4A)
4B)
The War in Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Mr. Speaker, last night
the President gave his State of the Union address to the Nation and to the
Congress; and he brought up, rather surprisingly, weapons of mass destruction.
The President said that American inspectors have ``identified dozens of weapons
of mass destruction-related program activities'' in
Iraq .
Mr. Speaker, I do not know what a weapons of mass destruction-related
program activity is. I would like to find out. I do know this: it is not weapons
of mass destruction. We have not found weapons of mass destruction in
Iraq . David Kay, the American inspector, has not found them. The
international inspectors did not find them.
Like many Members of this House, I voted in favor of the war in
Iraq . I did so in order to disarm Saddam Hussein of weapons of mass
destruction. I am glad that we have defeated Hussein. I am glad he is in our
custody. We and the Iraqi people are better off with him in custody. He was a
murderous tyrant. But we have not found the weapons of mass destruction, and it
is clear that an extraordinary amount of exaggeration and deception occurred
from the White House on the subject of weapons of mass destruction before we
went to war in order to win congressional support for going to war.
The President talked last night about our international coalition. The
President would like us to believe that we have a broad-based and effective
international coalition in
Iraq to move forward with securing what is still an unstable country and
to move forward with reconstruction. He listed a long number of nations that
have supplied some number of troops to the efforts in
Iraq .
The fact is that well over 90 percent of the troops in
Iraq are American. About 95 percent of the money being spent in
Iraq is American taxpayer dollars, well over $160 billion to date. The
fact is that we did not turn effectively to our traditional and historic allies
and move forward with the international community in order to build a coalition
to defeat Hussein in
Iraq .
The President, when he won his authority to go to war, made a number of
commitments. He said that he would exhaust diplomatic options before going to
war. He did not. He said he would allow the international inspectors the
opportunity to complete their work in
Iraq . He did not. He said he would go to the United Nations and build a
coalition, and he did not. And now the President would still have us believe
that we are on a successful hunt and are turning up weapons of mass destruction
in
Iraq as part of a broad-based coalition in that country, and neither of
those statements is true.
The fact of the matter is, Mr. Speaker, that the arrogance, the
unilateralism, and the cowboy diplomacy of the President and the White House
have made our challenges in
Iraq much harder than they should have been and have made our war on al
Qaeda and terror riskier and harder than it should be.
4C)
Do Not Trivialize Need to Internationalize Iraq
DO NOT TRIVIALIZE NEED TO INTERNATIONALIZE IRAQ
-- (House of Representatives - January 21, 2004)
[Page: H63]
---
The SPEAKER pro tempore.
Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr.
McGovern) is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. McGOVERN. Mr.
Speaker, last night in his State of the Union address to the Nation, President
Bush attempted to deride critics who have called upon him to broaden the
coalition and internationalize the effort to provide security to Iraq and
rebuild that war-torn nation. The President said, ``This particular criticism is
hard to explain to our partners in Britain.'' And then he named 15 other
countries and cited 17 others.
I respect the
contributions that these other nations have made in Iraq, some of which like
Spain, Italy and Japan have also lost sons to the war in Iraq.
[Page: H64]
But let us not be
disingenuous on the subject of our allies in Iraq. With the exception of the
United Kingdom, none are engaged in the arduous combat-related work that
confronts the 130,000 American troops in Iraq who have endured over 500 dead and
thousands of wounded among their ranks. And none carry the financial burden that
the American taxpayer provides for the security of Iraq. President Bush should
not trivialize the need to create a genuine international coalition capable of
sharing the burdens of building a safe, secure and democratic Iraq.
I would like to have
heard President Bush talk about how the United States needs the help, support
and expertise of the United Nations, which has also paid in blood for our Iraq
policy to ensure that the democracy-building and election process in Iraq are
inclusive and successful. I would have liked to have heard President Bush talk
about how the international community could help in the prosecution of Saddam
Hussein so that his trial has credibility both inside and outside Iraq. I would
have liked to have heard just one word from President Bush that indicates that
he gets it, that he understands the United States must work with allies, NATO
and the United Nations in order to secure the manpower and money necessary for a
secure and stable Iraq. Certainly those of us concerned about the resources of
our Federal budget understand this as we prepare to receive another supplemental
spending request for at least $50 billion sometime later this year. That is $50
billion in addition to the more than $120 billion we have already spent so far
on Iraq over the last year.
And, most of all, our
troops on the ground understand this, including the members and families of our
National Guard and Reserves who have served so valiantly, despite open-ended
deployments and equipment shortages. But President Bush simply does not get it
and last night he outlined how he will stay on the same go-it-alone course that
has so alienated the rest of the world, diminished the credibility of U.S.
foreign policy and intelligence, undermined international institutions, and left
us resented rather than respected.
I do not believe the
United States needs a permission slip to act when our security is genuinely
threatened, but we now know that with Iraq, our security was never in imminent
danger. There were no weapons of mass destruction. Instead, last night the
President talked about ``weapons of mass destruction-related program
activities,'' whatever that means. There were no ties to Osama bin Laden, whose
name the President never even mentioned last night.
[Time: 13:30]
There was only a driving
hunger to overthrow the Iraqi regime from the moment this administration entered
the White House.
The unilateral and
arrogant way in which the Bush administration has handled the Iraq war and its
aftermath has resulted in a U.S. occupation that has cost us dearly in terms of
human life and precious resources. It would have been nice if the President had
even acknowledged last night the 500 American soldiers who have sacrificed their
lives in Iraq and the thousands more who have been wounded.
Mr. Speaker, the
exaggeration and the manipulation of intelligence and our changing rationales
for our involvement have diminished the credibility and standing of the United
States around the globe in ways that I truly believe undermine our security. Now
we have a moral obligation to rebuild Iraq and to safeguard the Iraqi people,
and we can only do that successfully with the help and support of the United
Nations and the broader international community. It would have been nice if
President Bush had taken just a few seconds in an hour-long speech to
acknowledge that reality last night.
[From the Washington Post, Jan. 19, 2004]
Arms Issue Seen as
Hurting U.S. Credibility Abroad
(By Glenn Kessler)
The Bush
administration's inability to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq--after
public statements declaring an imminent threat posed by Iraqi President Saddam
Hussein--has begun to harm the credibility abroad of the United States and of
American intelligence, according to foreign policy experts in both parties.
In last year's State of
the Union address, President Bush used stark imagery to make the case that
military action was necessary. Among other claims, Bush said that Hussein had
enough anthrax to ``kill several million people,'' enough botulinum toxin to
``subject millions of people to death by respiratory failure'' and enough
chemical agents to ``kill untold thousands.''
Now, as the president
prepared for this State of the Union address Tuesday, those frightening images
of death and destruction have been replaced by a different reality: Few of the
many claims made by the administration have been confirmed after months of
searching by weapons inspectors.
Within the United
States, Bush does not appear to have suffered much political damage from the
failure to find weapons, with polls showing high ratings for his handling of the
war and little concern that he misrepresented the threat.
But a range of foreign
policy experts, including supporters of the war, said the long-term consequences
of the administration's rhetoric could be severe overseas--especially because
the war was waged without the backing of the United Nations and was opposed by
large majorities, even in countries run by leaders that supported the invasion.
``The foreign policy
blow-back is pretty serious,'' said Kenneth Adelman, member of the Pentagon's
Defense Advisory Board and a supporter of the war. He said the gaps between the
administration's rhetoric and the postwar findings threaten Bush's doctrine of
``preemption,'' which envisions attacking a nation because it is an imminent
threat.
The doctrine ``rests not
just on solid intelligence,'' Adelman said, but ``also on the credibility that
the intelligence is solid.''
Already, in the crisis
over North Korea's nuclear ambitions, China has rejected U.S. intelligence that
North Korea has a secret program to enrich uranium for use in weapons. China is
a key player in resolving the North Korean standoff, but its refusal to embrace
the U.S. intelligence has disappointed U.S. official and could complicate
negotiations to eliminate North Korea's weapons programs.
Richard Haass, president
of the Council on Foreign Relations, said the same problem could occur if the
United States presses for action against alleged weapons programs in Iran and
Syria. The solution, he said, is to let international organizations such as the
International Atomic Energy Agency take the lead in making the case, as has
happened thus far in Iran, and also to be willing to share more of the
intelligence with other countries.
The inability to find
suspected weapons ``has to make it more difficult on some future occasion if the
United States argues the intelligence warrants something controversial, like a
preventive attack,'' said Haass, a Republican who was head of policy planning
for Secretary of State Colin L. Powell when the war started. ``The result is
we've made the bar higher for ourselves and we have to expect greater skepticism
in the future.''
James Steinberg, a
deputy national security adviser in the Clinton administration who believed
there were legitimate concerns about Iraq's weapons programs, said the failure
of the prewar claims to match the postwar reality ``add to the general sense of
criticism about the U.S., that we will do anything, say anything'' to prevail.
Indeed, whenever Powell
grants interviews to foreign news organizations, he is often hit with a question
about the search for weapons of mass destruction. Last Friday, a British TV
reporter asked whether in retirement he would ``admit that you had concerns
about invading Iraq,'' and a Dutch reporter asked whether he ever had doubts
about the Iraq policy.
``There's no doubt in my
mind that he had the intention, he had the capability,'' Powell responded. ``How
many weapons he had or didn't have, that will be determined.''
Some on Capitol Hill
believe the issue is so important that they are pressing the president to
address the apparent intelligence failure in the State of the Union address and
propose ways to fix it.
``I believe that
unanswered questions regarding the accuracy and reliability of U.S. intelligence
have created a credibility gap and left the nation in a precarious position,''
Rep. Jane Harman (Calif.), the senior Democrat on the Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence, said in a speech last week. ``The intelligence community seems
to be in a state of denial, and the administration seems to have moved on.''
Since last year's State
of the Union, the White House has established procedures for handling
intelligence in presidential speeches by including a CIA officer in the
speechwriting process. The CIA is also conducting an internal review, comparing
prewar estimates with postwar findings, and the final report will be finished
after inspectors in Iraq complete their work.
But Bush and his aides
have largely sought to divert attention from the issue. White House aides have
said they expect this year's State of the Union speech to look ahead--to the
democracy the administration hopes to establish in Iraq--rather than look back.
Officials also have
turned the focus to celebrating Hussein's capture last month and repeatedly
drawing attention to Hussein's mistreatment of his people. Officials have argued
that if Iraq's stocks of weapons are still unclear, Hussein's intentions to
again possess such weapons are not. Thirteen years ago, when the United States
was a backer of
[Page: H65]
Hussein, Iraq used chemical
weapons in the Iran-Iraq war.
The administration ``rid
the Iraqi people of a murderous dictator, and rid the world of a menace to our
future peace and security,'' Vice President Cheney said in a speech last week.
Cheney--and other U.S. officials--increasingly point to Libya's decision last
month to give up its weapons of mass destruction as a direct consequence of
challenging Iraq.
Bush, when asked by
ABC's Diane Sawyer why he said Iraq had weapons of mass destruction when
intelligence pointed more to the possibility Hussein would obtain such weapons,
dismissed the question: ``So, what's the difference?''
The U.S. team searching
for Iraq's weapons has not issued a report since October, but in recent weeks
the gap between administration claims and Iraq's actual weapons holdings has
become increasingly clear. The Washington Post reported earlier this month that
U.S. investigators have found no evidence that Iraq had a hidden cache of old
chemical or biological weapons, and that its nuclear program had been shattered
after the 1991 Persian Gulf War. A lengthy study issued by the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace also concluded the administration shifted the
intelligence consensus on Iraq's weapons in 2002 as officials prepared for war,
making it appear more imminent and threatening than was warranted by the
evidence.
The report further said
that the administration ``systematically misrepresented the threat'' posed by
Iraq, often on purpose, in four ways: one, treating nuclear, chemical and
biological weapons as a single threat, although each posed different dangers and
evidence was particularly thin on Iraq's nuclear and chemical programs; two,
insisting without evidence that Hussein would give his weapons to terrorists;
three, often dropping caveats and uncertainties contained in the intelligence
assessments when making public statements; and four, misrepresenting inspectors'
findings so that minor threats were depicted as emergencies.
Jessica T. Mathews,
president of the Carnegie Endowment and co-author of the report, pointed to one
example in a speech delivered by Bush in Cincinnati on Oct. 7, 2002. U.N.
inspectors had noted that Iraq had failed to account for bacterial growth media
that, if used, ``could have produced about three times as much'' anthrax as Iraq
had admitted. But Bush, in his speech, turned a theoretical possibility into a
fact.
``The inspectors,
however, concluded that Iraq had likely produced two to four times that
amount,'' Bush said. ``This is a massive stockpile of biological weapons that
has never been accounted for and is capable of killing millions.''
Mathews said her
research showed the administration repeatedly and frequently took such liberties
with the intelligence and inspectors' findings to bolster its cases for
immediate action. In the Cincinnati example, ``in 35 words, you go from probably
to a likelihood to a fact,'' she said. ``With a few little changes in wording,
you turn an `if' into a dire biological weapons stockpile. Anyone hearing that
must be thinking, `My God, this is an imminent threat.' ''
Steinberg, who was privy
to the intelligence before President Bill Clinton left office, said that while
at the National Security Council he saw no evidence Iraq had reconstituted its
nuclear weapons program, but that there were unresolved questions about
Hussein's chemical and biological weapons programs. ``Given his reluctance to
address these questions, you had to conclude he was hiding something,'' he said,
adding that given the intelligence he saw, ``I certainly expected something
would have turned up.''
``I think there are
[diplomatic] consequences as a result of the president asking these questions
[about Iraq's weapons holdings] and the answer being no'' weapons, said Danielle
Pletka, vice president for foreign and defense policy studies at the American
Enterprise Institute, who believes the ouster of Hussein justified the war.
``The intelligence could have been better.''
Richard Perle, another
member of the Defense Advisory Board, said the criticism of the Bush
administration is unfair. ``Intelligence is not an audit,'' he said. ``It's the
best information you can get in circumstances of uncertainty, and you use it to
make the best prudent judgment you can.''
He added that presidents
in particular tend not to place qualifiers on their statements, especially when
they are advocating a particular policy. ``Public officials tend to avoid
hedging,'' he said.
Given the stakes
involved--going to war--Mathews said the standards must be higher for such
statements. ``The most important call a president can make by a mile is whether
to take a country to war,'' she argued, making the consequences of unwise
decisions or misleading statements even greater.
Indeed, she said, the
reverberations are still being felt, even as the administration tries to put the
problem behind it. A recent CBS poll found that only 16 percent of those
surveyed believed the administration lied about Iraq's weapons. But she said
there is intense interest in the report's findings, with 35,000 copies
downloaded from the think tank's Web site in just five days. ``It is too soon to
say there was no cost'' to the failure to find weapons, she said. ``I think
there is a huge appetite for learning about this.''
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