scientists who met frequently to provide classified advice to defense officials. The study's conclusions were presented to then-Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara.

   ``The political effects of US first use of TNW (tactical nuclear weapons) in Vietnam would be uniformly bad and could be catastrophic,'' the scientists wrote.

   They warned that US first-use of tactical nuclear weapons could lead China or the Soviet Union to provide similar weapons to the Viet Cong and North Vietnam, raising the possibility that US forces in Vietnam ``would be essentially annihilated'' in retaliatory raids by nuclear-armed guerrilla forces.

   If that happened, they wrote, ``insurgent groups everywhere in the world would take note and would try by all available means to acquire TNW for themselves.'' First-use of nuclear weapons in Southeast Asia, the scientists warned, was ``likely to result in greatly increased long-term risk of nuclear guerrilla operations in other parts of the world,'' including attacks on the Panama Canal, oil pipelines and storage facilities in Venezuela and the Israeli capital of Tel Aviv.

   ``US security would be gravely endangered if the use of TNW by guerrilla forces should become widespread,'' they concluded.

   Thirty-six years later some American officials are, according to press reports, once again contemplating the use of nuclear weapons, and seeking to repeal US prohibitions on the developments of smaller nuclear weapons, including so-called ``low-yield'' bombs and deep-penetration ``bunker-busters.''

   Writing recently in the Los Angeles Times, military analyst William Arkin disclosed the US Strategic Command in Omaha and the Joint Chiefs of Staff are secretly drawing up nuclear target lists for Iraq. ``Target lists are being scrutinized, options are being pondered and procedures are being tested to give nuclear armaments a role in the new U.S. doctrine of `preemption,' '' Arkin reported.

   There have also been reports that tactical nuclear weapons, particularly ``bunker busters,'' have been considered by Pentagon planners in the context of the escalating nuclear crisis with North Korea. Moreover, many US analysts believe there is a great danger that North Korea, if its survival was at stake, would be willing to sell its nuclear arsenal to the highest bidder.

   North Korea itself apparently believes the United States may be planning nuclear strikes of its own, and on March 1 warned that a war on the Korean peninsula would quickly ``escalate into a nuclear war.''

   I sincerely believe that any first use of nuclear weapons by the United States cannot and should not be sanctioned. As the Jason scientists argued in the 1960s, U.S. nuclear planning could serve as a pretext for other countries and, worse, terrorist groups such as al-Qaida, to build or acquire their own bombs. If we are not careful, our own nuclear posture could provoke the very nuclear-proliferation activities we are seeking to prevent.

   This study, ``Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Southeast Asia'', was released this past weekend by the Nautilus Institute of Berkeley, CA, and I would urge those with an interest in reading it in full to contact them directly.

   The conclusions of the Jason report are as valid, realistic and frightening today as they were in 1967. As we contemplate the future course of our nation's national security policy, I believe that it is important to look at past events, to learn from them, and to benefit from the counsel of history.

1B) Plan for Securing Nuclear Material in the FSU
PLAN FOR SECURING NUCLEAR WEAPONS, MATERIAL, AND EXPERTISE OF STATES OF FORMER SOVIET UNION--MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES -- (House of Representatives - March 11, 2003)

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   The SPEAKER pro tempore laid before the House the following message from the President of the United States; which was read and, together with the accompanying papers, without objection, referred to the Committee on International Relations:
To the Congress of the United States:

   As required by section 1205 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 (Public Law 107-107) and section 1205 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-314), I am providing a report prepared by my Administration which presents a plan for securing nuclear weapons, material, and expertise of the states of the Former Soviet Union and reports on implementation of that plan during Fiscal Year 2002.

   George W. Bush.

   The White House, March 11, 2003.

1C) National Emergency with Respect to Iran

   The SPEAKER pro tempore laid before the House the following message from the President of the United States; which was read and, together with the accompanying papers, without objection, referred to the Committee on International Relations and ordered to be printed:

To the Congress of the United States:

   Section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)) provides for the automatic termination of a national emergency unless, prior to the anniversary date of its declaration, the President publishes in the Federal Register and transmits to the Congress a notice stating that the emergency is to continue in effect beyond the anniversary date. In accordance with this provision, I have sent the enclosed notice, stating that the Iran emergency is to continue in effect beyond March 15, 2003, to the Federal Register for publication. The most recent notice continuing this emergency was published in the Federal Register on March 14, 2002 (67 FR 11553).

   The crisis between the United States and Iran constituted by the actions and policies of the Government of Iran, including its support for international terrorism, efforts to undermine Middle East peace, and acquisition of weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them, that led to the declaration of a national emergency on March 15, 1995, has not been resolved. These actions and policies are contrary to the interests of the United States in the region and pose a continuing unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States. For these reasons, I have determined that it is necessary to continue the national emergency declared with respect to Iran and maintain in force comprehensive sanctions against Iran to respond to this threat.

   GEORGE W. BUSH.

   THE WHITE HOUSE, March 12, 2003.

3A) Smallpox Vaccine Compensation
S. 15. A bill to amend the Public Health Service Act to provide for the payment of compensation for certain individuals with injuries resulting from the administration of smallpox countermeasures, to provide protections and countermeasures against chemical, radiological, or nuclear agents that may be used in a terrorist attack against the United States, and to improve immunization rates by increasing the distribution of vaccines and improving and clarifying the vaccine injury compensation program; to the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions.

3B) Homeland Security Federal Workforce Act of 2003

   S. 589. A bill to strengthen and improve the management of national security, encourage Government service in areas of critical national security, and to assist government agencies in addressing deficiencies in personal possessing specialized skills important to national security and incorporating the goals and strategies for recruitment and retention for such skilled personnel into the strategic and performance management systems of Federal agencies; to the Committee on Governmental Affairs.

   Mr. AKAKA. Mr. President. Today I rise on behalf of myself and Senators DURBIN, ALLEN and VOINOVICH to reintroduce the Homeland Security Federal Workforce Act. This is similar to legislation Senator Durbin, Senator THOMPSON, and I introduced in the 107th Congress. Like S. 1800, this bill is designed to strengthen the Federal Government's recruitment and retention efforts in the areas of science, mathematics, and foreign language where there is a growing absence of qualified personnel.

   In the weeks following the terrorist attacks of September 11, FBI Director Mueller made a plea on national television for speakers of Arabic and Farsi to help the FBI and national security agencies translate documents that were in our possession but which were left untranslated due to a shortage of employees with proficiency in those languages. The General Accounting Office has reported that agencies have shortages in translators and interpreters and an overall shortfall in the language proficiency levels needed to carry out their missions.

   The Federal Government also lacks personnel with scientific and engineering skills. On February 25, 2003, William Wulf, president of the National Academy of Engineering, noted that the supply of talented engineers in government is not keeping pace with growing demand. A recent poll found that a mere 24 percent of job seekers believe that the best engineering job opportunities are in the Federal Government compared to 52 percent for the private sector. In another example, a 1999 report of the National Research Council found significant science and technology weaknesses throughout the Department of State. These shortfalls have real consequences that hamper our ability to monitor exports of military-sensitive technology and preventing proliferation of biological warfare expertise from the former Soviet Union.

   Now more than ever, we must make sure we have the right people with the right skills in the right place. On January 9, 2003, the Washington Post reported that six major agencies moving into the Department of Homeland Security could lose roughly a quarter to one-half of their employees to retirement over the next five years. The data shows that about twice as many employees at these six agencies will be eligible to retire by the end of 2008 than

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   An alarming 26,363 employees out of 67,166 in the six agencies would be eligible to retire in 2008. Unfortunately, the numbers for other Federal agencies are not any better.

   We need programs to recruit personnel with the skills necessary to protect our country. The Homeland Security Federal Workforce Act will do just that. Today, agencies are forced to decide between funding programs and investing in their workforce. This is a no-win situation and has prevented many agencies from fully utilizing the Federal student loan repayment program which is intended to be a powerful recruitment and retention tool. The Homeland Security Federal Workforce Act expands the existing student loan repayment program by authorizing funds for key national security agencies. The Act establishes a separate fund to be administered by the Office of Personnel Management, OPM, to repay student loans for employees in national security positions who pledge to serve in the government for a minimum of three years.

   In addition, our legislation would establish a National Security Service Board to oversee and implement the new National Security Fellowship Program and the National Security Service Corps. The National Security Fellowship Program is designed to fund graduate education for selected students learning skills critical to national security who agree to enter federal service on the completion of their degree.

   Current employees would not be neglected. Twenty percent of fellowship slots would be reserved for Federal employees to enhance their education and training. In addition, more training opportunities would be provided to current federal employees through the National Security Service Corps. This program is designed to provide opportunities for mid-level federal employees in agencies with national security responsibilities to serve in rotational assignments to build experience and widen perspectives within the national security community.

   Last March I chaired a hearing in the Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services of the Governmental Affairs Committee on this bill. Witnesses commented on the additional benefits this legislation could have on the ability of government recruitment and retention efforts. My former colleague, Representative Lee Hamilton, now the Director of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, noted that, ``Enactment of these proposals would encourage more people to enter national security positions by easing the financial sacrifices often associated with graduate study and with government service.''

   The creation of the Department of Homeland Security once again raised concerns over the recruitment and retention of skilled employees in national security positions. To address these needs, Senator Voinovich and I successfully added an amendment to the Homeland Security Act to help alleviate problems associated with the workforce crisis facing the Federal Government. However, we must focus our efforts on recruiting and retaining employees with the technical and language skills the federal government needs the most. This legislation helps fill the holes in our recruitment and retention efforts.

   As the United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, also known as the Hart-Rudman Commission, concluded in 2001, `` ..... the maintenance of American power in the world depends upon the quality of U.S. government personnel, civil and military, at all levels ..... The U.S. faces a broader range of national security challenges today, requiring policy analysts and intelligence personnel with expertise in more countries, regions, and issues.'' The Homeland Security Federal Workforce Act will meet this challenge.

   I look forward to working with my colleagues to ensure that the Federal Government has the tools to put the right people with the right skills in the right place to protect our great Nation.

   I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the RECORD.

   There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

   S. 589

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

   SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Homeland Security Federal Workforce Act''.

   SEC. 2. FINDINGS, PURPOSE, AND EFFECT OF LAW.

    (a) FINDINGS.--Congress makes the following findings:

    (1) The security of the United States requires the fullest development of the intellectual resources and technical skills of its young men and women.

    (2) The security of the United States depends upon the mastery of modern techniques developed from complex scientific principles. It depends as well upon the discovery and development of new principles, new techniques, and new knowledge.

    (3) The United States finds itself on the brink of an unprecedented human capital crisis in Government. Due to increasing competition from the private sector in recruiting high-caliber individuals, Government departments and agencies, particularly those involved in national security affairs, are finding it hard to attract and retain talent.

    (4) The United States must strengthen Federal civilian and military personnel systems in order to improve recruitment, retention, and effectiveness at all levels.

    (5) The ability of the United States to exercise international leadership is, and will increasingly continue to be, based on the political and economic strength of the United States, as well as on United States military strength around the world.

    (6) The Federal Government has an interest in ensuring that the employees of its departments and agencies with national security responsibilities are prepared to meet the challenges of this changing international environment.

    (7) In January 2001, the General Accounting Office reported that, at the Department of Defense ``attrition among first-time enlistees has reached an all-time high. The services face shortages among junior officers, and problems in retaining intelligence analysts, computer programmers, and pilots.'' The General Accounting Office also warned of the Immigration and Naturalization Service's ``lack of staff to perform intelligence functions and unclear guidance for retrieving and analyzing information.''

    (8) The United States Commission on National Security also cautioned that ``the U.S. need for the highest quality human capital in science, mathematics, and engineering is not being met.'' The Commission wrote, ``we must ensure the highest caliber human capital in public service. U.S. national security depends on the quality of the people, both civilian and military, serving within the ranks of government.''

    (9) The events on and after September 11th have highlighted the weaknesses in the Federal and State government's human capital and its personnel management practices, especially as it relates to our national security.

    (b) PURPOSES.--It is the purpose of this Act to--

    (1) provide attractive incentives to recruit capable individuals for Government and military service; and

    (2) provide the necessary resources, accountability, and flexibility to meet the national security educational needs of the United States, especially as such needs change over time.

    (c) EFFECT OF LAW.--Nothing in this Act, or an amendment made by this Act, shall be construed to affect the collective bargaining unit status or rights of any Federal employee.

   SEC. 101. STUDENT LOAN REPAYMENTS.

    Subchapter VII of chapter 53 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by inserting after section 5379, the following:``§5379A. Pilot program for student loan repayment for Federal employees in areas of critical importance

    ``(a) DEFINITIONS.--In this section:

    ``(1) AGENCY.--The term `agency' means an agency of the Department of Defense, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of State, the Department of Energy, the Department of the Treasury, the Department of Justice, the National Security Agency, and the Central Intelligence Agency.

    ``(2) NATIONAL SECURITY POSITION.--The term `national security position' means an employment position determined by the Director of the Office of Personnel Management, in consultation with an agency, for the purposes of the Pilot Program for Student Loan Forgiveness in Areas of Critical Importance established under this section, to involve important homeland security applications.

    ``(3) STUDENT LOAN.--The term `student loan' means--

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    ``(A) a loan made, insured, or guaranteed under part B of title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1071 et seq.);

    ``(B) a loan made under part D or E of title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1087a et seq., 1087aa et seq.); and

    ``(C) a health education assistance loan made or insured under part A of title VII of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 292 et seq.) or under part E of title VIII of such Act (42 U.S.C. 297a et seq.).

    ``(b) ESTABLISHMENT AND OPERATION.--

    ``(1) IN GENERAL.--The Director of the Office of Personnel Management shall, in order to recruit or retain highly qualified professional personnel, establish a pilot program under which the head of an agency may agree to repay (by direct payments on behalf of the employee) any student loan previously taken out by such employee if the employee is employed by the agency in a national security position.

    ``(2) TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF PAYMENT.--Payments under this section shall be made subject to such terms, limitations, or conditions as may be mutually agreed to by the agency and employee concerned.

    ``(3) PAYMENTS.--The amount paid by the agency on behalf of an employee under this section may not exceed $10,000 towards the remaining balance of the student loan for each year that the employee remains in service in the position, except that the employee must remain in such position for at least 3 years. The maximum amount that may be paid on behalf of an employee under this paragraph shall be $80,000.

    ``(4) LIMITATION.--Nothing in this section shall be considered to authorize an agency to pay any amount to reimburse an employee for any repayments made by such employee prior to the agency's entering into an agreement under this section with such employee.

    ``(5) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.--Nothing in this section shall be construed--

    ``(A) to affect student loan repayment programs existing on the date of enactment of this section;

    ``(B) to revoke or rescind any existing law, collective bargaining agreement, or recognition of a labor organization;

    ``(C) to authorize the Office of Personnel Management to determine national security positions for any other purpose other than to make such determinations as are required by this section in order to carry out the purposes of this section; or

    ``(D) as a basis for determining the exemption of any position from inclusion in a bargaining unit pursuant to chapter 71 of title 5, United States Code, or from the right of any incumbent of a national security position determined by the Office of Personnel Management pursuant to this section, from entitlement to all rights and benefits under such chapter.

    ``(6) FUND.--As part of the program established under paragraph (1), the Director shall establish a fund within the Office of Personnel Management to be used by agencies to provide the repayments authorized under the program.

    ``(c) GENERAL PROVISIONS.--

    ``(1) COORDINATION.--The Director of the Office of Personnel Management shall coordinate the program established under this section with the heads of agencies to recruit employees to serve in national security positions.

    ``(2) REPORTS.--

    ``(A) ALLOCATION AND IMPLEMENTATION.--Not later than 6 months after the date of enactment of this section, the Director of the Office of Personnel Management shall report to the appropriate committees of Congress on the manner in which the Director will allocate funds and implement the program under this section.

    ``(B) STATUS AND SUCCESS.--Not later than 4 years after the date of enactment of this section, the Director of the Office of Personnel Management shall report to the appropriate Committees on Congress on the status of the program and its success in recruiting and retaining employees for national security positions, including an assessment as to whether the program should be expanded to other agencies or to non-national security positions to improve overall Federal workforce recruitment and retention.

    ``(d) INELIGIBLE EMPLOYEES.--An employee shall not be eligible for benefits under this section if such employee--

    ``(1) occupies a position that is excepted from the competitive service because of its confidential, policy-determining, policy-making, or policy-advocating character; or

    ``(2) does not occupy a national security position.

    ``(e) TERMS OF AGREEMENT.--

    ``(1) IN GENERAL.--An employee selected to receive benefits under this section shall agree in writing, before receiving any such benefit, that the employee will--

    ``(A) remain in the service of the agency in a national security position for a period to be specified in the agreement, but not less than 3 years, unless involuntarily separated; and

    ``(B) if separated involuntarily on account of misconduct, or voluntarily, before the end of the period specified in the agreement, repay to the Government the amount of any benefits received by such employee from that agency under this section.

    ``(2) SERVICE WITH OTHER AGENCY.--The repayment provided for under paragraph (1)(B) may not be required of an employee who leaves the service of such employee's agency voluntarily to enter into the service of any other agency unless the head of the agency that authorized the benefits notifies the employee before the effective date of such employee's entrance into the service of the other agency that repayment will be required under this subsection.

    ``(3) RECOVERY OF AMOUNTS.--If an employee who is involuntarily separated on account of misconduct or who (excluding any employee relieved of liability under paragraph (2)) is voluntarily separated before completing the required period of service fails to repay the amount provided for under paragraph (1)(B), a sum equal to the amount outstanding is recoverable by the Government from the employee (or such employee's estate, if applicable) by--

    ``(A) setoff against accrued pay, compensation, amount of retirement credit, or other amount due the employee from the Government; and

    ``(B) such other method as is provided for by law for the recovery of amounts owing to the Government.

    ``(4) WAIVER.--The head of the agency concerned may waive, in whole or in part, a right of recovery under this subsection if it is shown that recovery would be against equity and good conscience or against the public interest.

    ``(5) CREDITING OF ACCOUNT.--Any amount repaid by, or recovered from, an individual (or an estate) under this subsection shall be credited to the fund under subsection (b)(6). Any amount so credited shall be merged with other sums in such fund and shall be available for the same purposes and period, and subject to the same limitations (if any), as the sums with which merged.

    ``(f) TERMINATION OF REPAYMENT.--An employee receiving benefits under this section from an agency shall be ineligible for continued benefits under this section from such agency if the employee--

    ``(1) separates from such agency; or

    ``(2) does not maintain an acceptable level of performance, as determined under standards and procedures which the agency head shall by regulation prescribe.

    ``(g) EQUAL EMPLOYMENT.--In selecting employees to receive benefits under this section, an agency shall, consistent with the merit system principles set forth in paragraphs (1) and (2) of section 2301(b) of this title, take into consideration the need to maintain a balanced workforce in which women and members of racial and ethnic minority groups are appropriately represented in Government service.

    ``(h) ADDITIONAL BENEFIT.--Any benefit under this section shall be in addition to basic pay and any other form of compensation otherwise payable to the employee involved.

    ``(i) APPROPRIATIONS AUTHORIZED.--For the purpose of enabling the Federal Government to recruit and retain employees critical to our national security pursuant to this section, there are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out this section for each fiscal year.

    ``(j) LENGTH OF PROGRAM.--The program under this section shall remain in effect for the 8-year period beginning on the date of enactment of this section. The program shall continue to pay employees recruited under this program who are in compliance with this section their benefits through their commitment period regardless of the preceding sentence.

    ``(k) REGULATIONS.--Not later than 2 months after the date of enactment of this section, the Director of the Office of Personnel Management shall propose regulations to carry out this section. Not later than 6 months after the date on which the comment period for the regulations proposed under the preceding sentence ends, the Secretary shall promulgate final regulations to carry out this section.''.

   SEC. 201. FELLOWSHIPS FOR GRADUATE STUDENTS TO ENTER FEDERAL SERVICE.

    Subchapter VII of chapter 53 of title 5, United States Code, as amended by section 101, is further amended by inserting after section 5379A, the following:``§5379B. Fellowships for graduate students to enter federal service

    ``(a) DEFINITIONS.--In this section:

    ``(1) AGENCY.--The term `agency' means an agency of the Department of Defense, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of State, the Department of Energy, the Department of the Treasury, the Department of Justice, the National Security Agency, and the Central Intelligence Agency, and other Federal Government agencies as determined by the National Security Service Board under subsection (f).

    ``(2) DIRECTOR.--The term `Director' means the Director of the Office of Personnel Management.

    ``(3) INSTITUTION OF HIGHER EDUCATION.--The term `institution of higher education' has the meaning given to such term in section 101 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1001).

    ``(4) NATIONAL SECURITY POSITION.--The term `national security position' means an employment position determined by the Director of the Office of Personnel Management, in consultation with an agency, for the purposes of a program established for Fellowships for Graduate Students to Enter Federal Services as established under this section, to involve important homeland security applications.

    ``(5) SCIENCE.--The term `science' means any of the natural and physical sciences including chemistry, biology, physics, and

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    ``(b) IN GENERAL.--The Director shall establish and implement a program for the awarding of fellowships (to be known as `National Security Fellowships') to graduate students who, in exchange for receipt of the fellowship, agree to employment with the Federal Government in a national security position.

    ``(c) ELIGIBILITY.--To be eligible to participate in the program established under subsection (b), a student shall--

    ``(1) have been accepted into a graduate school program at an accredited institution of higher education within the United States and be pursuing or intend to pursue graduate education in the United States in the disciplines of foreign languages, science, mathematics, engineering, nonproliferation education, or other international fields that are critical areas of national security (as determined by the Director);

    ``(2) be a United States citizen, United States national, permanent legal resident, or citizen of the Freely Associated States; and

    ``(3) agree to employment with an agency or office of the Federal Government in a national security position.

    ``(d) SERVICE AGREEMENT.--In awarding a fellowship under the program under this section, the Director shall require the recipient to enter into an agreement under which, in exchange for such assistance, the recipient--

    ``(1) will maintain satisfactory academic progress (as determined in accordance with regulations issued by the Director) and provide regularly scheduled updates to the Director on the progress of their education and how their employment continues to relate to a national security objective of the Federal Government;

    ``(2) will, upon completion of such education, be employed by the agency for which the fellowship was awarded for a period of at least 3 years as specified by the Director; and

    ``(3) agrees that if the recipient is unable to meet either of the requirements described in paragraph (1) or (2), the recipient will reimburse the United States for the amount of the assistance provided to the recipient under the fellowship, together with interest at a rate determined in accordance with regulations issued by the Director, but not higher than the rate generally applied in connection with other Federal education loans.

    ``(e) FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT ELIGIBILITY.--If a recipient of a fellowship under this section demonstrates to the satisfaction of the Director that, after completing their education, the recipient is unable to obtain a national security position in the Federal Government because such recipient is not eligible for a security clearance or other applicable clearance necessary for such position, the Director may permit the recipient to fulfill the service obligation under the agreement under subsection (d) by working in another office or agency in the Federal Government for which their skills are appropriate, by teaching math, science, or foreign languages, or by performing research, at an institution of higher education, for a period of not less than 3 years, in the area of study for which the fellowship was awarded.

    ``(f) FELLOWSHIP SELECTION.--

    ``(1) IN GENERAL.--The Director shall consult and cooperate with the National Security Service Board established under paragraph (2) in the selection and placement of national security fellows under this section.

    ``(2) NATIONAL SECURITY SERVICE BOARD.--

    ``(A) ESTABLISHMENT OF BOARD.--There is established the National Security Service Board.

    ``(B) MEMBERSHIP.--The Board shall be composed of--

    ``(i) the Director of the Office of Personnel Management, who shall serve as the chairperson of the Board;

    ``(ii) the Secretary of Defense;

    ``(iii) the Secretary of Homeland Security;

    ``(iv) the Secretary of State;

    ``(v) the Secretary of the Treasury;

    ``(vi) the Attorney General;

    ``(vii) the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency;

    ``(viii) the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigations;

    ``(ix) the Director of the National Security Agency;

    ``(x) the Secretary of Energy;

    ``(xi) the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy; and

    ``(xii) 2 employees, to be appointed by each of the officials described in clauses (ii) through (ix), of each Department for which such officials have responsibility for administering, of whom--

    ``(I) 1 shall perform senior level policy functions; and

    ``(II) 1 shall perform human resources functions.

    ``(C) FUNCTIONS.--The Board shall carry out the following functions:

    ``(i) Develop criteria for awarding fellowships under this section.

    ``(ii) Provide for the wide dissemination of information regarding the activities assisted under this section.

    ``(iii) Establish qualifications for students desiring fellowships under this section, including a requirement that the student have a demonstrated commitment to the study of the discipline for which the fellowship is to be awarded.

    ``(iv) Provide the Director semi-annually with a list of fellowship recipients, including an identification of their skills, who are available to work in a national security position.

    ``(v) Not later than 30 days after a fellowship recipient completes the study or education for which assistance was provided under this section, work in conjunction with the Director to make reasonable efforts to hire and place the fellow in an appropriate national security position.

    ``(vi) Review the administration of the program established under this section.

    ``(vii) Develop and provide to Congress a strategic plan that identifies the skills needed by the Federal national security workforce and how the provisions of this Act, and related laws, regulations, and policies will be used to address such needs.

    ``(viii) Carry out additional functions under section 301 of the Homeland Security Federal Workforce Act.

    ``(g) SPECIAL CONSIDERATION FOR CURRENT FEDERAL EMPLOYEES.--

    ``(1) SET ASIDE OF FELLOWSHIPS.--Twenty percent of the fellowships awarded under this section shall be set aside for Federal employees who are working in national security positions on the date of enactment of this section to enhance the education and training of such employees in areas important to national security.

    ``(2) FULL- OR PART-TIME EDUCATION.--Federal employees who are awarded fellowships under paragraph (1) shall be permitted to obtain advanced education under the fellowship on a full-time or part-time basis.

    ``(3) PART-TIME EDUCATION.--A Federal employee who pursues education or training under a fellowship under paragraph (1) on a part-time basis shall be eligible for a stipend in an amount which, when added to the employee's part-time compensation, does not exceed the amount described in subsection (i)(2).

    ``(h) FELLOWSHIP SERVICE.--Any individual under this section who is employed by the Federal Government in a national security position shall be able to count the time that the individual spent in the fellowship program towards the time requirement for a reduction in student loans as described in section 5379A.

    ``(i) AMOUNT OF AWARD.--A National Security Fellow who complies with the requirements of this section may receive funding under the fellowship for up to 3 years at an amount determined appropriate by the Director, but not to exceed the sum of--

    ``(1) the amount of tuition paid by the fellow; and

    ``(2) a stipend in an amount equal to the maximum stipend available to recipients of fellowships under section 10 of the National Science Foundation Act of 1950 (42 U.S.C. 1869) for the year involved.

    ``(j) APPROPRIATIONS AUTHORIZED.--For the purpose of enabling the Director to recruit and retain highly qualified employees in national security positions, there are authorized to be appropriated $100,000,000 for fiscal year 2004, and such sums as may be necessary for each subsequent fiscal year.

    ``(k) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.--Noting in this section shall be construed--

    ``(1) to authorize the Office of Personnel Management to determine national security positions for any other purpose other than to make such determinations as are required by this section in order to carry out the purposes of this section; and

    ``(2) as a basis for determining the exemption of any position from inclusion in a bargaining unit pursuant to chapter 71 of title 5, United States Code, or from the right of any incumbent of a national security position determined by the Office of Personnel Management pursuant to this section, from entitlement to all rights and benefits under such chapter.''.

   SEC. 301. NATIONAL SECURITY SERVICE CORPS.

    (a) FINDINGS AND PURPOSES.--

    (1) FINDINGS.--Congress finds that--

    (A) a proficient national security workforce requires certain skills and knowledge, and effective professional relationships; and

    (B) a national security workforce will benefit from the establishment of a National Security Service Corps.

    (2) PURPOSES.--The purposes of this section are to--

    (A) provide mid-level employees in national security positions within agencies the opportunity to broaden their knowledge through exposure to other agencies;

    (B) expand the knowledge base of national security agencies by providing for rotational assignments of their employees at other agencies;

    (C) build professional relationships and contacts among the employees and agencies of the national security community; and

    (D) invigorate the national security community with exciting and professionally rewarding opportunities.

    (b) DEFINITIONS.--In this section:

    (1) AGENCY.--The term ``agency'' means an agency of the Department of Defense, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of State, the Department of Energy, the Department of the Treasury, the Department of Justice, and the National Security Agency.

    (2) BOARD.--The term ``Board'' means the National Security Service Board established under section 5379B(f)(2) of title 5, United States Code.

    (3) CORPS.--The term ``Corps'' means the National Security Service Corps.

    (4) CORPS POSITION.--The term ``corps position'' means a position that--

    (A) is a position--

    (i) at or above GS-12 of the General Schedule; or

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    (ii) in the Senior Executive Service;

    (B) the duties of which do not relate to intelligence support for policy; and

    (C) is designated by the head of an agency as a Corps position.

    (c) GOALS AND ADMINISTRATION.--The Board shall--

    (1) formulate the goals of the Corps;

    (2) resolve any issues regarding the feasibility of implementing this section;

    (3) evaluate relevant civil service rules and regulations to determine the desirability of seeking legislative changes to facilitate application of the General Schedule and Senior Executive Service personnel systems to the Corps;

    (4) create specific provisions for agencies regarding rotational programs;

    (5) formulate interagency compacts and cooperative agreements between and among agencies relating to--

    (A) the establishment and function of the Corps;

    (B) incentives for individuals to participate in the Corps;

    (C) professional education and training;

    (D)(i) the process for competition for a Corps position;

    (ii) which individuals may compete for Corps positions; and

    (iii) any employment preferences an individual participating in the Corps may have when returning to the employing agency of that individual; and

    (E) any other issues relevant to the establishment and continued operation of the Corps; and

    (6) not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this section, submit a report to the Office of Personnel Management on all findings and relevant information on the establishment of the Corps.

    (d) CORPS.--

    (1) PROPOSED REGULATIONS.--Not later than 180 days after the date on which the report is submitted under subsection (c)(6), the Office of Personnel Management shall publish in the Federal Register, proposed regulations describing the purpose, and providing for the establishment and operation of the Corps.

    (2) COMMENT PERIOD.--The Office of Personnel Management shall provide for--

    (A) a period of 60 days for comments from all stakeholders on the proposed regulations; and

    (B) a period of 180 days following the comment period for making modifications to the regulations.

    (3) FINAL REGULATIONS.--After the 180-day period described under paragraph (2)(B), the Office of Personnel Management shall promulgate final regulations that--

    (A) establish the Corps;

    (B) provide guidance to agencies to designate Corps positions;

    (C) provide for individuals to perform periods of service of not more than 2 years at a Corps position within agencies on a rotational basis;

    (D) establish eligibility for individuals to participate in the Corps;

    (E) enhance career opportunities for individuals participating in the Corps;

    (F) provide for the Corps to develop a group of policy experts with broad-based experience throughout the executive branch; and

    (G) provide for greater interaction among agencies with traditional national security functions.

    (4) ACTIONS BY AGENCIES.--Not later than 180 days after the promulgation of final regulations under paragraph (3), each agency shall--

    (A) designate Corps positions;

    (B) establish procedures for implementing this section; and

    (C) begin active participation in the operation of the Corps.

    (e) ALLOWANCES, PRIVILEGES, ETC.--An employee serving on a rotational basis with another agency pursuant to this section is deemed to be detailed and, for the purpose of preserving allowances, privileges, rights, seniority, and other benefits with respect to the employee, is deemed to be an employee of the original employing agency and is entitled to the pay, allowances, and benefits from funds available to that agency.

    (f) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.--There are authorized to be appropriated to the Office of Personnel Management such sums as may be necessary to carry out this section.

   SEC. 401. CONTENT OF STRATEGIC PLANS.

    Section 306(a)(3) of title 5, United States Code, is amended by inserting before the semicolon the following: ``, a discussion of the extent to which specific skills in the agency's human capital are needed to achieve the mission, goals and objectives of the agency, especially to the extent the agency's mission, goals and objectives are critical to ensuring the national security''.

   SEC. 402. PERFORMANCE PLANS.

    Section 1115(a) of title 31, United States Code, is amended--

    (1) by redesignating paragraphs (4) through (6) as paragraphs (5) through (7), respectively; and

    (2) by inserting after paragraph (3) the following:

    ``(4) pursuant to paragraph (3), give special attention to the extent to which specific skills are needed to accomplish the performance goals and indicators that are critical to ensuring the national security;''.

   SEC. 403. GOVERNMENTWIDE PROGRAM PERFORMANCE REPORTS.

    Section 1116 of title 31, United States Code, is amended--

    (1) in subsection (b)(1), by inserting before the period the following: ``, and shall specify which performance goals and indicators are critical to ensuring the national security''; and

    (2) in subsection (d)(3)--

    (A) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``and'' at the end;

    (B) in subparagraph (C), by adding ``and'' after the semicolon; and

    (C) by adding at the end the following:

    ``(D) whether human capital deficiencies in any way contributed to the failure of the agency to achieve the goal;''.

   By Mr. HOLLINGS:

4A) The Truth About Saddam
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Burton) is recognized for 5 minutes.

   Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, there has been a lot of misinformation going around about our good friend, Saddam Hussein, and I think that the American people as well as my colleagues need to know really what is going on, because a lot of people have not been paying attention to this.

   For the past decade, Saddam Hussein has violated 16 separate U.N. resolutions. He has failed to account for 26,500 artillery rockets used for delivering nerve gas; he has failed to account for 5,000 artillery shells filled with mustard gas; he has failed to account for more than 3,000 tons of chemicals that could be used as weapons; and he has failed time and time again to honor his agreement on the no-fly zone.

   Mr. Speaker, he has enough biological agents to produce 26,000 liters of anthrax, 26,000 liters, 1,200 liters of botulinum toxin, and a whole bunch of others. He has tried to procure uranium for nuclear weaponry, and he has failed to account for nearly 30,000 empty munitions that could be filled with chemical agents.

[Time: 19:15]

   Yet, there are so many people, after all of these violations, who keep saying, we ought to wait, we ought to wait, we ought to wait. He is connected to the terrorist network. If we are not very careful, if we do not deal with him very quickly, he is going to produce these biological and chemical weapons, he is going to give them to one of his minions in al Qaeda or some other terrorist organization, they are going to come into the United States, and they are going to kill tens or hundreds of thousands of Americans. That is why we need to deal with him very, very expeditiously.

   One of the things that concerns me so much is that we do not profit from history. Back in the late 1930s and early 1940s, Hitler, the Chancellor of Germany, said time and again that he wanted peace and he did not want to violate any neutrality treaties, and yet he violated the Treaty of Versailles. He went into the Sudetenland and got an agreement from the European allies and said that that was all he wanted. And then he went into Poland after violating a nonagression pact. And then he went into Denmark, and then he went into Norway, and then he went into Sweden, and then he went into Belgium, and then he went into Paris and France. And because the world did not pay attention to what was going on and they did not listen to Winston Churchill, who was the only voice who made any sense, 50 million people died. I want everybody to listen to that: 50 million people died because they did not pay any attention to what Hitler was saying and what he was doing.

   Now, Saddam Hussein has at his disposal weapons of mass destruction, and he has hidden them for the past 10 to 12 years; and he has not accounted for them. For us and the Free World to keep our heads in the sand while this is going on is absolutely incredulous.

   The President of the United States is doing the right thing. The only thing I would say to the President is if the United Nations does not start forcing him to adhere, Saddam to adhere to those U.N. resolutions, then why talk to them anymore? Mr. President, do what is necessary. Take our troops and invade Iraq from the north and the south, if possible, get rid of Saddam Hussein and his weapons of mass destruction, and send a signal to the world and the terrorists worldwide that we are not going to tolerate them. Do not mess with the U.N. anymore, Mr. President, because they simply are not with it.

4B) Dealing with the Deadly Challenge in Iraq
DEALING WITH A DEADLY CHALLENGE ON IRAQ -- (House of Representatives - March 11, 2003)

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   Mr. PRICE of North Carolina. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding, and congratulate him on a very fine and thoughtful statement.

   Mr. Speaker, there is a good possibility that our country will be at war in Iraq before the month is out. The President held out little hope for any alternative approach to disarming Iraq at his press conference last Thursday. Yet a majority of the American people continue to urge for more time for inspections while we are facing something close to a diplomatic meltdown with major allies. A failure to secure allied support will have major consequences for every American. Our citizens alone will shoulder the financial burden of this war and its aftermath. Our troops will need to be kept indefinitely in post-war Iraq, our country alone as an occupying force will be the target of hatred, resentment and hostility from many in the Arab world, and America will risk losing our standing among the world's democracies as one who leads by moral suasion and example as well as by military might.

   Pollsters here at home say they have rarely seen an issue where the public's reaction is more conditional or ambivalent. Tonight I want to suggest this is because the Bush administration has not answered basic questions about this war and has backed us into a situation where we seem to be choosing between equally unsatisfactory ways of dealing with what most agree is a deadly challenge.

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   The distinguished historian William Leuchtenburg citing Thomas Jefferson's maxim that ``great innovation should not be forced on slender majorities,'' recently contrasted George W. Bush's unilateralism to the behavior of previous wartime Presidents and found him ``unique in his defiance of so much international and domestic opinion.''

   Many of our constituents believe that the full range and intensity of public opinion has not been visible or audible in Congress. One reason is that, by our vote of October 10 which gave the President an open-ended authorization for the use of force, this institution forfeited its coordinate decisionmaking role. Mr. Speaker, an up or down vote on a resolution authorizing force is at best a blunt instrument for checking the executive's constitutional dominance of foreign and military policy; but by granting unchecked authority months in advance, we made that instrument blunter yet.

   Still, I believe the questions and the challenges to the President's approach

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   But critical questions remain regarding alternative means to this end. Many Members of this body have raised these questions with increasing intensity in recent weeks; and unfortunately, the Bush administration has rarely provided satisfactory answers. What accounting do we have for the costs and risks of a military invasion? How are we to secure and maintain the support and engagement of our allies? Can Iraq be disarmed by means that do not divert us from or otherwise compromise equally or more urgent antiterrorist and diplomatic objectives? And do we have a credible plan for rebuilding and governing postwar Iraq, and have we secured the necessary international cooperation to ensure that this does not become a perceived U.S. occupation?

   Administration officials, for example, have persistently refused to put a price tag on a U.S. invasion which, unlike the Gulf War, would have almost no financial backing from allies. The President's budget omits any reference to an Iraq war. With deficits for 2003 and 2004 already predicted to break historic records and $2 trillion slated to be added to the national debt by 2008, the addition of $80 billion to $200 billion in war costs could not come as welcome news. But it is an insult to this body and to the American people to submit a budget that absolutely fails to give an honest accounting, even within broad limits, of what those costs would be.

   Daily dispatches from Korea leave little doubt that North Korea is taking advantage of our preoccupation with Iraq to dangerously ratchet up its nuclear program, and that the administration's diplomacy has not been up to this challenge.

   And now we learn that the Bush administration, which, truth to tell, has never had its heart in Middle East peace-making, has rebuffed its so-called quartet partners, the European allies, Russia, and the United Nations, and insisted on yet another postponement in publishing the long-anticipated ``road map'' to an Israeli-Palestinian settlement. Why? Because of the crisis in Iraq. President Bush in December demanded that release of the timetable for reciprocal steps and negotiations be delayed until after the Israeli elections. Now he is insisting again that the effort be delayed, this time until after we deal with Iraq, seemingly thinking that victory in Iraq will be the key to solving this and most other problems in the Middle East.

   As the New York Times editorialized last Sunday, ``The Bush administration has not been willing to risk any political capital in attempting to resolve the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, but now the President is theorizing that invading Iraq will do the trick.''

   The fact is that the festering Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Bush administrations's failure to do anything about it represent an enormous obstacle to enlisting the support we need to achieve our objectives in the region, including the war on terrorism. That is certainly the way the Europeans see it; and the President's rebuff has further poisoned the atmosphere, even as the administration struggles to gain allied support for military action against Iraq. Among the angriest allies reportedly is Britain's Prime Minister Tony Blair, who for months has pleaded with President

   Bush to become more involved in Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking.

   The administration's torpedoing of the Quartet initiative is also ill advised and ill timed with respect to Palestinian efforts at reform. It comes precisely at the time that President Arafat, under considerable pressure, has nominated Mahmoud Abbas, otherwise known as Abu Mazen, for the new position of Prime Minister of the Palestinian Authority. Abu Mazen, with whom the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Davis) and I had a cordial and useful visit in Ramallah in December, has been an outspoken critic of the militarization of the Palestinian uprising. How successful his appointment proves in reforming Palestinian governance will depend, among other things, on how much real authority he and his position are given. But President Bush could hardly have picked a more inauspicious time to throw cold water on the plans to get back to negotiations.

   ``There was a lot of dismay when the road map was put off before, and the dismay right now is even worse,'' one European diplomat told a New York Times reporter. ``Without hope, the power of extremists will only grow,'' added another.

   Such, Mr. Speaker, are the costs of allowing Iraq to trump everything else on our antiterrorist and diplomatic agenda.

   Mr. Speaker, the world welcomed the President's decision last fall to take the Iraq matter to the United Nations and, apparently, to give more extensive inspections and the supervised destruction of weapons a chance to work. But his rhetoric since that time has led many to believe that he has always regarded the inspections as foreordained to failure and war as the only recourse. Suspicions have deepened as administration statements about links between Iraq and al Qaeda have become less and less measured. Such statements have helped persuade some 42 percent of the American public that Saddam Hussein was personally responsible for the 9-11 World Trade Center attacks. But prospective allies examining the rationale for war have understandably been less impressed.

   Inspections, of course, are a two-way street. They will never work without Iraq's willing cooperation; and that cooperation, as Mr. Blix and Mr. El Baradei have made clear, has been far from satisfactory. No matter how numerous or how skilled the inspectors are, they cannot find what amounts to needles in haystacks without honest and complete information regarding the weapons and the material which the Iraqis claim to have destroyed and the whereabouts of any remaining stockpiles.

   Still, it does matter how we reach the conclusion that Iraq has effectively continued its defiance that the inspections have failed, and that war is the only remaining option. In fact, the report of the inspectors at the United Nations last Friday significantly undermined the American position, arguing that progress has, in fact, been made and discounting the dangers of any Iraqi nuclear program.

   It is essential that the world know and face the fact, as the President said last Saturday, that Iraq is still violating the demands of the United Nations by refusing to disarm. But we undermine our own credibility when we scoff at the destruction of a stockpile of Al Samoud missiles as a matter of no consequence, or insist on a U.N. resolution with so short a time frame as to make it seem merely a pretext for war.

   In fact, the U.N. inspectors themselves have specified the tasks remaining before them, and there is every reason to support the systematic pursuit of those objectives within a tight, but feasible, time frame. In the meantime, we must resist the notion that the alternatives confronting us are either to invade in the next few days or to appear to ``back down'' in a humiliating and dangerous fashion.

   It is true that the massing of 235,000 troops has created a momentum of its own, and they cannot stay in place indefinitely. But the risks and the costs of an invasion undertaken in the face of major allied opposition remain, and we need to give full consideration to options that avoid either leaving Iraq's weapons in place or inexorably marching to war.

   What might those options be? Michael Walzer has suggested intensifying what he calls the ``little war'' in which we are already engaged and challenging the French and the Germans and the Russians to become part of the solution. This could include extension of no-fly zones to cover the entire country, maintaining an embargo on strategic and dual-use materials,

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   If such a program succeeded in destroying or neutralizing Iraq's weapons capability, the U.S. and the U.N. could credibly declare their mission accomplished, and most of the troops could return home, having created the military pressure that helped prompt compliance. I realize that at present, prospects for such an outcome appear to be fading. But when we are in an untenable position, contemplating outcomes that are equally unacceptable, we have an obligation to press in new directions.

   Mr. Speaker, whatever course our President and our country take, we will give our men and women in uniform our full support, and I am confident that a unified Congress will provide whatever resources they need to succeed. I have been moved by the farewell ceremonies for National Guard units in my own district, and I have the utmost respect for the service and sacrifice that these men and women exemplify. The debates we have over foreign and military policy do not change that in the least. In fact, we owe them, and all of our citizens, this debate, so that we do not choose our Nation's course either impulsively or by default, but with due consideration of our Nation's interests and values, and consideration of how our vast power can be a force for what is just and right in the world. May God grant us wisdom and courage for the facing of these days.

4C) Is Iraq a Just War?

   Mr. KENNEDY. Madam President, the true greatness of America lies in the values we share as a nation.

   From America's beginning, we shared a passionate concern for the rights and the well-being of each individual--a concern stated eloquently in our founding documents, the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution and the Bill of Rights.

   From our immigrant roots, we learned not only to tolerate others whose appearance, religion, and culture are different from our own, but to respect and welcome them, and to recognize our diversity as a source of great strength.

   From our religious faith and our sense of community, we gained an understanding of the importance of fairness and compassion for the less fortunate.

   In the same way that parents try to build a better life for their children, each generation of Americans has tried to leave a more just society to the next. We all know that our history includes periods when grave injustices were tolerated. Those dark periods in our national history teach us lessons we must never forget. But we have battled fiercely to overcome injustice, and we are a better nation for our willingness to fight those battles.

   Our most deeply held national values are rooted in our pursuit of justice for all. It urges us to ensure fair treatment for each person, to extend help to those in need, and to create opportunity for each individual to advance. Those are among the most important yardsticks by which we measure our success in building ``a more perfect union.''

   Now as we consider the prospect of war with Iraq, many of us have serious questions about whether current national policy reflects America's values.

   We owe it to the brave men and women of our armed forces to ensure that we are embarked on a just war--that the sacrifice we ask of them is for a cause that reflects America's basic values.

   Our men and women in uniform are working and training hard for the serious challenges before them. They are living in the desert, enduring harsh conditions, and contemplating the horrors of the approaching war.

   Their families left behind are sacrificing, too, each and every day here at home, wondering if their loved ones in uniform will return unharmed. Many--especially the families of our reservists--are struggling to make ends meet as their spouses are called up for months of duty abroad. Wives are separated from husbands. Children are separated from fathers and mother. Businesses and communities are struggling to go forward without valued employees now serving in the gulf.

   More than 150,000 National Guard and Reserve soldiers have been mobilized. Of these, 13,000 have been on active duty for at least a year. Others return home from deployments, only to turn around and head back overseas for a new tour of duty. For many of these soldiers, ``the expected one weekend a month, two weeks a year'' is merely a slogan, and does not reflect their new reality. In fact, today's reservists are spending thirteen times longer on active duty than they did a decade ago.

   A recall to active duty brings financial hardship as well. Many give up larger civilian salaries when they go on active duty. The law requires employers to take back reservists after their deployments. But for those who work in small firms or are self-employed, there are no such guarantees unless their firms are still in business.

   The families of our men and women in uniform pay a price for this deployment. During the Vietnam War, only 20 percent of all Army military personnel were married. Today over 50 percent of the military are married, which means enormous strain on the families who are left behind to worry and cope with the sudden new demands of running a household alone, never knowing how long their loved ones will be away.

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   Among those on active duty, we are demanding more from our troops for longer periods of time. One of our aircraft carriers, the USS Abraham Lincoln, has been away from home port for 233 days. The crew expected to return for Christmas, and had made it half way home across the Pacific Ocean when they were given orders to turn around and head for the Persian Gulf. These men and women are forced to put their lives on hold, missing births, delaying weddings, and dealing with family crises by phone and e-mail.

   These men and women are well-prepared to serve their country. But in calling them up, we also pay the price here at home with increased vulnerability in our police and fire departments. A recent survey of 8,500 fire departments by the International Association of Fire Chiefs showed that nearly three-fourths of them have staff in the Reserves. A similar survey of more than 2,100 law enforcement agencies by the Police Executive Research Forum found that 44 percent have lost personnel to call ups.

   These are Americans who love their country. They proudly wave the Stars and Stripes on our national holidays. They honor and pray for past veterans on Memorial Day. Their children are in our schools. They attend our churches, our synagogues, and our mosques. We see them in the grocery store or at PTA meetings. They are a part of our communities--and a part of us. And they are willing to give their lives for their country. So we owe it to these men and women and their families--these brave Americans--to get it right.

   I am concerned that as we rush to war with Iraq, we are becoming more divided at home and more isolated in the world community. Instead of persuading the dissenters at home and abroad, the Administration by its harsh rhetoric is driving the wedge deeper. Never before, even in the Vietnam war, has America taken such bold military action with so little international support. It is far from clear that the United Nations Security Council will pass any new resolution that we can use as authorization for military action in Iraq. Even some strategically important allies, such as Turkey, who were expected to be with us, have backed away. The administration continues to turn a deaf ear to all of these voices, and single-mindedly pursues its course to war.

   Within the rising chorus of dissent have been the voices of much of the organized religious community in this country--Christian, Jewish and Muslim. Within the Christian community, opposition to war against Iraq includes the Roman Catholic Church, to which I belong, and many mainline Protestant and Orthodox churches. These are not pacifist groups who oppose war under all circumstances. They are religious leaders who say the moral case has not been made for this war at this time.

   War is not just another means to achieving our goals. More than any other option, it is dangerous, it is deadly, it is irreversible. That is why, whenever we resort to force in the world, there is an urgent need to ensure that we remain true to our values as Americans.

   Saddam Hussein is one of the most brutal tyrants on the world stage today. He has murdered thousands of his own people--many with chemical and biological weapons. He has attempted to wipe out entire communities. He has attacked neighboring countries. He supports terrorism against innocent civilians throughout the Middle East. Undeniably, the world would be a better place without Saddam Hussein. That fact, however, should not be the end of the inquiry, but only the beginning.

   From the perspective of our shared values, the fundamental question is whether this is a ``just war.'' That is not an easy question to answer, because some elements of a just war are clearly present.

   There are six principles that guide the determination of ``just war.'' They were first developed by St. Augustine in the Fifth Century and expanded upon by St. Thomas Aquinas in the Thirteenth Century. To be just a war must have a just cause, confronting a danger that is beyond question; it must be declared by a legitimate authority acting on behalf of the people; it must be driven by the right intention, not ulterior, self-interested motives; it must be a last resort; it must be proportional, so that the harm inflicted does not outweigh the good achieved; and it must have a reasonable chance of success.

   These are sound criteria by which to judge our impending war in Iraq.

   First, does Iraq pose a danger to us that is beyond question?

   Clearly, Iraq does pose a considerable danger, principally because of Saddam Hussein's biological and chemical weapons and his history of attempts to develop nuclear weapons. But it is not at all clear that the only way to protect ourselves from that threat is war. In fact, many of us are deeply concerned that initiating a war to remove Saddam Hussein will actually increase the danger to the American people.

   The biological and chemical weapons Saddam has are not new. He has possessed them for more than a decade. He did not use them against us in the gulf war and he did not use them against us in the years since then, because he understands that any use of them would lead to his certain destruction. As CIA Director George Tenet stated last year in testimony before Congress, the greatest danger of their use occurs if Saddam knows he is about to be removed from power and therefore perceives he has nothing left to lose.

   Iraq, to the best of our knowledge, has no nuclear weapon. If nuclear weapons in the hands of a rogue state are our principal concern, then certainly North Korea poses a much more imminent threat. And Iran--not Iraq--is close behind.

   The President must explain why war with Iraq will not distract us from the more immediate and graver danger posed by North Korea. Something is wrong at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue if we rush to war with a country that poses no nuclear threat, but will not even talk to a country that brandishes its nuclear power right now. Any nuclear threat from Iraq, we are told, is probably 5 years into the future. But the threat from North Korea exists today.

   Desperate and strapped for cash, North Korea is the greatest current nuclear danger to the United States, and it is clearly taking advantage of the situation in Iraq. It is the country most likely to sell nuclear material to terrorists. It may well have a long-range missile that can strike our soil.

   War with Iraq will clearly undermine our ability to deal with this rapidly escalating danger. But our options are not limited to invading Iraq or ignoring Iraq. No responsible person suggests that we ignore the Iraqi threat.

   The presence of U.N. inspectors on the ground in Iraq, coupled with our own significant surveillance capacity, make it extremely unlikely that Iraq can pursue any substantial weapons development program without detection. If we can effectively immobilize Saddam's activity, the danger his regime poses can be minimized without war.

   Above all, we cannot allow differences over Iraq to shatter the very coalition we depend upon in order to effectively combat the far greater and more imminent threat posed by the al-Qaida terrorists. Close international cooperation is what led to the recent arrest in Pakistan of the planner of the 9/11 attack.

   Second, has the war been declared by a legitimate authority acting on behalf of the people?

   When Congress voted last October, most Members believed that the use of force by America would have United Nations backing. Such backing is now highly unlikely. Last October, no international inspectors had been in Iraq for 5 years. Now, U.N. inspectors are on the ground engaged in disarming Saddam.

   No war by America can be successfully waged if it lacks the strong support of our people. And America remains divided on an invasion of Iraq without United Nations approval. The reason for that lack of support today is clear. The administration has not made a convincing case that war is necessary, nor have they credibly answered crucial questions about the cost of the war in lives and dollars, how long American troops will remain in Iraq, and what type of Iraqi government will replace Saddam.

   In his address last week on a post-war Iraq, President Bush failed to give adequate answers to the key questions on the minds of the American people about the war and its aftermath. He painted a simplistic picture of the

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   Third, any war must be driven by the right intention.

   I do not question the President's motive in pursuing this policy, but I seriously question his judgment.

   The Bush administration was wrong to allow the anti-Iraq zealots in its ranks to exploit the 9/11 tragedy by using it to make war against Iraq a higher priority than the war against terrorism.

   Al-Qaida--not Iraq--is the most imminent threat to our national security. Our citizens are asked to protect themselves from al-Qaida with plastic sheeting and duct tape, while the administration prepares to send our armed forces to war against Iraq. Those priorities are wrong.

   In a desperate effort to justify its focus on Iraq, the administration has long asserted that there are ties between Osama and Saddam--a theory with no proof that is widely doubted by intelligence experts. Two weeks after 9/11, Secretary Rumsfeld claimed that we had ``bulletproof'' evidence of the link. But a year later, CIA Director Tenet conceded in a letter to the Senate Intelligence Committee that the Administration's understanding of the link was still ``evolving'' and was based on ``sources of varying reliability.'' In fact, the link is so widely doubted that intelligence experts have expressed their concern that intelligence is being politicized to support the rush to war.

   Fourth, war must always be a last resort.

   That is why all options must be pursued. Inspections still have a chance to work in Iraq. Progress is difficult. No one said it would be easy. But as long as inspectors are on the ground and making progress, we must give peace a chance.

   But before resorting to war, it is extremely important to reach agreement that there is no alternative. Nations that have been among our closest allies oppose us now because they do not believe that the alternatives to war have been exhausted. Many of them believe that an invasion of Iraq could destabilize the entire Middle East.

   Many of them believe that instead of subduing terrorism, war with Iraq will increase support and sympathy in the Islamic world for terrorism against the West. We cannot cavalierly dismiss these concerns of our allies.

   War with Iraq runs the very serious risk of inflaming the Middle East and provoking a massive new wave of anti-Americanism that may well strengthen the terrorists, especially if we act without the support of the world community.

   A year ago, The Wall Street Journal quoted a dissident in Saudi Arabia who has turned his focus from his own government to the U.S. Government. He said: [The main enemy of the Muslims and the Arabs is America--and we don't want it to impose things on us. We would rather tolerate dictatorship in our countries than import reforms from America.]

   The war against al-Qaida is far from over, and the war against Iraq may make it worse.

   After 9/11 we witnessed an unprecedented rallying of the world community to our side. That international unity was our strongest weapon against terrorism. It denied terrorists sanctuary, it led to a vital sharing of intelligence, and it helped to cut off the flow of financial resources to al-Qaida. We cannot allow that international cooperation to shatter over our differences on Iraq. We cannot be a bully in the world school yard and still expect friendship and support from the rest of the world.

   Fifth, any war must be proportional, so that the harm inflicted does not outweigh the good achieved.

   If there is a war, we all pray that it will be brief, and that casualties will be few. But there is no assurance of that. Certainly, we have the military power to occupy Iraq. But that may only be the beginning. Our troops may be confronted by urban guerilla warfare from forces still loyal to Saddam or simply anti-Western. The war may be far more brutal than we anticipate.

   In such a conflict, innocent civilian casualties could also be high. We cannot let Saddam hide behind innocent human shields if there is a war. But that large risk makes it all the more imperative for war to be only a last resort.

   We have been told that an attack on Iraq will begin with an enormous cruise missile assault to destroy their infrastructure, strike fear and awe in the hearts of the enemy, and undermine their will to resist. We know that thousands of cruise missiles will be fired in the first 48 hours of the war, more than were launched in the entire 40 days of the gulf war. Such a massive assault will unavoidably produce a very substantial number of civilian casualties. That harsh reality adds greatly to the burden that must be overcome by those who argue that war is the proper response now. It is a burden they have not met.

   One of the highest and worst costs of war may be the humanitarian costs. Sixty percent of Iraq's people rely on the United Nations' Oil-for-Food Program for their daily survival. Food is distributed through 46,000 government distributors supplied by a network of food storage barns. A war with Iraq will disrupt this network. Many Iraqis, especially poor families, have no other source of food. Women and children will be the most vulnerable victims. According to recent reports, 500,000 Iraqi children already suffer from malnutrition.

   And what are the costs to America? We all know there is an increased risk of another domestic terrorist attack. The war will make it a more dangerous time on the American homefront.

   There will also be a very substantial financial cost to the war The short-term cost is likely to exceed $100 billion. The long-term cost, depending on how long our troops must remain in Iraq, will be far more. If our national security were at stake, we would spare no expense to protect American lives. But the administration owes the nation a more honest discussion about the war costs we are about to face, especially if America has to remain in Iraq for many years, with little support from other nations.

   The sixth element of a just war is that it must have a reasonable chance of success.

   I have no doubt that we will prevail on the battlefield but what of the consequences for our own national security and the peace and security of the Middle East?

   We know that a stable government will be essential in a post-war Iraq. But the administration refuses to discuss in any real detail how it will be achieved and how long our troops will need to stay. President Bush assumes everything will go perfectly. But war and it's consequences hold enormous risks and uncertainties.

   As retired General Anthony Zinni has asked, will we do what we did in Afghanistan in the 1970s--drive the old Soviet Union out and let something arguably worse emerge in it's place?

   The vast majority of the Iraqi people may well want the end of Saddam's rule, but they may not welcome the United States to create a government in our own image. Regardless of their own internal disagreements, the Iraqi people still feel a strong sense of national identity, and could quickly reject an American occupation force that tramples on local cultures.

   We must recognize that from the day we occupy Iraq, we shoulder the responsibility to protect and care for its citizens. We are accountable under the Geneva Conventions for public safety in neighborhoods, for schools, and for meeting the basic necessities of life for 23 million Iraqi civilians.

   This daunting challenge has received very little attention from the administration. As the dust settles, the repressed tribal and religious differenced of the past may come to the fore--as they did in the brutal civil wars in the former Yugoslavia, in Rwanda, and other countries. As our troops bypass Basra and other Iraqi cities on their way to Baghdad, how will we prevent the revenge bloodletting that occurred after the last Gulf War, in which thousands of civilians lost their lives?

   What do we do if Kurds in northern Iraq proclaim an independent Kurdistan? Or the Shia in southern Iraq move toward an alliance with Iran, from which they have long drawn their inspiration?

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   We have told the government of Turkey that we will not support an independent Kurdistan, despite the fact that the Kurdish people in Iraq already have a high degree of US-supported autonomy and have even completed work on their own constitution. Do we send in our troops again to keep Iraq united?

   Post-War Afghanistan is not exactly the best precedent for building democracy in Iraq. Sixteen months after the fall of the Taliban government in Afghanistan, President Hamid Karzai is still referred to as ``the Mayor of Kabul''--because of the weak and fragile hold of his government on the rest of the nation. Warlords are in control of much of the countryside. The Afghan-Pakistani border is an area of anarchy--and ominous al-Qaida cells.

   The U.S. military is far from equipped to handle the challenge of meeting the needs of a post-Saddam Iraq. Our government must have a plan in place to care for the population. Yet we have heard little from the administration on how they intend to meet this obligation. To succeed in winning the peace, we will need the help and support of the international community. That is afar less likely to happen if we do not have the international community with us the start.

   Before the President makes the final fateful decision to go to war in Iraq, his administration must answer each of these just war questions much more convincingly than they have so far. The American people are waiting for the answers. The entire world is waiting for the answers.

   We are no at a major cross-road in our history. The 9/11 attrocities has forced us all to think profoundly about what is great in America. All through our shock and grief, the people's courage never failed. 9/11 was one of the Nation's saddest hours, but the response was one of our finest hours.

   That hour must not be lost. It can mark the beginning of a new era of common purpose--a return to policies which truly reflect America's values, a return to the genuine pursuit of justice. The unselfishness we saw in 2001 must not give way to selfishness in 2003. The noble caring for one another that we celebrated then must not be succeeded now by a retreat from our ideals.

   Yes, our country is strong but it can be stronger--not just in the power we hold, but in the promise we fulfill of a nation that truly does make better the life of the world. If we rededicate ourselves to that great goal, our achievements will reverberate around the globe, and America will be admired anew for what it must be now, in this new time, more than ever--``the last, best hope of earth.''

   I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

   The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

   Mrs. DOLE. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

4D) Controlling the Tyrant in Iraq

   The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mrs. Blackburn). Under the Speaker's announced policy of January 7, 2003, the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Inslee) is recognized for 60 minutes.

   Mr. INSLEE. Madam Speaker, I have come to the floor tonight to discuss our Nation's policy in Iraq and before I discuss that most important issue I would like to make a couple of preparatory comments.

   First, I would I want to express my respect, admiration and appreciation for the men and women of our Armed Services who are today deployed in the service of their country, who are already assisting the security and freedoms of our country today, regardless of the outcome of our national policy in Iraq. And I think it is important to note in any discussion of our national policy that the very reason we have the opportunity to discuss and debate these issues on the floor of the House of Representatives are the contributions past, present and future of the men and women of the America's armed forces. Because the very right of freedom of speech would not exist without the courage and dedication of our soldiers and sailors and Air Force personnel, Marines and Coast Guard and there are others.

   We would not have the ability and other Americans would not have the ability to protest, to question their government's policy but for the dedicated courage of these individuals. And I have a particular personal connection and admiration for them. In the last 2 weeks I have gone to two deployments of citizens and my neighbors to the Middle East. I went to the deployment in Bremerton, Washington of the 8th Navy Hospital Unit who left about 2 1/2 weeks ago and watched them say good-bye to their husbands and wives and children for the service of this country. And I have them in mind when I am deciding what position to take in Iraq.

   I have the sailors of the U.S.S. Rodney Davis, a U.S.S. frigate that shipped off last weekend from Everett, Washington now bound for the Middle East and watched them say good-bye to their loved ones on that dock, and I have them in minds when I think about what our policy ought to be in Iraq.

   Regardless of what Americans think their policy should be in Iraq, I think we should stand absolutely unanimously as we did in Congress here, in the House last week when we passed a resolution respecting and pledging our support and our prayers, which the brave men and women have tonight and today, in the sands of the Middle East, and we have should not forget them in any stretch.

   Second, I want to say that I think that the U.S. Congress needs more discussion, not less, of America's policy in Iraq. And I think it is very disappointing to many Americans that there has been a pall of silence in the House about Iraq for the last several months. It is disappointing because while every democratically elected legislative body around the world or many of them have been debating this subject, the very citadel of democracy, the U.S. House of Representatives right here, the People's House, has been almost absolutely silent on this issue, and I think that is not in the best traditions of democracy.

   To that end, we have invited some of my Republican colleagues, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. DELAY), to lead an effort to debate what should be our policy here in the House of Representatives, and to date we have not convinced them to agree to that type of debate in the House and I think it is very unfortunate. I hope that some of my Republican colleagues will engage with us in that discussion in the near future, and we have hope the gentleman from Texas (Mr. DeLay) would reconsider and would allow debate to occur on the floor of the House in this regard.

   And the reason I say that is while this House did cast a vote, which I believe unwisely abrogated our constitutional authority to make the decision on war to the executive branch, a lot has happened since that decision months ago. This Chamber should be debating what the right course of action is in Iraq. We owe it to the soldiers and sailors of the 8th Hospital Unit in the Navy and the people of the U.S.S. Rodney Davis and all Americans to decide and debate this subject. And I think it is most unfortunate that the House has derogated its responsibility to make that decision and punted it over to the White House down on Pennsylvania Avenue. So I hope that we can inspire additional debate. I have come to discuss this today. I wish we had others to join us who has a different view about Iraq.

   Now to the substance of Iraq, I will pose about 8 or 10 questions that I think that we need to have answered before a war starts in Iraq.

   The first question I would pose is, is a policy of inaction in Iraq the right and acceptable policy for America and the international community? And I will answer that with a resounding no.

   Inaction is not an accepted policy when it comes to

   Iraq. And fortunately inaction is not what we have at this moment. We have a policy of keeping this thug, this tyrant, this diabolical dictator in a tight little box and that is where we ought to keep him, and we ought to continue and promote and make stronger our inspection protocol to find and root out and disarm this tyrant. And we have been having success in that regard in the last several weeks. And we ought to continue and enhance and strengthen our no-fly zone, which denies that dictator effective control of 70 percent of his country. And fortunately, and this is very difficult to the Iraqi innocent citizens under this tyrant's control, but we ought to continue this economic sanction policy as well to keep this tyrant in his box.

   The gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Kind) has joined us and I yield to him.

   Mr. KIND. Madam Speaker, I appreciate my friend from Washington State for yielding to me.

   I just wanted to commend the gentleman for having this discussion this evening. I think it is perhaps the most important decision that the President is about to make on behalf of our Nation, and it is a decision that is going to affect our relationship with the Arab world and the rest of the international community for decades to come. But one of my concerns is for the past several months Congress has been AWOL on this issue, absent without leave. And I think there is still time for us to engage on this fundamentally important decision, and that is what will be the future course of events in dealing with Saddam Hussein and Iraq. And somehow, some way I think we need to come to grips with the new reality of the international order, and that is there are some bad people out there that pose security threats against the safety of our citizens, but it is imperative that we figure out a way of distinguishing between those individuals who are deterable and those who are undeterable.

   Certainly I would put Osama bin Laden, the al Qaeda regime in the undeterable category. Those are the ones we need to focus on, we need to get after in order to enhance the security of our people in this country.

   I think there is still a debate going on in regards to Saddam Hussein and whether he, in fact, can be deterred. But what is most disconcerting in all this is that we have lost a lot of good will in the international community. The international coalition of support that the President said he would work hard to try to achieve last fall has not

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   The fact that we do not have this coalition of support to do it the right way, not the military operation which we can pretty well do on our own but the rebuilding afterwards. I am afraid we could win the war but lose the peace. And that is why international support is so crucial. But also the domestic implication. The President a couple weeks ago submitted a budget calling for the largest deficit in our Nation's history, and it does not include a dime for the cost of the military buildup in the Middle East or the possible military action or the rebuilding that will have to come afterwards. These are issues that all of us in this Congress should been engaged in in having a national discussion, however unpleasant that might be. That is what a great democracy needs to do.

   And that is why I earlier this week called on the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hastert) and Majority Leader FRIST to allow the United States to have a renewed discussion, to give our constituents back home an opportunity through their representatives to voice their opinions and their concerns in regard to this very important decision. And that is why, again, I want to just thank my friend from Washington State (Mr. Inslee) for trying to have a dialogue on this very important issue, because a lot of folks back home feel that they are wondering where Congress is in all of this. And instead of having these meaningful discussions, we are instead discussing about changing French fries to freedom fries. I mean, how trivial can you get?

   So as we move forward, and I still think there is time to engage the country but also the international community in regard to this important decision, hopefully we will have more of an opportunity for Congress to get back involved in this and get the policy right. And regardless of what decision the President makes, and if it is a decision to send the troops in, I would hope at a minimum there would be consensus in the country that we need to support our troops.

   I have been to a lot of deployment ceremonies for Guard and Reserve units in Wisconsin, and I had a chance to meet a lot of those who are being called up today, and let me tell you they are impressive individuals.

   Well-trained, well-motivated, very patriotic. They love and believe in their country, and we need to give them support in their mission. But it is our task as policymakers to make sure we get the policy right, and there is where the conversation should take place, and there is why we need to have these type of discussions.

   So I thank my friend again for the opportunity to speak on this important issue, for the leadership he has shown on this important issue. And hopefully we will be able to work and engage together on this. That it is not just one individual here in this country making such a profound decision that will affect our position on the global scene for many years to come.

   Mr. INSLEE. I appreciate it. We will continue to get our efforts to get a dialogue going in the House. The gentleman has written the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hastert). I have written the gentleman from Texas (Mr. DeLay). We will continue these efforts.

   Before the gentleman goes, I will note just a little problem we will be working on. I met with a group of reservists last weekend because we are having these longer deployments and longer call-ups and one of the things we need to work on is make sure they get adequate health care when they switch from one coverage to another as well as adequate travel reimbursement because, unfortunately, we will have longer deployments. I will be talking with the gentleman.

   I thank the gentleman for joining me and I thank him for his leadership on this work.

   Madam Speaker, we are talking about inaction is not an option when it comes to Iraq. And I point this out because I feel that in the debate, those who have supported a largely unilateral war, which is the situation we are in with very little international support, those who support that position have suggested that there is only two decisions here, war or passivity, war or inaction.

   I think it is very important to note that the course we are advocating is that we continue to squeeze down on this tyrant. And that it is important to realize that we ought to engage the power of the international community to isolate him and to continue this disarmament program, and I think just in the last few days we have continued to see success in the inspection process, and it is important to realize no inspection process is going to be totally effective in the first 24 hours or the first 30 days. It took us years in the 1990s but the disarmament program and the inspection protocol, although it was not absolutely foolproof, in fact destroyed more weapons of Saddam Hussein than were destroyed in the Persian Gulf War. That is a significant fact that is sometimes forgotten. It ought to give us some degree of optimism about continuing the inspection protocol which is so important, which we ought to make stronger.

   By the way, when it comes to these inspections, if we have to double the number of inspectors, if we have to triple the number of inspectors, if they need to go up a factor of ten, it is cheap at twice the price. Because frankly this inspection protocol is costing us a few million dollars a year. A war will cost somewhere between 60- and $120 billion a year to the United States taxpayers. And we ought to advocate with the United Nations to have a more rigorous inspection protocol and accomplish that.

   The second question I would ask and I think is important to answer in this debate, is the President's assertion, his implicit assertion, that Saddam Hussein was behind the horrendous attack on our Nation September 11 supported by the evidence of our intelligence services? And I am afraid to say that that assertion is wholly unsupported by the evidence.

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   If Saddam Hussein were connected with the September 11 attack on this Nation, I would not hesitate for 5 seconds to vote for an action by the United States, even largely unilaterally, as we did in Afghanistan, because the Taliban was directly behind the attacks of the United States of America. It was responsible for thousands of deaths.

   I have listened closely for months now for some shred of meaningful evidence that Saddam Hussein had broken with his decade of failing and refusing to ally with the al Qaeda, and all of the sudden the September 11 attack, and that has been wholly missing in this debate. I have gone to repeated classified briefings; and I obviously will not disclose what were in those briefings, but I have come away from a review of the entire record and not seen meaningful evidence of a connection between Saddam Hussein and September 11.

   Frankly, it is not too surprising, because anyone who has studied the Mideast understands that there is a dramatic difference between the thinking of al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden and the type of tyranny and oppression that Saddam Hussein has advocated, because al Qaeda has been a fundamentalist Islamic group, and they have called Saddam Hussein, as recently as several weeks ago, an apostate, who is a secular tyrant; and they have been oil and water, and it is a good thing that they have been.

   I serve on the Committee on Financial Services, and as recently as yesterday we had the Homeland Security Department, the Department of Justice, and the Department of Treasury; and we were looking at money laundering and issues about the financing of terrorism. I asked our three agencies whether there was any evidence that they would share with us that there was any financing by Saddam Hussein of the September 11 attacks, and I asked them a very specific question, because this is fundamental to the President's argument. They did not present one shred of evidence that there was a connection between Saddam Hussein and September 11, and this is very important in this debate.

   It is not important to know whether Saddam Hussein is a despicable, loathsome human being who has been a tyrant, who has tortured his citizens,

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   When it comes to deciding whether America should go to war, it would be a huge mistake to go to war based on an illusion that this is the person responsible for September 11; and unfortunately, and it is unfortunate, I think, I saw a poll the other day that the President has convinced 42 percent of Americans that Saddam Hussein was behind September 11 when his own intelligence agencies know otherwise. That is unfortunate in this debate.

   The third question I would ask that is important to ask is what is the relative threat posed by Iraq relative to the threats posed by other nations and non-nations around the world, and that is an important question, because there are an unlimited number of threats to our personal security. It is unlimited, and there is a hierarchy of how imminent and how dangerous they are, and if we simply focus on Iraq and if we are willing to go to war in Iraq, to the detriment of our ability to deal with other threats that I believe are more imminent and potentially more lethal, it will be a bad decision by the United States. So if I can, for a moment, talk about some of these other threats.

   The President has indicated that Saddam Hussein has attempted to obtain fissionable materiel and nuclear weapons. This is true. It is clear that Saddam Hussein has tried for decades to obtain a nuclear device, and he has been spectacularly unsuccessful in his multiple-decade efforts, but other countries have not been unsuccessful.

   North Korea, the country that the President of the United States told us is not creating a crisis, a country that has probably got fissionable materiel and is on the course to have several nuclear weapons in several months, that recently intercepted our reconnaissance aircraft, which has been involved in infiltration of various other countries, who is acting in a fanatical, totally unpredictable manner, who may have or will have shortly nuclear weapons that can reach Japan, who is developing missiles that can reach the western coast of the United States in a few years, that is an imminent threat to this country. Unfortunately, America's response to North Korea has been damaged, hindered and limited due to the President's concentration on Iraq, and I have to stand here to sadly say that if Saddam Hussein could, potentially, I do not know how with the inspection process, but with our inspection process under way, he is decades away from a nuclear weapon.

   North Korea is months away from nuclear weapons that are deliverable to other nations and potentially the Western United States in several years. That is the number one threat to the security of this Nation and the

   President, who only has 24 hours in the day, has been making a lot of calls about Iraq, and has not had time to make calls about North Korea; and we have to be aware of the presence of these other threats.

   Second threat, Iran. I was in Israel about a year and a half ago, and I met with the number three or five person in the Israeli defense force, and I asked him what he was most concerned about in threats in the region and to the security of Israel. Obviously, the intafada, creating the havoc and destruction, is first on his mind; but he told me, and he had a lot of concern in his voice when he told me this, that we had to really crack down on a country that started with the letter I in the Mideast, because they were very, very dangerous to the regional security of the area and to the security of Israel, and that country was Iran.

   Because he told me that, because of the assistance of Russia, Iran was making significant progress to nuclear weapons, and his statement to me almost a year and a half ago has been borne out by the intelligence photographs we saw last, I guess it was, Monday now in our newspapers about the cascade of centrifuges that Iran has developed to develop fissionable materiel in relatively short order for another nuclear power in the Mideast. That is a clear and present danger to the security of the Mideast and ultimately to the United States, but the United States has not been able to deal with that threat because it has been so focused on Iraq, and I think that is most unfortunate.

   While we are fighting a war in Iraq, if that breaks out, these other nuclear-armed countries, or very shortly will be, will be perfecting their weaponry under the cover of this war of Iraq. While we are fighting a country that is trying to make balsa wood airplanes, that we are now told was the reason to go to war, and I will come to that in a moment, we have got to be very cautious about focusing on one threat to the detriment of our ability to deal with others.

   Fourth question, are we making progress in disarmament of Iraq? I have been actually relatively pleasantly surprised at the rate of progress we have made. It seems like every week or two we have been able to make progress in the disarmament of Iraq, and the folks listening probably are more familiar than I am; but it is important to note that progress continues as it did in the 1990s.

   I think we cannot be naive. There is no way to guarantee absolute 100 percent disarmament of Iraq unless it becomes under our military control. It would take years to conduct searches of every nook and cranny in Iraq; but what we can say, I think with a relative degree of assurance, is that we have stopped Iraq's efforts to the extent they existed, which were quite rudimentary, at least in the last year or two, toward a nuclear weapon.

   We have significantly impaired any ability to have a meaningful bioweapons hazard program, and we are on the way to assuring that the destruction of the delivery system or potential delivery system to the al-Samoud missile system, which I think now we have destroyed about 40 percent of their missile system, we are making real progress. The question in my mind is why stop that progress now in favor of a war while we are continuing to make progress on this effort? I do not believe there is a good answer to that question.

   Fifth question, what would be needed in postwar Iraq? Here is where I think unfortunately the administration is wholly not up at least at the moment to the task of what they have said their goal is in Iraq. The President has offered a variety of statements as to what his goal is in Iraq. He has said that he has wanted to wage war or may want to wage war in Iraq in order to preserve the sanctity of the United Nations to make sure that the United Nations has credibility, and he has said that he is concerned about Iraq's threatening its neighbors. He said that it is for our own personal security, and he has said that he wants to free the Iraqi people from this tyrant; and I want to address that last goal of freeing Iraq from this tyrant.

   The reason I want to address that is, to me, that actually if there were a legitimate reason for a war in Iraq would be the one that would be most telling and most consistent with the facts and the evidence, and the reason is because there is no question but that innocent Iraqis, by the millions, have suffered at the hand of this tyrant. It is an appealing thought to believe that we could free them from that control of this despot. That is appealing.

   I have to say that in reviewing the plans, or lack of plans, and the commitment, or lack of commitment, of this administration, the ability of George Bush to bring democracy to Iraq, at best, is highly speculative; and I will tell my colleagues the reasons why.

   Number one, exhibit A, Afghanistan. I believed war in Afghanistan was necessary from a personal security standpoint due to the tie of the Taliban government to the September 11 attack; but we had a perfect opportunity

   to, in fact, try to establish a democracy, and this administration has blown it big time. To the extent that when it came time for this year's budget, to put money in to help the rebuilding of Afghanistan, to help restore democracy to keep out the return of the Taliban, do my colleagues know how much money they put in their budget? Zero dollars, zero dollars for democracy in Afghanistan.

   Their explanation was they forgot, and I think that was very candid. The President's administration forgot about the goal of democracy in Afghanistan; and today we are faced with the same problem we had after there were efforts to kick the Russians out, which is the return of the Taliban and the return to tyranny and return to the war lords because we have not made the investment that is required to get the job

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   We have been asking on a bipartisan basis for the administration's plans on a postwar Iraq for months and months now; and we have been given, I do not know how to say this charitably. I am searching for a way to say it charitably. A joke perhaps is the best thing to say on what their plans are on a postwar Iraq.

   Here is a country, cobbled together after the British Empire left the Mideast, of three distinct ethnic groups that have never worked together except under the heels of a despot with the Kurds who the administration has already decided to sell out to Turkey for the 15th time to the Kurds, the Kurds who are now finally enjoying some degree of autonomy under our no-fly zone. We have got the Kurds some freedom today from Saddam Hussein because of our no-fly zone and think of the irony of it.

   The President may be on the cusp of a war, and he has agreed to turn them back to Turkey, and in fact, that is overstating a little bit, but he has allowed Turkey, under the secret deal he wants to make, to come into the Kurds' territory; and what an irony it is that the President says he wants to restore democracy in Iraq, and the first deal he cuts with Turkey is to allow them to come back in and again be dominant over the Kurds who are now free for the first time in decades.

   That is the type of shady dealing and efforts that have plagued us in our Mideast policy for years.

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   And to think that we can break these eggs and put them back into the democracy category with the lack of commitment of this administration is wholly speculative and most disappointing to the poor people of Iraq. And I think anyone who knows the history of these people knows how terrible their conditions have been.

   Frankly, if we had an administration that we believed we could have confidence would really commit to the democracy in Iraq, for the long-term future, and who made the commitment financially and otherwise, I would be a lot more willing to look at the idea. But we do not have that right now in this administration.

   Talk about a financial commitment, we are talking about tens of millions, perhaps in the billions, of dollars in a postwar Iraq. And the President has not even factored in the cost of even the attack, much less the postwar cost into his budget, nor have my friends on the Republican side of the aisle. What type of commitment do we think we can make to the international community to in fact build democracy in Iraq when we basically have said we are not going to spend a dime to do it and we have been afraid, Congress and the administration, to build into our budget the cost that it would take to do this? No, perhaps building democracy in Iraq after a war could be a great vision, but we have certainly not seen the vision to make it happen.

   Six. What are the real goals of the administration in Iraq? Here is something I think that is very important in the discussion. The discussion we have heard, and it has changed over time, but when the President went to the United Nations at one time, he said his good deal was the disarmament of Iraq. The problem is, and the reason I believe we have had so much problem in winning and building an international coalition, unlike the success that the first President Bush enjoyed, is that President Bush, in the very first statement of his administration, said that was not our goal at all. He said our goal was simply to remove Saddam Hussein, period. No ifs, ands, buts. No disarmament. Saddam Hussein was going to have to go.

   When the President said, as he did most recently last week, that it is simply about removing Saddam Hussein, it did not matter what benchmarks he made, did not matter what inspections we had or what disarmament he would do, he was going to have to go, well, that would be attractive; but it has damaged our ability to build an international coalition to deal with this despot. And it is an unfortunate contrast to the skills that the first President Bush demonstrated in building an international coalition to deal with the threat in Iraq.

   When the first President Bush spoke with respect to our international partners, we were clear to them about our goals, we hewed to the commitments we made to our international partners, and we did not tell our international partners that we were going to do what we were going to do, and it did not matter what they thought. That is what the first President Bush did, and he was successful. This administration has violated all those fundamental precepts of human communication, which is respect for one another.

   The other goal is the President has said he wants to make sure the United Nations resolutions are honored. That is a legitimate goal. He has implicitly said he wants to show respect for the United Nations and build it up as a coalition, an international body that can deal with this. That is a laudable goal and an important one, but it certainly is shortchanged and has its legs cut out from underneath it when in the same breath the President says he wants to respect the United Nations, but then says he is going to ignore the United Nations if they do not do exactly as he wants them to do and he will start a war anyway.

   You do not instill trust in your colleagues, or in the United Nations, when right out of the box you say you are just coming to them for a rubber stamp and you are going to start a war anyway. It is not the way to build respect in the United Nations. It is one of the problems we are having now in trying to build an international coalition to deal with this problem.

   Seventh question. What has changed since Congress voted on this resolution? I thought it was unwise then for the U.S. Congress to derogate its constitutional duty to make a decision about war when it voted to essentially allow one person, one person in this country, to make the decision to go to war, rather than the elected officials here in Congress. When they drafted the Constitution, they said Congress had the power to declare war, so that one person would not have that awesome challenge and responsibility. Nonetheless, Congress did that, and my side of the vote did not prevail.

   It is important to have this discussion now because since that decision, other potential enemies of the United States have used our continued concentration and obsession, and I will not use the word obsession, I will strike that word, but our concentration on Iraq has allowed them to continue to develop their own nuclear weapons programs. And we have been totally ineffective in dealing with those other issues, and that calls for Congress to have a debate about what the current state of this situation is. And we should have one.

   The eighth question. Has the President really leveled with the American people about the ramifications of this war financially and otherwise? The sad fact is that he has not. He has refused to even discuss with the U.S. Congress what the costs are going to be. And at the same time that we are going to incur from $60 billion to $120 billion in cost, the President, unlike any other wartime President in American history, and every other wartime President in American history has leveled with the American people, and they have told the American people what the war would cost in lives and treasury. They have been straight and said we need to pay this. And this President has not been straight with the American people about the cost of this war, either in lives or treasury, because he wants his tax cut above everything. Above everything. At the same time we are going to spend an additional $60 billion to $120 billion, he continues to try to ram through these tax cuts, which is his number one ideological belief.

   Now, to me, when we have seen our soldiers and sailors off to harm's way in this war, and they are making this sacrifice, it does not seem to me to be right that the President of the United States says we might have a war overseas, but we are going to have a fiscal party at home. That is irresponsible, and it does not respect the tradition and the willingness of Americans to

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   Number nine. What does a war in Iraq do to our security on the downside? Because many of us believe, and I believe, that while a war in Iraq and the elimination of Saddam Hussein's rule could reduce a particular threat that he presents, it could create greater threats in many other ways. I believe that in balancing those threats there is as much potential increased harm to the United States, in threats to our security, as there is benefit. And there are multiple reasons for that. The most obvious reason is what is happening in Iraq today, where we have kicked Saddam Hussein out of a particular region in the northeast corner of the country and al Qaeda has moved in.

   It is a great irony. We have seen the sort of picture of what Iraq is going to look like in a post-Saddam Hussein world. Because in this corner of chaos, where there is no state, it is like a little Afghanistan about a decade ago. The fundamentalist Islamic movement has moved in and this group has now got about 700 fighters that are grouping in Iraq. Not under or allied with Saddam Hussein, but they are using the absence, this vacancy, this vacuum of state control to regroup and potentially plan attacks against the United States of America. By creating a chaotic situation in Iraq, we not only inspire the hatred which we have heard so many people talk about of young Muslim folks in the Mideast, but we will provide them a place to group, which is in a vacuum of what used to be Iraq.

   It has been said by many people that a war in Iraq could be sort of the great dream of Osama bin Laden. Because no Osama bin Laden is going to bring down the United States in his wildest imagination. His dream is to incite a war between the West and Muslim nations. And his dream can only be accomplished in one possible way, and that is if the United States acts in a way which will prove to folks in the Muslim nations that in their view that we intend a colonial empire in the Middle East, which I do not believe we do. But to them, having an occupied Mideast Muslim nation, occupied for potentially years, and we have been in Germany for over 50, the ramifications of the recruiting efforts of Osama bin Laden are obvious.

   I cannot think of a single thing that could potentially allow the regrouping of the al Qaeda network other than a war with Iraq, eventually. This is truly one battle we could win but lose the war. That is why war does not always buy more security. Sometimes it buys less, even if you win the first battle. And I think we should think about that.

   Tenth. What would a largely unilateral war do to America's moral leadership in the world? I will close on this point, because I think it could be the most important for the long-term future of our Nation.

   I believe America is a unique country that has a unique responsibility for moral leadership in the world. The world looks to us for leadership. It looks to us for an idea of what is acceptable conduct by nations and men. It looks to us to lead in the establishment of a rules-based society, because that is the genius of America. We have rules here and we follow rules here. Other countries do not. They do not have rules they follow in a lot of countries.

   Since the collapse of the Soviet Empire, an empire we contained in a way that certainly makes Saddam Hussein look like a petty little maggot, but we contained the Soviet Union for many, many decades, and we should think about that in regard to Saddam Hussein. But we have this moral leadership, and we wear the cloak of moral leadership in the world, and we are looked to all over the world for leadership. The Statue of Liberty is not just about immigration. That flame is about leading the world in a lot of ways, not just economically.

   It is my belief that should we go it alone, largely alone, which is the position we are in at the moment, if there is a lack of success developing an international coalition, which there has been a spectacular failure at this moment, if we act without United Nations sanctioning, we will have damaged our ability to fulfill the destiny of America to lead the world to a new civilization internationally, not just along the borders of our country. That is why it is so important for us to work with the international community to maintain what we have right now, which is the admiration of the world.

   Think about what has happened in the last 12 months, where in the weeks following September 11 the world embraced us. There were headlines around the world in various newspapers. We were all Americans. Think how far that has changed because of the reaction against the United States and this administration acting so cavalierly in certain regards. It is disappointing.

   But we can regain this. We can regain our position. We can continue to keep this tyrant in his box. We can build an international coalition. We can succeed in these inspections. We can continue our no-fly zone. We should continue to work with the international community. And in the days ahead, we hope that the President will listen to the American people and the voices from around the world in doing that, because that is America's destiny.

END

4E) Possible Consequences of Use of Force in Iraq
By Mr. FEINGOLD:

   S.J. Res. 9. A joint resolution requiring the President to report to Congress specific information relating to certain possible consequences of the use of United States Armed Forces against Iraq; to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

   Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, today I introduce a Senate companion to a joint resolution already introduced in the House by Congressman SHERROD BROWN of Ohio.

   This resolution is quite simple. It requires the President to report to Congress on the potential costs and consequences of military action in Iraq before ordering the United States Armed Forces to war in Iraq. This is a resolution that simply requires that this country know what it is we are getting into before, not after, war breaks out.

   Of course, it is my hope, and I very much believe the President when he asserts that it is his hope, that there will be no war. But judging from the administration's statements and Iraq's behavior, with each passing day it becomes more and more likely that the United States will engage in a major military operation in Iraq. It is entirely possible that we will undertake this operation without a great deal of international support. And while I have no doubt in my mind that our admirable men and women in uniform will be successful in any military engagement, I do have doubts about whether or not the American people truly understand the magnitude of the task the country is setting for itself--not only with regard to the military engagement itself, but with regard to occupation and reconstruction.

   I do not believe that Americans have been told much about what the future holds beyond the most optimistic of scenarios, and frankly I do not believe that Congress has heard much about the full range of potential scenarios either.

   This resolution would require that the President provide that information before ordering our men and women in uniform to war in Iraq.

   The resolution asks for a full accounting of the implications for homeland security of initiating military action against Iraq. It asks for an accounting of the implications for the fight against terrorism. It asks for an accounting of the implications for regional stability in the Middle East, and for an accounting of the implications of war in Iraq for the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

   This resolution recognizes that there may be positive and negative implications to consider. It does not pre-judge these issues. But it does acknowledge that Members of Congress, the elected representatives of the people, should be privy to the thinking of our experts and leaders in the executive branch about the effect of war in Iraq on all of these issues. It is our responsibility to weigh these questions, to weigh the consequences of starting a war.

   And, while I do not doubt for a moment the skills and competence of our brave service men and women, I do know that their efforts alone are not enough to ensure a lasting victory. It is crucial to the ultimate success of U.S. policy, that the American people understand the potential risks and the potential rewards of this national undertaking. We are considering the American military occupation of a major Middle Eastern country, and we are considering this in a very dangerous time. This country must have its eyes open before we move forward.

   This resolution also requires that the administration explain to Congress the steps that the United States and our allies will take to ensure that any and all weapons of mass destruction will be safeguarded from dispersal to other rogue states or international terrorist organizations. If the goal is disarmament, then defeating Saddam Hussein's forces is not going to accomplish the mission at hand. Do we know where the WMD sites are? One would assume that we would share that information with the inspectors if we had it. But if we do not, how will we ensure that WMD and the means to

   make them are not dispersed across Iraq's borders, or sold off to the highest bidder, in the event of invasion. Saddam Huessein's order is despicable and dangerous. But disorder is dangerous too. Again, we need to understand the risks, and we need to understand the plan.

   This resolution requires the Administration to explain the plan for stabilization and reconstruction. Earlier this week the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held a hearing on reconstruction in Iraq. We had hoped to get answers to some of the basic questions that senior officials from the State and Defense Departments were utterly unable to respond to as recently as February. But the Administration canceled the appearance of General Jay Garner, the director for the Pentagon's Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, who was slated to come before the committee. And so the Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate is left scanning the newspapers to get a sense of Administration plans, extrapolating from tidbits in the press to understand potential costs, and quizzing very capable experts--but experts not privy to Administration planning--about the universe of possibilities. This is simply unacceptable.

   This resolution calls for the Administration to clearly report to Congress on the nature and extent of the international support for military action against Iraq and the impact of military action against Iraq on allied support for the broader war on terrorism. I believe that this is the single most important issue before us. I know that I disagree with some of my colleagues on the wisdom of the Administration's policy in Iraq. But I am certain that none of us disagree on the proposition that the first priority of all of us in government must be the fight against terrorism. And we all know that we cannot fight terrorism alone. But I have heard directly from foreign officials who are telling me that it will be more difficult for them to be strong supporters of the fight against terrorism if the U.S. acts in Iraq without the United Nations' approval.

   This resolution calls on the Administration to explain clearly the steps that it will take to protect United States soldiers, allied forces, and Iraqi civilians from any known or suspected environmental hazards resulting from military operations. Everyone in this body has heard from veterans of the Gulf War who suffer and struggle even today, long after their period of sacrifice for their country should have ended. Based on what we know from these veterans, it is entirely reasonable to demand a plan now, not after the fact.

   The resolution also calls for the Administration to provide estimates of the American and allied military casualties, Iraqi military casualties, and Iraqi civilian casualties resulting from military action against Iraq, and measures that will be taken to prevent civilian casualties and adhere to international humanitarian law. I know that America is a resilient society and a resolute society. But I am not at all

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   This resolution calls for an estimate of the full costs associated with military action against Iraq, including, but not limited to, providing humanitarian aid to the Iraqi people and to neighboring nations in light of possible refugee flows, reconstructing Iraq with or without allied support, and securing long-term political stability in Iraq and the region insofar as it is affected by such military action. I can tell you that right now in the Budget committee, we are flying blind, trying to make fiscally responsible decisions for the future while the Administration remains unwilling to provide an honest accounting of what this war will cost, or what it will cost to meet the humanitarian needs of Iraq, or what the long process of reconstruction will cost. We know that these

   are not small figures. And unfortunately, it looks as though we will be proceeding without a great deal of international support, meaning less burden-sharing and more shouldering of this cost on our own. And that is why this resolution also calls for an accounting of the anticipated short and long term effects of military action on the United States economy and the Federal budget.

   I feel strongly that we should have demanded this information long ago. But we continue to ask, because Congress continues to have constitutional responsibilities. And I continue to hear from a tremendous number of my constituents who are deeply concerned about the prospect of a war with Iraq. The sources of their concern and their views on the issue vary, but in virtually all cases, they want to understand the range of options before us, and they are demanding more information about the costs and commitments they will incur as a result of decisions that we make here. They are right to insist on that information, to insist that we exercise some foresight here and wrestle honestly with the consequences that may follow from taking military action. Without such a discussion, we cannot hope to answer the most important question before us--will a given course of action make the U.S. more or less secure in the end.

   I urge my colleagues to support this resolution, and to insist that the Administration provide this information before war breaks out. I voted against the resolution authorizing the use of force in Iraq last fall, because I was uncomfortable with the Administration's shifting justifications for war, dissatisfied with the vague answers available at the time relating to our plans for dealing with weapons of mass destruction and reconstruction in Iraq, and most of all, because I was concerned that this action would actually alienate key allies in the fight against terrorism. But even those who voted differently surely must believe that we have a responsibility to anwser these questions now, and to share the answers with our constituents, so that this great country is operating not on wishful thinking or simple ignorance, but with an understanding of the facts before us, and the awesome task ahead.

END

Requiring the President to report to Congress specific information relating to certain possible consequences of the use of United States Armed Forces against Iraq.

Whereas Saddam Hussein is a repressive dictator who has demonstrated through his own actions, including the invasion of Kuwait and the oppression of the Iraqi people, that it is necessary for the international community to ensure that his conduct accords with international law;

Whereas on September 12, 2002, President Bush committed the United States to `work with the United Nations Security Council to meet our common challenge' posed by Iraq and to `work for the necessary resolutions', while also making clear that `the Security Council resolutions will be enforced, and the just demands of peace and security will be met, or action will be unavoidable';

Whereas the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 (Public Law 107-243; 116 Stat. 1498), enacted into law on October 16, 2002, authorizes the President to use the United States Armed Forces to defend the national security of the United States against the threat posed by Iraq and to enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq;

Whereas section 2 of Public Law 107-243 supports efforts by the President to obtain prompt and decisive action by the United Nations Security Council to ensure that Iraq complies with all such relevant Security Council resolutions;

Whereas Congress recognizes the efforts of the President to obtain unanimous approval for United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441 (2002) which affords Iraq `a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations under relevant resolutions of the Council';

Whereas section 4 of Public Law 107-243 states that `[t]he President shall, at least once every 60 days, submit to the Congress a report on matters relevant to this joint resolution, including actions taken pursuant to the exercise of authority granted in section 3 [to use the Armed Forces against Iraq] and the status of planning for efforts that are expected to be required after such actions are completed';

Whereas section 3(b) of Public Law 107-243 states that `[i]n connection with the exercise of the authority granted in subsection (a) to use force the President shall, prior to such exercise' make available to Congress his determination that `acting pursuant to this joint resolution is consistent with the United States and other countries continuing to take the necessary actions against international terrorist[s] and terrorist organizations, including those nations, organizations, or persons who planned, authorized, committed or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001';

Whereas section 3 of the War Powers Resolution (Public Law 93-148; 87 Stat. 555) states that `[t]he President in every possible instance shall consult with Congress before introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances';

Whereas section 4(b) of the War Powers Resolution states that `[t]he President shall provide such other information as the Congress may request in the fulfillment of its constitutional responsibilities with respect to committing the Nation to war'; and

Whereas additional information needed for Congress to fulfill its constitutional responsibilities with respect to committing the Nation to war has not been provided to Congress: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This joint resolution may be cited as the `Presidential Report on Iraq Resolution of 2003'.

SEC. 2. REPORTING REQUIREMENT.

(a) REPORT- The President shall, prior to using United States Armed Forces against Iraq pursuant to section 3(a) of the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 (Public Law 107-243; 116 Stat. 1498), report to Congress the following:

(1) A determination that further diplomatic or other peaceful means will not adequately protect the national security of the United States against the threat posed by Iraq.

(2) A full accounting of the implications, both positive and negative, of initiating military action against Iraq in regard to homeland security, the war on terrorism, regional stability in the Middle East, the Middle East peace process, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

(3) The steps the United States and its allies will take to ensure that any and all weapons of mass destruction and the related knowledge base will be safeguarded from dispersal to other rogue states or international terrorist organizations.

(4) The United States plan for achieving long-term social, economic, and political stabilization of a post-conflict Iraq, including a plan to provide humanitarian assistance to the Iraqi people, to ensure respect of their human rights, and to bring to justice the individuals responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian and human rights law committed in Iraq.

(5) The nature and extent of the international support for military action against Iraq and the impact of military action against Iraq on allied support for the broader war on terrorism.

(6) The steps the United States and its allies will take to protect United States military personnel, allied forces, and Iraqi civilians from any known or suspected environmental hazards resulting from military operations, an estimate of the American and allied military casualties, Iraqi military casualties, and Iraqi civilian casualties resulting from military action against Iraq, and measures that will be taken to prevent civilian casualties and adhere to international humanitarian law.

(7) An estimate of the full costs associated with military action against Iraq, including providing humanitarian aid to the Iraqi people and to neighboring nations in light of possible refugee flows, reconstructing Iraq with or without allied support, and securing long-term political stability in Iraq and the region insofar as it is affected by such military action.

(8) The anticipated short-term and long-term effects of military action on the United States economy and the Federal budget.

SEC. 3. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.

Nothing in this joint resolution supersedes any requirement of the War Powers Resolution (Public Law 93-148; 87 Stat. 555).

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