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Congressional Record Weekly Update

September 29-October 3, 2003

Return to the Congressional Report Weekly.


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NUCLEAR/ NONPROLIFERATION
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1A) Manhattan Project National Historical Park Study Act of 2003

   S. 1687. A bill to direct the Secretary of the Interior to conduct a study on the preservation and interpretation of the historic sites of the Manhattan Project for potential inclusion in the National Park System; to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources.

   Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I rise to introduce the Manhattan Project National Historical Park Study Act. This bill authorizes the National Park Service, in coordination with the Secretaries of Energy and Defense, to undertake a special resource study to assess the national significance, suitability, and feasibility of designating various Manhattan Project sites and their facilities as a National Historical Park. Specifically, the study will evaluate the historic significance of the Manhattan Project facilities of Los Alamos and the Trinity Site in the State of New Mexico, of the Hanford Site in the State of Washington, and of Oak Ridge in the State of Tennessee. I am pleased that my distinguished colleagues from the States of Washington, Senators CANTWELL and MURRAY, are cosponsoring this bill.

   The significance of the Manhattan Project to this Nation--and indeed the World--would be difficult to overstate. The project was initiated as a desperate effort in the middle of World War II to beat Nazi Germany to the construction of the first nuclear bomb. The effort was of a magnitude and intensity not seen before or since: in a mere three years, 130,000 men and women went to work on a $2.2 billion mission that furiously pushed science, technology, engineering, and society into a new age.

   The magnitude of the effort is easily matched by its legacy. This legacy includes an ending to the Second World War, as well as the foundation for nuclear medicine and great advances in physics, mathematics, engineering, and technology. A number of scholars have argued that it also includes a dramatic change to a sustained era of relative world peace. But this legacy also includes the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Japanese, and the sacrifices of the homesteaders that were forced off of the sites to make way for the project, its thousands of workers and their families, and the uranium miners, ``down-winders'', and others. This legacy has been the subject of hot debate for decades, and this debate continues today--as it must.

   There are historic facilities at the four Manhattan Project sites that are absolutely essential resources for informing this important debate, and there should be no question that they are of great national and international significance. Pulitzer Prize-winning Manhattan Project author Richard Rhodes has said that ``the discovery of how to release nuclear energy was arguably the most important human discovery since fire--reason enough to preserve its remarkable history.''

   But while the enormous significance of the Manhattan Project makes our obligation to preserve and interpret this history abundantly clear, it makes it equally challenging. The greatest challenge has been--and will continue to be--interpreting this history in a sensitive and balanced way. This Nation is blessed with historic assets that praise the best of humanity and some that mourn the worst, some that grace us with glory and some that humble us with anguish, some that impress us with brilliance and some that embarrass us with senselessness, some that manifest beginnings and some that mark ends, some that inspire us with awe and some that fascinate us with curiosities, and some that grip us with the fear of destruction and some that give us the hope of creation. But I don't know of any others that challenge us with legitimate passions for all of these.

   Preserving and interpreting this history also includes the challenge of respecting the ongoing missions and responsibilities of the Department of Energy and the Department of Defense at the Manhattan Project sites. Access to some of the historic facilities must be restricted--to some prohibited--and other precautions also may be necessary. The Departments of Energy and Defense have begun to take on these challenges, and they deserve much credit for doing so. The Bradbury Museum in Los Alamos is a good example, as are the biannual tours of the Trinity Site on White Sands Missile Range. They have recognized that preserving this history offers great opportunities not only for the public, but for their employees. Employees who better appreciate this history will be more likely to appreciate their careers, and they certainly will appreciate the boost interested tourists give to their local economies.

   This bill asks the question whether we will do better to preserve and interpret the important history of the Manhattan Project by unifying and promoting the various efforts at these sites as a National Historical Park. It is appropriate that our Nation's leader in historic preservation and interpretation--the National Park Service--lead the effort to answer this question. In doing so, they will consult with the Secretaries of Energy and Defense, as well as State, tribal, and local officials, and representatives of interested organizations and members of the public. The Park Service's expertise, experience, and enthusiasm is critical to the endeavor.

   In asking this question we are neither celebrating the Manhattan Project nor lamenting it. But we are recognizing our responsibility to society to ensure it is neither forgotten nor misunderstood.

   I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the RECORD.

   There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

   S. 1687

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

   SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Manhattan Project National Historical Park Study Act of 2003''.

   SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress finds that--

    (1) the Manhattan Project, the World War II effort to develop and construct the world's first atomic bomb, represents an extraordinary era of American and world history that--

    (A) included remarkable achievements in science and engineering made possible by innovative partnerships among Federal agencies, universities, and private industries; and

    (B) culminated in a transformation of the global society by ushering in the atomic age;

    (2) the Manhattan Project was an unprecedented $2,200,000,000, 3-year, top-secret effort that employed approximately 130,000 men and women at its peak;

    (3) the Manhattan Project sites contain historic resources that are crucial for the interpretation of the Manhattan Project, including facilities in--

    (A) Oak Ridge, Tennessee (where the first uranium enrichment facilities and pilot-scale nuclear reactor were built);

    (B) Hanford, Washington (where the first large-scale reactor for producing plutonium was built);

    (C) Los Alamos, New Mexico (where the atomic bombs were designed and built); and

    (D) Trinity Site, New Mexico (where the explosion of the first nuclear device took place);

    (4) the Secretary of the Interior has recognized the national significance in American history of Manhattan Project facilities in the study area by--

    (A) designating the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory in the State of New Mexico as a National Historic Landmark in 1965 and adding the Laboratory to the National Register of Historic Places in 1966;

    (B) designating the Trinity Site on the White Sands Missile Range in the State of New Mexico as a National Historic Landmark in 1965 and adding the Site to the National Register of Historic Places in 1966;

    (C) designating the X-10 Graphite Reactor at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in the State of Tennessee as a National Historic Landmark in 1965 and adding the Reactor to the National Register of Historic Places in 1966;

    (D) adding the Oak Ridge Historic District to the National Register of Historic Places in 1991;

    (E) adding the B Reactor at the Hanford Site in the State of Washington to the National Register of Historic Places in 1992; and

    (F) by adding the Oak Ridge Turnpike, Bear Creek Road, and Bethel Valley Road Checking Stations in the State of Tennessee to the National Register of Historic Places in 1992;

    (5) the Hanford Site has been nominated by the Richland Operations Office of the Department of Energy and the Washington State Historic Preservation Office for addition to the National Register of Historic Places;

    (6) a panel of experts convened by the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation in 2001 reported that the development and use of the atomic bomb during World War II has been called ``the single most significant event of the 20th century'' and recommended that various sites be formally established ``as a collective unit administered for preservation, commemoration, and public interpretation in cooperation with the National Park Service'';

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    (7) the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation reported in 2001 that the preservation and interpretation of the historic sites of the Manhattan Project offer significant value as destinations for domestic and international tourists; and

    (8) preservation and interpretation of the Manhattan Project historic sites are necessary for present and future generations to fully appreciate the extraordinary undertaking and complex consequences of the Manhattan Project.

   SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.

    In this Act:

    (1) SECRETARY.--The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary of the Interior.

    (2) STUDY.--The term ``study'' means the study authorized by section 4(a).

    (3) STUDY AREA.--The term ``study area'' means the following Manhattan Project sites:

    (A) Los Alamos National Laboratory and townsite in the State of New Mexico.

    (B) The Trinity Site on the White Sands Missile Range in the State of New Mexico.

    (C) The Hanford Site in the State of Washington.

    (D) Oak Ridge Laboratory in the State of Tennessee.

    (E) Other significant sites relating to the Manhattan Project determined by the Secretary to be appropriate for inclusion in the study.

   SEC. 4. SPECIAL RESOURCE STUDY.

    (a) STUDY.-- ---

    (1) IN GENERAL.--The Secretary shall conduct a special resource study of the study area to assess the national significance, suitability, and feasibility of designating the various historic sites and structures of the study area as a unit of the National Park System in accordance with section 8(c) of Public Law 91-383 (16 U.S.C. 1a-5(c)).

    (2) ADMINISTRATION.--In conducting the study, the Secretary shall--

    (A) consult with the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Defense, State, tribal, and local officials, representatives of interested organizations, and members of the public; and

    (B) evaluate, in coordination with the Secretary of Energy and the Secretary of Defense, the compatibility of designating the study area, or 1 or more parts of the study area, as a national historical park or national historic site with maintaining security, productivity and management goals of the Department of Energy and the Department of Defense, and public health and safety.

    (b) REPORT.--Not later than 1 year after the date on which funds are made available to carry out the study, the Secretary shall submit to Congress a report that describes the findings of the study and any conclusions and recommendations of the Secretary.

   SEC. 5. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

    There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as are necessary to carry out this Act.

   Ms. CANTWELL. Mr. President, I rise today as a cosponsor, along with my colleagues, Senators BINGAMAN and MURRAY of the Manhattan Project National Historical Park Study Act.

   This bill authorizes a special resource study to determine the suitability and feasibility of developing a national park site at one or more of the facilities that playing a major role in the Manhattan Project--the Federal Government's top-secret effort during World War II to develop nuclear weapons before its opponents, an initiative that changed the course of world history. I believe it is tremendously important for the citizens of our Nation to learn about the important functions the various Manhattan Project sites served in defending our Nation, from World War II through the cold war, and to recognize and understand the complicated and weighty issues arising from the production and use of nuclear weapons, their impact on world history as well as their human and environmental costs.

   In January of 1943, Hanford, WA was selected by the War Department to serve as a part of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's Manhattan Project plan. The site was selected for several reasons: It was remotely located from population centers, which fostered security and safety; the Columbia River provided plenty of water to cool the reactors; and cheap and abundant electricity was available from nearby Federal dams.

   The history of this era is a complicated one--as farmers and tribes were displaced, given 30 days to move from their homes in central Washington. By March 1943, construction had started on the site, which covers about 625 square miles. At the time, the priority facility on the Hanford Reservation was the B reactor. Built in just 11 months as American scientists and their allies engaged in what was then perceived as a race with the Germans to develop nuclear capability, B reactor was the world's first large-scale plutonium production reactor.

   The need for labor for the project turned Hanford into an atomic boomtown, with the population reaching 50,000 by the summer of 1944. Workers at the sprawling Hanford complex were not even sure of what they were producing, and tales of German rockets used during battles led many workers to believe they were producing rocket fuel. In fact, this secrecy continued even after the atomic bombs were dropped. One worker recalled that many children who lived in the area didn't even know what their parent who worked at Hanford did on the job.

   Clearly, the B reactor at Hanford made significant contributions to U.S. defense policies during its production run, from 1944 through 1968. Plutonium from the B reactor was used in the world's first nuclear explosion, called the Trinity Test, in New Mexico on July 16, 1945. B reactor plutonium was also used in the ``Fat Man'' bomb dropped on Nagasaki, Japan on August 9, 1945. The blast devastated more than two square miles of the city, effectively ending World War II. The B reactor also produced plutonium for the cold war efforts until 1968.

   The B reactor is simply a stunning feat of engineering. Built in less than a year, the reactor consisted of a 1,200-ton graphite cylinder lying on its side, which was penetrated through its entire length horizontally by over 2,000 aluminum tubes. Two hundred tons of uranium slugs the size of rolls of quarters went into the tubes. Cooling water from the Columbia River, which first had to be treated, was pumped through the aluminum tubes at 75,000 gallons per minute. Water consumption approached that of a city with a population of 300,000. The B reactor was one of three reactors that had its own auxiliary facilities that included a river pump house, large storage and settling basins, a filtration plant, huge motor-driven pumps for delivering the water, and facilities for emergency cooling in case of a power failure. It was the first of an eventual nine nuclear reactors that remain on the banks of the Columbia River--a potent reminder of both the war effort and the environmental burden with which we must contend.

   The people of Washington State, and especially the residents of the tri-cities, are proud of their contributions to the World War II and cold war efforts. We are left with these irreplaceable relics of the Manhattan Project--such as the B reactor--which are incredibly important in understanding the engineering achievements that propelled this country into the nuclear age, with all of the complicated moral issues it poses for the possessors of such technology. As the Department of Energy continues its work to clean up the Hanford site, the country's most contaminated nuclear reservation, it is important that we also honor the achievements of the important work done here, as well as commemorate the tremendous sacrifices made by workers, displaced families and tribes, and this era's environmental legacy.

   There is already strong support in the communities that surround Hanford for preserving the history of the Manhattan Project, and I would like to commend the B reactor Museum Association and Bechtel Hanford, Inc. for all this work to date. In recent years, they have worked hard to decontaminate, clean, inventory, and spruce up B reactor's interior so that people can walk in to see three chambers. But more work needs to be done if we want to preserve the reactor for future generations, which must learn about the Manhattan Project and its impact on world history.

   One such way to do that is to look into the possibility of adding the B reactor as well as Manhattan Project sites in other parts of the country as a new National Park unit.

   I look forward to working with my colleagues to ensure passage of this bill, as the study it authorizes is a much-needed first step in determining the best options for preserving this important piece of American history.

 

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MISSILE DEFENSE AND DEFENSE POLICY
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2A) Defense Production Reauthorization Act of 2003

Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the immediate consideration of S. 1680, an original bill reported by the Banking Committee.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will state the bill by title.

   The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

 

   A bill (S. 1680) to reauthorize the Defense Production Act of 1950, and for other purposes.

 

   There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the bill.

   Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I rise today in support of passage of the Defense Production Reauthorization Act of 2003. This bill will reauthorize the Defense Production Act of 1950 for an additional 5 years.

   Mr. President, the Defense Production Act of 1950 was originally passed in response to the outbreak of war on the Korean Peninsula. The U.S. defense industrial base that had provided the fighter planes, tanks and ships that were so crucial to the outcome of World War II had been largely scrapped following the end of that horrific conflict. The prevailing view, of course, was that such an industrial base was no longer needed in light of the defeat of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan and the introduction into the American arsenal of atomic weapons.

   As we learned literally within hours of the crossing of the 38th Parallel by the first North Korean Army units, that view was catastrophically wrong. The Defense Production Act was the recognition by the executive and legislative branches of Government that a large industrial base oriented toward national defense was still vital to our national security and that the usual process by which weapons and other equipment are procured would not suffice in a genuine crisis.

   As in June 1950, the United States remains dependent upon the ability to respond to crises in a manner appropriate to the circumstances. That is where the Defense Production Act of 1950 continues to play a vital role in providing for the national defense. Its authorities allow the President to prioritize and reallocate contracts when the United States is confronted by an imminent threat to its well-being, and to respond to those threats after they've materialized. It provides the authority for the Department of Defense to go into factories that can not afford to maintain a critical capability due to insufficient demand and provide the means for that factory to continue to produce the required item. It indemnifies contractors against legal actions taken as result of U.S. Government directives issued under Defense Production Act authorities, as was needed during the first Persian Gulf War when Civil Air Reserve commercial aircraft were drafted into the war effort at the expense of their commercial obligations.

   Over time, the Defense Production Act has been expanded to include natural disasters as well as man-made events like terrorist attacks, and disasters resulting from accidents and equipment failures that can result in large sections of the United States being blacked-out by a major utility failure. In short, it is an emergency capability that we keep in our back pocket and hope it is never needed.

   But the Defense Production Act is routinely needed. I have alluded to the Transportation Security Administration's use of it in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. It has also been used by the Department of Defense in support of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan to procure vital military equipment like Predator UAVs and military satellite communications technology vital for the conduct of joint operations. And with the scale of contraction in the U.S. defense industrial base over the past decade, the act's authorities will remain as vital as ever for the foreseeable future.

   In drafting reauthorizing legislation, it was the committee's intent to modernize the Defense Production Act to take into account the dramatic changes that occurred since the act's last update in 1994. The emergence of terrorism, evident in the U.S. Embassy

   bombings in East Africa, the attack on the USS Cole in the Gulf of Aden, and the tragic events of 9-11, as the central focus of U.S. national security planning has created an imperative that the Defense Production Act be adapted to that reality. That is why the Banking Committee-passed bill includes new findings and a declaration of policy: because the war on terrorism and the growth in scale of threat to the nation's critical infrastructure of telecommunications, transportation, energy, banking, and other sectors of society the security of which are vital to our national security and our economic and social well-being.

   The committee-passed bill, in line with the recommendations of the President's Report to Congress on the Modernization of the Defense Production Act and the Report of the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, included in its findings and declaration of policy this emphasis on the war on terrorism and critical infrastructure protection. In addition, language was added intended to further strengthen the linkage between critical infrastructure and the authorities provided by the Defense Production Act during committee consideration of this bill.

   Unfortunately, this modernization of the act was more than the other chamber could swallow right now. That is why the ranking member of the Banking Committee, Senator SARBANES, and I will offer an amendment in the nature of a substitute. Because the Defense Production Act expires today, there would be no time for a protracted conference. Consequently, the Banking Committee and its House counterpart have agreed to a more modest update of the Act. The amendment by the ranking member and me does the following:

   Reauthorizes the Defense Production Act for five years, as requested by the Defense Department;

   Provides funding the department requested for hardening electronics against the effects of radiation;

   Clarifies the President's authority to obtain information needed for the performance of assessments of the U.S. defense industrial base--a provision requested by the Department of Commerce; and

   Formally incorporates the concept of critical infrastructure protection under Defense Production Act authorities by including it under the definition of ``national defense.''

   Mr. President, I cannot emphasize enough the importance of the Senate passing the amendment in the nature of a substitute and then voting on final passage as soon as possible. The minute the Defense Production Act lapses, vital authorities for the conduct of military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq disappear. I urge my colleagues' support for the amendment and for final passage of the bill.

   Mr. SARBANES. Mr. President, I rise in support of the Defense Production Act Reauthorization of 2003.

   The Defense Production Act provides the President with important authorities to ensure the availability of industrial resources to meet national security needs and to deal with domestic civil emergencies. This is obviously a period in which the authorities of the DPA are being actively utilized. The DPA expires today, September 30. The Administration has made clear that the reauthorization of the DPA is a high priority.

   The Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs marked up and reported out this bill last week by unanimous consent. The House Financial Services Committee, our counterpart Committee, has also reported out a reauthorization of the DPA that is pending on the House floor. Both bills are essentially simple extensions of the DPA with minor changes requested by the Administration. The imminent expiration of the authorities of the DPA led the staff of the two committees to meet last week to reconcile the few differences between the two bills. That has been accomplished, and Senator SHELBY and I will shortly offer an amendment in the nature of a substitute reflecting that agreement.

   Both bills contained provisions requested by the Administration to correct the industrial resource shortfall for radiation-hardened electronics, and to clarify the President's authority under the DPA to obtain information in order to perform industry studies assessing the capabilities of the United States industrial base to support the national defense.

   The Senate bill also contained a provision sponsored by Senator Bennett, which makes explicit that the authorities of the DPA can be used to protect and restore critical infrastructure. This authority takes on a heightened sense of importance in the aftermath of 9/11, and is retained in the substitute amendment with the strong support of the Administration. The Senate bill provides for a 5 year authorization, as requested by the Administration, and the House bill provides for a 4 year authorization. Senator DODD has raised a concern about the need to address the issue of offsets, which falls under the authority of the DPA. As a result, the

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substitute will provide for a 1 year authorization. This is essentially the package.

   I would like to commend Chairman SHELBY and his staff for working cooperatively to bring this bill and the substitute amendment before the Senate today. I hope the Senate can act promptly to pass this legislation and send it over to the House. I believe the House will then be in a position to take up the Senate bill, pass it, and send it to the White House for the President's signature. That would ensure the continued availability of the important authorities of the Defense Production Act.

   Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished chairman of the Banking Committee for all his efforts to bring the reauthorization of the Defense Production Act to the floor. It is excellent legislation, and I support it wholeheartedly. I particularly want to express my appreciation for the agreement that was reached to reconsider this piece of legislation in 1 year. That will allow the Defense Production Act to continue uninterrupted, while also providing us with the opportunity to address the very grave concerns that are shared by many Senators about the issue of foreign offset arrangements over the next year.

   According to the General Accounting Office and Department of Commerce, these arrangements serve no positive purpose. And yet, offsets are displacing 9,500 American workers annually. In 2000, the Commerce Department reports that out of $5.6 billion exported by the U.S. aerospace and defense industries, $5.1 billion was ``offset'' by these arrangements. In other words, offset arrangements imposed on contracts with American firms amounted to nearly 90 percent of their export value. And in the years 2002 and 2003, the total value of offsets are projected to be close to 100 percent of the value of those contracts--virtually eliminating any gains from U.S. exports of these goods.

   Once again, I appreciate the willingness of the chairman and ranking member of the Banking Committee for agreeing to work with me on this issue as we assess additional reauthorization legislation for the Defense Production Act in the coming months.

   Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I appreciate the words of the distinguished Senator from Connecticut and look forward to continuing work with my colleagues on these important issues concerning the needs of our military industrial base. The Defense Production Act is an important piece of legislation that provides vital authorities to the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, Commerce, and Energy to prepare for and respond to crises. These provisions are particularly important during this time as the nation prosecutes its war on terror. The act's authorities allow government agencies to allocate contracts and re-prioritize contracts to meet emergency requirements. And it also provides authority to these agencies, especially the Defense Department, to work with private industry to ensure they have the industrial capabilities required to meet national security requirements that economics alone would otherwise allow to atrophy.

   I am pleased the Senate will act on this legislation before it expires at midnight tonight. My hope is that it will be passed by the other body and signed into law by the President shortly.

   Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the substitute amendment at the desk be agreed to, the bill, as amended, be read the third time and passed, the motion to reconsider be laid upon the table, and that any statements relating to the bill be printed in the RECORD.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

   The amendment (No. 1792) was agreed to, as follows:

 

    Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following:

   SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Defense Production Act Reauthorization of 2003''.

   SEC. 2. REAUTHORIZATION OF DEFENSE PRODUCTION ACT OF 1950.

    (a) IN GENERAL.--The 1st sentence of section 717(a) of the Defense Production Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. App. 2166(a)) is amended--

    (1) by striking ``sections 708'' and inserting ``sections 707, 708,''; and

    (2) by striking ``September 30, 2003'' and inserting ``September 30, 2004''.

    (b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.--Section 711(b) of the Defense Production Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. App. 2161(b)) is amended by striking ``through 2003'' and inserting ``through 2004''.

   SEC. 3. RESOURCE SHORTFALL FOR RADIATION-HARDENED ELECTRONICS.

    (a) IN GENERAL.--Notwithstanding the limitation contained in section 303(a)(6)(C) of the Defense Production Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. App. 2093(a)(6)(C)), the President may take actions under section 303 of the Defense Production Act of 1950 to correct the industrial resource shortfall for radiation-hardened electronics, to the extent that such Presidential actions do not cause the aggregate outstanding amount of all such actions to exceed $200,000,000.

    (b) REPORT BY THE SECRETARY.--Before the end of the 6-month period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit a report to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives describing--

    (1) the current state of the domestic industrial base for radiation-hardened electronics;

    (2) the projected requirements of the Department of Defense for radiation-hardened electronics;

    (3) the intentions of the Department of Defense for the industrial base for radiation-hardened electronics; and

    (4) the plans of the Department of Defense for use of providers of radiation-hardened electronics beyond the providers with which the Department had entered into contractual arrangements under the authority of the Defense Production Act of 1950, as of the date of the enactment of this Act.

   SEC. 4. CLARIFICATION OF PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY.

    Subsection (a) of section 705 of the Defense Production Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. App. 2155(a)) is amended by inserting after the end of the 1st sentence the following new sentence: ``The authority of the President under this section includes the authority to obtain information in order to perform industry studies assessing the capabilities of the United States industrial base to support the national defense.''.

   SEC. 5. CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION AND RESTORATION.

    Section 702 of the Defense Production Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. App. 2152) is amended--

    (1) by redesignating paragraphs (3) through (17) as paragraphs (4) through (18), respectively;

    (2) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following new paragraph:

    ``(3) CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE.--The term `critical infrastructure' means any systems and assets, whether physical or cyber-based, so vital to the United States that the degradation or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on national security, including, but not limited to, national economic security and national public health or safety.''; and

    (3) in paragraph (14) (as so redesignated by paragraph (1) of this section), by inserting ``and critical infrastructure protection and restoration'' before the period at the end of the last sentence.

   SEC. 6. REPORT ON CONTRACTING WITH MINORITY- AND WOMEN-OWNED BUSINESSES.

    (a) REPORT REQUIRED.--Before the end of the 1-year period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit a report to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives on the extent to which contracts entered into during the fiscal year ending before the end of such 1-year period under the Defense Production Act of 1950 have been contracts with minority- and women-owned businesses.

    (b) CONTENTS OF REPORT.--The report submitted under subsection (a) shall include the following:

    (1) The types of goods and services obtained under contracts with minority- and women-owned businesses under the Defense Production Act of 1950 in the fiscal year covered in the report.

    (2) The dollar amounts of such contracts.

    (3) The ethnicity of the majority owners of such minority- and women-owned businesses.

    (4) A description of the types of barriers in the contracting process, such as requirements for security clearances, that limit contracting opportunities for minority- and women-owned businesses, together with such recommendations for legislative or administrative action as the Secretary of Defense may determine to be appropriate for increasing opportunities for contracting with minority- and women-owned businesses and removing barriers to such increased participation.

    (c) DEFINITIONS.--For purposes of this section, the terms ``women-owned business'' and ``minority-owned business'' have the meanings given such terms in section 21A(r) of the Federal Home Loan Bank Act, and the term ``minority'' has the meaning given such term in section 1204(c)(3) of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989.

   The bill (S. 1680), as amended, was read the third time and passed.


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CHEM/ BIO AND WMD TERRORISM
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3A) Congratulating Fort Detrick on 60 Years of Service to the U.S.

Mr. BARTLETT of Maryland. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and agree to the concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 271) congratulating Fort Detrick on 60 years of service to the United States, as amended.

   The Clerk read as follows:

   H. Con. Res. 271

   Whereas April 10, 2003, was the 60th anniversary of the founding of the Army installation in Frederick, Maryland, named Fort Detrick;

   Whereas Fort Detrick is designated as an Army Medical Installation and is home to the United States Army Medical Research and Materiel Command (USAMRMC), one of two campuses of the National Cancer Institute (NCI-Frederick), and 36 other organizations of the Department of Defense and other Federal departments;

   Whereas the primary missions of the organizations at Fort Detrick include biomedical research and development, medical materiel management, and global telecommunications;

   Whereas throughout that installation's 60-year history, the personnel and organizations assigned to that installation have contributed scientific breakthroughs and medical solutions for the Armed Forces and the Nation;

   Whereas Fort Detrick is a focal point for the Nation's biomedical scientific leadership and has contributed extensively to protecting and improving public health in the United States;

   Whereas Fort Detrick has been home to preeminent researchers in bacteriology, microbiology, clinical and preventative medicine, biochemistry, neurology, botany, virology, and genomics;

   Whereas the research program at Fort Detrick was a pioneer in the laboratory facility designs, equipment, and procedures that are used for infectious disease research in laboratories worldwide;

   Whereas researchers at Fort Detrick have improved public health throughout the world through the creation of botulinum antibodies, which have been used to treat both infant and adult victims of botulism;

   Whereas the Venezuelan equine encephalitis vaccines, which were created at Fort Detrick, have been used to control human and animal outbreaks of Venezuelan equine encephalitis, and the Rift Valley Fever vaccines, which were also created at Fort Detrick, have been used to protect people in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and other countries who are at high risk of Rift Valley Fever;

   Whereas, on January 27, 1969, the Office of the Surgeon General of the Army established the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (hereinafter in this resolution referred to as the ``Institute''), which is located at Fort Detrick and is the Department of Defense's lead laboratory for medical aspects of biological warfare defense;

   Whereas when outbreaks of hantaviral disease began in the southwestern United States in 1993, the Institute was called upon by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and by various State health departments for consultations;

   Whereas when the Ebola virus was first carried to the shores of the United States in late 1989 by a primate colony found in Reston, Virginia, it was researchers at the Institute who diagnosed and contained the outbreak;

   Whereas the Institute also played a key role in the identification of and response to the initial outbreak of West Nile virus in New York;

   Whereas the Institute continues its life-saving work by collaborating with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the National Institutes of Health on the development of diagnostics and the evaluation of antiviral drugs for Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome;

   Whereas the Institute created a vaccine against hemorrhagic fever in the 1980s, which has possibly saved thousands of lives in Argentina, including the lives of agricultural workers at risk for exposure to this hemorrhagic fever virus;

   Whereas the Institute was the only Federal laboratory to maintain a continuous diagnostic reference capability on a 24-hour per day basis after the attacks of September 11, 2001, and provided expertise in medical diagnostics and decontamination that was key to ensuring that congressional office buildings were safe to reoccupy after the anthrax mail attacks in the fall of 2001;

   Whereas leading vaccine candidates for anthrax, plague, tularemia, and botulinum neurotoxins were all originally developed at the Institute;

   Whereas the basic research program at the Institute is responsible for some of the most promising medical countermeasures against the leading biological threats that are on the ``A'' List of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention;

   Whereas the Institute has established a partnership with the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases of the National Institutes of Health to collaborate and accelerate biodefense research that will protect all Americans against the threat of biological and chemical attacks by terrorists;

   Whereas in 1974, the United States Army Medical Materiel Agency was relocated to Fort Detrick and the Navy, Air Force, and Army all now conduct medical logistics planning and management at Fort Detrick in support of global military operations;

   Whereas the Foreign Disease-Weed Science Research Unit of the Agricultural Research Service of the Department of Agriculture has conducted high-priority research in the Plant Pathogen Containment Facility at Fort Detrick for over 30 years, providing the agricultural community with basic epidemiological information and rapid diagnostic assays for exotic threatening and emerging crop diseases, such as Karnal bunt of wheat, soybean rust, potato late blight, and plum pox virus;

   Whereas Company B, 4th Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, 4th Marine Division, United States Marine Corps Reserve, which has been assigned to Fort Detrick since October 1987, had a mission of reconnaissance and security in support of a Marine Air/Ground Task Force and received the Meritorious Unit Citation for its service during Operation Desert Storm;

   Whereas the Army's 1108th Signal Brigade at Fort Detrick provides important strategic

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communication support to the White House and the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and

   Whereas the National Cancer Institute-Frederick at Fort Detrick, one of two campuses of the National Cancer Institute of the National Institutes of Health, is an internationally recognized center for scientific excellence in the prevention, detection, and treatment of cancer and AIDS: Now, therefore, be it

    Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That the Congress--

    (1) congratulates Fort Detrick, Maryland, on 60 years of service to the Nation; and

    (2) commends the military and civilian personnel of the Army, other elements of the Department of Defense, and other Federal departments and agencies who have worked diligently at Fort Detrick since its founding--

    (A) to defend the United States against biological and chemical attack; and

    (B) to develop vaccines for all types of illnesses.

 

   The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Bartlett) and the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Ortiz) each will control 20 minutes.

   The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Bartlett).

   GENERAL LEAVE

   Mr. BARTLETT of Maryland. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks on the concurrent resolution under consideration.

   The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Maryland?

   There was no objection.

   Mr. BARTLETT of Maryland. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

   As the cosponsor of H. Con. Res. 271, I rise to congratulate Fort Detrick on 60 years of outstanding service to our Nation. Fort Detrick, located in Frederick, Maryland, employs men and women who are among the Nation's most preeminent researchers in bacteriology, microbiology, clinical and preventive medicine, biochemistry, neurology, botany, virology, and genomics. These scientists and technicians have an unparalleled record protecting the men and women in America's Armed Forces from the scourge of biowarfare.

   They have also led the world's fight against many infectious diseases. Today workers at Fort Detrick are helping to protect and improve the health of all Americans, as well as people around the world.

   During the height of World War II, in 1943, scientists converged at Camp Detrick when the War Department began to address the threat of biological warfare. In 1956, the U.S. Army Medical Unit was formed to develop medical countermeasures which included rapid and effective diagnostic and identification procedures. Throughout the Cold War, Fort Detrick developed and matured many of the standard protocols and technology utilized in biomedical research.

   In 1969, the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, USAMRIID, was established to continue America's defense against biological agents.

   Of today's top six biological threats, the CDC's ``A'' list, the leading candidate countermeasures for at least five of the six have come from the basic research program at USAMRIID. Leading vaccine candidates for anthrax, plague, and neurotoxins were all originally developed at USAMRIID. The technology used to develop a new smallpox vaccine was first demonstrated at USAMRIID. The National Cancer Institute-Frederick is an internationally recognized center for scientific excellence in the prevention, detection, and treatment of cancer and AIDS. Three billion dollars in congressionally directed research into breast and prostate cancer have been done at the NCI, which is located at Fort Detrick.

   Fort Detrick is also a home of the 1108th Signal Brigade, the U.S. Army Medical Material Agency, and the 4th Light Armored Vehicle Battalion of the U.S. Marine Corps Reserve. The Foreign Disease-Weed Science Research Unit of the Department of Agriculture is also located at Fort Detrick and has conducted high-priority research in exotic threatening and emerging crop diseases for over 30 years.

   The National Institutes of Health will be constructing an integrated biomedical research facility at the post to support the biodefense mission of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases. The Department of Homeland Security is considering joining NIAID and USAMRIID in an expanded biodefense campus at Fort Detrick. Fort Detrick is the logical location because of the 60-year record of accomplishments, the existing facilities and the productive partnerships already in place between the military and many civilian agencies of the Federal Government.

   Fort Detrick is a focal point for America's biomedical scientific leadership. I congratulate all of the thousands of former and current employees for their outstanding service to our Nation.

   Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

   Mr. ORTIZ. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

   (Mr. ORTIZ asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

   Mr. ORTIZ. Mr. Speaker, I join my colleague from Maryland (Mr. Bartlett) in support of this resolution and urge my colleagues to support it as well.

   Fort Detrick is one of the most important lines of defense should we ever be attacked with a chemical or biological weapon. Since 1969, it has been our Nation's lead laboratory for the medical aspects of biological warfare defense.

   

[Time: 12:15]

   The September 11 attacks used civilian airplanes as weapons of mass destruction; but it raises the specter of a terrorist attack that would use a chemical , biological, or nuclear weapon against us. I hope such an attack never occurs; but if it does, the men and women of Fort Detrick are devoted to improving the ways to quickly detect the use of chemical or biological weapons, halt the spread of chemical and biological agents as quickly as possible, and treat the victims of the attack.

   But the mission of Fort Detrick goes beyond just protecting against chemical or biological attack. Fort Detrick has played a leading role in protecting our Nation and other nations against all types of infectious diseases. They helped identify the West Nile Virus several summers ago, and they created a vaccine in the 1980s that probably saved the lives of thousands of Argentinians from an agricultural virus. Fort Detrick has been a world leader in research of microbiology, biochemistry, botany, and other scientific disciplines that are necessary to understanding how to detect and treat lethal viruses.

   Fort Detrick also serves as home to one of the two campuses of the National Cancer Institute of the National Institutes of Health. This NIH campus is internationally recognized for its contribution to cancer and AIDS research.

   The mission of Fort Detrick goes beyond research as well. Since 1974, all medical logistical support of global military operations is planned and managed by Fort Detrick. This is an extremely important mission as our troops are flung worldwide in the global war on terrorism. And as my good friend, the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Bartlett), mentioned, the Army's 1108th Signal Brigade at Fort Detrick provides strategic communications support to the White House and the joint chiefs.

   This is just a symbol of the accomplishments and missions of Fort Detrick, not an inventory of what they do. They do a great job.

   Mr. Speaker, I commend and congratulate my good friend, the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Bartlett), for bringing this resolution to the floor.

  • [Begin Insert]

     

   Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Speaker, as Congressman from Maryland's Second Congressional district home to Aberdeen and Fort Meade ..... I know what it means to represent our brave military men and women who continue to defend this nation abroad and here at home.

   Many who protect us do so with weapons ..... and many protect us in otherways. . .

   Fort Detrick is the premier military base for medical and biological research. The men and women that work at the Detrick have led the way in infectious disease and chemical warfare research.

   Detrick began as a chemical research facility housing the research branch of The Army Chemical Warfare Service. It is also the home

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to the Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center (AFMIC).

   Detrick is also home to U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Disease (USAMRIID). These state of the art laboratories are continuing to develop vaccines and treatments to defend against offensive bioweapons. USAMRIID also has a large staff dedicated to finding cures for cancer.

   I am proud that the United States has dedicated a military base to these problems and I am proud it is in the my home state of Maryland. It is imperative in this day of terrorism to be prepared for the new chemical and biological weapons. Today I am happy to honor the 60 years of research that Detrick has provided for the National Security of this Nation.

  • [End Insert]

     

   Mr. ORTIZ. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

   Mr. BARTLETT of Maryland. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

   The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Sessions). The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Bartlett) that the House suspend the rules and agree to the concurrent resolution, H. Con. Res. 271, as amended.

   The question was taken; and (two-thirds having voted in favor thereof) the rules were suspended and the concurrent resolution, as amended, was agreed to.

   The title of the concurrent resolution was amended so as to read: ``Concurrent resolution congratulating Fort Detrick, Maryland, on 60 years of service to the Nation.''.

   A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
 


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IRAQ AND WMD
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4A) Iraq

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the Speaker's announced policy of January 7, 2003, the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra) is recognized for 60 minutes as the designee of the majority leader.

   Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Speaker, tonight I wish to spend a few minutes talking about a couple of issues; number one, the progress and the commitment and the hope that I have observed in Iraq in two different trips, two different opportunities I have had to travel to Iraq, once in August and going back in September; and then I want to talk a little bit about the statement today by Dr. David Kay on the interim progress of the Iraqi Survey Group. The Iraqi Survey Group is the group that is working in Iraq and doing the search and the delineation of exactly what the WMD, the weapons of mass destruction , program consisted of in Iraq before and during the Operation Iraqi Freedom.

   First, let me talk about my trip to Iraq in August and in September. You fly into a city of 5.7 million people and then you fly over Baghdad for half an hour or 40 minutes to get kind of an observation as to exactly what is going on in Baghdad. Remember, I did this in the middle of August. The first observation was that this was not a country and that this was not a city that was destroyed by war and mired in turmoil. Sometimes that is the impression that we get from watching the nightly news.

   Aside from a few small pockets of destruction in Baghdad, the city appeared to be functioning close to a normal city in the Middle East. There were cars, buses and trucks on the streets. There were people on the streets. The stores were open. Commerce was going on in Baghdad. There had been a lot of progress and a lot of activity going on in Baghdad.

   We had the opportunity to talk with our troops and to hear about the rebuilding and the reconstruction that they had been involved with in Iraq over the last number of months. They talked about having what I call walking-around money, but it is very closely tracked by the military. The military, at any given time, can print out a list of all the projects that they have been working on.

   The 101st Division, up in northern Iraq, gave us a list of roughly 1,800 projects that they had been involved with, that they had completed or were still working on in the middle of August. They had 1,800 projects, from repairing clinics, drilling wells, repairing schools, working in hospitals, agricultural projects, and a whole number of different kinds of things that clearly empowered them to go into the communities where they were stationed and where they were trying to provide security and to assist the Iraqis in rebuilding their community, not tomorrow but at that moment and on that day. As these funds were depleted, the troops would get more funds. These funds came from the dollars that were left over in the Iraqi treasury after Saddam Hussein was overthrown.

   A second thing that kind of struck me. I was impressed by the troops. They are doing an absolutely awesome job there. The other thing that people have asked me, what were you surprised about when you went to Iraq? I was not surprised about the work of our troops in Iraq. I have seen our troops in action in Afghanistan. I have been on aircraft carriers. I have been in Bosnia and Kosovo and had the opportunity to interact. I am not surprised by the work of our troops. I am impressed but not surprised. I have come to expect that because they have demonstrated it over and over.

   But one of the things that did surprise me is I had heard of the palaces of Saddam in Iraq. I have been to Versailles, I have been to Buckingham Palace, but nothing prepares you for Saddam's lavish spending on himself once you take a look at his palaces in Iraq.

   The palace in Tikrit has over 100 buildings in it. It probably stretches an area from the Capitol here in Washington down to the White House, if not a larger area. It has a perimeter security system with walls and watchtowers and those types of things; three to four story high buildings, which in terms of their scale are closer in scale to the size of this building, the Capitol of the United States, than what they are of our White House. And again he has these all over the country.

   We also had the opportunity to meet with Peter McPherson, who is the President of Michigan State University, who for a number of months served in Iraq. He is now back at Michigan State but served as their finance minister.

   I asked him about one of the allegations that was made about the post-war planning. I said, Peter, there are folks that are saying there is very little planning that went on as to what we were going to do after the war. He kind of laughed and said, you know, a number of the things that typically happen after a war in a country did not happen here in Iraq.

   Many times the currency will collapse. As a matter

   of fact, here in Iraq, we had a debate about whether we should keep the Iraqi dinar. Why the debate? Well, the debate was the Iraqi dinar has a picture of Saddam Hussein on it, and the last thing we really wanted to do was to provide to the people of Iraq a constant reminder of the Saddam regime and that Saddam was still out there. But he said, Pete, we went through this conscious decision to keep the Iraqi dinar in circulation so that commerce could continue and so that the economy would not collapse.

   He also said that by keeping the dinar in circulation and by providing the security into the system, the banks did not collapse, that there was not a run on the banks right after the banks reopened. The banking and the financial institutions stayed in business. As a matter of fact, with the stability that we have there, there are now a number of international banks that are clamoring to get into Iraq. And in a couple of weeks we will be introducing a new currency into Iraq, one that gets rid of the picture of Saddam Hussein on the money.

   Peter McPherson worked with the Iraqi Governing Council to put in place a tax structure, highest tax rate of 15 percent, to put in a tariff structure and also to come up with rules for international investment. Every industry will now be open for foreign investment, except the energy sector.

   I also had the opportunity to meet with another individual from Michigan, Jim Haverman, who is serving as kind of the shadow finance minister, or health care minister in Iraq. What he is doing is rebuilding the structure. I asked him the same question. Jim, what about the plan or the lack of planning in the post-war period?

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   He came back and said, we do not get a lot of credit or we get no credit for the things that did not happen here. A lot of times after there has been a war, there will be an outbreak of epidemic diseases, things like cholera, malaria, and other diarrheal diseases. So you notice none of those things happened here in Iraq. We were able to keep the hospitals open, we were able to keep the clinics open, we were able to provide the basic health care necessary to prevent the outbreak of epidemic diseases, and now we have moved forward, that we have distributed 10,000 tons of pharmaceuticals.

   It is not that many of those pharmaceuticals were not present prior to the war in Iraq. They were present in Iraq, but they were stored in warehouses, and they were there for the elite and not for the masses. But what Jim and the Iraqi health care service have done is they have been focusing on getting quality health care or improved health care out to much of the rest of the country. They have been successful in doing that, and they are now working at upgrading the health care system.

   Remember, somebody like Saddam Hussein spent about 60 to 70 cents on health care for each and every Iraqi last year, in contrast to what he spent on his palaces. And the joke, though it is not very funny in Iraq, is what Saddam spent his money on. He spent his money on his palaces. He spent it on runways. You will fly over Iraq and you will see military runways all over Iraq, so he was building the military infrastructure. And then he also spent a significant amount of money on munitions. Later on, as I talk about Dr. Kay's report, Dr. Kay outlines that they estimate that they have munitions dumps that will hold over 600,000 tons of munitions.

   The bottom line, from my perspective and those of the people who I traveled to Iraq with, is that we are making progress in Iraq. We are bringing stability and hope to the Iraqi people. It does not mean that on occasion, and maybe too frequently, we do not have spectacular setbacks, the death of American soldiers or a bombing where the folks that are opposed to us are going after American troops, coalition troops, Iraqis that are helping us, Iraqis that are stepping up and taking leading roles in their government, but we are making progress.

   

[Time: 17:45]

   It is our hope that once the people of Iraq experience freedom, economic opportunity and a representative democratic government, the hope and expectation is that they will embrace this new way of life and will not foresee ever returning to tyrannical rule by a despotic government that exerts control through fear and oppression.

   Today in the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence we had an opportunity to listen to testimony from Dr. David Kay talking about the progress, the 3-month progress report from the Iraqi survey group. This statement was released by Dr. Kay to the public at 5 p.m. This is a nonsecret version of the testimony that he provided to both the House and the Senate intelligence committees today. It contains a portion of what we heard today, but not everything. Let me just go through some of the materials that Dr. Kay wanted us to fully understand. This was my fourth opportunity to meet with Dr. Kay. I met with him on three different occasions in Iraq and then in front of the committee today.

   He begins by saying that he cannot strongly enough emphasize that the interim progress report is a snapshot in the context of an ongoing investigation of where we are after our first 3 months of work. It is not a completed report. It only covers the first 3 months. He says that they are still very much in the collection analysis mode, seeking the information and evidence that will allow us to confidently draw comprehensive conclusions to the actual objectives, scope, and dimensions of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction activities at the time of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Iraq's WMD program spanned more than 2 decades, involved thousands of people, billions of dollars, and was elaborately shielded by security and deception operations that continued even beyond the end of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

   He goes to say that the result talks about the period from 1991 to 2003 where much of what we expected to find in Iraq was based on very, very limited information. He talked extensively about what they have found and what we have not found. He said, ``What we have not found are stocks of weapons , but we are not yet at the point where we can say definitively that such weapon stocks do not exist or that they existed before the war and our only task is to find where they have gone.''

   Mr. Speaker, why are they having such difficulty? Here are some reasons. All of Iraq's WMD activities were highly compartmentalized within a regime that ruled and kept its secrets through fear and terror. It is hard to find out what was going on in Iraq. Deliberate dispersal and destruction of material and documentation relating to weapons programs began pre-conflict and ran trans- to post-conflict. They destroyed the evidence and the information that would have clearly and quickly outlined for us exactly the programs they had in place. ``Post-Operation Iraqi Freedom looting destroyed or dispersed important and easily collectable materials and forensic evidence concerning Iraq's weapons of mass destruction program.''

   The report covers in detail the significant elements of this looting that were carried out with a clear aim of concealing pre-Operation Iraqi Freedom activities of Saddam Hussein's regime. Some WMD personnel crossed borders in the pretrans-conflict period, and may have taken evidence and even weapons -related materials with them.

   Another reason we are having some difficulties, any actual WMD weapons or materials are likely to be small in relationship to the total conventional armaments footprints and difficult-to-near impossible to identify with normal search procedures. It is important to keep in mind that even the bulkiest materials we are searching for and the quantities we would expect to find can be concealed in spaces not much larger than a two-car garage.

   But what have they found? This is not only about why it is difficult. What he is telling us is why we maybe did not just walk into Baghdad or Iraq and say here is the warehouse, and here is all of the information. He is telling us why it is difficult, and he says they have found dozens of WMD-related program activities and significant amounts of equipment that Iraq concealed from the United Nations during the inspections that began in late 2002.

   Continuing on, he gives a few examples of these concealment efforts, some of which I will elaborate on later. They include a clandestine network of laboratories and safehouses that contained equipment subject to U.N. monitoring and suitable for continuing CBW research; a prison laboratory complex, possibly used in human testing of biological agents; referenced strains of biological organisms concealed in scientists' homes, one of which can be used to produce biological weapons ; new research on biological weapons applicable agents, documents and equipment hidden in scientists' homes that

   would have been useful in resuming uranium enrichment by centrifuge and electromagnetic isotope separation; a line of UAVs not fully declared at an undeclared production facility and an admission that they had tested one of their declared UAVs out to a range of 500 kilometers, 350 kilometers beyond the permissible limit; continued covert capability to manufacture fuel propellant useful only for prohibited SCUD variant missiles; plans and advanced design work for new long-range missiles with ranges of up to 1,000 kilometers, well beyond the 150-kilometer range limit imposed by the U.N.; clandestine attempts between 1999 and 2002 to obtain from North Korea technology related to 1,300 kilometer-range ballistic missiles.

   They faced systematic destruction of documents. With regard to biological warfare activities, he stated that Iraqi survey group teams are uncovering significant information, including research and development of BW-applicable organisms, the involvement of Iraqi intelligence service, and possible biological weapon activities and deliberate concealment activities.

   All of this suggests Iraq after 1996 further compartmentalized its program and focused on maintaining smaller, covert capabilities that could be activated quickly to surge the production of biological weapons agents. Debriefings of IIS, Iraqi Intelligence Service, officials and site visits have

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begun to unravel a clandestine network of laboratories and facilities within the security service apparatus. This network was never declared to the U.N. and was previously unknown. They are still working on determining the extent to which this network was tied to large-scale military efforts or BW terror agents; but this clandestine capability was suitable for preserving BW expertise, BW facilities, and continuing R&D, all key elements for maintaining a capability for resuming BW production.

   The Iraqi intelligence service also played a prominent role in sponsoring students for overseas graduate studies in the biological sciences. No big deal, except, the quote continues, according to Iraqi scientists and Iraqi intelligence service sources providing an important avenue for furthering BW applicable research. Interestingly enough, this was the only area of graduate work where the Iraqi intelligence service appeared to sponsor students.

   Another quote, in a similar vein, two key former BW scientists confirmed that Iraq, under the guise of legitimate activity, developed refinements of processes and products relevant to BW agents. The scientists discussed the development of improved simplified fermentation and spray-drying capabilities for the simulant BT that would have been directly applicable to anthrax. One scientist confirmed that the production line for BT could be switched to produce anthrax in one week if the seed stock were available.

   Another area that needs investigation, another quote out of the report, additional information is beginning to corroborate reporting since 1996 about human testing activities. Let me repeat that: reporting since 1996 about human testing activities using chemical and biological substance, progress in this area is slow given the concern of knowledgeable Iraqi personnel about their being prosecuted for crimes against humanity.

   I have only got a couple of minutes left; and the report that Dr. Kay has issued is an interim report, and I think that this report is now going to be available, or this portion, the declassified portion is going to be available to the American people.

   When you read through here and you take a look at the concealment of these different programs from the U.N., the systematic effort to hide and destroy relevant information, and then the things that we have found already, the different labs, the discussion about human testing, the different efforts that they had that were under way, the work that they had going on in a number of different areas, it becomes clear quickly that we need to do two or three things, the first of which is we need to let Dr. Kay finish his report and to finish his work. As he states at the front end, it is too early to draw any conclusions as to exactly what was going on, what was available, and where Saddam Hussein was going. We need to let Dr. Kay finish his work so that we will have a clear understanding of what was and what was not available in Iraq, and that is going to be a very difficult task given the destruction of materials and the environment that we have in Iraq today.

   The second thing that we need to do is we need to make sure that we give Dr. Kay the resources to get the job done.

   The third thing we know is there was a lot of stuff going on in Iraq, and the approach that Dr. Kay is taking is exactly the kind of approach that we need to take. Dr. Kay really has three criteria that he talks about before he will reach conclusions on exactly what Iraq has. He wants to find physical evidence, the materials or the equipment that demonstrate that certain programs or activities were under way. He wants to find the

   documentation that says here is the equipment, here is the documentation that outlines what this equipment was intended to do, and then the third piece that he wants to put with this is these are the Iraqis that were working the plan and working the equipment so that he has put all of the pieces together. That is exactly the kind of approach that we need to take, rather than asking Dr. Kay or others to jump to conclusions based on the piecemeal information that we have today.

   In this report, Dr. Kay talks about the mobile labs. They have found mobile labs. So they have a piece of the puzzle. They have found mobile labs, but rather than reaching a conclusion and saying what they were or were not used for, since they only found the mobile labs and they have not found the documentation and they have not found the Iraqi personnel that might have been operating these labs, we are at this point in time speculating what they may have been used for and capable of; and Dr. Kay has simply in this report said we are not reaching a conclusion or making a decision as to what we believe that equipment was being used for. We are going to wait until we find the Iraqis; we are going to wait until we have an opportunity to uncover the documents that will outline exactly what these bio labs or what these laboratories, mobile labs, were going to be used for.

   The professionalism of Dr. Kay and the process that he is going through are exactly what we need to have in place at this point.

   

[Time: 18:00]

   I think that the report today that was issued, the portions of the report that were made public, the portions of the report that are still classified, should give us the highest degree of confidence that Dr. Kay is going through this in exactly the right way that it needs to be done and that there are a number of very, very serious issues that need to be pursued and that we need to get to the bottom of. It will help us to better determine the accuracy and the effectiveness of our intel before the war, but also it will give us a better understanding as to how far chemical and biological weapons had progressed in Iraq, and we need to know that so that we will also have an idea as to what at some point in time may have been transferred to others who may want to do us harm.
 


4B) The Situation in Iraq

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from New York (Mr. Hinchey) is recognized for 5 minutes.

   Mr. HINCHEY. Madam Speaker, earlier this evening, one of our Republican colleagues, a very fine and thoughtful gentleman, came to the well here to lament the fact that the dialogue here, the discussion in the House, has become somewhat partisan lately. I have to agree with him that that is the case. He also said that earlier, after September 11, 2001, immediately thereafter, there was a sense of unity and purpose here, we were united. There is no question that that also is true. There are legitimate reasons for both circumstances.

   After the attack of September 11, of course we were united. We were united as a country and the Members in this House were united purposefully to deal with the problems associated with that attack.

   

[Time: 17:15]

   The President and the Members of Congress here identified the source of that problem. It was al Qaeda network being harbored by the Taliban in Afghanistan, and we all united together to make sure that that problem was eliminated. Some of us even went to Afghanistan to be with our military personnel to show them our support for the efforts there. That military action is over. Unfortunately, due to the lack of attention of the administration, however, it is rapidly deteriorating.

   But I want to talk more about the situation that exists in Iraq because that has become the major focus of our attention, and indeed it has taken on a partisan perspective, and there are very good reasons for that because we have major differences of opinion. First of all, with regard to the rationale for attacking Iraq and, secondly, with regard to how the circumstances there are being carried out by this administration and especially by the Defense Department under this administration.

   Everyone will recall that the President, when he spoke here in this House to a joint session of Congress and the American people, said over and over and over again directly and indirectly that there were ties and relationships between Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden, between Iraq and the al Qaeda network, and that was the reason why we had to go to war. Just recently the President has had to admit that that was not the case. There was no connection between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda or Osama bin Laden.

   Then the administration was telling us that they had to go over weapons of mass destruction . They knew there were chemical and biological weapons there in Iraq, and we had to go in there because those weapons were dangerous and they had to be taken care of. We have been there now for 5 months. We have found no chemical or biological weapons , no trace of any program dealing with nuclear weapons in spite of the fact that the President, from the podium here in this House, said that he had good solid information that the Iraqis were importing enriched uranium from Niger to facilitate the development of their nuclear program. All of that has turned out to be false. And so, yes, we raised the question why did we go to Iraq? For what purpose are we there? Why did we disrupt that country? Why have we created a situation of chaos there that has resulted in the death, up to this moment, of more than 300 American soldiers and the injury, the wounding, many of them very serious, of hundreds more, not to mention the deaths of tens of thousands, perhaps hundreds of thousands of Iraqis and others from other countries? Yes, we question that.

   Now, we find out other things. For example, we have learned recently that there are now, according to General Abizaid, who is the highest-ranking American military officer in the Persian Gulf, that there are 650,000 tons of conventional weapons in Iraq, and they are essentially unguarded. The administration is running around the country there looking for so-called weapons of mass destruction . They have not paid a bit of attention to 650,000 tons of conventional weapons , grenades, surface-to-air missiles, 500-pound bombs, things of that nature that are scattered in places all over that country.

   The destruction of the UN headquarters in Iraq recently, which resulted in the death of the highest-ranking United Nations official in Iraq, is something that we are all deeply concerned about and lament. What caused that? It turns out that under an FBI investigation, they found remnants of a Russian-made 500-pound bomb that, in all likelihood, came from one of these arsenals that are scattered around Iraq unguarded from which the terrorists can get all of the explosives and all of the conventional weapons they want, because we are not paying sufficient attention to them because we are looking for something that the administration has known from the beginning, based upon intelligence from the Central Intelligence Agency, the FBI, and elsewhere, that there were no weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.

   They have taken us down a blind alley. We see through it. We see the falsehood. We see the mendacity. And, of course, we have an obligation, a responsibility to speak out against it. That is why the tone has turned in this House to a more partisan nature, because the administration and the leadership in this House pulled the wool over the eyes of the American people and many of the Members of this House who voted for that war resolution back last October. And now it is evident that they did so under false pretenses. It was a fraud, and we need to take action to correct it.


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