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Congressional Record Weekly Update

May 12-16, 2003

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NUCLEAR/ NONPROLIFERATION
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1A) Nuclear Infrastructure Security Act of 2003
 S. 1043. A bill to provide for the security of commercial nuclear power plants and facilities designated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission; referred to the Committee on Environment and Public Works.

1B) Low-Level Radioactive Waste Act of 2003
 S. 1045. A bill to strengthen United States capabilities to safely and securely dispose of all greater-than-Class C low-level radioactive waste; to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources.

   Mr. AKAKA. Mr. President, I rise to introduce the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Act of 2003. I am pleased that the Ranking Member of the Energy and Natural Resources Committee, Senator BINGAMAN, is a cosponsor of this important legislation. Our bill will address the efforts made by the Department of Energy, DOE, to recover and dispose of thousands of domestic Greater-than-Class-C, GTCC, radiological sources. These have the highest radiation levels and, in general, pose the greatest concern in terms of being used in a so-called ``dirty bomb.''

   Since September 11, we have faced the possibility that a terrorist could use a dirty bomb in an attack in the United States. A dirty bomb combines conventional explosives with highly radioactive materials. When exploded, it would disperse the radioactive materials, reducing the impact from radiation. But, if set off in the downtown of a major city, it could still contaminate a wide area with radiation, cause death and destruction due to the explosion, and panic and substantial economic damage could result. It is not surprising that the Department of Homeland Security has chosen as one of its training scenarios a simulated ``dirty bomb'' attack on an American city.

   Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham told an International Atomic Energy Agency conference in March, ``Radioactive sources can be found all over the world, and terrorist are seeking to acquire them.'' CIA Director George Tenet told Congress in February that he was concerned about Al Qaeda's attempts to build a dirty bomb. He said, ``construction of such a device is well within Al Qaeda capabilities--if it can obtain the radiological material.''

   Radiological sources are used widely in industry, agriculture, medicine, and research. Appropriately, Secretary Abraham has made it priority for the Department of Energy to help other countries secure their radiological sources. But as the United States works internationally to secure dangerous radiological sources, we also must be sure our own house is in order.

   As chairman of the International Security Subcommittee of the Senate Government Affairs Committee, I held hearings in the fall of 2001 that covered the threat posed by dirty bombs. I also requested that GAO examine U.S. efforts to secure radioactive sources within the United States.

   GAO recently finished their inquiry, and I am sorry to report that GAO found our house is not in order. Many of you may have seen the report on NBC Nightly News last night that featured GAO's investigation.

   GAO's report shows that not only the former Soviet Union, but also the United States does not keep track of or account for its radioactive sources in a reliable manner. There is not a precise count of GTCC sources in the United States. Some quarter to half a million are estimated to exist. Some 24,000 new GTCC sources are being produced each year.

   A central issue is what is being done with unwanted radioactive devices. We don't have an accurate account of unwanted devices in this country, and the program for recovering and securing them is proceeding too slowly.

   In 1985, Congress authorized DOE to provide a facility for disposing of GTCC waste, including GTCC sealed radiological sources that were no longer wanted by their owners. GAO found that after 18 years, DOE still has not developed a facility for storing GTCC wastes.

   DOE assumes a facility for receiving GTCC sealed sources will be available by FY 2007. But DOE has not taken serious steps to insure this facility will be built.

   Instead, DOES has an interim program for collecting and holding unwanted radiological sources. In 1999, DOE created an Off-site Source Recovery Project, or OSR, in the Office of Environmental Management for these purposes.

   The OSR Project has recovered about 5,3000 sealed sources. Another 4,400 sources, held by 328 different owners across the United States, are known to be in need of recovery. DOE estimates a further 4,600 sources will need to be recovered by 2010, when the OSR Project is scheduled to end because the permanent storage facility should be operating.

   Thousands more sources, however, will need to be recovered outside the OSR project once a depository opens.

   Every State in the Union has radioactive sources that need to be recovered, according to the GAO report. States with more than a 100 sources to be recovered include Arizona, California, Illinois, Maryland, New York, and Texas. Another 25 States have between 10 and 100 sources to be recovered.

   The GAO report notes that many of these are small sources with small amounts of radiation but hundreds are larger sources with large amounts of radioactivity.

   Alarmingly, the question of dirty bombs aside, there are almost two nuclear bombs worth of unwanted plutonium-239 sources that DOE cannot recover because they lack storage space. GAO reports that universities that have this material want to give it up, but cannot, because the DOE does not have the space to store them.

   We are concerned that the program to recover, secure, and store GTCC radiological sources is not receiving the

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priority it deserves. The disposal of thousands of radiological sources must be addressed. But DOE will not be prepared to dispose of these sources permanently in the next seven years because DOE has not identified the type of facility or provided a cost estimate and time-line for its construction.

   This bill will address these concerns. To insure the permanent disposal program gets the attention it needs within DOE, our legislation requires DOE to designate a responsibility entity within DOE to develop a facility for disposal of GTCC wastes.

   It also requires the DOE to report to Congress on the current situation and future plans for the disposal of GTCC radioactive waste. After the completion of this report, the DOE must submit to Congress a report on the cost and schedule to complete an environment impact statement and record of decision on a permanent disposal facility for GTCC radioactive wastes. Finally, before the year is out, DOE must deliver to Congress a plan to provide for the short-term recovery of the GTCC radioactive waste until a permanent facility is available.

   I am also concerned that the short-term Offsite Source Recovery Project may lack the funding required to ensure that all designated radiological sources are safety and securely recovered in a timely manner. The program apparently will be funded adequately through the end of FY04. The FY02 emergency supplemental budget provided ten millions dollars, and the President requested about two millions dollars in his FY04 budget proposal. But I caution Congress to keep an eye on this program to guarantee sufficient funds are requested in the FY05 budget when it is submitted to Congress next year.

   Thousands of sealed sources await disposal, some requiring security measures greater than those in place at current storage sites. The problem posed by these sources will not go away by itself. Universities and industry do not have the means or facilities to secure these materials and are asking the federal government for help.

   When the United States began non-proliferation efforts in the former Soviet Union, one of the first jobs was to begin consolidating nuclear weapons and fissile materials in secure facilities to await disposal or destruction. As Secretary Abraham has said, due to worries about terrorists acquiring dirty bombs, the DOE now is working to secure radiological sources overseas.

   I support these efforts. The bill Senator BINGAMAN and I have introduced will give radiological sources and waste on American soil the same consideration. Collecting and securing these sources was once a matter of public safety. It is now a national security concern that deserves the attention of Congress.

   I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the RECORD.

   There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

   S. 1045

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

   SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Low-Level Radioactive Waste Act of 2003''.

   SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress finds that--

    (1) section 3(b)(1)(D) of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act (42 U.S.C. 2021c(b)(1)(D)) requires the Secretary of Energy to safely dispose of all greater-than-Class C low-level radioactive waste (as defined in section 61.55 of title 10, Code of Federal Regulations);

    (2) the Offsite Source Recovery Program, established by the Department of Energy to recover and store sources of such waste, is scheduled to cease operation by September 30, 2010;

    (3) the Department of Energy estimates that about 14,000 sealed sources of such waste will become unwanted and will have to be disposed of through the Offsite Source Recovery Program by that date;

    (4)(A) in February 1987 the Secretary of Energy submitted to Congress a comprehensive report making recommendations for ensuring the safe disposal of all greater-than-Class C low-level radioactive waste; and

    (B) 16 years later, it is likely that the information contained in the report is no longer current and does not reflect the new security threat environment;

    (5) the Department of Energy--

    (A) does not have the resources or storage facility to recover and store all unwanted sources of greater-than-Class C low-level radioactive waste; and

    (B) has not identified a permanent disposal facility;

    (6) it is unlikely that a permanent disposal facility will be operational by the time that the Offsite Source Recovery Program ceases operation;

    (7) the initial steps in developing a disposal facility (including preparation of an environmental impact statement and issuance of a record of decision) could take several years and will require dedicated funding to complete; and

    (8) before a final decision on the disposal alternative to be implemented is made, Congress must have an opportunity to review the alternatives under consideration and provide input.

   SEC. 3. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY RESPONSIBILITIES

    (a) DESIGNATION OF RESPONSIBILITY.--The Secretary of Energy shall designate an entity within the Department of Energy to have the responsibility of completing activities needed to develop a facility for safely disposing of all greater-than-Class C low-level radioactive waste.

    (b) CONSULTATION WITH CONGRESS.--In developing a plan for a permanent disposal facility for greater-than-Class C low-level radioactive waste (including preparation of an environmental impact statement and issuance of a record of decision), the Secretary of Energy shall consult with Congress.

   SEC. 4. REPORTS.

    (a) UPDATE OF 1987 REPORT.--

    (1) IN GENERAL.--Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Energy shall submit to Congress an update of the report referred to in section 2(4).

    (2) CONTENTS.--The update shall contain--

    (A) an identification of the radioactive waste that is to be disposed of (including the source of the waste and the volume, concentration, and other relevant characteristics of the waste);

    (B) an identification of the Federal and non-Federal options for disposal of the waste;

    (C) a description of the actions proposed to ensure the safe disposal of the waste;

    (D) an estimate of the costs of the proposed actions;

    (E) an identification of the options for ensuring that the beneficiaries of the activities resulting in the generation of the radioactive waste bear all reasonable costs of disposing of the waste;

    (F) an identification of any statutory authority required for disposal of the waste; and

    (G) in coordination with the Environmental Protection Agency and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, an identification of any regulatory guidance needed for the disposal of the waste.

    (b) REPORT ON PERMANENT DISPOSAL FACILITY.--

    (1) REPORT ON COST AND SCHEDULE FOR COMPLETION OF EIS AND ROD.--Not later than 180 days after the date of submission of the update under subsection (a), the Secretary of Energy shall submit to Congress a report containing an estimate of the cost and schedule to complete an environmental impact statement and record of decision for a permanent disposal facility for greater-than-Class C radioactive waste.

    (2) REPORT ON ALTERNATIVES.--Before the Secretary of Energy makes a final decision on the disposal alternative to be implemented, the Secretary of Energy shall--

    (A) submit to Congress a report that describes all alternatives under consideration; and

    (B) await action by Congress.

    (c) REPORT ON SHORT-TERM PLAN.--

    (1) IN GENERAL.--Not later than December 31, 2003, the Secretary of Energy shall submit to Congress a plan to ensure the continued recovery and storage of greater-than-Class C low-level radioactive waste until a permanent disposal facility is available.

    (2) CONTENTS.--The plan shall contain estimated cost, resource, and facility needs.

1C) Mini-Nuclear Weapons
Ms. WOOLSEY. Mr. Speaker, I am here today to highlight a security issue that has been overlooked since September 11, 2001. That would be the number of nuclear weapons in the world today.

   As I speak here on the floor of this House, the United States has 7,500 nuclear weapons deployed and ready for use. Their destructive power is equal to 80,000 Hiroshima-sized bombs. At the same time, Russia has more than 6,000 warheads scattered across Asia, some of them still on hair-trigger alert. I wonder if any are pointed at this building, this building that we are standing in right now.

   Even India, Pakistan, and now North Korea have joined the nuclear club. These countries are motivated to obtain nuclear weapons for several reasons: security, global influence, and pride. These countries are motivated to obtain nuclear weapons because other countries have them or are trying to get them, including the United States. It is a Catch-22 with unthinkable consequences.

   But make no mistake: every nuclear weapon built by any country on this Earth was built with money diverted from a school that should have been built, a hospital that should be saving lives, and food that should be feeding the poorest of the poor. The resources that human beings pour into weapons solely intended to facilitate their very own destruction is astonishing.

   These weapons threaten not only individuals and nations, but the very existence of humankind. This is a threat that cannot be tolerated. This is the father of all weapons of mass destruction.

   That is why I am so disappointed that the Bush administration supports funding research on so-called low-yield nuclear weapons. This is a terrible mistake. Even the so-called low-yield weapons planned by Pentagon bureaucrats will be almost as strong as the bomb dropped on Hiroshima. These low-yield weapons will spew radioactive dust miles into the atmosphere where it falls. It will spew dust of radioactive dust on mothers, babies, brothers and sisters, men and women, all of them innocent, all of them undeserving of a personal nuclear holocaust.

   Nuclear weapons are humanity's biggest threat. Their greatest strength is that they corrupt human beings with misguided visions of power and security. We are fooling ourselves if we think more nuclear weapons means greater security and smaller nuclear weapons means guaranteed safety. These are the delusions that only lead closer to nuclear destruction.

   Instead of researching the new nukes, we ought to be getting rid of the ones we have. That is why I will soon introduce the Nuclear Nonproliferation treaty, NPT, Commitments Act, which calls on the United States to live up to its commitments under the NPT to take immediate steps toward a nuclear weapons convention to eliminate all nuclear weapons.

   I ask my colleagues to sign on to my bill, because our world will not be safe from nuclear destruction until we turn the tables on these horrific weapons and destroy them. In the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty which went into effect in 1972, the United States committed to work toward completely eliminating the world's stock of nuclear weapons.

   The fact is that as long as these weapons exist, they will spread, bringing the threat of nuclear destruction to all. The only way to keep this from happening is to abolish nuclear weapons entirely and develop a strong, multilateral organization to prevent nuclear weapons from threatening the world ever again.

   The Cold War is over; but, sadly, the threat from nuclear weapons has increased. Instead of wasting our resources building more weapons that can never be used and serve only to threaten the very existence of humankind, let us take the path away from nuclear war and toward a lasting peace for our children.

1D) Motivating China-Japan’s Nuclear Options
Mr. KIRK. Mr. Speaker, on the departure of the South Korean President, we have to look at the North Korean situation with new eyes. I think it is clear that U.S. pressure on North Korea will not be effective since North Korea is a very poor country under 50 years already of U.S. economic sanctions. There are few, if any, U.S. options to bring effective nonmilitary pressure to bear. It is also clear that the South Korean Government will not issue new effective pressure on North Korea. But Chinese pressure can be effective.

   China is the primary donor to North Korea, and despite cool relations, China supports North Korea to prevent a collapse. China so far has rejected pressure because it fears any pressure may hasten the very collapse of North Korea they intend to prevent. Therefore, finding a motivation for China to help generate effective pressure from North Korea is asking the question, what do the Chinese regard as worse than risking a North Korean collapse? And the answer is the potential of Japanese nuclear armament.

   Few of us have realized that Japan owns more plutonium than in the United States nuclear arsenal. Japan has a large nuclear power program. It is seeking to reduce its reliance on foreign uranium by recycling nuclear fuel that will make its plutonium stockpile grow even larger.

   Today Japan owns 38 tons of plutonium, 5 tons located in the country and 33 tons at its European processors. That is enough for 7,000 nuclear weapons. Japan is also accelerating its production of plutonium. Once the Rokkasho-mura reprocessing plant comes online in 2005, Japan will be able to produce 100 tons of plutonium by 2015. North Korea recently complained in public about 206 kilos of missing plutonium from Japan's Tokai-mura facility.

   Japan is also rethinking its defense policy. Prime Minister Koizumi is leading efforts to expand Japan's defense role. Japan's self-defense force won Diet approval recently of purchasing long-range strike aircraft, including four 767 tankers; power projection, including the formation of an air brigade; and missile defense, including software, hardware and AEGIS class cruisers.

   Japan's perception of the North Korean threat is growing. North Korea shot a No Dong missile over Japanese territory in 1994. They shot a Taepo-dong missile over Japan in 1998. In December Japanese Coast Guard vessels clashed with North Korean spy boats.

   There is a nuclear debate beginning in Japan. In April, opposition leader Ichiro Ozawa openly discussed the nuclear option. In May, Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda generally hinted at revising defense doctrine. And last month, Defense Minister Ishiba stated Japan might conventionally strike North Korea first.

   Japan is also developing delivery vehicles. Japan's H-2 civilian rocket program is very advanced, and Japan is participating in missile defense focused on software, nose cones, infrared seekers, warheads and rocket motors.

   All of these facts should be shared at the highest level with Japanese leaders. We can help China to understand that if North Korea fully develops a nuclear arsenal, Japan may develop a deterrent.

   Japan's nuclear arsenal would quickly outpace China's. France's nuclear submarine costs just $13 billion and would be well within Japan's means. And Japan nuclear armament would encourage other Asian nations to also arm, even Taiwan.

   These facts should be shown to be clear that the Chinese should act clearly to diffuse the North Korea crisis.

   Article 9 of Japan's Constitution commits to no use of war to resolve international disputes. And it takes a two-thirds vote of both houses to amend the Constitution. Support for Article 9 in Japan now in the face of the North Korean threat is just 50/50. Japanese Prime Minister Sato formally studied a nuclear weapons program in 1967, and Japan would have to leave the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty that it ratified in 1977.

   Some have said the Japanese reactor-grade plutonium would not be fully usable, but the U.S. detonated a reactor-grade plutonium device in 1962, and in order to discourage other countries from using plutonium as a fuel, President Carter declassified data on the feasibility of a reactor-grade plutonium for nuclear weapons in 1976.

   We need to help China understand that other Asian nations maybe forced to develop a nuclear deterrent. To curb this crisis, China must act, otherwise there will be an historical reversal of power in Asia, something the Chinese should realize and seek to avoid.
 

 

 

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MISSILE DEFENSE AND DEFENSE POLICY
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2A) Support for NATO Enlargement
Ms. LANDRIEU. Mr. President, when NATO formed in 1949, the world had been liberated from the grips of Hitler and the Japanese. But, the rise of communism and the Soviet Union brought new threats and the fear of nuclear war. NATO was created with vision and vigor to combat, through political and military means, the spread of communism. NATO has succeeded.

   Today, the Soviets are gone, and a partnership between Russia and NATO is growing. Still, freedom-loving societies have been threatened anew by state and non-state supported terrorists looking to achieve their destructive aims through the spread of WMD.

   The question looms whether NATO will address these new threats or be pushed to the side because it was unable to transform when the cold war ended. Some have said NATO's mission ended when the Berlin Wall fell. Some have even said NATO is dead. Well, I do not think NATO is dead. Now is the time to recommit ourselves to NATO to ensure that the world's greatest alliance for peace perseveres and is improved to remain strong for another 50 years. To do so, NATO must adapt its mission to deal with today's threats. NATO members must commit to a common defense with both policy and budgetary commitments that improve interoperability and reduce the capabilities gap between the U.S. and other members. As NATO's largest and most powerful member, the United States and her leaders in the Senate stand ready to strengthen NATO and repair recently strained relationships amongst NATO members. We must do so, and we must take the first step by supporting NATO enlargement and the admission of seven new members: Romania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Slovenia, Slovakia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

   NATO expansion makes strategic sense because expansion creates a united Europe. The addition of the seven aspirants creates a land bridge forming a contiguous alliance on the European Continent. Now, Western Europe from the Atlantic will be connected with its allies in Greece and Turkey on the Mediterranean and Black Sea. With the Partnership for Peace, NATO spreads across three continents. Bitter enemies just 13 years ago are now reliable allies.

   NATO membership is a carrot to political and economic reform to all nations wishing to join the alliance. Again, just 13 years ago, the seven proposed new members of NATO were under the darkness and weight of the Iron Curtain. Today, they are burgeoning democracies committed to market economics. To be in NATO, a democratic form of governance is needed. Spain, Greece, and Portugal undertook political reforms to gain NATO approval, and the same is true today for the seven countries currently seeking NATO admission.

   The seven new members are ready to actively participate and contribute to a robust NATO. In fact they are already doing so. I would like to cite Romania as one example. Romania has undertaken major political and economic reforms. Romania overthrew Nicolae Ceausescu--a ruthless and oppressive totalitarian leader. Since being unshackled, Romania has celebrated its freedom. Romania has held four nationwide elections, and democracy is blossoming.

   Romania is also committed to the defense of the members of the NATO alliance, both in Europe and the U.S. Some have questioned what the seven new members can bring to the table to

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benefit NATO. We need not question whether Romania will be a positive force within NATO. Romania has risked the lives of its soldiers for the benefit of the United States.

   Participation in Operation Desert Storm--Romania contributed a military hospital company to the Allied Forces.

   Participation in Afghanistan--Romania used its own airlift, a C-130, to transport a battalion of soldiers to Afghanistan. These forces have made two rotations. Romania is currently involved in the peacekeeping mission in Afghanistan.

   Operation Iraqi Freedom--Romania mobilized its military police and a nuclear , biological, chemical detection team to work alongside U.S. forces in Iraq.

   Currently 5,000 U.S. marines are based at Constanza, Romania. Our strategic threats are different today than they were 50 years ago. We are no longer endangered by Russia. Today, the greatest threat to NATO and its members is the threat of terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction. As a result, the U.S. should consider whether it would be wise to reconfigure our forces overseas.

   Our new threats are coming from the Middle East and southwest Asia. Romania and Bulgaria are halfway between Germany and the Middle East. Moving bases closer to the threat will allow the U.S. to mobilize faster and get to the fight sooner. We would also be welcome in Romania and Bulgaria. There is some question whether we are still welcome in Western Europe.

   There are those who say NATO is dead or has no modern mission. That is simply not the case. The Soviet Union may no longer be a threat, but threats still exist. The end of the cold war may have erased the notion of warfighting where million-man armies face million-man armies on the European Continent. But, the end of the cold war unleashed despots willing to use the asymmetrical means of terrorism and WMD proliferation as methods of aggression and diplomatic blackmail.

   NATO must adopt a new mission--combating terrorism and WMD proliferation both in Europe and globally. The threats that emerged from September 11 do not only affect the United States, these threats should be a concern to the entire NATO community. As we have seen, al-Qaeda cells were active in Germany, Spain, France, and Italy.

   International terrorism on our shores was unknown to Americans prior to September 11. However, it was not uncommon in Europe. The other NATO members should unite behind America's interests to root out terrorism and stop WMD proliferation because the European members have been targets before and could be targets, again. This will require NATO to look not only within its borders, but NATO must also look beyond its borders. NATO members and Partnership for Peace participants stretch from the Pacific Ocean in the U.S. to bordering on China in Kazakhstan. There are several countries just on the edges of NATO's borders who wish to terrorize those countries within NATO.

   NATO has made a pledge to combat terrorism and WMD proliferation. The promise made by the NATO heads of state at the Prague summit to focus on terrorism and WMD proliferation is encouraging. Now, we need action. We should not let recent spats with France and Germany obstruct the implementation of this new mission. Moreover, France and Germany should not let their disagreements with the U.S. obstruct this new mission. Such actions benefit none.

   For NATO to remain relevant, the European members must close the capabilities gap between U.S. and European forces. Many NATO members, including France and Germany, have reduced defense spending over the last decade. Such reductions leave the alliance vulnerable and make it difficult for NATO members to participate in operations with the U.S.

   U.S. defense spending is dwarfing European defense spending. America's defense budget is greater than all other 18 NATO members combined. The $48 billion dollar increase in U.S. defense spending from fiscal year 2002 to fiscal year 2003 is greater than what 12 of the other 18 members spend on defense.

   Europe's leaders are world leaders. NATO members must make a greater investment in national security, NATO's longevity, and world security. We do not need them to spend as much as the U.S.; we need them to complement the U.S. and add value to NATO operations.

   NATO should focus its spending on interoperability and communications improvements. The U.S. has committed billions to making it so all four branches of the military can be linked using the same communications devices. We are dedicated to interoperability within our own forces. It has not been easy and the job is not finished, but we have seen the fruits of this effort in Iraq and Afghanistan. Who would have imagined years ago that a B-52 pilot could talk with a Special Operations team on the ground to deliver close air support? This was possible because of interoperability.

   NATO must focus on such interoperability. Not only must we ensure that a European tanker plane can refuel a U.S. fighter. We must ensure that 26 members, who speak many different languages, can share a common communications network and operate as one cohesive force, not 26 independent militaries. If this gap is not closed, no value will be added and we will have to question NATO's worth.

   NATO must not be just an alliance based on military strength. NATO must be a diplomatic alliance. Military might alone is not the solution. First, we must use all diplomatic means to achieve peace. The united strength of NATO as a diplomatic force will also increase the security of NATO's members.

   In the near future, NATO must make decisions to determine whether it will be a vibrant alliance capable of protecting its members in the 21st century or whether it is a relic of the past. I know it can have a meaningful mission in the future--a mission focused on rooting out terrorism and stopping the spread of WMD. To do so, NATO members must increase defense spending and focus on modernization and interoperability. I am confident NATO's members want NATO to have a great role in shaping the 21st century. As a member of NATO, the U.S. should push for a strong alliance. By expanding NATO to include seven new members, we will take a key step in making NATO strong and viable for the 21st century. The Senate sent a strong message of support by approving the admission of Romania, Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Slovenia, and Slovakia to NATO. The vote is good for the safety of the U.S., Europe, and the world.
 


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CHEM/ BIO AND WMD TERRORISM
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3A) The Oppression of Jews in Syria
Mr. PALLONE. Mr. Speaker, I rise this evening to draw attention to the historic and continued oppression of Jews living in Syria. At the start of the 20th century, it is estimated that there were approximately 40,000 Jews living in Syria. However, by early 1947 only 13,000 were left, with 20,000 having fled through the course of the previous decade as Nazi zeal permeated the region. Immediately after Syria gained independence from France in 1945, vitriolic anti-Semitic propaganda was broadcast on television and radio, inciting the Arab masses to violence. In December, 1947, 1 month after the Partition Plan's acceptance, a pogrom erupted in the Syrian town of Aleppo, torching numerous Jewish properties including synagogues, schools, orphanages, and businesses.

   A flurry of anti-Semitic legislation passed in 1948 restricted, among other things, Jewish travel outside of government-approved ghettos, the selling of private property, acquiring land or changing their place of residence. A decree in 1949 went a step further, seizing all Jewish bank accounts; and under threats of execution long prison sentences and torture, most Jews were able to depart between 1948 and 1962.

   Due mainly to U.S. influence in the context of the Madrid Peace Process, the majority of the members of the Syrian Jewish community have fled, with only about 1,000 still remaining. Most have chosen to settle here in the United States, including a sizable number in my district in New Jersey.

   Mr. Speaker, the situation for those few who remained has deteriorated dramatically over the last few decades. A report published in 1981 indicated Syrian Jews were subject to the Mukhabarat, the Syrian secret police, who conduct a reign of terror and intimidation, including searches without warrant, detention without trial, torture and summary execution.

   The few synagogues still open in Syria are considered by authorities as ``centers of sedition,'' with services held under surveillance. Nightly curfews have been established in Jewish communities, and Jews have been required to carry special identity cards.

   Jews are barred from employment in government offices, public bodies, or banks. Jews have been arbitrarily dismissed from jobs without compensation, and their licenses to conduct foreign trade have been revoked. Jews have been forbidden the ability to obtain driver's licenses or to even have telephones in the homes. The only exceptions have been for doctors and a handful of merchants that have been given preferential treatment. Syrians are officially advised not to buy in Jewish shops, and government and military personnel are expressly forbidden to even enter them.

   Mr. Speaker, the mail of Syrian Jews is even censored. I have been told by Jews here in the United States who still have family in Syria that the relatives request not to be sent any letter or message because they will face interrogation by the state police.

   Some would like to think that the number of Jews in Syria is insignificant compared with the millions who are oppressed elsewhere. However, the political implications of the thousands of scapegoats held captive in Syria are beyond comparison to their number.

   Syria is listed on the State Department's list of countries who harbor and support terrorism. Syria has proved to be a destabilizing force in the Middle East, continuing to develop and stockpile chemical weapons and the missiles to deliver them and remains the occupying power in Lebanon. Syria offered support to Iraq even as U.S. and coalition forces were engaged in combat in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Yet Syria is subject to fewer U.S. sanctions than any other country considered a state sponsor of terrorism.

   Mr. Speaker, I would like to take this opportunity to commend my colleagues, the gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. Ros-Lehtinen) and the gentleman from New York (Mr. Engel), for introducing the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003. This legislation, which I have cosponsored, holds Syria accountable for its support for terrorism, occupation of Lebanon, and possession and continued development of weapons of mass destruction and would give the President the tools to impose penalties on Syria unless it corrects its behavior immediately.

   Mr. Speaker, Syria's mistreatment of its Jewish citizens is one more reason that Congress cannot remain silent on Syria. I urge my colleagues to cosponsor the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act. Congress cannot allow these activities in

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Syria to continue. We must raise our voices and speak out against Syria's support of international terror and the systematic oppression of its own people.
 

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IRAQ AND NORTH KOREA
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4A) Remove Sanctions Against Iraq?
Mr. SMITH of Michigan. Madam Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and agree to the concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 160) expressing the sense of Congress that the United Nations should remove the economic sanctions against Iraq completely and without condition, as amended.

   The Clerk read as follows:

   H. Con. Res. 160

   Whereas United Nations Security Council Resolution 661 established sanctions as a result of Saddam Hussein's unprovoked, illegal aggression against the sovereign Arab State of Kuwait;

   Whereas United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 continued the sanctions, which were intended to deprive the government of Saddam Hussein of maintaining or acquiring the means to threaten other states or peoples, or to continue to oppress his own people;

   Whereas the United Nations Security Council, through the Oil-for-Food program, allowed for humanitarian goods to flow to Iraq while maintaining the sanctions regime and control over Iraq's oil revenue;

   Whereas the Coalition that liberated Iraq poses no risk to other states or peoples, and there is no reason to believe that the people of Iraq, liberated from the tyrant Saddam Hussein, pose such a risk;

   Whereas the Coalition is providing for the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people;

   Whereas the people of Iraq are now ready to rebuild their nation after over 30 years of tyranny;

   Whereas the sanctions established by United Nations Security Council Resolutions 661 and 687 prohibit the importation of goods necessary for the Iraqi people to rebuild their country;

   Whereas these sanctions restrict the trade of Iraqi goods, by and on behalf of the Iraqi people, necessary to allow expeditious rebuilding of Iraq and recovery from the tyranny of Saddam Hussein; and

   Whereas continuing the sanctions imposed on the government of Saddam Hussein punishes the people of Iraq for the actions of a

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brutal tyrant who no longer rules them: Now, therefore, be it:

    Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That it is the sense of the Congress that--

    (1) the United Nations should immediately act to lift the economic sanctions imposed by United Nations Security Council Resolutions 661 and 687; and

    (2) member states of the United Nations should allow and encourage their nationals to trade with Iraq.

 

   The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Smith) and the gentleman from American Samoa (Mr. Faleomavaega) each will control 20 minutes.

   The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Smith).

   GENERAL LEAVE

   Mr. SMITH of Michigan. Madam Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on H. Con. Res. 160, the legislation under consideration.

   The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Michigan?

   There was no objection.

   Mr. SMITH of Michigan. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

   Madam Speaker, this resolution calls on the United Nations to immediately and unconditionally lift the economic sanctions on Iraq. The U.N. sanctions were passed after Saddam Hussein, a totalitarian dictator, invaded Kuwait in 1990. That resolution was the first of 17 U.N. resolutions passed over the next 11 years trying to bring Saddam Hussein under control.

   At the time then-President Bush organized a coalition that sent in the military, forced Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait, and subsequently loosened the hold of this murderous tyrant over the Kurdish people in northern Iraq.

   Madam Speaker, in September of 1991, the United Nations modified the sanctions to contain Saddam Hussein and allowed him to trade Iraq's oil for only humanitarian supplies through the so-called Oil for Food Program. These sanctions were meant to keep Saddam Hussein's military from developing more weapons and becoming a greater threat.

   However, after an impressive military success, Iraq is now entering a new day and is no longer a threat. Coalition forces have freed the Iraqi people, and the U.N. sanctions which once strove to contain a murderous tyrant now contain the Iraqi people themselves. The Iraqi people have historically been one of the most highly educated, industrious, and entrepreneurial people in the Middle East. To rebuild their country, Iraq and the Iraqi people must be able to trade freely. Every additional day that these sanctions remain is an additional day that the people of Iraq are suffering from Saddam Hussein's tyranny.

   The President has called on the United Nations to end these sanctions. I have introduced this resolution, and the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde), the chairman, and the ranking member, the gentleman from California (Mr. Lantos) have moved it through the Committee on International Relations so members of the Security Council would understand that the United States Government speaks with a single voice in Iraq.

   The coalition returned political freedom to the Iraqi people, but with these sanctions the U.N. is withholding the opportunity for economic freedom and recovery from Saddam Hussein's tyranny. I hope that Congress can send a strong message demanding that the United Nations immediately correct this mistake and lift the economic sanctions against Iraq.

   Madam Speaker, let me briefly describe the resolution before us. This resolution recognizes that the United Nations sanctions were imposed on the regime of Saddam Hussein, not on Iraq or its people. Iraq had become a murderous toy for a totalitarian dictator. The Iraqi people did not choose to invade Kuwait. Their Arab neighbors and Saddam Hussein actually went and did it. The Iraqi people did not choose to go to war with Iran in the 1980s. Saddam Hussein did. The Iraqi people certainly did not decide to use chemical weapons against either Iranian soldiers or on Iraqi Kurds. Saddam Hussein did.

   These sanctions were not imposed on the Iraqi people. They were imposed on the regime led by a crazy man who exploited the resources of Iraq for his own gains. And when this regime fell, so did the basis for his sanctions.

   The resolution recognizes that the coalition freed the Iraqi people for a better future. It recognizes that at this time the coalition is providing for the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people. The coalition is working as hard and as fast as it can to have Iraq standing on its own two feet, but restricting trade makes this very difficult.

   Newspaper reports have said that after the Iran/Iraq war, it took 3 years for electric power to come back to some parts of Baghdad. The U.S. is pushing to get the people of Baghdad working and getting them electricity by this June.

   The coalition is working with the United Nations and other organizations to provide as much as possible for the Iraqi people after the more than two decades of neglect of Iraq's infrastructure.

   This resolution also recognizes that with the liberation of the Iraq, the effects of the sanctions have shifted. Sanctions were imposed, Madam Speaker, because the resources of Iraq were used to serve the dangerous interests of a single man. The sanctions help contain his ability to build an army and threaten Iraq's neighbors and the Iraqi people themselves.

   Now that Saddam Hussein's regime has ended, the resources of Iraq can now serve the people of Iraq. When they seek to trade their goods for goods of others, it is in their own interest, not in those of a tyrant. The Iraqi people want to trade to rebuild their country, devastated by 30 years of misrule. Before Iraq was liberated, the sanctions contained Saddam Hussein. Now they contain the Iraqi people. The continuation of these sanctions has, in effect, equated the people of Iraq with their former dictator.

   A majority of Iraqis have lived most of their adult lives under Saddam Hussein. The transition to a free enterprise economy will be difficult, impossible while trade sanctions continue.

   Madam Speaker, I offer this resolution because some members of the Security Council have hesitated in ending these sanctions for what appear to be selfish reasons. In doing so they undermine the Iraqi people, and they continue to undermine their own credibility and that of the United Nations.

   I know my colleagues in Congress will join me in calling on the United Nations to end the economic sanctions on Iraq.

   Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

   Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

   (Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

   Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Madam Speaker, I want to thank and commend my good friend, the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Smith), my colleague, for his authorship of this resolution. I certainly want to commend him for his leadership and his expertise not only as a member of the Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia, but his firm understanding of the issues now at hand. I also want to commend the chairman of our Committee on International Relations, the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde), and our senior ranking member, the gentleman from California (Mr. Lantos) for their providing support of this legislation that is now before us.

   Madam Speaker, I rise in strong support of this resolution.

   First, I would like to express my condolences to the families of all those who died in yesterday's suicide bombing attack in Saudi Arabia. I hope for the speedy recovery of those who were injured. This attack demonstrated that in the midst of the very crisis facing these countries, we need to maintain our focus on the war on terrorism and remain focused on protecting our homeland.

   Madam Speaker, the resolution before us today calls for an end to sanctions against Iraq, an issue that holds the key to resolving virtually every major economic and social problem in newly liberated Iraq. Sanctions on Iraq, established by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 661 and reaffirmed in United Nations Security Council Resolution 687, have been in place for nearly 13 years since the August 1990 Iraq invasion of Kuwait.

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These sanctions were intended to deprive Saddam Hussein insofar as it was possible of the means to carry out the most nefarious of his policies, threatening his neighbors and Iraq's own citizens, developing weapons of mass destruction and supporting terrorism.

   

[Time: 15:15]

   Madam Speaker, clearly the need for United Nations sanctions on Iraq, indeed the very logic of sanctions, has now expired with the defeat and demise of Saddam Hussein's regime. Neither the coalition authorities nor the Iraqi people liberated from Saddam's tyranny pose any sort of threat to neighboring states. Nor, we can be certain, Madam Speaker, will the coalition authorities or a subsequent Iraqi regime support terrorism or develop weapons of mass destruction .

   It is, therefore, time for the international community to decisively lift the sanctions and to allow the Iraqi people to resume a normal economic life and proceed with the reconstruction of their country, a crucial first step towards developing the healthy political and social environment in which democracy and social harmony can flourish.

   Madam Speaker, I know that this matter is now being negotiated by our diplomats at the United Nations, and I have confidence that they will soon reach a satisfactory solution, I would certainly like to commend our Secretary of State, Colin Powell, for his outstanding leadership in this area.

   This resolution strengthens our diplomats' hands by reinforcing the message that the world should support, and certainly not impede, economic development in liberated Iraq.

   I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting H. Con. Res. 160 and urge an end to anachronistic sanctions on Iraq.

   Madam Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from California (Mr. Farr).

   Mr. FARR. Madam Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me the time.

   I rise today in support of H. Con. Res. 160, a bill to remove the economic sanctions against Iraq. For too long, the sanctions have drained the Iraqi society and its vital economic energy. In their wake, we find a country whose standard of living has declined significantly, its middle class has all but disappeared, and its infrastructure is in total disrepair.

   Now that dictator Saddam Hussein, the inspiration for the sanctions regime, has been defeated, there no longer remains any justification for its continuation. I hope that the lifting of the sanctions will lead to a prosperous Iraq economy which will benefit the people and bring them back into the world of free and open commerce.

   I think that this bill, which signals the commitment of the United States to reconstruction in Iraq, is a good step in the right direction. I trust that the United Nations will respond positively to this initiative.

   The removal of sanctions, however, will not alone bring prosperity to Iraq. Before there is prosperity, there must first be security. It is my firm belief that the United States, by intervening militarily in Iraq, has assumed the responsibility for the safety and the security of the Iraqi people.

   I applaud the gentleman from Michigan's initiative on the economic front. We must also pay attention to the security front.

   As we continue to assist Iraq in its reconstruction, I think we need to establish here in Congress an institutional framework for postconflict resolutions and for postconflict operations. Part of that institutional framework would be to strengthen the U.S. Government's ability to respond to authority gaps left by failed or otherwise collapsed states.

   I propose to draft legislation for the creation of an integrated security component in NATO, which would train and equip special units which would provide for the security of the civilian population serving as an interim police force.

   I urge my colleagues today to support H. Con. Res. 160, and I look forward to working with the sponsor and other interested Members of Congress to develop this postconflict legislation to close the security and justice gaps so that Iraq and countries emerging from conflict can achieve the economic prosperity to which they, and we, aspire.

   Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Madam Speaker, I have no additional speakers, and I yield back the balance of my time.

   Mr. SMITH of Michigan. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

   I would like to say in relation to the gentleman from California (Mr. Farr) that our Committee on International Relations is looking carefully at these issues and looks forward to working with my colleague, and certainly in a bipartisan effort to deal with this possible legislation.

   I would like to say also, Madam Speaker, that the gentleman from American Samoa (Mr. Faleomavaega) is one of the outstanding Representatives in Congress that is both exceptionally capable and also a good friend. Concluding my comments, I again urge the United Nations to act swiftly. In the language of the resolution the United Nations Security Council Resolution 661 established sanctions as a result of Saddam Hussein's unprovoked illegal aggression against the sovereign Arab State of Kuwait. This resolution is expressing the sense of Congress that now the United Nations should remove the economic sanctions against Iraq completely and without condition.

   It is the hope of the United States to have this resolution in the United Nations passed by June 3. It is my personal opinion that if the United Nations refuses to pass this resolution, the United States and the coalition should act aggressively to still allow oil and other products to be exported from Iraq to allow necessary supplies be purchased to go to Iraq for rebuilding.

   Madam Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

   The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mrs. Capito). The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Smith) that the House suspend the rules and agree to the concurrent resolution, H. Con. Res. 160, as amended.

   The question was taken.

   The SPEAKER pro tempore. In the opinion of the Chair, two-thirds of those present have voted in the affirmative.

   Mr. SMITH of Michigan. Madam Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

   The yeas and nays were ordered.

   The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX and the Chair's prior announcement, further proceedings on this motion will be postponed.


4B) Time to Deal with North Korea

 Mr. PITTS. Mr. Speaker, the dictatorship Government of North Korea is a menace to world peace. It continues to produce nuclear material, violating its agreements. They want to use these weapons to blackmail us for more assistance. And in reports this week, it looks like this rogue regime is using the international drug trade to fund its terrible activities. We cannot negotiate with a regime like this.

   In 1985, North Korea signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Eighteen months later it stalled in implementing the treaty, demanding that we remove nuclear weapons from South Korea. As we negotiated, they made nuclear weapons. In 1991, we withdrew our weapons from South Korea. In 1996, President Clinton tried to bargain

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again, giving North Korea more assistance to stop making nuclear weapons.

   This time we should not be intimidated into making concessions to a rogue regime because they want to extract more assistance. Kim Jong Il uses whatever money he can get to terrorize his people and threaten the security of the entire region. China, Japan, Russia, and South Korea all should make an effort to contain this rogue dictator and help put an end to his blackmail games.


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