Congressional Record Weekly UpdateDecember 8-9, 2003Return to the Congressional Report Weekly. 1A) Additional Protocol Implementation Act of 2003 By Mr. LUGAR: S. 1987. A bill to implement the obligations of the United States under the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the United States of America and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United States of America, known as ``the Additional Protocol'' signed by the United States on June 12, 1998; to the Committee on Foreign Relations. Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, at the request of the administration, I am pleased to introduce the Additional Protocol Implementation Act of 2003. This important legislation is needed to implement the provisions of the Protocol to the Agreement of the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA, Regarding Safeguards in the United States. The United States signed the Additional Protocol in Vienna on June 12, 1998. President Bush submitted the Additional Protocol to the Senate on May 9, 2002. The State Department sent the implementing legislation to us on November 19, 2003, and asked that it be considered in conjunction with the Senate's advice and consent on the Protocol. The adoption of this agreement is an important step in demonstrating U.S. leadership in the fight against the spread of nuclear weapons. The Additional Protocol will provide the United States and the IAEA with another tool as we attempt to secure broader inspection rights in non-nuclear-weapon states that are parties to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, NPT. When the Committee on Foreign Relations reported out the NPT in 1968, it noted that ``the treaty's fundamental purpose is to slow the spread of nuclear weapons by prohibiting the nuclear weapon states which are party to the treaty from transferring nuclear weapons to others, and by barring the non-nuclear weapon countries from receiving, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring nuclear weapons.'' Since the Senate ratified the NPT, we have seen 188 states join the United States in approving the treaty. But recently we also have seen a disturbing increase in the global availability of nuclear materials and reprocessing and enrichment technology. To ensure that these materials and technologies are devoted only to peaceful purposes, the IAEA must have the power to conduct intrusive inspections at almost any location in a non-nuclear-weapon state to verify state parties' commitments under the NPT. The world community has learned that existing safeguard arrangements in non-nuclear-weapon states do not provide the IAEA with a complete and accurate picture of possible nuclear weapons-related activities. It is critical that the IAEA have the ability to expand the scope of its activities in states that pose a potential proliferation threat. At this point, the only means at the IAEA's disposal, beyond existing safeguards arrangements, is the Model Additional Protocol. The United States, as a declared nuclear-weapon state party to the NPT, may exclude the application of IAEA safeguards on its nuclear activities. Under the negotiated Additional Protocol, the United States also has the right to exclude activities and sites of direct national security significance in accordance with its National Security exclusion. This provision is crucial to U.S. acceptance of the Additional Protocol and provides a basis for the protection of U.S. nuclear weapons-related activities, sites, and materials as a declared nuclear power. The Additional Protocol does not contain any new arms control or disarmament obligations for the United States. While there are increased rights granted to the IAEA for the conduct of inspections in the United States, the administration has assured the committee that the likelihood of an inspection occurring in the United States is very low. Nevertheless, should an inspection under the Additional Protocol be potentially harmful to U.S. national security interests, the United States has the right, through the National Security Exclusion, to prevent such an inspection. The Committee on Foreign Relations will hold hearings early next year to consider the Additional Protocol. I am confident the Committee will draft a resolution of ratification that will enjoy the support of the senate. Ratification of this treaty and passage of its implementing legislation would be an important demonstration of the U.S. commitment to vigorous and expansive authority for the IAEA in non-nuclear-weapon states. I am pleased to introduce this legislation today as a statement of the Committee's strong support for aggressive verification capabilities in the global fight against the spread of weapons of mass destruction. I look forward to working closely with my friend, Senator HATCH, Chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary, to construct legislation that protects U.S. national security interests, while strengthening the ability of the IAEA to discover illegal nuclear weapons activities. the package I send to the desk today contains a letter from the Department of State, the administration's implementing legislation, and a section-by-section analysis, all submitted by the administration. I ask unanimous consent that the referenced letter and analysis be printed in the RECORD. There being no objection, the additional material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Washington, DC. DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: On behalf of the President, I am pleased to submit for consideration the Administration's recommended text for legislation to implement the Protocol Additional to the Agreement Between the United States of America and the International Atomic Energy Agency for Application of Safeguards in the United States of America (U.S.-IAEA Additional Protocol). The U.S.-IAEA Additional Protocol, signed in Vienna on June 12, 1998, is a bilateral treaty that supplements and amends the Agency verification arrangements under the existing Agreement Between the United States of America and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United States of America of November 18, 1977 (the ``Voluntary Offer''), which entered into force on December 9, 1980. The U.S.-IAEA Additional Protocol contains a number of provisions that require implementing legislation to give them effect within the United States. These include: Declarations of U.S. civil nuclear activities and related industry; Restrictions on disclosure of information; and International inspections of locations in the United States. The President, in his letter of transmission dated May 9, 2002, stated that the U.S.-IAEA ``Additional Protocol is in the best interests of the United States. Our acceptance of this agreement will sustain our longstanding record of voluntary acceptance of nuclear safeguards and greatly strengthen our ability to promote universal adoption of the [Page: S16125] Model Protocol, a central goal of my nuclear nonproliferation policy. Widespread acceptance of the Protocol will contribute significantly to our nonproliferation objectives as well as strengthen U.S., allied and international security.'' We urge the Senate to give early and favorable consideration to the Protocol and the recommended implementing legislation. The Office of Management and Budget advises that there is no objection to the submission of this proposal and its enactment, is in accord with the President's program. We hope this information and the enclosed recommended legislation and sectional analysis are helpful. Please let us know if we can be of further assistance. Sincerely, Assistant Secretary, -- Section-by-Section Analysis of the Proposed Additional Protocol to the U.S.-IAEA Safeguards Agreement Implementation Act of 2003 OVERVIEW The Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the United States of America and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for the Application of Safeguards in the United States of America (the Additional Protocol) contains a number of provisions that require legislation to give them effect within the United States. These include provisions on the submission to the United States Government of civil nuclear and nuclear-related information by entities identified in Article 2 of the Additional Protocol, and on civil and criminal penalties for failure of such entities to keep or provide such information. The proposed legislation also sets forth procedures for inspections, or ``complementary access,'' by the IAEA at U.S. locations under the Additional Protocol. The proposed Additional Protocol to the U.S.-IAEA Safeguards Agreement Implementation Act (the Act) contains five miscellaneous sections and six titles. The five miscellaneous sections concern the short title of the Act, the table of contents, Congressional findings, definitions, and a severability clause. Title I provides specific authority for the President to implement and carry out the Act and the Additional Protocol through directing the issuance of necessary regulations. Title II authorizes complementary access at U.S. locations consistent with the Act, and establishes the terms upon which such access may take place. For example, it addresses the notice that must be given to the owner or operator of the inspected location, and the procedures to be followed for seeking access--including obtaining an administrative search warrant where necessary. Title III restricts disclosure of certain information provided pursuant to the Act or the Additional Protocol. Title IV makes it illegal for entities willfully to fail to report information required by regulations pursuant to the Act, and Title V provides for criminal and civil penalties for such violations. Finally, Title VI authorizes appropriation of funds for the Agencies required to carry out responsibilities under the Act. MISCELLANEOUS SECTIONS The first part of the Act contains five miscellaneous sections: the short title of the Act, the table of contents, Congressional findings, definitions, and a severability clause. The first two sections are standard provisions. The third section contains seven Congressional findings, which recognize the threat posed by nuclear proliferation, the importance of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the urgency of strengthening its safeguards system, and the need to implement the U.S.-IAEA Additional Protocol as a means of encouraging other NPT State Parties to accept stricter verification measures. The fourth section provides definitions of key terms as they are used in the Act. In many instances, the same definitions appear in the Additional Protocol, and are therefore cross-referenced. Finally, the fifth section provides that, if any provision of the Act is held invalid, the remainder of the Act shall remain in force. The Administration believes that the Additional Protocol and the Act are fully consistent with the U.S. Constitution, but has included this section as a matter of prudence. TITLE I--AUTHORIZATION Title I authorizes the President to implement and carry out the provisions of the Act and the Additional Protocol. This is to be accomplished through an Executive Order designating Agencies to promulgate regulations requiring, inter alia, submission to the United States Government of information specified under Article 2 of the Additional Protocol. This information is necessary for the United States to fulfill its Treaty obligation to provide the IAEA with a broad declaration of its civil nuclear and nuclear-related activities. While the Agencies most likely to issue or amend such regulations are identified in Section 101(a) of the Act, this list is not exclusive. TITLE II--COMPLEMENTARY ACCESS Title II sets forth the terms under which complementary access may occur in the United States. Section 201 of the Act makes clear that the IAEA may not conduct complementary access in the United States without the authorization, in accordance with the Act, of the United States Government. It further directs that certain U.S. agencies may not participate in complementary access. These agencies, including the Environmental Protection Agency and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, are excluded because their employees may detect violations of regulatory schemes wholly unrelated to the Additional Protocol. Section 201 further requires the number of U.S. representatives be kept to a minimum. Section 202 addresses procedures for complementary access. For example, Section 202(b) sets forth the requirement for the United States Government to provide ``actual written notice'' of a complementary access request, as soon as possible, to the owner, operator, occupant or agent in charge of the location to be inspected. The notice must contain all appropriate information provided by the IAEA concerning the purpose of the access request, the basis for selection of the location, the activities it intends to carry out, the time and duration of the access, and the identities of inspectors. In addition, Section 202(c) requires IAEA and U.S. personnel participating in the complementary access to show their credentials prior to gaining entry to the inspected location. Section 202(d)(1) states the general rule that IAEA inspectors may conduct all activities specified under Article 6 of the Additional Protocol for the type of location being inspected. However, there are several exceptions to this rule. First, a warrant issued authorizing complementary access at a location may restrict the activities that inspectors may conduct. Second, as indicated in 202(d)(1), the United States Government has certain rights under the Additional Protocol to limit such access. In addition to its right under Article 1(b) of the Protocol to deny IAEA access to activities with direct national security significance or to location or information associated with such activities, the United States may manage access in connection with such activities, locations or information. These rights are unilateral and absolute; they are not subject to challenge by or negotiation with the IAEA. Furthermore, Article 7 of the Additional Protocol provides for managed access, under arrangements with the IAEA, to prevent the dissemination of proliferation sensitive information, to meet safety or physical protection requirements, or to protect proprietary or commercially sensitive information. Third, Section 202(d)(2) lists a series of items that are specifically excluded from IAEA access. This third set of exceptions, which are mainly directed at protecting commercial information, may not however be enforced if the Additional Protocol requires such disclosure. Section 202(e) requires that all persons participating in complementary access, including U.S. representatives, observe all environmental, health, safety and security regulations applicable for the inspected location. Section 203 provides the legal framework for IAEA inspectors to gain complementary access to U.S. locations under the Additional Protocol. Section 203(a) sets forth three grounds for such access: warrantless access, where the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution does not require a warrant; consent to the access by the owner/operator of the location; or, where necessary, obtaining an administrative search warrant. Section 203(a)(2) makes clear that the legislation is intended to impose no warrant requirement beyond that which is required by the Fourth Amendment. Where such a warrant requirement exists, Section 203(a)(1) directs the United States Government first to seek consent to access from the location's owner or operator. The remainder of Section 203 addresses the requirements for obtaining an administrative search warrant, and what such a warrant should contain. Section 203(b)(1) states that the United States Government shall provide to the judge all appropriate information it has received from the IAEA regarding its basis for selecting a particular location for complementary access. A ``judge of the United States'' is defined by the Act to mean a judge or magistrate judge of a district court of the United States. In addition, Section 203(b)(2) requires the United States to submit to the judge a more detailed affidavit showing, among other things, that the Additional Protocol is in force in the United States, applicable to the location to be inspected, and that the complementary access requested is consistent with the provisions of the Additional Protocol, including Article 4 regarding the purpose of the access, and Article 6 regarding its scope. The affidavit must also indicate the anticipated time and duration of the inspection. Finally, the affidavit must show that the location to be inspected was selected by the IAEA either (i) because there is probable cause, on the basis of specific evidence, to believe that information required to be reported regarding a location pursuant to regulations promulgated under the Act is incorrect or incomplete, and that the location to be accessed contains evidence regarding that violation; or (ii) pursuant to a reasonable general administrative plan developed by the IAEA based upon specific neutral criteria. Selection based on either of these approaches would meet U.S. Constitutional requirements for issuance of a warrant. Section 203 directs that a judge, upon receiving the affidavit, shall promptly issue an administrative search warrant authorizing the requested complementary access. The warrant is to specify the same information as the affidavit, and shall, if known, also include the identities of the IAEA complementary access [Page: S16126] team and accompanying U.S. representatives. TITLE III--CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION Title III of the proposed implementing legislation restricts the disclosure of information provided to the United States Government, or to its contractor personnel, pursuant to the Act or the Additional Protocol. For example, Section 301(a) exempts from the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) disclosure information obtained by the United States Government in implementing the provisions of the Additional Protocol. Thus, information reported to the Government by entities covered by Article 2 of the Additional Protocol, as required by regulation, is not subject to release under the FOIA. TITLE IV--RECORDKEEPING Title IV of the proposed implementing legislation prohibits the willful failure of any person to maintain records or submit reports to the United States Government as required by regulations issued under Section 101 of the Act. The prohibitions of Title IV are necessary to implement the Additional Protocol, as the United States is dependent on such reporting to meet its Treaty obligations. A person is defined by the Act very broadly to ensure that all possible entities within the United States are covered. TITLE V--ENFORCEMENT Title V of the proposed implementing legislation provides for both civil and criminal penalties for failure to meet the recordkeeping and reporting requirements of Title IV. Violators shall be subject to imprisonment for not more than five years, criminal fines, and civil penalties up to $25,000 per violation. While the Agency issuing the applicable regulations is responsible for their enforcement, an entity subject to civil penalty under this Title may seek judicial review. Title V also provides United States district courts with jurisdiction to specifically enforce Agency orders, either by restraining or compelling action so as to avoid a violation of Title IV. TITLE VI--AUTHORIZATION OF FUNDS Title VI of the proposed legislation authorizes the appropriation of such sums as necessary to carry out the purpose of the Act.
CHEM/ BIO AND WMD TERRORISM ************************************ 3A) Poison Control Center Enhancement and Awareness Act Amendments of 2003
Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, I ask the Chair lay before the Senate a message from the House of Representatives on the bill (S. 686) to provide assistance for poison prevention and to stabilize the funding of regional poison control centers. The Presiding Officer laid before the Senate the following message from the House of Representatives: S. 686 Resolved, That the bill from the Senate (S. 686) entitled ``An Act to provide assistance for poison prevention and to stabilize the funding of regional poison control centers'', do pass with the following amendment: Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert: SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the ``Poison Control Center Enhancement and Awareness Act Amendments of 2003''. SEC. 2. FINDINGS. The Congress finds the following: (1) Poison control centers are our Nation's primary defense against injury and deaths from poisoning. Twenty-four hours a day, the general public as well as health care practitioners contact their local poison centers for help in diagnosing and treating victims of poisoning and other toxic exposures. (2) Poisoning is the third most common form of unintentional death in the United States. In any given year, there will be between 2,000,000 and 4,000,000 poison exposures. More than 50 percent of these exposures will involve children under the age of 6 who are exposed to toxic substances in their home. Poisoning accounts for 285,000 hospitalizations, 1,200,000 days of acute hospital care, and 13,000 fatalities annually. (3) Stabilizing the funding structure and increasing accessibility to poison control centers will promote the utilization of poison control centers, and reduce the inappropriate use of emergency medical services and other more costly health care services. (4) The tragic events of September 11, 2001, and the anthrax cases of October 2001, have dramatically changed our Nation. During this time period, poison centers in many areas of the country were answering thousands of additional calls from concerned residents. Many poison centers were relied upon as a source for accurate medical information about the disease and the complications resulting from prophylactic antibiotic therapy. (5) The 2001 Presidential Task Force on Citizen Preparedness in the War on Terrorism recommended that the Poison Control Centers be used as a source of public information and public education regarding potential biological, chemical, and nuclear domestic terrorism. (6) The increased demand placed upon poison centers to provide emergency information in the event of a terrorist event involving a biological, chemical, or nuclear toxin will dramatically increase call volume. SEC. 3. AMENDMENT TO PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE ACT. Title XII of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 300d et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following: ``Part G--Poison Control ``SEC. 1271. MAINTENANCE OF A NATIONAL TOLL-FREE NUMBER. ``(a) IN GENERAL.--The Secretary shall provide coordination and assistance to regional poison control centers for the establishment of a nationwide toll-free phone number to be used to access such centers. ``(b) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.--Nothing in this section shall be construed as prohibiting the establishment or continued operation of any privately funded nationwide toll-free phone number used to provide advice and other assistance for poisonings or accidental exposures. ``(c) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.--There is authorized to be appropriated to carry out this section $2,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2000 through 2009. Funds appropriated under this subsection shall not be used to fund any toll-free phone number described in subsection (b). ``SEC. 1272. NATIONWIDE MEDIA CAMPAIGN TO PROMOTE POISON CONTROL CENTER UTILIZATION. ``(a) IN GENERAL.--The Secretary shall establish a national media campaign to educate the public and health care providers about poison prevention and the availability of poison control resources in local communities and to conduct advertising campaigns concerning the nationwide toll-free number established under section 1271. ``(b) CONTRACT WITH ENTITY.--The Secretary may carry out subsection (a) by entering into contracts with 1 or more nationally recognized media firms for the development and distribution of monthly television, radio, and newspaper public service announcements. ``(c) EVALUATION.--The Secretary shall-- ``(1) establish baseline measures and benchmarks to quantitatively evaluate the impact of the nationwide media campaign established under this section; and ``(2) prepare and submit to the appropriate congressional committees an evaluation of the nationwide media campaign on an annual basis. ``(d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.--There are authorized to be appropriated to carry out this section $600,000 for each of fiscal years 2000 through 2005 and such sums as may be necessary for each of fiscal years 2006 through 2009. ``SEC. 1273. MAINTENANCE OF THE POISON CONTROL CENTER GRANT PROGRAM. ``(a) REGIONAL POISON CONTROL CENTERS.--The Secretary shall award grants to certified regional poison control centers for the purposes of achieving the financial stability of such centers, and for preventing and providing treatment recommendations for poisonings. ``(b) OTHER IMPROVEMENTS.--The Secretary shall also use amounts received under this section to-- ``(1) develop standardized poison prevention and poison control promotion programs; ``(2) develop standard patient management guidelines for commonly encountered toxic exposures; ``(3) improve and expand the poison control data collection systems, including, at the Secretary's discretion, by assisting the poison control centers to improve data collection activities; ``(4) improve national toxic exposure surveillance by enhancing activities at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry; ``(5) expand the toxicologic expertise within poison control centers; and ``(6) improve the capacity of poison control centers to answer high volumes of calls during times of national crisis. ``(c) CERTIFICATION.--Except as provided in subsection (d), the Secretary may make a grant to a center under subsection (a) only if-- ``(1) the center has been certified by a professional organization in the field of poison control, and the Secretary has approved the organization as having in effect standards for certification that reasonably provide for the protection of the public health with respect to poisoning; or ``(2) the center has been certified by a State government, and the Secretary has approved the State government as having in effect standards for certification that reasonably provide for the protection of the public health with respect to poisoning. ``(d) WAIVER OF CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS.-- ``(1) IN GENERAL.--The Secretary may grant a waiver of the certification requirement of subsection (c) with respect to a noncertified poison control center or a newly established center that applies for a grant under this section if such center can reasonably demonstrate that the center will obtain such a certification within a reasonable period of time as determined appropriate by the Secretary. ``(2) RENEWAL.--The Secretary may renew a waiver under paragraph (1). ``(3) LIMITATION.--In no instance may the sum of the number of years for a waiver under paragraph (1) and a renewal under paragraph (2) exceed 5 years. The preceding sentence shall take effect as if enacted on February 25, 2000. ``(e) SUPPLEMENT NOT SUPPLANT.--Amounts made available to a poison control center under this section shall be used to supplement and not supplant other Federal, State, or local funds provided for such center. ``(f) MAINTENANCE OF EFFORT.--A poison control center, in utilizing the proceeds of a grant under this section, shall maintain the expenditures of the center for activities of the center at a level that is not less than the level of such expenditures maintained by the center for the fiscal year preceding the fiscal year for which the grant is received. ``(g) MATCHING REQUIREMENT.--The Secretary may impose a matching requirement with respect to amounts provided under a grant under this section if the Secretary determines appropriate. ``(h) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.--There are authorized to be appropriated to carry out this section $25,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2000 through 2004 and $27,500,000 for each of fiscal years 2005 through 2009. ``SEC. 1274. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION. ``Nothing in this part may be construed to ease any restriction in Federal law applicable to the amount or percentage of funds appropriated to carry out this part that may be used to prepare or submit a report.''. SEC. 4. CONFORMING AMENDMENT. The Poison Control Center Enhancement and Awareness Act (42 U.S.C. 14801 et seq.) is hereby repealed. Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate concur in the House amendment, the motion to reconsider be laid upon the table, and that any statements relating to the bill be printed in the RECORD. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
IRAN/INDIA/PAKISTAN AND WMD ********************************** 4A)
Commending India
and Pakistan
SPEECH OF HON. ALCEE
L. HASTINGS OF FLORIDA IN THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES MONDAY, DECEMBER
8, 2003 |