Congressional Record Weekly UpdateNovember 22-25, 2003Return to the Congressional Report Weekly. 1A) Explanation of Vote on Conference Report on Defense Authorization Bill SPEECH OF HON. RUSH D. HOLT OF NEW JERSEY IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 21, 2003
1B) Congratulating Kazakhstan on the 12th Anniversary
of Independence Ms. LANDRIEU (for herself and Mr. BURNS) submitted the following concurrent resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations: Whereas, on December 16, 2003, the people of the Republic of Kazakhstan will celebrate 12 years of independence, and on December 25, 2003, the United States and Kazakhstan will mark the 12th anniversary of diplomatic relations between the two countries; Whereas Kazakhstan in a short period of time has managed to shed totalitarian shackles and become a dynamically developing civil society in which public and private institutions are strong, effective democratic mechanisms and the rule of law are established, and basic human rights are respected; Whereas Kazakhstan, an open country where citizens of more than 100 ethnic groups enjoy equal rights and opportunities, made a significant contribution to promoting global peace and harmony by hosting in September 2003 the Congress of the World and Traditional Religions, which brought together leaders of world religions seeking to bridge religious differences; Whereas the Government of Kazakhstan has toughened legislation and taken other concrete steps to prevent human trafficking and end this cruel form of human mistreatment; Whereas Kazakhstan is confidently moving toward integration with the world economic system by establishing the conditions for developing a true market economy; Whereas the United States Government, recognizing the economic progress of Kazakhstan, granted to Kazakhstan ``market economy status'', the first such designation of any country in the Commonwealth of Independent States; Whereas United States businesses actively participate in the development of one of the world's largest energy resources in Kazakhstan and consider the country to be an alternative and reliable source of energy; Whereas the application to Kazakhstan of chapter 1 of title IV of the Trade Act of 1974 (commonly referred to as the ``Jackson-Vanik amendment'') prevents Kazakhstan from achieving permanent normal trade relations status with the United States; Whereas an independent and democratic Kazakhstan is the cornerstone of peace, stability, and prosperity in the vitally important region of Central Asia; Whereas Kazakhstan voluntarily disarmed its nuclear arsenal, the world's fourth largest, and joined the Treaty on Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, with Annexes, Protocols, and Memorandum of Understanding, signed at Moscow on July 31, [Page: S16035] GPO's PDF 1991 (START Treaty), and in so doing provided an example of a responsible national approach to nonproliferation; Whereas the people of Kazakhstan, under the leadership of Nursultan Nazarbayev, are providing unconditional and firm support in the ongoing allied campaign in Afghanistan by allowing coalition forces to use the air space of Kazakhstan and the largest airport in Almaty, Kazakhstan; Whereas Kazakhstan is taking an active part in rehabilitating Iraq and is the only country in the region of Central Asia to send a military contingent of combat engineers who in a few months have neutralized more than 300,000 explosive devices in Iraq, thereby saving thousands of lives; Whereas, within the framework of growing military cooperation, the United States and Kazakhstan signed an Article 98 Agreement relating to the International Criminal Court; Whereas the increasing significance of Kazakhstan to United States foreign policy has resulted in the creation of the United States-Kazakhstan Interparliamentary Friendship Group, which is designed to strengthen relations of strategic partnership between the two countries; and Whereas Kazakhstan is an important friend and strategic ally of the United States: Now, therefore, be it Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That Congress-- (1) congratulates the people and Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan on the 12th anniversary of the independence of Kazakhstan and the establishment of diplomatic relations with the United States; (2) welcomes and supports political and economic transformations achieved by Kazakhstan during its years of independence; (3) expresses gratitude for the leadership of Kazakhstan in establishing interreligious dialogue to promote peace and harmony in the world; (4) commends Kazakhstan on toughening measures to stop human trafficking; (5) recognizes the need to terminate application to Kazakhstan of title IV of the Trade Act of 1974 (commonly known as the ``Jackson-Vanik Amendment'') and extend normal trade relations status to Kazakhstan; (6) expresses gratitude for the support and assistance of the people of Kazakhstan in the antiterrorist campaign of the United States and coalition countries and for their support for the reconstruction of Iraq; (7) applauds the wise decision of the leadership of Kazakhstan to renounce the deployment of the nuclear weapons inherited by the country and make the world a safer place; (8) calls upon the President to actively popularize the example set by Kazakhstan in renouncing the deployment of its nuclear weapons with respect to United States negotiations with countries that are trying to acquire, develop, or deploy nuclear weapons; and (9) urges further strengthening of strategically important relations between Kazakhstan and the United States on all other issues of importance between the two countries.
CHEM/ BIO AND WMD TERRORISM ************************************ 3A) Supporting Poison Prevention and Control Centers SPEECH OF HON. RAHM EMANUEL OF ILLINOIS IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 21, 2003
3B) Expressing the Sense of the Senate Regarding the
Anthrax and Smallpox Vaccines Mr. BINGAMAN submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Armed Services: S. Res. 278 Whereas military personnel are asked to risk and even sacrifice their lives and the well-being of their families in defense of the United States; Whereas vaccines are an important factor in ensuring force health protection by protecting the military personnel of the United States from both natural health threats and health threats resulting from biological weapons in overseas conflicts; Whereas vaccines offer significant benefits and protections that must be carefully balanced with the reality that vaccines and drugs generally carry rare but serious adverse events and life-threatening risks; Whereas in 2002, the insert label for the anthrax vaccine required by the Food and Drug Administration was revised to include approximately 40 serious adverse events with information that ``approximately 6 percent of the reported events were listed as serious.''; [Page: S16032] Whereas in 2002, the Food and Drug Administration also compelled the manufacturer of the anthrax vaccine to substantially revise the package insert and changed the risk to pregnant women from Category C (a possible risk) to Category D (a known risk) because of ``positive evidence of human fetal risk based on adverse reaction data from investigational or marketing experience or studies in humans''; Whereas in 2002, the General Accounting Office reported ``an estimated 84 percent of the personnel who had had anthrax vaccine shots between September 1998 and September 2000 reported having side effects or reactions. This rate is more than double the level cited in the vaccine product insert. Further, about 24 percent of all events were classified as systemic--a level more than a hundred times higher than that estimated in the product insert at the time''; Whereas in June 2003, the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention withdrew its support for expanding the smallpox vaccination program for first-responders after finding that 1 in 500 civilians vaccinated for smallpox had a serious vaccine event; Whereas in 2002, the General Accounting Office found that 69 percent of experienced pilots and aircrew members in the National Guard and the Reserve reported that the anthrax shot was the major influence in their decision to change their military status in 2000, including leaving the military entirely; Whereas in the war in Iraq that continues as of the date of enactment of this resolution, the British and Australian militaries have conducted voluntary anthrax vaccine programs, and other allies who have been offered the anthrax vaccine have declined; Whereas in March 2000, the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Disease reported in the ``Jordan Report 20th Anniversary: Accelerated Development of Vaccines 2000'' that no data existed to support the effectiveness of the anthrax vaccine against pulmonary (inhalation) anthrax in humans; Whereas because anthrax can be prevented and treated with antibiotics and other options are either in clinical trials or development, the current anthrax vaccine is not the only choice for force health protection; Whereas in the 2002 State of the Union address, President Bush placed a national priority on developing a new anthrax vaccine and a newer and safer smallpox vaccine is also in development; and Whereas the threat of anthrax and smallpox attacks against the deployed troops of the United States has significantly diminished since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and the disruption of Al Qaeda activity in Afghanistan: Now, therefore, be it Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that-- (1) the Secretary of Defense should reconsider the mandatory nature of the anthrax and smallpox vaccine immunization program, pending the development of new and better vaccines that are under development as of the date of enactment of this resolution; (2) the Secretary of Defense and Board for Correction of Military Records should reconsider adverse actions already taken or intended to be taken against servicemembers for refusing to accept the anthrax or smallpox vaccine; (3) the Secretary of Defense and the intelligence community should reevaluate the threat of anthrax and smallpox attacks on troops in Iraq and Afghanistan to reflect operational realities as of the date of enactment of this resolution when considering the continuation of a mandatory military vaccination program; and (4) the Secretary of Veterans Affairs should assess those adverse events being reported with respect to the anthrax and smallpox vaccines, research causal relationships, and estimate a future cost to the Department to treat these conditions. Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, throughout the conflict in Iraq, our brave soldiers have carried out their duties with strength, with honor, and with courage. They have never faltered in their service to this nation or the world. That is why I am so troubled that some of our servicemembers and their families believe that current Department of Defense policies may be failing them, with grievous consequences. That is why I rise today to submit a Sense of the Senate Resolution that asks for reconsideration of the policies surrounding the current smallpox and anthrax immunization programs. Specifically it asks the Secretary of Defense to reconsider the mandatory nature of its smallpox and anthrax vaccine immunization programs pending the development of new and better vaccines that are currently under development; reconsider adverse actions taken against servicemembers on the basis of refusal to take the smallpox or anthrax vaccines; and reevaluate, with the intelligence community, the current threat of anthrax and smallpox attacks on our troops, in an effort to reflect current operational realities when considering the continuation of a mandatory vaccination program. It also urges the Department of Veterans Affairs to assess these adverse events being reported with respect to the smallpox and anthrax vaccines, research causal relationships, and estimate a future cost to the Department of Veterans Affairs to treat these conditions. Vaccines are an important factor in ensuring protection of our nation's military personnel from health threats--both natural or from biological weapons--in overseas conflicts. However, the current smallpox and anthrax vaccines have real and serious consequences that must be weighed against the potential benefits. This is why the President has made development of a modern anthrax vaccine a national priority in his last two State of the Union addresses and why the Institute of Medicine urged the government to do so in March 2002. What are the consequences of a policy that makes it mandatory that military personnel get the anthrax and smallpox vaccines? First, there are a growing number of adverse events reported in conjunction with these two vaccines, which is in sharp contrast to other vaccines. Second, there is a morale problem in the military associated with the mandatory nature of requiring military personnel to take these shots that has a serious negative impact on the recruitment and retention of our military personnel. Third, the long-term consequences of the vaccine programs for the health and well-being of our military personnel and our veterans is in question and should be addressed. Ensuring the health and well-being of our military personnel before, during and after serving our country should always be a top priority of our nation. The major potential benefit of any vaccine would be force protection. Unfortunately, there are major questions that arise with this argument concerning the anthrax and smallpox vaccines. First, even if there was a threat, such a threat against our troops in the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan has been significantly diminished. Second, there are other mechanisms to address any potential exposure, including post-exposure vaccination and antibiotics. This was the effective treatment used in the Senate after the anthrax exposure in 2001. Third, we do not even know if the anthrax vaccine works at all on inhalation anthrax or weaponized anthrax, so the vaccine may be completely ineffective anyway. For our brave men and women serving in harm's way, all too often the first threat they face is not when their boots hit the ground in Baghdad, Iraq, or Kandahar, Afghanistan--the first threat many servicemembers believe they face may be in line at the home station when they receive their anthrax and smallpox vaccinations. There is a growing number of disturbing reports about how some of our servicemembers have contracted health problems shortly after receiving the anthrax and smallpox vaccines. These illnesses include mysterious pneumonia-like illnesses, heart problems, blood clots, and other medical conditions that have stricken otherwise young, healthy, and strong military personnel. It has even resulted in death. This is not entirely surprising, in light of the fact that the Food and Drug Administration, or FDA, has identified a number of adverse reactions associated with these two vaccines. With respect to the anthrax vaccine alone, in 2002 the FDA required the anthrax vaccine product label be revised and it now includes approximately 40 serious adverse events. As it reads, ``Approximately 6% of the reported events were listed as serious. Serious adverse events include those that result in death, hospitalization, permanent disability or are life-threatening.'' The FDA also raised the rate of systemic reactions by up to 175 times over the previous 1999 product label, from 0.2 percent to 5-35 percent Meanwhile, in light of adverse events that exceed those for other vaccines and other concerns about the smallpox vaccine, both the Institute of Medicine and the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices recently issued recommendations calling for a pause in the Federal Government's smallpox vaccination program. Meanwhile, both CBS News and UPI have identified a growing number of deaths and severe illnesses that they [Page: S16033] claim point to the anthrax and smallpox vaccines. These include the deaths of Army SP4 Joshua Neusche, Army SGT Michael Tosto, LTC Anthony Sherman, Army SP4 Rachel Lacy, Army SP4 Zeferino Colunga, Army SP4 Cory Hubbell, Army SP4 Levi Kinchen, Army SSG Richard Eaton, Jr., Army PVT Matthew Bush, Army SSG David Loyd, and Army SP4 William Jeffries. Eight of these 11 Army personnel were under the age of 25. As Dr. Jeffrey Sartin, and infectious disease doctor at the Gundersen Clinic in La Crosse, WI, said, ``I would say that the number of cases among young healthy troops would seem to be unusual.'' The numbers of those with adverse health events is significantly higher. There have been around 700 adverse events reported in just the first 6 months of this year and this is as part of a reporting system that has been found to significantly under-report adverse events. In addition, there are the reports of problems at both Ft. Stewart and Ft. Knox with respect to sick and injured soldiers who have been waiting weeks and sometimes months for medical treatment. Senators LEAHY and BOND should be commended for drawing attention to those problems and getting the military to move to address it. What remains disturbing is that many of those who are ill and on ``medical hold'' were never deployed. At Ft. Stewart, Senators BOND and LEAHY found that one-third of the 650 soldiers awaiting medical care and follow-up evaluations were not physically qualified for deployment and therefore never deployed overseas. At Ft. Knox, according to a UPI story, 369 of the 422 soldiers at Ft. Knox did not deploy to Operation Iraqi Freedom because of their illnesses. This includes, according to the story, ``strange clusters of heart problems and breathing problems, as did soldiers at Ft. Stewart and other locations.'' These are health problems that are often cited as adverse events accompanying the anthrax and smallpox vaccines. Once again, there is a surprising number of such cases in what are otherwise a strong, healthy, and young group of people. We certainly do not know whether these cases have been caused by the anthrax or smallpox vaccines at this point. In fact, these personnel desperately await any medical treatment and that must be addressed. While the military works to address that problem, they should also reconsider the mandatory nature of the anthrax and smallpox vaccines, as they may be contributing heavily to the problem. In the case of Army SP4 Rachel Lacy, who loved her country and volunteered to deploy to the Persian Gulf, she was ordered to take the anthrax vaccine and did so without objection. Within days, she started to suffer pneumonia and flu-like symptoms. Within weeks, she was dead. The coroner listed ``post-vaccine'' problems on the death certificate for Rachel Lacy and said, ``it's just very suspicious in my mind ..... that she's healthy, gets the vaccinations and then dies a couple weeks later.'' The Army is, according to published reports, conducting an investigation of the 100 or more soldiers that have gotten pneumonia in Iraq and southwestern Asia. Of those 100, 2 have died and another 13 have had to be put on respirators. According to a story published in both the New York Times and Washington Post on November 19, 2003, as part of that investigation, the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices and the Armed Services Epidemiology Board said the evidence ``strongly favors'' the belief that vaccines led to the death of Rachel Lacy. It was an important admission and yet the military immediately said its vaccination policies would ``not be changed.'' Rachel's father, Moses Lacy, has asked, ``Let's stop this, re-evaluate what we're doing, re-evaluate the risks.'' That is a reasonable request and our nation's servicemembers and families deserve it. We owe it to the Lacy family and to all our military personnel and their families. As a result of the concerns of servicemembers and their families that these vaccines are having on their health and well-being, it must also be noted that the anthrax and smallpox vaccines are having serious consequences for our nation's military readiness. In September 2002, the General Accounting Office reported that 69 percent of trained and experienced pilots and aircrew members in the Guard and Reserve reported that the anthrax shot was the major influence in their decision to change their military status in 2002, including leaving the military entirely. Responding to the serious recruitment and retention problems caused by the mandatory anthrax vaccine policy, in February 2000, my colleague and then Presidential candidate JOHN MCCAIN called for a moratorium of this policy. Unfortunately, the safety concerns Senator MCCAIN noted then have not been resolved. The military continues to deny problems with the vaccine while simultaneously operating a clinic at Walter Reed Army Medical Center to treat the illnesses caused by the vaccine. Instead of reconsidering its policy, the DOD has, instead, aggressively moved against those who have refused the vaccines. After his testimony before the House Government Reform Committee, Major Sonnie Bates, the highest ranking officer to refuse the anthrax vaccination, was charged under article 15 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the Department of Defense moved to court-martial him. After accusations of reprisal came from the Congress, the Department of Defense backed down and discharged Major Bates. There is also the case of Air Force Captain John Buck, M.D. He was court-martialed for refusing the anthrax vaccine in a trial in which the judge refused to allow the jury to hear the doctor's views on its safety and efficacy. After he was convicted, fined $21,000, and denied a promotion he had earned, Dr. Buck deployed to the Indian Ocean after September 11th to support U.S. military operations in Afghanistan. He was awarded a medal for his service in support of Operation Enduring Freedom and subsequently given an honorable discharge. In fact, the military has court-martialed soldiers throughout the military for refusing the anthrax vaccine, including a case this spring in New York of Private Rhonda Hazley who refused the vaccine because she was breast-feeding her child. One of the things this resolution asks is for the Department of Defense to reconsider adverse actions taken against servicemembers on the basis of refusal to take the smallpox or anthrax vaccines. The court-martialing of a woman that refused these vaccines because she was breast-feeding is particularly disturbing. It is important to note that the FDA revised the product label for the anthrax vaccine from ``a possible risk'' to a ``known risk'' to pregnant women because of ``positive evidence of human fetal risk based on adverse reaction data from investigational or marketing experience or studies in humans.'' While Private Hazley was no longer pregnant, the FDA does believe the ``pregnancy and lactation are a clinical continuum.'' Once again, the risks of the vaccine would appear to far outweigh the benefit to a mother and mechanic in the Army. The DOD's actions in such cases have created a climate of distrust and fear within the ranks of the military. This comply or be discharged or prosecuted policy is of great concern to our brave young men and women in uniform, and in the case of Private Hazley, to her child. Again, due to this policy, many soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines to reevaluate their commitment to the military. The military has argued that we need a mandatory program with respect to our nation's military personnel as part of ensuring force protection. However, I understand that our allies--both the British and Australians--have not made the anthrax vaccines mandatory in the Iraqi Freedom Operation. As those two nations weighed the potential consequences of requiring all military personnel to get the vaccines versus any potential benefit, they came down on the side of making the vaccine voluntary. In the case of the British military, more than half the armed forces personnel deployed in the Gulf have refused to be vaccinated against anthrax. The British Ministry of Defense spokesman said that this policy would remain voluntary ``in accordance with [Page: S16034] long-standing medical practice.'' Of interest, British army units that would be responsible for dealing with suspect chemical and biological sites are given the smallpox vaccine but still are not required to get the anthrax vaccine. For those that have agreed to accept the anthrax vaccine among British troops, they are reporting a large number of adverse events. According to a report by the British National Gulf Veterans and Families' Association, they anticipate adverse reaction among ``at least 6,000 new cases as a result of the Iraq conflict--about 30 percent of the 22,000 troops who had the anthrax vaccination.'' In addition to the policy of our allies that military personnel should be able to make their own decisions regarding the anthrax vaccine, another reason they have made the vaccine voluntary is that we do not even know whether the anthrax vaccine is effective against inhalation or weaponized anthrax. Furthermore, even if we had truly thought there was strong evidence that the Iraqi government had and was preparing to use biological weapons such as anthrax against the United States military, the report by Weapons Inspector David Kay in September indicates that threat has been found to be lacking or non-existent. There appears to be little evidence available that Al Qaeda or Saddam have the capability to deliver anthrax or smallpox against our troops in Iraq or Afghanistan. Even if there was such a threat, it is likely extremely small at this point. Again, if nothing else, this change in the threat to our troops requires an immediate reevaluation of DOD vaccination policy. Even if you still think there is some potential benefit of these vaccinations, it must be further weighed against whether there is another mechanism available that would have the same effect. We in the Senate, for example, know very well that the treatment of anthrax exposure via antibiotics works very well. The Senate was faced with the choice of having those exposed undergo a course of antibiotics versus getting the anthrax vaccine and the vast majority of those exposed to anthrax choose to take the antibiotic treatment rather than volunteer to take the anthrax vaccine. In fact, the current Majority Leader, Senator FRIST, said at the time the anthrax vaccine was offered to Senate employees potentially exposed to anthrax, ``I do not recommend widespread inoculation for people with the vaccine in the Hart Building. There are too many side effects and if there is limited chance of exposure the side effects would far outweigh any potential advantage.'' Again, in weighing the potential benefit of the vaccine versus the option of antibiotics, the vast majority decided in support of the latter option. Our military personnel certainly deserve the option that many Senate personnel chose for themselves and what it seems the Secretary of Defense chose for himself when he acknowledged on October 25, 2001--in the midst of the anthrax attacks--that he was not taking the anthrax vaccine. When the President was running for our Nation's highest office, he said with respect to questions posed to him in the September 2000 issue of U.S. Medicine, ``The Defense Department's Anthrax Immunization Program has raised numerous health concerns and caused fear among the individuals whose lives it touches. I don't feel the current administration's anthrax immunization program has taken into account the effect of this program on the soldiers in our military and their families. Under my administration, soldiers and their families will be taken into consideration.'' Some of our nation's servicemembers and their families believe that the current policy of this Administration does not adequately take soldiers and their families into consideration. They believe we are, in fact, failing to ensure the health and well-being of our military personnel and we must do better. Before closing, I would like to particularly note the long-standing work by Congressman CHRISTOPHER SHAYS on this issue. In a report issued by the House Committee on Government Reform in April 2000, the report states, ``many members of the armed services do not share that faith [that the DOD places in the anthrax vaccine]. They do not believe merely suggestive evidence of vaccine efficacy outweighs their concerns over the lack of evidence of long term vaccine safety. Nor do they trust DOD has learned the lessons of part military medical mistakes: atomic testing, Agent Orange, Persian Gulf war drugs, and vaccines. Heavy handed, one-sided informational materials only fuel suspicions the program understates adverse reaction risks in order to magnify the relative, admittedly marginal, benefits of the vaccine.'' Many of the findings by Congressman SHAYS, such as the concerns by military servicemembers are even more valid today with the introduction of the smallpox vaccine to the list of vaccines required by the military. Consequently, I urge the passage of this Sense of the Senate urging the Department of Defense to reconsider the mandatory nature of its smallpox and anthrax vaccination programs and to minimize the use of these vaccines pending the current development of new and better vaccines. I also plan to introduce legislation early next year, as the Institute of Medicine recommended back in 1999, to establish a National Center for Military Deployment Health Research. Our nation's servicemembers deserve our best efforts to assure their health and well-being. As the IOM said in making the recommendation to establish a National Center for Military Deployment Health Research, ``Veterans' organizations were instrumental in developing the idea for a national center for the study of war-related illness and postdeployment health issues, and these organizations continue to support the national center concept.'' We owe this to our nation's servicemembers and veterans and I look forward to working with them over the coming months in the development of that long-needed legislation. END
IRAQ/SYRIA AND WMD **************************** 4A) Opposing the Syria Accountability Act
HON. FORTNEY PETE STARK OF CALIFORNIA IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 21, 2003
4B) The Limits and Liabilities of Power: Lessons of Iraq
SPEECH OF HON. JAMES A. LEACH OF IOWA IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 21, 2003
[Page: E2451] GPO's PDF
[Page: E2452] GPO's PDF
[Page: E2453] GPO's PDF
4C) Independent Intelligence Commission Act S. 1946. A bill to establish an independent national commission to examine and evaluate the collection, analysis, reporting, use, and dissemination of intelligence related to Iraq and Operation Iraqi Freedom; to the Select Committee on Intelligence. Mr. CORZINE. Mr. President, I am introducing today a bill to establish an independent, bipartisan commission to examine intelligence issues related to Iraq. This commission is necessary because what we have discovered on the ground in Iraq has shown our intelligence to be wrong. It is necessary because Administration officials misused intelligence--that is, they made public statements and submitted reports to Congress that the Administration knew at the time to be unsupported by the available intelligence. And it is necessary because inaccurate and misused intelligence played a role in leading us to war. [Page:
S15839] Accurate, objective, and credible intelligence is a fundamental cornerstone of our national security, particularly in an age of shadowy terrorist networks and clandestine weapons programs. Unless we improve our intelligence, we risk failing to identify serious threats to the United States and being distracted by lesser dangers at the expense of larger and more urgent security concerns. This effort must include not only the collection and analysis of intelligence, but the use, reporting, and dissemination of intelligence assessments. If the American people are asked to go to war to preempt an attack, or--as in the case of Iraq--to prevent a possible future threat from emerging, it is critical that the public statements of our officials be supported by the available intelligence. If members of Congress are to consider authorizing the use of force, particularly against countries that have not attacked the United States, they must be provided with honest and complete intelligence. And if our allies are to be asked to join us in confronting these threats, the intelligence that we share with them and that we rely on to bolster our case must be credible in the eyes of the world. I first proposed an independent commission to examine intelligence related to Iraq last summer, when it became clear that President Bush had made an important but unsubstantiated claim in his January 2002 State of the Union address. That claim was, quote: ``The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa.'' Although this statement has been dismissed as the ``16 words,'' its significant cannot be overstated. The State of the Union address is the most important, the most scrutinized speech the President delivers. The statement concerned the most important topic a President can discuss--whether to send Americans to war. And this claim was the most important element of the President's argument for war: that there was evidence that Saddam Hussein might have the necessary materials to produce a nuclear bomb. As for the reference to the British government, it is hard to imagine how the use of the word ``learned'' could imply anything other than that the United States independently believed that the claim was true. It turns out that the Bush Administration had ample reason to know at the time that what the President was telling the nation could not be substantiated. The CIA had sought to dissuade the White House from making claims about uranium purchases. And on February 5, a week after the State of the Union address, Secretary of State Powell made a presentation to the Untied Nations in which he omitted the claim precisely because it was not supported by the available intelligence. Despite this knowledge, the Administration never issued a clarification. As a result, the President's statement stood, as an important element of the Administration's case for war. Only last summer, after Americans learned from Ambassador Joe Wilson and others what Administration officials knew at the time, did the Administration acknowledge that the uranium allegation should never have been included in the State of the Union Address. The case generated outrage across party lines. Republicans as well as Democrats expressed serious concern about the credibility of the Administration and the country. They stressed that cabinet members, the vice president, and the entire administration are responsible for honestly representing intelligence. They called for someone in the Administration to be held accountable. The Senate passed a resolution by voice vote. The chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee promised to undertake a, quote ``very aggressive review.'' And the Bush Administration insisted that it would cooperate. As White House spokesman Ari Fleischer stated on June 11, quote: ``The Administration welcomes the review. It's important.'' In July, when I first sought to establish this commission, there was no dispute that the use of intelligence, as well as the collection and analysis of intelligence, should be examined. Republicans who voted against the commission did so, they said, because the commission would intrude on the jurisdiction of the Intelligence Committee. I was, and remain supportive of efforts by the committee to look into the use of intelligence related to Iraq, an inquiry that is clearly included within the committee's jurisdiction. But it was and is my belief that an independent, bipartisan commission, building on the findings of Congressional and other investigations, could undertake the most thorough, depoliticized review possible. Now, however, it seems an independent commission is the only remaining means left to examine the use, or misuse, of intelligence. On November 13, the Chairman of the Intelligence Committee announced that there would be no examination of how intelligence was used by policymakers. I deeply regret this decision by the chairman and fervently hope the committee will ultimately exercise its role, established in the resolution laying out its jurisdiction, in overseeing the, quote: ``use or dissemination'' of intelligence. In the meantime, I would expect that an independent commission would receive strong bipartisan support. It is now beyond question that our intelligence on Iraq was inaccurate. After months of searching, investigative teams have yet to find stockpiles of chemical or biological weapons. David Kay, who heads up the Iraqi Survey Group, has stated that Iraq's nuclear program was only at the, quote: ``very most rudimentary level.'' The Administration has yet to produce evidence of the high-level ties between Iraq and al Qaeda that it warned of prior to the war. And now, tragically, we must add to the list of intelligence failures the inability to anticipate the current resistance to U.S. occupation. Clearly, the facts and circumstances surrounding these failings warrant a detailed and systematic review. But what of the use of intelligence? As important as the State of the Union address was, that speech was only part of a larger case made by the Administration for war. Administration officials made many claims--particularly those related to chemical and biological weapons--that were expressed in terms that were more specific and more certain than the intelligence may have supported. Most troubling, however, were the highly dubious assessments and suggestions related to nuclear programs and terrorism with which the Administration built its most powerful and emotionally potent argument. That argument had three elements: 1. That Iraq had a nuclear weapons program, and possibly even a nuclear weapon; 2. that Saddam Hussein was allied with al Qaeda, and that he may have been involved with the terrorist attacks of September 11; and 3. that the threat was imminent. The Administration began to make its argument in the summer of 2002. As vice President Cheney stated in an August 26 speech, quote: ``Simply stated, there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction.'' In an indication of how Administration officials would make their case over the next seven months, the vice president insisted that the intelligence indicated no doubt, no internal disagreement, and no uncertainty. Then, on September 12, President bush, in his speech to the United Nations, went further, stating, quote: ``right now, Iraq is expanding and improving facilities that were used for the production of biological weapons.'' the President also made two statements regarding Iraq's alleged nuclear program. The first was that Iraq had made, quote: ``several attempts to buy high-strength aluminum tubes used to enrich uranium for a nuclear weapon.'' He failed to mention that neither the Department of Energy nor the Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research believed that the tubes were intended for that purpose. The President's second statement added the missing ingredient: the uranium itself. As the President stated, quote: ``Should Iraq acquire fissile material, it would be able to build a nuclear weapon within year.'' This was the context for the President's claim made in the State of the Union address that Iraq had sought to purchase uranium from Africa. The Administration continued making its case throughout the fall of 2002, adding claims concerning ties between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda. One of many examples was Secretary Rumsfeld's September 26 statement that the [Page:
S15840] Administration had, quote: ``very reliable reporting of senior level contacts going back a decade.'' As Congress deliberated whether to authorize the use of force against Iraq, the Administration officials made increasingly alarming statements about Iraq's ties to al Qaeda and about its nuclear weapons program. On October 7, three days before the vote in the House of Representatives and four days before the vote in the Senate, President Bush gave a speech in which he said, unequivocally, that, quote: ``We know that Iraq and al Qaeda have had high-level contacts that go back a decade,'' and, quote: ``The evidence indicates the Iraq is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program.'' He repeated the allegations about uranium tubes and the warning about purchases of uranium. Then the President put it all together--the implication that Iraq was connected to the September 11 attacks, the implication that Iraq could have a nuclear bomb at any time, and the warning that Saddam Hussein could decide on any day to explode a nuclear bomb in the United States. Here is what the President said: ``Why do we need to confront it [Saddam] now? And there's a reason. We've experienced the horror of September the 11th. We have seen that those who hate America are willing to crash airplanes into buildings full of innocent people. Our enemies would be no less willing, in fact, they would be eager, to use biological or chemical, or a nuclear weapon. Knowing these realities, America must not ignore the threat gathering against us. Facing clear evidence of peril, we cannot wait for the final proof--the smoking gun--that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud.'' This was the most powerful, dire, and convincing warning a President could give. And it was based on one inference that the President has acknowledged he never had any evidence of, that Saddam was tied to September 11, and another which had already been refuted by many within the Administration, that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear program. Later statements included Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld's claims to specific knowledge of the whereabouts and movements of biological and chemical weapons. On March 11, he stated, quote: ``We know he continues to hide biological and chemical weapons, moving them to different locations as often as every 12 to 24 hours, and placing them in residential neighborhoods.'' On March 30, he said, quote: ``We know where they are. They're in the area around Tikrit and Baghdad and east, west, south and north somewhat.'' The Administration also continued to insist that the threat was imminent--a claim that served to counter arguments that the United Nations should be given more time. On February 6, the day after Secretary of State Powell made his presentation to the UN, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld made an appeal for immediate action. ``Why now?'' he asked. ``The answer is that every week that goes by, his weapons of mass destruction programs become more mature.'' That same day, Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz stated, quote: ``Connections with terrorists, which go back decades, and which started some 10 years ago with al Qaeda, are growing every day.'' Finally, on March 16, the day before President Bush's ultimatum to Saddam Hussein, Vice President CHENEY went beyond claims that Iraq had the intent to produce nuclear weapons, and even beyond the claims that Iraq was seeking centrifuge equipment or uranium. Rather, the vice president stated flatly, quote: ``We believe he has, in fact, reconstituted nuclear weapons.'' This assertion, which the vice president has recently acknowledged was a misstatement, was not corrected. Instead, it was allowed to stand as nearly the final word on why we were going to war. Questions surrounding the Administration's use of intelligence extend beyond public statements, to include reports to and testimony before Congress. One example of unsubstantiated reporting was the January 20 report to Congress, mandated by the use of force resolution, that cited Iraq's failure to declare its, quote: ``attempts to acquire uranium and the means to enrich it''--the same unsubstantiated claim made in the President's State of the Union address. This commission would be authorized to examine other intelligence issues related to Iraq, as well. The Administration made claims related to weapons delivery systems, including President Bush's assertion on October 7 that, quote: ``Iraq has a growing fleet of manned and unmanned aerial vehicles that could be used to disperse chemical or biological weapons across broad areas,'' and that Iraq could use them for, quote: ``missions targeting the United States.'' There has never been evidence that Iraq had UAVs with ranges of thousands of miles. Administration officials made claims related to the occupation, including Vice President CHENEY's March 16 assertion that, quote: ``I really do believe that we will be greeted as liberators,'' and Deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitz's November 17 analogy to, quote: ``post-liberation France.'' The Administration also downplayed the costs of the occupation. Despite White House economic advisor Lawrence Lindsey's estimate that the occupation would cost between $100 and $200 billion--an estimate for which he was apparently fired--Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld on January 19 put the figure at, quote: ``something under $50 billion,'' On February 27, Deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitiz stated that, quote: ``there's a lot of money there, and to assume that we're going to pay for it is just wrong.'' And, on March 27, Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz stated, quote: ``We're dealing with a country that can really finance its own reconstruction, and relatively soon.'' The independent commission I propose would be authorized to examine the relationship between policy makers and the intelligence community. Were members of the intelligence community pressured to produce analyses that conformed to the Administration's policies? Did Administration officials seek to bypass the normal analysis process by cherry-picking bits of intelligence that suited their agenda, through the Office of Special Plans in the Department of Defense or through other special or ad hoc arrangements? Did the Administration base its analyses on foreign intelligence sources of dubious credibility? These questions must be answered, and corrective measures undertaken, if our intelligence community is to be as effective and objective as we need it to be. Perhaps the most egregious undermining, indeed betrayal, of the intelligence community was the identification by senior Administration officials of a covert CIA operative. The operative is the spouse of a person who has been called a national hero by President George H.W. Bush but who questioned the current Administration's statements regarding Iraq. The leak of this operative's identity sent an implicit warning to others in the intelligence community who might disagree with the Administration's positions. It potentially endanged the life of the operative and those with whom the operative worked. And it rendered the operative's skills, experience and sources permanently useless, thus wasting precisely the kind of intelligence asset that the United States so desperately needs right now. The purpose of this commission is to identify ways in which we can learn from past mistakes and thus improve our collection, analysis, reporting, use and dissemination of intelligence. The commission's members, who will come from both parties, will be prominent Americans with experience in intelligence, the armed forces and other relevant areas. Their work will build on relevant Congressional and other investigations. The commission, through an objective, independent, highly professional examination process, will help depoliticize an extremely complicated and sensitive topic. By reviewing intelligence related to Iraq beginning in 1998, it will draw conclusions about the use of intelligence by a Democratic as well as Republican Administration. And by reporting its recommendations directly to the President and to Congress, it will serve as a valuable resource outside the context of open political debate. In this respect, I disagree with the Chairman of the Intelligence Committee who has stated that the full Congress and the public could ``decide for themselves whether the intelligence was accurately represented by government officials.'' This issue is far too serious to simply ignore. Over one hundred thousand brave Americans are currently serving [Page:
S15841] in Iraq, facing challenges that require accurate and objective intelligence. We have an obligation to pursue every opportunity to improve that intelligence. Meanwhile, the United States faces other threats--from despotic regimes with nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, from terrorism, and from the horrible possibility that terrorists could acquire these weapons. Our ability to confront these threats requires that our intelligence be accurate and objective. And, as we seek to enlist our friends and allies in our efforts to address these common threats, we must ensure that our intelligence is credible. Unless we identify and correct the mistakes of the past, we will not be safer. I ask unanimous consent that the text of the legislation be printed in the Record. There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows: S. 1946 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the ``Independent Iraq Intelligence Commission Act''. SEC. 2. ESTABLISHMENT OF COMMISSION. There is established the National Commission on Iraq Intelligence (in this Act referred to as the ``Commission''). SEC. 3. PURPOSES. The purposes of the Commission are as follows: (1) To examine and evaluate the performance of the United States intelligence community with respect to the collection of intelligence, and the quality of intelligence obtained, on the weapons of mass destruction and related delivery systems capabilities of Iraq in the period from 1998 until the conclusion of military operations against Iraq under Operation Iraqi Freedom. (2) To examine and evaluate the performance of the United States intelligence community with respect to the collection of intelligence, and the quality of intelligence obtained, on the connections and support, if any, of Iraq with and for the plans and intentions of terrorist groups to attack the United States or United States interests abroad during the period referred to in paragraph (1). (3) To examine and evaluate the performance of the United States intelligence community with respect to the collection of intelligence, and the quality of intelligence obtained, during and after the period referred to in paragraph (1), on matters relating to-- (A) the conduct of military and intelligence operations against Iraq; (B) the search for and securing of weapons of mass destruction, related delivery systems capabilities, and conventional weapons in Iraq; and (C) the military, political, and economic aspects of the occupation of Iraq. (4) To examine and evaluate the quality of the analysis by the United States intelligence community of the available intelligence related to the matters referred to in paragraphs (1) through (3), including intelligence from foreign intelligence services, that served as a basis during the period referred to in paragraph (1) for-- (A) reports, testimony, and presentations to policymakers in the Executive Branch and Congress, and to United Nations bodies and other consumers; and (B) assessments that were used or disseminated by the Executive Branch. (5) To examine and evaluate the effect, if any, on the United States intelligence community of the actions of Executive Branch officials regarding the collection, analysis, and reporting on intelligence matters referred to in paragraphs (1) through (3). (6) To examine and evaluate the relevant facts and circumstances relating to the use and dissemination by Executive Branch officials of intelligence and intelligence analyses underlying assessment of intelligence matters referred to in paragraphs (1) through (3) during the period referred to in paragraph (1), including assessments contained in public speeches, statements, and interviews, reports to and testimony before Congress, and communications with and reports and presentations to United Nations bodies. (7) To build on the investigations of other entities, and avoid unnecessary duplication, by reviewing the work, findings, conclusions, and recommendations of other Executive Branch, Congressional, or independent commission investigations into the collection, analysis, reporting, use, and dissemination of intelligence related to Iraq by the United States. (8) Based on the examinations and evaluations under paragraphs (1) through (6) and the work, findings, conclusions, and recommendations of other investigations referred to in paragraph (7), to identify corrective measures to improve the collection, analysis, reporting, use, and dissemination of intelligence by the Executive Branch, and to report to the President and Congress on the examinations, evaluations, findings, and conclusions of the Commission and on the recommendations of the Commission with respect to such corrective measures. SEC. 4. COMPOSITION OF COMMISSION. (a) MEMBERS.--The Commission shall be composed of 10 members, of whom-- (1) 1 member shall be appointed by the President, who shall serve as co-chairman of the Commission; (2) 1 member shall be appointed by the leader of the Senate (majority or minority leader, as the case may be) of the Democratic Party, in consultation with the leader of the House of Representatives (majority or minority leader, as the case may be) of the Democratic Party, who shall serve as co-chairman of the Commission; (3) 2 members shall be appointed by the senior member of the Senate leadership of the Democratic Party; (4) 2 members shall be appointed by the senior member of the leadership of the House of Representatives of the Republican Party; (5) 2 members shall be appointed by the senior member of the Senate leadership of the Republican Party; and (6) 2 members shall be appointed by the senior member of the leadership of the House of Representatives of the Democratic Party. (b) QUALIFICATIONS; INITIAL MEETING.-- (1) POLITICAL PARTY AFFILIATION.--Not more than 5 members of the Commission shall be from the same political party. (2) NONGOVERNMENTAL APPOINTEES.--An individual appointed to the Commission may not be an officer or employee of the Federal Government or any State or local government. (3) OTHER QUALIFICATIONS.--It is the sense of Congress that individuals appointed to the Commission should be prominent United States citizens, with national recognition and significant depth of experience in such professions as governmental service, the armed services, law, intelligence, and foreign affairs. (4) DEADLINE FOR APPOINTMENT.--All members of the Commission shall be appointed not later than one month after the date of the enactment of this Act. (5) INITIAL MEETING.--The Commission shall meet and begin the operations of the Commission as soon as practicable. (c) QUORUM; VACANCIES.--After its initial meeting, the Commission shall meet upon the joint call of the co-chairmen or a majority of its members. Six members of the Commission shall constitute a quorum. Any vacancy in the Commission shall not affect its powers, but shall be filled in the same manner in which the original appointment was made. SEC. 5. FUNCTIONS OF COMMISSION. The functions of the Commission are-- (1) to conduct an investigation into the relevant facts and circumstances relating to the collection, analysis, reporting, use, and dissemination by the United States intelligence community and others in the Executive Branch of intelligence relating to Iraq and Operation Iraqi Freedom, including-- (A) an examination and evaluation of the quantity and quality of United States intelligence underlying assessments made during the period referred to in section 3(1) of-- (i) weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems capabilities of Iraq; (ii) connections and support, if any, of Iraq with and for the plans and intentions of terrorist groups to attack the United States or United States interests abroad; (B) an examination and evaluation of the quantity and quality of United States intelligence underlying assessments made during after the period referred to in section 3(1) on intelligence matters relating to-- (i) the conduct of military and intelligence operations against Iraq; (ii) the search for and securing of weapons of mass destruction, related delivery systems capabilites, and conventional weapons in Iraq; and (iii) the military, political, and economic aspects of the occupation of Iraq; (C) an examination and evaluation regarding whether the analytical judgments in the assessments referred to in subparagraphs (A) and (B) were thorough, timely, objective, independent, and reasonable, based upon intelligence collection; (D) an examination and evaluation of the accuracy of the assessments referred to in subparagraphs (A) and (B) when compared with the results of the investigative efforts of the Iraq Survey Group and other relevant Executive Branch and Congressional entities, and with relevant assessments of the United Nations and other multilateral bodies, foreign governments, nongovernmental organizations, and other institutions and individuals; (E) an examination and evaluation of the quality of the intelligence on Iraq that was provided to the United States intelligence community and Executive Branch policymakers, including by foreign intelligence services, that served as a basis during the period referred to in section 3(1) for-- (i) reports, testimony, and presentations to policymakers in the Executive Branch and Congress, and to United Nations bodies and other consumers; and (ii) assessments that were used or disseminated by the Executive Branch; (F) a determination of the extent, if any, to which elements of the United States intelligence community were inappropriately pressured by members of the Executive Branch to produce intelligence consistent with such members policy objectives, and of the extent, if any, to which intelligence was manipulated or misrepresented by members of the Executive Branch or elements under their control; [Page:
S15842] (G) an assessment of the extent to which Congress was kept fully and currently informed about intelligence related to Iraq and Operation Iraqi Freedom; (H) a determination of the extent to which the intelligence of the United States intelligence community, and of the United States Armed Forces and coalition forces, were sufficiently accurate, thorough, timely, objective, and independent to prepare such forces to conduct effective military and intelligence operations against Iraq, including the search for and securing of weapons of mass destruction and conventional weapons in Iraq, and to prepare such forces and other United States and coalition entities to successfully carry out the military, political, and economic aspects of the occupation of Iraq; and (I) an examination, evaluation, and assessment of such other related facts and circumstances that the Commission considers appropriate; (2) to identify, review, and evaluate the lessons learned from issues related to the collection, analysis, reporting, use, and dissemination of intelligence relating to Iraq and Operation Iraqi Freedom; (3) to investigate the facts and circumstances relating to disclosures, if any, by Executive Branch officials of the identify of a covert Central Intelligence Agency official; and (4) to submit to the President and Congress the reports provided for by section 11. SEC. 6. POWERS OF COMMISSION. (a) IN GENERAL.-- (1) HEARINGS AND EVIDENCE.--The Commission or, on the authority of the Commission, any subcommittee or member thereof, may, for the purpose of carrying out this Act-- (A) hold such hearings and sit and act at such times and places, take such testimony, receive such evidence, administer such oaths; and (B) subject to paragraph (2)(A), require, by subpoena or otherwise, the attendance and testimony of such witnesses and the production of such books, records, correspondence, memoranda, papers, and documents, as the Commission or such designated subcommittee or designated member may determine advisable. (2) SUBPOENAS.-- (A) ISSUANCE.-- (i) IN GENERAL.--A subpoena may be issued under this subsection only-- (I) by the joint agreement of the co-chairmen; or (II) by the affirmative vote of 5 members of the Commission. (ii) SIGNATURE.--Subject to clause (i), subpoenas issued under this subsection may be issued under the signature of a co-chairman or any member designated by 5 members of the Commission, and may be served by any person designated by a co-chairman or by a member designated by 5 members of the Commission. (B) ENFORCEMENT.-- (i) IN GENERAL.--In the case of contumacy or failure to obey a subpoena issued under subsection (a), the United States district court for the judicial district in which the subpoenaed person resides, is served, or may be found, or where the subpoena is returnable, may issue an order requiring such person to appear at any designated place to testify or to produce documentary or other evidence. Any failure to obey the order of the court may be punished by the court as a contempt of that court. (ii) ADDITIONAL ENFORCEMENT.--In the case of any failure of any witness to comply with any subpoena or to testify when summoned under authority of this section, the Commission may certify a statement of fact constituting such failure to the appropriate United States attorney, who may bring the matter before the grand jury for its action, under the same statutory authority and procedures as if the United States attorney had received a certification under sections 102 through 104 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (2 U.S.C. 192 through 194). (b) CONTRACTING.--The Commission may, to such extent and in such amounts as are provided in appropriation Acts, enter into contracts to enable the Commission to discharge its duties under this Act. (c) INFORMATION FROM FEDERAL AGENCIES.-- (1) IN GENERAL.--The Commission may secure directly from any executive department, bureau, agency, board, commission, office, independent establishment, or instrumentality of the Government, information, suggestions, estimates, and statistics for the purposes of this Act. Each department, bureau, agency, board, commission, office, independent establishment, or instrumentality shall, to the extent authorized by law, furnish such information, suggestions, estimates, and statistics directly to the Commission, upon request made by a co-chairman, the chairman or co-chairman of any subcommittee created by 5 members of the Commission, or any member designated by 5 members of the Commission. (2) RECEIPT, HANDLING, STORAGE, AND DISSEMINATION.--Information shall only be received, handled, stored, and disseminated by members of the Commission and its staff consistent with all applicable statutes, regulations, and Executive orders. (d) ASSISTANCE FROM FEDERAL AGENCIES.-- (1) GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION.--The Administrator of General Services shall provide to the Commission on a reimbursable basis administrative support and other services for the performance of the Commission's functions. (2) OTHER DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES.--In addition to the assistance prescribed in paragraph (1), departments and agencies of the United States may provide to the Commission such services, funds, facilities, staff, and other support services as they may determine advisable and as may be authorized by law. (e) GIFTS.--The Commission may accept, use, and dispose of gifts or donations of services or property. (f) POSTAL SERVICES.--The Commission may use the United States mails in the same manner and under the same conditions as departments and agencies of the United States. SEC. 7. NONAPPLICABILITY OF FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ACT. (a) IN GENERAL.--The Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.) shall not apply to the Commission. (b) PUBLIC MEETINGS AND RELEASE OF PUBLIC VERSIONS OF REPORTS.--The Commission shall-- (1) hold public hearings and meetings to the extent appropriate; and (2) release public versions of the reports provided for by subsections (a) and (b) of section 11. (c) PUBLIC HEARINGS.--Any public hearings of the Commission shall be conducted in a manner consistent with the protection of information provided to or developed for or by the Commission as required by any applicable statute, regulation, or Executive order. SEC. 8. STAFF OF COMMISSION. (a) IN GENERAL.-- (1) APPOINTMENT AND COMPENSATION.--The co-chairmen, acting jointly and in accordance with rules agreed upon by the Commission, may appoint and fix the compensation of a staff director and such other personnel as may be necessary to enable the Commission to carry out its functions, without regard to the provisions of title 5, United States Code, governing appointments in the competitive service, and without regard to the provisions of chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of such title relating to classification and General Schedule pay rates, except that no rate of pay fixed under this subsection may exceed the equivalent of that payable for a position at level V of the Executive Schedule under section 5316 of title 5, United States Code. (2) PERSONNEL AS FEDERAL EMPLOYEES.-- (A) IN GENERAL.--The executive director and any personnel of the Commission who are employees shall be employees under section 2105 of title 5, United States Code, for purposes of chapters 63, 81, 83, 84, 85, 87, 89, and 90 of that title. (B) MEMBERS OF COMMISSION.--Subparagraph (A) shall not be construed to apply to members of the Commission. (b) DETAILEES.--Any Federal Government employee may be detailed to the Commission without reimbursement from the Commission, and such detailee shall retain the rights, status, and privileges of his or her regular employment without interruption. (c) CONSULTANT SERVICES.--The Commission may procure the services of experts and consultants in accordance with section 3109 of title 5, United States Code, but at rates not to exceed the daily rate paid a person occupying a position at level IV of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of title 5, United States Code. SEC. 9. COMPENSATION AND TRAVEL EXPENSES. (a) COMPENSATION.--Each member of the Commission may be compensated at not to exceed the daily equivalent of the annual rate of basic pay in effect for a position at level IV of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of title 5, United States Code, for each day during which that member is engaged in the actual performance of the duties of the Commission. (b) TRAVEL EXPENSES.--While away from their homes or regular places of business in the performance of services for the Commission, members of the Commission shall be allowed travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, in the same manner as persons employed intermittently in the Government service are allowed expenses under section 5703(b) of title 5, United States Code. SEC. 10. SECURITY CLEARANCES FOR COMMISSION MEMBERS AND STAFF. The appropriate Federal agencies or departments shall cooperate with the Commission in expeditiously providing to the Commission members and staff appropriate security clearances to the extent possible pursuant to existing procedures and requirements, except that no person shall be provided with access to classified information under this Act without the appropriate security clearances. SEC. 11. REPORTS OF COMMISSION; TERMINATION. (a) INTERIM REPORTS.--The Commission may submit to the President and Congress interim reports containing such examinations, evaluations, findings, and conclusions of the Commission, and such recommendations with respect to corrective measures (including changes in policies, practices, organizational structures, and arrangements), as have been agreed to by a majority of Commission members. (b) FINAL REPORT.--Not later than 18 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Commission shall submit to the President and Congress a final report containing such examinations, evaluations, findings, and conclusions of the Commission, and such recommendations with respect to corrective measures (including changes in [Page:
S15843] policies, practices, organizational structures, and arrangements), as have been agreed to by a majority of Commission members. (c) TERMINATION.-- (1) IN GENERAL.--The Commission, and all the authorities of this Act, shall terminate 60 days after the date on which the final report is submitted under subsection (b). (2) ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIVITIES BEFORE TERMINATION.--The Commission may use the 60-day period referred to in paragraph (1) for the purpose of concluding its activities, including providing testimony to committees of Congress concerning its reports and disseminating the final report. SEC. 12. FUNDING. (a) IN GENERAL.--Of the amounts authorized to be appropriated for the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government for fiscal year 2004, $15,000,000 shall be available for transfer to the Commission for purposes of the activities of the Commission under this Act. (b) DURATION OF AVAILABILITY.--Amounts made available to the Commission under subsection (a) shall remain available until the termination of the Commission.
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