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Congressional Record Weekly Update

May 5-9, 2003

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1A) Strengthen Cooperation Efforts with Kazakhstan

  • Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Mr. Speaker, today, when our country faces unprecedented challenges, it is crucial that we have strong allies in the world. One such ally is Kazakhstan, a country that throughout its short history of independence has demonstrated a true commitment to our principles and ideals of building a safe and prosperous world.

  • Against the backdrop of modem threats of catastrophic terrorism with the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), Kazakhstan has voluntarily renounced the world's fourth largest nuclear arsenal it inherited from the former Soviet Union, has shut down the world's largest nuclear test site and has been actively working with the United States in the fight against international terrorism.

  • Kazakhstan's example can be used as a response to aspirations by rogue states to develop WMD to impose their interests in the world. This is why I believe we need to actively spread the story of Kazakhstan's responsible international conduct and its strong cooperation with the United States that is of exceptional significance to settle today's most critical international problems.

  • As a key state for our interests in the center of Eurasia, Kazakhstan was one of the first to support us in the tragic days after September 11 and is providing concrete assistance in the Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. Kazakhstan, sharing our interest in securing stability in Iraq and its surroundings after Operation Iraqi Freedom, is also sending its military medical personnel to join the International Coalition Stabilizing Force.

  • Now is the time, I believe, for us to develop multifaceted cooperation with Kazakhstan, a strategic partner of the United States in the fight against terrorism and proliferation of WMD. Now is the time to support this young and perspective country of pro-Western orientation in its serious efforts to build a developed and prosperous society. Such a course will undoubtedly meet the interests of our two nations.

  • On May 5, 2003, the Honorable Kanat Saudabayev, Ambassador of Kazakhstan, published an article in the Washington Times
    [Page: E882]  GPO's PDF
    entitled ``Kazakhstan's contribution'' in which he addressed these issues in a most persuasive manner. I call upon my colleagues to read this article and request your permission to include it in the U.S. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.
    KAZAKHSTAN'S CONTRIBUTION

    U.S. SHOULD STRENGTHEN COOPERATION EFFORTS
    (By Kanat Saudabayev)

    Although the recent PBS screening of ``Avoiding Armageddon'' did mention Kazakhstan as a country that chose to rid itself of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), it was disappointing that Americans were not fully informed of what was behind that choice and what it means for global security.

    Kazakhstan's ``notable example'' of disarmament, as the White House recently described it, could be used as a counterweight to aspirations of some countries to develop WMD as means to assert their interests in the world. I strongly believe that Kazakhstan's story of responsible international behavior and strong cooperation with the U.S. is of paramount importance, as it might lead to solutions to today's most acute international problems.

    In 1991, having suffered through almost 500 Soviet nuclear tests that destroyed the lives of 1.5 million people, Kazakhstan voluntarily renounced what would have been the world's 4th nuclear arsenal and shut down the world's largest nuclear test site at Semipalatinsk. Together with the United States, we have since destroyed the remaining infrastructure of the loathsome legacy of the Cold War. Amongst the most graphic examples of our cooperation under the Nunn-Lugar program have been Project Sapphire, which shipped more than 1,300 pounds of weapons-grade uranium from Kazakhstan to the U.S., and the destruction of the world's largest anthrax production and weaponization facility at Stepnogorsk.

    The path of history could have been different, however, had President Nursultan Nazarbayev chosen to go with the significant portion of Kazakhstan's elite that was in favor of keeping the nuclear weapons as means to ostensibly gain international respect.

    To the contrary, it was Mr. Nazarbayev's unswerving commitment to disarmament during all these years that led Kazakhstan to renounce the nuclear weapons, becoming a strong disarmament advocate, and ultimately, gaining the recognition as a peace-loving nation.

    Indeed, it is our policies that enabled Kazakhstan to launch a new security organization for Asia with the participation of the leaders of 16 nations. At its inaugural meeting in Almaty in June 2002, we hosted the presidents of China, Russia, Pakistan and Afghanistan, and the prime minister of India and others. At the height of a crisis between New Delhi and Islamabad, their leaders sat at one table and were able to directly listen to each other. This event became Kazakhstan's important contribution to the reduction of tensions between the two nuclear powers of the subcontinent.

    ``Countries like Kazakhstan that have renounced nuclear weapons for all time provide an example and can provide valuable leadership on these issues,'' former Sen. Sam Nunn said this month at a Washington conference. ``One of the things I hope we can do is pay some real attention, and put in a leadership role, to countries that have given up nuclear weapons.''

    I couldn't agree more. We believe our example should become international public knowledge and a factor in dealing with threshold countries.

    Though our disarmament might seem something of the distant past, it also relates directly to present challenges to global security.

    We still need to take care of what Mr. Nunn calls the human factor. As we moved to disarm and destroy the military infrastructure, scores of experienced nuclear scientists and biological specialists and their families, were left lingering in ghost towns with neither proper jobs nor means to live. They can be instrumental in commercial projects of conversion in such areas as the peaceful use of atomic energy and biotechnologies. The help from the United States will not only give them an opportunity to peacefully apply their skills, but will also strengthen our joint counterproliferation efforts at a time when numerous countries and terrorist groups continue to seek WMD.

    Our cooperation with the United States in nonproliferation and fighting terrorism has served as a strong foundation for our relations, dubbed ``strategic partnership'' by Presidents Nursultan Nazarbayev and George Bush.

    The people of Kazakhstan were outraged by the horrific attacks of September 11, and we have worked closely with the United States in bringing peace and stability to Afghanistan. As of now, more than 1,000 coalition aircraft have flown over Kazakhstan as part of Operation Enduring Freedom. We have provided our major airport for the use by U.S. Air Force, and significantly expanded the cooperation between our armed forces and intelligence services.

    We have supported the American-led efforts to disarm Saddam Hussein, who failed to present clear evidence of the disarmament of Iraq and hence bore the full responsibility for the military action. Today, we stand united in bringing stability to that country and the region.

    It is crucial then that in this fragile time, policy-makers and people of both Kazakhstan and the United States make strong efforts to support our cooperation further. This will bode well with the long-term interests of both nations and will help us build a safer and more prosperous world.

1B) NATO Expansion Treaty

NATO EXPANSION TREATY

   The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order, the Senate will go into executive session to consider Executive Calendar No. 6, which the clerk will report.

   The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

   Resolution of Ratification to Accompany Treaty Document No. 108-4, Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on Accession of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.

   The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order, the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee is recognized prior to the vote on the resolution of ratification.

   Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, the Senate comes together this morning to ratify the accession of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia to the NATO alliance. It will be a truly historic vote in the Senate and a most important day in the histories of these nation-states. I am hopeful the Senate will support overwhelmingly this remarkable foreign policy initiative.

   When President Bush made his first trip to Warsaw Europe 2 years ago, he strongly voiced in his Warsaw address the U.S. commitment to Europe generally and to NATO in particular. Now, at a moment when relations with some of our European allies are strained, a clear showing of bipartisan support for NATO enlargement takes on added importance. The affirming message of the first round of enlargement led to improved alliance capabilities and strengthened transatlantic ties. I am confident that this second round will do the same. The eyes of a hopeful and expectant world are upon us. I ask my colleagues to join me in voting for this resolution of ratification.

   I would like to direct the attention of Senators to the balcony above where we are joined today by the Foreign Ministers of the seven aspirant states. They have come together with us today to witness our actions and to join with us on the Senate floor at the completion of the vote. At noon they will be hosted by the Secretary of State for lunch at the State Department and later by President Bush at a Rose Garden ceremony. Their presence, here today, is a personal witness to the close relationship our nations will enjoy as partners in the NATO Alliance.

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   I thank Senators for their cooperation and ask for their support of the enlargement of the NATO allliance .

   The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Delaware.

   Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, it is fitting on this day, which is the 58th anniversary of VE Day, the victory over Nazi tyranny in Europe, that the Senate is about to vote to admit seven countries that suffered under that tyranny and the tyranny of Communism--Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia--all of which have their Ambassadors present today and are very welcome.

   His Holiness Pope John Paul the II and President Reagan should be thanked for having hastened the fall of Communism in Europe. President George H.W. Bush should be thanked for the unification of Germany, and our President Bush for having widened the circle of the current round of NATO enlargement, and President Clinton, who skillfully led the way to the pathbreaking last round of enlargement which moved NATO into formerly Communist Central Europe.

   Today is a culmination of the work of a number of great men and women. I am just happy to be able to play a little tiny part.

   I urge everyone to vote, which I am confident they will, for accession.

   Mr. REED. Mr. President, I join my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to express my support for the ratification of the protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on the accession of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.

   NATO has been perhaps the most successful military alliance in history, ensuring the peace and security of Europe for over fifty years. I believe these seven countries will not only benefit immeasurably from their inclusion in NATO, but they will all serve to further strengthen the alliance in ways that we could not have imagined in 1949. Though they are all fledgling democracies, they bring with them a zeal for the democratic process that we all share.

   In 1997, I had concerns about admitting the last three nations into NATO--Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic. I had significant concerns about the cost we as a nation might incur by allowing these countries with immature political and social structures and outdated militaries to enter the alliance. But time has proven that these costs are less than we imagined, and I believe that the cost required to bring these next seven nations into the alliance should be well worth the investment.

   At the same time, I continue to have reservations about the likelihood of true interoperability with these seven new nations. These seven nations use military hardware that is a product of the Soviet armed forces, and it is rapidly reaching the end of its useful life. Very little of this equipment is compatible with the latest hardware, weapons, and ammunition currently utilized by the United States. The militaries of the seven new nations are also top heavy with senior officers who were trained under the old Soviet regime. As with the ground forces, their air forces are also products of the Soviet era, and are greatly outdated. Finally, interoperability within the communications arena will be extremely challenging, at best, until these militaries become proficient in English.

   Despite these misgivings, I still believe that we should admit these seven nations into the NATO alliance. The NATO alliance ensured victory in the Cold War and has preserved the peace in Europe for over fifty years. But in order to survive for the next fifty years, the alliance must be willing to make much-needed changes to its charter. I support the Warner-Levin-Roberts amendment and its two major provisions that the President of the United States placed on the agenda at the North Atlantic Council. First, I agree that we must eliminate the ``consensus rule,'' the antiquated requirement in the NATO charter that nearly prevented NATO from protecting one of its own members, Turkey, before the commencement of Operation Iraqi Freedom. This rule may have worked when the alliance was first formed in 1949 with its original 12 members, but it cannot work any longer. Secondly, I support the need for a new rule in NATO that authorizes the members of the alliance to suspend the membership of any country in NATO which no longer supports the ideals of the alliance. The recent refusal of support on the part of some of our NATO allies during the build-up for and execution of Operation Iraqi Freedom has again shown the need for such a change. Only with these two critical steps will NATO continue to thrive and be as critical to peace and security in the 21st Century as it was in the 20th Century.

   Mr. JEFFORDS. Mr. President, I will vote today to provide advice and consent to the ratification of the Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949, approving accession to the treaty by Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.

   While I will vote for this resolution of ratification, I do so with deep concerns over the future of NATO and its ability to serve as an effective military alliance. Five years ago, I voted against expanding NATO to include Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. I did so, in part, because of a belief that there was no logical end point once NATO began to expand. I was worried at that time that an expanded NATO would become unwieldy and lose focus on its primary mission as a defensive military alliance. Those fears continue today, magnified by the realities associated with seven additional members. However, having decided in 1998 to admit Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, there is little reason for the United States to reject the current round of NATO aspirants. Based on the logic of this latest round of expansion, I assume that this trend will continue, and that new members will be added in coming years as they meet NATO criteria, with the ultimate composition of the alliance becoming extremely diverse.

   I am greatly concerned that the inclusion of 10 new NATO members over the past 5 years demonstrates that the United States and its original NATO Allies are wavering from the original purpose of the alliance. Throughout the cold war, the alliance presented a unified front, functioning as an efficient, credible deterrent to aggression. With the radical expansion of alliance membership by over 50 percent since 1998, the alliance has jeopardized its ability to act decisively in times of crisis. I am concerned that the alliance has expanded to the point of becoming inefficient and unwieldy. It runs the risk that divergent views will lead to paralysis or, worse yet, irrelevance when action is required.

   The United States and Europe already have the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe to handle concerns related to promoting security in Europe, and there are several other organizations directed toward trade and the resolution of other political issues. I am concerned that an expanded NATO will be more suitable for discussion than action, and history has unfortunately shown that action is sometimes required. I continue to believe that the original decision in 1998 to expand NATO was a mistake, but reluctantly agree to accession by these seven countries.

   Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, today will go down as a remarkable day in the history of world diplomacy. I enthusiastically support the passage of Treaty Document No. 108-04, the Resolution of Ratification to the Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on the Accession of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.

   We are seizing a remarkable opportunity to extend the democratic zone of security, stability, tranquility, and mutual assistance eastward. I welcome the seven aspirant countries, and commend their efforts since the fall of their communist regimes 12 years ago to embrace democratic governance and liberal economic policies.

   I urge the adoption of the Resolution of Ratification because I believe that NATO expansion will bring positive security benefits to the United States. Sovereign states no longer pose the greatest threats to U.S. national security; transnational actors--terrorists groups and their networks of supporters do. I believe that the war on terrorism will only be won through effective cooperation between the U.S. and our allies around the world. Since 9/11, our NATO allies have helped tremendously in our attempt to thwart terrorist attacks here and abroad. The NATO accession of Bulgaria, Estonia,

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Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia will solidify the cooperation that already exists bilaterally between the U.S. and these seven countries.

   I do have one concern that I would like to mention: the rights of the large historic Hungarian minorities in Slovakia and Romania. I urge both countries' governments to continue to work with their Hungarian communities to resolve property restitution disputes and other contentious issues. And I urge the governments of all seven countries to pay continued attention to human rights so that all of their citizens may enjoy the benefits that accession to NATO will bring.

   I extend a special welcome to the distinguished Foreign Ministers and Ambassadors who have come to the Senate Chamber today from each of the seven countries. I welcome them to a crucial alliance, one that was formed in the wake of World War II to protect freedom and democracy, human rights, and rule of law through the combined strength of western military, intelligence, economic, and political assets.

   Mr. President, today's vote gives me great optimism about the future of our NATO alliance and about the contributions that these seven newest members will make for our collective peace, stability, freedom, and prosperity.

   Ms. MIKULSKI. Mr. President, I rise in support of ratification of the Protocol to the Washington Treaty to bring seven new members in the NATO alliance.

   Allies and partners make concrete and indispensable contributions to American national security in the complex and rapidly-changing post-cold war environment. Most security problems cannot be addressed unilaterally, and acting with others helps reduce the backlash against the United States. We are virtually always better off sharing the risks and burdens and costs with our allies. The NATO alliance has been a reliable cornerstone of America's national security since it was founded more than half a century ago.

   I believe we need to modernize and strengthen NATO as our key alliance in the 21st century. We need to do four things to make NATO stronger:

   First, we need to overcome differences over Iraq and other issues by working together to develop a common understanding of the threats we face, so we don't again face the challenge of NATO Allies refusing access to U.S. troops or denying protection to another ally.

   Second, our European partners need to modernize their military capabilities to be ready to take on any potential enemy or military task, and to ensure interoperability between U.S. and European forces.

   Third, NATO must be ready to act beyond Europe, because our common enemies and shared missions could be anywhere.

   Finally, NATO must be ready to fight new enemies rather than just conventional military forces. These threats include the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles, rogue states and ethnic conflicts, and terrorism.

   The limited debate and sparse opposition to further enlargement of NATO are a tribute to the success of the round of NATO enlargement we ratified in 1996. Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic are full and reliable NATO allies. They have already contributed to America's security, joining in the unanimous invocation of article 5 of the Washington Treaty, that an attack on one is an attack on all, after terrorists attacked the United States on September 11 of 2001.

   Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic are being fully integrated into Europe including membership in the European Union. But they understand the value of the trans-Atlantic alliance.

   I am particularly proud that Poland is always ready to stand with America. Poland sent ground forces for the war in Iraq, joining only two other allies: the United Kingdom and Australia.

   I strongly support NATO membership for the three Baltic states: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. These countries know freedom and are willing to fight for it, because they suffered so long under Soviet occupation. The Baltic states are working to help America confront new challenges now that the cold war is over.

   I had the opportunity to visit Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania a few years ago, and participate in the NATO parliamentary assembly meeting in Vilnius. I was truly impressed by the spirit and progress of the Estonian, Lithuanian and Latvian peoples. All three Baltic states are building modern armed forces to contribute to the security of NATO.

   I am particularly proud of the Maryland-Estonia partnership, under which the Maryland National Guard has helped organize and train Estonia's military. All three Baltic states have contributed to the war on terrorism and international peacekeeping missions.

   I urge my colleagues to join me in support of further enlargement of NATO. I believe this round of enlargement, like the last, will strengthen NATO. Strengthening NATO strengthens America's national security.

   Mr. EDWARDS. Mr. President, I rise in strong support of NATO's expansion and the ratification of the Treaty before us. For more than 50 years, the alliance has been the cornerstone of the U.S.-European relationship, and I believe that NATO remains our most important alliance. NATO's enlargement is critical to ensuring its continuing relevance in the 21st century.

   With the inclusion of 7 new members--Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia--NATO shows its commitment to establishing partnerships with its former adversaries and expanding the zone of freedom and security from Europe's West to Europe's East. Enlargement enables these countries to complete the journey they began with the end of Soviet communism, a journey that will make them part of a Europe that is whole, free and at peace.

   With this step, we also come closer to completing the vision outlined by President Bill Clinton nearly a decade ago. In January 1994, President Clinton first described the enlargement of NATO as one of not ``whether but when.'' Thanks to his strong leadership, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic joined the alliance in 1999, and NATO developed a new relationship with Russia. President George W. Bush deserves credit for continuing his predecessor's policies.

   I am deeply committed to NATO. A year ago, I voted in favor of the Freedom Consolidation Act, which stressed the importance of NATO and endorsed taking the step of enlargement. And last December, I went to NATO headquarters in Brussels and met with senior alliance officials, including Lord George Robertson, the superb NATO Secretary General; General Joe Ralston, then-NATO's military commander; our excellent U.S. Ambassador to NATO, Nick Burns; and several of his fellow NATO Ambassadors. I also visited London, where I met with the leader of one of our closest NATO allies, the United Kingdom's Tony Blair.

   In all of these discussions, we agreed that bringing these deserving countries into NATO was critical to making the alliance stronger. But we also agreed that enlargement was only the first step--and in some ways, that it might prove to be the easiest. This is remarkable, especially when considering how contentious the issue of NATO enlargement was less than half a decade ago, not only here in the Senate, but around the world.

   For NATO to continue to be a strong alliance, its members must meet at least two challenges. First, NATO members must close the gap in their military capabilities, and second, we must work to orient NATO toward new missions.

   The Europeans understand that in terms of military spending and modernization, they are just not keeping up. A big part of the problem is budgetary. Last year the U.S. spent twice as much on defense than every other NATO member combined. The $48 billion increase in military spending that Congress appropriated after the September 11, 2001, attacks was itself twice as much as Germany's entire defense budget.

   Everyone at NATO understands the problem. Lord Robertson repeatedly warns about it, but the question is whether our European partners can muster up the creativity and political will to get the job done. Since I believe that it is in the U.S. security interest

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to work more, not less, with our European partners, it is obvious that our partners need to be strong and capable of working with the United States.

   Beyond the issue of capabilities, NATO's members face an even more fundamental question: What is NATO's purpose? My answer is this: If NATO's cold war mission was to keep the peace in Europe, the real point of the Transatlantic security relationship in the 21st century is what we can do together outside of Europe. This includes addressing threats like terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and pandemics like HIV/AIDS. And it includes acting in places that NATO planners have considered ``out of area'': the Middle East, South and Central Asia, and Africa. The bottom line is that neither the United States nor Europe can tackle any of these problems alone. We need each other, and to neglect natural building blocks like NATO simply does not make any sense.

   Over the past 2 years, NATO has made historic strides in addressing these new threats. Following the September 11 attacks, NATO Allies came together and, for the first time, invoked the alliance's self defense clause. NATO partners are on the ground today in Afghanistan. Later this year, the alliance itself will assume command of the international security force in Afghanistan.

   I also believe that NATO can and should play a central role in providing security in a postwar Iraq. We all know that many NATO members were deeply divided over the issue of what to do about Iraq. But now that the war is over, I believe that we have an opportunity to reaffirm NATO's importance and relevance--as well as America's commitment to the Alliance--by looking for ways to include NATO in providing security today in Iraq. Doing so would not only lend credibility to America's efforts in Iraq, but over the coming months and years ease the burden on the American people. This is a test, a test not just for NATO but for American leadership in NATO.

   This is not the first time America's leadership in NATO has been tested. In fact, the question of whether or not to enlarge NATO was a test of American leadership, and with our vote today, we will have met that test. Now, I believe we have to show the same sense of commitment and resolve to help NATO meet the new challenges we face in Iraq and elsewhere.

   The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Chair recognizes the minority leader.

   Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, I commend Senators LUGAR and BIDEN for their historic achievement this morning. This has been an effort that has enjoyed strong bipartisan support within our country and within the Senate. I commend them especially for their remarkable leadership in bringing us to this point.

   I also welcome the Foreign Ministers and Ambassadors who join us on this momentous occasion from Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. I welcome them to NATO; I welcome them here. This is truly a historic day.

   We continue today what we did on VE Day, now more than 50 years ago, what thousands of our GIs, including my father, started more than 60 years ago with the landing at Normandy, the creation of a Europe that is whole and that is free.

   This is the beginning of a partnership that will produce greater world stability, greater international involvement in world affairs, and a partnership with countries that will increasingly become valuable partners and allies of the United States.

   Expanding NATO to include these seven democracies will make NATO stronger and the United States safer.

   Five years ago we undertook to expand NATO for the first time. At that time, the debate hung on this critical question: Should NATO limit its mission to defending a fixed list of nations, selected more than 50 years ago, against an enemy that no longer existed? Or does it exist to provide a collective security umbrella armed to defend an alliance of free countries--countries that have demonstrated not only a deep commitment to democracy, but a willingness to defend it?

   A strong, bipartisan majority answered that question by voting to enlarge NATO to meet the threats of a new world. The results of that decision did not disappoint.

   On September 12, 2001, for the first time in its history, NATO invoked Article 5, and mobilized to defeat the threat of terrorism. NATO aircraft patrolled American skies and later this summer NATO will take over control of the Security Force in Afghanistan. Today we have the opportunity to take the next step and strengthen NATO yet again.

   Each of the seven countries seeking to join our alliance has made the democratic reforms that inclusion in NATO demands. We could not have made this contention 15 years ago. But due to the foresight and perseverance of the citizens of each of these countries, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia are all today strong democracies.

   Emerging from a history of foreign occupation, and defending themselves against the threats of corruption and organized crime, these nations have affirmed their commitment to democracy both in word and in deed. They have earned the right to be members of NATO. With that right, comes a responsibility, and they have shown a willingness to meet that responsibility.

   Each has contributed to the peacekeeping missions in the Balkans. Each contributed to Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom. Each has contributed to the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan and have pledged contributions for the reconstruction of Iraq.

   As important as our shared values are, NATO remains, at its core, a defensive alliance.

   As such, the forces of alliance members must remain capable of defending against a significant military threat--in Europe and beyond.

   At Prague, NATO members pledged to transform NATO to make it better able to address the threats we face now.

   Gone are the days of defending the Fulda Gap in the heart of Europe. Now we must be ready to counter the elusive and ever-present threat of terrorism, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction far outside the borders of Europe.

   Each of our new partners will bring specialized capabilities to the alliance.

   In Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Balkans, we have seen first-hand the expertise of Bulgarian and Slovak anti-nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons teams; Slovenian de-mining units; and Romanian mountain troops.

   We will continue to draw on their skills as we carry forward our efforts to defeat terror and restore stability to Afghanistan and Iraq.

   The addition of new members amplifies the need to close the disparities between the United States and our Allies.

   We are encouraged by our new members ``niche capabilities.'' But the differences between the United States and its NATO Allies in transport, logistics, communications, and intelligence capabilities risk undercutting the alliance.

   As we take this momentous step today--of extending the NATO security guarantee to seven new countries stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea--we remind our friends, new and old, of their responsibility to invest in the capabilities of our brothers in arms.

   We also must not permit periodic disagreements to erode the common cause that has made NATO the most successful military alliance in history.

   The feud in the North Atlantic Council over how to aid Turkey in the event of an attack by Iraq exposed serious divisions in NATO. Subsequent discussion of a EU-based security arrangement as an alternative to NATO does little to ease those divisions.

   These are not insurmountable challenges, but this alliance, like our key alliances in Asia, demand communication, attention, and diplomacy.

   Handled correctly, this new and newly energized NATO can play a central role in post-Saddam Iraq--a role that can ease the burden on America's troops and American taxpayers.

   I am proud to cast my vote for this resolution on the anniversary of one of our Nation's most glorious achievements--V-E Day, May 8.

   My father was an Army sergeant in World War II. He landed on the beaches of Normandy with the 6th Armored Division on ``D Plus 1''--June 7, 1944.

   One of his many duties was getting word back to the States about the dead

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and missing so their families could be notified. That experience left him with a profound respect for the sacrifices democracy sometimes demands. It is a lesson he passed on to his four sons.

   He taught my brothers and me another lesson: When you make a promise, you keep it.

   With this vote, the United States makes a promise--a promise to protect our Allies, old and new, from any threat that may emerge in the years to come.

   In return, we expect their wholehearted commitment to stand with us to continue the push for a Europe, whole and free. That effort began over 60 years ago with the blood and effort of soldiers like my father. By advancing their cause, this treaty honors their sacrifice.

   I yield the floor.

   The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The majority leader.

   Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, 6 months ago, I traveled to Prague to support and bear witness to the historic decision of President Bush and the leaders of the Atlantic alliance to invite seven countries to join NATO. Today, on the 58th anniversary of Victory in Europe Day, the United States will vote to ratify in this Senate that vision of a free Europe, stretching from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea.

   I commend the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Lugar, and the ranking member, Senator Biden, for their efforts to support this goal. I also thank the Democratic leader, Senator Daschle, for helping to make this happen.

   In the few years I have been in Washington and in my few short months as majority leader of the Senate, I have seen few ideas that are so untroubled by political differences, that so united the Senate and the Nation, and that so completely fortified the very foundation of our liberty--that democratic government shall be defended and that freedom shall prevail.

   These are exhilarating times in which we live. In just over a dozen years, we have seen the collapse of the Soviet Union, the freeing of captive nations, the collapse and defeat of tyrannical dictatorships, and the birth of new democracies across Europe, Latin America, the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. Each of these victories for freedom has been hard fought and each is worthy of defending.

   It should be instructive to us that all seven of these soon-to-be NATO Allies were already on our side in the recent fight to liberate Iraq because they had to fight for their own liberation. They understand that freedom is not free.

   It has often been said that during the long years of the cold war, America's example inspired Europe's freedom fighters, but to many of us, it is their example which is truly inspiring. To those from the ranks of Europe's new democracies who watch this morning as we cast our votes on this important treaty, I say: Thank you for your example and thank you for your inspiration.

   Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on the resolution of ratification.

   The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there a sufficient second?

   There is a sufficient second.

   The question is on agreeing to the resolution of ratification, as amended. The clerk will call the roll.

   The legislative clerk called the roll.

   Mr. McCONNELL. I announce that the Senator from Alaska (Ms. MURKOWSKI) is necessarily absent.

   Mr. REID. I announce that the Senator from Delaware (Mr. CARPER), the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. KENNEDY), and the Senator from Connecticut (Mr. LIEBERMAN) are necessarily absent.

   I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. KENNEDY) would vote ``aye''.

   The yeas and nays resulted--yeas 96, nays 0

1C) Expand DoD Authority for Nunn-Lugar Programs

  • Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to introduce legislation that is of utmost importance to our national security and our future as a global community. My legislation will expand the Defense Department's authority for Nunn-Lugar cooperative threat reduction programs outside of the former Soviet Union. My bill will authorize efforts to dismantle and destroy nuclear , chemical, and other weapons of mass destruction in nations such as Pakistan, India, North Korea, China, Iran, and Iraq. These programs have a single objective: to reduce stockpiles of nuclear (and non-nuclear ) materials in both military and nonmilitary facilities that may be converted to weapons of mass destruction to prevent such highly dangerous materials from being stolen or sold to terrorist organizations.
  • It is critical for our national security to ensure that terrorists do not have easy access to weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons. Over a decade ago, the landmark Nunn-Lugar cooperative threat reduction legislation, the initiative of Senators Nunn and Lugar, was signed into law. This initiative was born out of necessity to ensure that the nuclear arsenal of the Soviet Union would not fall into the wrong hands as the Soviet empire was coming apart. Throughout the latter half of the Cold War, the Soviet and the US camps had achieved mutually assured destruction capability, which had resulted in an uneasy yet stable security with regard to our nuclear arsenals. The enemy was clear and identifiable. However, the demise of the Soviet empire ushered in a new post-Cold War period with unclear and unidentifiable threats, and a new and very real sense of urgency, instability and insecurity.
  • At this critical juncture, Congress established the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program in 1991, authorizing the use of Defense Department funds to assist with the safe and secure transportation, storage, and dismantlement of nuclear , chemical and other weapons in the former Soviet Union. In the ten years since, while much has been done to dismantle Russia's and the former Soviet Republics' nuclear weapons, the dangers persist, and in some cases have increased.
  • In addition to the traditional nuclear weapons and materials concerns in the former Soviet Union, there are new and emerging threats from nuclear proliferators such as North Korea, Pakistan, and China, as well as Libya, Iran, Iraq, and stateless terrorist organizations headed by individuals such as Osama Bin Laden, that are actively in search of their next deal on nuclear weapons technology and components. It is this latter type of threat--the unclear, mobile, and not easily identifiable source of threat--that compels us to continue and increase our efforts to secure nuclear weapons and materials wherever they may be found.
  • The world has changed, and with it so to have the threats. We cannot afford to cut back on such worthwhile programs as Nunn-Lugar and other non-proliferation programs. There is much work to be done, and we must be increasingly vigilant in an ever-changing world with new threats that go far beyond nuclear weapons.
  • Significant progress has been made thus far, as reported in the May 2001 Cooperative Threat Reduction Scorecard issued by the Department of Defense. With regard to the established CTR Baseline attributed to Russia under the START process, the Nunn-Lugar program has successfully deactivated 5,504 of the 13,3000 Warheads; destroyed 423 of the 1,473 ICBMs; eliminated 383 of the 831 ICBM Silos; eliminated 85 of the 167 Bombers; destroyed 483 of the 487 Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs; eliminated 352 of the 728 SLBM Launchers; eliminated 209 of the 936 SLBMs; destroyed 19 of the 48 SSBNs; and sealed all 194 Nuclear Test Tunnels. In addition, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus--the three former Soviet nuclear powerhouses--are nuclear weapons free, according to the Defense Threat Reduction Agency of the Department of Defense.
  • The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program can and should be credited for significant achievements in reducing threats from the former Soviet Union. However, continuing economic and social weaknesses in Russia, coupled with an eroding early warning system, poorly secured Russian nuclear , biological and chemical weapons and materials, and poorly paid Russian weapons scientists and security personnel, increase the threat of mass destruction on an unprecedented scale, especially if they fall into the hands of terrorists or rogue nations.
    [Page: E920]  GPO's PDF
  • Mr. Speaker, now more than ever we must make a fundamental shift in the way we think about nuclear weapons, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and our national security. My bill will authorize the Department of Defense to expand their cooperative threat reduction programs outside of the former Soviet Union.
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MISSILE DEFENSE
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2A)Strengthening Munitions Export Control

SEC. 1201. CONTROL OF ITEMS ON MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME ANNEX.

    (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS- It is the sense of Congress that all proposals to export or transfer to foreign persons by other means, whether in the United States or abroad, and any other activities subject to regulation under section 38, 39, or 40 of the Arms Export Control Act, relating to items on the Missile Technology Control Regime Annex, should be accorded stringent control and scrutiny consistent with the purposes of section 71 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2797).

    (b) CONTROL OF ITEMS ON MTCR ANNEX- The Secretary, in coordination with the Secretary of Commerce, the Attorney General, and the Secretary of Defense, shall ensure that all items on the MTCR Annex are subject to stringent control by the United States Government pursuant to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations and the Export Administration Regulations.

    (c) CERTIFICATION- Not later than March 1 of each year, the Secretary, in coordination with the Secretary of Commerce, the Attorney General and the Secretary of Defense, shall prepare and submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that contains--

      (1) a certification that the requirement of subsection (b) has been met for the prior year, or if the requirement has not been met, the reasons therefor; and

      (2) a description of the updated coverage, if any, of the regulations referred to in subsection (b) with respect to all items on the MTCR Annex and an explanation of any areas of overlap or omissions, if any, among the regulations.

SEC. 1202. CERTIFICATIONS RELATING TO EXPORT OF CERTAIN DEFENSE ARTICLES AND SERVICES.

    Section 36(c) (22 U.S.C. 2776(c)) is amended--

      (1) in the first sentence of paragraph (1), by inserting after `$1,000,000 or more' the following: `, or, notwithstanding section 27(g) of this Act, for any special comprehensive authorization under sections 120-130 of title 22, Code of Federal Regulations (commonly known as the `International Traffic in Arms Regulations') for the export of defense articles or defense services in an aggregate amount of $100,000,000 or more';

      (2) in paragraph (2)--

        (A) by striking subparagraph (B); and

        (B) by redesignating subparagraph (C) as subparagraph (B); and

      (3) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A) of paragraph (5), by inserting `or paragraph (2)' after `paragraph (1)'.

2B) Missile Threat Reduction Act of 2002

TITLE XIV--MISSILE THREAT REDUCTION ACT OF 2003

SEC. 1401. SHORT TITLE.

    This title may be cited as the `Missile Threat Reduction Act of 2003'.

Subtitle A--Strengthening International Missile Nonproliferation Law

SEC. 1411. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:

      (1) The spread of offensive ballistic missiles suitable for launching nuclear, chemical, and biological warheads is accelerating across the globe.

      (2) According to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, more than 25 countries possess missiles with ranges in excess of 300 kilometers and capable of delivering a nuclear warhead.

      (3)(A) Many of the countries now possessing such missiles, and engaging in the sale and transfer of such missiles and their production technology to other countries, are directly hostile to the United States, its interests, and its allies.

      (B) Of particular concern in this regard is North Korea, which regularly sells ballistic missiles and technology to countries in regions of instability and concern to the United States.

      (4) The Central Intelligence Agency has stated in its most recent report on the foreign ballistic missile threat the following:

        `Emerging ballistic missile states continue to increase the range, reliability, and accuracy of the missile systems in their inventories--posing ever greater risks to U.S. forces, interests, and allies throughout the world. A decade ago, U.S. and allied forces abroad faced threats from SRBM's [Short Range Ballistic Missiles]--primarily the Scud and its variants. Today, countries have deployed or are on the verge of deploying MRBM's [Medium Range Ballistic Missiles], placing greater numbers of targets at risk.

        `Proliferation of ballistic missile-related technologies, materials, and expertise--especially by Russian, Chinese, and North Korean entities--has enabled emerging missile states to accelerate the development timelines for their existing programs, acquire turnkey systems to gain previously non-existent capabilities--in the case of the Chinese sale of the M-11 SRBM to Pakistan--and lay the groundwork for the expansion of domestic infrastructures to potentially accommodate even more capable and longer range future systems.'.

      (5) The same CIA report also noted the following: `North Korea has assumed the role as the missile and manufacturing technology source for many programs. North Korean willingness to sell complete systems and components has enabled other states to acquire longer range capabilities earlier than otherwise would have been possible--notably the sale of the No Dong MRBM to Pakistan. The North also has helped countries to acquire technologies to serve as the basis for domestic development efforts--as with Iran's reverse-engineering of the No Dong in the Shahab-3 program. Meanwhile, Iran is expanding its efforts to sell missile technology.'.

      (6) Since 1987, 33 countries have committed to abide by a voluntary set of guidelines known as the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), whereby adherents agreed to refrain from the transfer to nonadherents of certain categories of whole missiles, their constituent parts, and the facilities to manufacture them, especially `Category I' missiles, which at a range of 300 kilometers or more and a payload capacity of 500 kilograms or more are especially suited for delivering nuclear weapons.

      (7) In October 2002, 93 countries committed to observe a nonbinding code of conduct derived from, but less restrictive than, the nonbinding MTCR. While this is a welcome achievement, it does not provide a legal obligation on its adherents to refrain from the trade in missiles or missile technology.

      (8) On December 10, 2002, the White House released its `National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction', wherein it is stated that strengthening international nonproliferation controls on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and upon the missiles that can deliver them is the second of three principal pillars of the National Strategy. The National Strategy also states that `effective interdiction is a critical part of the U.S. strategy to combat WMD and their delivery means'.

      (9) On December 11, 2002, the United States took control of an unflagged freighter that was attempting clandestinely to ship, from North Korea to Yemen, SCUD missiles of a type that would be generally prohibited from transfer as Category I missiles.

      (10) Neither North Korea nor Yemen is an adherent to the MTCR guidelines, which in any case are not legally binding, and there is no binding international legal instrument that would prohibit shipments of the missiles referred to in paragraph (9).

      (11) At Yemen's request, the United States released the shipment of North Korean Scud missiles to Yemen.

      (12) Also on December 11, 2002, the White House press spokesman stated that existing international law regarding halting the spread of missile proliferation could be strengthened. The new National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction also commits the United States to support those regimes that are currently in force, and to work to improve the effectiveness of, and compliance with, those regimes, and identifies the MTCR as a regime that the United States will seek to strengthen.

      (13) Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, testifying on February 12, 2003, before the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, stated the following: `...[I]t's pretty clear that the proliferation regimes that exist in the world worked pretty well before, [but] they're not working very well right now.... [U]nless the world wakes up and says this is a dangerous thing and creates a set of regimes that will in fact get cooperation to stop those weapons, we're going to be facing a very serious situation in the next five years.'.

      (14) The MTCR has made an invaluable contribution to restraint in the international trade of offensive ballistic missiles. Strengthening international controls on ballistic missiles, however, will require a dramatic expansion of adherents that rigorously abide by the MTCR's guidelines, and a binding legal basis for the United Nations and countries devoted to nonproliferation to prevent, and when necessary act to prevent, further proliferation of offensive ballistic missiles around the world.

      (15) Therefore, it should be the policy of the United States to promote the creation of new international mechanisms that would, in all future circumstances, allow the peace-loving and law-abiding nations of the world the authority to interdict and prevent the transfer of such missiles.

SEC. 1412. POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES.

    It shall be the policy of the United States to seek a binding international instrument or instruments to restrict the trade in offensive ballistic missiles with ranges of 300 kilometers or more that have a payload capacity of 500 kilograms or more. Such a binding international instrument may take the form of a multilateral treaty, a United Nations Security Council resolution, or other instrument of international law, and should provide for enforcement measures including interdiction, seizure, and impoundment of illicit shipments of offensive ballistic missiles and related technology, equipment, and components.

SEC. 1413. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

    It is the sense of the Congress that the United States should immediately introduce a resolution in the United Nations Security Council to prohibit all members of the United Nations from purchasing, receiving, assisting or allowing the transfer of, and to authorize the subsequent interdiction, seizure, and impoundment of, any missile, missile-related equipment, means of producing missiles, or missile-related technology from North Korea.

Subtitle B--Strengthening United States Missile Nonproliferation Law

SEC. 1421. PROBATIONARY PERIOD FOR FOREIGN PERSONS.

    (a) IN GENERAL- Notwithstanding any other provision of law, upon the expiration, or the granting of a waiver, on or after January 1, 2003, of sanctions against a foreign person imposed under section 73(a) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2797b(a)) or under section 11B(b)(1) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2410b(b)(1)), as continued in effect under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, a license shall be required, for a period of not less than 3 years, for the export to that foreign person of all items controlled for export under section 5 or 6 of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2404, 2405), as continued in effect under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, in accordance with the Export Administration Regulations.

    (b) TERMINATION- Subsection (a) shall not apply to a foreign person 30 days after the President notifies the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate that he has determined that--

      (1) the foreign person has--

        (A) ceased all activity related to the original imposition of sanctions under section 73(a) of the Arms Export Control Act or section 11B(b)(A) of the Export Administration Act of 1979, as the case may be; and

        (B) has instituted a program of transparency measures whereby the United States will be able to verify for at least a period of 3 years that the foreign person is not engaging in prohibited activities under those provisions of law referred to in paragraph (1); and

      (2) there has been an appropriate resolution of the original violation or violations, such as financial penalties, incarceration, destruction of prohibited items, or other appropriate measures taken to prevent a recurrence of the violation or violations.

SEC. 1422. STRENGTHENING UNITED STATES MISSILE PROLIFERATION SANCTIONS ON FOREIGN PERSONS.

    (a) ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT- Section 73(a)(2) (22 U.S.C. 2797b(a)(2)) is amended by striking `2 years' each place it appears and inserting `4 years'.

    (b) PUBLIC INFORMATION- Section 73(e)(2) (22 U.S.C. 2797b(e)(2)) is amended by adding at the end the following new sentence: `Such report may be classified only to the extent necessary to protect intelligence sources and methods. If the report is so classified, the President shall make every effort to acquire sufficient alternative information that would allow a subsequent unclassified version of the report to be issued.'.

    (c) EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT OF 1979- Any sanction imposed on a foreign person under section 11B(b)(1) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2410b(b)(1)), as continued in effect under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, shall be in effect for a period of 4 years beginning on the date on which the sanction was imposed.

    (d) APPLICABILITY- The amendments made by subsections (a) and (b) and the provisions of subsection (c) shall apply to all sanctions imposed under section 73(a) of the Arms Export Control Act or section 11B(b)(1) of the Export Administration Act of 1979, as continued in effect under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, by reason of acts giving rise to such sanctions that were committed by foreign persons on or after January 1, 2003.

SEC. 1423. COMPREHENSIVE UNITED STATES MISSILE PROLIFERATION SANCTIONS ON ALL RESPONSIBLE PERSONS.

    (a) ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT- Section 73(a) (22 U.S.C. 2797b(a)) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

    `(3)(A) Sanctions imposed upon a foreign person under paragraph (2) shall also be imposed on any governmental entity that the President determines exercises effective control over, benefits from, or directly or indirectly facilitates the activities of that foreign person.

    `(B) When a sanction is imposed on a foreign person under paragraph (2), the President may also impose that sanction on any other person or entity that the President has reason to believe has or may acquire items that may not be exported to that foreign person on account of the sanction imposed on that foreign person, with the intent to transfer to that foreign person, or provide to that foreign person access to, such items.

    `(C) The President may also prohibit, for such period of time as he may determine, any transaction or dealing, by a United States person or within the United States, with any foreign person on whom sanctions have been imposed under this subsection.

    `(D) The President shall report on an annual basis to the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate the identity of any foreign person that engages in any transaction or activity with a foreign person on whom sanctions have been imposed under this subsection that either--

      `(i) would be the basis for imposing sanctions under subparagraph (B) but for which sanctions have not been imposed; or

      `(ii) would be the basis for imposing sanctions under subparagraph (C) if the transaction or activity had been carried out by a United States person or by a person in the United States.

    Such report shall be unclassified to the maximum extent feasible, but may include a classified annex.'.

    (b) DEFINITION OF PERSON- Section 74(a)(8)(A) (22 U.S.C. 2797c(a)(8)(A)) is amended to read as follows:

      `(8)(A) the term `person' means--

        `(i) a natural person;

        `(ii) a corporation, business association, partnership, society, trust, transnational corporation, or transnational joint venture, any other nongovernmental entity, organization, or group, and any governmental entity;

        `(iii) any subsidiary, subunit, or parent entity of any business enterprise or other organization or entity listed in clause (ii); and

        `(iv) any successor of any business enterprise or other organization or entity listed in clause (ii) or (iii); and'.

    (c) EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT OF 1979-

      (1) SANCTIONS IMPOSED ON GOVERNMENT ENTITIES- Any sanction imposed on a foreign person under section 11B(b)(1)(B) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2410b(b)(1)(B)), as continued in effect under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (in this subsection referred to as a `dual use sanction'), shall also be imposed on any governmental entity that the President determines exercises effective control over, benefits from, or directly or indirectly facilitates the activities of that foreign person.

      (2) OTHER ENTITIES- When a dual use sanction is imposed on a foreign person, the President may also impose that sanction on any other person or entity that the President has reason to believe has or may acquire items that may not be exported to that foreign person on account of the dual use sanction imposed on that foreign person, with the intent to transfer to that foreign person, or provide to that foreign person access to, such items.

      (3) TRANSACTIONS BY THIRD PARTIES- The President may also prohibit, for such period of time as he may determine, any transaction or dealing, by a United States person or within the United States, with any foreign person on whom dual use sanctions have been imposed.

      (4) REPORT- The President shall submit on an annual basis to the appropriate congressional committees a report that contains the identity of any foreign person that engages in any transaction or activity with a foreign person on whom dual use sanctions have been imposed that either--

        (A) would be the basis for imposing dual use sanctions under paragraph (2) but for which such sanctions have not been imposed; or

        (B) would be the basis for imposing dual use sanctions under paragraph (3) if the transaction or activity had been carried out by a United States person or by a person in the United States.

      Such report shall be unclassified to the maximum extent feasible, but may include a classified annex.

      (5) DEFINITIONS- In this subsection:

        (A) PERSON- The term `person' means--

          (i) a natural person;

          (ii) a corporation, business association, partnership, society, trust, transnational corporation, or transnational joint venture, any other nongovernmental entity, organization, or group, and any governmental entity;

          (iii) any subsidiary, subunit, or parent entity of any business enterprise or other organization or entity listed in clause (ii); and

          (iv) any successor of any business enterprise or other organization or entity listed in clause (ii) or (iii).

        (B) In the case of countries where it may be impossible to identify a specific governmental entity referred to in subparagraph (A), the term `person' means--

          (i) all activities of that government relating to the development or production of any missile equipment or technology; and

          (ii) all activities of that government affecting the development or production of aircraft, electronics, and space systems or equipment.

        (C) UNITED STATES PERSON- The term `United States person' has the meaning given that term in section 16(2) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2415(2)).

        (D) MISSILE EQUIPMENT OR TECHNOLOGY- The term `missile equipment or technology' has the meaning given that term in section 11B(c) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2410b(c)).

    (d) EFFECTIVE DATE- The amendments made by subsections (a) and (b) shall apply with respect to sanctions imposed on or after January 1, 2003, on foreign persons under section 73(a)(2) of the Arms Export Control Act, and the provisions of subsection (c) shall apply with respect to sanctions imposed on or after January 1, 2003, on foreign persons under section 11B(b) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2410b(b)), as continued in effect under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act.

Subtitle C--Incentives for Missile Threat Reduction

SEC. 1431. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE.

    (a) TYPES OF ASSISTANCE- The President is authorized to provide, on such terms as the President deems appropriate, the following assistance to countries that agree to destroy their ballistic missiles, and their facilities for producing ballistic missiles, that have a payload capacity of 500 kilograms or more over a distance of 300 kilometers or more:

      (1) Assistance under section 23 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2763).

      (2) Assistance under chapter 4 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2346 et seq.), notwithstanding section 531(e) or 660(a) of that Act (22 U.S.C. 2346(e) or 2420(a)).

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CHEM/ BIO AND WMD TERRORISM
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3A) Reform Needed at United Nations
Mr. FOSSELLA. Mr. Speaker, as the President of the United States has indicated, the war against terror is far from over. The battle may be won but it is far from over. Therefore, I think it is important that the United Nations step up to the plate and reflect reality and serve in the positive role that it can. That is why I think H.R. 800 is a needed step toward reform at the United Nations. It reduces U.S. funding for United Nations commissions like the Commission on Human Rights which have been hijacked by terrorist nations. The latest outrage is Cuba. The dictatorship is in the midst of a brutal crackdown, having executed three men for trying to escape Cuba and imprisoned dozens of others for daring to speak out. The U.N. said nothing about the crackdown but elected Cuba to another term on the human rights panel. The current chair of that panel is Libya, that beacon of human rights. At the beginning of the year, Iraq was going to head the Conference on Disarmament . Iraq did not take over but remained on the commission. Iran chairs that conference. North Korea and Cuba also sit on the Disarmament Committee. This is all symptomatic of a culture of carelessness at the U.N. It would not be as grave if not for the fact that the United States pays 22 percent of the United Nations' operating budget. Diplomacy and dialogue are important, but sometimes dollars are the only thing that makes sense.

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IRAQ
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4A)Lessons Learned Since September 11

There is a myth that during the Reagan years the Cold War was ended because of some kind of bipartisan cooperation. I will tell my colleagues from the inside of the White House, we did not see much bipartisan cooperation. Yes, there were about one-fourth of the Democrats who were willing to stand by the administration when the fighting was hardest with the Communists; but by and large, every time Ronald Reagan tried to make a stand against the Communists during his 8 years as President, there was an active group of people on the other side of the aisle who were doing their best to fight those who were fighting Communism. They were anti-, anti-Communists; and it is a miracle that the President was able to succeed in the way he did with the type of people who were undermining his efforts.

   The Communists invested in a whole bunch of intermediate range missiles they put into Europe and immediately said let us have a freeze and left them in a position of superiority, and then we have the nuclear freeze movement which was supported by, unfortunately, many people on the other side of the

[Page: H3676]
aisle; and Ronald Reagan stepped forward and said, no way, we are not going to freeze them into a superior position, and then offered, as Ronald Reagan always does and always did, a positive alternative, let us bring the number of missiles down to zero, let us agree to eliminate the class of intermediate range of missiles in Europe which, by the way, he was called names. He was made fun of. They called him an amiable dunce. They were suggesting he does not know what he is talking about, the Russians will never agree to that; and of course, within 5 years there was an agreement signed with the Russians to do precisely that.

   These whiners have been with us every time America takes a stand, and it is not just against Communism. We are talking about, these are people predicting doom whenever we try to act. It seems there are people that are part of our political system, part of our political spectrum here that have a compulsive lack of faith in America itself, and they were suggesting all kinds of horrible scenarios of what was going to happen if we took a stand and acted against Saddam Hussein; and they were the ones claiming within a very short period of time after Afghanistan started, oh, are we bogging down in Afghanistan.

   After 1 week of fighting, well, remember, let us not forget these predictions and let us learn from them. It was predicted that there would be a major tank battle, Saddam's Republican Guard was going to engage us in a major tank battle outside of Baghdad. Whatever happened to that? I will tell my colleagues what happened to it. We had the technology to destroy most of those tanks before they started moving up to any position where they could threaten our troops. What tank battles there were were limited. Our people were very brave; but by and large, that major tank battle, historic tank battle that would be on the scale of El Alamein and all the rest never happened.

[Time: 22:00]

   What about the gas attacks and the nuclear attacks that were going to vaporize our soldiers, this fear which immobilized so many people. We have to stop our President from putting our troops in or they were going to be gassed and vaporized by nuclear weapons. That, of course, never happened.

   Some ask what happened to the weapons of mass destruction the President was talking about? Let me just note I have been a strong supporter of the President from the very beginning. I have called for eliminating Saddam Hussein for many years. When I was first elected is when we went to the war in the Gulf and I told DICK CHENEY and Colin Powell then not to start this fight unless we are going to finish it. And yes, I have been critical of President Clinton, and now let us be critical of President Bush's father. He did not finish the job. He left us vulnerable, and left a homicidal maniac in charge of the country of Iraq. Well, that was not the responsible course of action, just like many things that Clinton did were not responsible, but we had to make up for it.

   I have never suggested that Saddam Hussein had to have weapons of mass destruction for us to justify joining with the people of Iraq or helping liberate the people of Iraq from this dictator or monster because he had a blood grudge against us. It was prudent for us to eliminate that dictator before he was able to amass these mountains of money that were predicted because of the oil revenues that Iraq could expect in the future years, these tens of billions of dollars. He would have bought himself a chemical, biological or nuclear weapon. He would not have to build it; he would have bought chemical and biological weapons. He would have overthrown the Saudis with the tens of billions of dollars of oil money that he was about to reap. No, it made no sense to leave that man there.

   We can be proud our President made the stand, even while everyone was throwing up their hands and nitpicking and naysaying and predicting horrible things. How many times did we hear: Why did we rush to this? The President took month after month after month trying to work it out peacefully, and then he was castigated as if he was rushing into war.

   We should remember that because those who were predicting weeks of house-to-house combat, building by building would have to be taken, and urban fighting. That never materialized. It never materialized. We kept saying the people of Iraq do not want to live in a dictatorship. And yes, President Saddam Hussein did have his gang of thugs that were somewhat of a threat, but the people of Iraq have by and large been on our side.

   What about the massive demonstrations that were going to be precipitated by America's adventurism overseas? And of course as the war ran its course, opposition actually declined. The number of people going into these demonstrations and saying and having all of these very negative thoughts about our country and troop deployment, they decreased over the days of this military operation. And of course now that it has ended in a very successful way, no one is out demonstrating.

   Remember if we did this, there were predictions that there would be chaos and destabilization throughout the Arab world and the region and there in the Persian Gulf. Oh, the instability this would create. There would be wars springing up everywhere and regimes falling and it would create a much less safe world. That did not happen, did it?

   But we heard all of these predictions. Let us not forget them. Let us not forget who was making those predictions and the speeches we heard right here on this floor by people making these very same predictions and doing their best to make sure that the American people had no confidence in their President's leadership during this vital moment in our history.

   So what about the chaos and destabilization? It did not happen. What about the urban fighting that was supposed to go on for weeks? It did not happen. What about the vaporization of our troops with gas and nuclear weapons? That did not happen.

   What about the Shiites rising up? There have been a few Shiite demonstrations, and most have been religious marches because under Saddam Hussein they were restricted from demonstrating their faith for 20 years. Finally, there are hundreds of thousands of them marching for their religious faith; but the left wing of this country, the news media, ends up characterizing that as being anti-American. No, the power play by some Shiites who are politically motivated in that direction numbered a couple thousand people, and we have made it clear to the people of Iraq that they are going to elect their own leaders and we are going to set up a system, we are going to work with them for a couple of years, and set up the institutions necessary for them to elect their own leaders.

   Mr. Speaker, I have no doubt some Shiites are going to be elected, but they are not going to be elected in the name of establishing a theocracy like Iran. They just got rid of their dictatorship. Clearly the people of Iraq would like to live in freedom; and yes, there are some powermongers there, but we are not going to let them get away with it, and the people of Iraq are not going to let them pressure their way into power.

   Remember the predictions about the Turks. They were going to invade the Kurdish areas in the northern part of Iraq. These Turks were going to come in and grab the oil and there would be bloodshed and chaos. Funny thing, that prediction did not come true either. Just remember who made these predictions.

   All I am suggesting is let us learn, America, from what we have just gone through so when people get up in the future and undercut a President who is trying to make a tough stand to secure the blessings of peace and liberty for future Americans we will be able to stick behind him and we will know that the naysayers will always be with us, and the naysayers will always try to undercut a President that is acting on the behalf of the United States of America perhaps because psychologically they just down deep have such little faith in our own system because they only see the flaws in America.


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