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1A) Continuation of National Emergency with Respect to Russia’s Fissile Material
CONTINUATION OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY CREATED BY ACCUMULATION OF WEAPONS-USABLE FISSILE MATERIAL IN THE TERRITORY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION--MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES (H. DOC. NO. 108-84) -- (House of Representatives - June 10, 2003) [Page: H5154] GPO's PDF --- The SPEAKER pro tempore laid before the House the following message from the President of the United States; which was read and, together with the accompanying papers, without objection, referred to the Committee on International Relations and ordered to be printed: To the Congress of the United States: Section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)) provides for the automatic termination of a national emergency unless, prior to the anniversary date of its declaration, the President publishes in the Federal Register and transmits to the Congress a notice stating that the emergency is to continue in effect beyond the anniversary date.

In accordance with this provision, I have sent the enclosed notice, stating that the emergency declared with respect to the accumulation of a large volume of weapons-usable fissile material in the territory of the Russian Federation is to continue beyond June 21, 2003, to the Federal Register for publication. The most recent notice continuing this emergency was published in the Federal Register on June 20, 2002 (67 FR 42181). It remains a major national security goal of the United States to ensure that fissile material removed from Russian nuclear weapons pursuant to various arms control and disarmament agreements is dedicated to peaceful uses, subject to transparency measures, and protected from diversion to activities of proliferation concern. The accumulation of a large volume of weapons-usable fissile material in the territory of the Russian Federation continues to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States. For this reason, I have determined that it is necessary to continue the national emergency declared with respect to the accumulation of a large volume of weapons-usable fissile material in the territory of the Russian Federation and maintain in force these emergency authorities to respond to this threat.

George W. Bush. The White House, June 10, 2003.

2A) Missile Defense policy in FY04 Defense Authorization
Ms. McCOLLUM. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in opposition to H.R. 1588, the fiscal year 2004 Defense Authorization bill. While I strongly believe we must support our armed servicemen and women around the world, this bill contains several unnecessary provisions intended to weaken employee protections and the environment while authorizing billions of dollars on a national missile defense policy that is unproven and untested. It is unfortunate that these controversial measures were included in such an important piece of legislation.

I agree that the Department of Defense (DOD) should have the flexibility to manage itself in an efficient manner and provide the strongest national defense. This flexibility, however, should not come at the expense of worker's protections. H.R. 1588 gives the DoD broad authority to strip almost 700,000 civilian employees of fundamental rights relating to due process, appeal and collective bargaining rights. This means the DoD will be able to fire employees with no notice and no opportunity to respond, prevent discrimination actions from being heard by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, strip employees of their right to join a union and repeal the laws preventing nepotism. Civil service employees at DoD have defended our Nation bravely and made enormous sacrifices to support the military effort in Iraq. DOD should not be given unlimited authority to trample on their basic rights.

H.R. 1588 also unnecessarily weakens long-standing environmental protections at our military facilities by lowering the accountability standard DoD must follow when recovering imperiled species under the Endangered Species Act. The new standard fails to ensure the DOD's conservation plans are actually effective in assisting the recovery of imperiled species.

H.R. 1588 also creates a far less protective definition of `harassment' of marine life by military activities under the Marine Mammal Protection Act. This new definition allows DoD to avoid ensuring its activities are conducted in a manner to minimize harm to marine life such as whales, dolphins and sea lions. Although I fully appreciate the importance of military training and readiness, the DOD has not made the case that exemptions to important and long-standing environmental laws are necessary or that training is greatly impaired because of those laws. Furthermore, the President already has the authority to waive environmental laws if he deems it a matter of national security, and not once has a waiver requested by the President been turned down. Until our national security is at stake, no government agency--including the DOD--should be above laws that preserve our air and water and sustain America's wildlife.

This measure also authorizes $9.1 billion for the unproven and untested National Missile Defense system. This costly program fails to address the rising threat of a chemical or biological weapons attack by terrorists and will divert precious resources away from the very real human investments needed to keep our military, intelligence agencies and domestic security agencies strong. At a time when the Federal Government shortchanges our local communities and neighborhoods in their hometown security efforts, it is irresponsible to be adding billions of dollars to a risky National Missile Defense program. We must strengthen our home security and provide our citizens with the appropriate resources necessary to ensure a terrorist attack never happens again on American soil.

Although I oppose H.R. 1588, I am encouraged that the bill provides a significant boost for military salaries, health care, housing allowances and housing construction opportunities. We need to assure our military that as we continue to support their readiness capabilities, we remember the personal well being of the men and women in uniform as well as their families. When the Conference Report on this bill between the House and Senate is addressed in the House, we will have another opportunity to pass a measure that reflects the critical needs of our military while protecting the civil service protections of our employees and our environment. I look forward to working with my colleagues on these efforts.

3A) Globalization and Bioterrorism
Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, I wish to take this opportunity in morning business to comment on issues of current events but also tied to the events of the last several years. The issues relate to the natural and the unnatural emergence and use of biology and microbes that have resulted in a convergence of two issues. One is this natural occurrence and one is the use of microbes, bacteria, viruses potentially as bioterror agents, all of that coupled with another nexus, globalization, the realization and evolution of a much smaller world in which we all live.

Globalization is generally addressed in the context of economics, economies of countries, information technologies, coffee shop franchises, luxury hotels, luxury clothing--what labels are on the backs of those sweaters and shirts--Internet surfing, instant messages. Globalization has helped democratize faraway countries. It has brought wealth and comfort to many of the world's peoples. But it has always exposed us to new vulnerabilities which we have read about in recent years and, indeed, we read about each day in the papers.

Specifically, globalization has brought us much closer to the threat of [Page: S7653] GPO's PDF natural disease as well as disease used potentially as an instrument of terror. We can take, for example, the outbreak of monkeypox about which we are reading and listening today. We know monkeypox causes fever, headache, cough, and an extremely painful rash with pus-filled sores that can spread across the body. We know in children and those individuals who have a suppressed immune system, whether it is because of cancer or treatment for cancer or other autoimmune diseases, it can cause death. Monkeypox is suspected to have originated with the importation of an exotic pet, actually a rather popular exotic pet called the Gambian giant rat. Then the monkeypox virus apparently jumped to infect the pet prairie dogs, and then jumped to infect human beings. We know there are 37 suspected or confirmed cases of monkeypox that are currently being investigated by the Centers for Disease Control. Public health officials, we learn, fear the prairie dog owners will release their infected pets into the wild and, thus, spread the disease through communities, regions, and, indeed, throughout North America. Some also believe that this outbreak of monkeypox is the tip of a growing problem of infectious diseases being brought into the country through the importation of exotic animals.

Not too long ago--and, in fact, even right now--we focused on SARS. As we have seen with SARS, international travel by humans is also proving to be a conduit of disease. As I speak, Toronto is struggling with yet another suspected outbreak of SARS and at any point could go back on the World Health Organization's travel advisory list. The SARS epidemic continues to disrupt international travel, continues to affect and, indeed, depress national economies. Monkeypox, SARS, West Nile virus, which we know is seasonal--it has been 4 years since it first arrived in New York, and it has claimed 284 deaths and 4,156 infections. Several years ago, people did not know what West Nile virus was. Several months ago we did not know what SARS was, and several days ago we did not know what monkeypox was.

Last year, just in this region of Maryland, Virginia, and the District, the West Nile virus killed 11 people. After what has been a wet spring in this region, where mosquito breeding is facilitated, officials fear--again not to be an alarmist--there will be another explosion of infections this summer. West Nile has spread across the United States of America. It is now firmly established, entrenched as a North American disease. West Nile, SARS, and now monkeypox--we will see emerging infections continue to appear, at least at this rate. These are the natural health threats.

Equally alarming is this whole arena of bioterrorism, the use of microbes, viruses, bacteria, and other microbes as biological weapons to threaten others. This very body, the Senate, has been attacked with anthrax. We know there is an entity called the plague which, indeed, wiped out about a third of Europe in the 1300s. We know the risk of smallpox. We know one gram of botulinum toxin, if aerosolized, has the potential for taking the lives of a million and a half people. I mention all of this not to be an alarmist but to give some definition to what I think we all know today but we did not think very much about 3 or 5 years ago, and that is these threats, those of bioterrorism and the naturally occurring, are real.

With regard to bioterrorism, I do commend President Bush for successfully leading America and indeed the world to face these new realities of terrorists. We have disrupted terrorist networks. We have frozen terrorist assets. We have removed terrorist leaders and indeed have arrested more than 3,000 individual terrorists worldwide. We have toppled two of the world's most notorious terrorist regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq with decisive victories. With regard to our domestic response, we are finally rebuilding our public health system after a long period of neglect. As a nation, this has enabled us to respond, in an appropriate way, to the potential spread of SARS much more effectively than other countries. We must continue to invest in and enhance our public health system to detect and respond to such emergencies, for, as I said earlier, we will see more. We must actively lead the way to develop new treatments in vaccines, and that is why when I come to the floor each morning and mention the importance of vaccine research, vaccine development, and specifically bioshield legislation, which is sitting before this body perched and ready for us to act upon it, but there are certain problems we have had among ourselves in coming to an agreement, how best to bring that to the floor--but that bioshield legislation is in exact response to these issues I mention today.

I should also add that we, and our friends and allies across the world, must not allow other countries to pursue biological weapons programs. President Bush has set the United States, with the help of our allies, along a proper course to ultimately win the war on terror. I, for one, am grateful he and his national security team have answered the call to serve in this perilous time. We will defeat the forces of terror. We must take our enemies seriously, but because of globalization they are closer than ever. I am optimistic. We have an obligation in this body to respond and indeed prepare for and prevent, whether it is those naturally occurring infections or any attempt of others to use these biological agents as weapons of mass destruction . I yield the floor.

3B) Condemning the Islamic Republic of Iran
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I rise to introduce a resolution, which calls on the government of Iran to comply with its NPT obligations, sign the AIEA Model Additional Protocol, and halt support for terrorism. Also, it asks President Bush and the international community to renew their commitment to the war against terrorism, and impede the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The proliferation of nuclear weapons anywhere in the world poses a serious threat to international peace and security.

The knowledge, non-nuclear materials, and components needed for the production of nuclear weapons are already accessible worldwide. The main technical barrier is obtaining the nuclear material. Therefore, to prevent any further proliferation of nuclear weapons, we must work to prevent the propagation of nuclear materials. The director of the International Atomic Energy Agency (AIEA) has recently announced that Iran has built a plant to enrich uranium--a key component of advanced nuclear weapons.

This deeply worries me, because U.S. intelligence sources indicate that Iran could develop as many as 50 nuclear weapons from this facility. Mr. Speaker, members of this chamber have not yet given adequate attention to the dangers of a nuclear Iran. Iran's nuclear intentions are a cause of fear. It is unclear whether Iran, by pursuing a sophisticated and advanced nuclear program, has chosen to break from the NPT treaty now; but it is obvious that it has positioned itself to do so within a very short time if it ever decides to.

Iran is the most active state sponsor of terrorism, and continues to provide material support to Hizballah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad--all recognized terrorist groups. The country's construction of nuclear facilities coupled with its known ties to terrorist groups constitutes a threat to global peace and security. Nuclear materials that could be used to develop nuclear weapons must not fall into the hands of terrorists or state sponsors of terrorism--like Iran. Preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons capabilities must remain a foreign policy and homeland security priority. There are many difficulties, but also opportunities, on the road towards nuclear non-proliferation. For the last few decades a number of diplomatic and political strategies have been pursued. Let me empathetically opine that we need to redouble these efforts. If we are to achieve a non-nuclear Iran, we must commit to a thoughtful strategy of dialogue.

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

Condemning the Islamic Republic of Iran (also known as Iran) for constructing a facility to enrich uranium with potential for developing a program for the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and for its support of global terrorism.

Whereas in March 2003, the Director of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) announced that Iran was constructing a facility to enrich uranium, a key component of advanced nuclear weapons;

Whereas this facility, located at Natanz, can be used to develop nuclear weapons;

Whereas a second nuclear power plant, projected to be operational by the end of 2003, is currently under construction at Bushehr;

Whereas United States intelligence sources indicate that Iran could develop nuclear weapons from this facility;

Whereas the unclassified Report on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, submitted to the Congress by the Director of Central Intelligence pursuant to section 721 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (50 U.S.C. 2366) covering the 6-month period beginning on July 1, 2001 (in this preamble referred to as the `proliferation report'), states that Iran may have some capability for biological weapons, including blister, blood, and choking agents;

Whereas the proliferation report raises questions about Iran's compliance with its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which Iran signed on January 13, 1993, and ratified on June 8, 1997;

Whereas in February 2003, the Director of Central Intelligence stated that `No Iranian government, regardless of its ideological leanings, is likely to willingly abandon weapons of mass destruction programs that are seen as guaranteeing Iran's security';

Whereas the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000 requires periodic reports to Congress concerning the transfer to Iran of goods, services, and technology that have the potential to make a material contribution to the development of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, or ballistic or cruise missiles;

Whereas the unanimous passage in both Houses of the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000 demonstrates concern and commitment on the part of the Congress to monitor the transfer to Iran of materiel for the development of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, and ballistic or cruise missiles;

Whereas Iran has been a signatory of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) since January 1, 1968;

Whereas signatories of the NPT are committed to preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, promoting cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and achieving nuclear disarmament;

Whereas since January 1984, Iran has been identified by the Department of State as the most active state sponsor of terrorism;

Whereas Iran continues to provide material support to Hizballah, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, all recognized terrorist groups;

Whereas Iran increased its support for terrorism by encouraging coordination among Palestinian terrorist groups following the start of the September 2000 Palestinian uprising;

Whereas approximately 150 members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps remain in Lebanon to coordinate Iranian arms deliveries to Hizballah;

Whereas in its indictments of 14 people in June 2001, the Department of Justice stated its belief that the government of Iran was involved in the June 1996 Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia, which killed 19 United States Airmen; and Whereas Iran's construction of nuclear facilities, coupled with acknowledged ties to terrorist groups, constitutes a threat to global peace and security:

Now, therefore, be it Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That the Congress--

(1) calls on the Government of Iran-- (A) to comply with its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC); (B) to verify compliance with its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; (C) to sign the Model Additional Protocol of the International Atomic Energy Agency, which would allow inspectors freer access to nuclear sites; and (D) immediately and unconditionally to halt support for terrorism, renounce all forms of terrorism, and close all terrorist facilities in Iran;

(2) calls on the President of the United States to set a new direction, incorporating all available nonproliferation tools, to redirect Iranian efforts away from nuclear weapons; and

3) calls on member states of the United Nations to join the United States in preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and reaffirm their commitment to fighting all forms of terrorism.

4A) Finding Weapons of Mass Destruction
Mr. HOEFFEL. Mr. Speaker, I will be joined by several colleagues this evening in a discussion about Iraq, with two fundamental questions to be addressed: First, are we winning the peace in Iraq after our impressive and important military victory, are we winning the peace in Iraq? And secondly, where in the world are the weapons of mass destruction? I will be joined shortly by the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Menendez), the minority caucus chair and a senior member of the Committee on International Relations, and by the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Delahunt), a senior member of the House Committee on International Relations, and several others.

We would like to have a colloquy this evening amongst ourselves to discuss this issue, to raise these issues for the American people. Let me make a few points to get us started. We all agree that our Armed Forces performed brilliantly in Iraq. We are very proud of our young men and young women in uniform, and the military victory we won was important in that it removed the threat posed to regional and even world peace by the murderous regime of Saddam Hussein. But while the military victory is ours, the military mission is not yet accomplished, because we have not found and disarmed and dismantled the weapons of mass destruction.

There must be an accounting to Congress, to the American people, and to our allies regarding the weapons of mass destruction. They are certainly, in the hands of a terrorist, the greatest security challenge we face, and yet we do not know where the weapons of mass destruction are today. We need to determine what we must do to disarm and dismantle them. We must determine who has the custody of those weapons and what steps we must require of any new custodian to render those weapons harmless. If the weapons have been destroyed, then how did that happen, and how is it possible that our security agencies would not have known? And, fundamentally, did the Bush administration overstate its case for war against Iraq, based upon weapons of mass destruction? Did the administration mislead the Congress and the American people intentionally, or not, about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction program? Did the Bush administration misuse the intelligence gathered by our national security agencies? Did they hear only what they wanted to hear? Did they believe only what they wanted to believe? Or did they tell us only what they wanted us to hear about the weapons of mass destruction? The Bush administration has a growing credibility gap, Mr. Speaker, regarding the weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, and we must have a full accounting.

Let me quickly touch on the second topic before turning to my colleagues, and that would be whether we are winning the peace in Iraq. We are faced with enormous challenges: peacekeeping, humanitarian aid, reconstruction, and building a new government. And the truth is that events in post-conflict Iraq are not going as well as they should. Security is a huge problem. Rampant lawlessness is blocking the economic recovery and the establishment of a civil society that we all want to achieve. Humanitarian aid is lacking. Reconstruction has not even started. And the establishment of a pluralistic and representative government seems a very long way off as the demands of religious and ethnic groups are loud and unresolved. What are we doing in Iraq to deal with this? We have replaced all of the senior administrators that we first sent under Jay Garner and have replaced them with a new crew under Paul Bremmer. We have won the United Nations' approval by the Security Council of U.N. Resolution 1483 which names the U.S. and Great Britain as occupying powers, occupying powers under international law in Iraq. So we are responsible for the recovery, the reconstruction, the administration, and the establishment of a new government in Iraq as the occupying power.

Well, what have we done to get the ball rolling here? First came the Chalabi plan, Ahmed Chalabi, a 30- or 35-year exile from Iraq, head of the Iraqi National Congress. He visited my office on October 3, 2002. I believe he was making the rounds of members of the Committee on International Relations. To tell my colleagues the truth, I found Mr. Chalabi to be a blowhard, to be a blusterer, full of spin, the kind of man my grandfather would have called a four-flusher. [Time: 23:10] I am not quite sure what that means, but I think Achmed Chalaby meets the definition. The Pentagon civilian leadership believed Achmed Chalaby, believed him when he said that Saddam Hussein had vast stores of weapons of mass destruction. Those weapons have not been found. They believed Chalaby when he said there was a close connection between al Qaeda and Hussein. That connection has not been established. The Pentagon civilian leadership believed Chalaby when he said the Shiite Muslims in the south of Iraq would greet American military forces as liberators, greet them with open arms. Instead, they are treating us as occupiers and colonizers.

We flew Mr. Chalaby in with 700 followers. We armed him. We gave him arms, Mr. Speaker. We have now had to take those arms away because he does not have credibility. The second plan was the Group of Seven plan to take seven so-called leaders, mostly exiles like Chalaby, and put them in as an interim authority to run Iraq. We have had to give up on that. Jay Garner could not get that to happen.

The third plan now is the Bremer plan. Under the Bremer plan, Paul Bremer, the new viceroy, American Viceroy in Iraq, will appoint a 25- to 30-person advisory council to give us advice on how to rule Iraq. We are not forming an interim authority or government, as we spoke of before. We hope to establish by fiat what really should come from within, from the people of Iraq. So we have some very real challenges. I have more comments to make, but I have colleagues here who are anxious to join this debate and engage in a colloquy. Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Delahunt).

Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding to me. I want to congratulate him on conducting this particular Special Order because I think it is very important. Clearly, newspaper reports, interviews over the course of the past several days, have raised these issues, really, to a level that I know our respective offices are receiving numerous telephone calls by constituents that are expressing profound concern. Earlier this evening, a Republican colleague of ours talked about these issues. I think he was suggesting that they were emanating from a crowd that he called Blame America First. I respectfully have to disagree with him. I think these are questions that have to be asked. I think it is our responsibility to ask them on behalf of the American people. We are not the only ones that are asking these questions. If there is a Blame America crowd, there are many people in that crowd who are not only highly regarded and highly respected but are Members of both parties.

I think it is important to note that the top Marine officer in Iraq, Lieutenant General Jim Conway, and again, this is from a report in The Washington Post, when no such weapons had been found and the move was announced just hours ago, and we are talking about a reorganization of the group that is missioned or tasked to look for these weapons of mass destruction, he said in a press conference that U.S. intelligence was simply wrong in leading the military to believe that the invading troops were likely to be attacked with chemical weapons. This is a statement by Lieutenant General James Conway. I doubt that he is part of any group that would blame America, but he is making a statement that deserves an answer. The Republican Chair of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of this House, highly regarded, well respected on both sides of the aisle, in a letter dated May 22, 2003, and I am referring to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss), he co-signed a letter to the director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Let me just simply quote several sentences: ``The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence believes that it is now time to reevaluate U.S. intelligence regarding the amount or existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and that country's linkages to terrorist groups such as al Qaeda. ``The committee wants to ensure that the intelligence analysis relayed to our policymakers from the intelligence community was,'' and I am quoting the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss), ``accurate, unbiased, and timely in light of new information resulting from recent events in Iraq.'' He goes on: ``The committee is also interested in understanding how the CIA's analysis of Iraq's linkages to terrorist groups such as al Qaeda was derived.'' No one in this body would ever describe the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) as a member of the Blame America Crowd. When we raise questions about the planning and the efforts of reconstructing Iraq after that war, I am confident that no one would ever accuse the Republican chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Richard Lugar, as part of the Blame America Crowd.

Let me read, Mr. Speaker, to my colleagues and to the American people what Senator Lugar, a Republican from the State of Indiana, chairman of the foreign relations committee, had to say in an opinion piece that he wrote on May 22 of this year: ``But transforming Iraq will not be easy, quick, or cheap.'' These are his words: ``Clearly, the administration's planning for the post-conflict phase in Iraq was inadequate. I am concerned that the Bush administration and Congress has not yet faced up to the true size of the task that lies ahead or prepared the American people for it. The administration should state clearly that we are engaged in nation-building.'' That is Senator Lugar's phrase. ``We are constructing the future in Iraq. It is a complicated and uncertain business, and it is not made any easier when some in the Pentagon talk about quick exit strategies or saying dismissively that they don't do nation-building. The days when America could win battles and then come home quickly for a parade are over.''

Mr. HOEFFEL. Mr. Speaker, I would like to ask the gentleman if he is aware of some of the comments made by the administration last fall in the lead-up to the votes, the very important votes taken in Congress and in the United Nations regarding the war on Iraq. Statements of certainty from the President and other high administration officials have not been supported by recent disclosures from the intelligence agencies, the kinds of problems that I believe are leading to the credibility gap that I see growing here. Let me give the gentleman a couple of examples, and I would be interested in his comment. President Bush said in the Rose Garden on September 26, 2002, that the Iraqi regime possesses biological and chemical weapons. The Iraqi regime is building the facilities necessary to make more biological and chemical weapons.''

However, at the very time, the Defense Intelligence Agency was circulating a report in September of 2002 which said there was ``no reliable information on whether Iraq is producing or stockpiling chemical weapons, or whether Iraq has or will establish its chemical agent production facilities.'' [Time: 23:20] This and other information led Greg Thielmann, who retired from the State Department in September 2002 as director of the Strategic Proliferation and Military Issues Office in the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, who reviewed this classified intelligence gathered by the CIA and other agencies in the run-up to the debate in the Congress and the U.N., to accuse the administration of distorting intelligence and presenting conjecture as fact. And he was quoted this week by the Associated Press as saying, ``What disturbs me deeply is what I think are the disingenuous statements made from the very top about what the intelligence did say.'' Is the gentleman aware of these statements and inconsistencies, and would he care to comment on them?

Mr. DELAHUNT. Yes, I am clearly aware of them and it even goes beyond to simply Mr. Thielmann. In fact, there is such outrage among intelligence professionals, people that have committed their lives to this work who I am sure are devoted to their country and are clearly not part of the Blame America Crowd; but they have come together and formed a group, Veterans Intelligence Professionals for Sanity. They wrote recently to President Bush to protest what they call a policy, and, again, I am quoting here, ``a [Page: H5083] policy in intelligence fiasco of monumental proportions. While there have been occasions in the past when intelligence has been deliberately warped for political purposes,'' this is their letter, ``never before has such warping been used in a systematic way to mislead our elected representatives in voting to authorize war.'' That is a very serious accusation; and the American people deserve to have these individuals, other individuals come before in public session, the appropriate committees in Congress, and listen to what they have to say and provide us with an opportunity to inquire to them, let us lift the veil of secrecy. This is a democracy. When we talk about American values, we talk about transparency and accountability; and I am profoundly concerned as to what I am witnessing over the course of the past 2 or 3 weeks, specifically as it relates to the issues of weapons of mass destruction and the issue of links with al Qaeda and the Saddam Hussein regime.

Mr. MENENDEZ. On the gentleman's very point, I want to thank our colleague for convening this opportunity to talk about a very important issue. I would like to ask both of the gentlemen, you sat, as I did here, during the State of the Union speech. You heard the President, as I did, say that one of the concerns is that Iraq sought to buy uranium in Africa. And that was included in the President's State of the Union speech, one of many compelling reasons why supposedly we had to be alarmed about Iraq and Saddam Hussein. And yet we read in today's Washington Post that the National Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice conceded that that was an inaccurate claim.

And yet here before the entire body of Congress and the American people, we were told that one of the compelling reasons, why do you buy uranium? You buy uranium for nuclear devices. Iraq is something that we need to be concerned about. And my question to both of my colleagues is, does this not go to the fundamental issue that if the President's preemption doctrine, not that many of us agree with that as a doctrine that should be followed by the United States, but this doctrine of preemption which basically says we cannot wait for the risk to rise to a level that is a threat to the national security of the United States, we have to go in there in any country and preempt that threat, that even if one is to ascribe themselves to that view, that it is based upon the ability of the United States too gather accurate intelligence and make honest assessments? Does that not go to that very purpose of that doctrine? When we see the revelations that seem to be coming forth like Condoleezza Rice saying, yes, that statement that the President made before Congress and the whole Nation about uranium purchases in Africa being false, that those begin to raise concerns. How do we begin to have any credibility in any such preemption doctrine when the fundamental underpinnings seem to be at question, which is what I think the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Delahunt) is saying.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Exactly. I think the point is, how in the future, if we face a genuine threat to our liberty, to our democracy, do we turn to our allies and the rest of the world and say this is a moment when the United States must take action, given what appears to be, what appears to be issues surrounding the quality of our intelligence.

Let me just go a bit further with the example that you alluded to. It was so shoddy, the intelligence work, that a local police department, let alone our intelligence agencies, would have, I hope, discovered that this information was false. It was based on forged documents. It was one of the documents being signed by the foreign minister of this particular nation which happens to be Niger, not Nigeria, but Niger on the continent of Africa, signed by the foreign minister. And simply taking the name of the foreign minister and doing an Internet search would have revealed that the foreign minister whose signature appeared, in fact, had left that particular role, had resigned from government for 10 years, 10 years.

What does that say about the quality of the intelligence that was relied on by the President and by those who supported the military intervention in Iraq? And yet some would suggest that to even pose these questions or raise these concerns is Blame America First? I respond by saying it is defending America, defending our democracy, defending our credibility, defending our claim to moral authority among the family of nations. Not to do so would be unpatriotic.

Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. Speaker, I think the gentleman's point is well taken. As a matter of fact, one of the things that I was additionally concerned about, and the gentleman did mention the Internet and how anybody who just did a casual search would see that this foreign minister had not been in office in a decade, and yet we rely upon it as fact by which we act and we do not even do a rudimentary study to find out whether that document had legitimacy. It is interesting to note that one of our allies in this regard seems to have the same problem in this regard.

There is an article that appeared in The New York Times that talks about how the top aide to Prime Minister Blair wrote to the head of Britain's Intelligence Service earlier this spring conceding that the government's presentation of a report on Iraqi arms was mishandled. And the report which is entitled, ``Iraq, Its Infrastructure of Concealment, Deception and Intimidation,'' was used as part of the reason to pursue an invasion of Iraq and Saddam Hussein. And it is now referred to in the British news media as the dodgy dossier because of evidence that part of it was down loaded from the Internet, completed with typographical errors from an American student's thesis that relied on 12-year-old public information. And it is now being reviewed by two parliamentary committees in Great Britain because it raises doubts about its central claim that Iraq's chemical and biological weapons were in such a state of readiness that they could be launched within 45 minutes, within 45 minutes. [Time: 23:30] That type of information is incredibly frightening when that is the basis under which we would deploy American troops, put at harm American soldiers.

There is no question, I think we would all agree, that Saddam Hussein was a dictator, was a bad actor, happy to see him leave from the world stage; but the question is, what invokes the policy of preemption, the use of U.S. forces and power abroad, under what basis? That is why so many of us who asked questions at the time and say, well, what is the foundation, what is the clear and present danger to the U.S., what is the imminent threat, have real concerns now as I think we see this intelligence information suggesting that there was not necessarily a clear and present danger, any imminent threat to the United States. I think it puts us in a serious doubt with the international community when the next situation arises. I do not know what my colleague thinks about it.

Mr. HOEFFEL. The certainty that was used by the Bush administration to present this information in the fall of 2002 I think is a critical issue here. It is not completely clear at this point what all of the intelligence agencies were saying. Their information is becoming declassified and is beginning to be made public, but it is very clear what administration leaders were saying.

In addition to the President, whom I already quoted also on September 26, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld told reporters, ``Iraq has active development programs. Iraq has weaponized chemical and biological weapons.'' Yet a national intelligence estimate of October 2002, which was reputed to have said that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction, when we look at the backup material that is just being declassified, it is much more equivocal. The question is was the intelligence wrong or were the political leaders who were getting that intelligence misusing it? Were they hearing what they wanted to hear? Were they telling us what they thought we ought to hear? Were these innocent mistakes? Were they unintentionally mishandling the information, or was it more sinister?

I think these are fundamental questions that need to be asked if the gentleman is right; that if we are going to evaluate this new doctrine of preemption, a fundamental part of that has to be faith and credibility that our fear of [Page: H5084] imminent attack from another nation is an accurate fear, and if it is not an accurate fear, then the whole notion of preemption cannot possibly work. I know my colleagues are anxious to respond, but we have been joined by a senior member of the House, the gentleman from Washington (Mr. McDermott) who is sitting patiently and I think has quite a bit he would like to add to the discussion. So I would be happy to yield to the gentleman from Washington (Mr. McDermott).

Mr. McDERMOTT. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for coming out here at 11:30 at night to discuss this. The tragedy and really travesty of this whole thing of us being out here at this hour of the night, we have no mechanism to which we can get at the truth. They will never have an investigation in this House that ought to be done on what the President has said, what he has led to believe. In Great Britain, they are calling for an independent judge to look at the whole question. What do we do in this House? Our distinguished colleague, who was mentioned before, from Florida was, Let's have the intelligence community look at their reports and see if they can evaluate how they did. That is about like asking the fox to go down to the hen house and check the lock, see if the key works. I mean, that makes no sense at all in my view.

It is clear we have two choices. We either have the choice that the President and those people who presented the evidence, or whoever presented him bad information, which implies stupidity, or we have a situation where they manipulated us. I voted against it because it was clear to me from September that they were so eager to go to war that they were going to say whatever they had to, and they shifted from al Qaeda to weapons of mass destruction to aluminum tubes to cake from Niger. Anything they could grab they threw up here and said this is the reason we have to go to war. The other day Wolfowitz said the reason we had to go to war was because we did not have any other way to get at him. They were sitting on a lake of oil so we could not manipulate him financially anymore so we had to attack. North Korea, we can manipulate them financially because they are broke. We can squeeze them, but there was no way to squeeze the Iraqis.

In my view, we were going to go to war from about the first of September on. They had made the decision, and they came out here and repeatedly presented information. In one of the training sessions before they went to the United Nations, they were rehearsing with Mr. Powell, and he finally got so frustrated looking at this stuff he threw pages up in the air and said bull-, and he used the word from the barnyard. He said this is nonsense. But yet the next day he got up and presented it to the whole world as this was the truth. And here we are, 80 days after they say the war is over. I mean, the President stages this photo op out there and lands and says, well, we have conquered it.

You know why he does not say the war is over? Because if he did, he would have to face the reality or the real travesty of this thing is that they never planned for after the war. The mess they have got over there right now is incredible, and I mean all we have to do is read the BBC. The BBC says that the incidence of diseases such as cholera, dysentery, and typhoid are 2 1/2 times greater in the month of May 2003 than they were in the month of May 2002. That is what democracy brought the children of Iraq. That is what our President says he was going to bring. We are going to bring democracy, we are going to bring you cholera, we are going to kill kids on the basis of diarrhea. The electric lights are not on. Why? Because they are having a big squabble with Bechtel about whether they ought to privatize the electric industry. The water is not clean because they are having a squabble with Bechtel about privatizing utilities.

And the worst thing was in today's newspaper. In today's newspaper, the New York Times on page 15, here we have a colonel that is responsible for 500,000 people in southern Baghdad. He has got 700 paratroopers and he is supposed to run a city of half a million people. He says, ``I was in Haiti but I arrived here with zero experience running a city. We all wonder if we can go back and apply for an honorary degree in public communication. A lot of this stuff we are just completely feeling our way in the dark.'' This is a colonel in the United States military talking.

Mr. HOEFFEL. Mr. Speaker, if I can ask the gentleman a question, I am glad he moved us on to the questions of reconstruction and new governance in Iraq. It seems to me the biggest problem facing America in post-conflict Iraq is the perception, if not the reality, that we are an occupying colonial power as opposed to a liberating power, anxious to work internationally with existing organizations to develop a representative government.

Mr. McDERMOTT. My colleague is absolutely correct. The Arab world has had this before. They saw the West come in into Palestine, into Algeria, into Egypt. They were going to be there just a couple of years to get things stabilized after the Ottoman Empire was over and the First World War was done, and they stayed for 25 years. These people see us, they have got a memory, and they are just saying, hey, get out of here, let us run it; you said we were going to be able to elect our own people. My colleague from Pennsylvania has already pointed out that we have already said we cannot have an election until you learn to pick the right people. So we are going to give you a group of 10 that we will select, and that way we will put an Iraqi face on the government. Now, if you cannot ask where is our democracy, I do not know. They certainly have a right to choose their own government. It should not be decided by our government who is going to run that country.

Mr. HOEFFEL. Mr. Speaker, the gentleman from Massachusetts I think has a comment. [Time: 23:40]

Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Speaker, let me pick up on the issue that the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Hoeffel) raises and the gentleman from Washington (Mr. McDermott). Our troops made us proud. We all support them. Every American supports them. Now they are being asked to do something, as the gentleman indicates, that they have not been trained for. There they are on the ground in a situation that at best is unstable. I do not even want to calculate the number of dead American soldiers on a weekly basis that have occurred as a result of guerrilla-type attacks, ambushes. It is simply not fair. And the irony of this is that the Army Chief of Staff, General Shinseki, indicated before the war that it was his judgment, his estimate that we would need several hundred thousand troops in Iraq for an extended period of time. He was dismissed by the Secretary of Defense. I think maybe it was the Under Secretary of Defense, Mr. Wolfowitz, maybe Mr. Rumsfeld.

Mr. McDERMOTT. It was Mr. Rumsfeld.

Mr. DELAHUNT. But that was grossly exaggerated. Now we discover that General Shinseki is absolutely correct. When I asked during the course of a House Committee on International Relations hearing to the Under Secretary of Defense, Mr. Dan Fife, simple questions, I think his responses are informative; and if I could indulge, I asked Secretary Fife, ``We read different estimates of the cost of reconstruction to the American taxpayers. What is the current estimate of the administration in terms of the cost to the American taxpayers for the reconstruction of Iraq? ``Mr. Fife: There is no total estimate for the whole government for the whole range of things. ``Mr. Delahunt: There is no estimate. Is there a range? ``Mr. Fife: I am not aware that anybody has pulled together all of the threads.'' So then I said, ``Well, I would hope that they would pull the threads together, and if you can get that information to me in writing, I would appreciate that.''

This is maybe several weeks ago rather than at the end of the combat, the hostilities announced by the President. I would hope, in fact, that these estimates would have occurred months before the military intervention was launched. Then I go on, ``You have answered my question, but I would like to receive something in writing, Mr. Secretary, and I would like to share it [Page: H5085] with my colleagues. I think it was General Shinseki that estimated some 200,000 troops would be necessary to secure stability in Iraq. What is the current estimate from the Department of Defense and for how long would they be required?'' The Under Secretary's response: ``These kinds of questions have been an issue for some weeks, and we are continually being asked. And we are, obviously, not getting through on a key point which is there are so many things, so many different aspects of reconstruction and security, and each aspect depends on events and it depends on things we do not know about and we cannot know about. For example, how smoothly is the transition to an Iraq interim authority going to take place, and how quickly are the Iraqis going to be organizing?'' I responded, ``I respect that, Mr. Secretary, but at the same time I would hope that the department would have been prepared to provide a range in terms of worst- and best-case scenarios. I think we have a right to that information. Let me ask you another question: Do you have an estimate in terms of when an election in Iraq may occur?'' The Under Secretary responded, ``No, we do not.'' ``I appreciate your answers. You indicated there appears to be a narrow popular support for a theocracy similar to the one in Iran. Do we have polling data to support your thesis, or is this just an opinion through intelligence?'' Mr. Fife responded, ``It is an opinion that comes from intelligence. It comes from diplomatic reporting.'' ``But there is no polling data, I take it?'' ``I do not know whether there are. I do not know off the top of my head whether there is polling data.'' So then I said, ``Let me ask this question. Let me pose you a hypothetical question. If we have a free and fair election and if as a result of that election there is a leadership that does not necessarily feel warmly towards the United States, are we unconditionally willing to accept that particular leadership, presuming again free and fair elections?'' Mr. Fife answers, ``We are going to be working with the Iraqis to get a government organized, and part of that is going to be organizing a constitution and a bill of rights.''

Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. Speaker, I think the questioning was a precursor, as mine was, when Secretary Powell appeared before the committee before that, and I asked the Secretary how long, how many lives will we lose, how long will we be there, how much will it cost, and are we nation building? And I know that my colleagues have listened certainly for the decade that I have been here, listened to our colleagues on the other side of the aisle talk about how they abhorred the concept of nation-building when we were in Bosnia and other places, stopping real atrocities that were taking place, and hearing we are into nation-building. And yet as the gentleman was trying to elicit from the witness before our Committee on International Relations, which we both sit on, we have no real planning.

There was Jay Gardner, who was designated as the head of the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance. Here we have the Department of Defense doing nation-building, something that we consistently heard our colleagues on the other side of the aisle rail against, and he in essence was on the job a full 3 weeks, and after all of that preparation that supposedly took place for him to be there, we get rid of him in 3 weeks. He was going to develop a national assembly of Iraqis, and that did not work. And then his State Department successor, Ambassador Bremer, thought that perhaps seven opposition groups might be able to work effectively as an interim government. That was soon abandoned.

Now we are talking about a so-called advisory council of 20 or 25 Iraqis, but this latest plan of an advisory council seems to minimize, not increase, the participation of Iraqis in the process for months, if not longer. So here we are in this preemption doctrine for which we now have serious questions about the underpinnings under which we committed massive force because it was alleged at the time that there was a clear and present danger to the United States. We are told by the administration, well, you have to have a lot more time; and yet we did not want to give any more time to U.N. weapons inspectors, but we are asked to give enormous amounts of time here. And we have the full roam of the country uninhibited. And then we supposedly were prepared for the post-Saddam era, and we seem not to be able to put that together, or I am not sure what our intent is. [Time: 23:50] We do not seem to know where Saddam Hussein is. We also do not seem to know where Osama bin Laden is, and that is a whole other issue in terms of Afghanistan and what happened. And so you have the confluence of all of these issues.

Mr. McDERMOTT. There is one other one you have left out. That is our allies, the British. Their defense chiefs are quoted in the newspaper as saying they are resisting calls for British troops to be sent to join American forces in Baghdad because they could, quote, be sucked into a quagmire. They do not want British troops caught up in the rising tide of anti-American violence. So even our allies are stepping back now and saying, hey, look, you guys got over in there and you said you knew what you were doing. It is more complicated even than our own problems.

Mr. MENENDEZ. The point really is that it is the congressional responsibility for oversight that we have on behalf of all of the American people to raise the questions and get the answers that ultimately lead us to make the right choices in the future, informed choices, based upon real substantive information, not perceived or possibly manipulated information, and to be understanding that we have got to be prepared. We won the war; we salute the men and women who did not ask whether this was the right conflict or not but just responded to the Nation's call. I visited one of our bases and the young men and women there told me, Congressman, we don't ask whether this is right or wrong, we don't pick the time, the place or the conflict, we just respond. We salute them for that. But before we send those young men and women, sons and daughters of Americans of this country, we should know that we are sending them on the right information, that we have a plan not only to win the war but then to achieve the peace and to make sure that the seeds that we seek to sow in terms of democracy take place. Those are some of our concerns I think in this process.

Mr. HOEFFEL. The gentleman from New Jersey speaks very eloquently about congressional responsibilities, the things we ought to be asking about. You were talking about how to get a representative government started in Iraq. It seems to me that what Congress ought to be pushing the administration to focus on in our efforts to create liberty is to create the institutions of liberty first. We cannot have a democratic system in Iraq if they do not have the institutions of a free press and a functioning judiciary and the traditions of free speech and a civil society and a noncorrupt bureaucracy. In fact, all that needs to be founded in some written constitution that has public support and public input. What does my colleague think we need to do to achieve that, if he agrees with me that that is the fundamental goal that we have got to establish first before democracy is ever going to come to the people of Iraq?

Mr. MENENDEZ. I think there are a variety of things. I am sure some of our colleagues have some ideas as well. But fundamentally you have to get Iraqi civil society back engaged. You have to create the wherewithal to show that not only were we liberators, hopefully, but at the end of the day that we have also come to help really create a better society and to assist Iraqis to be able to do that. That comes with, first of all, at least having the functioning entities of civil society be able to take place, as you suggested, some of those institutions. As our colleagues suggested, to get some of the basic fundamental services that Iraqis would expect from a liberating force to take place and to begin to act. So, clean water, running sewerage systems, the opportunity for electricity to be present, the return to schools of children, the opportunity for hospitals to [Page: H5086] be able to take care of the sick. The rudimentary elements of a civil society start there. And then to engage civil society within Iraq to begin to perform some of their own functions and to also ask the beginnings of Iraq's natural resources to go for the purposes of helping Iraq rebuild itself. I think the American people have the right to know how long are we going to continue to be there? How many more lives will we lose? How much will it cost? And, as I always listen to our colleagues here in the House and in committee, what is our exit strategy? What is our exit strategy?

Mr. DELAHUNT. We do not seem to be hearing that anymore.

Mr. MENENDEZ. No, we do not hear about exit strategies or nation building anymore.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Or lockboxes, either, for that matter. As the both of you were talking about the men and women that really made us all proud, and we consider our very best, I think it is important to state unequivocally that when they return, it is not simply about parades, it is about respecting them and delivering the promise and the commitment to veterans that I know each and every member of our party is willing to make. No cuts in veterans' benefits. None at all. That is unacceptable and would be unconscionable. But let me end my digression and go back to the issue of nation building and just read a paragraph from the May 19 Washington Post. It is entitled ``Plan to Secure Postwar Iraq Faulted.'' The author writes the following paragraph: ``In interviews here and in Washington and in testimony on Capitol Hill, military officers, other administration officials, and defense experts said the Pentagon ignored lessons from a decade of peacekeeping operations in Haiti, Somalia, the Balkans and Afghanistan.''

Let us be candid and let the American people hear this: that in Afghanistan, we are at great risk of returning to that kind of chaos, that kind of volatility, instability that occurred prior to our invasion of Afghanistan. It is a mess in Afghanistan. The President of that country, President Karzai, cannot leave Kabul. The rest of that nation and many sections of Pakistan bordering Afghanistan are rife with Taliban and with other terrorist groups. And we have failed miserably in reconstruction efforts there. I would hope that this administration and this House would look to Afghanistan as an example of what not to do and go forward with a sensible plan that we can all support, because we know our responsibility.

Mr. HOEFFEL. Would the gentleman agree that using NATO as a peacekeeping force might be the right thing to do in both Afghanistan and Iraq?

Mr. DELAHUNT. I think what is rather ironic, of course, is in Afghanistan, our NATO ally Germany is playing a key and vital role. Afghanistan militarily was truly a coalition of the willing, not a coalition of the coerced, the bribed, but a coalition of the willing. But I think it is important that we approach the reconstruction of both Afghanistan and Iraq on a multilateral basis. We cannot ask the American people to continue to bear the full burden. We have already made a comment in Iraq which practically guarantees a new hospital in every Iraqi city, 100 percent maternity coverage for Iraqi women that is going to be funded by the taxpayers of the United States. And what are we doing here in this Congress under this Republican leadership to Medicare? We are cutting it by $95 billion. That is not fair to the American taxpayer. It is not fair to the American people.

Mr. HOEFFEL. I thank the gentleman for his comments, for his leadership in the House and his eloquence on the House Committee on International Relations. Would my friend from New Jersey like to make some final remarks as our time is short?

Mr. MENENDEZ. Very briefly, I appreciate the gentleman's engaging in the dialogue, and I hope we will continue it in the future. I think we owe America's young men and women who went into harm's way, that before we call upon them again for a preemptive strike, that we are doing so based upon sound information, that we are based on intelligence that is honest, truthful and transparent, that we ultimately have a plan not only to win the war but to win the peace, because we are losing soldiers every day. It is not as well publicized, but we are losing soldiers every day. We deserve, before we send the finest to answer the Nation's call, and that is where the congressional responsibility takes place, in asking these questions, in getting answers and being able to prepare for the future.

Mr. HOEFFEL. I thank my colleagues for joining me.

END

4B) Iraq and WMD
Mr. PENCE. Mr. Speaker, I was in the grocery checkout line buying some Motrin for my ailing 8-year-old daughter late this Saturday night; and the woman next to me, seeing me wearing something of a Republican T-shirt on the weekend but not recognizing me as a Congressman, said, ``I guess your President is in some hot water over weapons of mass destruction.'' And that seems to be what many on the other side of the aisle and many in the national debate would like to say about the President, that somehow this administration either directly or indirectly intentionally or unintentionally exaggerated the threat of weapons of mass destruction and the WMD program of the Nation of Iraq during the months and weeks leading up to Operation Iraqi Freedom.

It is an extraordinary assertion, and as I went on to describe there in the checkout line last Saturday night and rise today to describe, it is patently untenable and ignores the real and demonstrable history of the nation of Iraq and the region. First, a lesson in history. We go back to 1981 when Israel was forced to bomb Saddam Hussein's nuclear reactor at Osirak. In fact, the United Nations established at that time that Iraq had begun a nuclear weapons program and, in their words, chemical and biological weapons capability systems. In fact, in the immediate aftermath of the last Persian Gulf War, Saddam Hussein and his regime as a part of the cease fire agreement acknowledged extensive biological and chemical weapons programs; and I cite now from UNSCOM's sources, the U.N. agency responsible for overseeing the cease fire of Iraq, that Iraq itself acknowledged 10,000 nerve gas warheads, 1,500 chemical weapons, and 412 tons of chemical weapons agents.

Last week before the Committee on International Relations, John Bolton, the Under Secretary for Arms Control at the U.S. State Department testified before us; and I asked him very specifically, Mr. Speaker, whether or not the assessment of the WMD program in Iraq changed significantly from the Clinton administration to the Bush administration. He hesitated and then very carefully said it had not changed in any significant way and that in many respects the Clinton administration assessed the WMD program in Iraq precisely the same as the Bush administration did. Citing those hundreds of tons of chemical and biological agents that Iraq admitted it had in 1991, Under Secretary of State John Bolton said, ``Both administrations said these materials were unaccounted for.'' In fact, when President Clinton bombed Iraq in 1998 after they expelled our weapons inspectors, he justified the bombing by saying ``it was necessary to attack Iraq's nuclear , chemical and biological programs and its capacity to threaten its neighbors.'' So said President Bill Clinton. So those who would say that in the 5 years leading up from the time Iraq expelled weapons inspectors to the time of Operation Iraqi Freedom that somehow, even though he refused to admit it, Saddam Hussein willingly and privately destroyed his enormous cache of weapons of mass destruction, ignore common sense, ignore history, the truth is, Mr. Speaker, we would have to believe the worst of George W. Bush and the best of Saddam Hussein to believe that there was not an extraordinary program of biological, chemical and even a nascent program for nuclear weapons being developed in the nation of Iraq and the capital of Baghdad.

Facts are stubborn things, and reciting those facts that Iraq admitted to in 1991 and establishing a decade-long pattern of deception and denial confirms, as our Iraqi survey group continues to scour that country for further evidence of a WMD program, I remain confident, as the President said yesterday, that we will not only continue to find evidence of a program, the mobile labs, the biological and chemical suits and the syringes that were found with antidotes for chemical deployments, but the day will come in the very near future, I am confident, that U.S. and coalition forces will find the elusive evidence of a program of weapons of mass destruction.

4C) Informed Citizenry vs. Need for Secrecy
 Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, a critical problem that demands constant oversight in a democracy is the tension between an informed Congress and an informed citizenry because both are necessary for a democracy. That tension is against the need for secrecy in some instances and in the interest of national security. That is what I wish to draw Members' attention to today.

From Watergate to Iran contra, to the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, we have seen and experienced and learned from the peril of the executive branch's use of secrecy in the name of national security to accomplish unlawful deception and illegal acts.

We face this issue again now in regard to Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and the flat assertions by the President of the United States that Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction pose an imminent threat to the United States. After all, it was these assertions that led many of the Members of the legislature, both in the House of Representatives and in the other body, to support the war, and so did many Americans.

So it is a significant question whether the President's assurance was warranted by the evidence, whether he had something to back up these repeated assertions that the weapons of mass destruction held by the former ruler of Iraq were indeed an imminent threat to the United States.

So where are these weapons of mass destruction? One day the President assured us that they will be found. The next day we are told that he only meant to claim that Iraq had programs to develop weapons of mass destruction, and that program was under way. But then the day after that his spokesman said never mind, even if Saddam had no weapons imminently threatening us, he was a bad and evil person who deserved to be destroyed.

Now, these contradictions have begun to be noted by more and more people, and I want to report that some in the public are changing their view about this war and what brought us into it as American casualties mount in Iraq, as violence and civilian strife grow worse there, and disease and hunger spread in the aftermath of war.

Now, whatever the ultimate final assessment is that will be made about Iraq, the fundamental problem that I bring to Members' attention this evening is if the President deceives the Congress and the public on an issue as sensitive as war or peace, it raises the greatest constitutional issues about whether he is abusing his office, whether he is violating his oath, and whether he is misleading the American people.



[Time: 17:45]

It is particularly critical because this President's doctrine of preventive war, never before employed by any of the preceding Presidents of this great country, suggests that he may or will be trying to persuade America to support other preventive wars in the future. Will that campaign be based on misrepresentation?

Missing Weapons of Mass Destruction: Is Lying About the Reason for War an Impeachable Offense?
(By John W. Dean)

President George W. Bush has got a very serious problem. Before asking Congress for a Joint Resolution authorizing the use of American military forces in Iraq, he made a number of unequivocal statements about the reason the United States needed to pursue the most radical actions any nation can undertake--acts of war against another nation.

Now it is clear that many of his statements appear to be false. In the past, Bush's White House has been very good at sweeping ugly issues like this under the carpet, and out of sight. But it is not clear that they will be able to make the question of what happened to Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) go away--unless, perhaps, they start another war.

That seems unlikely. Until the questions surrounding the Iraq war are answered, Congress and the public may strongly resist more of President Bush's warmaking.

Presidential statements, particularly on matters of national security, are held to an expectation of the highest standard of truthfulness. A president cannot stretch, twist or distort facts and get away with it. President Lyndon Johnson's distortions of the truth about Vietnam forced him to stand down from reelection. President Richard Nixon's false statements about Watergate forced his resignation.

Frankly, I hope the WMDs are found, for it will end the matter. Clearly, the story of the missing WMDs is far from over. And it is too early, of course, to draw conclusions. But is not too early to explore the relevant issues.

PRESIDENT BUSH'S STATEMENTS ON IRAQ'S WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

Readers may not recall exactly what President Bush said about weapons of mass destruction; I certainly didn't. Thus, I have compiled these statements below. In reviewing them, I saw that he had, indeed, been as explicit and declarative as I had recalled.

Bush's statements, in chronological order, were:

``Right now, Iraq is expanding and improving facilities that were used for the production of biological weapons.''--Untied Nations Address, September 12, 2002.

``Iraq has stockpiled biological and chemical weapons, and is rebuilding the facilities used to make more of those weapons.

``We have sources that tell us that Saddam Hussein recently authorized Iraqi field commanders to use chemical weapons--the very weapons the dictator tells us he does not have.''--Radio Address, October 5, 2002.

``The Iraqi regime ..... possesses and produces chemical and biological weapons. It is seeking nuclear weapons.

``We know that the regime has produced thousands of tons of chemical agents, including mustard gas, sarin never gas, VX nerve gas.

``We've also discovered through intelligence that Iraq has a growing fleet of manned and unmanned aerial vehicles that could be used to disperse chemical or biological weapons across broad areas. We're concerned that Iraq is exploring ways of using these UAVS for missions targeting the United States.

``The evidence indicates that Iraq is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program. Saddam Hussein has held numerous meetings with Iraqi nuclear scientists, a group he calls his ``nuclear mejahideen''--his nuclear holy warriors. Satellite photographs reveal that Iraq is rebuilding facilities at sites that have been part of its nuclear program in the past. Iraq has attempted to purchase high-strength aluminum tubes and other equipment needed for gas centrifuges, which are used to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons.''--Cincinnati, Ohio Speech, October 7, 2002.

``Our intelligence officials estimate that Saddam Hussein had the materials to produce as much as 500 tons of sarin, mustard and VX nerve agent.''--State of the Union Address, January 28, 2003.

``Intelligence gathered by this and other governments leaves no doubt that the Iraq regime continues to possess and conceal some of the most lethal weapons ever devised.''--Address to the Nation, March 17, 2003.

SHOULD THE PRESIDENT GET THE BENEFIT OF THE DOUBT?

When these statements were made, Bush's let-me-mince-no-words posture was convincing to many Americans. Yet much of the rest of the world, and many other Americans, doubted them.

As Bush's veracity was being debated at the united Nations, it was also being debated on campuses--including those where I happened to be lecturing at the time.

On several occasions, students asked me the following question: Should they believe the President of the United States? My answer was that they should give the President the benefit of the doubt, for several reason deriving from the usual procedures that have operated in every modern White House and that, I assumed, had to be operating in the Bush White House, too.

First, I assured the students that these statements had all been carefully considered and crafted. Presidential statements are the result of a process, not a moment's thought. White Hose speechwriters process raw information, and their statements are passed on to senior aides who have both substantive knowledge and political insights. And this all occurs before the statement ever reaches the President for his own review and possible revision.

Second, I explained that--at least in every White House and administration with which I was familiar, from Truman to Clinton--statements with national security implications were the most carefully considered of all. The White House is aware that, in making these statements, the President is speaking not only to the nation, but also to the world.

Third, I pointed out to the students, these statements are typically corrected rapidly if they are later found to be false. And in this case, far from backpedaling from the President's more extreme claims, Bush's press secretary, Ari Fleischer had actually, at times, been even more emphatic than the President had. For example, on January 9, 2003, Fleischer stated, during his press briefing, ``We know for a fact that there are weapons there.''

In addition, others in the Administration were similarly quick to back the President up, in some cases with even more unequivocal statements. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld repeatedly claimed that Saddam had WMDs--and even went so far as to claim he knew ``where they are; they're in the area around Tikrit and Baghdad.''

Finally, I explained to the students that the political risk was so great that, to me, it was inconceivable that Bush would make these statements if he didn't have damn solid intelligence to back him up. Presidents do not stick their necks out only to have them chopped off by political opponents on an issue as important as this, and if there was any doubt, I suggested, Bush's political advisers would be telling him to hedge. Rather than stating a matter as fact, he would say: ``I have been advised,'' or ``Our intelligence reports strongly suggest,'' or some such similar hedge. But Bush had not done so.

So what are we now to conclude if Bush's statements are found, indeed, to be as grossly inaccurate as they currently appear to have been?

After all, no weapons of mass destruction have been found, and given Bush's statements, they should not have been very hard to find--for they existed in large quantities, ``thousands of tons'' of chemical weapons alone. Moreover, according to the statements, telltale facilities, groups of scientists who could testify, and production equipment also existed.

So there is all that? And how can we reconcile the White House's unequivocal statements with the fact that they may not exist?

There are two main possibilities. One that something is seriously wrong within the Bush White House's national security operations. That seems difficult to believe. The other is that the President has deliberately misled the nation, and the world.

A DESPERATE SEARCH FOR WMDS HAS SO FAR YIELDED LITTLE, IF ANY, FRUIT

Even before formally declaring war against Saddam Hussein's Iraq, the President had dispatched American military special forces into Iraq to search for weapons of mass destruction, which he knew would provide the primary justification for Operation Freedom. None were found.

Throughout Operation Freedom's penetration of Iraq and drive toward Baghdad, the search for WMDs continued. None were found.

As the coalition forces gained control of Iraqi cities and countryside, special search teams were dispatched to look for WMDs. None were found

During the past two and a half months, according to reliable news reports, military patrols have visited over 300 suspected WMD sites throughout Iraq. None of the prohibited weapons were found there.

BRITISH AND AMERICAN PRESS REACTION TO THE MISSING WMDS

British Prime Minister Tony Blair is also under serious attack in England, which he dragged into the war unwillingly, based on the missing WMDs. In Britain, the
missing WMDs are being treated as scandalous; so far, the reaction in the U.S. has been milder.

New York Times columnist Paul Krugman has taken Bush sharply to task, asserting that it is ``long past time for this administration to be held accountable.'' ``The public was told that Saddam posed an imminent threat,'' Krugman argued. ``If that claim was fraudulent,'' he continued, ``the selling of the war is arguably the worst scandal in American political history--worse than Watergate, worse than Iran-Contra.'' But most media outlets have reserved judgment as the search for WMDs in Iraq continues.

Still, signs do not look good. Last week, the Pentagon announced it was shifting its search from looking for WMD sites, to looking for people who can provide leads as to where the missing WMDs might be.

Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton, while offering no new evidence, assured Congress that WMDs will indeed be found. And he advised that a new unit called the Iraq Survey Group, composed of some 1,400 experts and technicians from around the world, is being deployed to assist in the searching.

But, as Time magazine reported, the leads are running out. According to Time, the Marine general in charge explained that ``[w]e've been to virtually every ammunition supply point between the Kuwaiti border and Baghdad,'' and remarked flatly, ``They're simply not there.''

Perhaps most troubling, the President has failed to provide any explanation of how he could have made his very specific statements, yet now be unable to back them up with supporting evidence. Was there an Iraqi informant thought to be reliable, who turned out not to be? Were satellite photos innocently, if negligently, misinterpreted? Or was his evidence not as solid as he led the world to believe?

The absence of any explanation for the gap between the statements and reality only increases the sense that the President's

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misstatements may actually have been intentional lies.

INVESTIGATING THE IRAQI WAR INTELLIGENCE REPORTS

Even now, while the jury is still out as to whether intentional misconduct occurred, the President has a serious credibility problem. Newsweek magazine posed the key questions: ``If America has entered a new age of pre-emption--when it must strike first because it cannot afford to find out later if terrorists possess nuclear or biological weapons--exact intelligence is critical. How will the United States take out a mad despot or a nuclear bomb hidden in a cave if the CIA can't say for sure where theyare? And how will Bush be able to maintain support at home and abroad?''

In an apparent attempt to bolster the President's credibility, and his own, Secretary Rumsfeld himself has now called for a Defense Department investigation into what went wrong with the pre-war intelligence. New York Times columnist Maureen Dowd finds this effort about on par with O.J.'s looking for his wife's killer. But there may be a difference: Unless the members of the Administration can find someone else to blame--informants, surveillance technology, lower-level personnel, you name it--they may not escape fault themselves.

Congressional committees are also looking into the pre-war intelligence collection and evaluation. Senator John Warner (R-VA), chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, said his committee and the Senate Intelligence Committee would jointly investigate the situation. And the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence plans an investigation.

These investigations are certainly appropriate, for there is potent evidence of either a colossal intelligence failure or misconduct--and either would be a serious problem. When the best case scenario seems to be mere incompetence, investigations certainly need to be made.

Senator Bob Graham--a former chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee--told CNN's Aaron Brown, that while he still hopes they find WMDs or at least evidence thereof, he has also contemplated three other possible alternative scenarios: ``One is that [the WMDs] were spirited out of Iraq, which maybe is the worst of all possibilities, because now the very thing that we were trying to avoid, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, could be in the hands of dozens of groups. Second, that we had bad intelligence. Or third, that the intelligence was satisfactory but that it was manipulated, so as just to present to the American people and to the world those things that made the case for the necessity of war against Iraq.''

Senator Graham seems to believe there is a serious chance that it is the final scenario that reflects reality. Indeed, Graham told CNN ``there's been a pattern of manipulation by this administration.''

Graham has good reason to complain. According to the New York Times, he was one of the few members of the Senate who saw the national intelligence estimate that was the basis for Bush's decisions. After reviewing it, Senator Graham requested that the Bush Administration declassify the information before the Senate voted on the Administration's resolution requesting use of the military in Iraq.

But rather than do so, CIA Director Tenet merely sent Graham a letter discussing the findings. Graham then complained that Tenet's letter only addressed ``findings that supported the administration's position on Iraq,'' and ignored information that raised questions about intelligence. In short, Graham suggested that the Administration, by cherrypicking only evidence to its own liking, had manipulated the information to support its conclusion.

Recent statements by one of the high-level officials privy to the decisionmaking process that lead to the Iraqi war also strongly suggests manipulation, if not misuse of the intelligence agencies. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, during an interview with Sam Tannenhaus of Vanity Fair magazine, said: ``The truth is that for reasons that have a lot to do with the U.S. government bureaucracy we settled on the one issue that everyone could agree on which was weapons of mass destruction as the core reason.'' More recently, Wolfowitz added what most have believed all along, that the reason we went after Iraq is that ``[t]he country swims on a sea of oil.''

WORSE THAN WATERGATE? A POTENTIAL HUGE SCANDAL IF WMDS ARE STILL MISSING

Krugman is right to suggest a possible comparison to Watergate. In the three decades since Watergate, this is the first potential scandal I have seen that could make Watergate pale by comparison. If the Bush Administration intentionally manipulated or misrepresented intelligence to get Congress to authorize, and the public to support, military action to take control of Iraq, then that would be a monstrous misdeed.

As I remarked in an earlier column, this Administration may be due for a scandal. While Bush narrowly escaped being dragged into Enron, it was not, in any event, his doing. But the war in Iraq is all Bush's doing, and it is appropriate that he be held accountable.

To put it bluntly, if Bush has taken Congress and the nation into war based on bogus information, he is cooked. Manipulation or deliberate misuse of national security intelligence data, if proven, could be ``a high crime'' under the Constitution's impeachment clause. It would also be a violation of federal criminal law, including the broad federal anti-conspiracy statute, which renders it a felony ``to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose.''

It's important to recall that when Richard Nixon resigned, he was about to be impeached by the House of Representatives for misusing the CIA and FBI. After Watergate, all presidents are on notice that manipulating or misusing any agency of the executive branch improperly is a serious abuse of presidential power.

Nixon claimed that his misuses of the federal agencies for his political purposes were in the interest of national security. The same kind of thinking might lead a President to manipulate and misuse national security agencies or their intelligence to create a phony reason to lead the national into a politically desirable war. Let us hope that is not the case.

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