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Congressional Record Weekly Update

November 22-25, 2003

Return to the Congressional Report Weekly.


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NUCLEAR/ NONPROLIFERATION
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1A) Explanation of Vote on Conference Report on Defense Authorization Bill

SPEECH OF

HON. RUSH D. HOLT

OF NEW JERSEY

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 21, 2003

  • Mr. HOLT. Mr. Speaker, the final version of this legislation continues our shared bipartisan commitment to boost the income for all of our military personnel with a 4.15-percent average increase in base pay. This is an important testament to the brave men and women who risk their lives to defend America's freedom.
  • In addition, this conference report extends several special pay provisions and bonuses for active duty personnel through December 31, 2004. It reduces the average amount of housing expenses paid by service members from 7.5 percent to 3.5 percent in FY 2004 and eliminates the out-of-pocket expense completely by FY 2005. It increases the family separation allowance for service members with dependents, worldwide, from $100 per month to $250 per month for the period beginning October 1, 2003 and ending December 31, 2004. Finally, it increases the rate of special pay for those subject to hostile fire and imminent danger, worldwide from $150 per month to $225 per month for the period beginning October 1, 2003 to December 31, 2004.
  • While I am not satisfied with the provisions in this conference report regarding concurrent receipt for military retirees, it does provide some, overdue redress for this out-of-date policy.
  • But on balance, I am opposing this final conference report because I fundamentally disagree with key aspects of its policy presumptions and prescriptions. On balance, it will make America less safe in an increasingly unstable world.
  • First and most importantly, the growing reliance upon nuclear weapons that this legislation encourages makes our nation and the world less safe, not more so. Accordingly, I strongly disagree with the funding in this bill to continue work on high yield, burrowing nuclear ``bunker-busters'' that target underground military facilities or arsenals. I am equally opposed to the language in this bill that lifts the ban on research leading to low yield ``mini-nuclear weapons'' of 5 kilotons or less.
  • Last April, I sent a letter to President Bush that was co-signed by 34 of my colleagues to convey our grave concern that he is weakening long-standing U.S. policy governing the use of nuclear as opposed to conventional weapons. I regret that we have never received a substantive reply from the President. That congressional action coupled with the examples I've cited and other provisions in this conference report further undermine the U.S. non-proliferation efforts of Republican and Democratic Presidents alike and heighten growing international fear that Bush Administration's policies are fueling a new nuclear arms race.
  • Second, I am opposed to the blanket exemptions from our nation's environmental protection laws for the Pentagon in this bill. There is no convincing evidence that environmental laws like the Clean Air Act and the Endangered Species Act hinder our military's capacity to defend our nation.
  • But you don't have to take my word for it. Former EPA Administrator, Christine Whitman, testified to the Congress that she does not ``believe that there is a training mission anywhere in the country that is being held up or not taking place because of environmental protection.'' Furthermore, the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) has reported to the Congress that the Pentagon has failed to produce any evidence that environmental laws have significantly affected our military readiness.
  • I do not think the Pentagon or any other federal agency should be above the law. Moreover, current law already allows case-by-case environmental exemptions for the Pentagon, when they are determined to be in the national interest.
  • Finally, this conference report also contains provisions that will be very harmful to hundreds of thousands of dedicated civilian men and women who make our Defense Department work.
  • Last year saw the largest government reorganization in more than 3 decades with the creation of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, affecting 170,000 federal employees. Following extensive congressional debate, Secretary Ridge was granted authority to establish a more flexible that attempted to protect basic worker rights.
  • But this legislation will give Defense Secretary Rumsfeld broad authority to rollback worker protections for hundreds of thousands of Pentagon employees. There will be nothing to prevent agency managers from abusing their power for political advancement or engaging in discriminatory practices. Allowing managers the ability to waive such protections under the guise of national security and the need for greater flexibility is wrong. It will not make us safer.
  • Thanks to this legislation, Secretary Rumsfeld will be able to do away with the current personnel system in the Pentagon. I am unwilling to give the Bush Administration a blank check to undo, in whole or in part, many of the civil service laws and protections that have been in place for nearly a century to safeguard against the return of an unfair patronage system.
  • I want to be very clear. I support a strong national defense. I support modernizing our military. I support giving our troops the resources and training they need to keep our nation secure. But I cannot support this conference report which contains provisions that will take our military backwards, rather than forwards. I cannot support legislation that will re-ignite a global nuclear arms race, even as our troops in Iraq and elsewhere risk their lives every day to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. I cannot support legislation that takes away the rights of hundreds of thousands of hard-working Pentagon employees Finally, I cannot support legislation that disingenuously claims that stripping away important environmental protections here at home will somehow bolster our national security.

 

1B) Congratulating Kazakhstan on the 12th Anniversary of Independence

Ms. LANDRIEU (for herself and Mr. BURNS) submitted the following concurrent resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations:

   Whereas, on December 16, 2003, the people of the Republic of Kazakhstan will celebrate 12 years of independence, and on December 25, 2003, the United States and Kazakhstan will mark the 12th anniversary of diplomatic relations between the two countries;

   Whereas Kazakhstan in a short period of time has managed to shed totalitarian shackles and become a dynamically developing civil society in which public and private institutions are strong, effective democratic mechanisms and the rule of law are established, and basic human rights are respected;

   Whereas Kazakhstan, an open country where citizens of more than 100 ethnic groups enjoy equal rights and opportunities, made a significant contribution to promoting global peace and harmony by hosting in September 2003 the Congress of the World and Traditional Religions, which brought together leaders of world religions seeking to bridge religious differences;

   Whereas the Government of Kazakhstan has toughened legislation and taken other concrete steps to prevent human trafficking and end this cruel form of human mistreatment;

   Whereas Kazakhstan is confidently moving toward integration with the world economic system by establishing the conditions for developing a true market economy;

   Whereas the United States Government, recognizing the economic progress of Kazakhstan, granted to Kazakhstan ``market economy status'', the first such designation of any country in the Commonwealth of Independent States;

   Whereas United States businesses actively participate in the development of one of the world's largest energy resources in Kazakhstan and consider the country to be an alternative and reliable source of energy;

   Whereas the application to Kazakhstan of chapter 1 of title IV of the Trade Act of 1974 (commonly referred to as the ``Jackson-Vanik amendment'') prevents Kazakhstan from achieving permanent normal trade relations status with the United States;

   Whereas an independent and democratic Kazakhstan is the cornerstone of peace, stability, and prosperity in the vitally important region of Central Asia;

   Whereas Kazakhstan voluntarily disarmed its nuclear arsenal, the world's fourth largest, and joined the Treaty on Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, with Annexes, Protocols, and Memorandum of Understanding, signed at Moscow on July 31,

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1991 (START Treaty), and in so doing provided an example of a responsible national approach to nonproliferation;

   Whereas the people of Kazakhstan, under the leadership of Nursultan Nazarbayev, are providing unconditional and firm support in the ongoing allied campaign in Afghanistan by allowing coalition forces to use the air space of Kazakhstan and the largest airport in Almaty, Kazakhstan;

   Whereas Kazakhstan is taking an active part in rehabilitating Iraq and is the only country in the region of Central Asia to send a military contingent of combat engineers who in a few months have neutralized more than 300,000 explosive devices in Iraq, thereby saving thousands of lives;

   Whereas, within the framework of growing military cooperation, the United States and Kazakhstan signed an Article 98 Agreement relating to the International Criminal Court;

   Whereas the increasing significance of Kazakhstan to United States foreign policy has resulted in the creation of the United States-Kazakhstan Interparliamentary Friendship Group, which is designed to strengthen relations of strategic partnership between the two countries; and

   Whereas Kazakhstan is an important friend and strategic ally of the United States: Now, therefore, be it

    Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That Congress--

    (1) congratulates the people and Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan on the 12th anniversary of the independence of Kazakhstan and the establishment of diplomatic relations with the United States;

    (2) welcomes and supports political and economic transformations achieved by Kazakhstan during its years of independence;

    (3) expresses gratitude for the leadership of Kazakhstan in establishing interreligious dialogue to promote peace and harmony in the world;

    (4) commends Kazakhstan on toughening measures to stop human trafficking;

    (5) recognizes the need to terminate application to Kazakhstan of title IV of the Trade Act of 1974 (commonly known as the ``Jackson-Vanik Amendment'') and extend normal trade relations status to Kazakhstan;

    (6) expresses gratitude for the support and assistance of the people of Kazakhstan in the antiterrorist campaign of the United States and coalition countries and for their support for the reconstruction of Iraq;

    (7) applauds the wise decision of the leadership of Kazakhstan to renounce the deployment of the nuclear weapons inherited by the country and make the world a safer place;

    (8) calls upon the President to actively popularize the example set by Kazakhstan in renouncing the deployment of its nuclear weapons with respect to United States negotiations with countries that are trying to acquire, develop, or deploy nuclear weapons; and

    (9) urges further strengthening of strategically important relations between Kazakhstan and the United States on all other issues of importance between the two countries.

 



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CHEM/ BIO AND WMD TERRORISM


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3A) Supporting Poison Prevention and Control Centers

SPEECH OF

HON. RAHM EMANUEL

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 21, 2003

  • Mr. EMANUEL. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong support of S. 686, which strengthens poison prevention in America and guarantees funding for our nation's 74 poison control, information and treatment centers. Each year these centers save countless lives, and it is critical that we ensure the financial stability and public awareness they need to best serve the American people.
  • As our nation's primary line of defense against poison-related injuries and deaths, these centers provide physicians and the general public with direct access to life-saving information. Health care professionals rely on these centers for immediate, around-the-clock assessments and treatment recommendations for many types of poisonings, overdoses and drug interactions affecting people of all ages. Parents who find their child has consumed a toxic substance can receive immediate professional help with one phone call, any time, day or night.
  • Over 90 percent of all accidental poisonings take place in the home. More than 50 percent of these accidents involve children under the age of six, with more than one million young children exposed to toxins annually. When a child's life is potentially in danger, parents need to know immediately where to go for help. Too often parents are unaware of the services provided by poison control centers and turn to costly and time-consuming options such as rushing to emergency rooms at distant hospitals. In response to this situation, this bill provides for both a nationwide toll free number connected to local poison control centers, and a new media campaign to call the public's attention to services available through this number.
  • My home state of Illinois is served by the nation's oldest poison control, information and treatment center, the Illinois Poison Center. The IPC has expertly served the needs of metropolitan Chicago since 1953, and handles approximately 100,000 cases throughout the state of Illinois each year. In 1985, my state was served by five regional poison control centers, but only IPC remains after deep budget cuts over the years. We must ensure that our nation's remaining centers receive the support they need to continue serving the public.
  • Our nation's Poison Control and Information Centers also play a vital role in managing public health crises, environmental disasters, and the threat of weapons of mass destruction . In July of 2000, the Illinois Poison Center was the first to respond to a nitric acid leak at a Chicago factory. In December of that same year, the IPC was again the first to respond, this time to an anthrax threat at the British-American Chamber of Commerce in Chicago. And, in August of 2001, the IPC responded to a toxic chemical spill on the Dan Ryan Expressway.
  • The Illinois Poison Center has developed protocols for response and notification of proper governmental agencies when these events occur, and it is also a participant in regional disaster drills throughout the metropolitan Chicago area. Poison control and information centers like the IPC are a critical part of our nation's emergency response and disaster preparedness systems.
  • Poison centers represent a cost effective investment that benefits the public health. In 1998, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services estimated that every dollar spent on a poison center saves seven dollars in unnecessary medical costs.
  • Mr. Speaker, I commend our colleagues on both sides of the aisle for their hard work on this legislation. This bill is good for the health, safety and security of the American people. I strongly encourage my colleagues to vote for S. 686.

 

3B) Expressing the Sense of the Senate Regarding the Anthrax and Smallpox Vaccines

Mr. BINGAMAN submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Armed Services:

   S. Res. 278

   Whereas military personnel are asked to risk and even sacrifice their lives and the well-being of their families in defense of the United States;

   Whereas vaccines are an important factor in ensuring force health protection by protecting the military personnel of the United States from both natural health threats and health threats resulting from biological weapons in overseas conflicts;

   Whereas vaccines offer significant benefits and protections that must be carefully balanced with the reality that vaccines and drugs generally carry rare but serious adverse events and life-threatening risks;

   Whereas in 2002, the insert label for the anthrax vaccine required by the Food and Drug Administration was revised to include approximately 40 serious adverse events with information that ``approximately 6 percent of the reported events were listed as serious.'';

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   Whereas in 2002, the Food and Drug Administration also compelled the manufacturer of the anthrax vaccine to substantially revise the package insert and changed the risk to pregnant women from Category C (a possible risk) to Category D (a known risk) because of ``positive evidence of human fetal risk based on adverse reaction data from investigational or marketing experience or studies in humans'';

   Whereas in 2002, the General Accounting Office reported ``an estimated 84 percent of the personnel who had had anthrax vaccine shots between September 1998 and September 2000 reported having side effects or reactions. This rate is more than double the level cited in the vaccine product insert. Further, about 24 percent of all events were classified as systemic--a level more than a hundred times higher than that estimated in the product insert at the time'';

   Whereas in June 2003, the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention withdrew its support for expanding the smallpox vaccination program for first-responders after finding that 1 in 500 civilians vaccinated for smallpox had a serious vaccine event;

   Whereas in 2002, the General Accounting Office found that 69 percent of experienced pilots and aircrew members in the National Guard and the Reserve reported that the anthrax shot was the major influence in their decision to change their military status in 2000, including leaving the military entirely;

   Whereas in the war in Iraq that continues as of the date of enactment of this resolution, the British and Australian militaries have conducted voluntary anthrax vaccine programs, and other allies who have been offered the anthrax vaccine have declined;

   Whereas in March 2000, the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Disease reported in the ``Jordan Report 20th Anniversary: Accelerated Development of Vaccines 2000'' that no data existed to support the effectiveness of the anthrax vaccine against pulmonary (inhalation) anthrax in humans;

   Whereas because anthrax can be prevented and treated with antibiotics and other options are either in clinical trials or development, the current anthrax vaccine is not the only choice for force health protection;

   Whereas in the 2002 State of the Union address, President Bush placed a national priority on developing a new anthrax vaccine and a newer and safer smallpox vaccine is also in development; and

   Whereas the threat of anthrax and smallpox attacks against the deployed troops of the United States has significantly diminished since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and the disruption of Al Qaeda activity in Afghanistan: Now, therefore, be it

    Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that--

    (1) the Secretary of Defense should reconsider the mandatory nature of the anthrax and smallpox vaccine immunization program, pending the development of new and better vaccines that are under development as of the date of enactment of this resolution;

    (2) the Secretary of Defense and Board for Correction of Military Records should reconsider adverse actions already taken or intended to be taken against servicemembers for refusing to accept the anthrax or smallpox vaccine;

    (3) the Secretary of Defense and the intelligence community should reevaluate the threat of anthrax and smallpox attacks on troops in Iraq and Afghanistan to reflect operational realities as of the date of enactment of this resolution when considering the continuation of a mandatory military vaccination program; and

    (4) the Secretary of Veterans Affairs should assess those adverse events being reported with respect to the anthrax and smallpox vaccines, research causal relationships, and estimate a future cost to the Department to treat these conditions.

   Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, throughout the conflict in Iraq, our brave soldiers have carried out their duties with strength, with honor, and with courage. They have never faltered in their service to this nation or the world. That is why I am so troubled that some of our servicemembers and their families believe that current Department of Defense policies may be failing them, with grievous consequences.

   That is why I rise today to submit a Sense of the Senate Resolution that asks for reconsideration of the policies surrounding the current smallpox and anthrax immunization programs. Specifically it asks the Secretary of Defense to reconsider the mandatory nature of its smallpox and anthrax vaccine immunization programs pending the development of new and better vaccines that are currently under development; reconsider adverse actions taken against servicemembers on the basis of refusal to take the smallpox or anthrax vaccines; and reevaluate, with the intelligence community, the current threat of anthrax and smallpox attacks on our troops, in an effort to reflect current operational realities when considering the continuation of a mandatory vaccination program.

   It also urges the Department of Veterans Affairs to assess these adverse events being reported with respect to the smallpox and anthrax vaccines, research causal relationships, and estimate a future cost to the Department of Veterans Affairs to treat these conditions.

   Vaccines are an important factor in ensuring protection of our nation's military personnel from health threats--both natural or from biological weapons--in overseas conflicts. However, the current smallpox and anthrax vaccines have real and serious consequences that must be weighed against the potential benefits. This is why the President has made development of a modern anthrax vaccine a national priority in his last two State of the Union addresses and why the Institute of Medicine urged the government to do so in March 2002.

   What are the consequences of a policy that makes it mandatory that military personnel get the anthrax and smallpox vaccines? First, there are a growing number of adverse events reported in conjunction with these two vaccines, which is in sharp contrast to other vaccines. Second, there is a morale problem in the military associated with the mandatory nature of requiring military personnel to take these shots that has a serious negative impact on the recruitment and retention of our military personnel. Third, the long-term consequences of the vaccine programs for the health and well-being of our military personnel and our veterans is in question and should be addressed.

   Ensuring the health and well-being of our military personnel before, during and after serving our country should always be a top priority of our nation.

   The major potential benefit of any vaccine would be force protection. Unfortunately, there are major questions that arise with this argument concerning the anthrax and smallpox vaccines. First, even if there was a threat, such a threat against our troops in the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan has been significantly diminished. Second, there are other mechanisms to address any potential exposure, including post-exposure vaccination and antibiotics. This was the effective treatment used in the Senate after the anthrax exposure in 2001. Third, we do not even know if the anthrax vaccine works at all on inhalation anthrax or weaponized anthrax, so the vaccine may be completely ineffective anyway.

   For our brave men and women serving in harm's way, all too often the first threat they face is not when their boots hit the ground in Baghdad, Iraq, or Kandahar, Afghanistan--the first threat many servicemembers believe they face may be in line at the home station when they receive their anthrax and smallpox vaccinations.

   There is a growing number of disturbing reports about how some of our servicemembers have contracted health problems shortly after receiving the anthrax and smallpox vaccines. These illnesses include mysterious pneumonia-like illnesses, heart problems, blood clots, and other medical conditions that have stricken otherwise young, healthy, and strong military personnel. It has even resulted in death.

   This is not entirely surprising, in light of the fact that the Food and Drug Administration, or FDA, has identified a number of adverse reactions associated with these two vaccines. With respect to the anthrax vaccine alone, in 2002 the FDA required the anthrax vaccine product label be revised and it now includes approximately 40 serious adverse events. As it reads, ``Approximately 6% of the reported events were listed as serious. Serious adverse events include those that result in death, hospitalization, permanent disability or are life-threatening.'' The FDA also raised the rate of systemic reactions by up to 175 times over the previous 1999 product label, from 0.2 percent to 5-35 percent

   Meanwhile, in light of adverse events that exceed those for other vaccines and other concerns about the smallpox vaccine, both the Institute of Medicine and the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices recently issued recommendations calling for a pause in the Federal Government's smallpox vaccination program.

   Meanwhile, both CBS News and UPI have identified a growing number of deaths and severe illnesses that they

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claim point to the anthrax and smallpox vaccines. These include the deaths of Army SP4 Joshua Neusche, Army SGT Michael Tosto, LTC Anthony Sherman, Army SP4 Rachel Lacy, Army SP4 Zeferino Colunga, Army SP4 Cory Hubbell, Army SP4 Levi Kinchen, Army SSG Richard Eaton, Jr., Army PVT Matthew Bush, Army SSG David Loyd, and Army SP4 William Jeffries. Eight of these 11 Army personnel were under the age of 25.

   As Dr. Jeffrey Sartin, and infectious disease doctor at the Gundersen Clinic in La Crosse, WI, said, ``I would say that the number of cases among young healthy troops would seem to be unusual.''

   The numbers of those with adverse health events is significantly higher. There have been around 700 adverse events reported in just the first 6 months of this year and this is as part of a reporting system that has been found to significantly under-report adverse events.

   In addition, there are the reports of problems at both Ft. Stewart and Ft. Knox with respect to sick and injured soldiers who have been waiting weeks and sometimes months for medical treatment. Senators LEAHY and BOND should be commended for drawing attention to those problems and getting the military to move to address it. What remains disturbing is that many of those who are ill and on ``medical hold'' were never deployed. At Ft. Stewart, Senators BOND and LEAHY found that one-third of the 650 soldiers awaiting medical care and follow-up evaluations were not physically qualified for deployment and therefore never deployed overseas.

   At Ft. Knox, according to a UPI story, 369 of the 422 soldiers at Ft. Knox did not deploy to Operation Iraqi Freedom because of their illnesses. This includes, according to the story, ``strange clusters of heart problems and breathing problems, as did soldiers at Ft. Stewart and other locations.'' These are health problems that are often cited as adverse events accompanying the anthrax and smallpox vaccines. Once again, there is a surprising number of such cases in what are otherwise a strong, healthy, and young group of people.

   We certainly do not know whether these cases have been caused by the anthrax or smallpox vaccines at this point. In fact, these personnel desperately await any medical treatment and that must be addressed. While the military works to address that problem, they should also reconsider the mandatory nature of the anthrax and smallpox vaccines, as they may be contributing heavily to the problem.

   In the case of Army SP4 Rachel Lacy, who loved her country and volunteered to deploy to the Persian Gulf, she was ordered to take the anthrax vaccine and did so without objection. Within days, she started to suffer pneumonia and flu-like symptoms. Within weeks, she was dead. The coroner listed ``post-vaccine'' problems on the death certificate for Rachel Lacy and said, ``it's just very suspicious in my mind ..... that she's healthy, gets the vaccinations and then dies a couple weeks later.''

   The Army is, according to published reports, conducting an investigation of the 100 or more soldiers that have gotten pneumonia in Iraq and southwestern Asia. Of those 100, 2 have died and another 13 have had to be put on respirators.

   According to a story published in both the New York Times and Washington Post on November 19, 2003, as part of that investigation, the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices and the Armed Services Epidemiology Board said the evidence ``strongly favors'' the belief that vaccines led to the death of Rachel Lacy. It was an important admission and yet the military immediately said its vaccination policies would ``not be changed.''

   Rachel's father, Moses Lacy, has asked, ``Let's stop this, re-evaluate what we're doing, re-evaluate the risks.'' That is a reasonable request and our nation's servicemembers and families deserve it. We owe it to the Lacy family and to all our military personnel and their families.

   As a result of the concerns of servicemembers and their families that these vaccines are having on their health and well-being, it must also be noted that the anthrax and smallpox vaccines are having serious consequences for our nation's military readiness. In September 2002, the General Accounting Office reported that 69 percent of trained and experienced pilots and aircrew members in the Guard and Reserve reported that the anthrax shot was the major influence in their decision to change their military status in 2002, including leaving the military entirely.

   Responding to the serious recruitment and retention problems caused by the mandatory anthrax vaccine policy, in February 2000, my colleague and then Presidential candidate JOHN MCCAIN called for a moratorium of this policy. Unfortunately, the safety concerns Senator MCCAIN noted then have not been resolved. The military continues to deny problems with the vaccine while simultaneously operating a clinic at Walter Reed Army Medical Center to treat the illnesses caused by the vaccine.

   Instead of reconsidering its policy, the DOD has, instead, aggressively moved against those who have refused the vaccines. After his testimony before the

   House Government Reform Committee, Major Sonnie Bates, the highest ranking officer to refuse the anthrax vaccination, was charged under article 15 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the Department of Defense moved to court-martial him. After accusations of reprisal came from the Congress, the Department of Defense backed down and discharged Major Bates.

   There is also the case of Air Force Captain John Buck, M.D. He was court-martialed for refusing the anthrax vaccine in a trial in which the judge refused to allow the jury to hear the doctor's views on its safety and efficacy. After he was convicted, fined $21,000, and denied a promotion he had earned, Dr. Buck deployed to the Indian Ocean after September 11th to support U.S. military operations in Afghanistan. He was awarded a medal for his service in support of Operation Enduring Freedom and subsequently given an honorable discharge.

   In fact, the military has court-martialed soldiers throughout the military for refusing the anthrax vaccine, including a case this spring in New York of Private Rhonda Hazley who refused the vaccine because she was breast-feeding her child. One of the things this resolution asks is for the Department of Defense to reconsider adverse actions taken against servicemembers on the basis of refusal to take the smallpox or anthrax vaccines. The court-martialing of a woman that refused these vaccines because she was breast-feeding is particularly disturbing.

   It is important to note that the FDA revised the product label for the anthrax vaccine from ``a possible risk'' to a ``known risk'' to pregnant women because of ``positive evidence of human fetal risk based on adverse reaction data from investigational or marketing experience or studies in humans.'' While Private Hazley was no longer pregnant, the FDA does believe the ``pregnancy and lactation are a clinical continuum.'' Once again, the risks of the vaccine would appear to far outweigh the benefit to a mother and mechanic in the Army.

   The DOD's actions in such cases have created a climate of distrust and fear within the ranks of the military. This comply or be discharged or prosecuted policy is of great concern to our brave young men and women in uniform, and in the case of Private Hazley, to her child. Again, due to this policy, many soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines to reevaluate their commitment to the military.

   The military has argued that we need a mandatory program with respect to our nation's military personnel as part of ensuring force protection. However, I understand that our allies--both the British and Australians--have not made the anthrax vaccines mandatory in the Iraqi Freedom Operation. As those two nations weighed the potential consequences of requiring all military personnel to get the vaccines versus any potential benefit, they came down on the side of making the vaccine voluntary.

   In the case of the British military, more than half the armed forces personnel deployed in the Gulf have refused to be vaccinated against anthrax. The British Ministry of Defense spokesman said that this policy would remain voluntary ``in accordance with

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long-standing medical practice.'' Of interest, British army units that would be responsible for dealing with suspect chemical and biological sites are given the smallpox vaccine but still are not required to get the anthrax vaccine.

   For those that have agreed to accept the anthrax vaccine among British troops, they are reporting a large number of adverse events. According to a report by the British National Gulf Veterans and Families' Association, they anticipate adverse reaction among ``at least 6,000 new cases as a result of the Iraq conflict--about 30 percent of the 22,000 troops who had the anthrax vaccination.''

   In addition to the policy of our allies that military personnel should be able to make their own decisions regarding the anthrax vaccine, another reason they have made the vaccine voluntary is that we do not even know whether the anthrax vaccine is effective against inhalation or weaponized anthrax.

   Furthermore, even if we had truly thought there was strong evidence that the Iraqi government had and was preparing to use biological weapons such as anthrax against the United States military, the report by Weapons Inspector David Kay in September indicates that threat has been found to be lacking or non-existent. There appears to be little evidence available that Al Qaeda or Saddam have the capability to deliver anthrax or smallpox against our troops in Iraq or Afghanistan. Even if there was such a threat, it is likely extremely small at this point. Again, if nothing else, this change in the threat to our troops requires an immediate reevaluation of DOD vaccination policy.

   Even if you still think there is some potential benefit of these vaccinations, it must be further weighed against whether there is another mechanism available that would have the same effect. We in the Senate, for example, know very well that the treatment of anthrax exposure via antibiotics works very well. The Senate was faced with the choice of having those exposed undergo a course of antibiotics versus getting the anthrax vaccine and the vast majority of those exposed to anthrax choose to take the antibiotic treatment rather than volunteer to take the anthrax vaccine.

   In fact, the current Majority Leader, Senator FRIST, said at the time the anthrax vaccine was offered to Senate employees potentially exposed to anthrax, ``I do not recommend widespread inoculation for people with the vaccine in the Hart Building. There are too many side effects and if there is limited chance of exposure the side effects would far outweigh any potential advantage.''

   Again, in weighing the potential benefit of the vaccine versus the option of antibiotics, the vast majority decided in support of the latter option. Our military personnel certainly deserve the option that many Senate personnel chose for themselves and what it seems the Secretary of Defense chose for himself when he acknowledged on October 25, 2001--in the midst of the anthrax attacks--that he was not taking the anthrax vaccine.

   When the President was running for our Nation's highest office, he said with respect to questions posed to him in the September 2000 issue of U.S. Medicine, ``The Defense Department's Anthrax Immunization Program has raised numerous health concerns and caused fear among the individuals whose lives it touches. I don't feel the current administration's anthrax immunization program has taken into account the effect of this program on the soldiers in our military and their families. Under my administration, soldiers and their families will be taken into consideration.''

   Some of our nation's servicemembers and their families believe that the current policy of this Administration does not adequately take soldiers and their families into consideration. They believe we are, in fact, failing to ensure the health and well-being of our military personnel and we must do better.

   Before closing, I would like to particularly note the long-standing work by Congressman CHRISTOPHER SHAYS on this issue. In a report issued by the House Committee on Government Reform in April 2000, the report states, ``many members of the armed services do not share that faith [that the DOD places in the anthrax vaccine]. They do not believe merely suggestive evidence of vaccine efficacy outweighs their concerns over the lack of evidence of long term vaccine safety. Nor do they trust DOD has learned the lessons of part military medical mistakes: atomic testing, Agent Orange, Persian Gulf war drugs, and vaccines. Heavy handed, one-sided informational materials only fuel suspicions the program understates adverse reaction risks in order to magnify the relative, admittedly marginal, benefits of the vaccine.''

   Many of the findings by Congressman SHAYS, such as the concerns by military servicemembers are even more valid today with the introduction of the smallpox vaccine to the list of vaccines required by the military.

   Consequently, I urge the passage of this Sense of the Senate urging the Department of Defense to reconsider the mandatory nature of its smallpox and anthrax vaccination programs and to minimize the use of these vaccines pending the current development of new and better vaccines.

   I also plan to introduce legislation early next year, as the Institute of Medicine recommended back in 1999, to establish a National Center for Military Deployment Health Research. Our nation's servicemembers deserve our best efforts to assure their health and well-being. As the IOM said in making the recommendation to establish a National Center for Military Deployment Health Research, ``Veterans' organizations were instrumental in developing the idea for a national center for the study of war-related illness and postdeployment health issues, and these organizations continue to support the national center concept.'' We owe this to our nation's servicemembers and veterans and I look forward to working with them over the coming months in the development of that long-needed legislation.

END

 


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IRAQ/SYRIA AND WMD


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4A) Opposing the Syria Accountability Act

 

HON. FORTNEY PETE STARK

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 21, 2003

  • Mr. STARK. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to this bill despite being one of its cosponsors and having voted for it when it came before the House on October 15th.
  • I strongly believe Syria's actions ought to be called into question. To say this regime is a bad actor is putting it mildly. Their actions are rightly condemned, especially when it comes to their tacit support for terrorism and ongoing occupation of Lebanon. The United States ought to use the tools at our disposal--both political and economic--to demand an end to their egregious policies.
  • There is, however, a reason why I am voting against this resolution. It is based on my long held reservations about the President's intentions on foreign policy. Given his belligerent declarations yesterday, I have genuine concerns that he may seek authority in this resolution to pursue aggressive military action against Syria.
  • After all, Mr. Speaker, this President did not need much to march to war against Iraq. At best, the evidence was soft, the intelligence was trumped up and now not a grain of proof can be found showing Iraq had any weapons of mass destruction . But, ultimately, President Bush used past declarations of Congress meant merely to reprimand Iraq for its policies to justify full-blown war against that regime.
  • This resolution today contains provisions that rightly admonish Syria, but do so on the basis of reasonable beliefs and assumptions, not proven facts. Most notably, there is reference to Syria's ``hostile actions'' in regard to the United States and our troops in Iraq. Although our suspicions are well founded, there is as yet no proven connection between the government of Syria and terrorism in Iraq.
  • I have concerns the President may not draw this distinction and take these words as grounds for pursuing preemptive military action.
  • Frankly, Mr. Speaker, I don't trust this President. His actions toward Iraq have clearly demonstrated his willingness to lie to the American people. But, they also underscore his willingness to use force indiscriminately without the burden of proof.
  • I cannot support a resolution that might be used as a vehicle for the President to act counter to the interest of the American people. I vote ``no'' on this resolution.

 

 

4B) The Limits and Liabilities of Power: Lessons of Iraq

 

SPEECH OF

HON. JAMES A. LEACH

OF IOWA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 21, 2003

  • Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, the issue of our engagement in Iraq demands that we as a society probe the question of the limits of a superpower's power and the possible anomaly that there are severe liabilities to power, particularly for a superpower.
  • Does, for instance, overwhelming military might protect us from terrorism or, if used unwisely, increase our vulnerability to terrorism?
  • Likewise, does overwhelming economic power ensure loyalty or buy friendship even from the countries most indebted to the U.S.?
  • In other words, can military and economic might ever become a substitute for sensible and sensitive foreign policy?
  • And given the dilemma of Iraq, could it indeed be that the most important ``multibillion'' problem America faces is not deficits measured in dollars, fiscal or trade, but the antagonism of billions of people around the world who object to our current foreign policy?
  • Here, let me say that I strongly believe in the need for clarification of thought as it applies to policy, and anyone who wishes to review the reasoning I have applied to the Iraq issue, ranging from a floor explanation of a ``no'' vote on the Congressional resolution authorizing war last year to calls for internationalizing the civil governance in Iraq last month, to a vote in favor of generosity in reconstruction efforts last week, can find the explanatory statements on my Congressional web site: www.house.gov/leach.
  • What I would like to do today is summarize the dilemma we face and make the following points about where we might go from here:
  • (1) There are no certitudes. Anyone who was not conflicted on the original decision to approve intervention or who does not see a downside to all courses of action today is not approaching the problem with an open mind. America and the world are in a strategic pickle. In an era of anger, of divisions in the world based on economics, on color of skin, on ethnicity, on religious belief, on happenstance of family and place of birth; in a world made smaller by technological revolutions in communications and transportation, those who have causes--good or bad--have possibilities of being heard and felt around the globe that never existed before. Great leaders like Gandhi and Martin Luther King appealed to the higher angels of our nature and achieved revolutionary change with non-violence. Mendacious leaders like Hitler, Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden have sought to impose their wills on others through appeals to hate and reliance on increasingly wanton instruments of oppression.
  • As the world's only superpower, the U.S. has no choice but to display firmness of purpose and resolve in deterring inhumane breaches of order. Yet, firmness and resolve must be matched by compassionate understanding of the reasons people of the world lash out. We have the world's greatest armed forces. But these forces cannot successfully be deployed to counter international misconduct if we don't also seek to undercut the causes of such conduct.
  • Reviewing the causes of World War I, historians quickly concluded that there was not enough flexibility in the European alliance system and that this allowed a rather minor event, the assassination of an Austrian archduke, to precipitate a cataclysmic war. With this example in mind, political leaders in the 1930s erred on the side of irresolution, which led them to Munich and the partition of Czechoslovakia. Too much inflexibility caused one war; too little spine a greater one.
  • The problem today is not whether we should meet problems with firmness or compassion. We need both. The problem is determining when and how to respond with firmness, when and how to express compassion. As in all human conduct, the challenge is wisdom.

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  • (2) We must listen as well as assert. Four decades ago the British author Lawrence Durrell wrote a series of novels called the Alexandria Quartet, in which he describes a set of events in Alexandria, Egypt, preceding World War II. An experiment in the relativity of human perception, each of the four books views the same events through the eyes of a different participant. While the events described are the same in each book, the stories as told by each of the participants are surprisingly different. The reader comes to the realization that a broad understanding about events that transpire can only be developed by synthesizing the singularly different perceptions of various protagonists.
  • To understand the Middle East today, we need to listen to everyone's story.
  • (3) To shape or deter an opponents' actions, we need to understand how they think. American policy makers, at their best, reason in a pragmatic, future-oriented manner. In much of the rest of the world, on the other hand, people reason by historical analogy. Events dating centuries back, especially umbrages, dominate thinking about today. People in the Middle East, like the Balkans, are oriented to the past and are driven by ideas of honor of a different shape and emphasis than those we derive from American culture.
  • (4) No country can go it alone for long and expect to be respected as an international leader. Doctrines of American exceptionalism--the precept that we should not be bound by legal or procedural norms that bind others--which are now fashionable in certain Washington ideological circles have led to intervention in Iraq without full UN sanction. Ironically, prior to 9/11 these same notions led to rejection of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and of upgraded verification provisions for the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention--agreements that would have stood in the way of WMD production in Iraq and provided a legal basis for possible armed intervention if violations occurred. The world is crying out for leadership in restraining weapons development. We are not providing it because Washington policy makers prefer that restraint on others not apply to ourselves.
  • (5) When Washington policy makers speak on foreign policy they must understand that their audience is more than one party's political base. While Saddam Hussein is widely perceived to be the worst sort of tyrant, many people around the world view us as bullies for attacking a sovereign country without prior armed provocation. That is why it is so critical that a case for intervention should be based on concern for the well-being of others as well as the U.S. national interest.
  • For foreign policy to be effective, it must be clearly articulated and convincing in those parts of the world most affected by it.
  • (6) We must rededicate ourselves to building up an intelligence capacity that better understands the Middle East and the Islamic world and is less susceptible to being politicized. Our inability to understand Islamic culture resulted in the greatest intelligence failure of our era. It is, however, not the sole intelligence failure. In one of the greatest judgmental errors of our time we appear to have attempted to combat the ideological posturing of others by slanting our own intelligence. Based on what is known today, policy makers not only erred in assessing Saddam Hussein's WMD capacities, but put too much faith in a narrow cadre of ideologues who suggested the U.S. would be welcomed as a liberating rather than conquering or, worse yet, colonizing force in Iraq. Estimates of the costs of war, of the ramifications of involvement, of the expected reaction of the population and of the likelihood of foreign support were dead wrong.
  • (7) It is the responsibility of public officials to ensure that no American soldier is deployed as a defenseless magnet for terrorist attack--or in such a way as to incite foreign radicals to commit terrorist acts in America itself.
  • American soldiers have been trained to withstand the heat of battle in defense of America and American values. For two and a quarter centuries no country has been more effectively or more courageously served by a citizen soldiery than the United States. In Iraq, our armed forces could not have performed more professionally or valiantly than in the initial engagement. But the difference between service in combat and service in occupation of a foreign land, especially an Islamic society, is profound. In Iraq, which is fast becoming for us much like Algeria was for the French in the 1950s, our men and women in uniform are increasingly facing hit-and-run terrorist assaults, which are much more difficult to defend against than traditional military confrontations.
  • The challenge of policy makers is to recognize that there is a distinction between three endeavors: warfare, reconstruction and occupation. Our armed forces are trained to prevail in the first; they can be helpful in the second; but in the Islamic world no outside power is ever going to be well received as an occupying force. Hence, strategies that emphasize the first two endeavors and don't lead to long-term reliance on the third should be the goal of U.S. policy makers.
  • (8) Responses to terrorism often lead to escalating action/reaction cycles. When our forces become subject to terrorist assaults and the perpetrators disappear into their neighborhoods, we, like Israel, will inevitably be tempted to retaliate in ways that may intensify rather than restrain future violence.
  • Calls will be made not only to use air power in urban areas but to double or triple troop deployments, perhaps without adequate assessment of what such troops will be assigned to do. In conventional warfare, the case for overwhelming superiority (sometimes referred to as the Powell Doctrine) is compelling. In a terrorist setting, as in modernist design, less can often be more. There may be cases where deploying a large force to combat terrorism is appropriate. There may also be cases--and I believe Iraq is one--where additional soldiers simply become additional targets, and a different mix of strategies is both preferable and more effective.
  • (9) To defend against terrorism, especially when it is fueled by an explosive mixture of religious and nationalist sentiments, requires frank acknowledgment of the nature and depth of the problem.
  • For months, the administration has suggested the problem in Iraq is limited to 5,000 dissidents. This is a 5-digit miscalculation. At least half the Muslim world--over 500,000,000 people--are outraged by the U. S. government's attitudes and action. Long simmering resentment of American policies in Muslim countries like Indonesia has in recent months metastasized into hatred. And in Europe, including what the defense secretary called the ``new Europe,'' as well as in South and East Asia, respect for American policy is in steep decline.
  • In the Vietnam War we gave a great deal of attention to the notion of ``winning the hearts and minds'' of the people. We didn't succeed in convincing the Vietnamese or world opinion of our good intentions despite the horrendous tactics of the Vietcong and the Communist North. Today, Americans must understand that in the battle for the minds of men, particularly in the Moslem world, we are doing less well than even in the most difficult days of the Vietnam War. In this context, we would be well-advised to remember America's original revolutionary commitment to a decent respect for the opinions of mankind.
  • (10) While, for the time being, security in Iraq must remain the responsibility of U.S. military commanders in the field, we would be wise to put an international face on civil governance in the country and ask Secretary General Kofi Annan to immediately appoint a top civilian administrator to whom Ambassador Bremer and his staff would report.
  • Transfer of interim civil authority to the UN would provide greater legitimacy to the formation of a new Iraqi government and encourage other countries to help with economic reconstruction and security requirements. We should also work to transfer, as soon as practicable, responsibility for internal security to troops of other nations or the Iraqis themselves. Transferring the police function to others is a way to build up Iraqi's own postwar internal security infrastructure and make evident that the U.S. does not desire long term control.
  • (11) We should also move forthwith to transfer more political control to the Iraqi Governing Council and press for immediate elections and constitution writing. Some argue that stability is more likely to be achieved with a long U.S. occupation. I believe the reverse is true. The longer we are in Iraq, the greater the instability there and the greater the likelihood that terrorism will spread to other countries, including the United States.
  • (12) America cannot cut and run politically, economically or militarily, but we would be wise to announce a timetable for troop withdrawal, by the end of next year at the latest. Some experts in and out of government believe that American troops should stay in and control Iraq at least as long as we did in Japan and Germany after World War II. Such a time table (a minimum of 5 years) is out of sync with the times and the mood in the Islamic world.
  • The world is more impatient today and Muslims in particular are more history sensitive than ever before. While we assume the Iraqi populace should accept the American presence because of our good will, the Muslim world sees our forces as a compounding of grievances dating back to the crusades and, more recently, to American support of Israel. The imagery AlJazeera projects of Baghdad is that of another West Bank. In this context, American commitments to ``slog on'' interminably play into the hands of extremists. All extremists have to do is continue blowing up a vehicle or two every day, thereby eliciting a military reaction that we might view as reasonable but that the Islamic world is likely to see as heavy-handed, angering the populace and emboldening further dissent.

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  • The longer we stay, the greater the opportunity for al Qaeda and radical Baath party supporters to claim that the war is continuing and that they are prevailing. To prevent this and to keep control of events we would be wise to announce a withdrawal timetable that we, not they, control. Setting such a timetable has the effect of asserting that the war itself is over and we prevailed, and that Iraqis cannot dither in establishing a legitimate, elected government.
  • A drawn out occupation plays into the hand of radicals. It gives them a rallying cry to keep up resistance in Iraq and expand terrorist assaults around the world. It gives them the chance to suggest that America is bent on continuing the crusades and, when we eventually withdraw, the prospect of claiming that they won the war. On the other hand, if we set a firm schedule for drawing down our troops, we define the war as being over in its 3rd week, not in its 6th year. An announced time table can later be modified to allow, for instance, a small force to remain briefly in northern Iraq to maintain sovereign cohesion. Timetables can also be abbreviated. But the point is that they underscore our reluctance to become an imperial power and, perhaps more importantly, our determination to control our own destiny.
  • (13) It is critical to the security of our troops, as well as Iraqi security, that we create an Iraqi police force as soon as possible. Responsibility for domestic security is an internal not external matter. We can't be their policemen and if we persist in trying, we will make it harder for stability to be established and maintained.
  • Students of international politics have for the past generation questioned the capacity and moral authority of any country to be policeman for the world. But little academic attention was devoted to the challenge of being policeman within a country after the conclusion of a conflict. We have little experience with such a responsibility. In Japan, MacArthur relied on indigenous Japanese police; in Germany, we quickly reconstituted a German constabulary at most local levels.
  • Common sense would indicate that trying to police a country the size of France with soldiers unfamiliar with the language and culture of the society, untrained in the art of policing, and unwelcome and resented in critical cities and towns must be a nearly impossible task. Hence the need to expedite the training of an indigenous Iraqi police force.
  • (14) We should announce that we have no intention of establishing permanent military bases in Iraq. Some Washington policy makers want such bases but they would be a political burden for any new government in Baghdad and a constant struggle for the U.S. to defend. Defense of American bases in Iraq from terrorism in the 21st century is likely to be far more difficult than the challenge we foresaw of maintaining U.S. sovereignty over the Panama Canal in the 20th century. The reason the Department of Defense concluded in the Carter administration that it was wise to transfer control over the Panama Canal to Panamanians was the estimation that the Canal could be defended against traditional aggression but not sabotage or acts of terrorism. It seemed wiser to respect nationalist sentiment and provide for a gradual transfer of the canal to local control than to insist on quasi-colonial assertions of power.
  • There are many reasons why Europeans are so smugly opposed to our policy in Iraq. One is historical experience with colonialism. The French were chased out of Algeria, the Russians, and earlier the British, out of Afghanistan. U.S. intervention in Iraq is seen in Europe as not too dissimilar to the British and French effort to re-establish control over the Suez Canal in 1956. It is noteworthy that the Islamic world deeply appreciated President Eisenhower's refusal to back the British and French intervention in Egypt. Europeans now think that the shoe is on the other foot. We appear insensitive to history.
  • (15) Credit will remain the dominant economic issue until Iraq's foreign debt is reduced or canceled. Neither significant private nor large scale public credit will be made available to Iraqis until the burden of old debt is lifted. Accordingly, we should press vigorously for Saddam-era debt--which went largely to build palaces for Saddam's family and to buy weapons of aggression--to be written off. We should also press to establish community-centered banks and credit unions where micro credit can be offered. Oil wealth has its advantages only if revenues are used for the benefit of society rather than political insiders. Increasing petroleum production is not enough. Oil is not a labor intensive industry. Jobs matter, and Iraq needs bankers and small business entrepreneurs far more than oil barons. We have no choice except to help rebuild Iraq's oil infrastructure, but we must make clear that we have no intention of controlling Iraq's oil reserves. The natural resources of Iraq must be treated as the patrimony of the Iraqi people.
  • (16) Economic assistance to Iraq should be front-loaded and generous. War has been a constant of history, but the concept of reconstruction is relatively new. The 20th century gave us two vastly different models. At the end of World War 1, the victors imposed retributive terms on Germany, which so angered German society that it turned to fascism. World War II was the result.
  • The allies took a different approach at the end of World War II. Generosity was the watchword. The Marshall Plan was adopted to rebuild Europe and Gen. MacArthur directed the reform and modernization of Japan. Model democracies emerged. The world was made more secure. The economic plan for Iraq should be two-pronged: debt forgiveness coupled with institution building. A better world is more likely to emerge if the American agenda places its emphasis on construction rather than destruction.
  • Here a note about the other reconstruction model in American history is relevant. With his call for malice toward none, Lincoln's second inaugural address set the most conciliatory tone in the history of war. His successor once removed, U.S. Grant, proved to be a more proficient soldier than President and countenanced carpet bagging conflicts of interest. Our government today would be well advised to recognize that neither history nor the American public approves of war or post-war profiteering. Great care has to be taken to ensure transparency and integrity in government contracts and common sense would indicate that the more Iraqis are involved in rebuilding their own society, the more lasting such efforts are likely to be.
  • (17) Terrorism affects world economics as well as politics. Markets depend on confidence and nothing undercuts confidence more than anarchist acts. Policies designed to deter terrorism can be counter-productive. International disapproval of our actions may jeopardize our economy and diminish the credibility of our political leadership in the world. Increased terrorism could well have the dual effect of precipitating new U.S. military engagements and, ironically, strengthening isolationist sentiment--which, in turn could degenerate into a disastrous spiral of protectionism.
  • (18) The measure of success in reconstruction is not the sum of accomplishments. In the Vietnam War the Pentagon gave progress reports that came to be symbolized by its body counts. One of the most liberal critics of that war, I.F. Stone, once commented that he accepted the validity of the body counts but thought that they did not reveal the big picture. It would be as if, Stone suggested, he were to be walking down the street and bump into a man running out of a bank waving a gun and carrying a satchel full of money, and were to ask the man, ``What are you doing?'' If the man responded, ``I'm waiting for a car,'' the man would be telling the truth but not revealing the big picture.
  • Good things are being accomplished in Iraq, particularly in the North where an American general has won a measure of popularity through progressive stabilization initiatives. Yet terrorism cannot credibly be contained in the arms-infested Iraqi environment. American civilians as well as armed services personnel who have been posted to Iraq deserve to be commended for their commitment and sacrifices, but prudence suggests that brevity of service is preferable to a long standing presence. Otherwise, in a world where terrorism is a growth industry even extraordinary sacrifice and significant accomplishments could be for naught.
  • (19) We must respect Iraqi culture and work to ensure that the art and artifacts of this cradle of civilization are preserved for the Iraqi people. There are few umbrages more long lasting than cultural theft. Cultural looting must be stopped and the market for stolen antiquities squelched. For our part we should ensure that Iraqi cultural sites are protected and that our laws are upgraded. Any stolen antiquities brought to America must be returned.
  • (20) The war in Iraq should not cause us to forget Afghanistan. While the center of our military attention may at the moment be Baghdad, we must remember that no Iraqi was involved in hijacking the planes that struck the World Trade Center and Pentagon on 9/11. Few countries are more distant physically or culturally from the United States than Afghanistan, yet it is there where the plotting for that terrorist act began. The Taliban have been removed and a new, more tolerant government has been established, but the world community has not fulfilled its commitments to raise that country out of poverty and warlordism. The U.S. cannot continue to be complacent about economic and social development in that country, where foreigners have never been welcome. Failure of the Karzai government and a return of the Taliban would be a major setback in the battle with terrorism.
  • (21) Lastly, and most importantly, U.S. policy makers should never lose sight of the fact that events in Israel and Iraq are intertwined and that no challenge is more important for regional and global security than resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian dilemma.

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  • Extraordinarily, administration after administration in Washington seems to pay only intermittent attention to this issue. There should be no higher priority in our foreign policy than a resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Attention in Washington should be riveted at all times on this singular issue. The current status quo is good neither for Israel nor for the Palestinians. Now, for the first time lack of progress in establishing a mutually acceptable modus vivendi between the parties may be even more damaging to countries not directly involved in the conflict. The need for U.S. leadership in pressing for peace has never been more urgent. It would be a tragedy if, focussed on making war in one part of the Middle East, we neglected to promote peace in another.
  • In conclusion, the world is noting what we are saying and what we are doing. Many are not convinced by our words; many are appalled by our actions. Yet nothing would be worse for the world than for us to fail. We must not. The key at this point is to recognize the limits as well as magnitude of our power and emphasize the most uplifting aspects of our heritage: democracy, opportunity, freedom of thought and worship. Differences we must respect; intolerance we must reject. But America does better as a mediator and multi-party peace maker than as a unilateral interventionist. This is the great lesson of the past year.

 

4C) Independent Intelligence Commission Act

S. 1946. A bill to establish an independent national commission to examine and evaluate the collection, analysis, reporting, use, and dissemination of intelligence related to Iraq and Operation Iraqi Freedom; to the Select Committee on Intelligence.

   Mr. CORZINE. Mr. President, I am introducing today a bill to establish an independent, bipartisan commission to examine intelligence issues related to Iraq. This commission is necessary because what we have discovered on the ground in Iraq has shown our intelligence to be wrong. It is necessary because Administration officials misused intelligence--that is, they made public statements and submitted reports to Congress that the Administration knew at the time to be unsupported by the available intelligence. And it is necessary because inaccurate and misused intelligence played a role in leading us to war.

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   Accurate, objective, and credible intelligence is a fundamental cornerstone of our national security, particularly in an age of shadowy terrorist networks and clandestine weapons programs. Unless we improve our intelligence, we risk failing to identify serious threats to the United States and being distracted by lesser dangers at the expense of larger and more urgent security concerns.

   This effort must include not only the collection and analysis of intelligence, but the use, reporting, and dissemination of intelligence assessments. If the American people are asked to go to war to preempt an attack, or--as in the case of Iraq--to prevent a possible future threat from emerging, it is critical that the public statements of our officials be supported by the available intelligence. If members of Congress are to consider authorizing the use of force, particularly against countries that have not attacked the United States, they must be provided with honest and complete intelligence. And if our allies are to be asked to join us in confronting these threats, the intelligence that we share with them and that we rely on to bolster our case must be credible in the eyes of the world.

   I first proposed an independent commission to examine intelligence related to Iraq last summer, when it became clear that President Bush had made an important but unsubstantiated claim in his January 2002 State of the Union address. That claim was, quote: ``The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa.''

   Although this statement has been dismissed as the ``16 words,'' its significant cannot be overstated. The State of the Union address is the most important, the most scrutinized speech the President delivers. The statement concerned the most important topic a President can discuss--whether to send Americans to war. And this claim was the most important element of the President's argument for war: that there was evidence that Saddam Hussein might have the necessary materials to produce a nuclear bomb. As for the reference to the British government, it is hard to imagine how the use of the word

   ``learned'' could imply anything other than that the United States independently believed that the claim was true.

   It turns out that the Bush Administration had ample reason to know at the time that what the President was telling the nation could not be substantiated. The CIA had sought to dissuade the White House from making claims about uranium purchases. And on February 5, a week after the State of the Union address, Secretary of State Powell made a presentation to the Untied Nations in which he omitted the claim precisely because it was not supported by the available intelligence.

   Despite this knowledge, the Administration never issued a clarification. As a result, the President's statement stood, as an important element of the Administration's case for war. Only last summer, after Americans learned from Ambassador Joe Wilson and others what Administration officials knew at the time, did the Administration acknowledge that the uranium allegation should never have been included in the State of the Union Address.

   The case generated outrage across party lines. Republicans as well as Democrats expressed serious concern about the credibility of the Administration and the country. They stressed that cabinet members, the vice president, and the entire administration are responsible for honestly representing intelligence. They called for someone in the Administration to be held accountable. The Senate passed a resolution by voice vote. The chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee promised to undertake a, quote ``very aggressive review.'' And the Bush Administration insisted that it would cooperate. As White House spokesman Ari Fleischer stated on June 11, quote: ``The Administration welcomes the review. It's important.''

   In July, when I first sought to establish this commission, there was no dispute that the use of intelligence, as well as the collection and analysis of intelligence, should be examined. Republicans who voted against the commission did so, they said, because the commission would intrude on the jurisdiction of the Intelligence Committee. I was, and remain supportive of efforts by the committee to look into the use of intelligence related to Iraq, an inquiry that is clearly included within the committee's jurisdiction. But it was and is my belief that an independent, bipartisan commission, building on the findings of Congressional and other investigations, could undertake the most thorough, depoliticized review possible.

   Now, however, it seems an independent commission is the only remaining means left to examine the use, or misuse, of intelligence. On November 13, the Chairman of the Intelligence Committee announced that there would be no examination of how intelligence was used by policymakers. I deeply regret this decision by the chairman and fervently hope the committee will ultimately exercise its role, established in the resolution laying out its jurisdiction, in

   overseeing the, quote: ``use or dissemination'' of intelligence. In the meantime, I would expect that an independent commission would receive strong bipartisan support.

    It is now beyond question that our intelligence on Iraq was inaccurate. After months of searching, investigative teams have yet to find stockpiles of chemical or biological weapons. David Kay, who heads up the Iraqi Survey Group, has stated that Iraq's nuclear program was only at the, quote: ``very most rudimentary level.'' The Administration has yet to produce evidence of the high-level ties between Iraq and al Qaeda that it warned of prior to the war. And now, tragically, we must add to the list of intelligence failures the inability to anticipate the current resistance to U.S. occupation. Clearly, the facts and circumstances surrounding these failings warrant a detailed and systematic review.

    But what of the use of intelligence? As important as the State of the Union address was, that speech was only part of a larger case made by the Administration for war. Administration officials made many claims--particularly those related to chemical and biological weapons--that were expressed in terms that were more specific and more certain than the intelligence may have supported. Most troubling, however, were the highly dubious assessments and suggestions related to nuclear programs and terrorism with which the Administration built its most powerful and emotionally potent argument. That argument had three elements: 1. That Iraq had a nuclear weapons program, and possibly even a nuclear weapon; 2. that Saddam Hussein was allied with al Qaeda, and that he may have been involved with the terrorist attacks of September 11; and 3. that the threat was imminent.

    The Administration began to make its argument in the summer of 2002. As vice President Cheney stated in an August 26 speech, quote: ``Simply stated, there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction.'' In an indication of how Administration officials would make their case over the next seven months, the vice president insisted that the intelligence indicated no doubt, no internal disagreement, and no uncertainty.

    Then, on September 12, President bush, in his speech to the United Nations, went further, stating, quote: ``right now, Iraq is expanding and improving facilities that were used for the production of biological weapons.'' the President also made two statements regarding Iraq's alleged nuclear program. The first was that Iraq had made, quote: ``several attempts to buy high-strength aluminum tubes used to enrich uranium for a nuclear weapon.'' He

   failed to mention that neither the Department of Energy nor the Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research believed that the tubes were intended for that purpose. The President's second statement added the missing ingredient: the uranium itself. As the President stated, quote: ``Should Iraq acquire fissile material, it would be able to build a nuclear weapon within year.'' This was the context for the President's claim made in the State of the Union address that Iraq had sought to purchase uranium from Africa.

   The Administration continued making its case throughout the fall of 2002, adding claims concerning ties between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda. One of many examples was Secretary Rumsfeld's September 26 statement that the

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Administration had, quote: ``very reliable reporting of senior level contacts going back a decade.''

   As Congress deliberated whether to authorize the use of force against Iraq, the Administration officials made increasingly alarming statements about Iraq's ties to al Qaeda and about its nuclear weapons program. On October 7, three days before the vote in the House of Representatives and four days before the vote in the Senate, President Bush gave a speech in which he said, unequivocally, that, quote: ``We know that Iraq and al Qaeda have had high-level contacts that go back a decade,'' and, quote: ``The evidence indicates the Iraq is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program.'' He repeated the allegations about uranium tubes and the warning about purchases of uranium. Then the President put it all together--the implication that Iraq was connected to the September 11 attacks, the implication that Iraq could have a nuclear bomb at any time, and the warning that Saddam Hussein could decide on any day to explode a nuclear bomb in the United States. Here is what the President said: ``Why do we need to confront it [Saddam] now? And there's a reason. We've experienced the horror of September the 11th. We have seen that those who hate America are willing to crash airplanes into buildings full of innocent people. Our enemies would be no less willing, in fact, they would be eager, to use biological or chemical, or a nuclear weapon. Knowing these realities, America must not ignore the threat gathering against us. Facing clear evidence of peril, we cannot wait for the final proof--the smoking gun--that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud.''

   This was the most powerful, dire, and convincing warning a President could give. And it was based on one inference that the President has acknowledged he never had any evidence of, that Saddam was tied to September 11, and another which had already been refuted by many within the Administration, that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear program.

   Later statements included Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld's claims to specific knowledge of the whereabouts and movements of biological and

   chemical weapons. On March 11, he stated, quote: ``We know he continues to hide biological and chemical weapons, moving them to different locations as often as every 12 to 24 hours, and placing them in residential neighborhoods.'' On March 30, he said, quote: ``We know where they are. They're in the area around Tikrit and Baghdad and east, west, south and north somewhat.''

   The Administration also continued to insist that the threat was imminent--a claim that served to counter arguments that the United Nations should be given more time. On February 6, the day after Secretary of State Powell made his presentation to the UN, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld made an appeal for immediate action. ``Why now?'' he asked. ``The answer is that every week that goes by, his weapons of mass destruction programs become more mature.'' That same day, Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz stated, quote: ``Connections with terrorists, which go back decades, and which started some 10 years ago with al Qaeda, are growing every day.''

   Finally, on March 16, the day before President Bush's ultimatum to Saddam Hussein, Vice President CHENEY went beyond claims that Iraq had the intent to produce nuclear weapons, and even beyond the claims that Iraq was seeking centrifuge equipment or uranium. Rather, the vice president stated flatly, quote: ``We believe he has, in fact, reconstituted nuclear weapons.'' This assertion, which the vice president has recently acknowledged was a misstatement, was not corrected. Instead, it was allowed to stand as nearly the final word on why we were going to war.

   Questions surrounding the Administration's use of intelligence extend beyond public statements, to include reports to and testimony before Congress. One example of unsubstantiated reporting was the January 20 report to Congress, mandated by the use of force resolution, that cited Iraq's failure to declare its, quote: ``attempts to acquire uranium and the means to enrich it''--the same unsubstantiated claim made in the President's State of the Union address.

   This commission would be authorized to examine other intelligence issues related to Iraq, as well. The Administration made claims related to weapons delivery systems, including President Bush's assertion on October 7 that, quote: ``Iraq has a growing fleet of manned and unmanned aerial vehicles that could be used to disperse chemical or biological weapons across broad areas,'' and that Iraq could use them for, quote: ``missions targeting the United States.'' There has never been evidence that Iraq had UAVs with ranges of thousands of miles.

   Administration officials made claims related to the occupation, including Vice President CHENEY's March 16 assertion that, quote: ``I really do believe that

   we will be greeted as liberators,'' and Deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitz's November 17 analogy to, quote: ``post-liberation France.''

   The Administration also downplayed the costs of the occupation. Despite White House economic advisor Lawrence Lindsey's estimate that the occupation would cost between $100 and $200 billion--an estimate for which he was apparently fired--Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld on January 19 put the figure at, quote: ``something under $50 billion,'' On February 27, Deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitiz stated that, quote: ``there's a lot of money there, and to assume that we're going to pay for it is just wrong.'' And, on March 27, Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz stated, quote: ``We're dealing with a country that can really finance its own reconstruction, and relatively soon.''

   The independent commission I propose would be authorized to examine the relationship between policy makers and the intelligence community. Were members of the intelligence community pressured to produce analyses that conformed to the Administration's policies? Did Administration officials seek to bypass the normal analysis process by cherry-picking bits of intelligence that suited their agenda, through the Office of Special Plans in the Department of Defense or through other special or ad hoc arrangements? Did the Administration base its analyses on foreign intelligence sources of dubious credibility? These questions must be answered, and corrective measures undertaken, if our intelligence community is to be as effective and objective as we need it to be.

   Perhaps the most egregious undermining, indeed betrayal, of the intelligence community was the identification by senior Administration officials of a covert CIA operative. The operative is the spouse of a person who has been called a national hero by President George H.W. Bush but who questioned the current Administration's statements regarding Iraq. The leak of this operative's identity sent an implicit warning to others in the intelligence community who might disagree with the Administration's positions. It potentially endanged the life of the operative and those with whom the operative worked. And it rendered the operative's skills, experience and sources permanently useless, thus wasting precisely the kind of intelligence asset that the United States so desperately needs right now.

   The purpose of this commission is to identify ways in which we can learn from past mistakes and thus improve our collection, analysis, reporting, use and dissemination of intelligence. The commission's members, who will come from both parties, will be prominent Americans with experience in intelligence, the armed forces and other relevant areas. Their work will build on relevant Congressional and other investigations.

    The commission, through an objective, independent, highly professional examination process, will help depoliticize an extremely complicated and sensitive topic. By reviewing intelligence related to Iraq beginning in 1998, it will draw conclusions about the use of intelligence by a Democratic as well as Republican Administration. And by reporting its recommendations directly to the President and to Congress, it will serve as a valuable resource outside the context of open political debate. In this respect, I disagree with the Chairman of the Intelligence Committee who has stated that the full Congress and the public could ``decide for themselves whether the intelligence was accurately represented by government officials.''

    This issue is far too serious to simply ignore. Over one hundred thousand brave Americans are currently serving

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in Iraq, facing challenges that require accurate and objective intelligence. We have an obligation to pursue every opportunity to improve that intelligence. Meanwhile, the United States faces other threats--from despotic regimes with nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, from terrorism, and from the horrible possibility that terrorists could acquire these weapons. Our ability to confront these threats requires that our intelligence be accurate and objective. And, as we seek to enlist our friends and allies in our efforts to address these common threats, we must ensure that our intelligence is credible.

    Unless we identify and correct the mistakes of the past, we will not be safer.

    I ask unanimous consent that the text of the legislation be printed in the Record.

    There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

   S. 1946

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

   SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Independent Iraq Intelligence Commission Act''.

   SEC. 2. ESTABLISHMENT OF COMMISSION.

    There is established the National Commission on Iraq Intelligence (in this Act referred to as the ``Commission'').

   SEC. 3. PURPOSES.

    The purposes of the Commission are as follows:

    (1) To examine and evaluate the performance of the United States intelligence community with respect to the collection of intelligence, and the quality of intelligence obtained, on the weapons of mass destruction and related delivery systems capabilities of Iraq in the period from 1998 until the conclusion of military operations against Iraq under Operation Iraqi Freedom.

    (2) To examine and evaluate the performance of the United States intelligence community with respect to the collection of intelligence, and the quality of intelligence obtained, on the connections and support, if any, of Iraq with and for the plans and intentions of terrorist groups to attack the United States or United States interests abroad during the period referred to in paragraph (1).

    (3) To examine and evaluate the performance of the United States intelligence community with respect to the collection of intelligence, and the quality of intelligence obtained, during and after the period referred to in paragraph (1), on matters relating to--

    (A) the conduct of military and intelligence operations against Iraq;

    (B) the search for and securing of weapons of mass destruction, related delivery systems capabilities, and conventional weapons in Iraq; and

    (C) the military, political, and economic aspects of the occupation of Iraq.

    (4) To examine and evaluate the quality of the analysis by the United States intelligence community of the available intelligence related to the matters referred to in paragraphs (1) through (3), including intelligence from foreign intelligence services, that served as a basis during the period referred to in paragraph (1) for--

    (A) reports, testimony, and presentations to policymakers in the Executive Branch and Congress, and to United Nations bodies and other consumers; and

    (B) assessments that were used or disseminated by the Executive Branch.

    (5) To examine and evaluate the effect, if any, on the United States intelligence community of the actions of Executive Branch officials regarding the collection, analysis, and reporting on intelligence matters referred to in paragraphs (1) through (3).

    (6) To examine and evaluate the relevant facts and circumstances relating to the use and dissemination by Executive Branch officials of intelligence and intelligence analyses underlying assessment of intelligence matters referred to in paragraphs (1) through (3) during the period referred to in paragraph (1), including assessments contained in public speeches, statements, and interviews, reports to and testimony before Congress, and communications with and reports and presentations to United Nations bodies.

    (7) To build on the investigations of other entities, and avoid unnecessary duplication, by reviewing the work, findings, conclusions, and recommendations of other Executive Branch, Congressional, or independent commission investigations into the collection, analysis, reporting, use, and dissemination of intelligence related to Iraq by the United States.

    (8) Based on the examinations and evaluations under paragraphs (1) through (6) and the work, findings, conclusions, and recommendations of other investigations referred to in paragraph (7), to identify corrective measures to improve the collection, analysis, reporting, use, and dissemination of intelligence by the Executive Branch, and to report to the President and Congress on the examinations, evaluations, findings, and conclusions of the Commission and on the recommendations of the Commission with respect to such corrective measures.

   SEC. 4. COMPOSITION OF COMMISSION.

    (a) MEMBERS.--The Commission shall be composed of 10 members, of whom--

    (1) 1 member shall be appointed by the President, who shall serve as co-chairman of the Commission;

    (2) 1 member shall be appointed by the leader of the Senate (majority or minority leader, as the case may be) of the Democratic Party, in consultation with the leader of the House of Representatives (majority or minority leader, as the case may be) of the Democratic Party, who shall serve as co-chairman of the Commission;

    (3) 2 members shall be appointed by the senior member of the Senate leadership of the Democratic Party;

    (4) 2 members shall be appointed by the senior member of the leadership of the House of Representatives of the Republican Party;

    (5) 2 members shall be appointed by the senior member of the Senate leadership of the Republican Party; and

    (6) 2 members shall be appointed by the senior member of the leadership of the House of Representatives of the Democratic Party.

    (b) QUALIFICATIONS; INITIAL MEETING.--

    (1) POLITICAL PARTY AFFILIATION.--Not more than 5 members of the Commission shall be from the same political party.

    (2) NONGOVERNMENTAL APPOINTEES.--An individual appointed to the Commission may not be an officer or employee of the Federal Government or any State or local government.

    (3) OTHER QUALIFICATIONS.--It is the sense of Congress that individuals appointed to the Commission should be prominent United States citizens, with national recognition and significant depth of experience in such professions as governmental service, the armed services, law, intelligence, and foreign affairs.

    (4) DEADLINE FOR APPOINTMENT.--All members of the Commission shall be appointed not later than one month after the date of the enactment of this Act.

    (5) INITIAL MEETING.--The Commission shall meet and begin the operations of the Commission as soon as practicable.

    (c) QUORUM; VACANCIES.--After its initial meeting, the Commission shall meet upon the joint call of the co-chairmen or a majority of its members. Six members of the Commission shall constitute a quorum. Any vacancy in the Commission shall not affect its powers, but shall be filled in the same manner in which the original appointment was made.

   SEC. 5. FUNCTIONS OF COMMISSION.

    The functions of the Commission are--

    (1) to conduct an investigation into the relevant facts and circumstances relating to the collection, analysis, reporting, use, and dissemination by the United States intelligence community and others in the Executive Branch of intelligence relating to Iraq and Operation Iraqi Freedom, including--

    (A) an examination and evaluation of the quantity and quality of United States intelligence underlying assessments made during the period referred to in section 3(1) of--

    (i) weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems capabilities of Iraq;

    (ii) connections and support, if any, of Iraq with and for the plans and intentions of terrorist groups to attack the United States or United States interests abroad;

    (B) an examination and evaluation of the quantity and quality of United States intelligence underlying assessments made during after the period referred to in section 3(1) on intelligence matters relating to--

    (i) the conduct of military and intelligence operations against Iraq;

    (ii) the search for and securing of weapons of mass destruction, related delivery systems capabilites, and conventional weapons in Iraq; and

    (iii) the military, political, and economic aspects of the occupation of Iraq;

    (C) an examination and evaluation regarding whether the analytical judgments in the assessments referred to in subparagraphs (A) and (B) were thorough, timely, objective, independent, and reasonable, based upon intelligence collection;

    (D) an examination and evaluation of the accuracy of the assessments referred to in subparagraphs (A) and (B) when compared with the results of the investigative efforts of the Iraq Survey Group and other relevant Executive Branch and Congressional entities, and with relevant assessments of the United Nations and other multilateral bodies, foreign governments, nongovernmental organizations, and other institutions and individuals;

    (E) an examination and evaluation of the quality of the intelligence on Iraq that was provided to the United States intelligence community and Executive Branch policymakers, including by foreign intelligence services, that served as a basis during the period referred to in section 3(1) for--

    (i) reports, testimony, and presentations to policymakers in the Executive Branch and Congress, and to United Nations bodies and other consumers; and

    (ii) assessments that were used or disseminated by the Executive Branch;

    (F) a determination of the extent, if any, to which elements of the United States intelligence community were inappropriately pressured by members of the Executive Branch to produce intelligence consistent with such members policy objectives, and of the extent, if any, to which intelligence was manipulated or misrepresented by members of the Executive Branch or elements under their control;

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    (G) an assessment of the extent to which Congress was kept fully and currently informed about intelligence related to Iraq and Operation Iraqi Freedom;

    (H) a determination of the extent to which the intelligence of the United States intelligence community, and of the United States Armed Forces and coalition forces, were sufficiently accurate, thorough, timely, objective, and independent to prepare such forces to conduct effective military and intelligence operations against Iraq, including the search for and securing of weapons of mass destruction and conventional weapons in Iraq, and to prepare such forces and other United States and coalition entities to successfully carry out the military, political, and economic aspects of the occupation of Iraq; and

    (I) an examination, evaluation, and assessment of such other related facts and circumstances that the Commission considers appropriate;

    (2) to identify, review, and evaluate the lessons learned from issues related to the collection, analysis, reporting, use, and dissemination of intelligence relating to Iraq and Operation Iraqi Freedom;

    (3) to investigate the facts and circumstances relating to disclosures, if any, by Executive Branch officials of the identify of a covert Central Intelligence Agency official; and

    (4) to submit to the President and Congress the reports provided for by section 11.

   SEC. 6. POWERS OF COMMISSION.

    (a) IN GENERAL.--

    (1) HEARINGS AND EVIDENCE.--The Commission or, on the authority of the Commission, any subcommittee or member thereof, may, for the purpose of carrying out this Act--

    (A) hold such hearings and sit and act at such times and places, take such testimony, receive such evidence, administer such oaths; and

    (B) subject to paragraph (2)(A), require, by subpoena or otherwise, the attendance and testimony of such witnesses and the production of such books, records, correspondence, memoranda, papers, and documents, as the Commission or such designated subcommittee or designated member may determine advisable.

    (2) SUBPOENAS.--

    (A) ISSUANCE.--

    (i) IN GENERAL.--A subpoena may be issued under this subsection only--

    (I) by the joint agreement of the co-chairmen; or

    (II) by the affirmative vote of 5 members of the Commission.

    (ii) SIGNATURE.--Subject to clause (i), subpoenas issued under this subsection may be issued under the signature of a co-chairman or any member designated by 5 members of the Commission, and may be served by any person designated by a co-chairman or by a member designated by 5 members of the Commission.

    (B) ENFORCEMENT.--

    (i) IN GENERAL.--In the case of contumacy or failure to obey a subpoena issued under subsection (a), the United States district court for the judicial district in which the subpoenaed person resides, is served, or may be found, or where the subpoena is returnable, may issue an order requiring such person to appear at any designated place to testify or to produce documentary or other evidence. Any failure to obey the order of the court may be punished by the court as a contempt of that court.

    (ii) ADDITIONAL ENFORCEMENT.--In the case of any failure of any witness to comply with any subpoena or to testify when summoned under authority of this section, the Commission may certify a statement of fact constituting such failure to the appropriate United States attorney, who may bring the matter before the grand jury for its action, under the same statutory authority and procedures as if the United States attorney had received a certification under sections 102 through 104 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (2 U.S.C. 192 through 194).

    (b) CONTRACTING.--The Commission may, to such extent and in such amounts as are provided in appropriation Acts, enter into contracts to enable the Commission to discharge its duties under this Act.

    (c) INFORMATION FROM FEDERAL AGENCIES.--

    (1) IN GENERAL.--The Commission may secure directly from any executive department, bureau, agency, board, commission, office, independent establishment, or instrumentality of the Government, information, suggestions, estimates, and statistics for the purposes of this Act. Each department, bureau, agency, board, commission, office, independent establishment, or instrumentality shall, to the extent authorized by law, furnish such information, suggestions, estimates, and statistics directly to the Commission, upon request made by a co-chairman, the chairman or co-chairman of any subcommittee created by 5 members of the Commission, or any member designated by 5 members of the Commission.

    (2) RECEIPT, HANDLING, STORAGE, AND DISSEMINATION.--Information shall only be received, handled, stored, and disseminated by members of the Commission and its staff consistent with all applicable statutes, regulations, and Executive orders.

    (d) ASSISTANCE FROM FEDERAL AGENCIES.--

    (1) GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION.--The Administrator of General Services shall provide to the Commission on a reimbursable basis administrative support and other services for the performance of the Commission's functions.

    (2) OTHER DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES.--In addition to the assistance prescribed in paragraph (1), departments and agencies of the United States may provide to the Commission such services, funds, facilities, staff, and other support services as they may determine advisable and as may be authorized by law.

    (e) GIFTS.--The Commission may accept, use, and dispose of gifts or donations of services or property.

    (f) POSTAL SERVICES.--The Commission may use the United States mails in the same manner and under the same conditions as departments and agencies of the United States.

   SEC. 7. NONAPPLICABILITY OF FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ACT.

    (a) IN GENERAL.--The Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.) shall not apply to the Commission.

    (b) PUBLIC MEETINGS AND RELEASE OF PUBLIC VERSIONS OF REPORTS.--The Commission shall--

    (1) hold public hearings and meetings to the extent appropriate; and

    (2) release public versions of the reports provided for by subsections (a) and (b) of section 11.

    (c) PUBLIC HEARINGS.--Any public hearings of the Commission shall be conducted in a manner consistent with the protection of information provided to or developed for or by the Commission as required by any applicable statute, regulation, or Executive order.

   SEC. 8. STAFF OF COMMISSION.

    (a) IN GENERAL.--

    (1) APPOINTMENT AND COMPENSATION.--The co-chairmen, acting jointly and in accordance with rules agreed upon by the Commission, may appoint and fix the compensation of a staff director and such other personnel as may be necessary to enable the Commission to carry out its functions, without regard to the provisions of title 5, United States Code, governing appointments in the competitive service, and without regard to the provisions of chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of such title relating to classification and General Schedule pay rates, except that no rate of pay fixed under this subsection may exceed the equivalent of that payable for a position at level V of the Executive Schedule under section 5316 of title 5, United States Code.

    (2) PERSONNEL AS FEDERAL EMPLOYEES.--

    (A) IN GENERAL.--The executive director and any personnel of the Commission who are employees shall be employees under section 2105 of title 5, United States Code, for purposes of chapters 63, 81, 83, 84, 85, 87, 89, and 90 of that title.

    (B) MEMBERS OF COMMISSION.--Subparagraph (A) shall not be construed to apply to members of the Commission.

    (b) DETAILEES.--Any Federal Government employee may be detailed to the Commission without reimbursement from the Commission, and such detailee shall retain the rights, status, and privileges of his or her regular employment without interruption.

    (c) CONSULTANT SERVICES.--The Commission may procure the services of experts and consultants in accordance with section 3109 of title 5, United States Code, but at rates not to exceed the daily rate paid a person occupying a position at level IV of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of title 5, United States Code.

   SEC. 9. COMPENSATION AND TRAVEL EXPENSES.

    (a) COMPENSATION.--Each member of the Commission may be compensated at not to exceed the daily equivalent of the annual rate of basic pay in effect for a position at level IV of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of title 5, United States Code, for each day during which that member is engaged in the actual performance of the duties of the Commission.

    (b) TRAVEL EXPENSES.--While away from their homes or regular places of business in the performance of services for the Commission, members of the Commission shall be allowed travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, in the same manner as persons employed intermittently in the Government service are allowed expenses under section 5703(b) of title 5, United States Code.

   SEC. 10. SECURITY CLEARANCES FOR COMMISSION MEMBERS AND STAFF.

    The appropriate Federal agencies or departments shall cooperate with the Commission in expeditiously providing to the Commission members and staff appropriate security clearances to the extent possible pursuant to existing procedures and requirements, except that no person shall be provided with access to classified information under this Act without the appropriate security clearances.

   SEC. 11. REPORTS OF COMMISSION; TERMINATION.

    (a) INTERIM REPORTS.--The Commission may submit to the President and Congress interim reports containing such examinations, evaluations, findings, and conclusions of the Commission, and such recommendations with respect to corrective measures (including changes in policies, practices, organizational structures, and arrangements), as have been agreed to by a majority of Commission members.

    (b) FINAL REPORT.--Not later than 18 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Commission shall submit to the President and Congress a final report containing such examinations, evaluations, findings, and conclusions of the Commission, and such recommendations with respect to corrective measures (including changes in

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policies, practices, organizational structures, and arrangements), as have been agreed to by a majority of Commission members.

    (c) TERMINATION.--

    (1) IN GENERAL.--The Commission, and all the authorities of this Act, shall terminate 60 days after the date on which the final report is submitted under subsection (b).

    (2) ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIVITIES BEFORE TERMINATION.--The Commission may use the 60-day period referred to in paragraph (1) for the purpose of concluding its activities, including providing testimony to committees of Congress concerning its reports and disseminating the final report.

   SEC. 12. FUNDING.

    (a) IN GENERAL.--Of the amounts authorized to be appropriated for the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government for fiscal year 2004, $15,000,000 shall be available for transfer to the Commission for purposes of the activities of the Commission under this Act.

    (b) DURATION OF AVAILABILITY.--Amounts made available to the Commission under subsection (a) shall remain available until the termination of the Commission.


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