CNS - July 14-18, 2003 - Congressional Record Weekly Update

Mr. SPRATT moves that the managers on the part of the House at the conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the Senate amendment to the bill H.R. 1588 be instructed to insist upon the provisions contained in section 3111 of the House bill.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 7(b) of rule XXII, the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Spratt) and the gentleman from California (Mr. Hunter) each will control 30 minutes.

I offer this motion simply to ask the House to stand by a bipartisan compromise that we struck last May in marking up the defense authorization bill, the bill we are now sending formally to conference which deals with the development of low-yield nuclear weapons .

Members of the House may have read, they may have heard that the Bush administration is pushing to repeal the so-called ban on low-level nuclear weapons research. They disavow any intention of building such weapons , but they at least seek the flexibility to conduct research in that realm. Let me tell everybody, they basically won that argument. Both the House and the Senate defense authorization bills propose changes to current law that allow the flexibility of research into low-yield nuclear weapons .

The administration said this was a problem, the Department of Energy said it was a problem, existing law, so we have changed it. We have addressed the problem. I was an author of the so-called Spratt-Furse amendment in 1993. I believe that the language of that amendment as it now stands as amended in the committee mark is sensible and a fair compromise. That is what I am asking the House to do, to stand behind it.

Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Skelton), the ranking member on our committee.

While there are many reasons to support this motion, let me say that one key reason for supporting it is that the provisions contained in section 3111 of the House bill are largely the same legislation adopted by this body in the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 which, of course, was last year's defense bill.

The House adopted that legislation after considerable and very careful deliberations and on a bipartisan basis led by the gentleman from South Carolina. We authorized research but retained the prohibition on development activities that could lead to the production of a destabilizing and unnecessary new low-yield nuclear weapon. We also described permissible activities necessary to address the safety and reliability of those issues.

Mr. Speaker, being a student of history, the war in Iraq and Desert Storm some 12 years ago now have taught us that stealth technology, standoff capability and precision munitions are the key to future warfare. New conventional technologies have changed the way we fight and, if anything, will

The House position on low-yield nuclear weapons makes sense. I urge my colleagues to support the motion to instruct conferees.

Mr. Speaker, this provision which is in the House-passed bill is a provision that was agreed to by the vice-chairman of the committee, the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon), and the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Spratt) last year. It was restated this year. It is the House position going into conference. For that reason, we are certainly not going to urge anybody to vote against it.

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Reyes), the ranking member on the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the motion to instruct conferees offered by my friend and colleague, the gentleman from South Carolina.

Earlier this year, the administration proposed a complete repeal of a law that has been on the books for over a decade, the Spratt-Furse ban on research and development of new nuclear weapons with yields below five kilotons. The Spratt-Furse ban is not a complete ban. It bans just R&D of new low-yield nuclear weapons . It permits R&D on new weapons with yields above five kilotons. It permits R&D of modifications to existing nuclear weapons regardless of their yield.

It also permits our national laboratories to conduct R&D on low-yield nuclear weapons for the purposes of counterproliferation, that is, how to detect a low-yield nuclear terrorist device and devise ways in which to disable them.

The Spratt-Furse ban also permits R&D of low-yield nuclear weapons if it is necessary to help keep our nuclear arsenal safe and reliable.

When asked, Department of Energy officials admitted that there is no military requirement for a new low-yield nuclear weapon, and they had no plans to develop one anytime soon.

They simply wanted to repeal the Spratt-Furse ban because they maintain that it somehow has a chilling effect on the freedom of their scientists to look at any nuclear weapon option regardless of whether or not there is a military need.

During the markup of the defense authorization, the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Spratt) offered an amendment that was adopted by the full committee by a voice vote, and I think this is a very sound compromise. The Spratt amendment permits research on new low-yield nuclear weapons , but draws the line on moving past research and into development. In short, the Spratt amendment makes sure that the Congress will be a coequal partner with the executive branch if there is any decision to move past research and actually start developing new low-yield nuclear weapons . I think that the Spratt amendment makes good sense and protects Congress's right to fully participate on any future decision to start up development of new low-yield weapons . I urge all of my colleagues to support this motion to instruct.

Let me take just a minute to explain the state of play and why it is important that the House provisions prevail over the Senate provision. The Senate defense authorization bill repeals these provisions in their entirety, but then backfills the gap with language that requires specific authorization of Congress to move from development into production of low-yield nuclear weapons . This amounts, really, to restating what the law already is, that to do something this significant with respect to a new product money has to be authorized and appropriated.

The House bill is similar in consequence but better, in my opinion, because it makes it absolutely clear that any movement beyond just research will require Congress to change by law the nuclear weapons policy of the United States. The House and Senate both addressed these specific concerns raised by the administration and the weapons labs and the Department of Defense to permit more flexibility in basic research, but our version contains a stronger guarantee that the Congress is going to be a partner in any decision to go beyond the scope.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from California (Mrs. Tauscher).

Mr Speaker, I would like to offer my strong support for the motion to instruct which sends an important message that it is the will of the House to maintain the ban on development of low-yield nuclear weapons , and I commend the chairman of the full committee for his initiative to work with us on this.

Nuclear weapons will remain a crucial part of America's arsenal for the foreseeable future. They provide a hedge against potentially hostile nuclear powers and underpin security commitments to our allies. Today, however, the United States is addressing the threat of weapons of mass destruction from North Korea, India, Pakistan, and a growing list of countries.

As we have seen in Afghanistan and in the global war on terrorism, when the United States leads with a purpose, the rest of the world will follow. And just as the world follows our lead on tackling common enemies, it also reacts when we take provocative and destabilizing action. I believe strongly that until our war fighters have a military requirement for a new nuclear weapon or have exhausted conventional alternatives, Congress should maintain its ban on the development of such weapons .

Preventing the development of new nuclear weapons would not affect the RNEP study with focuses on existing warheads. It would not prevent any of the ideas that are currently being explored regarding missile systems. In addition to having no military requirement for them, new nuclear weapons are not the answer to threats being used to justify them. Nuclear weapons of any yield have a limited penetration ability and will never surgically destroy hardened targets. They offer no guarantee of destroying chemical and biological agents without releasing them into the atmosphere. Detonated in an urban area, even a 1-kiloton nuclear bomb would kill tens of thousands of civilians and hinder friendly troops.

Preserving the ban on new nuclear weapons is a small step that would also help restore the belief that the United States intends to fight the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction . I hope my colleagues would support this motion to recommit.

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Holt), a nuclear physicist who understands what is at stake here better than possibly anybody in the House.

Mr. HOLT. Mr. Speaker, I thank my friend from South Carolina for yielding me this time.

The direction in which the administration has been leading our Nation on nuclear weapons is becoming increasingly dangerous. That is why I wrote to President Bush in April, a letter co-signed by 33 of my colleagues here, to underscore our concern that our Nation's leaders not adopt a mindset of viewing nuclear weapons as just an extension of the continuum of conventional military options available to the United States. It is important that we maintain the nuclear distinction.

I rise to support this motion because it gives us the opportunity to invoke at least one cautionary restraint on this dangerous path. Both the House and Senate versions of this bill eliminate the Spratt-Furse ban that has been in place since 1993. And this Senate language, especially, would allow Pandora's box to be opened to allow, in effect, unfettered research into low-yield nuclear weapons . As a scientist, I can talk about the studies that some of my scientific colleagues have prepared about why some of the newly conceived weapons like the bunker buster would not work as proposed, why they would be dirty, why they would be unwieldy; but I choose instead to focus for just a moment on the more important strategic and tactical questions.

moving in that direction. U.S. battlefield commanders have said over and over again that they have long recognized the folly of battlefield nukes. The weapons and especially these newly conceived weapons put our troops at risk and are not useful in advancing military campaigns. And very important, this work would be sending the wrong message to our allies and to potential adversaries around the world. They would view the adoption of this bad, particularly the bad Senate language as further evidence that America is bent upon developing and procuring a new generation of nuclear weapons . As we go to war around the world in part to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons , we should not be sending the signal that we are bent on developing and procuring a new generation of nuclear weapons .

So the Spratt motion is a very constructive step that provides, I think, an important safeguard that actually will help to make our country and our world more secure.

I thank the gentleman for his comments, and I rise to make one correction. The House bill does have language which we would like to retain. The gist of this motion is let us stand by the House language and reject the Senate language.

I rise in support of the motion to instruct and I rise to thank the gentleman from California (Mr. Hunter), the distinguished chairman of my former committee, for his acceptance of this motion.

Certainly this motion reflects a bipartisan compromise that has been worked out not just in this Congress but in the past Congress, and when that happens we should seize the moment. It does allow expanded research, but it stops short of allowing the development or the fabrication of new nuclear weapons . That is an essential step for this Congress to take, partly to make sure that we do not send the wrong signal to the rest of the world and partly to make sure that the institutional prerogatives of this House are protected when decisions of that magnitude are faced at any time.

There is, of course, an important strategic deterrent role for nuclear weapons , but 10 years ago or more we stepped back from the brink with Russia. We stepped back from maintaining or developing tactical nuclear weapons . We do not need to go down that path again because if we do, we risk losing further our standing in the international community. Our arguments about nonproliferation will seem hollow.

We are today continually concerned about weapons of mass destruction held by adversaries or held by other countries where we believe there is some risk to our security in the world. We do not advance those arguments about weapons of mass destruction if we start to develop new nuclear weapons that can only be used in a tactical way, whatever they are called. The nuclear Earth penetrator is one. We really need to make sure that we are exercising the kind of responsible leadership in this area that the world expects of us and that will redound to the benefit of our own national security.

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Markey).

Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Speaker, the Cold War is over and the good news, to my friends, is we won and the Soviet Union lost. We do not need a new arms race with ourselves. We do not now need to send a signal to countries around the world who harbor desires to obtain nuclear weapons that we believe that it is still worth our while to invest in a new generation of nuclear weapons which are more usable in battleground situations. We must avoid being viewed as the drunk preaching temperance from a bar stool. If we want to convince others to embrace our view that nuclear weapons are not usable, we must ourselves act in a way that does not leave the misimpression that we are still engaging in the same kind of mindless development of another generation of nuclear weapons that only encourages countries like North Korea, countries like Iran, which each have active nuclear weapons programs, that they are wise in pursuing that course.

So the resolution that we are considering right now is one which is saying to the rest of the world we understand their concern about an initiation of another nuclear arms race, and we understand the consequences for regions around the world where there are bad actors, bad countries trying to develop nuclear weapons programs. We brought the country of Iraq to its knees militarily in 3 weeks. Our problem is not destroying any country's military capacity. Our real problem is in controlling the country after we do so, and nuclear weapons do not add to our capacity to accomplish those goals. So this is, in my opinion, a wise approach to take. The gentleman from South Carolina as usual is trying to draw a very fine line between programs that have already been put in place and do protect our country and new programs which would potentially add to an acceleration of an arms race, a nuclear arms race around the world.

We now must turn our attention to Iran and North Korea. The only way to deal with it is with strong diplomacy, active diplomacy. Additional nuclear weapons will not help us, and that is why this resolution must pass.

Mr. Speaker, in conclusion, let me simply put in context why we have this particular provision before us and why we are emphasizing it in this motion to instruct. The Spratt-Furse prohibition on low-yield nuclear weapons was a follow-up to the decision by President Bush, the first President Bush, on September 27, 1991, a historic day.

That day he announced the withdrawal of all land-based tactical nuclear weapons from our overseas bases, particularly those in Europe, and all sea-based tactical nuclear weapons from surface ships, submarines, and naval aircraft. We decided to forgo the development of the follow-on to Lance, a battlefield tactical nuclear missile, and we sent a signal to the world by all of these decisions that we were serious about minimizing the role and possible uses of nuclear weapons early in a conflict and especially for tactical or theater purposes. We said that our arsenal in the future in effect would be a strategic arsenal, a strategic determinant, and we would not use nuclear weapons for tactical and theater purposes anymore, such as the Davy Crockett, to take out tanks or nuclear artillery, rounds, and sea-based mines and things of that kind.

This move away from tactical nuclear weapons prompted the Soviet Union to move in the same direction; and Gorbechev shortly announced the elimination of their warheads, their land-based tactical nuclear missiles, mines, and artillery shells. He announced that he was removing warheads from surface-to-air missiles and removing sea-based tactical nukes on naval aircraft.

Taken together, these steps marked a major step away from tactical nuclear weapons and a step toward global security. The initiative by the first Bush administration helped us persuade Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Belarus to forswear nuclear weapons after the breakup of the Soviet Union. It also made it easier for the United States and our European allies to convince much of the rest of the world to extend indefinitely the nuclear proliferation treaty, or NPT.

Now, the NPT is not the final, definitive answer to our proliferation concerns, but the world would be a lot riskier place without it. It definitely makes it harder for nations or terrorist groups to obtain nuclear materials and nuclear know-how, and it establishes the authority of the war community to question and inspect the activities of States that are a signatory to this treaty.

I think a return by the United States back to the days of tactical nuclear weapons , especially nuclear weapons designed to be more usable by virtue of low yields, would send a troubling signal, a signal that nuclear weapons just maybe are useful for tactical purposes, battlefield purposes, strategic purposes, and were really just an extension of conventional weapons for the same tactical purposes. It would indicate that we see tactical utility in these weapons , and it would reverse the

Now, there are some who will say that we need to do this because we have to have weapons to take on deep, hard targets. The actual numbers are classified, of course, but even if we can improve the ability of our nuclear weapons to burrow in the hard terrain and into geologic formations such as granite, simple physics tells us we are going to come up way short of reaching the underground bunkers that we are really worried about, like those in North Korea.

Some say that we need these new weapons , these low-yield weapons , deeper penetrators, because we need the heat and the gamma rays and the X-rays of a nuclear weapon to destroy the chemical and biological agents that might be stored in deep underground bunkers. But if the fireball and the X-rays and the gamma rays are to reach the bunker, then we need to use, we are told by qualified experts, weapons that are much, much bigger than 5 kilotons; and using even a 5 kiloton weapon has consequences that have to be dealt with, fallout, for example.

Alternatively, if we want to use the pressure and blast of a nuclear weapon to crush a bunker, then we already have weapons to do that job.

Supporters of full repeal also say that our restraint thus far on developing these tactical theater and battlefield nuclear weapons has not really had any effect on nations that are bent upon acquiring them, North Korea being a prominent example, but I am not so sure about that. Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan in a momentous decision all decided to rid their countries of nuclear weapons . Brazil, South Africa, South Korea, and Taiwan have taken similar steps; and numerous countries have signed the NPT.

So before we repeal this long-standing language in the code, we should keep in mind the effects that surround us and also, also I think we should point out what is already in this bill. This bill will reduce the amount of time it takes to resume underground nuclear testing. This bill will call for a review of nuclear weapons for ``bunker-busting'' missions, the so-called Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator. This bill will call for building a brand-new, multi-billion-dollar facility to produce plutonium pits for nuclear weapons . Just the beginning, planning money, but these things that are in here of a still-robust nuclear policy but one that is slanted towards strategic usage and not tactical usage.

Mr. Speaker, I commend the chairman of our committee for his generosity and collegiality in allowing us to reach an agreement on this. I know it is a compromise for him. He has his doubts, and we have our disagreements. But, nevertheless, I appreciate his kindness in doing it.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Speaker, I just want to thank the gentleman for his participation as a great member of the committee. I did have and do have my reservations about his position, but it was an agreement between the gentleman from Pennsylvania and the gentleman from South Carolina and it is the position of the House. We are now going into conference with the other body, and I think it is appropriate to carry the House position forward.

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, reclaiming my time, I have gratitude for the gentleman's agreeing to the amendment. As long as it passes by voice vote, I will not ask for a record vote on final passage.

Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the motion. The Administration and the Republicans in Congress have made clear their intent to explore new, low-yield nuclear weapons . Before we head down that path, we need to remember two things.

(1) The Cold War is over and I have good news for my friends on the other side of the aisle. We won! The Russians are no longer our adversaries. Remember, President Bush has told us he's looked into President Putin's eyes and found him to be a man he could deal with! Let's stop fighting the last war. The Russians are no longer a threat and I see no reason why we should allow the development of mini-nukes because somebody in Russia may have talked about the possibility of developing new weapons . They're probably only talking about doing that because they hear all of this talk about new nuclear weapons being developed by the U.S. What does this mean? It means that the only reason to develop mini-nukes is to start a new arms race. But that begs the question: with whom would we have this arms race? No nation in the world has a conventional military that can compare with ours. The only country that has a nuclear arsenal that compares to ours is Russia, and we're paying them to dismantle their nuclear weapons ! Where's the beef behind this threat?

(2) These so called mini-nukes are still nuclear weapons . They may be smaller, but they will still kill tens of thousands of people, will still produce radioactive fallout and contaminate the countryside, and will still carry the stigma of being nuclear weapons . We already have big nuclear weapons , and medium-sized nuclear weapons , and small nuclear weapons . In fact, some of our nuclear weapons are ``dial-a-yield'', meaning we can select the yield of the weapon--and some of them can be ``dialed'' down to less than 1 kiloton, which, by the scale of nuclear weapons , is pretty mini. We used to have a weapon with a yield of less than a kiloton that weighted only 163 pounds--we called that the SADM or Special Atomic Demolition Munition. Is that what we want? To have kicked out the nuclear-seeking Saddam, only to replace him with our own nuclear SADM?

I would urge my colleagues to remember these two things: that to develop mini-nukes would be to start an arms race with ourselves, and that a mini-nuke is still a nuclear weapon, with all the associated consequences. We simply cannot preach nuclear temperance from a barstool. We cannot tell Iran, North Korea and other countries not to develop nuclear weapons while simultaneously developing our own new weapons .

I urge you to support this Motion to Instruct. Let's not turn back the clock and start a new ``mini'' arms race.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Bass). Without objection, the previous question is ordered on the motion.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion to instruct offered by the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Spratt).

Mr. HOBSON. Mr. Chairman, it is my pleasure to submit to the House for its consideration the fiscal year 2004 Energy and Water Development Appropriations Bill. On Tuesday, July 15th, the Appropriations Committee unanimously approved the bill, and I believe it merits the support of the entire membership of the House. I want to thank all the members of the subcommittee for their help in bringing the bill to the floor today. I particularly want to thank Mr. Visclosky for his help and cooperation. I also want to thank the Chairman of the Appropriations Committee, Mr. Young, and the ranking minority member, Mr. Obey for allowing us to move forward in such an expeditious manner.

Mr. Chairman, this bill provides annual funding for a wide variety of programs, which include such diverse matters as maintenance of the Nation's nuclear weapons stockpile, navigation improvements, environmental cleanup, flood control, advanced scientific research, and nuclear waste disposal.

Total spending in the fiscal year 2004 Energy and Water Development Bill is $27,080,000, the same as the subcommittee's 302b allocation. This is an increase of $942 million over fiscal year 2003 and $134 million over the President's budget request. The bill I present to the House today is fiscally responsible, and meets the major needs of the members of the House.

�. Mr. Chairman, another area of concern is the portion of the Department of Energy's budget request that deals with the nuclear weapons complex. The Department continues to ask Congress to fund a Cold War nuclear arsenal, and the infrastructure necessary to maintain that arsenal, even though we no longer face a Cold War adversary. As President Bush said when he announced reductions to the nuclear stockpile on November 13, 2001, ``The United States and Russia have overcome the legacy of the Cold War.'' AT that time, he pledged that the United States would reduce our stockpile to 1,700 to 2,200 operationally deployed warheads over ten years because, as he said, ``the current levels of our nuclear forces do not reflect today's strategic realities.'' I couldn't agree more. We do not need thousands of warheads to deter a nuclear attack anymore, but the Department of Energy and the Department of Defense want Congress to continue to pay for a Cold War stockpile. It is time the DOE and the DOD begin to shrink the footprint of the nuclear weapons infrastructure to reflect the President's decision to reduce our nuclear arsenal. DOD is rethinking the kinds of forces it needs to respond to the threats of the new century, and will go through another round of BRAC to bring down its footprint. The National Nuclear Security Administration should go through a similar process and take a hard look at its workforce and facility needs for a smaller stockpile. Accordingly, we have not approved all of the increase requested for weapons activities in fiscal year 2004.

Mr. Chairman, in this Bill we have also attempted to send a signal to the Department of Energy and the Russian government with regard to the Nuclear Nonproliferation program. At the end of May of this year, the Department had unobligated balances in this program of almost $600 million. That is money just sitting at DOE headquarters. In addition, by this fiscal year, the Department estimates that it will have uncosted balances of over $1.1 billion. I view this as poor management. We are fully supportive of the nuclear nonproliferation mission, but we have to question whether we are achieving the program goals when over a billion dollars goes unspent. We need to figure out what is wrong and fix it before this issue endangers support for the program.

Mr. HOLT. Mr. Chairman, today I rise in support of this appropriations bill and also to highlight the need for increased funding for basic science programs at the Department of Energy� I also want to commend Mr. Hobson and the committee for reducing funding for study of a new generation of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons on the battlefield would be a nightmare, and reasonable battlefield commanders say they would never want them. Nuclear ``bunker buster'' bombs are flawed in concept and we should not be spending money to pursue them.

Mrs. TAUSCHER. Mr. Chairman, I would like to commend Mr. HOBSON and Ranking Member VISCLOSKY for offering a strong bill that ensures that the United States continues to have a robust nuclear deterrent and the infrastructure to support it.

As the former ranking member of the Armed Services panel to oversee the National Nuclear Security Administration, I am especially pleased that the committee report highlights the need for the NNSA to focus on its primary mission of maintaining the viability of the existing stockpile.

The committee's cuts in funding for new nuclear weapons and for the robust nuclear earth penetrator are vital steps toward restoring U.S. leadership in fighting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Indeed, not only does the military not have any requirements for these weapons, but developing them would send a strong signal to other countries that the pursuit of nuclear weapons is legitimate and necessary.

At a time when we are facing a changing security environment it would seem prudent to strengthen the core missions of the nuclear establishment such as our science based stockpile stewardship rather than embark on potentially dangerous new missions that would have a destabilizing effect.

In this regard, I am pleased to see full support for the National Ignition Facility, a key Stockpile Stewardship Program facility which is being build in my district.

Recently NIF brought the first four of its 192 beams online and has demonstrated full power and full performance on those beams. Those four beams now constitute the most powerful laser in the world.

NIF will begin to do experiments to provide data to the Stockpile Stewardship Program this year--while it continues to commission additional laser beams on the path to full facility operation in FY2008.

A critical element of the committee's action is the support for growth in the Experimental Support Technologies, which provide the technologies to use NIF.

I also strongly urge the chairman to work with me and other members of the Armed Services Committee to move forward on the work necessary to refurbish the W-80. The W-80 fills a unique niche in our nuclear deterrent.

The work called for in the budget request will lay the groundwork for improving the safety, security and reliability of the W-80.

It is important that the budget request for the NNSA work on the W-80 be supported so that the production plant work can be effectively managed.

Finally, I am concerned about the language in section 301 mandating that the Department of Energy automatically compete labs that have been managed by a particular contract for more than 50 years.

The decision to chose a given contractor to manage a particular laboratory with its specific needs, is an exceedingly complex one, involving all manner of judgments concerning the

relative value of factors such as the ability of a given contractor to attract and retain the strong technical workforce required to focus on issues of supreme national security importance to our country.

These issues deserves in-depth scrutiny and study, not an automatic competition of the contract. Neither the Department of Defense, NSF or NASA treats its contractors this way, and I am concerned that DOE would be asked to do so.

On the water side, I understand the committee's rationale for not including funding for the CALFED program.

The program must be authorized by Congress this year and I am working with my colleagues from California to advance a comprehensive reauthorization bill this year.

The federal government must be an active partner with California to heal the Delta's ecosystem and prepare for the state's growing population.

Mr. MATHESON. Mr. Chairman, I strongly oppose the Advance Weapons Concepts funding in this appropriations bill. While I was pleased to see that the Energy and Water Appropriators chose to reduce funding for the ``Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator,'' I am still concerned that this bill provides $5 million for the weapon.

We live in an era when terrorism and national security concerns dominate the political landscape, as well they should. No one is arguing about the need to find new technologies with which our Nation can combat deeply buried targets, particularly those held by terrorists. Supporters of the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator, argue that the current funding is strictly limited to weapons research and development in Department of Energy labs.

This claim ignores the obvious end result of such funding--weapons design does not occur in a vacuum. In order for our soldiers to use nuclear weapons in combat, these weapons must first be physically tested, most likely at the Nevada Test Site. The Federal Government's poor record on weapons testing and containment of fallout is lengthy and disappointing, at best.

I have already seen too many Americans succumb to then-unforeseen consequences of nuclear weapons. The price of new usable nuclear weaponry is too high for this great Nation, once again, and I reiterate my opposition to the advance weapons concepts funding.

Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time and for all his work and cooperation, and I rise to speak on some of the positive elements of this bill.

This bill includes my amendment on Iran's program to develop nuclear weapons and is particularly relevant given recent developments in Iran. Iran continues to claim that its nuclear research program's only goal is to promote peaceful activities. Last week, however, Iran confirmed that it had successfully tested its mid-range missile, the Shahab-3, which can reach Israeli soil. And last month, the International Atomic Energy Agency stated Iraq has secretly processed nuclear material. Iran continues its game with the IAEA over signing the new nuclear safeguards protocol. Iran is a country with huge oil and natural gas reserves and clearly does not need nuclear power for its energy consumption.

My amendment, as incorporated in this bill, therefore, calls on the International Atomic Energy Agency to ensure that Iran's nuclear program is used only for peaceful purposes and urges the United States representatives to the IAEA to help develop guidelines for early identification of any Iranian noncompliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. And, finally, Iran should sign and ratify the new nuclear safeguards protocol to this treaty.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in strong support of H.R. 1950, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for fiscal years 2004 and 2005. At this time, I want to commend both our chairman, the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde), and our senior ranking member, the gentleman from

California (Mr. Lantos), of the House Committee on International Relations for their outstanding leadership in bringing to the floor the State Department reauthorization bill which has strong bipartisan support.

This bill includes an historic measure offering recognition to a Palestinian state if performance benchmarks can be reached; increases U.S. capacity at the United Nations, where rogue regimes are increasingly trying to hijack the agenda; initiates a new effort to promote free media abroad; and provides the State Department with tools to confront the alarming spread of ballistic missiles.

Mr. Chairman, this bill also includes three amendments which I offered during full committee markup on May 7, 2003, three of which were accepted by unanimous consent and have now been included in the full text of H.R. 1950.

One amendment expresses a sense of Congress relating to the Soviet nuclear tests in Kazakhstan and calls for the Secretary of State to establish a joint working group with the government of Kazakhstan to assist in assessing the environmental damage and health effects caused by Soviet nuclear tests Semipalatinsk.

The other amendment requires the State Department to prepare and transmit to Congress a report that contains a description of the extent to which the government of Pakistan has closed all known terrorist training camps operating in Pakistan and Pakistani-held Kashmir, has established serious and identifiable measures to prohibit the infiltration of Islamic extremists across the line of control into India, and has ceased the transfer of weapons of mass destruction, including any associated technologies, to any third country or terrorist organization.

Mr. PALLONE. Madam Chairman, a few weeks ago, President Bush announced a $3 billion aid package to Pakistan. I do not support the provisions of military aid in that package. However, President Bush was willing to put some conditions on the Pakistan aid package. Those conditions were, one, Pakistan must exemplify its effort to decrease crossborder terrorism in Kashmir; two, Pakistan must end support of nuclear nonproliferation in rogue nations; and, three, Pakistan must exemplify steps toward returning to a democracy.

Madam Chairman, this bill today includes language included by the gentleman from American Samoa that is consistent with the first two conditions outlined by the President. It requires the State Department to prepare a report that contains a description of the extent to which Pakistan has closed all known terrorist training camps operating in Pakistan and Pakistani-held Kashmir, has established serious and identifiable measures to prohibit the infiltration of Islamic extremists across the Line of Control into India, and has ceased the transfer of weapons of mass destruction.

Because this important language is included in the bill, I rise in support of this legislation and only wish to make the point that it is equally as important for Pakistan to return to democracy in order to ensure future peace and stability in South Asia.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 382, noes 42, not voting 10, as follows:

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Linder) (during the vote). Members are advised 2 minutes remain in this vote.

Ms. LINDA T. S�NCHEZ of California, Mr. BERRY and Mr. GREENWOOD changed their vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''

The title of the bill was amended so as to read: ``A bill to establish the Millennium Challenge Account to provide increased support for certain developing countries; to authorize the expansion of the Peace Corps; to authorize appropriations for the Department of State for fiscal years 2004 and 2005; and to authorize appropriations under the Arms Export Control Act and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 for security assistance for fiscal years 2004 and 2005, and for other purposes.''.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to take from the Speaker's table the bill (H.R. 1588) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2004 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed Forces, and for other purposes, with a Senate amendment thereto, disagree to the Senate amendment, and agree to the conference asked by the Senate.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California?

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, I yield to the gentleman from California for the purpose of explaining this request.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the distinguished gentleman from Missouri for yielding.

This unanimous-consent request allows the House and Senate Armed Services Committees to formally begin conference.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California?

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, the Chair appoints the following conferees:

From the Committee on Armed Services, for consideration of the House bill and the Senate amendment, and modifications committed to conference: Messrs. HUNTER, WELDON of Pennsylvania, HEFLEY, SAXTON, MCHUGH, EVERETT, BARTLETT of Maryland, MCKEON, THORNBERRY, HOSTETTLER, JONES of North Carolina, RYUN of Kansas, GIBBONS, HAYES, Mrs. Wilson of New Mexico, Messrs. CALVERT, SKELTON, SPRATT, ORTIZ, EVANS, TAYLOR of Mississippi, ABERCROMBIE, MEEHAN, REYES, SNYDER, TURNER of Texas, Ms. LORETTA SANCHEZ of California, and Mr. Cooper.

From the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, for consideration of matters within the jurisdiction of that committee under clause 11 of rule X: Mr. Goss, Mr. Hoekstra, and Ms. Harman.

From the Committee on Agriculture, for consideration of sections 1057 and 2822 of the House bill, and modifications committed to conference: Messrs. GOODLATTE, LUCAS of Oklahoma, and STENHOLM.

From the Committee on Education and the Workforce, for consideration of sections 544, 553, 563, 567, 907, 1046, 1501, 1502, and 1504 through 1506 of the House bill, and sections 233, 351, 352, 368, 701, 1034, and 1036 of the Senate amendment, and modifications committed to conference: Messrs. CASTLE, KLINE and GEORGE MILLER of California.

From the Committee on Energy and Commerce, for consideration of sections 601, 3113, 3201, and 3517 of the House bill, and sections 601, 701, 852, 3151, and 3201 of the Senate amendment, and modifications committed to conference: Messrs. TAUZIN, BARTON of Texas, and DINGELL.

From the Committee on Financial Services, for consideration of sections 814 and 907 of the House bill, and modifications committed to conference: Mr. Oxley, Mr. King of New York, and Mrs. Maloney.

From the Committee on Government Reform, for consideration of sections 315, 323, 551, 805, 822, 824, 828, 829, 1031,

1046, 1050, 1057, Title XI, Title XIV, sections 2825 and 2826 of the House bill, and sections 326, 801, 811, 813, 822, 831 through 833, 841, 852, 853, 1013, 1035, 1102 through 1104, and 2824 through 2826 of the Senate amendment, and modifications committed to conference: Mr. Tom Davis of Virginia, Mr. Shays, Mrs. Jo Ann Davis of Virginia, and Messrs. PUTNAM, TURNER of Ohio, WAXMAN, VAN HOLLEN, and DAVIS of Illinois.

From the Select Committee on Homeland Security, for consideration of section 1456 of the House bill, and modifications committed to conference: Messrs. COX, SHADEGG and THOMPSON of Mississippi.

From the Committee on House Administration, for consideration of section 564 of the Senate amendment, and modifications committed to conference: Messrs. NEY, MICA, and LARSON of Connecticut.

From the Committee on International Relations, for consideration of sections 1047, 1201, 1202, 1209, Title XIII, sections 3601, 3611, 3631, 3632, 3634, 3635, and 3636 of the House bill, and sections 323, 343, 921, 1201, 1202, 1204, 1205, 1207, 1208, Title XIII and section 3141 of the Senate amendment, and modifications committed to conference: Messrs. HYDE, BEREUTER, and LANTOS.

From the Committee on the Judiciary, for consideration of sections 661 through 665 and 851 through 853 of the Senate amendment, and modifications committed to conference: Messrs. SENSENBRENNER, SMITH of Texas, and CONYERS.

From the Committee on Resources, for consideration of sections 311, 317 through 319, 601, and 1057 of the House bill, and sections 322, 330, and 601 of the Senate amendment, and modifications committed to conference: Messrs. POMBO, GILCHREST, REHBERG, RAHALL, and UDALL of New Mexico.

From the Committee on Science, for consideration of sections 852 and 911 of the Senate amendment, and modifications committed to conference: Messrs. BOEHLERT, SMITH of Michigan, and HALL of Texas.

From the Committee on Small Business, for consideration of section 866 of the Senate amendment, and modifications committed to conference: Mr. Manzullo, Mrs. Kelly, and Ms. Vel�zquez.

From the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, for consideration of sections 312, 601, 907, 1049, 1051 and 2824 of the House bill, and sections 324, 601, and 2821 of the Senate amendment, and modifications committed to conference: Messrs. YOUNG of Alaska, PETRI, and CARSON of Oklahoma.

From the Committee on Veterans' Affairs, for consideration of section 565 of the House bill, and sections 644 and 707 of the Senate amendment, and modifications committed to conference: Messrs. SMITH of New Jersey, BILIRAKIS, and FILNER.

From the Committee on Ways and Means, for consideration of section 701 of the Senate amendment, and modifications committed to conference: Messrs. THOMAS, MCCRERY, and STARK.

2B) Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams - Defense Appropriations Act 2004

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I will make a statement while I am trying to locate the amendment I am going to offer. The 2004 budget request included no funding for the establishment of additional weapons of mass destruction civil support teams. There are currently 32 teams that are certified and operational. The plan is to field a total of 55 teams to ensure there is at least 1 team established in each State and territory.

The Senate Armed Services Committee included additional manpower and funding to establish 12 additional teams in fiscal year 2004. We included additional National Guard manpower for these teams, but we did not provide operation and maintenance or procurement funding.

I will send an amendment to the desk and ask that we consider it. This amendment conforms our bill to that of the Senate-passed national defense authorization bill regarding what we call CSTSs of the funds provided to the Department of Defense. This amendment would earmark $39.3 million in operation and maintenance funds, $25.9 million in procurement, and $1 million in research and development funds. I present the amendment as one that is offset and merely allocates funds to these teams as required by the Senate-passed authorization bill. I believe it has the support of my colleague Senator Inouye.

The Senator from Alaska [Mr. Stevens], for himself and Mr. Warner, proposes an amendment numbered 1232.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

SEC. 8124. Amounts appropriated by this Act may be used for the establishment and support of 12 additional Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams, as follows:

(1) Of the amount appropriated by title II under the heading ``OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE, ARMY'', up to $23,300,000.

(2) Of the amount appropriated by title II under the heading ``OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE, ARMY NATIONAL GUARD'', up to $16,000,000.

(3) Of the amount appropriated by title III under the heading ``OTHER PROCUREMENT, ARMY'', up to $25,900,000.

(4) Of the amount appropriated by title IV under the heading ``RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST AND EVALUATION, DEFENSE-WIDE'', up to $1,000,000.

Mr. STEVENS. I ask for the immediate consideration and adoption of this amendment.

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I have long advocated the creation of 23 additional full-time National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams and have supported the location of at least one team in each state and territory of the United States. I am pleased that last year the Congress passed--and the President signed into law--a defense authorization bill that required that these important teams be created.

I am also pleased that earlier this year the Senate passed a defense authorization bill that includes $88.4 million for 12 new teams in fiscal year 2004. I thank the Chairman and Ranking Member of the Armed Services Committee for their support on this issue, and for including language in the report accompanying the fiscal year 2004 DoD authorization bill urging the Pentagon to include funding for the remaining eleven teams in its fiscal year 2005 budget request.

I also want to thank the Chairman and the Ranking Member of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee for their work on this issue. I wonder if the managers would engage with me in a brief colloquy on this subject.

Mr. FEINGOLD. It is my understanding that the bill as amended by the Chairman includes the full $88.4 million authorized by the Armed Services Committee for 12 new Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams. I ask the Chairman of the Committee and the Senator from Hawaii [Mr. INOUYE] if that is the case?

Mr. FEINGOLD. So it is your understanding that the funding included in the bill currently before the Senate includes sufficient funding to man, equip, and train 12 new civil support teams?

Mr. SESSIONS. As the Chairman and Ranking Member are aware, for the last 7 years, since 1997, the Department of Defense has sponsored a unique biomedical research effort called the Neurotoxin Exposure Treatment Research Program or NETRP. This program conducts medical research that has wide applications in protecting and treating our soldiers, as well as advancing medical research that can lead to a cure for Parkinson's disease, which afflicts more than one million Americans.

The program addresses the protection of American soldiers from a wide range of exposures including chemical warfare agents, potential toxins in military uniforms and jet fuel, and radiation from radar and communications systems. Findings from this military research then have broad application to those diagnosed with Parkinson's and other neurodegenerative disorders.

This year's House of Representatives DOD Appropriations bill includes an increase in NETRP funding from the 2003 level of $21.25 million to $31 million--a solid investment in protecting our soldiers that can have the added benefit of saving or vastly improving the lives of millions of Americans.

Mr. STEVENS. I can assure the Senator from Alabama that I will give consideration during conference to the House proposal to increase NETRP funding levels.

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I rise to add my thoughts to the debate on the Defense appropriations bill for fiscal year 2004.

I wish to take this opportunity to thank all our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and members of the Coast Guard for their hard work in the ongoing fight against terrorism, their efforts in Iraq, and the many other missions to which they have been assigned. These dedicated men and women have volunteered to undertake, often at great personal sacrifice, the task of protecting the American people and our way of life. We owe a huge debt of gratitude to the members of the United States Armed Forces for their selfless service.

I am pleased that this bill appropriates an average pay raise of 4.15 percent for military personnel and lowers servicemembers' out-of-pocket housing costs from 7.5 to 3.5 percent.

I am pleased that the Appropriations Committee has fully funded at the authorized level the 12 additional full-time Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams, WMD-CST, included in the Senate-passed Department of Defense authorization bill. These teams, which are staffed by full-time members of the National Guard, will play an integral part in aiding first responders in their crucial work in the immediate aftermath of a terrorist attack. I have been a longtime supporter of the creation of these teams and am encouraged that we are well on our way to assuring that every State will have at least one full-time WMD-CST.

I am also pleased that funding for controversial data-mining programs, like the Terrorism Information Awareness Program and the Combat Zones That See Program, have been zeroed out in this bill. The untested and controversial intelligence procedure known as data-mining is capable of maintaining extensive files containing both public and private records on each and every American. Most Americans believe their private lives should remain private. Data-mining programs run the risk of intruding into the lives of individuals who have nothing to do with terrorism but who trust that their credit reports, shopping habits, and doctor visits would not become a part

of a gigantic computerized search engine, operating without any controls or oversight.

Unfortunately this enormous spending bill also contains many unnecessary items. I continue to be deeply concerned about the priorities of the Pentagon and about the process by which we consider the Department of Defense authorization and appropriations bills, a concern I have voiced every year that I have been a Member of this body. This bill includes $9.1 billion for missile defense, despite the fact that it is an unproven program. We also continue to pour billions of dollars into duplicative fighter aircraft programs. These are just two of many examples of excess.

Despite the almost $370 billion appropriated, this bill still does not accurately reflect the true cost of the defense budget. This bill stays within the Department of Defense allocation only by rescinding $3 billion from prior supplemental appropriations and counting those funds against this year's spending. Even worse, this bill contains absolutely no funding for the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, relying instead on future supplemental appropriations. These accounting tricks will not stop the ballooning of the national debt.

I was also disappointed that the Senate tabled the amendment to fully fund the President's AIDS initiative. I was thrilled by the commitment to fighting AIDS articulated by President Bush in his State of the Union Address, and I believe that the Congress should follow through on his historic and admirable pledge. Because I recognize that the AIDS pandemic is so devastating, because the pandemic causes the kind of instability and social collapse that present real security problems, I supported this amendment. But before I did, I studied it carefully because I needed to be certain that the offset would not diminish the resources available to the men and women of our armed forces currently deployed in dangerous missions in Iraq and elsewhere. Close scrutiny gave me confidence that the senior Senator from West Virginia had carefully crafted the offset to ensure that it would not do harm to our troops.

I will vote for this bill. This legislation includes good elements, such as the pay increases for military personnel and the funding for the establishment of much-needed WMD-CSTs. However, poor fiscal practices and accounting gimmicks cannot hide the fact that expensive, unproven, and redundant weapons programs continue to drain away scarce resources.

Mr. McCONNELL. I announce that the Senator from Texas (Mrs. HUTCHISON) is necessarily absent.

Mr. REID. I announce that the Senator from Florida (Mr. GRAHAM), the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. KERRY), the Senator from Connecticut (Mr. LIEBERMAN), and the Senator from Georgia (Mr. MILLER) are necessarily absent.

I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. KERRY) would vote ``yea.''

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber desiring to vote?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate insists on its amendments and requests a conference with the House on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses.

The PRESIDING OFFICER appoints Mr. Cochran, Mr. Specter, Mr. Domenici, Mr. Bond, Mr. McConnell, Mr. Shelby, Mr. Gregg, Mrs. Hutchison, Mr. Burns, Mr. Inouye, Ms. Collins, Mr. Byrd, Mr. Leahy, Mr. Harkin, Mr. Dorgan, Mr. Durbin, Mr. Reid of Nevada, and Mrs. Feinstein conferees on the part of the Senate.

Mr. TAUZIN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on H.R. 2122.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Louisiana?

There was no objection.

Mr. TAUZIN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 4 minutes.

Today, Mr. Speaker, the House will address one of President Bush's top initiatives in the war against terror, Project Bioshield.

Mr. Speaker, it is absolutely critical that America's public health emergency system be prepared to respond to new and emerging threats, and we are here today to take care of that job. This bipartisan legislation is about the safety and security of American families and of our country. America is stepping up to the profound threat of terrorism and other public health emergencies, and I am proud to report that H.R. 2122 combines smart policy and provides additional resources to prepare the Nation for bioterrorism threats and for other public health emergencies.

The chairman and ranking member of both the committees of jurisdiction and the Select Committee of Homeland Security have arrived at this consensus product that is before us today. I would like to thank the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Dingell), the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Tom Davis), the gentleman from California (Mr. Waxman), the gentleman from California (Mr. Cox), the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Turner) for their cooperation and hard work on this bill. This bipartisan spirit is similar to last year's effort on the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act that Senator Kennedy and I had the privilege to move through the Congress last year.

Project Bioshield will spur the research and development of new vaccines, drugs, and other countermeasures to deal with these biological, chemical, nuclear or radiological agents that pose a material threat to our Nation's security. The list includes, among other dangerous agents, such things as anthrax, botulinum toxin, the plague, ebola, and other similar viruses, many of which lack any effective treatment or antidote today.

The bill before us accomplishes this goal by doing two important things. First, it provides the needed flexibility in a range of areas from government contracting rules to peer review to personnel matters in order to speed up government-sponsored research and development into these deadly agents. Second, it creates a special reserve fund of money for the government to purchase these countermeasures that may ultimately be developed in response to the President's call. Without this clear commitment of funding in future years, private sector companies that are capable of such development simply will not undertake the heavy investment and risk associated with developing products to deal with agents that do not affect significant populations today and hopefully never will.

At our urging, the House has already provided an advanced appropriations of $5.6 billion over the next 10 years for this purpose, and this is all consistent with our authorization in the House budget resolution.

The bill also provides new authority to the Secretary of Health and Human Services to authorize in times of emergency the use of unapproved products whose benefits in treating or preventing infection outweigh the risk. Under current law, the only way an individual can receive an unapproved product is pursuant to a clinical investigation. But in time of national emergency, when this Nation is under attack, it may be necessary to give such investigational drugs on a large scale basis to millions of Americans. H.R. 2122 provides that if there is such an emergency, and if no adequate alternative therapy is available, the Secretary can authorize the use of a drug, device, or vaccine in such a flexible manner.

While we have made improvements to the administration's initial proposal in certain areas, our bill stays close to that original proposal, granting all the additional flexibilities and authorities requested by the President and even expanding them in some cases to further encourage companies to heed our call for innovation.

Once again, I want to applaud the leadership of President Bush and the truly bipartisan work of this body across multiple committees of jurisdiction to protect our country and to promote public health security from the many new dangers that we face today.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. BROWN of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 3 1/2 minutes.

Mr. Speaker, this legislation is the product of a good-faith bipartisan process. I want to thank the gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. Tauzin), the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Bilirakis), as well as the ranking member, the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Dingell), for their work on this bill.

The United States and the global community of which we are part can only benefit from the development of bioterrorism countermeasures. Because the very existence of countermeasures renders bioterrorism less lethal and, therefore, less attractive to would-be terrorists, new countermeasures, therefore, serve a dual purpose. They are both an antidote and a deterrent to future attacks.

For the sake of national and international security, it makes sense to invest in both basic and advanced research aimed at producing new bioterrorism countermeasures. When an opportunity to produce one of these countermeasures presents itself, it makes sense to capitalize quickly on that opportunity. That is the logic behind this legislation.

The bill establishes an expedited process for Federal support of countermeasure research and a procurement process to encourage private sector investment in this research. At the same time, Mr. Speaker, the legislation is

[Page: H6928]

not a blank check. Congress has a responsibility to weigh competing funding priorities and set funding levels appropriately.

In that context, it is appropriate to reiterate a concern that I raised last week while we debated the Labor, Health and Human Services appropriations bill. Bioterrorism funding is essential and important. The legislation before us is essential and important, but our investment in bioterrorism should not and must not come at the expense of research focusing on cancer and other health threats.

Let me repeat that. Our investment in bioterrorism should not and must not come at the expense of research focusing on cancer and other health threats. The appropriations bill we passed last week here funds the National Institutes of Health at a level barely sufficient to support existing research projects, much less new research. That is a direct outgrowth from the tax cut that this Congress passed recently and the tax cuts for the wealthiest, most privileged citizens this Congress passed 2 years ago. It means we have not had enough money to appropriate for basic research, for medical research for the National Institutes of Health. It means it may be difficult for us in the future to deal with bioterrorism funding as fully as we should.

This Congress has made choices by giving tax cuts to the wealthiest, most privileged citizens, and as a result has made far too many cuts in health care; and health care is clearly inadequately funded, as our committee has discussed over and over again.

Mr. Speaker, finding ways to prevent and to treat and to cure disease is an enduring national priority. Interest in it does not wax, does not wane. Our investment in it should not either. We need to make these decisions in a way that serves the public and serves the interest of more medical research. We have a responsibility to balance priorities to provide adequate resources to prepare the country for a possible bioterrorist attack while maintaining strong support for other medical research priorities.

Mr. Speaker, I hope we can work on a bipartisan basis to restore the momentum that we once had behind groundbreaking medical research while continuing to move forward in the area of bioterrorism preparedness. This legislation before us today promotes the latter goal, and I urge my colleagues to support it. I thank the gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. Tauzin), the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Bilirakis), the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Dingell), the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Markey), and others who worked on this legislation.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Markey), my good friend.

Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Brown) for yielding me time.

I rise for the purpose of entering into a colloquy with the gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. Tauzin).

I want to commend the chairman and his staff along with the gentleman from California (Mr. Cox); the ranking member, the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Dingell); and the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Brown); and the ranking member, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Turner) for all of their hard work and for working with me and my staff in a bipartisan fashion that ultimately led to a resolution of all of the concerns which I raised with the legislation.

I do have, however, two outstanding issues that I wish to clarify at this time. Mr. Speaker, I have concerns that relate to the emergency use section of Project Bioshield. Specifically, I want to be sure that once a declaration of an emergency is terminated or revoked, that current law applies and it will then be impermissible for anyone to move such drugs, devices or biologics in interstate commerce without going through the proper approval process. Is this the case under the legislation?

Mr. TAUZIN. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MARKEY. I yield to the gentleman from Louisiana.

Mr. TAUZIN. The gentleman is correct. Like you, I too want to ensure that unapproved products are available in times of emergency. And while we allow the FDA to make products available during such time of emergency, absent such emergency, current law applies. We do allow for the shipments of such therapies in limited circumstances, namely, where a physician authorizes the continued treatment of an individual who initially received the drug during an emergency. However, this is the only exception. Absent that, present law applies to these unapproved products.

Mr. MARKEY. I thank the gentleman.

Secondly, I very much appreciate the gentleman's work on crafting language to ensure that the countermeasures developed under this legislation are, where necessary, subject to the same export control laws and regulations as other chemical and biological agents and their associated countermeasures. One of the new responsibilities the Secretary of HHS is directed to assume is to review new countermeasures both in the R&D phase as well as in the procurement phase of the Bioshield Program. The Secretary is encouraged to consult with other Federal agencies who play a role in setting export control policy and to recommend whether the new countermeasure or countermeasure R&D should be added to the various lists of controlled technologies that cannot be transferred to other countries without prior permission.

Is it your understanding that the Secretary should do this as expeditiously as possible, and that each beneficiary of Bioshield funds be directed as part of the contract or grant to abide by all applicable U.S. export laws governing the transfer of technology and R&D?

Mr. TAUZIN. The gentleman is absolutely correct. The Secretary should perform these reviews as expeditiously as possible once the R&D or procurement has started so as to prevent any exports of countermeasures or countermeasure R&D that could harm our U.S. national security.

Mr. MARKEY. I just want to thank the chairman. He has worked very hard and long on this legislation. I want to thank the gentleman's staff and Kendra Bodner from my staff for working out this language.

Mr. TAUZIN. Let me thank the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Markey). He raised a great number of concerns as we went true this process. I want to thank the gentleman for the way in which he worked with Members on both sides of the aisle so we cannot only take care of those concerns but produce a great product for the security of our country, and he has added immeasurably to that effort.

Mr. MARKEY. Good job, Mr. Chairman, and good job to everyone who has worked on this bill on both sides of the aisle.

Mr. TAUZIN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. LaTourette).

Mr. LaTOURETTE. Mr. Speaker, I thank the chairman for yielding to me for the purpose of a colloquy in order to clarify the intent of two provisions.

This legislation authorizes the director of the National Institute of Allergies and Infectious Diseases to issue grants to non-Federal entities for the construction and operation of specialized research facilities. A second provision of the bill authorizes the Secretary of HHS to take control of these facilities in the event or threat of bioterror emergency.

As you know, the Public Buildings Act of 1959, which is under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, governs the construction, acquisitions, repair and alteration of public buildings, including many laboratories and research facilities.

Mr. Chairman, am I correct that nothing in this legislation exempts the Secretary of HHS or the director of the institute from the requirements of the Public Buildings Act?

Mr. TAUZIN. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. LaTOURETTE. I yield to the gentleman from Louisiana.

Mr. TAUZIN. The gentleman is absolutely correct. These provisions do not preempt the Public Buildings Act to the extent that it would otherwise apply to such activities.

[Time: 14:15]

Mr. LaTOURETTE. Mr. Speaker, it is also my understanding that the facilities authority granted to the Secretary of HHS and the Director of the Institute of Diseases is intended only for

[Page: H6929]

special use facilities, which do not meet the definition of a public building under the Public Buildings Act. Is that also correct?

Mr. TAUZIN. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman will continue to yield, that is also correct. The Project Bioshield Act authorizes the construction of highly specialized laboratories, all of which I would expect to be biosafety level 3 or 4 laboratories unsuitable for general purpose use. Project Bioshield does not authorize the construction of ``public buildings'' as defined by the Public Buildings Act of 1959.

Mr. LaTOURETTE. Mr. Speaker, lastly, it is my understanding that the march in authority granted the Secretary of HHS is intended to give the Secretary control of these facilities for a limited period of time only. Is that also correct?

Mr. TAUZIN. If the gentleman would continue to yield, that is also correct. The authority allows the Secretary to take control of these facilities only during, and as necessary to respond to, public health emergencies affecting national security. Under the Bioterrorism Response Act passed last year, a public health emergency can be declared by the Secretary for up to 90 days at a time; and although the Secretary may extend the designation for multiple 90-day periods, it is not the intention of this legislation to allow the Secretary to control a facility for the useful life of that facility.

Mr. LaTOURETTE. Mr. Speaker, I thank the chairman for the clarification.

Mr. BROWN of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. TAUZIN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

(Mr. TAUZIN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks, and include extraneous material.)

Mr. TAUZIN. Mr. Speaker, I think we have a couple of other Members who need to do colloquies.

While we are waiting, I wanted to take this time, Mr. Speaker, to refer to a letter received today from the Secretary of Health and Human Services, Secretary Tommy Thompson, dated July 16, 2003; and I want to place the letter in the RECORD at this point.

THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH

AND HUMAN SERVICES,

Washington, DC, July 16, 2003.
Hon. BILLY TAUZIN,
Chairman, Committee on Energy and Commerce, House of Representatives, Washington, DC.

DEAR CHAIRMAN TAUZIN: Thank you for your leadership on H.R. 2122, the Project BioShield Act of 2003. This legislation is a critical step toward strengthening our ability to protect Americans against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats.

H.R. 2122 would: (1) speed the Government's ability to turn promising scientific discoveries into necessary countermeasures by one-third or more; (2) authorize funding to purchase critical new countermeasures targeted against the most worrisome threats; and (3) allow the Food and Drug Administration to make promising treatments quickly available to Americans in emergency situations.

I would like to address two issues that have arisen as the House takes up this vital priority. First, I share Representative Wamp's interest in building domestic capacity to produce countermeasures. In implementing Project BioShield, I will do everything in my power to purchase from domestic sources. To have a secure supply, we must build capacity within the United States and my department is committed to achieving that objective. The essential purpose of Project BioShield is to ensure we have necessary and timely countermeasures. We cannot achieve this goal by relying on foreign sources. Building a robust domestic capacity to produce countermeasures is, therefore, at the very heart of Project BioShield.

Second, I agree with Representative Jackson-Lee that the Strategic National Stockpile must serve all areas of the Nation, including rural areas. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has positioned stockpile assets to deliver needed medical supplies anywhere in the country within 12 hours. I have a personal understanding of the challenges that rural areas face and share Representative Jackson-Lee's interest in rural America. My department is pro-actively working with state and local health departments to ensure the effective and timely delivery of stockpile assets to both rural and urban parts our Nation.

If I can provide you or the members of the Committee with any further information or if I can otherwise be of assistance, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Sincerely,
TOMMY G. THOMPSON.

Mr. Speaker, I wanted to refer to it because the Secretary refers to several concerns raised by other Members of the House, of which I also share with him, and I think we will have a colloquy on one of those.

The first is a concern by the gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. Wamp) whose interest is in building domestic capacity to produce countermeasures; and, indeed, the Secretary indicates in his letter that it is indeed his desire to make sure those countermeasures are developed within this country. We cannot achieve the goal of securing our country if indeed we rely upon foreign sources for these measures; and, therefore, the building of robust domestic capacity to produce these countermeasures is at the very heart of the Bioshield Project.

I wanted to assure my friend, the gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. Wamp), that I share the Secretary's comments and his intentions in that regard.

Secondly, the gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee) was concerned that strategic national stockpile must be developed in such a way as to serve rural areas of the country, not simply the urban areas of our country, because rural areas can be affected by these bioterrorism threats just as easily, obviously, as urban areas. The Secretary indicates that the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has positioned stockpile assets anywhere in the country, delivery within 12 hours, in effect making sure that rural areas are not left out of the protection of this bill and the other bioterrorism bills that have passed the House and are part of the Centers for Disease Control stockpiles and distribution system.

So that those two concerns by our colleagues are addressed in this letter, and I wanted to share with those colleagues my agreement with the Secretary on both of those points.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. BROWN of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself as much time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I share the comments both of the chairman of the committee and Secretary Thompson in his letter that the chairman just mentioned.

I applaud the gentleman from Tennessee's (Mr. Wamp) interest in building domestic capacity; and in terms of purchasing from domestic sources, I think that is an important thing that this Congress too often forgets. When we look at our trade policy, often that tends to favor investors and tends often to hurt workers, both in this country and internationally, whether it is the Singapore-Chile agreement coming up or whether it is the fast track authority that this Congress I think wrongly gave the President fairly recently.

I also support the efforts of the gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee) from Houston in terms of serving all the Nation, including rural areas. I think that our ability to deliver all kinds of health care, all kinds of public health care, especially in rural areas and urban areas alike, is especially important.

And I want to reiterate from my opening comments, Mr. Speaker, that while Bioshield is so very, very, very important and it gives us great opportunity to further develop our public health system, it is important that we keep in mind our long-standing, day-to-day public health system.

Bioshield can serve some synergism with the public health system as long as we keep focussed on the Centers for Disease Control, as long as we keep focused on local public health departments, because that has served the public very well, this public health system. It is too often starved, too often woefully, inadequately funded. I would hope that the synergism we can create with Bioshield and with public health will serve this country well, both in terms of deterring as an antidote and as a deterrence for bioterrorism attacks and in terms of the day-to-day issue of public health, whether it is lead-based paints, whether it is eliminating the discrepancy between rich and poor and the health care they get, whether it is providing safe drinking water and clean air and all the things that public health provide to us.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. TAUZIN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time again as I may consume.

(Mr. TAUZIN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks, and include extraneous material.)

[Page: H6930]

Mr. TAUZIN. Mr. Speaker, I insert at this point into the RECORD of these proceedings a statement of administration policy in strong support of this bill.

Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget,

Washington, DC, July 16, 2003.

Statement of Administration Policy

The Administration supports House passage of H.R. 2122, Project BioShield Act of 2003. This bill would implement a Presidential initiative to help spur the development and availability of next generation countermeasures against biological, chemical, nuclear, and radiological weapons. Specifically, H.R. 2122 would: (1) speed the Government's ability to turn promising scientific discoveries into necessary countermeasures by one-third or more; (2) authorize funding to purchase critical new countermeasures targeted against the most worrisome threats; and (3) allow the Food and Drug Administration to make promising treatments quickly available to Americans in emergency situations. Project BioShield is critical for strengthening our ability to protect Americans against biological, chemical, radiological, and nuclear terrorist threats.

The Administration notes that provisions on submission of legislative proposals, and of reports on options considered and rejected, should reflect Constitutional principles regarding Executive-originated legislative proposals and protecting Executive deliberations.

Mr. Speaker, I again center Congress' attention on the concerns that our colleague from Tennessee (Mr. Wamp) raises regarding the lack of domestic capacity to develop and produce new vaccines and countermeasures, indeed the concern he has that we might end up relying upon foreign sources for these critical supplies.

Let me first say that I share that concern about our lack of a robust domestic vaccine industry. I know that the Secretary of Health and Human Services shares that concern.

I also know that one of the primary purposes behind Project Bioshield is to help the Nation address this important problem by giving incentives to all companies, but especially our domestic pharmaceutical companies, to invest in this capacity, in this vaccine antidote producing capacity so that we have domestic supplies and domestic countermeasures available without relying upon foreign sources to protect this country in case of a domestic attack.

I just read from the Secretary's letter his commitment to do exactly that, to use this Act to make sure that we incentivize the capacity of our country to produce those vaccines and those countermeasures, those antidotes, whatever may be required, in case of the unbelievable attack upon our country with some of these awful agents, and I am confident the Secretary will implement the Act with that goal in mind.

We obviously on the Committee on Energy and Commerce will aggressively oversight the implementation of this Act so that we are satisfied that we are, in fact, encouraging domestic corporations to compete for these contracts.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. BROWN of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I have no other speakers, and I am willing to yield back if the gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. Tauzin) is.

Mr. TAUZIN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Norwood), a distinguished member of our committee.

Mr. NORWOOD. Mr. Speaker, I rise out of breath simply to urge my colleagues to vote for this. This is an enormous undertaking. The Secretary has done a great job for us. I think all Americans I know are as concerned about bioterrorism as any part of terrorism out there.

I thank the chairman for bringing this bill, and hopefully everybody here will help him and help the Secretary move this thing forward.

Mr. BROWN of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. Waxman).

Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to me.

I have had the opportunity to review this legislation from the prospect of two committees, as a member of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, which looks at the health impact of the threat of bioterrorism, as well as the Committee on Government Reform; and given the serious threat of bioterrorism, the development of effective countermeasures is vital to our national security.

Project Bioshield represents the administration's proposal to encourage the development of these products, and I fully support the intent of this legislation. I also agree with its premise that when the market cannot foster the development of critical products by itself, the government must rise to the challenge.

This bill is the product of collaboration between the majority and minority of three separate committees. Although the final bill may not be perfect, I believe the end product is one that all Members should support.

The bill before us today includes several significant improvements from earlier proposals. For example, it includes important protections against waste and abuse that are standard for government contracts, such as preserving the government's rights to review contractors' books and records.

The bill also permits the use of certain streamlined procurement procedures but only if the Secretary determines that there is a pressing need to do so. In emergency situations, we should not impede the development of necessary products. However, any exception from the standard procurement procedures should be made only when necessary and should be subject to review. This proposal preserves that standard.

The provisions of Bioshield authorizing the emergency distribution of unapproved drugs and devices, whose risks and benefits are not fully tested, impose an unprecedented responsibility on the government. The FDA must be vigilant in protecting the public against unnecessary risks from these products.

In part because of these concerns, the bill has been modified to require that health care providers and patients be informed that the products have not been approved and of their risks. The bill also has been modified to require that manufacturers monitor and report adverse reactions to the products and keep other appropriate records about the use of the products.

These conditions are essential for the safe use of unapproved products, and they should be imposed in all cases, except in truly extraordinary circumstances.

In addition, the Secretary is authorized to limit the distribution of the products, to limit who may administer the products, to waive good manufacturing practice requirements only when absolutely necessary, and to require recordkeeping by others in the chain of distribution.

We expect the Secretary to consider the need for these additional conditions in each case and to impose them to the full extent necessary to protect the public from the risks of these products.

The bill before us today is an improvement over the original proposal, and it deserves our support.

Mr. TAUZIN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Bilirakis), the distinguished chairman of the Subcommittee on Health of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, who celebrates his birthday today.

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the gentleman, my good friend, the chairman for recognizing me, and I speak in support of the Project Bioshield Act of 2003.

Mr. Speaker, in 2001, we really learned about the real threat of terrorism and the importance of being adequately prepared for an attack. The possibility that our enemies might attack us with biological, chemical or radiological weapons still remains, unfortunately, a significant threat.

During the last Congress, the Committee on Energy and Commerce worked together in a bipartisan fashion to produce the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Response Act which became law in June of 2002. I was proud to have been a small part of this important effort. However, while our legislation has helped get critical resources out to the States and moved us closer to the reality of a more comprehensive strategic national stockpile, more still needs to be done.

I am pleased to have worked with my colleagues and the Bush administration to develop legislation that would help make the vision of Project Bioshield a reality. As we have heard, this initiative is designed to speed the development and availability of medical countermeasures that will help us respond to any future terrorist attacks.

[Page: H6931]

The bill will also provide the Federal Government with tools to help encourage our research-driven pharmaceutical, biotechnology and medical technology to develop new countermeasures where none exists today.

It remains our responsibility to do what we can to ensure that the United States is ready for whatever biological, chemical or radiological threat we might face.

[Time: 14:30]

It is for that reason that I join the others in urging my colleagues to join us in supporting the Project BioShield Act of 2003.

Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Speaker, I control the time on behalf of the Democrats on the Committee on Government Reform, and I ask unanimous consent to yield the time that we have to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Brown) to control that time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Gilchrest). Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California?

There was no objection.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Brown) will be recognized for an additional 7 1/2 minutes.

Mr. BROWN of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, could you tell us how much time I have, the Committee on Energy and Commerce and the Committee on Government Reform, and how much time the gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. Tauzin) has?

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Brown) has 24 1/2 minutes remaining, and the gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. Tauzin) has 16 1/2 minutes remaining.

Mr. TAUZIN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Shays).

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Speaker, I rise to engage the chairman of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, the gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. Tauzin), in a colloquy.

Mr. Speaker, I am concerned that certain provisions of section 4 of the bill will unfairly treat the men and women of our armed services. Specifically, the bill would create a new section 564 of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act that would allow the application of medical products to the general population in emergencies, but only with appropriate safeguards. New subsection (k) of the act, however, seems to allow the President to waive or the Secretary of HHS to modify the application of these safeguards for military personnel. Can the chairman enlighten me as to his intent in this provision?

Mr. TAUZIN. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SHAYS. I yield to the gentleman from Louisiana.

Mr. TAUZIN. Mr. Speaker, I will be happy to speak to that.

New subsection (k) permits the President to waive, in writing, only the consent portion of the conditions of authorization set forth in section 564(e) with respect to armed services personnel, and only to the extent that complying with the requirement is not feasible, is contrary to the best interests of the personnel, or is not in the interest of national security.

It is not my intent that the President may ever waive pursuant to subsection (k) the other conditions. They are that the individual to whom the product is to be administered is informed, one, that the Secretary has authorized the emergency use of a product, and, two, about the significant known and potential benefits and risks of the use of the product. The committee intends, absent extraordinary circumstances, that such information be provided to individuals prior to receiving the unapproved product.

After the gentleman raised these issues with us, we took a closer look at the language, and I acknowledge that there is a crossreference in new section 564(k)(2) that could be confusing. I want to continue to work with the gentleman and the gentleman from New York (Mr. Towns), who I know cares deeply about this issue, along with you and many of us, to make sure that the final version of this bill from the conference that we will have with the Senate, I am sure, provides that our military are informed of the drugs that are given before these drugs are administered.

Let me also assure the gentleman from Connecticut that we understand the importance of the protections for military personnel receiving unapproved countermeasures contained in current law, title X, section 1107; and we intend the waiver authority in this bill to be used only in the very extraordinary circumstances that we describe in the bill.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Speaker, reclaiming my time, I thank the gentleman for his explanation, and I look forward to working with him to make sure that we clear this matter up in conference with the Senate.

Mr. TAUZIN. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman will continue to yield, I thank my friend and give him that assurance.

Mr. BROWN of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. TAUZIN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Nevada (Mr. Gibbons).

Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Speaker, I want to thank my friend, the chairman, for yielding me this time. I rise in support of Project BioShield. It is a very important step for the Department of Homeland Security.

Project BioShield aims to rapidly transfer technology into products that can be used to protect individuals against biological and chemical agents used as weapons of terrorism or mass destruction. The emphasis is on rapid introduction of new countermeasures into actual use, as many technologies currently under development need to be transitioned through regulatory commercial or regulatory cycles.

The Homeland Security Act gave the Department of Homeland Security responsibility for integrating intelligence information and assessing terrorist threats and vulnerabilities. This information makes full use of the Department's capabilities. Identifying the most urgent threats and setting research priorities will be vital to meeting the bioterror threat.

Obtaining the best intelligence and performing accurate threat assessment is absolutely critical. By properly understanding the threats that confront us, we can allocate our resources and focus our efforts where they are most needed, on agents for which the risk and potential consequence of attack are greatest.

BioShield tasks the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security with using the best information available to identify the greatest threats to the national security. Incorporated into the bill are several provisions that will strengthen the Secretary's threat assessment capabilities.

This legislation, Mr. Speaker, provides the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security the authority and resources needed to quickly hire the necessary bioterror analysts and rapidly build a bioterror intelligence infrastructure.

I urge all my colleagues to support H.R. 2122, the Project BioShield Act of 2003.

Mr. BROWN of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I rise again in support of this bill, and I ask unanimous consent that I be allowed to yield my remaining 24 1/2 minutes to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Andrews) with permission that he be allowed to yield said time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Ohio?

There was no objection.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Andrews) is recognized for the remaining time.

Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume; and I thank my friend, the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Brown), for yielding me this time. I assure my colleagues I will not personally take all 24 minutes; I will reserve the right to yield to other Members, and the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Turner) should be here forthrightly and he will be yielding.

Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. Tauzin) and the leadership of the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Dingell) on our side of the aisle, the other committees of jurisdiction, the gentleman from California (Mr. Cox), and the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Turner) for bringing this very important legislation to the floor.

Mr. Speaker, I think that history will reflect that this is our generation's version of the Manhattan Project. These are uncharted scientific waters. It is a world that we have not yet become accustomed to navigating.

[Page: H6932]

It is the world of massive biological attack against the United States of America. I have supreme confidence that we will be able to meet and deter such an attack, but only if we are able to engage the machinery of the best minds in our universities and our companies, in our government, and throughout society.

I believe that is exactly what this legislation does. It brings to the forefront the abilities of our researchers, of our scientists, of our entrepreneurs, of our public officials to systematically identify the biological risks that our country faces, to methodically analyze the best opportunities for addressing those biological risks, and to use a process that will effectively meet those risks.

I commend the authors for properly balancing the mechanisms of money, market, and exclusivity. It is very important there be adequate resources for the companies who we are asking to engage in this so that they will in fact engage in it. It is important that we create a market, because it is our fervent wish that there will never be a market for these products. We hope they are never needed. But in the absence of that market, it is important the law contain a specific guarantee to move forward.

Finally, with respect to exclusivity and insulation from antitrust considerations, it is very important that those who are willing to risk their capital and their energy to come up with these agents are afforded the protection of the law.

Mr. TAUZIN. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ANDREWS. I yield to the gentleman from Louisiana.

Mr. TAUZIN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman and will be happy to enter into a discussion with him.

Let me first thank him for the excellent statement he has made. I think the gentleman is correct. I think it is as important to our country as perhaps the Manhattan Project was. I remember when Speaker O'Neill used to remind this House that partisanship ended at the water's edge. He meant to tell us that when it came to protecting our country, we were not Democrats or Republicans, we were Americans. And where the water's edge used to be the boundary of the threats against our country, because of 9-11, we now understand the water's edge is no longer the boundary. Within our country we now face these potential threats.

So I thank the gentleman. And, indeed, the bill is designed to do exactly that, to balance those important elements of the equation and to make sure we incentivize the private marketplace, but also provide the public monies, $5.6 billion over 10 years, to make sure we have the available money in a trust fund, through our budget resolution, appropriated through our process, to make sure we can acquire those countermeasures, stockpile them, distribute them around the country, as the Secretary is prepared to do, to make sure that those countermeasures are available.

It also balances the need to build in our own country the capability of building those vaccines and countermeasures that otherwise would never be built. Because who would, in the private sector, want to build a vaccine for the plague today, without this particular legislation? So I thank the gentleman.

Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Speaker, reclaiming my time, I agree with the chairman. I think he is correct that bipartisanship cannot simply begin at the water's edge in a world where the battlefield is here. And there is a virtual battlefield that we are all, unfortunately, living in.

I would like to make two other points before I stop. The first is that I very much appreciate the inclusion into this bill, with the help of the gentleman from California (Mr. Cox), language that I suggested with respect to making it clear that when there is a termination for reason of convenience by the government, that all of the normal cost recovery rights that would accrue to the vendor in fact accrue under this bill. I very much appreciate that inclusion.

Mr. TAUZIN. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ANDREWS. I yield to the gentleman from Louisiana.

Mr. TAUZIN. Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the gentleman for that language. The neat thing about the way this bill has been processed is that all through the process Democrats and Republicans have assisted in building it into a much better bill. And the language the gentleman has added to the bill is an extraordinary addition to the bill, and I thank him for it.

Mr. ANDREWS. Reclaiming my time once again, Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the chairman's cooperation in that regard.

Second, I would like to say it is very important that the chairman has very skillfully, along with the ranking member, assured that there will be continuing oversight by the Congress of the activities under this bill. We had to strike the proper balance here between a guaranteed funding stream so that the companies involved in this would know that their investment would in fact be recovered, but at the same time not yielding the important oversight function that this Congress should exercise. And I commend the chairman and the ranking member and all the authors for making that the case.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. TAUZIN. Mr. Speaker, I would ask how much time is available on both sides at this point.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. Tauzin) has 11 1/2 minutes remaining, and the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Andrews) has 19 1/2 minutes remaining.

Mr. TAUZIN. Mr. Speaker, I commended the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Tom Davis) and the gentleman from California (Mr. Cox) previously, along with the ranking members for their extraordinary work we did together; and I now ask unanimous consent to yield the balance of my time to the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Tom Davis) so that Chairman Davis can control the balance of that time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Louisiana?

There was no objection.

Mr. TOM DAVIS of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, as I understand it, I would have the time yielded to the Committee on Government Reform in addition to the time yielded to me by the Committee on Energy and Commerce?

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman is correct.

Mr. TOM DAVIS of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. Boehlert).

(Mr. Boehlert asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BOEHLERT. Mr. Speaker, we live in a different world than we did 2 years ago, a world where the threat of attack from biological and chemical agents remains high. Here on Capitol Hill we know this all too well. We were all victims of a vicious attack using anthrax and poisoning our own postal system. The attack shut down half of an entire branch of our government and lives were lost. A very real threat became a sad reality.

Project BioShield will take the necessary steps to provide greater protection for Americans from those malicious attacks, to research, develop, manufacture and stockpile effective drugs and vaccines. In order to make this plan a reality, the Department of Health and Human Services and the National Institutes of Health must have a strong infrastructure of laboratories and facilities designed for research on the most dangerous of pathogens.

The research stage of this process is the most important part of developing a broad and effective basis for this project. In my own district, there is an effort underway to build a national biocontainment laboratory to be administered by the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases. This state-of-the-art facility would take on the daunting task of testing these dangerous agents that could threaten our communities, and they have got the charge to come up with the vaccines and drugs necessary to effectively deal with them. I am fully supportive of this plan and hope this critical facility will soon call upstate New York home.

Development of these vital medical countermeasures to biological and chemical agents can take years. With the building of new facilities to do the research and expedite the development of vaccines, more diseases may one day

[Page: H6933]

be eradicated or at least treatable to avoid mass casualty from any type of attack.

I am pleased that Project BioShield may offer assistance to enterprising companies like Viral Therapeutics of Ithaca, New York, that are currently producing needed vaccines and is interested in answering the call to expand research and development as well as production.

[Time: 14:45]

Mr. Speaker, I am proud of my service on the Select Committee on Homeland Security and our determined effort to give the American people what they desire and deserve, a comprehensive and balanced effort to protect them from the evils of biological and chemical weapons. This legislation is designed to do exactly that. I commend all those involved with the formulation of this bipartisan product for the American good.

Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Rhode Island (Mr. Langevin), who has had experience in State government with homeland security, who has had experience here on the Committee on Armed Services and now on the Select Committee on Homeland Security.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time on this incredibly important issue.

Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong support of the Project BioShield Act. Bioterrorism is a national threat to our national security, and I believe it is our job as the Members of the United States Congress to instill confidence in the American people that a coordinated, concerted effort is being made to combat this threat.

We have some incredibly talented people in this country in the public and in the private sector, and this joint partnership will ensure that we are moving ahead to effectively protect the American people from the potential of a bioterrorism attack.

While Project BioShield is not the only answer, it is certainly an important step toward that goal, and I hope Congress will continue to provide the funding and the oversight that the project needs to be effective.

However, I must mention my ongoing concern with the operation of Department of Homeland Security's information analysis and infrastructure protection directorate. This is truly a life-and-death issue. If this unit is not running effectively, then the rest of DHS is at a tremendous disadvantage in determining how to allocate resources and where to focus energies.

The proper implementation of Project BioShield requires a reliable and comprehensive threat assessment from the information analysis team, a team that should include bioterror experts, while working closely with their peers at CDC and NIH to identify the most pressing dangers.

Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. LANGEVIN. I yield to the gentleman from New Jersey.

Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Speaker, I very much appreciate the point the gentleman is making. The BioShield Project is built on a foundation of accurate assessment of the threats that we face. For example, if there is an assessment that we face a significant threat from botulism, the full resources of this bill are applied to finding an antidote to botulism.

The gentleman's point is very well taken. If the threat assessment is flawed, then we run the risk of either spending money on a threat that is not very viable, or failing to spend energy and money on a threat that is viable that we have failed to detect.

So we can employ the very best resources of our scientists, our engineers, our researchers, our entrepreneurs, but have them working on the wrong problem if there is not an adequate intelligence-gathering capability and then an adequate response to that intelligence-gathering capability shared with the Department of Homeland Security. I think the gentleman's point is very well taken.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Andrews) for interjecting that point, and I wholeheartedly concur.

The proper implementation of Project BioShield requires a reliable and comprehensive threat assessment from the information analysis team, a team that should include bioterror experts working closely with their peers at agencies like CDC and NIH to identify the most pressing dangers and develop a plan to combat them.

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support this legislation and hope that DHS will do its part to make Project BioShield as effective as possible.

Mr. TOM DAVIS of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 2122, the Project BioShield Act. This bill provides the government with the necessary tools to develop and purchase vaccines and other drugs to protect Americans in the event of a bioterrorist attack.

The President first announced this proposal during his 2003 State of the Union address. It is the cornerstone of the administration's strategy to prepare our Nation against the possibility of a bioterrorist attack. The bill we are considering today was introduced by the gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. Tauzin), chairman of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, and was referred to the committee, as well as the Committee on Government Reform which I chair, and the Select Committee on Homeland Security. It is a good bill which serves a compelling national interest.

As we tragically learned during the fall of 2001, our Nation is vulnerable to biological terrorism. Letters laced with anthrax caused the deaths of five individuals and thousands more had to be treated. The death toll could have been higher if there had not been an effective countermeasure to treat that form of anthrax. Unfortunately, there has been little progress in treatment for other deadly diseases, like smallpox, Ebola and plague, which effect few, if any, Americans.

The reality is that there is little manufacturer interest in developing necessary treatments for these diseases because there is no significant commercial market existing outside of government. The absence of financial incentives has provided drug companies with little reason to make the substantial investment that would be required to develop treatments for these deadly diseases.

Should the United States be attacked with any of these deadly pathogens, the needs for vaccines, tests and treatments would be great, and it would be immediate. H.R. 2122 is designed to ensure that our country is prepared. The bill provides the Secretary of Health and Human Services with a number of flexible acquisition tools based on existing streamlined procedures to promote research and development and procurement of necessary drugs and vaccines. These tools are instrumental to the success of the BioShield program.

For example, the bill increases the simplified acquisition threshold for research and development projects from the current level of $100,000 to $25 million. This increase will help the Secretary promote sophisticated research and development projects by streamlining the acquisition process. The bill also authorizes the procurement of biomedical countermeasures, again using tailored, flexible acquisition tools for inclusion in the Nation's stockpile using a special reserve fund.

The Secretary would also have expedited authorities to award research grants and hire technical experts and consultants. During national emergencies, the bill would permit the government to make available new and promising treatments prior to approval by the Food and Drug Administration. The Committee on Government Reform, which I chair, held a hearing to examine the BioShield proposal on April 4, 2003. Witnesses from the government, academia, and pharmaceutical and biotech companies were supportive of the bill. They all recognize the need to create incentives for manufacturers to develop biomedical countermeasures.

Our committee favorably reported the bill on May 22. Working in a bipartisan fashion with the gentleman from California (Mr. Waxman), we unanimously adopted some amendments to ensure greater accountability in the acquisition process and to clarify the circumstances when biocountermeasures can be processed.

Specifically, the amendments we approved permit the use of simplified acquisition procedures only when the Secretary of Health and Human Services determines there is a pressing need

[Page: H6934]

for the procurement of specific countermeasures. The bill commits decisions about research and development projects to the discretion of the Secretary of Health and Human Services. However, we approved an amendment which preserves a limited right for companies to appeal to the General Accounting Office contracting decisions made by the Secretary, but appeals could not be used to stall the research and development procurement process.

We also made some technical changes that seek to clarify the circumstances when the Secretary could use other than fully competitive procedures for research and development and production contracts.

Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. TOM DAVIS of Virginia. I yield to the gentleman from New Jersey.

Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Speaker, I would like to thank the chairman for working with the gentleman from California (Mr. Cox) and the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Turner) on the issue of termination for convenience. We think it is a very important clarification that if there is a termination by the government for reasons of convenience, the companies involved in the project can recover their costs under the normal rules for that. I know that the gentleman's committee was involved in making that possible, and I wanted to thank him for his cooperation.

Mr. TOM DAVIS of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, the gentleman is correct, and it makes them more likely to be involved in this process.

We think that all of these amendments, and I thank the gentleman from California (Mr. Waxman) for working with us as well, have been agreed to by the majority and the minority on the various committees; and they are part of the bill that we are considering today.

Since our markup, we have continued to work on this bill in a bipartisan fashion. This issue is really too important to play party politics with. We have worked out language to ensure that the rights of contractors with respect to payment are protected in the event they are terminated for convenience. This is a good bill and deserves our support.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to yield the balance of my time to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Turner) and that he may further allocate that time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Gilchrest). Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New Jersey?

There was no objection.

Mr. TURNER of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

To win the war on terror, we must do everything we can to protect the American people from the threat posed by terrorists using weapons of mass destruction. We know that our forces in Afghanistan uncovered plans by al Qaeda to engage in bioterrorism. We know from recent arrests in Europe that terrorist groups have the means and the will to carry out such attacks. It is without question that bioterrorism is a clear and present danger to the American people, perhaps one of our greatest threats.

In response to this threat, the administration is proposing this legislation, commonly known as Project BioShield. This bill is a first step toward ensuring that we protect Americans from the horror of bioterrorism. The purpose of the BioShield legislation is to provide incentives to private companies to produce the medicines, the vaccines, the antidotes we need to counter a biological attack.

Quite frankly, this concept is an experiment, a grand experiment, but no less an experiment. We do not know if the incentives will drive our pharmaceutical industry to invest the resources needed to truly prepare our country for the full range of possible biological attacks. If we do, we will have been successful and our country will be better off. If they do not, our country will remain dangerously vulnerable.

I support Project BioShield because I believe this is an experiment worth conducting; but from the beginning of this process, I have been working to build mechanisms into the legislation that would monitor whether the legislation is truly making our Nation safer.

For example, the Select Committee on Homeland Security added a requirement that the Secretary of Health and Human Services report annually if the President has identified biological agents that are threats to the United States, but no private company has contracted to produce a countermeasure. Thus, if there is a bioterrorist threat to the American people and private industry will not rise to the challenge of searching for a cure, we have the right to know about it.

These concerns were shared by the gentleman from California (Mr. Cox), chairman of the Select Committee on Homeland Security. They were also shared by the gentleman from Louisiana (Chairman TAUZIN) of the Committee on Energy and Commerce and the ranking member, the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Dingell).

If BioShield does not work as we hope it will, we will need plan B. Thus, I am very pleased that the legislation contains clear authority that allows the government to operate an emergency program to develop and produce vaccines. In my view, this is so very important because protecting our population is our first responsibility. If the private sector is not producing the medicines we need and we find ourselves under the threat of biological attack, then the government needs to have the authority to do the job directly.

The language that has been inserted in the legislation gives the President, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Secretary of Homeland Security the necessary authority to take action in the event that this experiment with the private sector fails to produce the results we all hope it will produce.

[Time: 15:00]

My final concern, Mr. Speaker, is that Project BioShield, despite its creative name, is really a fairly modest proposal. If we are lucky at the end of 10 years, we will have some vaccines to address a few of the possible pathogens that terrorists could use during a bioterror attack. But the potential problems are much more expansive. Terrorists may soon be able to genetically manipulate biological agents so they are resistant to our current stockpile of antibodies and perhaps to the vaccines we develop.

This possibility presents a daunting threat to our Nation. That is why I would like to see a much more robust proposal than the one before us today, an approach that moves us faster and stronger toward creating a comprehensive defense to the full range of threats we face from bioterrorism. Based on the information that we all know about, we clearly need a Manhattan Project to prepare this country to deal with the vast array and the diverse types of biological threats that we may face in the years ahead.

Time and time again when faced with such a great challenge, the government has played a central role in organizing a massive response. When war threatened to consume the world, we put an end to it through the success of the original Manhattan Project. When we raced the Russians to the stars, the Apollo Project put a man on the Moon. It will take these kinds of bold actions, this kind of bold leadership and deep resolve to prevail in the war on terror.

Mr. Speaker, I wholeheartedly support this current legislation, but I also believe that our Nation must take even stronger steps much sooner in order to protect us and to secure us in the days ahead.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. TOM DAVIS of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Shays), the distinguished vice chairman of the Committee on Government Reform.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate my chairman yielding me this time.

Throughout committee consideration of H.R. 2122, I expressed some skepticism about both the short- and long-term impact of the proposed approach on our ability to develop, procure and use new medical countermeasures against chemical, biological or radiological weapons. Thanks to the work of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, the Committee on Government Reform and the Select Committee on

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Homeland Security, the bill before us today represents a substantial improvement over the original proposal. This bill would create agile, proactive capabilities in meeting the threat of unconventional weapons, capabilities we do not have today.

Part of the value of Project BioShield would be purely deterrent. Just having the ability to develop and stockpile vaccines and antidotes decreases the likelihood, or the lethality, of a biological attack.

However, as I indicated in my earlier colloquy with Chairman TAUZIN, any authority to actually use experimental drugs or medical devices in emergency situations has to be defined and wielded with nothing less than surgical precision. Prior informed consent in connection with the administration of experimental therapy is a basic human right, a right no one should be asked to surrender except under the most extraordinary of circumstances. For example, if a patient is unconscious and cannot give consent or be informed before onset of a life-threatening disease or event, medical ethics allow use of an experimental therapy.

Mere military inconvenience can never justify waiving consent or failing to inform service members about medical countermeasures. No loosely defined concept of feasibility should allow the Secretary of HHS to waive or delay the requirement to provide essential information on medical risks and benefits prior to administration of a drug or vaccine, as could happen under the language in this bill Chairman TAUZIN has agreed to revisit. If the medicine can get to the front, there should always be room in the transport for the leaflet describing its dosage, interactions and contraindications.

In the 1991 Persian Gulf War, soldiers, sailors, aircrews and Marines were ordered to take experimental drugs and vaccines. Despite Pentagon promises to provide critical medical information and keep accurate medical records, very little information was provided and very few records survived the trip home. That cannot happen again. In the course of 14 hearings on the subsequent health problems of Gulf War veterans, the Government Reform subcommittee I chair reached this stark conclusion: ``Unless providing medical information to service members is mandatory, it's just too easy for the military, in the heat of battle, to decide it's just not feasible.''

In the war against terrorism, we are all on the front lines. The citizen-soldiers of our all-voluntary Armed Forces fight and die to protect our rights and freedoms. They should not be asked to surrender those fundamental rights under different, less rigorous, circumstances than those they left behind.

Again, I appreciate the very good work of Chairman TAUZIN, Chairman DAVIS and Chairman COX and their respective ranking members; and I look forward to a conference agreement that relies on the protections of current law and requires prior notification of service members whenever an unapproved drug or device has to be used.

Mr. TURNER of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the distinguished gentlewoman from the Virgin Islands (Mrs. Christensen).

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Mr. Speaker, I rise today as a member of the Select Committee on Homeland Security and also of the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness and Response in qualified support of the Project BioShield Act of 2003, the purpose of which is to increase the development of countermeasures to bioterrorism and facilitate their approval for use in mass production so that they would be readily available when needed.

While research and development of such products is extremely important, I remain very concerned that a commensurate amount of time and effort has not been devoted to furthering our public health security, a broader, more basic and more immediate issue.

Through the four or five hearings on Project BioShield, I joined several other of my colleagues in calling attention to the inadequacies and deficiencies that exist throughout the public health system in this country, especially in rural and minority communities.

With the focus on cost containment rather than care, our lack of focus on prevention and our failure to insure everyone's equal access to quality health care, added to the system's continued deterioration because of repeated funding cuts and misguided departmental policies, our Nation's public health infrastructure today is in worse shape than ever.

Project BioShield, though, is important because it will help to make sure that we have the vaccines and other countermeasures as quickly as possible in the case of a bioterrorism attack. But all of those fancy medicines and other agents will be worthless to you and me and to the people we serve without an intact public health system.

The recent bipartisan commission's report, ``First Responders Underfunded and Unprepared,'' documents the dire need of our public health and other responders in stark and frightening terms. I am still waiting for a formal hearing on their findings, and we should not be afraid to have the report aired. We should really be more afraid not to pay attention to its findings and its recommendations.

Mr. Speaker, I am happy that the gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee) and I were able to amend the bill in committee to ensure that the historically black colleges and universities and other minority-serving institutions of higher learning will be provided with special outreach to ensure their participation in this program to the fullest extent possible. This is an extremely important provision, and I thank our chair and ranking member and Chairman TAUZIN for working with us to include it in the bill.

Mr. Speaker, today I know that we will pass this bill, but what I and other health providers, public health experts and officials and the people of this country want to know is that we will always move just as determinedly and expeditiously to fully fund the strengthening of our public health system, the training of our first responders and provide them with the tools and facilities they need to protect us in those first critical hours where lives can and must be saved.

I want to take this opportunity to thank and commend Chairman COX and Ranking Member TURNER for their guiding what is often not an easy committee to guide and for their shepherding of this bill through that committee.

I ask the support of my colleagues for Project BioShield, but I also ask that when this is passed that we move on from here to soon pass ``Project Public Health.''

Mr. TOM DAVIS of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I yield the balance of my time to the gentleman from California (Mr. Cox).

Mr. COX. Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the chairman not only for yielding time but for the exceptional work that the Committee on Government Reform has done both on the majority and minority sides to bring us to this point; likewise, the Committee on Energy and Commerce, of which I am a member, and Chairman TAUZIN and Chairman DINGELL for their extraordinary leadership and commitment to bringing this bill to the floor; and my ranking member on the Select Committee on Homeland Security, which I chair, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Turner), who is with me on the floor now.

This has been a bipartisan effort for one simple reason. The terrorists do not discriminate between Democrats and Republicans. They certainly are not going to protect us because we are on one or another side of this debate. We are all in their sights. The committees of jurisdiction working closely together have managed to create a process in bringing this bill to the floor that has been focused on producing the best possible policy and thus the best possible security for our country. It is not focused on Capitol Hill turf battles. This type of cooperation serves as a model for our efforts to make America more secure against terrorist attack.

In the fall of 2001, we caught a glimpse of the terrible potential of a bioterror attack when anthrax attacks were loosed on the Nation's capital. A broader attack on the American population, on our armed services involving one of the many biologic agents for which we have no antidote could be devastating. The potential toll in lives would far exceed what happened on September 11, 2001. We must, of course, do all we can to prevent such attacks, but ultimately we must be prepared.

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Because no scheme of prevention, no matter how expert and reliable our intelligence collection and analysis, is going to be perfect. We must be prepared.

This legislation, the BioShield Project launched in this bill, will provide the resources and authorities we need to develop the next generation of biological countermeasures. It will help to ensure that we avoid the kind of catastrophe we are contemplating here on the floor today in the future.

The ability of the Secretary of Homeland Security to identify from around the world the most serious potential biological threats to our population is key to making Project BioShield effective, and it is key to the vital task that we have of meeting this threat. To do that, Secretary Ridge will have to get the very best intelligence available. By learning everything we can about the biological weapon threats that confront us, we can allocate our resources and focus our efforts where they will be most effective. By identifying the bioterror agents for which the risks and potential consequences of attacks are greatest, we can use these substantial new first responder resources most wisely.

That brings us, therefore, to the creation of Project BioShield in fulfillment of President Bush's charge to this Congress in his State of the Union message. Both President Bush and Vice President Cheney have made this a priority, and we are responding in this Congress.

The BioShield Project is by far the most expansive, broadest, largest first responder program initiated in the history of our country. It is budgeted for $5.6 billion, but we have made it very plain that, through the appropriations process and through the budget process, we will put the resources behind this program that are needed to develop the antidotes and, if a presidential decision on a recommendation of both the Secretary of Health and Human Services and the Secretary of Homeland Security is made, if the President decides to stockpile enough antidotes, vaccines to immunize the entire American population in the event of a catastrophe.

The Secretary of Homeland Security as part of this process is charged with identifying the most significant biological, chemical and nuclear agents that threaten the American population. Because our ability to collect, analyze and put to use timely and accurate intelligence information is at the very heart of doing this job, certainly in preventing a biological attack but also of being prepared to respond to it, in this legislation we have given the Secretary of Homeland Security the information analysis tools that he needs.

[Time: 15:15]

This bill is very important to the Select Committee on Homeland Security. We worked hard to get it right. We have held extensive hearings and nearly 3 months of work in three of our subcommittees and twice in the full committee. We conducted a series of oversight hearings which examined the new Department's ability to carry out its threat assessment function; and as a result, we have incorporated into the bill several provisions designed to strengthen the Secretary's threat assessment capabilities. We have given the Secretary the authority and the resources he needs to quickly hire the necessary bioterror analysts and to rapidly build a bioterror intelligence infrastructure. The Select Committee on Homeland Security added these provisions to this bill.

This legislation greatly increases our ability to conduct bioterror research against the most urgent threats identified by the Department of Homeland Security. But most importantly, rather than trying to create a parallel government bioterror industry, or I should say bioterror response industry, BioShield will draw on the expertise and resources of the private sector.

Our American industries lead the world in these categories. And our health care innovation, our free markets, our strong patent protections have led American industry to spend more on research and development on new products and treatments than all of Europe and Japan combined. To make the progress that is necessary in these noncommercial areas that are so essential to national security, it is essential we tap into this strength in the private sector. To accomplish this, the legislation establishes a reserve fund that will be available to stockpile security countermeasures that are produced against government requirements, even though these countermeasures do not presently exist.

We want to stimulate the invention, the productivity, the research that is necessary to find these antidotes, these vaccines to bioweapons that exist but for which countermeasures do not presently exist. The gentleman from Louisiana (Chairman TAUZIN) and I worked with the gentleman from Kentucky (Chairman ROGERS) of the new Appropriations Homeland Security Subcommittee to provide this funding in a 10-year advance appropriation. This money will remain available for a full decade, creating, in essence, a homeland security market for the development of critical security countermeasures for which no commercial market exists. The knowledge that funding will be available for a full decade and not be subject to the annual appropriations process will encourage the biotech industry to devote resources to develop and produce the next generation of treatments for bioterror agents.

So once again I want to thank the Members on both sides who have worked so hard on this legislation for their spirit of cooperation, of bipartisan cooperation; and I strongly urge my colleagues to support this very important legislation.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

I inquire how much time I have remaining.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Gilchrest). The gentleman from California (Mr. Cox) has 6 minutes remaining.

Mr. COX. Mr. Speaker, is that 6 minutes the time that was earlier yielded to me by the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Tom Davis)?

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Tom Davis) yielded 7 minutes, with a total of 14 1/2 minutes.

Mr. COX. So the time that we are speaking of, Mr. Speaker, comprises also the time allotted for purposes of debate to the Select Committee on Homeland Security?

The SPEAKER pro tempore. That is correct.

Mr. TURNER of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I yield 6 minutes to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Pascrell), one of the most vigorous advocates for equipping and training first responders to protect America.

Mr. PASCRELL. Mr. Speaker, the tragic events of September 11, and the anthrax attacks shortly thereafter, reinforced the possibility of a widespread bioterrorist strike on America; and that is very real. There was a report submitted to us by Warren Rudman, who was the chairman of the Independent Task Force on Emergency Responders dealing with this subject very recently, and in that report it says the following: public health labs in most States still lack basic equipment and expertise to adequately respond to a chemical or a biological attack, and 75 percent of State laboratories report being overwhelmed by too many testing requests.

In fact, Mr. Speaker, we were told of this threat well before 9-11. In January of 2001, a report submitted by the National Intelligence Council stated that the number of players, that is, state players and nonstate players, bioterrorism sponsored by state governments, bioterrorism sponsored by nonstate terrorist organizations throughout the world possessing or seeking to acquire a biological weapon, that group is growing despite the fact that biological weapons are banned by international treaty.

We were warned of this in January, 2001. While Congress has made progress over the last 18 months on expanding our vaccine stockpile, an enormous amount of work still remains. The Project BioShield Act of 2003 is so important because it encourages the development for new countermeasures against a bioterror attack in a comprehensive manner. This committee, the Select Committee on Homeland Security, was given a rude awakening upon hearing the testimony of Mr. Paul Redmond, the assistant secretary for information analysis at the Department of Homeland Security. We learned that Mr. Redmond's office had

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only one person working under him on the bioterror threat and that Mr. Redmond had limited access to the intelligence himself. Imagine, we are asking two people to protect 290 million Americans about a possible biological threat they do not know about.

The Cox-Turner amendment, approved by our committee, correctly concentrates on increasing not only access to intelligence but an increase in the staff of those folks who collect intelligence. Specifically, it requires that the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services be provided all intelligence information from all other agencies relating to the threats regardless of classification and regardless of whether the Secretary has requested the information.

This bill is not just about creating a significant stockpile of vaccines and medical devices. It is about making sure that our first responders do have the tools to effectively operate their attack. Mr. Speaker, they will be the first ones there, be it a firefighter, be it a cop, be it someone working in emergency services. They will be the first one there; and if they do not know what they are doing, if we do not train them, if we do not provide the training, we are doing a disservice to them and we are certainly putting them in harm's way. A nurse or a doctor will be able to immediately provide a vaccine and prevent the spread. A fireman will have a mask to breathe purified air while a building with biological agents burns.

This bill will make those and other lifesaving tools available so we can begin to protect ourselves, protect our children and our grandchildren from the threats of today and the unfathomable biological threat of tomorrow. This is just the beginning, Mr. Speaker. There is a great deal that we still do not know. When one reads the report of the National Intelligence Council on biological warfare, one understands what scale we are talking about and what a delayed onset is and what a delayed response will lead to. Most biological agents cause symptoms that have a delayed onset ranging from a few hours to many days. This is serious business. The fact that an attack has taken place can be masked, and the identification of the perpetrators would be extremely difficult to find out. I am confident, Mr. Speaker, that H.R. 2122 will help, will help protect every American against the unimaginable.

The importance of Project BioShield cannot be overstated, and I congratulate the leadership of both parties for bringing it to the floor today.

Mr. COX. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished gentlewoman from the State of Washington (Ms. Dunn), the vice chairman of the full Select Committee on Homeland Security.

Ms. DUNN. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of the Project BioShield Act of 2003. As the Members have heard today, Mr. Speaker, from the debate we have had on the floor, this is truly bipartisan legislation. It is also a major step towards giving Americans necessary protections to address the biological and the chemical threats that exist today. H.R. 2122 will provide for private companies the incentives they need to develop vaccines for biological agents. It also will increase our national pharmaceutical stockpile, and it will provide DHS, the Department of Homeland Security, better intelligence capabilities so that they can protect against biological and chemical attacks.

Earlier this year, President Bush announced his intentions to develop a vaccination program that would protect against an attack involving biological and chemical weapons. For months, three committees, including my committee, the Select Committee on Homeland Security, have held numerous hearings to consider the best ways to protect our constituents. I believe it is time to pass this legislation. Mr. Speaker, this bill will provide $5.6 billion over a 10-year period to develop vaccines to protect against some of the most dangerous biological agents that this country and this world has ever known. These funds are necessary to create an incentive for private companies to do research and development on drugs that might not normally be in demand in the marketplace. I believe this investment is worthwhile, considering the possible effects of a large-scale biological attack.

In addition to authorizing funds for this program, the BioShield program also addresses the sharing of intelligence. In order to develop an effective vaccination program, the Department of Homeland Security must have the intelligence capabilities to predict what the real threats are thought to be. By understanding the threats, DHS can focus its resources on those areas of highest vulnerability to the people who live in this country.

This legislation will authorize specific funds to be used by DHS for terror threat assessment. In addition, it will require other intelligence agencies such as the CIA to share timely information and threat analyses with the Department of Homeland Security.

One of the lessons we learned from the anthrax attacks during the fall of 2001 is the importance of responding to a biological attack quickly in order to minimize the damage it causes. While it is indeed tragic that during those attacks five people died, we all have to appreciate that. It could have been far worse if the vaccine had not immediately been available. H.R. 2122 will help us be prepared to respond quickly to agents such as ebola, plague and smallpox. I ask that we answer the President's call to develop the BioShield Project and that people support and that we pass H.R. 2122.

Mr. TURNER of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee), one of the foremost leaders in trying to prepare her city and this country to protect us against the threat of bioterrorism.

(Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.)

Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I thank the distinguished gentleman from Texas for yielding me this time.

This is an important statement, if you will, an actuality of the work that the Select Committee on Homeland Security has done along with collaborative efforts of our respective committees of jurisdiction.

[Time: 15:30]

Let me again thank the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Turner) for his work and the chairman for his work and realize that, as we begin this debate or as we engage in this debate, we need to do much more.

I rise to support this legislation because it takes America one step closer to being prepared in dealing with a biochemical terrorist attack. But as we consider this legislation, Mr. Speaker, I think it is important to note that, while America is on the trail, on the pathway, on the journey toward being safe, we are still not safe. We remain vulnerable. Our ports are not secure, our critical infrastructures are not secure, our communities are not protected from biochemical agents, but H.R. 2122 will help to make America safer.

The purpose of this Act is to enhance research, development, procurement, and use of biomedical countermeasures to respond to public health threats affecting national security and for other purposes. What it begins to do, Mr. Speaker, is to focus our attention narrowly on the question of what do we do if we are subjected to a bioterrorist attack. What kind of chemicals, if you will, will thwart the attack? What kind of research needs to be done in advance of the diabolical thoughts of anyone who would want to perpetrate a terrorist act with some chemical yet unknown?

We already have had the experience of the fear and the intimidation of anthrax. We have already had the terrible situation of people who had nothing better to do or wanted to intimidate or scare or frighten, use anything from salt to sugar to powder to suggest that they were utilizing anthrax. We know what can be done through a bioterrorist attack or the suggestion that there would be an attack by some sort of chemical.

Biological weapons pose a particularly dangerous threat. Biological weapons are highly portable and difficult to detect. So this concept of BioShield is more than overdue. Its time has come. Bioterrorism attacks not only pose a danger to human lives, they also have the ability to cripple the operation of our society and severely harm our economy.

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After 9/11, when we were allowed to fly home from Washington, I held one of the first town hall meetings with over 400 people on September 14, 2001, on a Sunday, in fact, to be able to bring some sort of order to people's thoughts, the fear that was going on, the actual intimidation as far away as Houston. There were all kinds of suggestions that Houston was next in line, that Houston was about to be attacked.

But, shortly thereafter, I also held a meeting with my first responders. As we were having a meeting, my hazardous materials team had to run out to a hospital about 50 miles down from where our meeting was being held because a woman drove to the hospital saying that she had anthrax; someone had put anthrax in her apartment or in her home. And without the understanding of what anthrax represents and the hospital officials not yet experienced, took whatever she had through the hospital, up the stairs, or wherever, up the elevator and, by its very exposure, caused the hazardous materials team to have to run out and shut down the hospital. A crippling effect, maybe just one hospital, but it shows the magnitude of what can happen if we are dealing with bioterrorism.

We all recall the primary and secondary impact of the anthrax attacks in 2001. The attacks involved a series of letters mailed in pre-stamped envelopes to places like Florida and New York and to the offices of Senator TOM DASCHLE and PATRICK LEAHY. Those kinds of incidences prove that it is vital that we focus on the research aspect. I am gratified that my colleagues saw the importance of spreading the knowledge, the research, the input, the collaboration throughout our Nation.

Therefore, we have included language to make sure that we include historically black, Hispanic-serving, Native American, and Pacific Islander institutions, that they are able to be exposed, if you will, to the various opportunities to engage in high-level research so that, as they are able to relate to different cultures and different communities, they, too, can be a part of securing the homeland.

It is important as well, as I noted in an amendment that I was going to propose, that the stockpiles of chemicals that will thwart bioterrorist attacks that are in this country should be strategically placed, that they can reach any urban center and any rural area, any hamlet, any town, any village. I am glad to note by a letter that has been submitted into the RECORD dated July 16, 2003, that the Secretary of Health and Human Services recognizes that my letter had merit and that he will continue to monitor and be astutely aware of whether or not the stockpiles we have are sufficient, whether they are within the sufficient depth, and whether they will be able to protect all of America.

Let me conclude, Mr. Speaker, by simply saying that I rise to support this legislation with the knowledge that we will be inclusive and that the idea is not only to secure the places we know and that are renowned but to secure the places where people live and to make sure that the home front and the home neighborhoods are secure in our country.

I ask my colleagues to support this legislation.

[Begin Insert]

Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 2122, the ``Project Bioshield Act of 2003.'' I support this important legislation because it takes America one-step closer to being prepared to deal with a biochemical terrorist attack. As we consider this legislation, Mr. Speaker, America is still not safe. We remain vulnerable. Our ports are not secure. Our critical infrastructure is not secure. Our communities are not protected from biochemical agents. H.R. 2122, will help to make America safer.

The purpose of the Project BioShield Act of 2003 is to ``enhance the research, development, procurement and use of biomedical countermeasures to respond to public health threats affecting national security, and for other purposes.'' The stated purpose of H.R. 2122 is a noble one given the danger posed by biochemical weapons.

The threat of bioterrorism is substantial, and protecting America from biochemical agents and terrorist attacks must be one of our chief concerns as we continue our work of protecting our homelands. Biological weapons pose a particularly dangerous threat. Biological weapons are highly portable and difficult to detect.

Bioterrorism attacks not only pose a danger to human lives, they also have the ability to cripple the operation of our society and severely harm our economy. We all recall the primary and secondary impact of the anthrax attacks in 2001. The attacks involved a series of letters mailed in pre-stamped envelopes to media outlets in Florida and New York and to the offices of Senators Thomas Daschle and Patrick J. Leahy (D-VT). The anthrax attacks killed five Americans and left 13 others severely ill. The five people who died from inhalation anthrax included two postal workers at the Brentwood postal facility in Washington, a Florida photojournalist, a New York hospital worker and a 94-year-old woman in Connecticut. Thousands more were exposed to the lethal bacteria. The letters passed through various post offices and postal distribution centers along the East Coast leaving a trail of contamination. Buildings from the Brentwood mail facility, to the Congressional office buildings, to NBC headquarters had to cease operations.

The threat of bioterrorism did not end in September of 2001. As recently as April 22nd of this year in Tacoma, WA, we had a bioterrorism scare. A white powder was found in two envelopes, and 94 people had to be evacuated from a mail distribution facility. Initial tests of the powder tested positive for biotoxins that cause bubonic plague or botulism. Four people at the facility had to be decontaminated. The same day, a suspicious powder was found in a Federal Express cargo area at Southwest Florida International Airport, in Fort Myers, FL. Six people were taken to a hospital for possible decontamination, including one who suffered burning eyes and nose.

We are presently faced with the threat of a worldwide SARS outbreak. The inability of many foreign countries to adequately deal with that outbreak raises questions about our own preparedness. What about other infectious diseases like tuberculosis? There are many ailments that our medical professionals are struggling to control. We must do better in the ares of biological weapons.

The ease with which biological weapons can be manufactured is also a danger. The equipment and ingredients needed to manufacture many biological agents can be purchased over the Internet. Additionally, as our failure to apprehend those responsible for the 2001 anthrax attacks illustrates, biological terrorists can operate with more secrecy than traditional terrorists.

Positive strides have been made in the various biochemical fields. We have improved our ability to secure our borders and prevent deadly materials from entering our country. However, it is unrealistic to expect no biological weapons to enter the United States. Last year alone 30 million tons of cocaine was smuggled into the United States. If we can't stop 30 million tons of cocaine from crossing our borders, how can we expect to stop a vial filled with anthrax, botulism, or smallpox? A vial that could kill hundreds or possibly thousands.

To adequately protect our homeland from bioterrorist attacks we must address these and many other concerns in the Project Bioshield bill. The provisions of Project Bioshield provide a good start to protecting Americans from a bioterrorist attack but work remains. Presently Project Bioshield's provisions grant the National Institutes of Health new powers, through grants and contract awards, to speed effective research and development efforts on bioterrorism countermeasures. Project Bioshield also creates a long-term funding mechanism for the development of medical countermeasures, and empowers the government to purchase safe and effective vaccines. Finally, Project Bioshield authorizes the Food and Drug Administration use promising, yet uncertified, biological treatments in the case of emergencies.

The research, development, and procurement provisions of the Project Bioshield bill are instrumental to the development of countermeasures for protecting our communities. The development of effective vaccines will mean the difference between life and death. There needs to be research and development participation from diverse institutions nationwide, so that the expertise of as many biological and chemical industry leaders can be utilized. During markup of this legislation in the Select Committee on Homeland Security, I negotiated the inclusion of language to ensure that Historically Black Colleges and Universities, and institutions serving large populations of Native Americans, Hispanic Americans, and Asian Pacific Americans are meaningfully aware of research and development grants. Provisions such as this not only include diverse scientists in the research and development process, they facilitate dispersal of information to all communities.

Protecting our communities is the most challenging and most important responsibility of the federal Department of Homeland Security, the House and Senate Select Committees on Homeland Security, and all Members of this Congress. An ongoing failure of all agencies responsible for homeland security is our inability to equip our local communities with the

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funds and supplies needed to counter a terrorist attack now. During recent on-site reviews in Colorado and California, I spoke with first responders and individuals responsible for securing our ports. I also organized a briefing with testimony on the issue of homeland security in Houston, TX, in April. During each of these events, America's first responders echoed the same sentiment: they lack the funding and equipment to deal with a terrorist attack.

The Project Bioshield bill is an opportunity to correct this continuing failure. If is insufficient to simply research and develop bioterrorism countermeasures. We must also get those countermeasures into the hands of the health professionals and other first responders responsible for administering vaccines to the victims of bioterror attacks. We must not delay. First responders need these supplies immediately.

Mr. Speaker, I believe the provision of H.R. 2122, the Project Bioshield bill, are good first steps in protecting Americans from biological attacks. However, I feel that our country is still not safe and that many protections need to be established to fully protect our communities from biochemical attacks.

[End Insert]

Mr. COX. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Arizona (Mr. Shadegg), the chairman of the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness and Response.

Mr. SHADEGG. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.

As a member of both the Select Committee on Homeland Security and the Committee on Energy Commerce, I rise in strong support of H.R. 2122, the Project BioShield Act.

Mr. Speaker, today, the House takes an important step toward preparing our Nation for the threat of bioterrorism. Clearly, we are living in a transformational era. Thirty years ago, none of us knew what biotechnology or genomics were, but, today, combined with our country's unparalleled leadership in semiconductors and computing power, we are on the verge of breathtaking breakthroughs in the field of bioscience.

Congress has played an important role not only by doubling the funding for the National Institutes of Health, but also by committing $6 billion in fiscal year 2003 to develop strategies and countermeasures to protect the American public from bioterror attacks.

Even though we are in a better position in terms of preparedness than we were just a few months ago prior to the anthrax attacks here on Capitol Hill, we have much more to do. Project BioShield is a critically important step in that process. In many ways, it will serve as our Nation's primary response to bioterror.

Mr. Speaker, the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness and Response of the Select Committee on Homeland Security, which I chair, held several hearings on this issue; and, during that process, we learned that having measures to counter bioterror threats will actually serve as a deterrent to those threats, as would-be terrorists see that America can be protected against bioagents which al Qaeda or other terrorists would use against us.

By providing a steady stream of funding for countermeasures, increased research capability at NIH, and expedited distribution during emergencies, project BioShield is a forward-thinking solution to bioterrorism.

Mr. Speaker, our subcommittee worked hard on this legislation. I believe it takes an important step in the right direction. I commend the full committee chairman and the other committees for their work on it, and I urge my colleagues to support the Project BioShield Act and to support H.R. 2122.

Mr. COX. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Lincoln Diaz-Balart), the chairman of the Select Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Rules.

Mr. LINCOLN DIAZ-BALART of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.

For years the National Institutes of Health have served as our Pentagon in the war against disease. I think Americans, as well as people around the world, have benefited. Now, we must call upon, and we do so in this important piece of legislation, for the NIH to utilize its expertise and innovation, the expertise and innovation of all of its scientists to guard this Nation against the horrors that a serious biological attack would mean.

We have already seen, Mr. Speaker, a biological attack on this country. We know the great damage that it can cause. So what this legislation is doing is taking another important step, taking another important step by this Congress to protect the Nation from the great damage that a biological attack would cause.

I thank the gentleman from California (Chairman Cox) and the entire committee for its hard work in bringing forth this important piece of legislation today.

Mr. TURNER of Texas. Mr. Speaker, may I inquire of the time remaining on both sides?

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Gilchrest). The gentleman from Texas (Mr. Turner) has 3 minutes remaining. The time of the gentleman from California (Mr. Cox) has expired.

Mr. TURNER of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 1 1/2 minutes.

Mr. Speaker, let me first commend the gentleman from California (Chairman Cox), along with the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Dingell), the ranking member, and the gentleman from Louisiana (Chairman TAUZIN), the gentleman from Virginia (Chairman DAVIS), and the gentleman from California (Mr. Waxman) for their excellent work on putting together this legislation in a bipartisan way. I know we all appreciate the work that Secretary Thompson and Secretary Ridge did on behalf of the President on this very important initiative.

I hope that we are successful with this legislation, and I hope that the desired result can be accomplished. But I also want to end with a caution that the ability of our enemies in the years ahead to develop, alter, and modify biological pathogens will be at a level unknown to us today. I urge all of us to commit ourselves to the task of developing the agility and the responsiveness that we need to address those threats that we inevitably will face in the future.

The Washington Post today spoke in an editorial entitled ``New Bugs'' that it is important for us to shorten the time frame from the identification of a dangerous pathogen to the development of a drug or antidote. The shortening of this time span will require a tremendous commitment on the part of the American people and our government, and I hope this step that we take today will be but a first step in ensuring that we can adequately meet the biological threat that this Nation will face in the future.

Mr. Speaker, I yield the balance of my time to the distinguished gentleman from California (Mr. Cox), the chairman of the Select Committee on Homeland Security.

Mr. COX. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Texas for yielding me the remaining time.

I want to take a moment to say not only how productive it was to work with the gentleman from Texas but what a pleasure it has been, because both sides of the aisle, the Republicans and the Democrats, have worked together, as we should, after September 11 to put our Nation's security first.

I hope that our Nation never sees the kind of bioterror attack that we have been discussing on the floor here today. It is our job to be prepared against that eventuality. The legislative steps that we are taking today, the resources that we are providing, the intelligence infrastructure that we are building, the stockpile of vaccines and antidotes that we may requisition under Project BioShield are all intended to protect against mass casualties that would result in the event of a terrorist attack that we hope to prevent and we hope never to see in this country.

After September 11, I daresay every Member of this body determined that we will win this war against these terrorists. They are not superhuman. They are individuals. They do not have infinite capabilities. They have finite resources. We can find them, we can defeat them, and we shall. And we will be prepared. That is the purpose of this legislation today. I strongly urge a vote in support.

[Begin Insert]

Mrs. LOWEY. Mr. Speaker, I support Project BioShield.

Over the last few months. I have been having meetings with local officials, first responders, hospitals, and school superintendents, to talk about how we can better prepare for the unimaginable, improve emergency planning, implement 21st century communication systems, and foster better cooperation among local, state, and federal public health and safety officials.

[Page: H6940]

But all of these efforts won't amount to much if we do not have the right tools to counteract biological, chemical, radiological, or nuclear agents, and the diseases caused by such agents. And that's the crux of this legislation.

With that said, I continue to have some concerns about whether this bill will be enough of an engine to spur research within the pharmaceutical industry and if our public health system is prepared and ready to assume the new products developed by BioShield.

During the drafting process of this bill, a number of expert witnesses stated that Project BioShield might not be tempting enough bait to entice the pharmaceutical industry to bite. These fears are legitimate. And that is why I am pleased that the bill includes a provision allowing the federal government to assume this work in-hours if private industry does not or cannot produce countermeasures fast enough.

On the other hand, if BioShield is successful, which I know we all hope it will be, and new countermeasures are developed, the success of these products depend on our public health systems' ability to distribute and deliver these serums to the general public in a timely, safe, and orderly fashion. In the case of smallpox, the cost of vaccinating--roughly $200 per vaccination because of screening, testing, post vaccination surveillance, and treatment of adverse reactions--has been a significant impediment to the program. Thus, the key to effective countermeasures depends on a lot of factors and costs other than buying countermeasures and putting them in the Strategic National Stockpile.

As I have discussed with my colleagues and Administration officials during both Homeland Security Committee and Labor HHS Appropriations Subcommittee hearings, the bioterrorism grants provided through the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and Health Resources Services Administration have not been adequate, particularly in the context of the current economy and failing state budgets. Basic health care programs are starved for cash for their core public health missions while also trying to take on treater responsibilities in the terrorism preparedness arena.

So today, I want to go on record with my colleagues that we must be prepared to better invest in our public health network if we truly want a sound and secure homeland.

Despite these criticisms, the BioShield proposal is a well-intended one, and a vitally important component in the fight agaisnt terrorism. The reality is: the more countermeasures we have, the less capable terrorists will be. And one way or another Project BioShield is going to make that happen.

Mr. KENNEDY of Rhode Island. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the BioShield legislation, and commend the committees for their diligence in meeting the challenge of bioterrorism.

While this bill is an important step in ensuring our nation's preparedness for bioterrorism, I am concerned that it does not fully meet our needs. This act does well in raising our defenses against the ``bio,'' but does nothing to defend against the ``terror.''

Mr. Speaker, the point of all terrorism, including bioterrorism, is not primarily to inflict physical damage, but to undermine our social, political, and economic vibrancy. Whether terrorists succeed depends not only on our ability to prevent or mitigate the physical impact of their acts, but whether we can prevent or mitigate the paralysis, panic, and demoralization they seek to create.

Tom Kean, Rudolph Giuliani, the National Academy of Sciences, first responders, and others have talked about the need to build resilience in our communities. Our preparedness efforts must include plans to ensure that officials' communications calm instead of panic. We need to make sure that the public, first responders, teachers, and others have the proper information delivered in an appropriate way about threats, safety measures, and emergency plans. If we do not specifically address the social and behavioral impacts of terrorism and the threat of terrorism, the measure we debate today and our other preparations will not be as effective as they could be.

I support this bill as component of our defense against biological terrorism, and hope that we can take the important next step as well.

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Project Bioshield Act of 2003. This legislation reflects bipartisan negotiations that have significantly improved the language submitted to us by the Administration. That is a credit to the Committee on Energy and Commerce and to other committees and colleagues. I commend the good work of all who participated in this endeavor.

Project Bioshield is unfortunately a necessary measure in view of the increased risk of harm to Americans in this era of heightened threats to our national security. There are no effective therapies for many of the ``select agents'' that have been identified as potential instrumentalities of terrorism. The basic purpose of Project Bioshield is to support research that will lead to the development and availability in the Strategic National Stockpile of ``countermeasures'' to combat public health emergencies that threaten our national security.

The bill has three basic features: enhanced countermeasure research; procurement of countermeasures; and emergency regulatory authority for approval and use of drugs, biologics, and devices that are qualified counter-measures. The Committees' work clarified, modified, and otherwise improved on the Administration's proposal in each of these areas.

Significantly, the bill before us contains an additional section that enhances accountability for actions taken pursuant to Project Bioshield. Congress will receive comprehensive information, not less than annually, on the major activities authorized by this act. In addition, the General Accounting Office and the National Academy of Sciences will provide reports on key economic and scientific elements of this program after it has been in effect for several years.

Finally, I commend Chairman TAUZIN of the Committee on Energy and Commerce and my other colleagues for deciding to proceed with an authorization for funding, rather than with the mandatory appropriation sought by the Administration. Bioshield should not automatically be given a higher priority over other national security or public health matters.

This is a good bill, and is a worthy continuation of our important, and bipartisan work on bioterrorism preparedness. I urge all of my colleagues to vote for this bill.

Mr. NUSSLE. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to speak on H.R. 2122, the Project BioShield Act of 2003. This Act would amend the Public Health Service Act to authorize appropriations to procure security countermeasures to treat, identify, and prevent the public health consequences of bio-terrorism.

Project BioShield has been described by President Bush as ``a key part of our all-out effort to prepare for the threat of bio-terror.'' So I am pleased that the Project BioShield Act of 2003 will be voted on today in this House.

The framework for this bill was initially established in the FY 04 Budget Resolution that was adopted in April. The budget resolution set aside $5.593 billion over ten years to establish a program to accelerate the research, development and acquisition of biomedical threat countermeasures. Recognizing the importance of this legislation, it took the somewhat usual step of establishing firewalls around these funds to ensure they are not used for any other purpose.

I am very pleased that the bill we are considering today is consistent with the budget resolution. It would authorize appropriations of $5.6 billion for fiscal years 2004 through 2013. As some of my colleagues may be aware, the House already passed appropriations for this bill as part of the Appropriations bill for Energy and Water. Accordingly, as provided by the budget resolution, I adjusted the 302(a) allocation to the Appropriations Committee to accommodate the appropriations for this important bill.

I would also like to comment on the funding mechanism for BioShield. At the time the budget resolution was adopted, it was unclear whether this program would be funded through annual appropriations or with a permanent indefinite appropriation. Both the Budget and Appropriations Committees expressed a preference for subjecting the program to periodic review of the annual appropriation process. The Administration preferred a new entitlement that would be automatically funded without further legislative action.

I believe the funding mechanism in this bill strikes the right balance. It would fund Project BioShield through what is effectively a multi-year appropriation that would give the Administration flexibility in the amount that is obligated in each year. It subjects the program to periodic Congressional review through the appropriations process but provides the pharmaceutical companies that develop the countermeasures the assurance of future funding.

In conclusion, speaking for myself, and my colleagues, H.R. 2122 reflects our strongest support for those necessary efforts to protect our people and our way of life.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Mr. Speaker, I rise today as the Representative of the Congressional District that is the intended home of a key component of the Project Bioshield Act, a $186 million bio-defense laboratory that is planned to be built on the northeast corner of the National Institutes of Health campus in Bethesda, Maryland. While I support the Bioshield initiative, I have serious concerns about the proposed location of the bio-defense laboratory.

Many of my constituents have expressed to me their concerns about the potential safety risks that the location of this laboratory poses to our community, and the possibility that it could become a target for terrorist attacks. Given that our government determined--even before this new laboratory was proposed--that a perimeter fence is required to safeguard the

[Page: H6941]

buildings and employees at the National Institutes of Health. I believe a number of questions must be answered before we proceed further with the plan to locate the laboratory on the NIH campus.

I have written to the Director of the National Institutes of Health and asked him to address the following issues:

(1) The property of locating this laboratory in an urban setting like Bethesda, as opposed to at Fort Detrick, where a bio-safety level 3 laboratory is already under construction;

(2) if located on the Bethesda campus, whether it can be located centrally on the campus, either in a new building or by renovating an existing building and relocating the offices and laboratories of that building to a building in the location chosen for Building 33; and

(3) the precautions that will be taken to ensure that, in the event of a terrorist attack or human error, that any potential risk to our community presented by the presence of this laboratory on the Bethesda campus is minimized or eliminated.

Mr. Speaker, I know that all of my colleagues in this House are united in our common effort to combat terrorism. But we owe it to our constituents to approach this endeavor carefully. I urge my colleagues and the Administration to consider all options so that we do right by all Americans.

[End Insert]

Mr. COX. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the order of the House of Tuesday, July 15, 2003, the previous question is ordered on the bill, as amended.

The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, was read the third time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the passage of the bill.

The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that the ayes appeared to have it.

Mr. COX. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, further proceedings on this question will be postponed.

[Later]

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The pending business is the question on the passage of the bill, H.R. 2122, on which further proceedings were postponed earlier today.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the passage of the bill on which the yeas and nays are ordered.

This will be a 5-minute vote.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 421, nays 2, not voting 11, as follows:

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Simpson) (during the vote). Members are advised that 2 minutes remain in this vote.

Mr. COX. Mr. Speaker, I hereby submit for inclusion in the RECORD the cost estimate from the Congressional Budget Office for H.R. 2122, the Project BioShield Act of 2003, reflecting that implementing H.R. 2122 would increase discretionary spending by $0.3 billion in 2004. The Public Printer estimates that the cost of including the CBO estimate in the RECORD is $975. Because this estimate dated July 9, 2003, was not received by the Committee in time for inclusion in the Committee Report on the legislation.

DEAR CHAIRMAN: The Congressional Budget Office has prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 2122, the Project BioShield Act of 2003.

If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contacts are Jeanne De Sa, who can be reached at 226-9010, and Sam Papenfuss, who can be reached at 226-2840.

H.R. 2122 would amend the Public Health Service Act (PHSA) to authorize appropriations of up to $5.6 billion for fiscal years 2004 through 2013 for procurement of certain security countermeasures (drugs, devices, and biological products to treat, identify, and prevent the public health consequences of terrorism). Of that amount, $890 million could be obligated in fiscal year 2004 and up to $3.4 billion could be obligated during fiscal years 2004 through 2008. Funding to buy these security countermeasures would be provided to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), but the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) would be responsible for procuring and stockpiling the countermeasures.

In addition, H.R. 2122 would authorize the appropriation of $5 million in 2004 and such sums as may be necessary for 2005 and 2006 for DHS to hire analysts to assess biological, chemical, nuclear, and radiological threats. The bill also would authorize appropriations of such sums as may be necessary for fiscal years 2003 through 2006 for DHS to acquire and deploy secure facilities to receive classified information and products.

Assuming appropriation of the authorized amounts and including administrative costs, CBO estimates that implementing H.R. 2122 would increase discretionary spending by $0.3 billion in 2004, $3.2 billion for fiscal years 2004 through 2008, and $5.7 billion over the 2004-2013 period. In addition, H.R. 2122 would relax certain requirements for federal agencies related to the development and approval of countermeasures. The bill would provide HHS with increased authority and flexibility to award contracts and grants for research and development of qualified countermeasures, hire technical experts, and procure items necessary for research. Those provisions might result in higher discretionary spending, but CBO does not have sufficient information to estimate their budgetary effect.

The bill also would authorize the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to approve the use of certain security countermeasures during emergencies designated by the Secretary of HHS. CBO estimates this provision would have no budgetary effect.

H.R. 2122 contains no intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) and would impose no costs on state, local, or tribal governments.

The estimated budgetary impact of H.R. 2122 is shown in the following table. The costs of this legislation fall within budget function 550 (health).

Under current law, MS administers the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS), which contains drugs, diagnostic devices, vaccines, and other biological products to combat the public health consequences of a terrorist attack or other public health emergencies. DHS currently provides the financing for those efforts, which include the procurement of a new smallpox vaccine and stockpiling of that vaccine and older versions of the vaccine. Authorization for those programs was established in the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness Response Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-88). That act authorized appropriations of $640 million in 2002 and such sums as may be necessary for fiscal years 2003 through 2006 for the SNS and $509 million in 2002 and such sums as may be necessary for fiscal years 2003 through 2006 for the development of the smallpox vaccine. About $400 million was appropriated in 2003 for those activities.

H.R. 2122 would modify the existing authorizations for the SNS and for the development of the smallpox vaccine by codifying the provision in the PHSA instead of in Public Law 107-88. CBO estimates that this modification would have no budgetary effect.

H.R. 2122 also would authorize DHS to augment the SNS with certain additional products. That effort, called Project BioShield , would allow the federal government to enter into contracts to procure security countermeasures, which are defined in the bill as drugs, devices, biological products, vaccines, vaccine adjuvants, antivirals, or diagnostic tests used to treat, identify, or prevent harm from biological, chemical, nuclear, or radiological agents that the Secretary determines are a material threat. Such drugs, devices, or biological products would have to be licensed or approved by the FDA, or otherwise determined by the Secretary of HHS to have the potential to be licensed or approved by the FDA. The federal government also could acquire products used to treat the adverse effects of drugs or biologic products used as security countermeasures.

The rate at which the funding authorized by the bill would be appropriated and spent would depend upon many factors, including the nature of advances in biotechnology, the degree of industry interest and capacity, the threat environment, and government priorities. Assuming appropriation of the authorized amounts, current and future Administrations would have the discretion to enter into multiple contracts for the manufacture of security countermeasures or to cease contracting altogether for a period of years.

To estimate spending under H.R. 2122, CBO consulted with Administration officials about activities they are planning or would consider if Project BioShield were enacted. Officials described plans to acquire and maintain stockpiles of seven security countermeasures to combat five biological agents. The Administration estimates that the cost of procuring, storing, and replacing those countermeasures would be about $5.6 billion over the 2004-2013 period if there were no constraints on funding.

Those currently planned acquisitions do not include any countermeasures for chemical, radiological, or nuclear agents, and they address only a subset of the threats for which research and development activities on countermeasures is being conducted or funded by HHS, the Department of Defense (DOD), and the private sector. Based on information provided by government officials and in consultation with outside experts, CBO has concluded that it is likely that drugs, devices, or biological products addressing some of those other threats will be developed in the coming decade and that some of those countermeasures would be stockpiled under Project BioShield if funds were appropriated for that purpose. CBO's estimate does not assume that any specific product would be developed and procured at any specific time. It does, however, account for a range of possibilities that would be available to the government if the authorized funds are appropriated.

Authorities and Requirements Under H.R. 2122. H.R. 2122 would authorize appropriations of up to $5.6 billion for fiscal years 2004 through 2013 for the federal government to enter into contracts to procure security countermeasures. Of that amount, $890 million could be obligated in fiscal year 2004 and up to $3.4 billion could be obligated during fiscal years 2004 through 2008.

Decisions regarding what types of security countermeasures to procure would be made by the President after reviewing recommendations of the Secretaries of DHS and HHS. Subject to Presidential approval and a determination that inclusion of certain countermeasures in the stockpile is appropriate, the Secretaries of DHS and HHS would seek potential vendors to produce the countermeasures and enter into contracts to buy the countermeasures from those vendors. In making that determination, the Secretary would determine and consider several factors, including the quantity of the product necessary for the stockpile, the feasibility of obtaining sufficient quantities of the product within five years, and whether there is a significant commercial market for the product other than as a security countermeasure. Those factors would not be requirements for procurement, but considerations in determining the appropriateness for inclusion of the countermeasure in the stockpile.

The Secretary of HHS would be responsible for arranging the procurement, including negotiating the quantity, price, and production schedule in five-year contracts or cooperative agreements, though eight-year contracts would be permitted for first awards. Payment would be conditioned on the delivery of a substantial portion of promised units. However, the Secretary could provide an advance payment of not to exceed 10 percent of the contract if the Secretary determines such payment is necessary to the project's success. The Secretary could pay vendors for storage, shipping, and handling and would be permitted to use noncompetitive procedures if the product is available only from a limited number of sources. Additional countermeasures for the same threat also could be procured, if they were to provide improved safety or effectiveness or otherwise enhance public health preparedness.

The authorized funds could not be used for the purchase of vaccines under contracts entered into prior to enactment, or for administrative costs. Based on information from Administration officials, CBO expects that funding would not be available specifically for research and development, although the price for the completed products would probably cover some development costs.

In addition, H.R. 2122 would allow HHS to produce the vaccines and other countermeasures if HHS and DHS determined that the government could produce the countermeasure more cheaply or more quickly than through the normal procurement process. This authority would not allow the government to spend more money than is authorized and appropriated for this purpose.

The Administration's Plans to Implement Project BioShield . Based on existing science and a current assessment of potential threats to public health, the Administration has identified several agents for which countermeasures are needed to protect the public health and could be included in Project BioShield . Those agents are smallpox, anthrax, botulinum toxin, plague, and Ebola. The Administration estimates that spending for countermeasures under Project BioShield , including purchase, storage, and replacement costs, would total about $5.6 billion over the 2004-2013 period, assuming the successful development of those countermeasures and no constraints on funding. More than half of those costs would be for the improved smallpox and anthrax vaccines. A brief description follows of the security countermeasures the Administration plans to acquire and stockpile.

Smallpox. Under Project BioShield , the Administration plans to procure a next-generation version of the smallpox vaccine called modified vaccinia Ankara (MVA). This new vaccine is an attenuated version of the existing vaccine and may be used to safely vaccinate about 30 million individuals with compromised immune systems, eczema, or certain other high-risk conditions. Under the authority provided for Project BioShield , HHS plans to purchase 60 million doses of the new vaccine at about $15 per dose over a three-year period for a cost of about $900 million. The Administration expects to be able to enter into contracts and begin acquiring the vaccine in 2004. Additional costs for inventory management and replacement of expired stocks over the 2007-2013 period would likely add another $1 billion, according to Administration estimates, but could be lower if long-term refrigerated storage proves to be effective.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, last week, CIA Director George Tenet accepted responsibility for having gone along with the African uranium statement in the President's State of the Union address. His acknowledgment that it should not

have been included in the address and his acceptance of responsibility was appropriate. But his explanation of the CIA's acquiescence in allowing the use of a clearly misleading statement raises more questions than it answers, and statements by other administration officials, particularly National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, compound the problem.

Even more troubling, however, is the fact that the uranium statement appears to be but one of a number of several questionable statements and exaggerations by the intelligence community and administration officials that were issued in the buildup to the war. The importance of objective and credible intelligence cannot be overstated. It is therefore essential that we have a thorough, open and bipartisan inquiry into the objectivity, credibility and use of U.S. intelligence before the Iraq war.

The President in his State of the Union Message said that the British Government had learned that Iraq recently sought to purchase significant quantities of uranium from Africa. The sole purpose of that statement was to make the American people believe that the American Government believed the statement to be true and that it was strong evidence of Iraq's attempt to obtain nuclear weapons . But the truth was that, at the very time the words were spoken, our Government did not believe it was true. Condoleezza Rice's effort to justify the statement on the grounds that it was ``technically accurate'' doesn't address the heart of the matter, which is that the statement was calculated to create a false impression. It is simply wrong to make a statement whose purpose is to make people believe something when you do not believe it yourself.

It is all well and good that the CIA has acknowledged its role in caving in to pressure from the National Security Council to concur in something which it did not believe. But Director Tenet's acknowledgment raises further questions of who was pushing the false impression at the National Security Council. The NSC should not misuse intelligence that way.

The President's statement that Iraq was attempting to acquire African uranium was not a ``mistake.'' It was not inadvertent. It was not a slip. It was negotiated between the CIA and the NSC. It was calculated, and it was misleading. And what compounds its misleading nature is that the CIA not only ``differed with the British dossier on the reliability of the uranium reporting,'' to use Director Tenet's words, but the CIA had also ``expressed [its] reservations'' to the British in September 2002, nearly 5 months before the State of the Union Address. Furthermore, the CIA pressed the White House to remove a similar reference from the President's speech on October 7, 2002, and the White House did so--nearly 4 months before the State of the Union Address.

The uranium issue is not just about sixteen words. It is about the conscious decisions that were made, apparently by the NSC and concurred in by the CIA, to create a false impression. And it is not an isolated example. There is troubling evidence of other dubious statements and exaggerations by the intelligence community and administration officials.

Relative to aluminum tubes, in a speech before the U.N. General Assembly on September 12, 2002, President Bush said, ``Iraq has made several attempts to buy high-strength aluminum tubes used to enrich uranium for a nuclear weapon.'' In fact, an unclassified intelligence assessment in October acknowledged that some intelligence specialists ``believe that these tubes are probably intended for conventional weapons programs,'' and on February 5, 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell told the U.N. Security Council that ``we all know there are differences of opinion,'' and that ``there is controversy about what these tubes are for.'' The International Atomic Energy Agency, after conducting an inquiry into the aluminum tubes issue, concluded they were not for uranium enrichment.

On the Iraq-al-Qaida connection: On September 27 of last year, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld described the administration's search for hard evidence for a connection between Iraq and al-Qaida. He said, ``We ended up with five or six sentences that were bullet-proof. We could say them, they are factual, they are exactly accurate. They demonstrate that there are in fact al-Qaida in Iraq.'' While Secretary Rumsfeld later went on to say, ``They are not beyond a reasonable doubt,'' he did not say there was considerable uncertainty in the intelligence community about the nature and extent of ties between Iraq and al-Qaida. It was certainly never a ``bullet- proof'' case.

On nuclear reconstitution, last Sunday, Ms. Rice said, ``We have never said that we thought he [Saddam] had nuclear weapons .'' But Vice President Cheney said on March 16, ``We believe he [Saddam] has, in fact, reconstituted nuclear weapons .''

On the question of certainty that Iraq possesses chemical and biological weapons , on August 26, 2002, Vice President Cheney said: ``Simply stated, there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction . There is no doubt he is amassing them to use against our friends, against our allies, and against us.'' On September 26, 2002, President Bush said,

``The Iraqi regime possesses biological and chemical weapons .'' On March 17, 2003, President Bush told the Nation that ``intelligence gathered by this and other governments leaves no doubt that the Iraq regime continues to possess and conceal some of the most lethal weapons ever devised.'' And on March 30, 2003, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said, ``We know where they [weapons of mass destruction ] are. They're in the area around Tikrit and Baghdad and east, west, south and north somewhat.'' The fruitless search to date for Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction during and after our entry into Iraq suggests that our intelligence was either way off the mark or seriously stretched.

As to mobile biological warfare labs, on May 28, 2003, the CIA posted on its Web site a document it prepared with the Defense Intelligence Agency entitled, ``Iraqi Mobile Biological Warfare Agent Production Plants.'' This report, which is still on the CIA Web site, concluded that the two trailers found in Iraq were for biological warfare agent production, even though other experts and intelligence community members do not agree with that conclusion, or believe there is not enough evidence to reach such a conclusion. None of these alternative views have been posted on the CIA's Web page.

On White House Web site photos, on October 8, 2002, the White House placed three sets of satellite photos on its Web site, with the headline, ``Construction at three Iraqi nuclear weapons -related facilities.'' Although one of the facilities was not nuclear-related, the captions of the photos gave the impression that Iraq was proceeding with work on weapons of mass destruction at these facilities, although UNMOVIC and IAEA inspections at these facilities found no prohibited activities or weapons . For instances, related to the Al Furat manufacturing facility, the caption notes that ``the building was originally intended to house a centrifuge enrichment cascade operation supporting Iraq's uranium enrichment efforts'' and that after construction resumed in 2001, ``the building appears operational.''

So the misleading statement about African uranium is not an isolated issue. There is a significant amount of troubling evidence that it was part of a pattern of exaggeration and misleading statements. That is what a thorough, open and bipartisan investigation should examine.

Finally, again relative to the uranium statement, I am deeply troubled by Ms. Rice's continuing justification of the use of the statement in the President's State of the Union Address. She repeatedly says it was ``accurate,'' despite the fact that its clear aim was to create a false impression. Her statement and Director Tenet's statement raise more questions than they answer. Here are some of those questions:

One, who in the administration was pressing the CIA to concur in a statement that the CIA did not believe was true, and why did they do so even after the CIA objected to the text?

Two, who at the CIA was involved in pressing the White House to remove the similar reference from the October 7 speech, and what reasons did they give for removing it?

Three, who in the White House was involved in removing a similar reference from the President's speech on October 7, nearly 4 months before the State of the Union speech?

service in September, 2002 of CIA's ``reservations'' about the inclusion of references to Iraqi efforts to obtain uranium from Africa in the British intelligence service's September 24 dossier?

Five, given the doubts of the U.S. Intelligence Community, why didn't the President say in his State of the Union speech not only that ``The British Government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa'' but that ``our U.S. intelligence community has serious doubts about such reporting''?

Six, how and when did the U.S. Government receive the forged documents on Niger, and when did it become aware that they might be bogus?

And, seven, what role did the Office of the Vice President have in bringing about an inquiry into Iraq's purported efforts to obtain uranium from Niger? Was the Vice President's staff briefed on the results of Ambassador Wilson's trip to Niger?

These and many other questions underscore the critical importance of a bipartisan, open, and thorough inquiry into the objectivity and credibility of intelligence concerning the presence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq immediately before the war and the alleged Iraq al-Qaida connection, and the use of such intelligence by the Department of Defense in policy decisions, military planning and the conduct of operations in Iraq.

Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, we in the Senate today had the experience of participating in the joint meeting in the House Chamber listening to Prime Minister Tony Blair. I opened the Senate this morning pointing out that we would be welcoming and honoring our distinguished visitor in this joint meeting. I mentioned that he is the fourth sitting Prime Minister to address a joint session of the Congress, preceded only by Winston Churchill, Clement Atlee, and Margaret Thatcher, three of histories great leaders.

Today's historic tribute gave us the opportunity to reaffirm our abiding friendship and our deep respect both for the man, Prime Minister Tony Blair, as well as the people of the United Kingdom. Our two nations have stood shoulder to shoulder to defend the free people around the world.

We had the opportunity to meet with the Prime Minister before the address. We were able to directly express our appreciation to the Prime Minister and for him to reflect to the people of Britain for their courage and their resolve.

As you sat in the majestic House Chamber and listened to those words, I think we were all affected very directly because it helped elevate the debate which seemed to have mired down in part of the way it has been handled by the media but also the way it has been handled by a number of our colleagues both in this Chamber and in the other Chamber.

The words from Tony Blair really did elevate it. There is just one passage I want to quote from what the Prime Minister said today in the Chamber:

And I know it's hard on America, and in some small corner of this vast country, out in Nevada or Idaho or these places I've never been to, but always wanted to go. I know out there there's a guy getting on with his life, perfectly happily, minding his own business, saying to you, the political leaders of this country, ``Why me? And why us? And why America?''

And the only answer is, ``Because destiny put you in this place in history, in this moment in time, and the task is yours to do.''

And our job, my nation that watched you grow, that you fought alongside and now fights alongside you, that takes enormous pride in our alliance and great affection in our common bond, our job is to be there with you.

You are not going to be alone. We will be there with you in this fight for liberty. We

will be with you in this fight for liberty. And if our spirit is right and our courage firm, the world will be with us.

I mention this passage because, as we sat there for that 30 minutes or so, this passage where he mentions that ``destiny put you in this place in history'' is one that just struck a chord.

I contrast that with the debate that has seemed to play out in the media over the last week in regard to the quality and integrity of the case made by President Bush for the removal of Saddam Hussein's regime.

I have to say, as I have heard people comment on the case that has been made for this war, I have been increasingly disturbed. In part it is because of the sound of shaking confidence by people who intend to shake the confidence, or who want to instill or inject into the American people self-doubt about America's mission in Iraq.

But when you stepped back and listened to the Prime Minister today, all of a sudden you realized that a bloody tyrant no longer rules in Iraq. It made you realize that a man who, without regret, murdered members of his own family, as well as tens of thousands of his own citizens, has now been removed from power. The perpetrator of one of the past century's most gruesome crimes against humanity--the use of chemical weapons on thousands of innocent Kurds--no longer is free to pursue such weapons . The aggressor in the gulf war who, a decade ago, invaded his neighbor, only to be driven out by a mighty coalition, no longer threatens the volatile region of the Middle East.

Now all of this second-guessing is perplexing to me. If you look over the last week, we have had things mentioned like Watergate, which was referenced by candidates eager for the next election. You hear candidates using words like ``impeachment'' being laid upon the table. We have seen, over the last week, special e-mails going out from party headquarters, saying: More money needed to fan the flames of controversy.

Indeed, we know all these campaigns have begun, and there are many people who seem to be eager to topple the leader. I mention all that because of the contrast in what we heard today from Tony Blair, who elevated the facts and the greater cause of liberty, in contrast so much to what our media and the candidates have focused on. This whiff of politics is in the air.

What bothers me about it is that there is a cost if we get in and play a game of politics at this juncture in history. As I listened to the Prime Minister today, I thought, what does this do to the reputation of our country, to the position of our President? Prime Minister Tony Blair helped put that into perspective today.

Indeed, the record is replete with the case against Saddam Hussein, such as the mass graves. Our colleagues who have just come back from Iraq so vividly described standing at these mass graves the size of football fields--thousands of graves exposed. And really only now are the thousands of widows and mothers and orphans--all victims, also--able to openly grieve. Who will ever forget the pictures we have seen of those desperate citizens of Baghdad, actually clawing at the ground in a vain search for these hidden prisons that might hold their loved ones. You see these images of mass graves.

Our colleagues have come back--and we have had two delegations over there, and another one will be going shortly--with descriptions of the unmistakable mark which these mass graves represent of history's tyrants, the legacy of this regime, and the shame of anyone among us who would have tolerated it for one day longer than we knew it to be a fact.

As I listen to some of the candidates and colleagues and critics, it leads me to ask: Are we deaf in some way to the plight of the Iraqi people based on the facts that we know? Is the suffering of the Iraqi people--when we think about those graves or about the thousands of Kurdish individuals upon whom Saddam Hussein inflicted chemical weapons of mass destruction --it makes you ask is our moral purpose as a Nation so diminished that we do not see the justice of our own cause, that larger purpose, that sense of liberty and fighting for liberty that Prime Minister Tony Blair talked about today?

We heard in this body all of the evidence on Iraq before the war. We had the opportunity, through open hearings, closed hearings, classified information. I clearly was convinced. I had the opportunity to sit in my office, which is just probably 200 steps from where I am speaking now, and listen to about 12 Kurdish physicians who came to visit the United States. They came to see me because I am a physician. They simply laid it out to me that they took care of thousands of people--these are the physicians who took care of thousands of people who were poisoned with chemical weapons from Saddam Hussein--thousands of people, not 10 or 15, but thousands. They talked about the peeling of skin. They talked about the suffocation. They talked about people dying before their eyes.

They also told me they are still taking care of those people who survived, although we know scores of thousands of people died from these chemical weapons imposed or inflicted upon them by Saddam Hussein; but, indeed, these doctors I talked to in my office months ago are still treating some of the victims from that atrocity. Yet, at the same time, we have heard discussions this past week with some questioning whether this tyrant was capable of possessing and using such weapons again.

There seems to be a disconnect over much of the discussion of the last week. This week people said: After all, he declared himself free of these weapons .

But as we all know, he denied again and again--and it was part of the resolution--those inspectors the opportunity to prove him wrong. So I am perplexed and bewildered by those who would accept the word of an inhumane, callous, mass murderer at this point in time, and whose word they seem to even be holding higher than that of the President of the United States.

It is a travesty to me. It is nonsense, and it really comes back to that basic question: Is there anybody in this Chamber who would honestly dispute that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction ; that he used weapons of mass destruction ; and that he never abandoned that course? I really don't think so.

We can take it a step further. Is there anybody in this Chamber who believes that we would have been all, in some way, better off with Saddam Hussein still in power? The answer is clear. Indeed, 9 months ago, 77 Members of this Chamber voted to authorize the President to use force in Iraq. In that resolution, we enumerated very clearly the many reasons.

First, the Senate found--this was 9 months ago--that Saddam Hussein was developing, did possess, and had used weapons of mass destruction . That is No. 1.

No. 2, 9 months ago, based on the information that was available to us and the briefings that we had, the Senate found that Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990. And after being driven back by an international coalition, Saddam Hussein unequivocally agreed to eliminate all weapons of mass destruction and to prove so to the world community.

No. 3, the Senate found that Saddam, in fact, used denial, used deception, and used harassment to thwart efforts by international inspectors to prove compliance with those terms.

Fourth, the Senate reiterated its finding from 1998 legislation that Saddam Hussein had a continuing program to develop weapons of mass destruction in material breach of his terms of surrender in the gulf war.

Finally, and fifth, the Senate listed the myriad of United Nations Security Council resolutions reaching the same conclusions that the Senate had reached.

I wish to stress once again, because it is important to understand, this was 9 months ago, and 77 Members of this Chamber voted with this understanding. All of these findings were made on thorough intelligence briefings. They were considered judgments by Members of this body, all separate from any report about a uranium purchase from Africa, which has tended to be the focus of people over the last week.

On October 9, 1998, 2 years before the current President was elected, Senators then wrote to President Bill Clinton demanding military action against Saddam Hussein. This is 1998. They wrote:

We urge you to take necessary actions (including if, appropriate, air and missile strikes) to respond effectively to the threat

This was followed by a December 17, 1998, letter calling for the use of military force again by then-President Clinton ``to compel compliance or to destroy to the best of our ability Iraq's capability to build and deliver weapons of mass destruction and threaten its neighbors.''

What is incredible to me now is that some of those very same people who signed those letters now are questioning whether an honest case was made by President Bush that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction . The very same people signed those letters. So I am moved to ask, What reversed the conclusion that they had so confidently reached 5 years ago? Was it in some way a change of facts or was it a change just in the Presidency?

Yes, my implication is what we have seen over the last week is a matter of politics, and I think, again, of the Prime Minister's visit today and his message of what this war has meant to free people, yes, in Iraq, but around the world. All of this is a serious matter. It demands our attention. I say that because as I speak, we all know that American soldiers, British soldiers, coalition soldiers stand in harm's way. We all sort of stand in fear of turning on the television at night, in the morning, or reading in the paper once again of tragic casualties.

All of that speaks to me that we must redouble our efforts against the small but determined enemy to stabilize Iraq. A democratic and prosperous Iraq, just as the Prime Minister said today, will not only change the Middle East, it will change the world for the better. It is a worthy cause of our Nation and one that we simply will not--will not--permit to fail.

Mr. President, I will, in the interest of time, probably have more to say about this next week. This is the nature of the debate. Again, I express my appreciation on behalf of the Senate to the Prime Minister for joining us today.

Mr. CORZINE. Madam President, I call up my amendment which is at the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.

The Senator from New Jersey [Mr. Corzine] proposes an amendment numbered 1275.

Mr. CORZINE. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

TITLE __X.--NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE DEVELOPMENT AND USE OF INTELLIGENCE RELATED TO IRAQ

There is established the National Commission on the Development and Use of Intelligence Related to Iraq.

(1) The Congress underscores its commitment to and support for ongoing Congressional reviews regarding the collection and analysis of intelligence related to Iraq.

(1) examine and report upon the role of policymakers in the development of intelligence related to Iraq and Operation Iraqi Freedom;

(2) examine and report upon the use of intelligence related to Iraq and Operation Iraqi Freedom;

(3) build upon the reviews of intelligence related to Iraq and Operation Iraqi Freedom, including those being conducted by the Executive Branch, Congress and other entities; and

(4) investigate and publicly report to the President and Congress on its findings, conclusions, and recommendations.

(2) 3 members shall be appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives;

(4) 3 members shall be appointed by the minority leader of the House of Representatives.

(1) IN GENERAL.--Subject to paragraph (2) the Chairperson and Vice Chairperson of the Commission shall be elected by the members.

(2) POLITICAL PARTY AFFILIATION.--The Chairperson and Vice Chairperson shall not be from the same political party.

(1) QUALIFICATIONS.--It is the sense of Congress that individuals appointed to the Commission should be prominent United States citizens, with national recognition and significant depth of experience in such professions as intelligence, governmental service, the armed services, law enforcement, and foreign affairs.

(2) INITIAL MEETING.--Once six or more members of the Commission have been appointed, those members who have been appointed may meet and, if necessary, select a temporary chairperson, who may begin the operations of the Commission, including the hiring of staff.

(d) QUORUM; VACANCIES.--After its initial meeting, the Commission shall meet upon the call of the chairperson or a majority of its members. Six members of the Commission shall constitute a quorum. Any vacancy in the Commission shall not affect its powers, but shall be filled in the same manner in which the original appointment was made.

(A) investigates the development and use of intelligence related to Iraq and Operation Iraqi Freedom; and

(i) possessed chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, and the locations of those weapons;

(iv) attempted to procure aluminum tubes for the development of nuclear weapons;

(v) possessed mobile laboratories for the production of weapons of mass destruction;

(vii) any other matters that bear upon the imminence of the threat to the national security of the United States and its allies.

(2) submit to the President and Congress such report as is required by this title containing such findings, conclusions, and recommendations as the Commission shall determine, including proposing organization, coordination, planning, management arrangements, procedures, rules, and regulations.

(A) FORM OF REPORT.--Each report prepared under this section shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.

(1) HEARINGS AND EVIDENCE.--The Commission or, on the authority of the Commission, any subcommittee or member thereof, may, for the purposes of carrying out this title--

(A) hold such hearings and sit and act at such times and places, take such testimony, receive such evidence, administer such oaths; and

(B) require, by subpoena or otherwise, the attendance and testimony of such witnesses and the production of such books, records, correspondence, memoranda, cables, e-mails, papers, and documents, as the Commission or such designated subcommittee or designated member may determine advisable.

(A) ISSUANCE.--Subpoenas issued under paragraph (1)(B) may be issued under the signature of the Chairperson of the Commission, the Vice Chairperson of the Commission, the chairperson of any subcommittee created by a majority of the Commission, or any member designated by a majority of the Commission, and may be served by any person designated by the Chairperson, subcommittee chairperson, or member.

(i) IN GENERAL.--In the case of contumacy or failure to obey a subpoena issued under paragraph (1)(B), the United States district court for the judicial district in which the subpoenaed person resides, is served, or may be found, or where the subpoena is returnable, may issue an order requiring such person to appear at any designated place to testify or to produce documentary or other evidence. Any failure to obey the order of the court may be punished by the court as a contempt of that court.

(ii) ADDITIONAL ENFORCEMENT.--In the case of any failure of any witness to comply with any subpoena or to testify when summoned under authority of this section, the Commission may, by majority vote, certify a statement of fact constituting such failure to the appropriate United States attorney, who may bring the matter before the grand jury for its action, under the same statutory authority and procedures as if the United States attorney had received a certification under sections 102 through 104 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (2 U.S.C. 192 through 194).

(1) IN GENERAL.--Meetings of the Commission may be closed to the public under section 10(d) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.) or other applicable law.

(2) ADDITIONAL AUTHORITY.--In addition to the authority under paragraph (1), section 10(a)(1) and (3) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.) shall not apply to any portion of a Commission meeting if the President determines that such portion or portions of that meeting is likely to disclose matters that could endanger national security. If the President makes such determination, the requirements relating to a determination under section 10(d) of that Act shall apply.

(c) CONTRACTING.--The Commission may, to such extent and in such amounts as are provided in appropriation acts, enter into contracts to enable the Commission to discharge its duties under this title.

(d) INFORMATION FROM FEDERAL AGENCIES.--The Commission is authorized to secure directly from any executive department, bureau, agency, board, commission, office, independent establishment, or instrumentality of the Government information, suggestions, estimates, and statistics for the purposes of this title. Each department, bureau, agency, board, commission, office, independent establishment, or instrumentality shall, to the extent authorized by law, furnish such information, suggestions, estimates, and statistics directly to the Commission, upon request made by the Chairperson, the chairperson of any subcommittee created by a majority of the Commission, or any member designated by a majority of the Commission.

(1) GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION.--The Administrator of General Services shall provide to the Commission on a reimbursable basis administrative support and other services for the performance of the Commission's functions.

(2) OTHER DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES.--In addition to the assistance prescribed in paragraph (1), departments and agencies of the United States are authorized to provide to the Commission such services, funds, facilities, staff, and other support services as they may determine advisable and as may be authorized by law.

(f) GIFTS.--The Commission may accept, use, and dispose of gifts or donations of services or property.

(g) POSTAL SERVICES.--The Commission may use the United States mails in the same manner and under the same conditions as departments and agencies of the United States.

(1) APPOINTMENT AND COMPENSATION.--The chairperson and vice chairperson, in accordance with rules agreed upon by the Commission, may appoint and fix the compensation of a staff director and such other personnel as may be necessary to enable the Commission to carry out its functions, without regard to the provisions of title 5, United States Code, governing appointments in the competitive service, and without regard to the provisions of chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of such title relating to classification and General Schedule pay rates, except that no rate of pay fixed under this subsection may exceed the equivalent of that payable for a position at level V of the Executive Schedule under section 5316 of title 5, United States Code.

(A) IN GENERAL.--The executive director and any personnel of the Commission who are employees shall be employees under section 2105 of title 5, United States Code, for purposes of chapters 63, 81, 83, 84, 85, 87, 89, and 90 of that title.

(B) MEMBERS OF COMMISSION.--Subparagraph (A) shall not be construed to apply to members of the Commission.

(b) DETAILEES.--Any Federal Government employee may be detailed to the Commission without reimbursement from the Commission, and such detailee shall retain the rights, status, and privileges of his or her regular employment without interruption.

(c) CONSULTANT SERVICES.--The Commission is authorized to procure the services of experts and consultants in accordance with section 3109 of title 5, United States Code, but at rates not to exceed the daily rate paid a person occupying a position at level IV of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of title 5, United States Code.

(a) COMPENSATION.--Each member of the Commission may be compensated at not to exceed the daily equivalent of the annual rate of basic pay in effect for a position at level IV of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of title 5, United States Code, for each day during which that member is engaged in the actual performance of the duties of the Commission.

(b) TRAVEL EXPENSES.--While away from their homes or regular places of business in the performance of services for the Commission, members of the Commission shall be allowed travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, in the same manner as persons employed intermittently in the Government service are allowed expenses under section 5703(b) of title 5, United States Code.

The appropriate executive departments and agencies shall cooperate with the Commission in expeditiously providing to the Commission members and staff appropriate security clearances in a manner consistent with existing procedures and requirements, except that no person shall be provided with access to classified information under this section who would not otherwise qualify for such security clearance.

(a) REPORT.--Not later than nine months after the date of the first meeting of the Commission, the Commission shall submit to the President and Congress a report containing such findings, conclusions, and recommendations for corrective measures as have been agreed to by a majority of Commission members.

(1) IN GENERAL.--The Commission, and all the authorities of this title, shall terminate 60 days after the date on which the report is submitted under section (a).

(2) ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIVITIES BEFORE TERMINATING.--The Commission may use the 60-day period referred to in paragraph (1) for the purpose of concluding its activities, including providing testimony to committees of Congress concerning its reports and disseminating the second report.

There are authorized to be appropriated to the Commission to carry out this title $5,000,000, to remain available until expended.

Mr. CORZINE. This amendment is premised on a strong view that intelligence and its honest analysis are vital tools in our war on terrorism. To protect the American people, our intelligence must not be shaped to win an argument, but must be used to inform.

This amendment calls for a bipartisan commission to study the use of intelligence related to Iraq. The commission would examine several key issues, including intelligence related to the following questions:

Earlier today I joined in a growing expression of concern by my colleagues and the American people about the representation of intelligence information by the President and the administration in building its case for the war in Iraq. Without a thorough explanation of why many of the administration's statements are in conflict, and have included claims unsubstantiated by the best intelligence, the American people, their representatives, and many of our would-be international partners in post-conflict Iraq, will most certainly begin to lose confidence in the administration's intelligence analysis, if not their word. Simply put, the Nation's credibility, in my view, is at stake.

This credibility is important for the security of the American people who have and continue to bear an enormously high cost, a heavy burden, in both life and treasure, with regard to our presence in Iraq. I know in my home State of New Jersey there have been seven soldiers who have been lost since the beginning of the conflict. It is something that impacts people's daily lives.

We stand with our troops. We stand with the mission they are trying to do, to bring about democracy, but we do have a right, and they have a right to have credibility with regard to the intelligence that is presented.

There have been a lot of accusations and allegations circulating in recent days. Some may be trying to politicize this debate. This amendment is an attempt to ensure that this debate does not become a political one, and that we focus in a bipartisan way on getting to the facts.

In my view, in order to preserve the public credibility of the United States, we need a thorough public review, one that is above politics, one with conclusions that will be regarded as credible and definitive, not only in the U.S. but around the world.

As we are now all well aware, in this year's State of the Union Address President Bush said:

The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa.

The power of the President's allegations in those 16 short words cannot be overstated. The Bush administration, using legalistic language, was leading people to embrace, at least in the opinion of many, the view that Saddam Hussein had an active nuclear program. The President did not say the British were claiming anything. He did not say they alleged anything. He said they ``learned'' that Saddam was attempting to buy uranium, implicitly accepting the charge as fact.

Although just 16 words long, it was a powerful statement that resonated in the context of debates that had gone on throughout the Nation and the world for nearly 5 months, in every public forum, the floor of the Senate, the halls of the United Nations, and across the airwaves. Only after many months did we the people and the Congress learn this statement was based on information that our own intelligence agency earlier learned was false. In fact, the administration's own spokesperson said the statement was inappropriate for the State of the Union address. And the Director of Central Intelligence has stated that: These 16 words should never have been included in the text written for the President.

Yesterday morning, Senator LEVIN, the distinguished ranking member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, raised several areas of particular concern, including: the aluminum tubes; the Iraq-al-Qaida connection; whether Iraq reconstituted nuclear weapons; whether Iraq possesses chemical and biological weapons; allegations of mobile biological warfare labs.

Furthermore, Senator LEVIN laid out seven questions about claims specifically regarding Iraq and the uranium. He argued that these should be answered in the context of a bipartisan investigation. I believe that is true, and I could not agree more.

This is not just a concern about the African uranium issue. It is about whether there was a fair and full presentation to the American people. But to that list of questions, I would add several others.

For example, if the information in the State of the Union Address was ``technically accurate,'' as administration officials have lately argued, why was it excluded in Secretary Powell's 90-minute presentation before the United Nations only 8 days later?

Also, why did we learn about the misleading nature of these comments, not from the administration, but from the International Atomic Energy Agency and the media?

This is not an academic matter. At stake is nothing less than the credibility of the United States, and that credibility is important for protecting the American

people. That credibility gets weakened each day we fail to have a full accounting of the facts about what happened, facts such as who knew that certain information was false? When did they know it? Why was it expunged from one administration speech but not another? And why are we just learning about much of this now?

Keep in mind, political leaders around the world, not just here at home, have staked their own reputations on their support of President Bush and the United States. As a consequence, many of our closest allies and their elected officials are facing enormous criticism from their own citizens, and sometimes--and this is quite telling--from their own political parties. We owe it not only to the American people but to all those who stood with us to be straight and to come clean immediately; otherwise, this episode will only undermine our ability to win support for other critical foreign policy interests in the future, and they are substantial. In fact, without a clear explanation, we put the American people at risk facing a world

where our partners question our credibility on many interconnected concerns: Korea, Iran, Syria, and the road map to peace in the Middle East.

We need to understand whether this is part of a broader pattern of selective release of information or just a series of unfortunate snafus. Last October, for example, during the Iraq debate, Secretary James Kelly was in Pyongyang, meeting with the North Koreans. At that meeting, a meeting that occurred a full week prior to the Senate vote on the resolution authorizing force in Iraq, the North Koreans admitted to an active nuclear program. Yet despite its importance and relevance to the debate regarding Iraq and America's national security posture generally, administration officials waited until after the Congress had voted on the resolution--6 days, by the way--to authorize the use of force before revealing the details of the North Korean disclosure.

To this Senator, that information was both relevant and timely to the Iraq debate. Was this information withheld because it might affect the tenor of the debate, or might impact the Congress's view of the Iraqi threat, or the relative view of the Iraq threat?

As Senator Levin and others have explained, there may have been other instances in which the administration selectively, in some form or another, misrepresented or withheld information to support their case for the war in Iraq.

For example, the administration claimed there were linkages between al-Qaida and Iraq. But many now believe those claims were overstated or exaggerated, and based on scant and circumstantial evidence.

Another widely discussed issue relates to Iraq's purchase of aluminum tubes, where there was considerable debate within the intelligence community about whether the tubes were intended for use as part of a nuclear program.

When these claims are added up, many people have concluded that the administration may have been seeking to win an argument--not inform the American public. And we need to know the truth. We need to be informed to make good decisions, to set priorities, to go forward, to protect the American people. The American people deserve to be informed accurately.

The commission I am proposing would be completely bipartisan. It would neither supplant nor interfere with ongoing Congressional reviews regarding the collection and analysis of intelligence related to Iraq.

So, again, I hope we can support this proposal. We need to ensure that the facts come out. We should do it on a bipartisan basis, and we should do it immediately. The safety and security of the American people are at stake.

Ms. STABENOW. Madam President, I rise to support the Corzine amendment. I think this is an incredibly important amendment to this important bill. In doing so, once again, as I have done before on this floor, I commend our service men and women who have served us so well in Iraq, as well as around the world.

However, I must rise today to express my deep concern about revelation after revelation of the fragile nature of the facts presented to the American public and the world about the reasons we had to preemptively, unilaterally attack Iraq.

Those misleading words in the President's State of the Union Address this past January have brought into question the credibility of our Government. This is extremely serious. It hurts our country because Iraq is not the only threat to our Nation, as the Senator from New Jersey indicated. We continue to be threatened by terrorists in emerging nuclear countries such as Iran and North Korea. In order to win the war on terrorism and ultimately disarm Iran and North Korea, we are going to have to work with NATO and other allies to protect American citizens.

Unfortunately, the misleading statements about Iraq attempting to purchase uranium from Niger will make building such coalitions even more difficult. This means our homeland will be less safe and our American citizens less secure. This is a deep concern of mine. I wish the misleading statements about Iraq and Niger were the only statements in question that the President and his administration have made to the American people. Unfortunately, there have been others.

First, let's go through what transpired with the statements on Iraq and Niger. Before the State of the Union referencing Iraqi purchases of uranium from Africa, the administration, at the direction of the CIA, took out a nearly identical line in a speech the President gave in Cincinnati last October justifying the use of force in Iraq. Then, the African uranium purchase was back in the State of the Union Address, although we were told now this was a mistake by the CIA director George Tenet. Then, the African reference was dropped from Secretary of State Powell's presentation on Iraqi weapons capabilities to the United Nations just 8 days later. Then, Saddam's nuclear weapons came back with certainty when Vice President Cheney appeared on Meet the Press in March and said, ``We believe he has, in fact, reconstituted nuclear weapons.''

This was one of the main assertions used that took us to war, and I believe the American people have a right to know which is it. If it was good intelligence, why the constant change of mind? Either Iraq had nuclear weapons or it didn't. If it was bad intelligence, who kept pushing to use it in the administration speeches and interviews? We need to know the answers to these questions. It is important for the credibility of our country and for the trust of the American people in our Government.

It does not end there. We heard much about specially-made aluminum tubes that could be used to build centrifuges to create weapons-grade uranium. In the same State of the Union where he referenced uranium purchases from Africa, President Bush also said: Our intelligence sources tell us that he has attempted to purchase high-strength aluminum tubes suitable for nuclear weapons production.

But, in fact, an unclassified intelligence assessment back in October stated some intelligence specialists ``believe that those tubes are probably intended for conventional weapons programs.''

U.N. Security Council that ``we all know there are differences of opinion,'' and that ``there is controversy about what these tubes are for.''

However, the International Atomic Energy Agency, after conducting its own study, concluded the uranium tubes were not for uranium enrichment.

Which is it? Enough time has gone by; we should have and are entitled to answers. We are entitled to the truth. Most importantly, the American people are entitled to the truth. Although we now have more than 140,000 troops in Iraq, we have not yet found chemical or biological weapons or even the plants needed to make them. We have not found evidence of al-Qaida training camps, although in the runup to the war the administration not only said they were there in Iraq but that they knew precise locations.

Again, this administration has taken us into a new age, an age where we claim the right to unilaterally, preemptively strike another nation because we believe our national survival is at stake. In such a world, the intelligence used as proof for striking first has to be unassailable, has to be totally credible, or the American people and our allies will be deeply suspicious of any future claims.

The claims led to decisions to put American men and women in harm's way and in too many instances have led to the loss of life. We need to find out the truth behind the various claims and questions, legitimate questions that have arisen, questions that have been asked by colleagues on both sides of the aisle, questions that have taken us into the deserts of Iraq and put our men and women in harm's way.

The only way we can get to the bottom of this is to set up an independent commission to get the facts, a bipartisan commission, a way to objectively look at what happened so it does not happen again.

There is nothing more serious than a potential nuclear threat to our people. If there was ever a need for an independent commission, it is now. We now

face potential nuclear threats from Iran, from North Korea. We could face more in the future. American families and our American troops deserve answers to the questions that have been raised. We all deserve answers. We all deserve the truth.

I hope my colleagues will join in support developing this independent commission. I believe nothing less than the credibility of our country is at stake. I hope we all join in supporting the Corzine amendment.

Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, I rise for a couple of minutes to compliment the distinguished Senator from Michigan for her very eloquent statement and for the leadership of the Senator from New Jersey, a member of the Foreign Relations Committee. Both Members have made their points very ably. I am grateful to both of them for their leadership in this effort.

The real question is, How do we assert the facts in the most logical and the most bipartisan manner? As we have seen on so many other occasions, the only way to ensure that is done with a public review of the information provided and all of the facts available to us is through this independent approach. The Intelligence Committee has done an outstanding job. I commend them for their session, even this afternoon as we speak, looking into the facts as they are presented from those within the intelligence community.

As Senator Rockefeller has noted on several occasions, they are constrained by their own understandable jurisdictional review and do not have the capacity to go beyond that jurisdictional review when issues involving other branches of the Government, other agencies of the executive branch, and certainly the White House itself, are involved.

So this affords an opportunity to do the right thing, to give the American people the confidence they need that we understand now what the facts are, what the story is, and how we can ensure as we make these judgments we are doing so with the very best policy and goals in mind.

I think this is a very worthy amendment. I think it ought to pass on an overwhelmingly bipartisan vote. I am hopeful we can do that this evening, and I am grateful to those who have committed to this amendment, and especially for the leadership of Senators STABENOW and CORZINE.

Mr. DAYTON. Mr. President, I rise also in support of Senator Corzine's amendment. Yesterday was a very grim day in Minnesota. We had the funeral service of the first Minnesotan to be killed in Iraq this year in the line of duty, PVT Edward James Herrgott. It is a grim reminder that 63 days after the President declared the hostilities almost over in Iraq, this young man lost his life on July 3, standing out in front, guarding the Baghdad Museum, the site where some of my colleagues and I had swept by, well protected, just 2 days before. He was killed, murdered by a sniper's bullet. At the age of 20, his life and all of its promise was snuffed out.

We learned last week from the Secretary of Defense that, in his judgment, the military presence, some major component of which will have to be from the United States--hopefully much less will be, when we do as we must, which is to internationalize the continued development and hopefully economic recovery in Iraq--but as long as there is going to be a presence there, United States troops are going to be a big part of that, and it is almost unavoidable under the circumstances, especially as they exist today, the number of men and women who have lost their lives since May 1--which stands now at 79--will only increase.

So, as Americans are faced, again and again, with a member of the family, a friend, an acquaintance, or just through the media a fellow citizen of that State, again and again they are going to be confronted with this question of, what are we doing in Iraq? What is the game plan to extricate our troops after achieving the success the military had so dramatically, remarkably in the 3 weeks it took from entering the country to sweeping into Baghdad with an incredible display of technology, the training, and most of all the dedication of those men and women who have really redefined the words ``courage'' and ``patriotism'' for this Senator.

They continue to labor there under the most extreme conditions, 115-degree temperatures, all the other difficulties that are manifest there, not to mention the life-threatening danger that so many of them are under day and night.

Given all that, I think it is imperative for our national security that we understand that we--all of us collectively in the Congress and the President, this administration--made what is the most momentous decision that can be made by this body and the administration, the decision whether or not to go to war--in this case, to initiate a war against another sovereign nation. To know that decision was made on accurate information from our intelligence operations, to me, is essential to our national security in the days and years ahead.

It is also essential to our democracy to know the information we are getting from our leaders is truthful, accurate, to the best of their knowledge. There are enough questions that have been raised that must be answered, and they must be answered with the truth and with the facts as that can be determined objectively and dispassionately to be.

I regret that the Senate Armed Services Committee, of which I am a member, is not going to be undertaking the bipartisan investigation into these issues as its counterpart, the Senate Intelligence Committee, has agreed to do. I think there has to be that kind of willingness on both sides of the aisle to seek the truth. I cannot understand why anybody would not want to find the truth and present it to the Members of this body and, even more importantly, to the American people. But that is a decision that evidently has been reached.

In the absence of that, I think this independent commission is essential. We owe it to ourselves. We owe it to the Private Herrgotts whose lives have been sacrificed in this endeavor. We owe it to the future men and women who will be over in Iraq, in future engagements, if necessary. We owe it, ultimately, to our country, our democracy, and to ourselves.

Mr. PENCE. Mr. Speaker, as Director George Tenet of the CIA comes to the Hill today, the debate will go on between whether U.S. intelligence agreed with the intelligence of our honored and treasured ally, Great Britain, over a particular transaction for enriched uranium in Africa. But there is no debate that Iraq had a nuclear weapons program that spanned nearly 3 decades.

Iraqi scientist Khidhir Hamza told U.S. officials after he fled Iraq in 1994 that he helped train a cadre of young scientists who would be capable of resuming Iraq's atomic weapons program as soon as the U.N. cut back inspections. He said the program was personally directed by Saddam since its inception 3 decades earlier and was aided and abetted by technology transferred from many Western nations.

And just 2 weeks ago, Mahdi Obeidi led U.S. authorities in Baghdad to dig up shrubbery in his backyard to find sophisticated parts and documents to support Saddam's nuclear weapons program.

While we debate agreements between intelligence agencies, let us remember that about which there is no debate: Saddam Hussein had a 30-year nuclear weapons program, and if he went forward unchecked, would have used it to blackmail and tyrannize the world.

Mr. DURBIN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

SEC. 8124. (a) LIMITATION ON AVAILABILITY OF CERTAIN FUNDS.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, of the amount appropriated by title VII of the Act under the heading ``INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT'', $50,000,000 may only be obligated after the President submits to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the role of Executive branch policymakers in the development and use of intelligence relating to Iraq and Operation Iraqi Freedom, including intelligence on--

(1) the possession by Iraq of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, and the locations of such weapons;

(4) the attempts of Iraq to procure aluminum tubes for the development of nuclear weapons;

(5) the possession by Iraq of mobile laboratories for the production of weapons of mass destruction;

(6) the possession by Iraq of delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction; and

(7) any other matters that bear on the imminence of the threat from Iraq to the national security of the United States.

(b) ADDITIONAL MATTERS ON URANIUM CLAIM.--The report on the matters specified in subsection (a)(3) shall also include information on which personnel of the Executive Office of the President, including the staff of the National Security Council, were involved in preparing, vetting, and approving, in consultation with the intelligence community, the statement contained in the 2003 State of the Union address of the President on the efforts of Iraq to obtain uranium from Africa, including the roles such personnel played in the drafting and ultimate approval of the statement, the full range of responses such personnel received from the intelligence community, and which personnel ultimately approved the statement.

(c) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DEFINED.--In this section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--

(1) the Committees on Appropriations, Armed Services, and Foreign Relations and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and

(2) the Committees on Appropriations, Armed Services, and International Relations and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

Mr. DURBIN. Madam President, yesterday as a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee, I sat through a 5-hour hearing with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Mr. George Tenet. It was one of the longest hearings I have ever been a party to in that committee. Virtually every member of the committee was present for the entire hearing. I think we can accurately draw the conclusion from that that it was a hearing of great importance because it addressed an issue which is central to our foreign policy and our national security, and that is the intelligence agencies of our Government.

We are asking now some very difficult but important questions along two lines. First, was the intelligence gathered before the United States invasion of Iraq accurate and complete? Secondly, was that information relayed and communicated to the American people in an honest and accurate fashion? Those are two separate questions that are related.

Yesterday, Director Tenet reiterated publicly what he has said before on July 11, that he accepted responsibility for the fact that in the President's State of the Union Address last January a sentence was included which was at best misleading. The sentence, of

course, related to whether or not Iraq had attempted to obtain uranium from the African nation of Niger. What I am about to say is not from the hearing yesterday but rather from public disclosures and press reports relative to that issue.

What we know is this: The allegations and rumors about Iraq obtaining uranium and other fissile materials from the country of Niger had been discussed at some length for a long period of time. In fact, documents had been produced at one point that some believed implicated the Iraqis and the Niger nation in this particular transaction. It is also true, though, that the people who are expert in this area had looked carefully and closely at that documentation and many had come to the opposite conclusion. Some had concluded this information, whether it was from British intelligence sources or American intelligence sources, was dubious, was not credible. Then it was disclosed that the documentation was actually a forgery.

Many of those documents have been made public. Yesterday a leading newspaper in Italy published the documentation and it was reported on the news channels last night in the United States that when those documents were carefully reviewed, it was found that, in fact, they contained things which on their face were ridiculous, names of ministers in Iraq and Niger who had not been in that position for years, supposedly official seals on documentation which, when examined closely, turned out to be patently false and phony.

So it was with that backdrop that the President, in his State of the Union Address, considered a statement concerning whether or not Niger had sold these fissile materials to Iraq.

It has been disclosed publicly and can be discussed openly on the Senate floor that there was communication between the Central Intelligence Agency and the White House on this issue. It is apparent now to those who have followed this story that there was a discussion and an agreement as to what would be included in the speech. The 16 famous words relative to this transaction have now become central in our discussion about the gathering and use of intelligence.

What I heard yesterday during the course of 5 hours with Director Tenet is that we have been asking the wrong question. The question we have been asking for some period of time now since this came to light was, Why didn't Director Tenet at the CIA stop those who were trying to put misleading information in the President's State of the Union Address? That is an important question. Director Tenet has accepted responsibility for not stopping the insertion of those words. But after yesterday's hearing and some reflection, a more important question is before the Senate. That question is this: Who are the people in the White House who are so determined to include this misleading information in the State of the Union Address and why are they still there?

That goes to the heart of the question, not just on the gathering of intelligence but the use of the intelligence by the Executive Office of the President. That is an important question. It is a question we should face head on.

An attempt was made last night by my colleague from New Jersey, Senator Corzine, to call for a bipartisan commission, a balanced commission, to look into this question about intelligence gathering and the use of the intelligence leading up to the war on Iraq. His amendment was defeated by a vote of 51 to 45 on a party-line vote--all Republicans voting against it; all Democrats supporting it. Senator Corzine's effort for a bipartisan, balanced, evenhanded commission was rejected by this Senate.

The amendment which I bring today offers to the Senate an alternative. If the Senate does not believe there should be a bipartisan commission to investigate this question, this use of intelligence, then what I have said in this amendment is that we are calling on the President to report to Congress, the appropriate committees in the classified and unclassified fashion, whether or not there was a misuse of intelligence leading up to the war on Iraq. Those are the only two options before the Senate.

In this situation, we have the Intelligence Committee in the House and the Senate looking at the classified aspect of this issue. We have said in the Senate that we do not accept the idea--at least, the Republican side does not accept the idea--of a bipartisan commission looking at this issue. So, clearly, the responsibility falls on the shoulders of the President.

This amendment says that the President will report to the appropriate committees of Congress on this use of the intelligence information.

Why is this an important discussion? It is particularly important from several angles. First, if we are engaged successfully in a war on terrorism, one of the greatest weapons in our arsenal will be intelligence. We will have to depend on our intelligence agencies to anticipate problems and threats to the United States. We will have to gather credible information, process that information, determine its credibility, determine its authenticity, and use it in defense of the United States. Now, more than ever, intelligence

Second, the President has said we are now following a policy of preemption; we will no longer wait until a country poses an imminent threat to the United States or our security. If the President and his administration believe a country may pose such a threat in the future, the President has said we are going to protect our right to attack that country to forestall any invasion or attack on the United States.

How do you reach the conclusion that another country is preparing to attack? Clearly, again, by intelligence gathering. Now, more than ever, in the war on terrorism and the use of a policy of preemption, we depend on intelligence. Those are the two central points.

Equally, if not more important, is what happened in the lead-up to the invasion of Iraq. For months, the President, the Vice President, and his Cabinet all sought to convince the American people this invasion of Iraq was not only inevitable but was, frankly, in the best interests of America's national security. The administration, the President, gathering the intelligence data, presented it to the American people in a variety of different fashions. We can all recall how this started. It was almost a year ago that in Crawford, TX, we first heard the President while he was in summer retreat suggest that something had to be done about Iraq and used the words ``regime change.''

Then, over the months that followed, a variety of different rationales came forward for the need to invade Iraq and remove Saddam Hussein. First and foremost--and nobody argued this point on either side of the aisle--Saddam Hussein was a very bad leader, not just for the people of Iraq but for the region and a threat to the world. His removal from power from the beginning was certainly something that everyone understood would be in the best interest of the people of Iraq.

But the obvious question was, if you are going to set out just to remove bad leaders of the world, where would you draw the line and what would those leaders do in response? So the administration said there are more arguments, even more compelling rationales.

First and foremost, in Iraq they were developing nuclear weapons. We recall that conversation. As evidence of that, administration officials talked about the fact that Iraq had obtained certain aluminum tubes that could likely be used for the development of new nuclear weapons.

Now, in fact, we know on reflection that there was even a debate within the administration whether these aluminum tubes could be used for nuclear weapons. Despite that, the administration said categorically, we believe they will be used for nuclear weapons and we believe that is a rationale for the invasion.

Second, on other weapons of mass destruction, chemical and biological weapons, the administration went so far in its presentation to suggest that there were 550 sites where there was at least some possibility of weapons of mass destruction. They went into detail about how these weapons could threaten Israel, could threaten other countries in the region, might even threaten the United States. That information was given repeatedly.

invasion of Iraq. More than 1,000 inspections have been made in Iraq. No weapons of mass

destruction have been found. There has been some small evidence related to the discovery of something buried in a rose garden that could have been a plan for the use of a nuclear device. There has been the discovery of these mobile units in trailers which might have been used for the development of biological weapons. Those things have been discovered but of the so-called 550 sites, the fact is we have not discovered or uncovered one as I stand here today.

I am confident before this is over that we will find some evidence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. It could happen as soon as tomorrow. I think that will happen. I believe that will happen. But we were told we were dealing with 550 sites. Statements were made by the President, the Vice President, Ms. Condoleezza Rice and others, that Saddam Hussein had arsenals of chemical and biological weapons. They have not been apparent.

To think in that lightning-fast conquest of Baghdad, somehow Saddam Hussein had the time to literally wipe away or destroy any evidence of weapons of mass destruction strains credulity.

What we have now is a serious question as to whether the intelligence was valid and accurate or whether it was portrayed to the American people in a valid and accurate way.

We also had allegations that Saddam Hussein was linked with al-Qaida. Of course, this is something of great concern to the American people. We know that the al-Qaida terrorists are responsible for September 11, the loss of at least 3,000 innocent American lives on that tragic day. We would and should do what we can in any way, shape, or form to eliminate al-Qaida's threat to terrorism.

I joined the overwhelming majority of the Senate, giving the President the authority and power to move forward on this question as to whether or not we should eliminate al-Qaida and its terrorist threat. The fact is, now, as we reflect on that information provided by the administration prior to the invasion of Iraq, there is scant information and scant evidence to link Saddam Hussein and al-Qaida.

The list goes on. It has raised serious questions about the intelligence gathering leading up to the invasion of Iraq and the portrayal of that information to the American people. There is nothing more sacred or important in this country than that we have trust in our leaders when it comes to the critical questions of national security. When a President of the United States, with all of his power and all of his authority, stands before the American people and says: I am asking you to provide me your sons, your daughters, your husbands, your wives, your loved ones, to stand in defense of America--that, I think, is the most solemn moment of a Presidency. That is what is being questioned now. Was the information, for example, in the State of the Union Address, accurate in terms of America's intelligence? Two weeks ago the President conceded at least that sentence was not.

What I have asked for in this amendment is that the Bush White House come forward with information on the gathering and use of this intelligence. With this information, they will be able to tell us with more detail exactly how the intelligence was used, intelligence related to the possession by Iraq of chemical and biological and nuclear weapons and locations, the links of the former Iraqi regime to al-Qaida, the attempts of Iraq to acquire uranium from Africa, the attempts of Iraq to procure aluminum tubes for the development of nuclear weapons, the possession by Iraq of mobile laboratories for the production of weapons of mass destruction, and the possession by Iraq of delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction, and any other matters that bear on the imminence of the threat from Iraq to the national security of the United States.

I go into particular detail in paragraph B of this amendment where it relates to the acquisition of uranium from Africa because I think this has become abundantly clear. Some person or persons in the White House were bound and determined to include language in the President's State of the Union Address which was misleading, language which the President has disavowed, language which in fact Director Tenet said should never have been included.

When you look at the uranium claims that were made in the President's State of the Union Address, and then read the statements made afterwards by members of the Bush White House, we can see on their face that we need to know more. Bush Communications Director Dan Bartlett, discussing the State of the Union Address, said last week that:

There was no debate or questions with regard to that line when it was signed off on.

I will tell you point blank that is not factual, based on statements made by Director Tenet.

On Friday, July 11 of this year, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice said there was ``discussion on that specific sentence so that it reflected better what the CIA thought.''

Director Tenet said Friday that CIA officials objected and ``the language was changed.''

White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer said Monday, July 14, that Miss Rice was not referring to the State of the Union speech, but she was, instead, referring to President Bush's October speech given in Cincinnati--even though Miss Rice was not asked about that speech.

We have a situation here where the President and his advisers and speech writers were forewarned in October not to include in a speech in Cincinnati any reference to the acquisition of uranium by Iraq from the nation of Niger or from Africa. That admonition was given to a member of the White House staff and that element was deleted from the President's speech.

Now we have statements from the President's National Security Adviser suggesting that there was still some discussion that needed to take place when it came to the State of the Union Address. I will tell you that is not a fact. This amendment which I am offering is asking that we have final clarity on exactly what happened in the White House on this critical piece of information that was part of the President's most important speech of the year, his State of the Union Address.

White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer also said on Monday, July 14, that while the line cut from the October speech in Cincinnati was based on Niger allegations, the State of the Union claim was based on ``additional reporting from the CIA, separate and apart from Niger, naming other countries where they believed it was possible that Saddam was seeking uranium.''

But Fleischer's words yesterday contradicted his assertion a week earlier that the State of the Union charge was ``based and predicated on the yellowcake from Niger.''

Consider the confusion and distortions which we have already received from this administration about that line in the speech, and what it was referring to. That is a clear indication that more information is needed, more clarity is needed. We need from the President leadership in clearing this up and, frankly, clearing out those individuals who attempted to mislead him in his State of the Union Address.

Miss Rice was asked a month ago about the President's State of the Union uranium claim on ABC's ``This Week,'' and here is what she replied:

The intelligence community did not know at the time or at levels that got to us that there was serious questions about this report.

But senior administration officials acknowledged over the weekend that Director Tenet argued personally to White House officials, including Deputy National Security Adviser, Stephen Hadley, who is in the office of Condoleezza Rice, that the allegations should not be used in the October Cincinnati speech, 4 months before the State of the Union Address.

CIA officials raised doubts about the Niger claims, as Director Tenet outlined on July 11, last Friday. The last time was when ``CIA officials reviewing the draft remarks'' of the State of the Union ``raised several concerns about the fragmentary nature of the intelligence with National Security Council colleagues.''

Here is what it comes down to. We now have a battle ongoing within the administration over the issue of gathering and use of intelligence. The American people deserve more. They

deserve clarity. They deserve the President's disclosure. They deserve the dismissal of those responsible for putting this misleading language in the President's State

of the Union Address. I think what is at stake is more than a little political embarrassment which this administration has faced over the last several days. What is at stake is the gathering and use of intelligence for the security of the United States of America.

This issue demonstrates the administration's intelligence-derived assertions about Iraq's levels of weapons of mass destruction-related activities raised increased concern about the integrity and use of intelligence and literally the credibility of our Government.

We now know that when Secretary Colin Powell, the Secretary of State, was to make his address to the United Nations several days after the President's State of the Union Address, he sat down and, it has been reported in U.S. News and World Report, for a lengthy gathering with Director Tenet at CIA headquarters and went through point by point by point to make certain that he would not say anything in New York at the United Nations which could be easily rebutted by the Iraqis. Secretary Powell wanted to be careful that every word that he used in New York was defensible. And one of the first things he tossed out was that element of the President's State of the Union Address which related to acquiring uranium from Africa.

Secretary Powell took the time and, with the right advisers, reached the right conclusion that certain things being said about Iraq that were being hyped and spun and exaggerated could not be defended. And he was not about to go before the United Nations Security Council and to use that information. He was careful in what he did because he knew what was at stake was not only his personal credibility but the credibility of the United States. That is why this incident involving the State of the Union Address is so important for us to look into.

On the question of weapons of mass destruction, on August 26 of last year, Vice President Cheney said:

Simply stated, there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction. There is no doubt he is amassing them to use against our friends, against our allies, and against us.

Intelligence gathered by this and other governments leaves no doubt that the Iraq regime continues to possess and conceal some of the most lethal weapons ever devised.

We know where they are. They're in the area around Tikrit and Baghdad and east, west, south, and north somewhat.

Not only did the administration tell us that there were over 500 suspected sites Secretary Donald Rumsfeld was even specific as to their location.

Here we are 10 weeks later and 1,000 inspections later with no evidence of those weapons of mass destruction.

On the al-Qaida connection, last year Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld described evidence about a connection between Iraq and al-Qaida as ``bulletproof.'' But he did not disclose that the intelligence community was, in fact, uncertain about the nature and extent of these ties.

In his speech before the United Nations Security Council on February 5, 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell said, in addition to the al-Qaida-affiliated camp run by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in areas not controlled by the Iraqi regime, two dozen extremists from al-Qaida-affiliated organizations were operating freely in Baghdad.

The claim of a close connection between the Iraqi regime and al-Qaida was key to the fears that Iraq could team up with terrorists to perpetrate another devastating attack on the United States. It is critical that the truth of these assertions be examined in light of what the United States has found during and after the war.

On the issue of reconstituting its nuclear weapons program in addition to the dispute about whether Iraq was trying to acquire uranium from Africa, the intelligence community was divided about these aluminum tubes that Iraq purchased and whether they were, in fact, intended to develop nuclear devices or only conventional munitions. Administration officials made numerous statements, nevertheless, expressing certainty that these tubes were for a nuclear weapons program.

In a speech before the United Nations General Assembly on December 12, 2003, the President said,

Iraq has made several attempts to buy high-strength aluminum tubes used to enrich uranium for a nuclear weapon.

On September 8, 2000, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice said on CNN's ``Late Edition'' that the tubes ``are only really suited for nuclear weapons programs, centrifuge programs.''

On August 26, Vice President Dick Cheney told the Veterans of Foreign Wars that ``many of us are convinced that Saddam will acquire nuclear weapons fairly soon. Just how soon we cannot gauge.''

Consider these assertions and these statements leading up to our decision to invade. The hard question which has to be asked is whether the intelligence supported the statements. If the intelligence did not, then in fact we have exaggerated misleading statements which have to be made part of our record.

On the question of mobile biological warfare laboratories, Secretary of State Powell said in his speech to the United Nations Security Council that ``we know that Iraq has at least seven of these mobile, biological agent factories.''

document it prepared with the Defense Intelligence Agency entitled ``Iraqi Mobile Biological Warfare Agent Production Plants.'' This report concluded that the two trailers found in Iraq were for biological warfare agent production, even though other experts and members of the intelligence community disagreed with that conclusion, or believe there is not enough evidence to back it up. None of these alternative views were posted on the CIA's Web page.

Did this Nation go to war based on flawed, incomplete, exaggerated, or misused intelligence?

I am a member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, which is conducting this review. I support that review because there is a lot we need to get into. We have oversight responsibilities over the intelligence agencies.

I commend our Chairman, Senator Roberts, and our ranking member, Senator Rockefeller, on that committee. They have requested that the Inspectors General of the Department of State and the Central Intelligence Committee work jointly to investigate the handling and characterization of the underlying documentation behind the President's statement in the State of the Union Address. I certainly support that investigation.

But the question of how intelligence related to Iraq was used by policymakers is a different question that simply must be determined.

What we are saying now is if the Senate, as it did last night, rejects the idea of a bipartisan commission to look into the question, at the very least we should say in this Department of Defense appropriations bill that the President has a responsibility to report to Congress on this use of intelligence and information. It really goes to the heart of the President's responsibility as the head of our country and as Commander in Chief. He needs to have people near and around him giving him the very best advice based on the best intelligence. It is not only good for his administration, but it is essential for the protection of this Nation.

Mr. STEVENS. Madam President, before the Senator leaves, I wish to say categorically that had I been the Vice President of the United States, based upon the intelligence briefings that I have participated in now for over 20 years, I would have made exactly the same statements the Vice President made.

I believe sincerely that the record of history shows clearly that Iraq has tried to acquire and did acquire nuclear capability in the past. The Israelis destroyed it once. We know he was trying again to reestablish them.

them on the Iranians. He used them on the Kurds. Gas is a weapon of mass destruction.

There is also no question at all that he had the vehicles to transport weapons of mass destruction. Why did he build the vehicles if he didn't have them?

This nit-picking at the language that was used--it was used, we now know, in error in terms of veracity as far as the reliance upon the concept of what the British had because it was later disclosed that one of the things they had was a forged document. Why did the United Nations, 17 times, ask to examine that country to find the weapons of mass destruction if the world did not believe he was after weapons of mass destruction, after he used them on the Iranians more than 15 years ago? They bombed the plant that absolutely had the reactor in it. And we knew he had weapons then.

I have to say that when we look at what has happened, when our troops went into those barracks after the war commenced, they found that the Iraqis had special masks to protect them against weapons of mass destruction. We don't have those kinds of weapons.

The Senator is a member of the Intelligence Committee. I am reliably informed that at a classified session yesterday he asked CIA Director George Tenet the very questions which he has asked on the floor, and he received the answers. Some of the Members don't like the answers, but they received them. Had Director Tenet took responsibility for a mistake in his agency--clearly he had problems about the way that document was handled and in terms of the speech.

This is the third time this has come up now on this bill. This amendment would fence the Community Management Agency of the CIA, one of the most important and vital works of the agency. It would take $50 million from them.

I am not going to do it now, but sometime in the future I am going to ask the Senator whether he believes that he never had weapons of mass destruction. Does he believe Iraq never had weapons of mass destruction? Does he believe there was no reason to go in there and do what we did?

The problem is this amendment standing alone would deny the following programs funding:

Assistant Director of the CIA to allocate their collection efforts against terrorists and other high-priority target activities. This is their central community program.

Talking about the intelligence community, one of them is the National Drug Intelligence Center's Analysis of Information for Narcotraffickers--a vital concept that deals with counterterrorism activities.

The second is the National Counterintelligence Oversight Analysis Assessment of Vulnerabilities to Foreign Intelligence Services.

The next is efforts to improve the intelligence community's expertise in foreign languages.

This was identified as the key unmet need by the joint inquiry that investigated the 9/11 activities.

In order to make his point on this concept, the Senator again seeks to fence off $50 million for those vital activities. I hope the Senate listens to us about what he is willing to do in order to make this statement again.

I shall move to table this amendment. But, again, I have been asked this question many times personally at home by the press and by family friends. Some of us are exposed to intelligence at a very high level of Government. We can't come out and talk about it.

I noticed in the paper yesterday that some of our people because of this issue are starting to ``lip off'' about intelligence matters that should be classified. The Senate and the Congress should come back to order on that. We are allowed access to classified information--and to have us, because of some question about one phrase in the President's speech, suddenly decide that classification means nothing,

Now, Senator Inouye and I have been involved in extremely classified information for years. As a matter of fact, at our request, there was what we call a ``tank'' built in our building so we could have those people come visit us and we would not have to go out and visit the CIA or the other intelligence agencies. And we do listen to them.

Based on everything I have heard--everything I have heard; and the two of us have shared the chairmanship of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, which is defense intelligence related, since 1981--everything I have heard convinces me, without question, that Iraq tried to develop a program of weapons of mass destruction, and did, in fact, have weapons of mass destruction. And we were justified--just as the Israelis were over 15 years ago when they went in and bombed one plant--we were justified to go in and just absolutely disestablish that administration because it had rebuked the U.N. 17 times in terms of the attempt to locate those weapons of mass destruction and to do what Saddam Hussein agreed he would do after the Persian Gulf war. He agreed to destroy them. He admitted he had them. He agreed to destroy them. And we tried to prove he destroyed them. Now, what is all this question about whether he had them? Because he admitted he had them.

It is time we settle down and get back to the business of providing the money for the men and women in uniform around the world, and to ensure that the people who conduct our intelligence activities have the money to do what they have to do.

The extended debate on this floor about intelligence activities because of that one 17- or 16-word--I don't remember--the small phrase in the President's State of the Union message is starting to really have an impact on the intelligence-collecting activities of this country. We do not want to besmirch that. We have the finest intelligence service in the world. If someone made a mistake--and now it has been admitted there was a mistake; not in whether or not he was trying to put together his nuclear weapons program--the mistake was in reference to what the British did have; and it was later found that the foundation for what the British thought they had was a forged document.

Intelligence is absolutely essential to a nation that bases its capability to maintain peace on force projection, and we have to rely on many people to provide us information. Human beings make mistakes. God forbid that anyone would ever say because of one mistake we should harness the core efforts of our intelligence efforts and deny them the money this bill has for them to proceed until this commission, which the Senator wants to create, reports. I cannot believe we would delay the release of these funds for those reasons.

The ongoing efforts of the Intelligence Committee are known. The Senator is a member of the Intelligence Committee. We who are members of the Subcommittee on Defense Appropriations have access to everything they have access to, because we manage the money that finances the agencies they investigate. So there is a whole series of us here who have access to extremely classified information.

We classify it primarily because there are so many people involved that many lives might be in jeopardy if we disclose the sources of that information or we disclose the impact of

that information in terms of the relationship to some of the programs we are funding today.

I urge the Senate to settle down. I urge the Senate to settle down. We do not need this continued debate about the words in that State of the Union message. That is history, and it is going to be examined in terms of politics in the future.

Now we had arranged the schedule this morning so we could conduct our business and still start the markup of four separate appropriations bills. I must be absent now as chairman of the committee for a period of time.

I move to table the Senator's amendment, and I ask unanimous consent that the vote on that occur at a time to be determined by the majority leader after consultation with the minority leader. At the time of the stacking of votes on this and other amendments, I shall seek approval for a recorded vote on this amendment.

Mr. DAYTON. Madam President, reserving the right to object, I ask what the Senator's intention is regarding the schedule right now after the Senator concludes his remarks?

Mr. STEVENS. Madam President, I have a motion to table. Has the motion to table been accepted by the Chair?

Mr. STEVENS. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the time for that vote be determined by the majority leader after consultation with the minority leader.

Mr. REID. Madam President, I reserve the right to object. The Senator from Illinois is also a member of the Appropriations Committee, but he wants to have an opportunity to respond.

Mr. REID. He can do it any way he chooses. We are not going to have a vote right away, so he can attempt to have the floor. I wonder if the Senator from Alaska would--we have no right to object in any way to the motion to table, but the Senator from Illinois has more to say.

Mr. STEVENS. I have no objection if the Senator wishes to respond. I wish to get my motion to table on the record, and I am happy for the Senator to speak after that motion in relationship to the amendment. I have no problem with that. I just want to get my part of this business done so I can go chair that committee markup.

Mr. STEVENS. Is there an objection to my request that the motion to table vote be postponed until a time certain to be determined by the majority leader after consultation with the minority leader?

Mr. STEVENS. I am prepared to yield the floor, and you can talk as much as you want.

Mr. REID. Madam President, before the distinguished chairman of the Appropriations Committee leaves the floor, the Senator from Minnesota asked a question: What are we going to do now? We have a number of amendments lined up.

We are not going to do those because the two managers of this bill are members, of course, of the Appropriations Committee, as are Senator Durbin and myself.

I would be prepared to make a request that after Senator Durbin makes his remarks there be a period for morning business during which the Senator from North Dakota may be able to speak for up to 30 minutes on a matter not related to this bill.

Mr. REID. Reserving the right to object, the Senator from Wyoming wishes to speak for 10 minutes, I am told, on the bill itself.

Mr. REID. The Senator from North Dakota has no objection to him going first, he being the Senator from Wyoming.

Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senator from Wyoming have 10 minutes to speak on the bill, and following that time, the Senator from North Dakota have 30 minutes as in morning business, and following that the Senator from----

Mr. DAYTON. I would like to speak on Senator Durbin's amendment. I would agree to 5 minutes.

Mr. STEVENS. Could it be that we agree to 30 minutes of debate pertaining to matters relating to this amendment, notwithstanding the motion to table has been made? Is that agreeable? That will give us enough time to get back.

Mr. REID. Also, Mr. President, if I could, Senator Kennedy is going to be here at around 11 o'clock. Of course, that has slipped.

Mr. REID. He will offer the next amendment. Perhaps then Senator Byrd will. Really, we are narrowing the number of amendments that are going to be offered.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I don't know what the Senate would do without the assistance of the distinguished Democratic whip. We have in history Light Horse Harry, and this is our ``Heavy Horse'' Harry. He does the heavy work around here, and we all appreciate him.

Mr. DURBIN. Madam President, pursuant to the unanimous consent agreement, I can assure my colleagues I will not take 30 minutes. I will be extremely brief because I already stated my case in support of this amendment. But I would like to respond to the Senator from Alaska.

He and I have had some titanic struggles on this floor over a variety of issues, but I have the highest regard and respect for him personally. I am certain he did not mean to suggest nor did he say I have disclosed any classified information in my statement this morning. I would not do that, not knowingly. What I have disclosed to the Senate, in preparation for a vote on this amendment, has all been a matter of public record and published information.

There are many other things I have learned as a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee to which I can't make reference, because it is classified and very important, that remain classified. But I don't know which bill you would go to if you didn't go to the Defense Department bill to deal with questions of intelligence. It is one of the few, if only, bills coming before the Senate relating to intelligence gathering. We don't have a full blown discussion here about appropriations for the Central Intelligence Agency and all the intelligence aspects of the Federal Government. It is a carefully guarded secret of our Government as to how much is being spent and how it is spent. Many people have objected to that over the years. I understand their objections. I also understand the wisdom that we try to keep in confidence exactly what we are doing to gather information to protect America. About the only place where we openly discuss the funding of intelligence is in this bill. If you don't come to this floor on this bill to suggest that we can do a better job in gathering intelligence to protect America, then, frankly, there is no other appropriations bill to which you can turn.

I assume you might argue that the Department of Homeland Security, our new Department, has some aspects of intelligence. Maybe that argument can be made. But the most compelling argument is on this bill, the Department of Defense bill. That is why this amendment is not superfluous or out of line. This is where the amendment needs to be offered because what we are saying is, America is only as safe as the men and women who are protecting it, men and women who are in uniform, literally putting their lives on the line, and men and women working for our Government gathering information so that we can anticipate threats and make certain we protect the people.

What I have said in this amendment is we, clearly, know now that in the President's State of the Union Address statements were made which the President has disavowed as not being accurate and which the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency has said should not have been included because they were misleading. That is a critical element.

We gather across this Rotunda in the House of Representatives once a year, the combined membership of the House and the Senate, the Cabinet, the Supreme Court, the diplomatic corps, to hear the President deliver the State of the Union Address. It is his most important speech of the year. He outlines to the people the accomplishments of our Nation and the challenges we face.

This President came before us last January in an atmosphere leading up to an invasion of Iraq, a war. I don't think there is any more serious undertaking by a government than to say we are going to war. We are asking our citizens to put their lives on the line for the security of America. The President came to the people with that message.

We now know that at least one major part of that message--they say it is only 16 words but it was a major part of his message--was not accurate.

There is no evidence of that whatsoever. I have not heard a single person say he intentionally misled the American people in making that statement. But I will tell you this, there were people in that White House who should have known better. They had been warned 4 months before not to use the same reference in a speech the President was giving in Cincinnati. They had been told by the CIA that the

information was not credible, could not be believed, should not be stated by the President of the United States, and that section was removed from the President's speech in October.

Those same people in the White House, bound and determined to put that language in the President's State of the Union Address, put in misleading language which attributed this information not to our intelligence, because our intelligence had disavowed it, discredited it, said we can't believe it.

No, they attributed it to British intelligence. Our people believed the British intelligence had been wrong from the start and yet we allowed that to be included in the speech.

Across America and around the world, people heard our President say that Iraq was acquiring uranium--or attempting to--from Niger in Africa to develop nuclear weapons. That is a serious charge. It is as serious as any charge that has been made against Saddam Hussein's regime. Someone in the White House decided they would cut a corner and allow the President to say this by putting in that phrase ``based on British intelligence.''

I would think the President would be angered over the disservice done to him by members of his staff. I would think the President would acknowledge the fact that even if Director Tenet could not discourage that member of the White House staff and stop them from putting in that language, the President has within his ranks on his staff some person who was willing to spin and hype and exaggerate and cut corners on the most important speech the President delivers in any given year.

That is inexcusable. This amendment says that this President will report to Congress on exactly what happened in reference to that State of the Union Address, that finally we will know the names of the people involved, that they will be held accountable for this misconduct which has caused such embarrassment, not just to the President, not just to his party, but to our Nation.

We need to be credible in the eyes of the world. When statements such as the one made by the President are clearly disavowed by the President, it affects our credibility.

Last night we tried to create an independent bipartisan commission to look into this question in an honest fashion. It was rejected on a party-line vote with every Republican voting against it.

Now I have taken the second option. Now we call on the President himself. Harry Truman from Independence, MO, used to say ``the buck stops here,'' when it comes to the President. The buck has stopped on the President's desk. The question is, What will he do to establish his credibility, to make certain that the next State of the Union Address is one that is credible in the United States and around the world and to make sure those people who misused the power of their office to lead him to make those misleading statements are removed once and for all?

It is a painful chapter in American history but it is one we cannot avoid. So long as it is unresolved, there will be a shadow over the intelligence gathering and use of this administration. That is not in the best interest of national security. It is not in the best interest of the people.

We in Congress have our responsibility, as a coequal branch of Government, to enforce oversight and to make certain that the American people are well served.

Mr. DAYTON. Following the custom of alternating back and forth, I am prepared to defer to my colleague from Wyoming. I would like to inquire as to his intentions to speak.

Mr. THOMAS. Madam President, my understanding was that I was going to have 10 minutes, then we would go to Senator Conrad, and then the Senator from Minnesota.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. It is correct that the Senator from Wyoming has 10 minutes, to be followed by the Senator from Minnesota.

Mr. REID. Is the consent agreement, as interpreted by the Chair, that the two morning business matters will be completed prior to debate on the motion to table? That seems a little unusual.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wyoming is speaking on the amendment for up to 10 minutes.

Mr. DAYTON. I have asked unanimous consent that following the conclusion of the remarks of the Senator from Wyoming, I might speak on the amendment for 10 minutes.

Mr. THOMAS. Madam President, I rise to discuss similarly what our floor leader said a few moments ago in terms of this bill before us. We are here to talk about the Defense appropriations. We have gone on now for a couple of days focusing on this matter of uranium from Africa. It seems to me that we need to focus on the issue that is before us and that is supporting our troops where they are, the Defense appropriations that we have, and probably the most important, certainly the largest appropriations that is before us.

I have been listening now for some days and listening to the media, the charge that the 16 words President Bush uttered during his January State of the Union have been false. This is what he said:

The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa.

That is what was said. So we say this may be false because in fact the British Government continues to stand by the assertion even if the CIA does not. So what Mr. Bush said about what the British believed was true in January, and it is still true today. That is what the British believed.

Now do we need to take a look at our intelligence system? Of course, that is very important to us. But anyone who thinks every piece of intelligence is going to have certified truthfulness behind it, of course, is being naive. Because that is not the way things work.

It is so clear this is so political that it really is kind of hard to accept. In fact, there are ads out now, political ads, assailing the President's credibility, and they go ahead and quote what the President said. But interestingly enough, they leave off the words ``the British government has learned.''

They leave those off. Doesn't this give you some feeling that we are taking this a little more politically than we are anything else? It seems to me that is the case. We are here now and this whole matter of weapons of mass destruction is an issue we are all concerned about. But this matter of uranium is not the reason we are in Iraq. Saddam Hussein used chemical weapons on his own people, his neighbors. Clearly, the production facilities were making chemical and biological weapons. There is no question about that.

In September 1980, Iraq invaded Iran, and Iraq used chemical weapons. In 1988, chemical weapons were used against Iraqi Kurdish, killing 5,000 Kurds. After Operation Desert Storm, February 18, 1991, in the terms of the cease-fire, Iraq accepted the conditions of the U.N. Security Council resolution. That resolution required Iraq to fully disclose and permit the dismantling of the weapons of mass destruction. That did not happen. That is why we are there.

This idea of leading us off the track because of the uranium is not really the issue. Should we look at our intelligence system? Of course. We do that constantly. But we don't need to take away the dollars that are in this bill for those agencies while we take a look at it. There is nothing more important in the world today than to have intelligence.

I just think we need to cut through some of the things that have been going on here and we need to get down to what issues there are that affect our defense and the American people and deal with those. Politics is fine, but this is not the place to continuously

use items that are obviously just political and try to take away the credibility of the President, which is one of his greatest assets, and I understand that. I understand that we are in an election cycle and so on. I really think it is time to deal with the important issues. We are having hearings. I think we need to move on and deal with the issues before us--to continue to clean up the situation in Iraq, look for peaceful solutions. That is really what it is all about.

I will not take any more time. For a couple of days, I have been listening to this constant recital of the same sort of thing. It seems to me it is pretty clear where we are. We are in Iraq for a number of reasons, this being a very slight impact on the decisionmaking. What we are really intent on doing is getting on with these appropriations bills, supporting our military, providing a strong military so we can continue to do the things we have to do. But this idea of continuing to try to contain an issue and make it something more than it really is seems to me to be worn out.

I hope we can move forward. We have a lot to do. We need to deal with the issues that are before us. I don't think this particular amendment is useful. We already have a system for looking at this. Withholding money pending a third-party operation simply doesn't make sense. I hope we will table this amendment.

Mr. DAYTON. I fully concur with my colleague that we need to conclude our work on this bill. This is the third day we have been on this matter. There are several hundred billion dollars involved; it is one of the most costly measures we consider every year. The majority leader said we will complete work on the bill tonight. I expect we will do so with that instruction. I am prepared to stay late, as others of my colleagues are, to talk about these issues. I cannot think of anything that is more profoundly important to this country today and to the future of this Nation and to the world today and to the future of the world than what we are addressing, which is the circumstances that caused the President of the United States to make, as my colleague from Illinois said, an onerous and fateful decision to start a war, doing something that was unprecedented in our Nation's history--to initiate a war against another country, invade another country.

Now, there may be other reasons cited for doing so, but under international law, under the U.N. Charter, of all the reasons cited by the administration for this action, the one that has no credence is the threat of an immediate and urgent attack against the United States by weapons of mass destruction with the missile capability to deliver them. That is what was stated and implied on a frequent basis by members of the administration last fall.

This is not about one 16-word inclusion in the President's State of the Union speech, as important as that is. This is about questions, as the Senator from Illinois said, that dictated the actions or influenced the actions of Congress last October in voting to give the President the authority to initiate military action, which the President followed through on 6 months later, for which we have 145,000 sweltering Americans in Iraq today. I was there 2 weeks ago in 115-degree temperatures. If anything, they are even hotter than that at this point in time. Some of those incredibly brave young men and women won't come home to their families and friends alive. They will give the ultimate sacrifice on behalf of their country.

So these are profound matters. I commend my colleague from Illinois for his careful choice of words and his reasoned approach to these matters, in recognition of his position on the Senate Intelligence Committee, his restraint in sharing only unclassified information to support his amendment, which I am proud to support myself.

We have tried on this side of the aisle in the last days to strike some bipartisan agreements about how to address matters of disclosure of financial expenditures for this military undertaking. We talked with the distinguished chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee about where the money is in this bill for the purposes of the ongoing military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The chairman informed us that 2 days ago, in the 2003 supplemental appropriations, those funds were provided that are being drawn down for the purpose of conducting these military operations in those two countries and we should expect another supplemental appropriations request to be forthcoming early in the next calendar year. That same day, however, the comptroller for the Department of Defense was quoted as saying there remains only $4 billion in that account. Given the statement of the Secretary of Defense to our Senate Armed Services Committee the week before that we are spending, on a monthly basis, $4.8 billion in Iraq and Afghanistan combined, it is quite obvious that that $4 billion is going to last them less than another month.

So we have tried and we have not been as successful as we should be because it ought to be transparent to this body exactly what is being spent, where it is being spent, and we ought to be appropriating, as others have pointed out--Senator Byrd first and foremost among them--that we ought to be doing this through proper channels.

Yesterday, as the Senator from Illinois said, we tried to get an agreement for a bipartisan independent commission that would be established and that would bring, it is my conception, the distinguished senior Americans, those whose credibility and integrity and experience and wisdom are unquestioned and would bring forth for the benefit of this body, but most importantly for the benefit of all the American people, what are the facts in these questions that have been raised and how do they instruct us in terms of the veracity of our intelligence information and the veracity of our political leaders.

Yesterday there was an editorial in the Washington Post which stated just that. It said: ``Wait for the facts.'' It cited the President's remarks in his State of the Union Address, the 16-word sentence that has received so much attention. It went on to say:

If so, that would represent one of several instances in which administration statements on Iraq were stretched to reflect the most aggressive interpretation of the intelligence.

That, I believe, is a carefully phrased way of saying what I said earlier in my remarks. There were several times last fall when the implication was made or the assertion was stated that these weapons of mass destruction were not only developed but were poised to be used against the United States and that they constituted an immediate and urgent threat to our national security which, as I said before, both under U.N. charter and international law, is the single legal basis for the United States to invade another country: The threat of imminent attack or the actual attack itself.

As the most powerful nation in the world, the one that has led the way for over the last half century in not starting wars--finishing wars successfully, but not starting them--for us to engage in now the first of what the President has articulated as the doctrine of preemption, where we will initiate those wars, we will attack first, in the judgment of this Senator is a very unwise course which will dangerously destabilize the world if it becomes the normal practice of nations, other than the United States--and we have to expect it will--to launch those kinds of attacks.

Last August, before the Veterans of Foreign Wars in Nashville, Vice President Cheney said:

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in September in Atlanta said that American intelligence had ``bulletproof'' evidence of links between al-Qaida and the government of President Saddam Hussein of Iraq.

In each case, officials have offered no details to back up those assertions. Mr. Rumsfeld said today doing so would jeopardize the lives of spies and dry up sources of information.

As was stated by a couple of my colleagues, we have to rely on this hidden information which can be alluded to, to prove just about any point anybody wants to make, but we cannot know the facts.

in the Chicago Tribune, for invasion, emphasizing the notion Hussein could strike the United States first and inflict ``massive and sudden horror.''

Finally, Secretary Rumsfeld, again testifying before the Armed Services Committee, said:

I could go on with illustrations. My point is, we should let the facts speak for themselves. We deserve to know the facts. We deserve and must know, for the sake of our national security, whether the information we received from intelligence agencies was accurate, and we need to know for the sake of our democracy whether the representation of those facts by our leaders was accurate.

That is the intent of the Durbin amendment. It is the reason it should be approved by this body. It is the reason this body should do what is right, which is to seek together to know the facts.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senator from North Dakota is recognized.

Mr. CONRAD. Madam President, I thank my colleagues for raising these important issues. I am going to take the first few minutes of my 30 minutes to talk on what has been discussed this morning because I think it is so important to the country, and then I will turn to another subject.

I have not previously spoken on these issues on the floor because my primary responsibility in the Senate is representing the State of North Dakota, and I have special responsibility for budget issues in my position as ranking member on the Budget Committee and as a senior member of the Finance Committee for matters that relate to Social Security and Medicare and the financing of the U.S. Government, and, of course, in my role on the Agriculture Committee dealing with questions of agricultural policy. I am not on the committees that deal with foreign policy and defense policy.

All of us have a responsibility to speak out when we believe the country is headed in a wrong direction. I believe the President is taking us down a road that is fraught with real danger for the country.

The President asked this Congress--the Senate and the House--for authority to launch a preemptive attack on another nation, an attack before that country had attacked us or attacked any of our allies. In fact, Iraq had not engaged in an attack on anyone for more than a decade. The President told us and told the world that they, Iraq, represented an immediate and imminent threat to America.

I personally believe there may be a place for preemptive attack in protecting the American people. I believe if we have clear and convincing evidence that a country represents an imminent threat to our people, we have a right to act first, especially in a world where weapons of mass destruction do exist, to prevent catastrophic loss to our Nation.

When we launch a preemptive attack on another country, we had better have it right. We had better make certain that what we are saying and telling the world is correct. This President and this administration told the world and told this Congress that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction. There were many reasons to believe that statement, but now the harsh reality is, those weapons of mass destruction have not been found. This administration and this President told the Congress and told the world that Iraq was trying to develop a nuclear capability, and they gave as their best evidence that Iraq was seeking to buy uranium from Niger. That has proved to be wrong.

The President told the world and told this Congress that there was a clear connection to al-Qaida, and repeatedly we were told the best evidence was there was a terrorist camp in Iraq training al-Qaida operatives. Now we learn that camp was in a part of Iraq not controlled by Saddam Hussein but controlled by the Kurds.

The day before yesterday, the President made the most astonishing statement of all. In the Washington Post, the President is quoted as saying that he attacked Iraq because Saddam Hussein would not permit the U.N. weapons inspectors into the country.

I do not know if the President was misquoted. I have seen no attempt to correct the record. I said nothing about this yesterday because I hoped that the White House would say the President was misquoted. There has been no attempt to correct the record.

We all know the weapons inspectors of the U.N. were in the country. They were in Iraq. They were going site to site trying to determine if there were weapons of mass destruction, trying to determine if there was a nuclear program underway in that country. For the President to now say he attacked Iraq because they would not permit inspectors absolutely stands the facts on their head. The inspectors were there. The reason the inspectors left is because we were threatening to attack Iraq. So saying that Saddam Hussein did not permit inspectors in as a rationale for war is mighty thin.

We have a fundamental problem of the credibility of the Nation. Our country told the world a set of assertions, one after another, that have proven to be wrong or have proven not to be demonstrably the case. That puts our country's credibility at risk. When we are talking about attacking other nations preemptively, as I said in the beginning, we better make certain we have it right because if we start going around the world attacking countries and cannot prove our assertions that they represented an imminent threat to us, then I think America is in very serious risk of alienating the world community. That is not in our interest.

Mr. REID. Senator Durbin had to go to an appropriations meeting, but he asked that I relate to the Senate, and I will do it through the Senator from North Dakota--is the Senator from North Dakota aware there is a Web site the President has--I am sure the Senator is aware of that; is that right?

Mr. REID. Well, I am aware of the fact that there was a part of that Web site that one can no longer get into. ``Behind the Scenes'' is what it was entitled. I hold up in front of the Senator now something that was on the Web site that one could go to, but one cannot anymore, talking about how the President prepares the State of the Union Message.

And it shows the President with his hands out there. It shows the President going over his speech word by word.

Under this, it says: While working at his desk in the Oval Office, President Bush reviews the State of the Union address line-by-line, word-by-word.

I want the Senator from North Dakota to know that Senator Durbin--this is on his behalf but certainly I underline and underscore what he wanted to be printed in the RECORD--we are to a point that the Senator from North Dakota said we are. It is the credibility of not necessarily going to war in Iraq, which is certainly part of it, but the credibility of this country in the world. Can the United States of America, the great country that it is--can people depend on the word of the President of the United States? And certainly in that they have taken this off the Web site, it indicates that there is certainly a problem with the President going over his speech word-by-word, line-by-line.

Mr. CONRAD. I say to the Senator, I have not said anything for weeks on this issue, but with each passing day I

become more concerned about the credibility of our Nation. When a policy is announced of preemptive strike, something we have never done before in our country's history--I remember going to grade school and being taught that America never attacked first, but if somebody attacked us, we countered and we always won. That was what we were taught growing up. I was proud of it. I was proud that America never attacked first.

Now the world has changed. I would be the first to acknowledge the world has changed. I can see a role for preemptive strike in a world where weapons of mass destruction do exist in order to prevent catastrophic loss to this country. But we better be very certain before we launch an attack on another nation that that attack is justified and that, in fact, that nation represents an imminent threat because, if we start attacking nations and we cannot prove our assertions, very quickly

the rest of the world is going to doubt our word, our credibility, and our basic goodness as a nation. Now, that is serious business.

The fact is, this administration told the world Iraq had weapons of mass destruction; that they were trying to develop nuclear capability; that there was a connection to al-Qaida. Each and every one of those claims now is in question. It is not just 16 words in the State of the Union. It is far more serious than that.

For the President, the day before yesterday, to compound it by saying he attacked Saddam Hussein because he did not permit U.N. weapons inspectors in that country is false on its face. We all know the weapons inspectors were there. We all know they were going site to site trying to find weapons of mass destruction. The question of whether or not they were effective or not is another question but to assert to the world that we attacked Iraq because there were not inspectors there, I am afraid it makes us look as though we are not very careful with our claims.

(The further remarks of Mr. Conrad are printed in today's RECORD under ``Morning Business.'')

Mr. KENNEDY. I ask unanimous consent that it be temporarily laid aside so that my amendment will be in order.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion to table the Durbin amendment No. 1277. The yeas and nays have been ordered. The clerk will call the roll.

I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. KERRY) would vote ``no.''

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber desiring to vote?

Mr. BURGESS. Madam Speaker, after the terrorist attacks of September 11, it became apparent that the United States needed to be more vigilant about terrorism and weapons proliferation and pay attention to prospects of weapons of mass destruction falling into the hands of groups that could use them against American interests.

The Bush Administration, the Clinton Administration, and the United Nations all agreed that Saddam Hussein possessed a significant biological and chemical capability in 1998 when the inspectors were withdrawn. There is broad agreement that Hussein, different from any other leader, had proven himself capable of using these weapons for offensive purposes and not merely a defensive posture.

There are efforts in the Congress to employ a full investigation into difficult issues to understand whether mistakes were made and to take action to fix them in fulfillment of Congress' important oversight responsibilities. To date, the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence reject a broader probe of the WMD issue.

I believe Congress is exercising its oversight authority and has set in place procedures to review comprehensively and on a bipartisan basis the intelligence surrounding Iraq prior to the outbreak of war and to take into account any dissident views on the Iraqi threat.

SEC. 504. None of the funds made available by this Act may be used to issue any license, approval, or authorization for the export or reexport, or the transfer or retransfer, either directly or indirectly, the Democratic Peoples' Republic of North Korea of--

(3) any components, technologies, substances, technical information, or related goods or services used (or which could be used) in a nuclear production or utilization facility; except that, this restriction shall not apply to exports, reexports, transfers, or retransfers of radiation monitoring technologies.

Mr. MARKEY (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the RECORD.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Massachusetts?

Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Chairman, this is a very simple amendment, and it is based upon a very complex, controversial, but ultimately ineffective, set of agreements which we reached with the North Korean Government making a promise to that government that we in conjunction with our allies would transfer two nuclear power plants to the Government of North Korea if they agreed in turn to put their full nuclear program under full scope safeguards. It has become clear through the Clinton administration and through the Bush administration that Kim Jong-Il is pathologically incapable of handling nuclear materials in a responsible way, and retrospectively it is now quite clear that the nature of the bargain that we made with Kim Jong-Il was fundamentally flawed.

Mr. HOBSON. Mr. Chairman, I know the gentleman wants to explain his amendment, but I am advised that the Committee on Energy and Commerce has passed similar language to this about three times. If that is correct, then I am willing to accept the amendment on its face. If there is a problem, we will have to work it out in conference at some point; but in an effort to expedite the process here on the floor, I am willing to accept the amendment at this point if the ranking member has no objection.

Mr. MARKEY. I thank the gentleman very much for his acceptance of the amendment. And just so it is clear what it was that was just accepted, it is basically saying that the United States writ large should not and will not transfer any nuclear power plants or material or personnel that could help them with nuclear power plants as part of any deal in the future; that if they want electricity, that we will build coal-fired plants for them, we will build natural-gas-fired plants for them, but we are not going to transfer materials that could be used for a nuclear weapons program to Kim Jong-Il in North Korea.

0 during the Clinton administration and during the Bush administration, but there are personnel inside of both administrations that continue to believe that there is a way in which we can transfer nuclear materials to the North Korean Government, and the Congress has said over and over again it is not a good idea. I appreciate the gentleman from Ohio accepting the amendment. I do want to work with him, as does the gentleman from California (Mr. Cox), towards the goal of removing any obstacles that might be created in the future.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Markey).

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Congressional Record Weekly Update

July 14-18, 2003