Congressional Record Weekly UpdateOctober 27-31, 2003Return to the Congressional Report Weekly. 1A) S.A. 1974 to H.R. 2800 – Excerpted Language re Nonproliferation SEC. 1804. FELLOWSHIPS FOR MULTIDISCIPLINARY TRAINING ON NONPROLIFERATION ISSUES. (a) FELLOWSHIPS AUTHORIZED.--In carrying out international exchange programs, the Secretary shall design and implement a program to encourage eligible students to study at an accredited United States institution of higher education in an appropriate graduate program. (b) ELIGIBLE STUDENT DEFINED.--In this section, the term ``eligible student'' means a citizen of a foreign country who-- (1) has completed undergraduate education; and (2) is qualified (as determined by the Secretary). (c) APPROPRIATE GRADUATE PROGRAM DEFINED.--In this section, the term ``appropriate graduate program'' means a graduate level program that provides for the multidisciplinary study of issues relating to weapons nonproliferation and includes training in-- (1) diplomacy; (2) arms control; (3) multilateral export controls; or (4) threat reduction assistance. (d) AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS.--Of the amounts authorized to be appropriated for educational and cultural exchange programs under section 1102, $2,000,000 may be available to carry out this section. ******************** SEC. 2126. NONPROLIFERATION, ANTI-TERRORISM, DEMINING, AND RELATED ASSISTANCE. (a) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.--There is authorized to be appropriated to the President for fiscal year 2004, $485,200,000 for Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs for the purpose of carrying out nonproliferation, anti-terrorism, demining, and related programs and activities under-- (1) chapter 8 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2349aa et seq.); (2) chapter 9 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2349bb et seq.); (3) section 551 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2348), as amended by section 2212 of this Act, to the extent such assistance is used for activities identified in the last sentence of that section, including not to exceed $675,000 for administrative expenses related to such activities, which amount shall be in addition to funds otherwise made available for such purposes; (4) section 504 of the FREEDOM Support Act (22 U.S.C. 5854) and programs under the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund to promote bilateral and multilateral activities relating to nonproliferation and disarmament, notwithstanding any other provision of law, including, when in the national security interests of the United States, with respect to international organizations and countries other than the independent states of the former Soviet Union; (5) section 23 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2763), for demining activities, the clearance of unexploded ordnance, the destruction of small arms, and related activities, notwithstanding any other provision of law; (6) section 301 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2221); (7) the Radiological Terrorism Threat Reduction Act of 2003 under title XII of this Act; and (8) the Global Pathogen Surveillance Act of 2003 under title XIII of this Act. (b) AVAILABILITY.--Amounts appropriated under this section for the purpose specified in subsection (a)-- [Page: S13282] (1) are authorized to remain available until expended; and (2) are in addition to amounts otherwise available for that purpose. ******************** SEC. 2237. CONSOLIDATION OF REPORTS ON NONPROLIFERATION IN SOUTH ASIA. Section 1601(c) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003 is amended to read as follows: ``(c) REPORT.--The report required to be submitted to Congress not later than April 1, 2004 pursuant to section 620F(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2376(c)) shall include a description of the efforts of the United States Government to achieve the objectives described in subsections (a) and (b), the progress made toward achieving such objectives, and the likelihood that such objectives will be achieved by September 30, 2004.''.
CHEM/ BIO AND WMD TERRORISM ************************************ 3A) S.A. 1974 to H.R. 2800 – Excerpted Language re CBW/WMD Terrorism TITLE XXIII--RADIOLOGICAL TERRORISM THREAT REDUCTION SEC. 2301. SHORT TITLE. This title may be cited as the ``Radiological Terrorism Threat Reduction Act of 2003''. SEC. 2302. FINDINGS. Congress makes the following findings: (1) It is feasible for terrorists to obtain and disseminate radioactive material by using a radiological dispersion device (RDD) or by emplacing discrete radioactive sources in major public places. (2) An attack by terrorists using radiological material could cause catastrophic economic and social damage, although it might kill few, if any, Americans. (3) The first line of defense against radiological terrorism is preventing the acquisition of radioactive material by terrorists. SEC. 2303. DEFINITIONS. In this title: (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.--The term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives. (2) BYPRODUCT MATERIAL.--The term ``byproduct material'' has the meaning given the term in section 11 e. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2014(e)). (3) IAEA.--The term ``IAEA'' means the International Atomic Energy Agency. (4) INDEPENDENT STATES OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION.--The term ``independent states of the former Soviet Union'' has the meaning given the term in section 3 of the FREEDOM Support Act (22 U.S.C. 5801). (5) RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL.--The term ``radioactive material'' means-- (A) source material and special nuclear material, but does not include natural or depleted uranium; (B) nuclear byproduct material; (C) material made radioactive by bombardment in an accelerator; and (D) all refined isotopes of radium. (6) RADIOACTIVE SOURCE.--The term ``radioactive source'' means radioactive material that is permanently sealed in a capsule or closely bonded and includes any radioactive material released if the source is leaking or stolen, but does not include any material within the nuclear fuel cycle of a research or power reactor. [Page: S13289] (7) RADIOISOTOPE THERMAL GENERATOR.--The term ``radioisotope thermal generator'' means an electrical generator which derives its power from the heat produced by the decay of a radioactive source by the emission of alpha, beta, or gamma radiation. The term does not include nuclear reactors deriving their energy from the fission or fusion of atomic nuclei. (8) SECRETARY.--The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary of State. (9) SOURCE MATERIAL.--The term ``source material'' has the meaning given the term in section 11 z. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2014(z)). (10) SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL.--The term ``special nuclear material'' has the meaning given the term in section 11 aa. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2014(aa)). SEC. 2304. INTERNATIONAL STORAGE FACILITIES FOR RADIOACTIVE SOURCES. (a) AGREEMENTS ON TEMPORARY SECURE STORAGE.--The Secretary is authorized to propose that the IAEA conclude agreements with up to 8 countries under which agreement each country would provide temporary secure storage for orphaned, unused, surplus, or other radioactive sources (other than special nuclear material, nuclear fuel, or spent nuclear fuel). Such agreements shall be consistent with the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, and shall address the need for storage of such radioactive sources in countries or regions of the world where convenient access to secure storage of such radioactive sources does not exist. (b) VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS TO IAEA AUTHORIZED.-- (1) IN GENERAL.--The Secretary is authorized to make voluntary contributions to the IAEA for use by the Department of Nuclear Safety of the IAEA to fund the United States share of the costs of activities associated with or under agreements under subsection (a). (2) UNITED STATES SHARE IN FISCAL YEAR 2004.--The United States share of the costs of activities under agreements under subsection (a) in fiscal year 2004 may be 100 percent of the costs of such activities in that fiscal year. (c) TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE.--The Secretary is authorized to provide the IAEA and other countries with technical assistance to carry out activities under agreements under subsection (a) in a manner that meets the standards of the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. (d) APPLICABILITY OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS.-- (1) INAPPLICABILITY OF NEPA TO FACILITIES OUTSIDE UNITED STATES.--The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.) shall not apply with respect to any temporary secure storage facility constructed outside the United States under an agreement under subsection (a). (2) APPLICABILITY OF FOREIGN ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS.--The construction and operation of a facility described in paragraph (1) shall be governed by any applicable environmental laws of the country in which the facility is constructed. (e) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.-- (1) IN GENERAL.--Of the amounts authorized to be appropriated under this division for Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs, there is authorized to be appropriated to the President for fiscal year 2004, $4,000,000 to carry out this section. (2) AVAILABILITY.--Amounts authorized to be appropriated by paragraph (1) are authorized to remain available until expended. SEC. 2305. DISCOVERY, INVENTORY, AND RECOVERY OF RADIOACTIVE SOURCES. (a) AUTHORITY.--The Secretary is authorized to provide assistance, including through voluntary contributions to the IAEA under subsection (b), to support a program of the Division of Radiation and Waste Safety of the Department of Nuclear Safety of the IAEA to promote the discovery, inventory, and recovery of radioactive sources in member nations of the IAEA. (b) VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS TO IAEA AUTHORIZED.--The Secretary is authorized to make voluntary contributions to the IAEA to fund the United States share of the program described in subsection (a). (c) TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE.--The Secretary is authorized to provide the IAEA and other countries with technical assistance to carry out the program described in subsection (a). (d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.-- (1) IN GENERAL.--Of the amounts authorized to be appropriated under this Act for Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs, there is authorized to be appropriated to the President for fiscal year 2004, $4,000,000 to carry out this section. (2) AVAILABILITY.--Amounts authorized to be appropriated by paragraph (1) are authorized to remain available until expended. SEC. 2306. RADIOISOTOPE THERMAL GENERATOR POWER UNITS IN THE INDEPENDENT STATES OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION. (a) SUBSTITUTION WITH OTHER POWER UNITS.-- (1) IN GENERAL.--The Secretary is authorized to assist the Government of the Russian Federation to substitute solar (or other non-nuclear) power sources for radioisotope thermal power units operated by the Russian Federation and other independent states of the former Soviet Union in applications such as lighthouses in the Arctic, remote weather stations, and for providing electricity in remote locations. (2) TECHNOLOGY REQUIREMENT.--Any power unit utilized as a substitute power unit under paragraph (1) shall, to the maximum extent practicable, be based upon tested technologies that have operated for at least one full year in the environment where the substitute power unit will be used. (b) CONSULTATION.--The Secretary shall consult with the Secretary of Energy to ensure that substitute power sources provided under this section are for facilities from which the radioisotope thermal generator power units have been or are being removed. (c) ACTIVITIES OUTSIDE FORMER SOVIET UNION.--The Secretary may use not more than 20 percent of the funds available under this section in any fiscal year to replace dangerous radioisotope thermal power facilities that are similar to the facilities described in subsection (a) in countries other than the independent states of the former Soviet Union. (d) FUNDING.-- (1) IN GENERAL.--Of the amounts authorized to be appropriated under this Act for Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs, there is authorized to be appropriated to the President for fiscal year 2004, $5,000,000 to carry out this section. (2) AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS.--Amounts available under paragraph (1) are authorized to remain available until expended. SEC. 2307. FOREIGN FIRST RESPONDERS. (a) IN GENERAL.--The Secretary is authorized to assist foreign countries, or to propose that the IAEA assist foreign countries, in the development of appropriate national response plans and the training of first responders to-- (1) detect, identify, and characterize radioactive material; (2) understand the hazards posed by radioactive contamination; (3) understand the risks encountered at various dose rates; (4) enter contaminated areas safely and speedily; and (5) evacuate persons within a contaminated area. (b) CONSIDERATIONS.--In carrying out activities under subsection (a), the Secretary shall take into account the findings of the threat assessment report required by section 2308 and the location of any storage facilities for radioactive sources under section 2304. (c) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.-- (1) IN GENERAL.--Of the amounts authorized to be appropriated under this Act for Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs, there is authorized to be appropriated to the President for fiscal year 2004, $2,000,000 to carry out this section. (2) AVAILABILITY.--Amounts authorized to be appropriated by paragraph (1) are authorized to remain available until expended. SEC. 2308. THREAT ASSESSMENT REPORTS. (a) REPORTS REQUIRED.--The Secretary shall, at the times specified in subsection (c), submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report-- (1) detailing the preparations made at United States diplomatic missions abroad to detect and mitigate a radiological attack on United States missions and other United States facilities under the control of the Secretary; (2) setting forth a rank-ordered list of the Secretary's priorities for improving radiological security and consequence management at United States missions; and (3) providing a rank-ordered list of the missions where such improvement is most important. (b) BUDGET REQUEST.--Each report under subsection (a) shall also include a proposed budget to carry out the improvements described in subsection (a)(2) under such report. (c) TIMING.-- (1) FIRST REPORT.--The first report under subsection (a) shall be submitted not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act. (2) SUBSEQUENT REPORTS.--Subsequent reports under subsection (a) shall be submitted with the budget justification materials submitted by the Secretary to Congress in support of the budget of the President for the fiscal year (as submitted under section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code) for each fiscal year commencing with fiscal year 2006. (d) FORM.--Each report shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. ******************** TITLE XXIV--GLOBAL PATHOGEN SURVEILLANCE SEC. 2401. SHORT TITLE. This title may be cited as the ``Global Pathogen Surveillance Act of 2003''. SEC. 2402. FINDINGS; PURPOSE. (a) FINDINGS.--Congress makes the following findings: (1) Bioterrorism poses a grave national security threat to the United States. The insidious nature of the threat, the likely delayed recognition in the event of an attack, and the underpreparedness of the domestic public health infrastructure may produce catastrophic consequences following a biological weapons attack upon the United States. (2) A contagious pathogen engineered as a biological weapon and developed, tested, produced, or released in another country can quickly spread to the United States. Given the realities of international travel, trade, and migration patterns, a dangerous pathogen released anywhere in the world can spread to United States territory in a matter of days, before any effective quarantine or isolation measures can be implemented. [Page: S13290] (3) To effectively combat bioterrorism and ensure that the United States is fully prepared to prevent, diagnose, and contain a biological weapons attack, measures to strengthen the domestic public health infrastructure and improve domestic surveillance and monitoring, while absolutely essential, are not sufficient. (4) The United States should enhance cooperation with the World Health Organization, regional health organizations, and individual countries, including data sharing with appropriate United States departments and agencies, to help detect and quickly contain infectious disease outbreaks or bioterrorism agents before they can spread. (5) The World Health Organization (WHO) has done an impressive job in monitoring infectious disease outbreaks around the world, including the recent emergence of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) epidemic, particularly with the establishment in April 2000 of the Global Outbreak Alert and Response network. (6) The capabilities of the World Health Organization are inherently limited by the quality of the data and information it receives from member countries, the narrow range of diseases (plague, cholera, and yellow fever) upon which its disease surveillance and monitoring is based, and the consensus process it uses to add new diseases to the list. Developing countries in particular often cannot devote the necessary resources to build and maintain public health infrastructures. (7) In particular, developing countries could benefit from-- (A) better trained public health professionals and epidemiologists to recognize disease patterns; (B) appropriate laboratory equipment for diagnosis of pathogens; (C) disease reporting based on symptoms and signs (known as ``syndrome surveillance''), affording the earliest possible opportunity to conduct an effective response; (D) a narrowing of the existing technology gap in syndrome surveillance capabilities and real-time information dissemination to public health officials; and (E) appropriate communications equipment and information technology to efficiently transmit information and data within national and regional health networks, including inexpensive, Internet-based Geographic Information Systems (GIS) and relevant telephone-based systems for early recognition and diagnosis of diseases. (8) An effective international capability to monitor and quickly diagnose infectious disease outbreaks will offer dividends not only in the event of biological weapons development, testing, production, and attack, but also in the more likely cases of naturally occurring infectious disease outbreaks that could threaten the United States. Furthermore, a robust surveillance system will serve to deter terrorist use of biological weapons, as early detection will help mitigate the intended effects of such malevolent uses. (b) PURPOSE.--The purposes of this title are as follows: (1) To enhance the capability and cooperation of the international community, including the World Health Organization and individual countries, through enhanced pathogen surveillance and appropriate data sharing, to detect, identify, and contain infectious disease outbreaks, whether the cause of those outbreaks is intentional human action or natural in origin. (2) To enhance the training of public health professionals and epidemiologists from eligible developing countries in advanced Internet-based and other electronic syndrome surveillance systems, in addition to traditional epidemiology methods, so that they may better detect, diagnose, and contain infectious disease outbreaks, especially those due to pathogens most likely to be used in a biological weapons attack. (3) To provide assistance to developing countries to purchase appropriate public health laboratory equipment necessary for infectious disease surveillance and diagnosis. (4) To provide assistance to developing countries to purchase appropriate communications equipment and information technology, including, as appropriate, relevant computer equipment, Internet connectivity mechanisms, and telephone-based applications to effectively gather, analyze, and transmit public health information for infectious disease surveillance and diagnosis. (5) To make available greater numbers of United States Government public health professionals to international health organizations, regional health networks, and United States diplomatic missions where appropriate. (6) To establish ``lab-to-lab'' cooperative relationships between United States public health laboratories and established foreign counterparts. (7) To expand the training and outreach activities of overseas United States laboratories, including Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and Department of Defense entities, to enhance the disease surveillance capabilities of developing countries. (8) To provide appropriate technical assistance to existing regional health networks and, where appropriate, seed money for new regional networks. SEC. 2403. DEFINITIONS. In this title: (1) BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION.--The term ``Biological Weapons Convention'' means the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, signed at Washington, London, and Moscow April 10, 1972. (2) ELIGIBLE DEVELOPING COUNTRY.--The term ``eligible developing country'' means any developing country that-- (A) has agreed to the objective of fully complying with requirements of the World Health Organization on reporting public health information on outbreaks of infectious diseases; (B) has not been determined by the Secretary, for purposes of section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2780), section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371), or section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2405), to have repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism, unless the Secretary exercises a waiver certifying that it is in the national interest of the United States to provide assistance under the provisions of this title; (C) is a state party to the Biological Weapons Convention; and (D) is determined by the United States Government not to have an offensive biological weapons program. (3) ELIGIBLE NATIONAL.--The term ``eligible national'' means any citizen or national of an eligible developing country who-- (A) is eligible to receive a visa under the provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.); and (B) is not currently or previously affiliated with or employed by a laboratory or entity determined by the United States Government to be involved in offensive biological weapons activities. (4) INTERNATIONAL HEALTH ORGANIZATION.--The term ``international health organization'' includes the World Health Organization and the Pan American Health Organization. (5) LABORATORY.--The term ``laboratory'' means a facility for the biological, microbiological, serological, chemical, immuno-hematological, hematological, biophysical, cytological, pathological, or other examination of materials derived from the human body for the purpose of providing information for the diagnosis, prevention, or treatment of any disease or impairment of, or the assessment of the health of, human beings. (6) SECRETARY.--Unless otherwise provided, the term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary of State. (7) SELECT AGENT.--The term ``select agent'' has the meaning given such term for purposes of section 72.6 of title 42, Code of Federal Regulations. (8) SYNDROME SURVEILLANCE.--The term ``syndrome surveillance'' means the recording of symptoms (patient complaints) and signs (derived from physical examination) combined with simple geographic locators to track the emergence of a disease in a population. SEC. 2404. PRIORITY FOR CERTAIN COUNTRIES. Priority in the provision of United States assistance for eligible developing countries under all the provisions of this title shall be given to those countries that permit personnel from the World Health Organization and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to investigate outbreaks of infectious diseases on their territories, provide early notification of disease outbreaks, and provide pathogen surveillance data to appropriate United States departments and agencies in addition to international health organizations. SEC. 2405. RESTRICTION. Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, no foreign nationals participating in programs authorized under this title shall have access, during the course of such participation, to select agents that may be used as, or in, a biological weapon, except in a supervised and controlled setting. SEC. 2406. FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM. (a) ESTABLISHMENT.--There is established a fellowship program (in this section referred to as the ``program'') under which the Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of Health and Human Services and subject to the availability of appropriations, shall award fellowships to eligible nationals to pursue public health education or training, as follows: (1) MASTER OF PUBLIC HEALTH DEGREE.--Graduate courses of study leading to a master of public health degree with a concentration in epidemiology from an institution of higher education in the United States with a Center for Public Health Preparedness, as determined by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (2) ADVANCED PUBLIC HEALTH EPIDEMIOLOGY TRAINING.--Advanced public health training in epidemiology to be carried out at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (or equivalent State facility), or other Federal facility (excluding the Department of Defense or United States National Laboratories), for a period of not less than 6 months or more than 12 months. (b) SPECIALIZATION IN BIOTERRORISM.--In addition to the education or training specified in subsection (a), each recipient of a fellowship under this section (in this section referred to as a ``fellow'') may take courses of study at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention or at an equivalent facility on diagnosis and containment of likely bioterrorism agents. (c) FELLOWSHIP AGREEMENT.-- (1) IN GENERAL.--In awarding a fellowship under the program, the Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of Health and Human Services, shall require the recipient [Page: S13291] to enter into an agreement under which, in exchange for such assistance, the recipient-- (A) will maintain satisfactory academic progress (as determined in accordance with regulations issued by the Secretary and confirmed in regularly scheduled updates to the Secretary from the institution providing the education or training on the progress of the recipient's education or training); (B) will, upon completion of such education or training, return to the recipient's country of nationality or last habitual residence (so long as it is an eligible developing country) and complete at least four years of employment in a public health position in the government or a nongovernmental, not-for-profit entity in that country or, with the approval of the Secretary, complete part or all of this requirement through service with an international health organization without geographic restriction; and (C) agrees that, if the recipient is unable to meet the requirements described in subparagraph (A) or (B), the recipient will reimburse the United States for the value of the assistance provided to the recipient under the fellowship, together with interest at a rate determined in accordance with regulations issued by the Secretary but not higher than the rate generally applied in connection with other Federal loans. (2) WAIVERS.--The Secretary may waive the application of paragraph (1)(B) and (1)(C) if the Secretary determines that it is in the national interest of the United States to do so. (d) IMPLEMENTATION.--The Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of Health and Human Services, is authorized to enter into an agreement with any eligible developing country under which the country agrees-- (1) to establish a procedure for the nomination of eligible nationals for fellowships under this section; (2) to guarantee that a fellow will be offered a professional public health position within the country upon completion of his studies; and (3) to certify to the Secretary when a fellow has concluded the minimum period of employment in a public health position required by the fellowship agreement, with an explanation of how the requirement was met. (e) PARTICIPATION OF UNITED STATES CITIZENS.--On a case-by-case basis, the Secretary may provide for the participation of United States citizens under the provisions of this section if the Secretary determines that it is in the national interest of the United States to do so. Upon completion of such education or training, a United States recipient shall complete at least 5 years of employment in a public health position in an eligible developing country or an international health organization. SEC. 2407. IN-COUNTRY TRAINING IN LABORATORY TECHNIQUES AND SYNDROME SURVEILLANCE. (a) IN GENERAL.--In conjunction with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the Department of Defense, the Secretary shall, subject to the availability of appropriations, support short training courses in-country (not in the United States) for laboratory technicians and other public health personnel from eligible developing countries in laboratory techniques relating to the identification, diagnosis, and tracking of pathogens responsible for possible infectious disease outbreaks. Training under this section may be conducted in overseas facilities of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention or in Overseas Medical Research Units of the Department of Defense, as appropriate. The Secretary shall coordinate such training courses, where appropriate, with the existing programs and activities of the World Health Organization. (b) TRAINING IN SYNDROME SURVEILLANCE.--In conjunction with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the Department of Defense, the Secretary shall, subject to the availability of appropriations, establish and support short training courses in-country (not in the United States) for public health personnel from eligible developing countries in techniques of syndrome surveillance reporting and rapid analysis of syndrome information using Geographic Information System (GIS) and other Internet-based tools. Training under this subsection may be conducted via the Internet or in appropriate facilities as determined by the Secretary. The Secretary shall coordinate such training courses, where appropriate, with the existing programs and activities of the World Health Organization. SEC. 2408. ASSISTANCE FOR THE PURCHASE AND MAINTENANCE OF PUBLIC HEALTH LABORATORY EQUIPMENT. (a) AUTHORIZATION.--The President is authorized, on such terms and conditions as the President may determine, to furnish assistance to eligible developing countries to purchase and maintain public health laboratory equipment described in subsection (b). (b) EQUIPMENT COVERED.--Equipment described in this subsection is equipment that is-- (1) appropriate, where possible, for use in the intended geographic area; (2) necessary to collect, analyze, and identify expeditiously a broad array of pathogens, including mutant strains, which may cause disease outbreaks or may be used as a biological weapon; (3) compatible with general standards set forth, as appropriate, by the World Health Organization and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, to ensure interoperability with regional and international public health networks; (4) necessary to secure and monitor pathogen collections containing select agents; and (5) not defense articles or defense services as those terms are defined under section 47 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2794). (c) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.--Nothing in this section shall be construed to exempt the exporting of goods and technology from compliance with applicable provisions of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2401 et seq.) (or successor statutes). (d) LIMITATION.--Amounts appropriated to carry out this section shall not be made available for the purchase from a foreign country of equipment that, if made in the United States, would be subject to the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.) or likely be barred or subject to special conditions under the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2401 et seq.) (or successor statutes). (e) HOST COUNTRY'S COMMITMENTS.--The assistance provided under this section shall be contingent upon the host country's commitment to provide the resources, infrastructure, and other assets required to house, maintain, support, secure, monitor, and maximize use of this equipment and appropriate technical personnel. SEC. 2409. ASSISTANCE FOR IMPROVED COMMUNICATION OF PUBLIC HEALTH INFORMATION. (a) ASSISTANCE FOR PURCHASE OF COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY.--The President is authorized to provide, on such terms and conditions as the President may determine, assistance to eligible developing countries for the purchase and maintenance of communications equipment and information technology described in subsection (b), and supporting equipment, necessary to effectively collect, analyze, and transmit public health information. (b) COVERED EQUIPMENT.--Equipment (and information technology) described in this subsection is equipment that-- (1) is suitable for use under the particular conditions of the area of intended use; (2) meets appropriate World Health Organization standards to ensure interoperability with like equipment of other countries and international health organizations; and (3) is not defense articles or defense services as those terms are defined under section 47 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2794). (c) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.--Nothing in this section shall be construed to exempt the exporting of goods and technology from compliance with applicable provisions of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2401 et seq.) (or successor statutes). (d) LIMITATION.--Amounts appropriated to carry out this section shall not be made available for the purchase from a foreign country of equipment that, if made in the United States, would be subject to the Arms Export Control Act or likely be barred or subject to special conditions under the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2401 et seq.) (or successor statutes). (e) ASSISTANCE FOR STANDARDIZATION OF REPORTING.--The President is authorized to provide, on such terms and conditions as the President may determine, technical assistance and grant assistance to international health organizations to facilitate standardization in the reporting of public health information between and among developing countries and international health organizations. (f) HOST COUNTRY'S COMMITMENTS.--The assistance provided under this section shall be contingent upon the host country's commitment to provide the resources, infrastructure, and other assets required to house, support, maintain, secure, and maximize use of this equipment and appropriate technical personnel. SEC. 2410. ASSIGNMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH PERSONNEL TO UNITED STATES MISSIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. (a) IN GENERAL.--Upon the request of a United States chief of diplomatic mission or an international health organization, and with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, the head of a Federal agency may assign to the respective United States mission or organization any officer or employee of the agency occupying a public health position within the agency for the purpose of enhancing disease and pathogen surveillance efforts in developing countries. (b) REIMBURSEMENT.--The costs incurred by a Federal agency by reason of the detail of personnel under subsection (a) may be reimbursed to that agency out of the applicable appropriations account of the Department of State if the Secretary determines that the relevant agency may otherwise be unable to assign such personnel on a non-reimbursable basis. SEC. 2411. EXPANSION OF CERTAIN UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT LABORATORIES ABROAD. (a) IN GENERAL.--Subject to the availability of appropriations, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the Department of Defense shall each-- (1) increase the number of personnel assigned to laboratories of the Centers or the Department, as appropriate, located in eligible developing countries that conduct research and other activities with respect to infectious diseases; and (2) expand the operations of those laboratories, especially with respect to the implementation of on-site training of foreign nationals and regional outreach efforts involving neighboring countries. [Page: S13292] (b) COOPERATION AND COORDINATION BETWEEN LABORATORIES.--Subsection (a) shall be carried out in such a manner as to foster cooperation and avoid duplication between and among laboratories. (c) RELATION TO CORE MISSIONS AND SECURITY.--The expansion of the operations of overseas laboratories of the Centers or the Department under this section shall not-- (1) detract from the established core missions of the laboratories; or (2) compromise the security of those laboratories, as well as their research, equipment, expertise, and materials. SEC. 2412. ASSISTANCE FOR REGIONAL HEALTH NETWORKS AND EXPANSION OF FOREIGN EPIDEMIOLOGY TRAINING PROGRAMS. (a) AUTHORITY.--The President is authorized, on such terms and conditions as the President may determine, to provide assistance for the purposes of-- (1) enhancing the surveillance and reporting capabilities of the World Health Organization and existing regional health networks; and (2) developing new regional health networks. (b) EXPANSION OF FOREIGN EPIDEMIOLOGY TRAINING PROGRAMS.--The Secretary of Health and Human Services is authorized to establish new country or regional Foreign Epidemiology Training Programs in eligible developing countries. SEC. 2413. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS. (a) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.-- (1) IN GENERAL.--Of the amounts authorized to be appropriated under this division for Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining and Related Programs, there is authorized to be appropriated $35,000,000 for the fiscal year 2004 to carry out this title. (2) ALLOCATION OF FUNDS.--Of the amounts made available under paragraph (1)-- (A) $25,000,000 for the fiscal year 2004 is authorized to be available to carry out sections 2406, 2407, 2408, and 2409; (B) $500,000 for the fiscal year 2004 is authorized to be available to carry out section 2410; (C) $2,500,000 for the fiscal year 2004 is authorized to be available to carry out section 2411; and (D) $7,000,000 for the fiscal year 2004 is authorized to be available to carry out section 2412. (b) AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS.--The amount appropriated pursuant to subsection (a) is authorized to remain available until expended. (c) REPORTING REQUIREMENT.--Not later than 120 days after the date of enactment of this title, the Secretary shall submit a report, in conjunction with the Secretary of Health and Human Services and the Secretary of Defense, containing-- (1) a description of the implementation of programs under this title; and (2) an estimate of the level of funding required to carry out those programs at a sufficient level.
3B) S.A. 1974 to H.R. 2800 - Foreign Operations Appropriations, FY 2004 The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana is recognized. AMENDMENT NO. 1974 (Purpose: To authorize appropriations for Foreign Relations and for Foreign Assistance, and to authorize Millennium Challenge Assistance) Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I call up amendment No. 1974. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to setting aside the pending amendment? Without objection, the pending amendment will be set aside. The clerk will report. The assistant legislative clerk read as follows: The Senator from Indiana [Mr. Lugar] proposes an amendment numbered 1974. Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that further reading of the amendment be dispensed with. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. (The amendment is printed in today's RECORD under ``Text of Amendments.'') Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I am pleased to offer an amendment that authorizes the spending contained in this appropriations bill. I thank Senator McConnell and Senator Leahy specifically for the way in which they have worked with me throughout this year on matters pertaining to foreign policy. Our staffs have consulted closely for months, and I believe that our respective legislative efforts have been enhanced greatly by this cooperation. My amendment is an up-to-date version of S. 925, the foreign affairs authorization bill. It contains all of the amendments included in the S. 925 Senate floor action in July. It is truly a bipartisan product. On those 3 days in July in which we debated the bill, we considered dozens of amendments from both sides of the aisle. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee worked with Members on constructive legislative language to enhance the bill; various components have received unanimous committee support. I thank almost every Member of this body who has contributed in one way or another to this amendment because the amendments of almost every Member of this body are a part of the product we are considering today. That is why it not only has enormous bipartisan support, it has pride of authorship of virtually every Senator. In this amendment, the Senate speaks forthrightly on the foreign policy challenges that this appropriations bill addresses by setting forth funding levels for specific programs and projects. This amendment gives voice to the Senate's views on issues touching every continent, from the threats of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, to the safety of Americans working in our embassies overseas, to the President's proposed Millennium Challenge Account, which is designed to spur economic growth in the poorest countries. My amendment authorizes appropriations for our diplomats, our foreign aid workers, our Peace Corps volunteers, many of them in harm's way. They are our civilian soldiers in the war on terrorism, and they are engaged in a noble battle against disease, poverty, and humanitarian disasters. American diplomats and aid workers have become targets in most countries and embassies around the world, but there is no shortage of recruits who want to be trained and sent abroad to do America's work. I thank every member of my committee for their hard work during the authorization process. Members on both sides of the aisle have devoted tens of hours to developing constructive approaches to a number of very difficult foreign policy questions. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has approached many foreign policy problems in a bipartisan spirit; thus, all of our authorizing legislation in S. 925 passed out of the committee by a vote of 19 to 0. I thank and commend, once again, the distinguished ranking member of our committee, Senator Biden, for his abiding cooperation through this whole lengthy process of this year. Republicans and Democrats reasoned together and made compromises that led to excellent legislation. The members of our committee are united in our belief that the authorization bill contained in this amendment will enhance U.S. national security. A vote for this amendment is a vote of confidence in the Senate's ability to help shape a world where peace, justice, and prosperity might prevail. This is not an academic exercise. Authorization legislation is important. If we are to have a foreign policy that has the long-term support of the American people, the Congress must be in it on the takeoffs as well as the landings. We should not be satisfied with appropriating funds after American soldiers [Page: S13353] are on the ground. Congress must be in on the policy formulations and the fulfillment of U.S. commitments. Our role is to help make the hard decisions, not just to sign the checks after decisions are made. Extensive hearings in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee have formed this amendment. The Senate needs the authorization process to project its voice on foreign policy and to have an impact on the direction this country takes in the world. I believe this step is especially necessary because we are now trying to accomplish our legislative work in extraordinary and dangerous times. These times demand the Senate do its duty to pass a foreign affairs authorization bill. Up to this point, we have not done our duty. We are asking a great deal of our diplomats, our military, and the administration; and on a daily basis, Senators of both parties can be heard delivering commentary on the administration's war effort. Our responsibilities as the elected representatives of the people make such commentary relevant and expected. Even as we perform oversight and function as loyal critics within our Government, we cannot forget we have our own responsibilities in fighting the war on terrorism. If we function merely as critics and commentators without taking the time and effort to authorize the very legislation that pertains to our Nation's security, we are failing in our duties. This simply cannot continue. After September 11, 2001, we know we need a robust civilian foreign policy capacity in addition to a strong military if we are going to shape a world that embraces democracy, tolerance, open markets, and the rule of law. But we find the State Department is stretched thin. Our public diplomacy is underfunded and unfocused on many occasions. Our foreign assistance faces constant conflicting pressures and we need to play catchup just to make sure Americans are as safe as possible in their embassy workplaces, and Americans who approach those workplaces are as safe as possible. We have no civilian surge capacity so our soldiers in Afghanistan and Iraq end up doing the nonmilitary tasks that should be done by civilians. Our appropriators have been sensitive to foreign policy needs. They have carried the burden of keeping vital foreign policy programs going, but a few lines in appropriations bills are not sufficient to provide the needed direction and framework and the sustained oversight this body should be paying to our civilian foreign affairs capacity. This year the foreign affairs authorization bill has had to overcome obstacles that have had little to do with its own merits. This authorizing amendment lays out Senate priorities for foreign affairs spending. I have resisted adding anything to it that was not approved in July in open debate and after the adoption of the dozens of amendments I talked about from virtually most, if not all, Senators on this floor. The bill exists as it emerged from the Senate floor at that time and it puts people first, as well as the safety of Americans who work around the world for us. It places a high priority on programs that help foreign governments cooperate with us in tracking down terrorists. It authorizes additional funds for security upgrades at embassies which we know are among the most threatened U.S. targets in the world. As we saw in Kenya and Tanzania, Americans serving in embassies are on the front line in the war against terrorism. The amendment authorized an increase in danger pay for the diplomats who serve in high-risk posts. We are in a race to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction and the authorization of this amendment will increase our capabilities. The amendment authorizes a greater American effort to reach out to the Islamic world. Beyond the war on terrorism, the amendment places a high priority on recognizing the deep reservoir of hope for humanity that resides in the American heart. It authorizes the fulfillment of our humanitarian instincts, including programs for child survival, nutrition and health, famine assistance and the Peace Corps. It authorizes the Millennium Challenge Account, President Bush's new program to invest American development dollars where they are most likely to spur economic growth. A lot of work has gone into the deliberations on the Millennium Challenge Account and the final product is supported by Republicans and Democrats in the Senate, as well as the President of the United States and the Secretary of State. All of us now support the President's concept for creating a new means of delivering economic assistance to nations that are implementing positive and measurable economic and political reforms. We agree with the President that this and our development assistance programs are important tools in the war on terrorism. They can prevent failed states, improve our relationships with developing countries, and reduce impoverished conditions that are conducive to terrorist recruitment. The Senate has been diligent this year in moving other foreign policy items. Among the measures we have passed are the global AIDS bill, the Moscow Treaty, NATO expansion, and the Iraq supplemental. The Senate has shown a capacity to act decisively on the Nation's foreign policy business because we recognize that in these perilous times it is our duty to do so. American national security is at risk, and as the leaders entrusted with passing legislation to keep America secure, we should include the authorization for the civilian foreign affairs agencies and their programs among our accomplishments this year. I ask for adoption of the amendment. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Vermont. Mr. LEAHY. Reserving the right to object, and I apologize because I just arrived on the floor--I am sorry. I thought my distinguished friend, the senior Senator from Indiana, had propounded a unanimous consent request. Mr. LUGAR. Yes. I am prepared to accept the passage of the amendment by voice vote if it is the pleasure of both managers of the bill. Mr. LEAHY. I suggest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll. The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll. Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. REID. Mr. President, let me say initially that in my experience in the Congress I have learned to recognize the quality of the senior Senator from Indiana. He is a fine man, an outstanding legislator, and his heart is always in the right place. I understand the importance of the State Department authorization bill. I have understood it for the more than two decades I have been in the Congress. It is important legislation. On this side of the aisle, we understand that and that is why we have worked so hard over the years to try to move forward. As the Senator from Indiana knows, it certainly was not his fault, but we had great difficulty moving the bill previously as a result of one Senator. On this legislation he now wants to make a part of this foreign operations appropriations bill, we have spent 2 days on this bill and during that period of time we had some good debate. We adopted some amendments. But we on this side feel we should move forward as with all legislation and not cut it off. In effect, that is what is happening. So without belaboring the point more, I raise a point of order that this is legislating on an appropriations bill. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana. Mr. LUGAR. I move to suspend rule XVI of the standing rules of the Senate during the Senate's consideration of H.R. 2800 in order to offer amendment 1974 to that bill. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nevada. Mr. REID. Mr. President, I think the question of the two managers of the bills: How much time do we need to spend on this? It is my understanding the issue that has been raised by the Senator from Indiana will take a two-thirds vote to pass the Senate. I am sure there are a few people who wish to speak on this, and I am sure on our side we could arrive at a reasonable period of time prior to a vote. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kentucky. Mr. McCONNELL. I ask the Senator from Indiana how much time he desires before proceeding to a vote? [Page: S13354] Mr. LUGAR. I respond to the distinguished Senator that I would like 15 minutes. Mr. McCONNELL. Are there any requests for time on the other side? Mr. LEAHY. Then would the request be a half hour evenly divided? Is that what the Senator is suggesting? Mr. REID. I think that is totally reasonable, if I could interrupt. We need to check with the ranking member of the Foreign Relations Committee. Senator Harkin has agreed to take 15 minutes. We don't know of anyone else who wished to speak on it, other than the manager of the bill. I hope, if we can go into an extremely brief quorum call, we can come up with a time agreement very quickly. Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I hope we can move on with this very quickly. I think a brief quorum call is a good idea. I therefore suggest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Crapo). The clerk will call the roll. The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll. Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I ask that there be 30 minutes of debate, equally divided, on the Lugar amendment, after which we will have a vote on that amendment. Have we had the yeas and nays? Mr. LEAHY. I ask for the yeas and nays on Lugar--on the motion to waive. Mr. REID. No, on the motion to suspend. Mr. LEAHY. On the motion to suspend; I am sorry. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second? There appears to be a sufficient second. The yeas and nays were ordered. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request? Without objection, it is so ordered. Who yields time? The Senator from Indiana. Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I yield myself 10 minutes at the outset of this debate. Mr. President, I regret that objection has been made, although I understand the reasoning of those who have made the objection. I identified this as the State Department authorization bill, a bill that also included authorization for the money in the challenge account and, for that matter, a good number of other things that, in this particular urgent period of the war on terrorism, attempts to help brave Americans who are serving in our embassies, who are serving in humanitarian ways abroad. I need not remind the Senate that a number of these brave Americans have lost their lives in recent days and weeks. I need not remind the Senate we are at war. This is not an incidental amendment or a last-minute whim of one Senator. Nor, for that matter, is it a particular desire of our committee--which voted 19 to zero in behalf of some very important principles that support Americans on the civilian side of the war against terrorism--to impose our will upon the Senate. Obviously, we are not in a position to do so. But I pointed out in the days of debate on the amendment that I have offered today, there were tens of amendments offered by many Senators. A majority, I believe, of the body have tried to perfect this bill. It is not a controversial bill. It is, in fact, a statement of the best motivation, the idealism of the Senate. It is our best collective effort to try to meet an imperative in the war against terrorism. At this point, a point of order has been raised that this is legislation on an appropriations bill. Indeed, it is. I have made a motion to waive that requirement, given what I believe is the gravity and the importance of the lives of the Americans we are trying to serve. Members may decide that they wish to debate procedure today. And procedure in the Senate and the rules of the Senate are very important. But the rules of the Senate also permit, as one rule of the Senate, the waiver, so that authorization might occur on an appropriations bill. Some Senators have approached me and indicated they think there is a lot of merit in the bill. As a matter of fact, some of their own work is in this bill, in this amendment I am offering. Yet at the same time, they are reluctant to vote for my waiver on this occasion, my desire to set aside rule XVI, because they believe there are, after all, many considerations the Senate might be taking up today. There is a broad gamut of domestic issues, for that matter, discussions of foreign policy--various ideas that might come to Senators that might be quite welcome to our national debate. I do ask for consideration of the whole package of the ideas, authorizations, and support that my amendment provides the Senate today because I believe it is important to our country. I believe it is important, as a statement of who we are, that we are doing business. We might make a statement, when we have this vote, that we are prepared, really, not to do business, but in our own internal difficulties we are prepared to frustrate each other at almost every pass. We enjoy the fact that, as a Senate, we are fairly evenly divided. Yet I pointed out on this particular bill we are not divided. So there almost has to be a very peculiar twist, it seems to me, that finds this debate whether or not we should authorize the State Department Millennial Challenge. Beyond that, there has been perhaps a debate in the Senate throughout the year. It is an important one. It is important to be resolved constructively. There may be some Senators who would say that, by and large, it is probably useful to have authorization bills but some Senators almost in the next breath will say it is not very necessary. In other words, if in fact programs are not thought through and they are not fleshed out and there are not formats for them that, by and large, somehow we get along year by year appropriating money and adding some verbiage that gives a hint that someone authorized these expenditures along the way as well as appropriated them. We found in July when Senator Biden and I were attempting to manage this bill that there were a lot of Senators who were in favor of what we were doing but some Senators said we have not really had our day on the floor; we have really not had a chance to offer our agenda; the reason we couldn't was because the format of the Senate always seemed to be taking up appropriations bills; and rule XVI says you cannot have authorization of general legislation. Therefore, we were cut out from any consideration of objectives which we thought were very important. As a result, we came along with an authorization bill and Senators said finally we have an authorization bill. This offers us the opportunity to pile in everything that we have. The Senators who argued against that point of view said, no, that really wasn't what the debate on foreign policy was about. But the opposition to that was simply we understand that, but we have not had our chance and we don't see that we are going to have our chance. We don't see another authorization bill coming along the pike. Therefore, although yours will somehow disappear in the midst of all of these other discussions, that has happened for years. Very seldom do we pass authorization bills, and in the case of foreign relations, as a matter of fact, not many for many, many years. As a result, our staff found as we approached the State Department and foreign assistance and what have you that this year there was a need for cleanup of a lot of our case activity, and we hope to do some more of that work next year. One reason for that is if you do not have authorization bills and force things to happen, no one really examines legislative language. There are a whole series of bureaucracies and responsibilities from year to year. No one pays attention and, legislatively, no one cares. Let me say we do care. In fact, a large majority of Senators care about the content of this legislation. I believe it is very important on this occasion that my proposal to lay aside rule XVI should be adopted, and that will be our goal. I encourage an ``aye'' vote not only on the rule XVI waiver but a vote on behalf of brave Americans who this amendment supports and serves and remembers. I reserve the remainder of my time. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Vermont. Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, how much time remains to each side? [Page: S13355] The PRESIDING OFFICER. There are 15 minutes in opposition, and 6 minutes for the proponents. Mr. LEAHY. Obviously, if the distinguished Senator from Indiana needs more time, I would not object to a unanimous consent request from him. Does the Senator from Iowa wish time? Mr. HARKIN. I have an amendment but I am not seeking time on this amendment. Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll. The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll. Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, time is running. I ask unanimous consent that the time under the quorum call not be charged against the side of the distinguished Senator from Indiana. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, that leaves us how much time on each side? The PRESIDING OFFICER. The opponents have 11 minutes 12 seconds, and the proponents have 6 minutes 12 seconds. Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I don't know if we have people coming to speak. If no one does, I will soon yield back the time so we can vote. I urge, as Senator McConnell has and as the leaders have, those who have amendments on which they seek votes to come to the floor and offer their amendments. I know that the intent of Senator McConnell and myself is if there are no other amendments waiting to be disposed of or pending, we plan to go to third reading. Going to the third reading could be in a matter of the next couple of hours at that pace. Some Senators have said they had a number of amendments. At such point that there are no amendments pending, it is our intention to go to third reading. I suggest the absence of a quorum and ask unanimous consent that the time be charged to my side. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The clerk will call the roll. The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll. Mr. LEAHY. I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I note the senior Senator from Massachusetts has arrived. I ask the Chair how much time is remaining. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Those in opposition have 9 minutes and 12 seconds. Mr. KENNEDY. I appreciate it. I will be prepared to address the Senate in a minute. I suggest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll. The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll. Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, as I understand, the amendment before the Senate is the State Department reauthorization legislation. I commend the Senator from Indiana and the Senator from Delaware for fashioning the reauthorization. It has not been done for a number of years, and I am very strong in support of that proposal. If the amendment of the Senator from Indiana is effective, we will lose the opportunity to have at least considered one of the very important amendments to the State Department reauthorization which dealt with hate crimes. I think it is entirely appropriate we have an opportunity to address the hate crimes issue on the State Department reauthorization because the State Department reauthorization obviously is dealing with foreign policy issues, and the origin of hate crimes is domestic terrorism. We have seen in recent times the growth of hate crimes in the United States. It is of significant importance. Hate crimes are not just crimes against an individual; they are crimes against a group in our society. They do not just do damage to an individual; they do something to our whole sense of community. That is why they are so treacherous. That is why they are so heinous. That is why they are so wrong. We have seen the hate crimes that have taken place on the basis of race, and on the basis gender, and the basis of sexual orientation. Particularly the time of the tragic circumstances surrounding the death of Matthew Shephard, whose death in Wyoming was tragic. He had studied overseas and was fluent in Arabic and German before joining the Federal service. Mr. President, crimes motivated by hate because of the victim's race, religion, sex, ethnic background, and disability are not confined to geographical boundaries of our great Nation. The current conflicts in the Middle East, the ethnic cleansing campaigns in Bosnia, Rwanda or the Holocaust itself demonstrate that violence motivated by hate is a worldwide danger. We have a special responsibility to combat it here at home. Since the September 11th attacks, we have seen a shameful increase in the number of hate crimes committed against Muslim Americans, Sikh Americans, and Americans of Middle Eastern descent. Congress has done much to respond to the vicious attacks on September 11. We authorized the use of force against terrorists and those who harbor them in other lands. We have enacted legislation to provide aid to victims and their families, to strengthen airport security, to improve security of our borders, to strengthen our defenses against bioterrorism, and to give law enforcement and intelligence officers enhanced powers to investigate and prevent terrorism. But the one thing we have not done is to try to deal with the hate crimes issue. We are prepared to vote on that. We are interested in half an hour time limitation, but we are told people have holds on that legislation. Members will refuse to let the Senate consider this legislation. I have indicated to the Senator from Indiana that I am prepared to permit and support the State Department reauthorization, but at least give us some opportunity to vote on hate crimes as a clean bill with a short time limit. We will take next week or the week after. We will even take a date in January or February of next year, but give us an opportunity to vote on hate crimes. The other side says no--not the Senator from Indiana--but the other side says no. So we are in a situation that says, well, let's circumvent or at least use the rules in such a way that will say we have two-thirds of the Senate that will permit him to use this reauthorization and effectively deny the Senate the opportunity to address the hate crimes issue. I don't fault the Senator from Indiana, but if this goes on, I am going to be there on the next amendment offering the hate crimes bill. Make no mistake about it. Make no mistake about it. We will have the opportunity and the time to take this up. I might mention there are some other issues as well, including the issue of the minimum wage. Here we just increased our own salaries by $3,400 and we have not been given an opportunity to increase the minimum wage by 75 cents an hour for 2 years. We are denied that opportunity. We are excluded from that. We had that as an amendment to the State Department authorization and we were told we cannot have an hour to debate that. Meanwhile, we see what is happening to the people at the lowest end of the economic ladder, primarily women. Regarding the minimum wage, it is a women's issue because a majority of those receiving the minimum wage are women. It is a children's issue because one-third of the women who receive the minimum wage have children. It is a civil rights issue because a disproportionate number of the men and women who receive the minimum wage are men and women of color. And it is a fairness issue. In this country of ours, people who work 40 hours a week, 52 weeks, ought to have a living wage. But we are denied that opportunity. What is it about our Republican friends that they refuse to permit the Senate to go on record on these issues? Now we are asked, let's have an exception. If we have an exception to this, we should face up to minimum wage, to hate crimes, and other issues. Fair is fair. I am for this legislation. It is up to the majority to set the agenda and give us an opportunity to vote on these issues and not deny a vote in the [Page: S13356] Senate in terms of hate crimes and minimum wage. They say no, no way, you are not going to get your opportunity. I hope this amendment will not be accepted. I hope we can work this out with the majority leader. We have tried, we have tried, we have tried, and we have tried, but to no avail. Since it is of no avail and we do not have cooperation, there will be no alternative for me other than to offer the amendment. I withhold the remainder of my time. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time? The Senator from Indiana. Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I yield myself the remainder of the time. Let me respond as thoughtfully and calmly as I can because the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts has indicated he has been a very strong friend of American diplomacy, of our diplomats abroad, of those who are at risk presently in the war against terror. I appreciate that. I have visited with him about ways in which we could have an authorization bill for the State Department, the millennium challenge, and the other issues that were in this comprehensive Senate bill, S. 925, originally, as amended by so many Senators. The Senator's statement illustrates precisely the problem on which Senators must now vote. That is, simply, if we are to have an authorization bill this year for the State Department, this is the opportunity. We had an opportunity in July. The distinguished Senator from Massachusetts points out correctly that he and other distinguished Senators had a number of issues that they believed were important. Hate crimes and the minimum wage are two of them. And there were additional ideas that Senators wanted to present. They made the point at that time that they believed that on our side of the aisle, they had not been given an opportunity to forward their agenda, to have a time certain for clean bills. Therefore, although in some cases they said, we regret the fact that the State Department authorization bill is likely now to be withdrawn and not to happen, essentially it hasn't happened for many years. As a matter of fact, very few authorization bills were happening. The only reason, I gather, that hate crimes and unemployment compensation came up in July was a belief on the part of proponents of those ideas that they had no other authorization bill on which to have a debate or to attach their amendments, that the appropriations procedure we are under today precluded all of that. I ask that even those who are strong proponents of legislation dealing with the minimum wage and hate crimes support the authorization of legislation that helps civilian Americans who are at risk in the war against terror now. That is an important objective. It has not been my purpose to try to frustrate the aims of any Senator but, rather, simply on behalf of a committee that voted 19 to zero and on behalf of a Senate that approved tens of constructive amendments, to try to forward that work product while there is still an opportunity this year. This is the moment in which Senators must make that sort of decision. Some may wish to make it on the basis of procedure or the basis of how the two parties get along with each other in the Senate. But I would plead with Senators that this is important by itself. It is an important, relevant vote for American security and American good governance. I believe the American people respect this effort. They want us to do this. They want Senators to vote aye, even though some may say this is at least an opportunity to make points on other discussions at the expense of the totality of all of it ending up in failure. I appreciate very much the cooperation of the managers of the bill. I thank, once again, my distinguished ranking member, Joe Biden, who has served our committee well as chairman and as a member for three decades, for all of the constructive work. I thank especially the members of the staffs on both sides of the aisle who have diligently devoted hundreds of hours of constructive work trying to reform aspects of the State Department, a bureaucracy of our Government that had not been observed and touched for a long time and which this bill, an authorization bill, has really the unique capacity to do. For all these reasons, I ask that Senators vote aye and that we have an opportunity for this legislation to proceed. I thank the Chair. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts has 20 seconds. Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the hate crimes bill be considered as original text before March 15 on the floor of the Senate. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Mr. LUGAR. I object. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard. Mr. KENNEDY. I make a similar request in terms of the minimum wage before March 15 of next year. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Mr. LUGAR. I object. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard. Mr. KENNEDY. I yield back the remainder of my time. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana has 1 minute 15 seconds remaining. Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, let me just say, in view of the two proposals made by the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts, I offered objection on both of these counts because I am the only Republican Senator in the Chamber. On behalf of the leadership of our party, that was my duty, given the fact that our party had not had an opportunity to consider those proposals. I would just say, personally, I am hopeful that consideration will be given to the Senator from Massachusetts and to all Senators for proposals that are constructive. Those two have a lot of constructive emphasis, and it may well be that before March 15, the Senate will be able to entertain those motions. I hope the Senator understands my objection today. That is why I stated it as a part of this conclusion. Once again, I am hopeful that Senators will vote constructively in favor of the foreign relations bill. I thank the Chair. I yield back my time. The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time having expired, the question is on agreeing to the motion to suspend rule XVI with regard to amendment No. 1974. The yeas and nays have been ordered. The clerk will call the roll. The legislative clerk called the roll. Mr. REID. I announce that the Senator from North Carolina (Mr. EDWARDS), the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. KERRY), and the Senator from Connecticut (Mr. LIEBERMAN) are necessarily absent. I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. KERRY) would vote ``nay.'' The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. CHAFEE). Are there any other Senators in the Chamber desiring to vote? The yeas and nays resulted--yeas 40, nays 57, as follows: [Rollcall Vote No. 413 Leg.] YEAS--40 Alexander Allen Bayh Biden Bond Brownback Bunning Burns Campbell Carper Chafee Coleman Collins Cornyn Craig Crapo DeWine Dole Domenici Enzi Feingold Fitzgerald Grassley Hagel Hatch Hutchison Inhofe Jeffords Kyl Lott Lugar McCain Murkowski Smith Snowe Sununu Talent Thomas Voinovich Warner NAYS--57 Akaka Allard Baucus Bennett Bingaman Boxer Breaux Byrd Cantwell Chambliss Clinton Cochran Conrad Corzine Daschle Dayton Dodd Dorgan Durbin Ensign Feinstein Frist Graham (FL) Graham (SC) Gregg Harkin Hollings Inouye Johnson Kennedy Kohl Landrieu Lautenberg Leahy Levin Lincoln McConnell Mikulski Miller Murray Nelson (FL) Nelson (NE) Nickles Pryor Reed Reid Roberts Rockefeller Santorum Sarbanes Schumer Sessions Shelby Specter Stabenow Stevens Wyden NOT VOTING--3 Edwards Kerry Lieberman The PRESIDING OFFICER. On this vote, the yeas are 40, the nays are 57. Two-thirds of the Senators voting not [Page: S13357] having voted in the affirmative, the motion to suspend rule XVI pursuant to notice previously given in writing is rejected. The point of order is sustained and the amendment falls.
IRAQ AND NORTH KOREA **************************** 4A) Appropriate Approach to North Korea
[From the New York Times, Oct. 21, 2003] TRYING DIPLOMACY ON NORTH KOREA President Bush is now taking a wiser and more sophisticated approach to the crisis caused by North Korea's reckless pursuit of nuclear weapons. In a proposal whose details are still being refined, Washington and four other nations would guarantee not to attack the North in exchange for its commitment to dismantle its nuclear weapons program. This proposal makes an eventual peaceful, diplomatic solution to this extremely dangerous problem somewhat more likely. Just how likely is impossible to tell because there is no assurance that North Korea's highly unpredictable leaders will agree to disarm. If the North does spurn this reasonable offer, Washington will find it easier to persuade Asian nations to support more coercive steps, like international economic sanctions. North Korea's nuclear programs are particularly alarming because the nation has a long history of selling advanced weapons to all who will pay for them, including other rogue states and perhaps terrorists. Yet in the past year, as the North has raced ahead with reprocessing plutonium into bomb fuel, Washington has handicapped its own efforts to achieve a diplomatic solution by refusing to specify what America would be willing to do if the North firmly committed to giving up its nuclear weapons ambitions in ways outsiders could reliably verify. The White House had insisted that specifying any such quid pro quo would be giving in to North Korean nuclear blackmail. Blackmail is a fair description of North Korea's behavior. But in a situation in which everyone agrees that military action against the North would have catastrophic consequences for hundreds of thousands of innocent South Koreans and Japanese, Washington's principled stand poorly served American interests. With this proposal, Mr. Bush is now making a serious effort to revive negotiations and is personally seeking the support of his fellow leaders at the Asia-Pacific summit meeting in Bangkok. All four of the nations that would join Washington in the proposed security guarantee--China, Japan, Russia and South Korea--are represented there. Washington's new approach deserves strong support from each of them. In offering security guarantees to the North, Mr. Bush wisely overruled hawkish administration officials who preferred moving directly toward coercive economic and military steps. This initiative comes less than a week after the administration's skilled diplomacy won unanimous backing for a United Nations Security Council resolution on Iraq that broadly endorsed Washington's policies there. Diplomacy is an important tool for advancing America's national security. It is good to see it. [From the Los Angeles Times, Oct. 21, 2003] CORRECT NUCLEAR STRATEGY President Bush's announced willingness to take part in a joint guarantee not to attack North Korea is an important maneuver in getting Pyongyang to end its nuclear weapons program. Even if Kim Jong Il's regime refuses to accept anything short of a full-fledged treaty, Bush's more conciliatory approach should win needed diplomatic support from China and South Korea. Bush took advantage of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Bangkok to discuss North Korea's nuclear ambitions with Presidents Hu Jintao of China and Roh Moo Hyun of South Korea. In August, both countries joined the U.S., Japan and Russia to present a united front, urging North Korea to end its atomic weapons development. The U.S. is correct to enlist the assistance of North Korea's neighbors; nuclear proliferation is a regional threat, not an issue of concern only to Pyongyang and Washington. When North Korea resisted further talks, China and South Korea urged Washington to try to woo the North back to the table by providing written, not just oral, assurance that it would not attack. Bush offered to take that extra step, although he correctly ruled out a formal treaty. Pyongyang's refusal to abide by its 1994 agreement with the U.S. to freeze its nuclear weapons program in exchange for energy supplies and economic aid raises doubts it would live up to a treaty. North Korea first should be required to show international inspectors that it is not reprocessing plutonium and enriching uranium. One administration official said the U.S. was willing to sign an agreement saying it had no ``hostile intent'' if North Korea demonstrated that it was making ``verifiable progress'' in dismantling its weapons program. That's an important change from administration insistence that Pyongyang end the program before getting any economic help. The North considered such an ultimatum unacceptable, but it might end the program in stages if it saw rewards at each step. North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty last year and keeps saying it is reprocessing plutonium from 8,000 fuel rods. That may be bluff and bluster, but if true it would produce enough fuel for perhaps 20 nuclear weapons. Monday, it fired a conventional missile into the Sea of Japan in a test timed to coincide with the Bangkok summit, though not with Bush's initiative. Pyongyang has sold missiles to other nations; because it is desperately poor and periodically racked by famine, there is no reason to believe it would refrain from selling weapons-grade nuclear material. China provides most of North Korea's food and oil supplies and has been instrumental in arranging six-nation talks. It should point to Washington's flexibility as it pressures North Korea to resume talks and give up nuclear weapons in exchange for security and aid.
4B)
Supplemental Appropriations Mr. BOND. Mr. President, I begin by
thanking the Chaplain for his prayers for our brave fighting men and women in
Iraq, as well as in Afghanistan, as well as for the first responders and law
enforcement personnel who are putting their lives on the line every day for us.
In California, we pray for those who are fighting the fires. Certainly our
hearts and sympathies go out to them. I also note, Mr. President, as you well know, that we are working hard to
complete the Iraqi supplemental, which will provide the support that our troops
need to be safe in Iraq, as well as the reconstruction money, which I hope we
can pass quickly so we can bring the troops home. Having said that, let me share with you an experience I had this weekend.
It came as a great surprise to hear on the news this weekend that newspapers
were reporting that the Intelligence Committee was preparing a report saying
that the distinguished chairman of the Intelligence Committee was trying to do
something with a report that was uncalled for and that would whitewash the
administration, and purporting to outline material in that report. That caught me by surprise, No. 1, because I am on the Intelligence
Committee. As reported by Chairman Roberts, we have not completed a
report. We have not started a report. We have worked very diligently with our
staff to interview a hundred witnesses from the intelligence agencies. They have
reviewed tens and perhaps thousands of documents, and they are continuing to do
so. As Chairman Roberts said, there will be information sought from the
Director of the CIA, Director George Tenet. So whatever was leaked was not based
on fact. The second thing that bothered me is that what was supposedly a work in
the classified confines of the Intelligence Committee had been somehow shared
with the press. Now, that is a problem. The President has come down very
strongly in saying that he absolutely abhors leakage of classified, sensitive
material, as he should. We all should. He said he will not tolerate it in the
administration, in the White House, or even in Congress. But it appears to me
that somehow in the Intelligence Committee it is leaking like a sieve, and
people are saying things that are not true. So I would caution those who are listening, when you hear about something
that is going on in the Intelligence Committee, perhaps you ought to take it
with a great big grain of salt. Chairman Roberts and Vice Chairman Rockefeller are
conducting these hearings, and all Members of this body can come to Hart 219 and
have access to the material if they want to find out what we are working on. But
what you hear being discussed is not necessarily relevant to anything that is
going on. What is relevant, and what many people have cited--and I am afraid they
have not read--is the work of Dr. David Kay, the Interim Progress Report of the
Iraqi Survey Group, the ISG. This is a declassified report from this
distinguished person who is heading the intelligence gathering in Iraq. He has
been cited as saying: Well, we have found no weapons of mass destruction;
therefore, there must not be any. Well, I would say, by that same reasoning, we have not found Saddam
Hussein; so by that reasoning, maybe Saddam Hussein did not exist. But we have
seen in the tragedies that have occurred in recent days and weeks in the Sunni
Triangle and in Iraq and elsewhere that the protégés, the adherents to Saddam
Hussein and Osama bin Laden, continue to carry on their war of terrorism. They
are attacking our troops. They are attacking Iraqi civilians. They have attacked
the U.N. They have attacked the Red Cross. They are very dangerous, and we know
that the battle on terrorism goes on. That is why we have to complete work on
the Iraqi supplemental appropriations. But what has David Kay found? Why hasn't he found any weapons of mass
destruction? I might note that it was only this summer, after we had been there
several months, that we found a squadron of Russian-made MIG airplanes hidden in
the desert. They were buried in the sand. Well, weapons of mass destruction, chemical or biological weapons, which
we know Saddam Hussein has had in the past and has used in the past, could be
hidden in a two-car garage, and they could be hidden in much smaller samples.
There is speculation in the media that they could have been taken out of
the country, which should really worry us. There is speculation elsewhere as to
what may have happened. But Dr. Kay said, talking about the extensive program of denial and
deception engaged in by Saddam Hussein's regime: From birth all of Iraq's WMD activities were highly compartmentalized
within a regime that ruled and kept its secrets through fear and terror and with
deception and denial built into each program; Deliberate dispersal and destruction of material and documentation related
to weapons programs began pre-conflict and ran trans-to-post conflict; In other words, they were concealing, they were denying they had it before
the war, during the war, and even after the war. Post-OIF-- In other words, after Iraqi Freedom-- looting destroyed or dispersed important and easily collectible material
and forensic evidence concerning Iraq's WMD program. As the report covers in
detail, significant elements of this looting were carried out in a systematic
and deliberate manner, with the clear aim of concealing pre-OIF activities of
Saddam's regime; Some WMD personnel crossed borders in the pre/trans-conflict period and
may have taken evidence and even weapons-related materials with them....... In other words, what Dr. Kay is saying is, the people involved with Saddam
Hussein, his loyal thugs, could have taken the material out of the country. But
he says what we have found and what we have discovered are: dozens of WMD-related program activities and significant amounts of
equipment that Iraq concealed from the United Nations during the inspections
that began in late 2000. The discovery of these deliberate concealment efforts
have come about both through the admissions of Iraqi scientists and officials
concerning information they deliberately withheld and through physical evidence
of equipment and activities that ISG has discovered that should have been
declared to the UN. He then goes on to cite many of the things they have found and also
discussions and reports on interviews he has had. For those who wonder what has happened to Saddam Hussein's WMD program,
the information already prepared and presented by Dr. Kay should be a good
example. But, Mr. President, I would say that the ISG's progress report is not
final. They have made an extensive investigation of Saddam's biological and
chemical weapons program, and the work that was going on to restart the nuclear
program. But unless we accept the fact that Saddam is somehow reformed, his
track record of not just developing but actually using weapons of mass
destruction stands as a brutal and tragic fact of history. It is clear that Saddam Hussein actively deceived the international
community and was in clear violation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1441
and was actively pursuing WMD programs. That Saddam may have redesigned programs around concealment activities is
something this body should find deeply troubling, certainly not grounds, as some
would say, to acquit him of any accusation of WMD use or pursuit. Our troops are
doing an outstanding job under difficult conditions. They are away from their
families in harsh conditions, and they are in harm's way, risking everything.
Yet they complain less and bicker less than many here in Washington. Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden-like terrorists know they cannot defeat
our brave military men and women on the ground. The only chance they have is to
create division here at home in the hope that we will cut and run. They cannot
conceive of retaking Baghdad from our troops, so their only chance of victory is
here in Washington. Yesterday we had a very interesting discussion with Tom Friedman of the
New York Times, a very seasoned observer, one who doesn't share my political
views on a lot of issues. But he has been in Iraq. He knows what is going on,
and he believes we did what we had to do. He said it is clear that Saddam
Hussein and Osama bin Laden are the motivating forces, the leaders behind these
attacks, and that they know that if they can create enough division here at
home, that is their one chance of winning. It is almost unthinkable in this day
and age that someone would attack the Red Cross, the ultimate humanitarian
institution, to try to drive them out of the country so they cannot minister to
the suffering of the Iraqi people. The Iraqi people share our goal, which is to create a free, stable Iraq,
independent of Saddam Hussein or the rule of ayatollahs or others who do not
tolerate human rights, freedom, and the rights of women. We cannot leave this
country in chaos. If we do, Saddam and Osama bin Laden win. Those who would say pack up and leave would turn over all of the fruits of
victory and turn them into the spoils of those who have wreaked such havoc on
the country. I believe Mr. Friedman said that when we got into Iraq, we
discovered a country that had been devastated back to the stone age. We are
working hard to restore security and to bring them out of the stone age. The
President has outlined a clear plan. He is asking for our help, $87 billion. I hope today we can complete efforts on the conference report on the Iraqi
supplemental. We need the $66 billion to make sure our troops are protected and
adequately well served. We need the other $21 billion as a grant, not as a loan,
to go to rebuilding the security forces, the military, the police, to assure
that they can maintain stability. We need to turn on the lights and turn on the
water so they can get back to making a productive country. We have to pass this
bill to give them support, to show Congress is behind them. We need to continue
to work to see that Iraqis can control their own destiny. We have some 55,000 Iraqi policemen. We have 700 Iraqi Army trained. We
are training more every day. What we need to do is provide them the resources so
they can be the eyes and ears because they, the Iraqi people, and their police
and military are the ones best suited to go into the dangerous parts of Baghdad
and Fallujah and elsewhere in the Sunni triangle and identify those who are
Saddam adherents and Osama adherents and drag them out in the middle of the
night and bring them to justice or stop their terrorist activities before they
continue to strike innocent Iraqis and international institutions such as the
U.N. and the Red Cross, the U.S. Army, and the military who are there. Hospitals are open. We have people going back to school. Progress is being
made. But we have to complete action. We have to provide the assistance to bring
Iraq out of the stone age to the point where, with the help of the donations
from the U.N. conference in Madrid, they can have the basic infrastructure that
will support loans that will enable them to rebuild their oil-producing
facilities, to rebuild what was a very fruitful agriculture. There is hope not only for the Iraqi people but for people throughout the
Middle East. If we will translate the victory over the Saddam Hussein government
into a victory over the Saddam and Osama bin Laden terrorists who continue to
carry the battle to Baghdad, there is hope for freedom for people in the Middle
East. That is in our best long-term interest. We are battling against terrorism
in Baghdad. Far better we battle in Baghdad than in Boston or Ballwin, MO, or
Belton, MO. That is our choice. The President has outlined a consistent and coherent plan that led to
peace, avoided the problems we thought could occur, and now we have to secure
the peace. Make no mistake about it, today, I feel no differently about Saddam and
his regime and the threat it posed as the day I voted with 77 of my other
colleagues to remove Saddam. The threat he posed was real. There is no question
that the world is better off without Saddam, his henchmen, and his two
despicable sons who were poised to sustain the legacy of Saddam for another half
century. The key lesson of September 11, 2001, is that in a world of proliferating
weapons of mass destruction, we cannot afford to wait until threats become
actual attacks. The stakes and risks are just too high and the brutal track
record of Saddam is clear. And clearly, as demonstrated recently by David Kay's interim report, we
have seen unequivocally, that Saddam remained a danger to the world up to the
last day of his regime. Mr. Kay stated ``his WMD programs spanned more than two decades, involved
thousands of people, billions of dollars''--(billions of dollars, I might add,
that belonged to the Iraqi people and should have been reinvested in Iraq's
infrastructure) ``and was elaborately shielded by security and deception
operations that continued even beyond the end of Operation Iraqi Freedom.'' For months after the passage of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1441,
Saddam Hussein continued to violate his obligations to the international
community by filing false declarations deceiving the inspectors and terrorizing
the Iraqi People. Mr. Kay stated in his interim report that dozens of WMD-related program
activities and significant amounts of equipment that Iraq concealed from the
U.N. during the inspections in late 2002 were discovered. According to his
report, the discovery of these concealment efforts were learned primarily
through the admission of Iraqi scientists and officials. Some of the examples he
cited were: A clandestine network of laboratories and safehouses within the Iraqi
intelligence service existed that contained equipment subject to U.N. monitoring
and suitable for continuing CBW research; A prison laboratory complex, possibly used in human testing of BW agents,
that Iraqi officials working to prepare for U.N. inspections were explicitly
ordered not to declare to the U.N. Reference strains of biological organisms concealed in a scientist's
home, one of which can be used to produce biological weapons; A line of UAVs not fully declared; Documents and equipment hidden in scientist's homes that would have been
useful in resuming uranium enrichment by centrifuge and electromagnetic isotope
separation; New research on BW-applicable agents, brucella and congo crimean
hemorrhagic fever and continuing work on ricin and aflatoxin were not declared
to the U.N. The ISG has also uncovered thus far the first documented link between Iraq
and North Korea, with documents detailing Iraq's attempt to buy equipment from
North Korea to make missiles with ranges of up to 1,300 km. The Iraqi Survey Group's progress report is not final. Extensive
investigation of Saddam's biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons programs
remains to be done, but unless we accept that Saddam was reformed, his track
record of not just developing but actually using wmd stands as a brutal and
tragic fact of history. It is clear that Saddam Hussein actively deceived the
international community, was in clear violation of UN Security Council Res. 1441
and was actively pursuing wmd programs. Mr. President, that Saddam may have redesigned programs around concealment
is something that this body should find deeply, deeply, troubling--certainly not
acquitting, as some seem to be suggesting. Our troops are doing an outstanding job under very difficult conditions.
They are away from their families, in harsh conditions and they are in harm's
way risking everything, yet they complain less, and bicker less than many here
in Washington Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden-like terrorists know that they cannot
defeat our brave military men and women on the ground. The only chance they have
is to create division here at home in hope that we will cut and run. They cannot
conceive of retaking Baghdad from our troops so their only chance of victory is
in Washington. Our enemies perceive that our failure to respond to the Khobar Towers and
the USS Cole and our withdrawal from Lebanon and Somalia shows a lack
of conviction and a weakness of our resolve. The terrorists working for Saddam and Osama, who are trying to thwart our
efforts by targeting not only our service men and women, but also Iraqi
civilians, humanitarian workers, and recently the Red Cross, are trying to break
our will and believe that Americans are weak and lack the will to win the peace.
Cowardly terrorists are shooting at our soldiers and innocent civilians,
but are aiming at American public opinion and our resolve to complete the
mission. If we leave the country in chaos, Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden win.
This would not only prevent us from seizing a tremendous opportunity to create a
stable, representative government in the heart of the Middle East, but it also
would send a signal to terrorists around the world that America is weak and
invite future acts of terror against the United States and our allies. Most all know that we cannot afford to retreat. We must strengthen our
resolve and complete the mission in Iraq, with self-governance of that nation as
our ultimate end. Through joint United States/Iraqi operations, we have captured hundreds of
foreign fighters and killed a number of them in combat. With each passing day,
we are witnessing more and more Iraqis assuming responsibility for the safety
and security of their nation. Currently, there are over 85,000,000 Iraqis
working to provide security for their country with: 6400 Iraqi border patrol
forces that will eventually replace coalition forces at checkpoints along the
border; 55,000 Iraqi police that will contribute to a stable society; 18,700
facilities protection service members that will secure power lines, refineries
and other key infrastructures that are targets for sabotage; 700 new Iraqi army
soldiers that will be a professional force for maintaining peace and stability versus Saddam's instrument of terror and
repression; and lastly, over 4,700 Iraq civil defense citizens that will remain
in their communities providing valuable local intelligence to coalition and
Iraqi forces while receiving on the job training in security patrolling. The men and women of the U.S. Armed Forces serving so dutifully in Iraq
represent America's finest. As the most highly trained, best-equipped fighting
force ever assembled, they are executing their mission and achieving success. I
recently visited with some of these incredible patriots at Walter Reed to thank
them for their patriotic and heroic service. What they and their fellow service
men and women still in Afghanistan and Iraq need from us is our support, not
just in the form of equipment and supplies, but support and affirmation that
Washington believes the mission they are carrying out--the one we voted to
authorize by a three to one margin--continues to be necessary to promote peace,
stability, and democracy in a world less threatened by terror. Our service men and women are helping the Iraqi men, women, and children
establish a foothold of peace and stability in the region, which will be a
catastrophic blow to the terrorists who have joined the fight in Iraq. Our
people on the ground get to see first hand the extent to which Saddam destroyed
a society--a society of people whom have never until this day had the
opportunity to be safe and free. Murder and mass graves are headlines in
Washington but they were a way of life under Saddam. After 9/11, we vowed to stick together and we have. The President asked
for our support in a sustained effort which will be measured in years, not
months. He told use that the world had changed and that we would have to change
with it. No longer would be in the mode where we would fire one shot then fall
back. He realized that the war on terrorism had to be carried to the
terrorist--we could not just wait for the next attack. He has asked Congress and the people to support a sustained effort and he
warned that it would be a fight like never before. It will have its ups and its
downs. Mistakes will be made and measures will be taken that may not always be
popular. We are fighting an enemy that wears no uniform and swears an allegiance to
a radical ideology, not to humanity or a country. One who is willing to kill
innocents without the slightest remorse. It is an unconventional war without borders--and it requires unconventional
methods to win it. By taking the fight to the enemy, we have more opportunity to
fight on our terms but on their ground--using our best soldiers and spies. So we
fight in Baghdad and Bagram so the war is not fought in Boston, Boise, or
Bolivar, MO. I believe that it remains instructive to note that there are two major
investigations ongoing in Washington. One, in relation to 9/11, asks why the
Government did not act based on imperfect information. The other, in relation to
Iraq, asks why the Government did act based on imperfect information. This helps
us understand the predicament that any President faces in a hostile world where
lives and freedom at stake with intelligence that can almost never be perfect
and sometimes can be wrong. In Afghanistan and Iraq, our people are facing hardship and death. Yet
they are getting the job done. We have seen reenlistment ceremonies that are
taking place in Iraq by our dedicated service men and women who are committed to
staying until their mission is complete. A central bank and Iraqi currency have been established months ahead of
schedule. We went from 0-60,000 trained Iraqi security and military personnel in
less than 5 months. Schools, which were formerly weapons storage depots, are
open. Electricity has been restored to prewar levels and is delivered not just
to Saddam's Bathist friends as before, but to the population at large. Hospitals
are open, working, and caring for patients; and the political leadership of the
country has begun coalescing. In Afghanistan, where there were once 800,000 boys
in school, there are now 2.5 million boys and 1.5 million girls in school.
Baghdad, which once got its news only from Saddam, Aljazeera and CNN, now may
have more news sources than Washington, DC. The Marshall Plan after World War II cost almost $80 billion, in 1998
dollars, and we had roughly 100,000 troops in Germany for 4 years after the war.
Who at that time asked after Pearl Harbor, how much was it going to cost to
defeat the Japanese; who asked how much was it going to cost to defeat the
Germans after they sank the Lusitania? The cost of the war on terror is great
but it must be weighed against the human tragedy and economic costs of 9/11. The supplemental appropriations bill that the Congress needs to pass out
of conference is necessary to help protect our troops, win the peace and create
conditions so that our troops can return home safely and victorious. The same
resolution that the Senate voted 77-23 to authorize war almost 1 year ago
expressly stated the need to restore a stable, peaceful Persian Gulf. Lets honor
that commitment today and pass the supplemental appropriations bill. We need to let our service men and women complete their mission so they
can come home. I say to our men and women serving here and abroad, to their families at
home, and to those Saddam loyalists and terrorists who doubt our will; don't
equate public discourse in a free society with weakness. We voted overwhelming
to authorize to take the fight to the enemy and we have voted overwhelmingly to
support our troops in the field and to help the Iraqi men, women, and children,
who were until now, hopeless of living with peace and freedom. We will not cut and run. We will not let those who have already paid the
ultimate price die in vain. We will not turn our backs on the commitments we
have made. Some doubted our ability to turn back Nazism and communism but
collectively, we did. Doubters that we can overcome terrorism will be just as
wrong now as doubters were then. I yield the floor. 4C)
Additional Cosponsors for S. Con. Res. 73 (Iran and the NPT)
At the request of Mr. SANTORUM, his name was added as a cosponsor of
S.
Con.
Res.
73,
a concurrent resolution expressing the deep concern of Congress regarding the
failure of the Islamic Republic of Iran to adhere to its obligations under a
safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency and the
engagement by Iran in activities that appear to be designed to develop nuclear
weapons. ******************** At the request of Mrs. FEINSTEIN, the name of the Senator from
Connecticut (Mr. LIEBERMAN) was added as a cosponsor of
S.
Con.
Res.
73,
supra. ******************** At the request of Mrs. FEINSTEIN, the name of the Senator from
Illinois (Mr. FITZGERALD) was added as a cosponsor of
S.
Con.
Res.
73,
a concurrent resolution expressing the deep concern of Congress regarding the
failure of the Islamic Republic of Iran to adhere to its obligations under a
safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency and the
engagement by Iran in activities that appear to be designed to develop nuclear
weapons. ******************** At the request of Mrs. FEINSTEIN, the names of the Senator from
Georgia (Mr. MILLER) and the Senator from Oregon (Mr. SMITH) were
added as cosponsors of
S .
Con.
Res.
73, a concurrent resolution
expressing the deep concern of Congress regarding the failure of the Islamic
Republic of Iran to adhere to its obligations under a safeguards agreement with
the International Atomic Energy Agency and the engagement by Iran in activities
that appear to be designed to develop nuclear weapons. 4E)
To Express the Sense of the Senate on Iran AMENDMENTS NOS. 2001; 2002; 2003; 1995, AS MODIFIED FURTHER; 2004; 2005;
2006; 1973; 2007; 2008; 2009; 2010; 2011; 2012; 2013; 2014; 2015; 1998, AS
MODIFIED; 2016; 2017; 2018; AND 2019; EN BLOC Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, we have two blocks of amendments
that have been agreed to on both sides that we are prepared to move at this
point. The first is a series of amendments as follows: Senator Leahy,
providing funds for U.S. contribution to UNAIDS; Senator Voinovich,
annual report on antisemitism; Senator Dodd, providing assistance for
OAS mission in Haiti; Senator Allard, amendment No. 1995 as modified
further; Senator Feingold, relating to U.S. citizens in Indonesia;
Senator Lugar, relating to danger pay for USAID; Senator Daschle,
sense of Congress on delivery of assistance by air; Senator McCain,
amendment No. 1973 relating to Azerbaijan; Senator Feingold, report on
Sierra Leone; Senator Biden, technical amendment; Senator Feingold,
report on Somalia; Senator Lugar, relating to the Global Fund; Senator
Inouye, related to the guinea worm eradication; Senator Harkin,
disabilities; Senator Allen, related to intellectual property rights;
Senator Brownback, providing assistance to promote democracy in Iran;
Senator Brownback, sense of the Senate on Iran; Senator Landrieu,
modification to amendment No. 1998; Senator Dodd, relating to contracts
in Egypt; Senator Lugar, relating to Millennium Challenge Account;
Senator Ensign, relating to democracy in Cuba; and Senator Leahy,
relating to HIV/AIDS. Mr. President, I send this block of amendments to the desk and ask for its
immediate consideration. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to consideration of the
amendments en bloc? Without objection, it is so ordered. Without objection, the amendments are agreed to. The amendments were agreed to, as follows: On page 23, line 8, before the period, insert the following:
********************* AMENDMENT NO. 2015 (Purpose: To
express the sense of the Senate on the development of democracy in Iran) On page 147, between lines 6 and 7, insert the following new section: SEC. 692. (a) Congress makes the following findings: (1) The Islamic Republic of Iran is neither free nor fully democratic,
and undemocratic institutions, such as the Guardians Council, thwart the will of
the Iranian people. (2) There is ongoing repression of journalists, students, and
intellectuals in Iran, women in Iran are deprived of their internationally
recognized human rights, and religious freedom is not respected under the laws
of Iran. (3) The Department of State asserted in its ``Patterns of Global
Terrorism 2002'' report released on April 30, 2003, that Iran remained the most
active state sponsor of terrorism and that Iran continues to provide funding,
safe-haven, training, and weapons to known terrorist groups, notably Hizballah,
HAMAS, the Palestine Islamic Jihad, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine. (4) The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has found that Iran has
failed to accurately disclose all elements of its nuclear program. The IAEA is
engaged in efforts to determine the extent, origin and implications of Iranian
nuclear activities that were not initially reported to the IAEA. (5) There have been credible reports of Iran harboring Al-Qaeda fugitives
and permitting the passage of terrorist elements into Iraq. (b) It is the sense of Congress that it should be the policy of the
United States to-- (1) support transparent, full democracy in Iran; (2) support the rights of the Iranian people to choose their system of
government. (3) condemn the brutal treatment and imprisonment and torture of Iranian
civilians expressing political dissent; (4) call upon the Government of Iran to comply fully with requests by the
International Atomic Energy Agency for information and to immediately suspend
all activities related to the development of nuclear weapons and their delivery
systems; (5) demand that al Qaeda members be immediately turned over to
governments requesting their extradition; and (6) demand that Iran prohibit and prevent the passage of armed elements
into Iraq and cease all activities to undermine the Iraqi Governing Council and
the reconstruction of Iraq. 4F)
Prohibition on Funding to
Countries that Trade in Certain Weapons with North Korea SA 1968. Mr. McCONNELL (for himself and Mr. LEAHY) proposed an amendment
to the bill H.R. 2800, making appropriations for foreign operations, export
financing, and related programs for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2004,
and for other purposes; as follows: On page 147, between lines 6 and 7, insert the following new section: PROHIBITION ON FUNDING TO COUNTRIES THAT TRADE IN CERTAIN WEAPONS WITH
NORTH KOREA SEC. 692. (a) No funds appropriated pursuant to this Act may be
made available to the government of a country or for a project in a country
that, during the 12-month period ending on the date that such funds would be
obligated, has-- (1) exported to North Korea any item listed on the United States
Munitions List under section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2278)
or any dual-use item on the Commerce Control List pursuant to the Export
Administration Regulations (15 C.F.R. part 730 et seq.), if the President
determines that such items are intended for use in a weapons of mass destruction
or a missile program in North Korea; or (2) imported from North Korea any item described in paragraph (1). (b) The President may waive the prohibition in subsection (a) with
respect to a county or project if the President certifies to Congress that it is
in the national interest of the United States to waive the prohibition. On page 48, line 21, insert after ``Jordan:'' the following: ``Provided
further, That of the funds appropriated by this paragraph, $27,000,000
shall be made available for assistance for Poland:''. On page 18, line 10, after ``Jordan'' insert the following: ``, which sum
shall be disbursed within 30 days of enactment of this Act''. On page 141, line 4, strike ``in Jamaica and El Salvador''. On page 141, after line 13, insert the following: ``(c) REPORT.--The requirement for an annual report, contained in
section 582(b)(1) of Division E of P.L. 108-7, shall be applicable to all
programs for which funds are provided under the authority of this subsection.''.
On page 21, line 18, after the colon insert the following: ``Provided
further, That of the funds appropriated under this heading, not less than
$350,000 should be made available, notwithstanding any other provision of law,
for the National Endowment for Democracy to support democracy and human rights
in North Korea:''. ******************** AMENDMENT NO. 1968 Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I have a series of cleared
amendments to the pending measure, the foreign operations bill, which I send to
the desk and ask for their immediate consideration. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report. The assistant legislative clerk read as follows: The Senator from Kentucky [Mr. McConnell], for himself and Mr.
Leahy, proposes an amendment numbered 1968. Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that
reading of the amendment be dispensed with. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. (The amendment is printed in today's RECORD under ``Text of
Amendments.'') Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I urge we adopt these amendments en
bloc. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate? Without objection, the amendment is agreed to. The amendment (No. 1968) was agreed to. Mr. McCONNELL. I move to reconsider the vote and I move to lay
that motion on the table. The motion to lay on the table was agreed to. 4H) 50th
Anniversary of U.S./Republic of Korea Mutual Defense Treaty SENATE RESOLUTION 256--OBSERVING THE 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE MUTUAL DEFENSE
TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, AFFIRMING THE DEEP
COOPERATION AND FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE
PEOPLE OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, AND THANKING THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA FOR ITS
CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM AND TO THE STABILIZATION AND
RECONSTRUCTION OF AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ Mr. BIDEN (for himself, Mr. LUGAR, Mr. KERRY, Mr.
BROWNBACK, Mr. DODD, and Mr. HAGEL) submitted the following
resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations: S. Res. 256 Whereas October 1, 2003, marked the 50th anniversary of the signing of the
Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of
Korea, signed at Washington October 1, 1953, and entered into force November 17,
1954 (hereinafter referred to as the ``Mutual Defense Treaty''); Whereas the United States and the Republic of Korea have formed a bond
through the common struggle against communist aggression; Whereas more than 34,000 Americans lost their lives fighting in the Korean
War, and approximately 37,000 men and women of the United States Armed Forces
are still deployed on the Korean peninsula, enduring separation from their
families and other hardships in the defense of freedom; Whereas the Mutual Defense Treaty has been instrumental in securing peace
on the Korean peninsula and providing an environment in which the Republic of
Korea has become an economically vibrant, free, democratic society; Whereas the foundation of the Mutual Defense Treaty rests not only on a
common adversary, but more importantly on a shared interest in, and commitment
to, peace, democracy, and freedom on the Korean peninsula, in Asia, and
throughout the world; Whereas the United States and the Republic of Korea are working closely
together to find a diplomatic solution to the threat posed by North Korea's
pursuit of nuclear weapons and the export by North Korea of ballistic missiles;
Whereas the Republic of Korea is making valuable contributions to the
global war on terrorism, including the contribution of logistics support for
international forces operating in Afghanistan; Whereas the Republic of Korea has pledged $260,000,000 and has already
sent 700 military engineers and medical personnel to assist in the United
States-led effort to stabilize and reconstruct Iraq; and Whereas South Korea President Roh Moo-hyun pledged on October 18, 2003, to
dispatch additional troops to work alongside United States and coalition forces
in Iraq: Now, therefore, be it Resolved, That the Senate-- (1) observes the 50th anniversary of the Mutual Defense Treaty between
the United States of America and the Republic of Korea, signed at Washington
October 1, 1953, and entered into force November 17, 1954; (2) reaffirms the deep cooperation and friendship between the people of
the United States and the people of the Republic of Korea; and (3) thanks the Republic of Korea for its contributions to the global war
on terrorism and to the stabilization and reconstruction of Afghanistan and
Iraq. Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, this resolution is cosponsored by my
distinguished colleague, the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
Senator Lugar, as well as Senators KERRY, BROWNBACK, DODD, and
HAGEL. It recognizes the 50th anniversary of the United States-Republic
of Korea Mutual Defense Treaty and is thanking the Republic of Korea for its
contributions to the global war on terrorism. The United States has no better friend in Asia than the Republic of Korea.
South Koreans have been there for us time and again, just as we have been for
them. Our alliance has paid dividends on and off the Korean Peninsula. Most
recently, South Korea has aided the U.S. effort in Afghanistan and Iraq. South
Korea has already sent 700 military engineers and medical personal to Iraq, and
President Roh pledged on October 18 to dispatch additional troops to work
alongside U.S. forces there. South Korea has also pledged $260 million in grants
to help reconstruct Iraq. The resolution I offer today observes the 50th anniversary of our
alliance, thanks South Korea for its contributions to the global war on
terrorism, and reaffirms the deep cooperation and friendship that exists between
our two countries. That cooperation and friendship are sorely needed now, given the
challenges posed by North Korea. North Korea today is on the verge of becoming a
nuclear bomb factory. The United States needs to redouble its diplomatic efforts
to persuade North Korea to change its course. President Bush, I note, has repeatedly called for a ``peaceful,
diplomatic'' solution to this crisis, and has worked with our friends and allies
in that region toward that goal. I believe President Bush's instincts are
correct on this issue. Last week President Bush told the leaders of Asia that the United States
is prepared to provide security assurances to North Korea if North Korea takes
tangible steps to dismantle its nuclear program. I find that very encouraging.
But in my view we need to do more. That is essentially where we left off at the
end of the last administration, when we were working within the Agreed
Framework. What we need to do is have more contact with North Korea. There were only
40 minutes of one-on-one dialog with North Korea last August in Beijing. That,
with the translation requirements in such an exchange, is barely enough time to
clear one's throat. Second, we should use the combination of carrots and sticks to convince
North Korea to change its course. The sticks are in play, including the
proliferation security initiative and a coordinated crackdown on the North's
elicit activities, including narcotics trafficking and counterfeiting, among
others. We need to identify as well some incentives for the good behavior that
would come if, in fact, there is a verifiable North Korean effort along the path
toward nuclear disarmament. This is not giving in to blackmail. It is a positive
reinforcement, and there is a huge difference between the two. Third, we need to sustain and consider increasing humanitarian food and
medical aid to North Korea. Nothing about this crisis will be improved by having
more hungry or sick North Korean children. This year, the United States provided
only 40,000 tons of food aid to the North a generous donation, to be sure, but a pittance against the world program
appeal of more than 600,000 tons is needed, and far below the food aid levels
the United States has provided in previous years. I note there is some dispute about the access of this food aid to the
people of North Korea, people we need to help. The fact is the World Food
Program and the director have reported significant progress towards monitoring
delivery of food and ensuring that the aid reaches those most in need. Further,
the food aid we have provided we seem fairly well assured is in fact getting
where it is intended. Finally, we need to speak with one voice. The administration has yet to
fully resolve the deep internal divisions over the direction of the President's
policy. Some senior officials in the administration continue to argue against
this policy of engagement. As a matter of fact, they seem to occasionally look
forward to tweaking the North Koreans. I might add there is very little social
redeeming value in the policies of Kim Jong Il in North Korea. I am not arguing
he is a particularly reasonable man, but it seems to me there should be one
voice and one policy coming out of the administration. Prospects for diplomatic
solutions are in direct proportion to one voice. To state the obvious, as I know the Presiding Officer knows, time is not
our ally in this crisis. The United States needs to communicate both the risks
of North Korea's current path and the benefits North Korea could enjoy if it
chooses to verifiably abandon its pursuit of nuclear weapons and its export of ballistic missiles. Since the
United States first confronted North Korea with allegations about its illegal
program to produce highly enriched uranium last October, the North has ended its
safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency, withdrawn from
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, taken its plutonium reprocessing plant out
of mothballs, begun to reprocess at least some of its 8,000 spent-fuel rods, and
has activated its Yongbyon nuclear reactor to produce still more spent fuel. I am not suggesting we should not have pointed out their violation. I am
not suggesting their response is remotely approaching anything rational. What I
am suggesting is a sense of urgency and a requirement for us to be on the same
page with our South Korean and Japanese friends as well as continuing to engage
the Chinese and the Russians in attempting to come to a resolution here. The North's pursuit of nuclear weapons poses a great threat to the
interests not only of the United States but to the entire region. As the North's
stockpile of fissile material grows, the likelihood the North will test a
nuclear weapon and prove the viability of its design increases, as does the
difficulty of securing the North's fissile material in any crisis. Moreover, we
have no guarantee North Korea will not export fissile material. All we know for
certain is if the North puts a nuke on the auction block, the bidders are not
likely to be our friends. Finally, the North's nuclear ambitions could prompt other countries in the
region--notably Japan and South Korea--to rethink their own opposition to
nuclear arms. I don't only think that is probable but I think that is likely. As
we all know, once Japan made that decision, it would be a matter of months
before Japan would be a nuclear armed power. We think that would be a very bad
idea. That, in my view, is why the Chinese have become so engaged now in helping
us put some pressure on these multilateral talks with South Korea to get them to
change their behavior. I believe China understands that if North Korea continues
down this path, there is almost a certainty Japan will. Japan becoming a nuclear
power would change the dynamic and the equation for the Chinese, and the race
will be on. The President has the right goal--to complete verifiable and irreversible
dismantlement of the North's nuclear weapons program. The only debate is how do
we get there. I think the way we get there is the President should either endow
Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly with more authority to drive North
Korean policy or, alternatively, appoint a special envoy with access to the
President to represent the United States in future negotiations. Second, we
should strive for a noncoercive negotiating environment. This means that North Korea should freeze its reactor, cease all
reprocessing and uranium enrichment activities, and place under safeguards any
fissile material that it has acquired since the Agreed Framework of 1994 was
signed. For our part, the United States should reiterate that it has no hostile
intent toward North Korea and pledge not to launch any military strikes or seek
new sanctions so long as the freeze remains in place and talks to resolve the
crisis continue. Finally, we should pursue a phased, reciprocal, verifiable agreement to
eliminate North Korea's nuclear weapons program, terminate its export of
ballistic missiles, and more closely integrate the North into the community of
nations. Some say North Korea cannot be trusted. They are right. Modifying
President Reagan's maxim, we should mistrust, and verify. But the alternatives to negotiating are grim. Our current approach leads
to one of two undesirable outcomes: Either the United States will essentially
acquiesce to the North's serial production of nuclear weapons or we may find
ourselves in a military confrontation with a desperate, nuclear-armed regime.
Any preemptive military strike option would place millions of South Koreans and
tens of thousands of Americans at risk. How do we go to war with the North if the South does not support it, if
that were the second option? Negotiations with North Korea are not easy, but they offer us the best
chance--I believe the only chance--to avoid a nuclear nightmare on the Korean
peninsula. I would like to submit a bipartisan staff report by the members of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee who traveled to North Korea immediately
following the six-party talks in Beijing in August. I ask unanimous consent that
it be printed in the RECORD following my marks. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. (See exhibit 1.) Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, let me conclude by saying today's paper carries
the news that the quixotic and unreliable and often inscrutable actions of the
North Koreans have brought the Supreme Leader of North Korea to the position
where he is now saying he will engage in multilateral talks again and resume
those talks, and that he is ready to consider what has been rejected before. That is the sense of the article. I have no inherent faith that we can rely upon the President of North
Korea. But it seems to me we have everything to gain and nothing to lose by
continuing to pursue these talks. We give nothing, and at a minimum what we do
is put ourselves in the position where the most isolated remaining country in
the world at least is exposed to the notions of other major nations in the
world, including China, Russia, South Korea, Japan, and the United States as to
what we consider to be appropriate behavior. Hopefully, that will have a
salutary impact on the willingness to negotiate an end to these programs. The alternative of not pursuing that is bleak. Therefore, I encourage the
President of the United States to continue down this path and to continue down
the path more quickly than we have thus far. Exhibit 1 Six Party Talks and the North Korean Nuclear Issue October 14, 2003. Dear Senators Lugar and Biden: In late August, Keith Luse and
Frank Jannuzi traveled to China and North Korea, and Mr. Jannuzi traveled to
South Korea, to examine the prospects for a peaceful negotiated solution to the
North Korean nuclear issue and to follow-up on an earlier set of visits to North
Korea in an effort to gain greater transparency on food aid issues. Throughout
the course of the visit, the staff delegation received commendable support from
U.S. Diplomatic personnel. The delegation enjoyed high level access to Chinese,
North Korean, and South Korean government officials, and also met with numerous
academics, think tank specialists, and employees of non-governmental
organizations concerned with developments on the Korean Peninsula. Our key
findings, including some recommendations for next steps on the Korean Peninsula,
are reported below. Sincerely, Keith Luse, Professional Staff Member, Majority Staff, East Asian and Pacific
Affairs, Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Frank Jannuzi, Professional Staff Member, Minority Staff, East Asian and Pacific
Affairs, Senate Foreign Relations Committee. SUMMARY Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) staff members Keith Luse and
Frank Jannuzi traveled to Northeast Asia August 21-September 2 to examine the
prospects for a peaceful negotiated solution to the North Korean nuclear issue
and to follow-up on their earlier set of visits to North Korea designed to push
for greater North Korean transparency and accountability on food aid and
humanitarian relief. The delegation expresses its appreciation to U.S.
diplomatic personnel at Embassies Beijing and Seoul who helped set up productive
meetings and coped with the vagaries of arranging travel to and from the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). Over the course of three days in Pyongyang, the delegation held a variety
of meetings with officials representing the DPRK, the United Nations, and
non-governmental organizations (see list of interlocutors, attached). The
delegation told senior DPRK officials that the United States views North Korea's
nuclear ambitions as a grave threat to international peace and stability and
urged the DPRK to seek a peaceful, negotiated solution to the crisis through
multilateral dialogue. The delegation visited select humanitarian relief
operations, making the point that such efforts are tangible proof that the United States has no
hostile intent toward North Korea. SFRC staff strongly advised DPRK officials
that they should permit greater transparency for food aid deliveries under the
auspices of the World Food Program and various non-governmental organizations.
The delegation pressed DPRK officials to adhere to international standards of
human rights, including respect for religious freedom, and emphasized that the
United States' concern for the human rights situation in North Korea reflects
the deeply held convictions of the American people. KEY FINDINGS Six party talks in Beijing helped improve coordination among the five
nations trying to reign in North Korea's nuclear ambitions, but DPRK officials
left the talks unconvinced that the United States genuinely seeks a peaceful,
negotiated solution to the crisis. DPRK officials told the staff delegation that
they believe the true aim of the United States is ``regime change,'' and that
de-nuclearization is just the first step toward that objective. Under pressure from China, the DPRK probably will come to another round of
multilateral talks. However, China's encouragement for DPRK's participation will
be contingent on the United States outlining specific steps it will take once
the DPRK pledges to dismantle/eliminate its nuclear program. Talks could easily
be derailed should North Korea decide to launch a ballistic missile or even test
a nuclear weapon. Moreover, North Korea might scuttle the talks in response to
the appropriate and necessary U.S. efforts to enforce the Proliferation Security
Initiative (PSI) and the Illicit Activities Initiative, both of which the North
interprets as attempts to ``strangle'' the regime. Some North Korean officials believe that the United States continues to
station nuclear weapons in South Korea. Decision-making in the DPRK is centralized and ultimate authority rests
with Kim Jong-il. Top officials in North Korea are carefully monitoring polling data
reflecting opinion on domestic politics in the United States, Japan and South
Korea. The World Food Program has taken some small, but significant steps in
recent months to enhance its operations in the DPRK and reduce the likelihood of
diversion of food aid. The significant reduction in U.S. food aid to North Korea
(from a high of more than 300,000 tons/year to this year's 40,000 tons) may have
undercut United States leverage in pressing for greater transparency on food
aid. North Korean officials are convinced the United States is using food as a
weapon. Humanitarian operations run by non-governmental organizations--such as the
Nautilus Institute's Village Wind Power Pilot Project and the Eugene Bell
Foundation's tuberculosis treatment programs--are making important contributions
to the welfare of the North Korean people and help allay DPRK suspicions about
the intentions of the United States, thereby contributing to an overall
political environment conducive to resolution of sensitive security issues. After extensive discussion with the delegation, Vice Minister Kim Gye Gwan
advised the DPRK would allow NGO access to some prison camps on a ``case by
case'' basis. There were two key differences to our earlier trips. While we were not
allowed to make purchases, street vendors were present throughout Pyongyang and
in Nampo, selling food and other small items. Additionally, the DPRK military
appeared to be at a higher state of alert. More soldiers were armed than during
our previous visits. DISCUSSION North Korea isolated ...... Over the course of three days in North Korea, the staff delegation found
DPRK officials to be disappointed by the six party Beijing talks, which they
described as ``five against one.'' In both formal meetings and informal
settings, DPRK officials described the Beijing talks as ``pointless'' and cast
doubt upon whether the North would be willing to engage in future rounds of
multiparty dialogue. DPRK officials were critical of the fact that they had only
40 minutes of ``direct'' dialogue with U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James
Kelly over the course of three days of talks in Beijing, and said they had been
misled into believing the multilateral talks would provide a venue for
substantive one-one-one discussions with the U.S. envoy. In one particularly blunt exchange, DPRK Vice Foreign Minister Kim Gye
Gwan told the staff delegation that the Beijing talks had ``confirmed'' the
North's assessment that the United States has no intention of changing its
``hostile policy.'' Kim said the DPRK, ``had no choice but to maintain and
reinforce its nuclear deterrent.'' The SFRC delegation conveyed their personal views that a North Korean
decision to enhance its nuclear weapons capabilities would be viewed by the
United States as a grave threat to international peace and security and would be
interpreted by Americans as a hostile act. The delegation urged the DPRK to
proceed with multiparty dialogue and to refrain from any provocative actions.
DPRK officials were non-committal with respect to any future dialogue, but
after the staff delegation's departure, the DPRK Foreign Ministry issued a
statement claiming that the North remains ``equally prepared for dialogue and
for a war.'' This statement represented a slight softening of the stance
articulated immediately after the Beijing talks, and certainly leaves the door
open to another round of multi-party talks in Beijing or some other venue. With strong encouragement from China (a senior delegation from China
visited the DPRK in late September), the DPRK may agree to another round of
six-party talks, if only to avoid being held directly responsible for a
breakdown of the diplomatic process. It remains unclear what stance the DPRK
will take at any future talks, and at what level they will be represented.
Decision-making in the DPRK is highly centralized, with Kim Jong-il wielding the
ultimate authority. Junior level DPRK officials such as Kim Yong-il, who
represented the DPRK in Beijing in August, often are unable to engage in
substantive dialogue, a fact which argues for the United States to try to
elevate the talks to engage officials with real authority and the ear of Kin
Jong-il. ..... and wary of U.S. intentions The difficult of communicating with the North Koreans was evident
throughout the staff delegation's visit to Pyongyang, highlighting the risk that
conflict could arise from miscalculation or mis-communication. North Korean
officials with whom we met had an imperfect understanding of United States
security policy, especially the recently issued National Security Strategy and
Nuclear Force Posture Review. They repeatedly expressed their belief that both
documents called for pre-emptive nuclear strikes against North Korea, and said
the North's own nuclear program was necessary to counter this United States
``nuclear threat.'' Sometimes, confusion arose out of the imprecision of different English
terms. DPRK officials asked the staff delegation to clarify the different
meanings ``simultaneous,'' ``synchronous,'' ``phased,'' and ``reciprocal.''
Attention to such detail suggests the DPRK is actively studying how the nuclear
issue might be resolved given what they characterized as the ``zero trust''
which exists between the two parties. DPRK officials took note of recent U.S. efforts to curtail North Korean
involvement in narcotics trafficking, counterfeiting, and other illicit
activities. DPRK officials flatly denied North Korean involvement in such
illicit activities, and alleged that the United States had trumped up the
charges as part of a more general campaign to ``stifle'' the DPRK. Food aid: slow progress on transparency and accountability The staff delegation met with the Flood Damage Rehabilitation Committee (FDRC)
director Jong Yun-hyong, who oversees agricultural reconstruction as well as
foreign food aid programs. The delegation explained to Yum that it as essential
for the DPRK to enhance transparency for food aid, to open up counties currently
off-limits, and to provide random access to WFP monitors seeking to verify food
aid deliveries. The delegation told Yum that the level of monitoring requested
by WFP was consistent with international norms, and that the DPRK could not
expect donors and potential donors to contribute food aid if they did not have
high confidence that the aid was reaching its intended recipients. Yun said that security issues are paramount for the DPRK, and that the
military would not permit international access to certain sensitive regions of
the country. He also said that monitoring had greatly improved since food aid
began to flow during the North Korean famine of the mid-1990's. Yun specifically
cited the recent U.N. nutritional survey, and reported that ``security
officials'' had initially objected to the survey, but that FDRC officials had
prevailed in an inter-agency battle in order to permit the survey to be
conducted. Yun argued that recent significant reductions in WFP food aid--just
300,000 metric tons in 2002, down from 811,000 tons in 2001--had made it more
difficult for him to push for greater numbers of monitors and greater access for
international observers. Nonetheless, Yun promised progress on monitoring in the
future, and invited the international community to shift its humanitarian aid
strategy away from food donations and toward ``sustainable development,''
including agricultural reforms, new seek varieties and planting techniques, and
``food for work.'' The delegation met with World Food Program country director Rick Corsino,
who reported slow, but significant progress toward enhanced monitoring of food
aid and ensuring that aid reaches those most in need. These are the highlights:
First, WFP has terminated food aid to 17 of 21 districts of the capital
city of Pyonghang after concluding that residents of the capital are on average
better fed than those of outlying areas. This is an important step, both
symbolically, and substantively. Second, with the full knowledge and support of DPRK authorities, WFP is
conducting Korean language training for food aid personnel stationed inside the
DPRK. The DPRK continues to object to WFP bringing in Korean-speaking experts
from overseas, but the growing language facility of WFP's foreign staff allows
for smoother interaction with DPRK officials and higher quality monitoring in
the field. Third, WFP has increased the number of monthly inspection visits and now
has approximately 50 international staff in residence in Pyongyang and at five
sub-offices located in Sinuiju, Wonson, Hamhung, Chongjin, and Hyesan. WFP is
the only international agency working in the country with international staff
permanently placed outside the capital. Fourth, WFP has sustained its access to 162 of 206 total counties in North
Korea. WFP does not deliver food aid to those counties that remain off limits,
most of which are concentrated along the sparsely populated mountainous
``spine'' of the country and along the DMZ (see attached map). Finally, through its inspection visits, WFP is gradually building a
detailed database of schools, hospitals, orphanages, and other institutions
receiving WFP assistance. Although the DPRK still has not provided a
comprehensive list of aid recipients--a list long requested by WFP
officials--the WFP is essentially building its own list with each inspection
visit. NGO's making contribution to welfare of average North Koreans Although WFP is the largest humanitarian organization working in North
Korea, they are not the only international organization operating in North
Korea. The staff delegation made a point of visiting two humanitarian operations
supported by U.S. non-governmental organizations; the Village Wind Power Pilot
Project run by the Nautilus Institute (with significant financial support
provided by the W. Alton Jones Foundation) and a tuberculosis treatment hospital
and mobile van sponsored by the Eugene Bell Foundation. These initiatives have
fostered good will on a ``people-to-people'' basis, and have measurably improved
the quality of life for the North Korean beneficiaries. Wind power The US-DPRK Village Wind Power Pilot Project was the first attempt by a
United States NGO to work side-by-side with North Koreans in cooperative
development. Previously, non-governmental organizations had been limited by both
Washington and Pyongyang to delivering food aid to North Korea. The project
installed seven technologically advanced wind turbine towers in a rural village
on the west coast of North Korea near the port of Nampo. This region is known as
a bread basket for North Korea, rich in arable land and other natural resources,
including steady breezes off of the Korea Bay. The turbines provide clean,
renewable energy to the village's medical clinic, kindergarten, and 67
households. In addition, a wind-powered water pump irrigates the village's
fields, and has significantly boosted yields, according to villagers. The
combined generating capacity of the turbines is 11.5kW. Since the wind power project was completed in 1999, it has had its share
of ups and downs. At present, the delegation found that the facility was not
operating at full capacity due to maintenance problems with two inverters and
damaged batteries. North Korea lacks adequately trained technicians to service
the equipment, and the nuclear stand-off has disrupted visits by foreign experts
needed to assess the maintenance requirements and make needed repairs. Despite these difficulties, the DPRK participants in the project remain
enthusiastic about it as a model for rural electrification, and hope to press
ahead with a major windpower survey project along the west coast in coming
months. DPRK authorities told the visiting Senate staff delegation that deciding
to proceed with the wind power survey requires approval from military officials
worried about the collection of militarily sensitive meteorological information.
Notwithstanding the sensitive nature of the data to be collected, DPRK officials
believe the project will move ahead. Wind power projects could alleviate severe
shortages of power in rural areas, and have the advantage of not requiring major
upgrades in North Korea's electric power grid--a grid that experts have found to
be in need of major overhaul before it could accommodate the introduction of
large new power plants such as the light water nuclear reactors contemplated
under the Agreed Framework. Tuberculosis treatment Since 1995, the Eugene Bell Foundation has been working inside North Korea
to fight deadly diseases like tuberculosis (TP). Eugene Bell foundation
currently coordinates the delivery of TB medication, diagnostic equipment, and
supplies to 1/3 of the North Korean population and approximately 50 North Korean
treatment facilities (hospitals and care centers). The staff delegation visited
one such hospital in Pyongyang, and also inspected one of the 17 mobile x-ray
vehicles designed to navigate the North's antiquated road network. The delegation found the Eugene Bell project to be characterized by high
standards of transparency and efficiency. The foundation conducts regular site
visits (more than 60 since 1995) and is able to donate goods directly to
recipients rather than through third parties or government intermediaries. Staff
at the hospital we visited appeared well trained and highly motivated. They were
deeply appreciative of the support they receive from the United States and
recognized that this humanitarian outreach occurs even at a time when the two
nations do not maintain normal diplomatic relations. The Eugene Bell foundation
supports 16 TB hospitals and 64 TB care centers in the DPRK. More than 200,000
patients have been treated. Moreover, serving as a conduit, the Eugene Bell
foundation is currently responsible for sending tuberculosis medicine, medical
aid, and equipment for approximately 1/3 of the North Korean population. Joint recovery operations The staff delegation met with Sr. Col. Kwak Chol-hui of the Korean
People's Army, the director of the Joint Recovery Operation searching for the
remains of U.S. servicemen left behind after the Korean War. The United States
estimates that as many as 8,000 remains of U.S. servicemen are on DPRK soil. So
far, only 378 of these remains have been recovered. More than 200 remains were
found as the result of unilateral DPRK searches and returned to the United
States. Just over 170 sets of remains have been recovered through the joint
recovery operation. The recovery operations are laborious. Historical records can indicate
likely search areas, but only eye witnesses can pinpoint the possible locations
for remains. As the population ages and the terrain of North Korea is shaped by
construction, erosion, flooding, and other forces, it is becoming increasingly
difficult to locate remains. Even after likely sites are identified,
time-consuming excavations and careful forensic work are necessary to find and
identify remains. U.S. and North Korean military personnel work side by side in
the field during the recovery operations. According to U.S. participants in the
operation, this interaction in the field has been constructive, deepening our
understanding of the Korean People's Army. Colonel Kwak told the delegation that the DPRK would like to expand the
joint recovery operation, employing as many as 2,700 investigators to scour the
country to conduct interviews with those elderly North Korean who might have
knowledge of the location of U.S. remains. He indicated that the DPRK's
commitment to the recovery operations is independent of the nuclear issue, and,
in his opinion, should remain so. It is unclear, however, what role the DPRK
envisions for U.S. forces in such an expanded operation. The staff delegation
believes that any expansion should be made contingent on greater U.S. access to
those North Korean citizens claiming to have first-hand knowledge of the
whereabouts of remains. STAFF CONCLUSIONS So as to reduce what we believe is a significant risk of conflict arising
out of miscalculation or mis-communication, the United States should greatly
expand dialogue with North Korea, both within the framework of multi-party
talks, as well as through informal or ``Track II'' bilateral negotiations. The United States should appoint a senior official to represent the United
States solely on issues related to the Korean Peninsula. Alternatively, the
Administration should endow the current negotiator, Assistant Secretary of State
James Kelly, with greater authority to direct and coordinate the President's
North Korea policy and gain access to more senior North Korean officials. The United States should acknowledge recent improvements in WFP operations
and continue food aid to the DPRK under UN auspices. The United States should
also consider funneling a portion of future U.S. food aid through
non-governmental organizations, some of which have been able to achieve strong
monitoring capability for their humanitarian relief. The U.S. should search for ways to expand outreach efforts by NGOs in the
fields of rural energy development, agriculture, and public health. The Joint Recovery Operation to identify the remains of U.S. servicemen
from the Korean War affords the United States valuable contact inside North
Korea. Any expansion of the operation, however, should be made contingent upon
greater U.S. access to those North Korean citizens claiming to have first-hand
knowledge of the whereabouts of remains. LIST OF INTERLOCUTORS In Beijing, China In North Korea In South Korea END *************************************** 5A)
Continuation of WMD Related
National Emergency (Executive Order 12938) CONTINUATION OF EMERGENCY POSED BY PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION AND THEIR DELIVERY SYSTEM--MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES (H. DOC. NO. 108-138) -- (House of Representatives - October 29, 2003) --- The SPEAKER pro tempore laid before the House the following message from
the President of the United States; which was read and, together with the
accompanying papers, without objection, referred to the Committee on
International Relations and ordered to be printed: Section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d))
provides for the automatic termination of a national emergency unless, prior to
the anniversary date of its declaration, the President publishes in the
Federal Register and transmits to the Congress a notice stating that the
emergency is to continue in effect beyond the anniversary date. Consistent with
this provision, I have sent to the Federal Register for publication the
enclosed notice, stating that the emergency posed by the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems declared by Executive
Order 12938 on November 14, 1994,
as amended, is to continue in effect beyond November 14, 2003. The most recent
notice continuing this emergency was signed on November 6, 2002, and published
in the Federal Register on November 12, 2002 (67 Fed. Reg. 68493). Because the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means of
delivering them continues to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the
national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States, I have
determined the national emergency previously declared must continue in effect
beyond November 14, 2003. George W. Bush. The White House, October 29, 2003. ******************** REPORT RELATIVE TO THE NATIONAL EMERGENCY DECLARED IN EXECUTIVE ORDER
12938 WITH RESPECT TO WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION--PM 53 -- (Senate - October
29, 2003) --- The Presiding Officer laid before the Senate the following message from
the President of the United States, together with an accompanying report; which
was referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs: Section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d))
provides for the automatic termination of a national emergency unless, prior to
the anniversary date of its declaration, the President publishes in the
Federal Register and transmits to the Congress a notice stating that the
emergency is to continue in effect beyond the anniversary date. Consistent with
this provision, I have sent to the Federal Register for publication the
enclosed notice, stating that the emergency posed by the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems declared by Executive
Order 12938 on November 14, 1994,
as amended, is to continue in effect beyond November 14, 2003. the most recent
notice continuing this emergency was signed on November 6, 2002, and published
in the Federal Register on November 12, 2002 (67 Fed. Reg. 68493). Because the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means of
delivering them continues to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the
national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States, I have
determined the national emergency previously declared must continue in effect
beyond November 14, 2003. George W. Bush. The White House, October 29, 2003.
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