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3A) Short-changing the U.S. Postal Service in Preventing Bioterrorism Through the Mail

SPEECH OF

HON. RUSH D. HOLT

OF NEW JERSEY

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 4, 2004

• Mr. HOLT. Mr. Speaker, the discovery of ricin in the Dirksen Senate Office Building, and the resulting closure of all three Senate office buildings, is an unfortunate and disturbing reminder of our mail system's vulnerability to terrorism . As the Representative of the 12th District of New Jersey, my concern on this matter is heightened because of our area's direct experience with the anthrax attacks of 2001. At least one of the anthrax-tainted letters mailed to Capitol Hill was sent from a postal drop box in Princeton, New Jersey and processed at a sorting facility in Hamilton, New Jersey. Anthrax spores were also discovered in my Washington, D.C. office, which resulted in my congressional office--and several others--being relocated for three months.

• I rise today to express my profound disappointment that our federal government seems to have learned very little from these incidents. I am concerned that the United States Postal Service (USPS) has not received adequate funding to protect postal employees and the general public from the risk of bio-terrorism in the Fiscal Year 2005 budget that President Bush delivered to Congress two days ago. Specifically, I am troubled that the USPS was denied emergency preparedness funding in Fiscal Year 2004, and would be denied again in the President's Fiscal Year 2005 budget request. This continued lack of funding leaves the United States Postal Service ill-equipped to defend against bioterrorism.

• A safe postal delivery system is critical not only for our homeland security, but also for our economic security. Only sustained, significant investment in our postal system will ensure that we are prepared to prevent, detect, and respond to bio-terrorism through the mail. I will be writing to President Bush to reconsider this oversight and provide the USPS with funding for this important initiative.

3B) The Day’s Events

   Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, we will be closing very shortly but I want to make a couple of remarks on the events of the day. The highlight of the day for me personally was the joint session we had earlier today with the presentation by President Aznar of Spain. His address to Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives very much captured the essence of what makes Spain and the United States of America strong allies and friends in the much broader defense of liberty.

   For much longer than many other nations and most other nations, Spain has been a part of United States history and indeed we have been a part of Spain's history. As we look back over the time, that history has been one full of discovery for both sides. It has been an experience rich in harmony and discord.

   I was able to talk to the President before as we reviewed that history and after his speech today. It has been a history that has been characterized by wars fought against each other and wars fought alongside each other.

   We have had the opportunity to celebrate together the creation of new democracies. We have celebrated together the defense of existing democracies, of old democracies. Together, as we look back over the last several years, we have faced the gravest threats to the security of free people, and through that togetherness and that partnership we have prevailed, advanced, and progressed.

   In our hour of need, our response to the acts of terrorism, September 11, 2001, acts that the President referred to--he referred to that day as a terrible day, reflecting, as he did today, that the principles that were attacked that day were the principles Spain had and the United States had, both countries have, and those very principles and values were attacked. I believe he used the words ``brutally attacked.'' In our hour of need, the Spanish people showed us a solidarity, a friendship, and a compassion that very much were the medicine for the soul of our Nation.

   Spain--and the President reflects this--has very much been our ally in every sense of the word. It was wonderful for us to be able to welcome him today and to listen to his comments in the Halls of the Capitol of the United States of America.

   For me and many others, in the course of the day, as business has progressed on the floor, we have been centered on the response to the ricin attack in the Dirksen Building now a little over 48 hours ago. I am happy to report that everybody is doing fine. A few hours ago I made an announcement that the postal system and that people in the postal system, both inside our buildings and inside our grounds, but also outside, are doing fine, which is very good news. I say that because it is important to realize that this agent ricin is a deadly agent. It is a life-threatening agent and, through exposure, could have hurt many people.

   As I said earlier but want to reinforce, we are making great progress in the collection of mail and in examining the Senate office buildings. Officials have moved aggressively. They have moved in an almost symphonic fashion to respond to this insult. As I previously announced, the Russell Office Building will open tomorrow at noon, the Hart Office Building will open Friday at 9 a.m., and the Dirksen Office Building, Monday at 7 a.m. Staff have been patient. Staff have been understanding. Staff have adapted to this terrible incident,

   working at home and working wherever they can find a space, sometimes in the hallways. I do want to thank my colleagues and the staff for responding in this fashion.

   I have previously mentioned that every time I go through the list in my own mind, I leave people out, but all the various people who are working together through the Sergeant at Arms' Office, the Office of the Secretary of the Senate, especially the Capitol Police, the U.S. Marines who are here with us, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the Joint Terrorism Task Force, the Department of Homeland Security, the Environmental Protection Agency, the various law enforcement agencies that have responded, the postal workers, the postal system across the United States of America in what has truly been remarkable when we think of what we have gone through, with anthrax 2 1/2 years ago and a number of other incidents.

   Looking back over the 200-year history of this wonderful celebrated building, probably the most celebrated building in the world, the place has been burned down essentially, has been attacked, has been assaulted again and again, but the institution itself, just like the people who are here, who are working here every day, has responded with a resiliency that is truly remarkable. There is a toughness and an ability to bounce right back.

   We have not missed a step in terms of conducting the Nation's business in spite of the really tragic occurrence of the last several days.

   I will close on this particular issue, again talking about my own staff who responded so admirably. I have my own staff who are in the mailroom, and when they see something is not quite right, they use procedures that they have been trained in and that we have all focused on very much in terms of our procedures. They immediately responded appropriately and handled that operation in an appropriate way with evaluation of the room, notification of the appropriate personnel, and the appropriate response. Without that, people could have been hurt and could have died.

   It is nice to be able to see that and commend the people working in such an environment. Unfortunately, these are the realities we have seen, anthrax 2 1/2 years ago, ricin today, Capitol Police officers assaulted in this building and killed not too long ago. The resiliency is truly remarkable in this great institution.

4A) The Need for Intelligence Reform

   Mr. GRAHAM of Florida. Mr. President, as Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence during most of the 107th Congress, I worked with colleagues from the House and Senate to accept the responsibility of reviewing the horrific events that struck our Nation's symbols of commerce and security on September 11, 2001, claiming the lives of nearly 3,000 Americans. From New York City and the Pentagon to a field in rural Pennsylvania, 9-11 demonstrated the vulnerabilities of our free society.

   But in my view, and after the careful review of the Intelligence Committees, the most tragic aspect of this day never to be forgotten is that it could have been prevented. Had our intelligence agencies been better organized and more focused on the problem of international terrorism--particularly Osama bin Laden--September 11th would have been prevented.

   I also have concluded that, had the President and the Congress initiated the reforms that our joint inquiry recommended, we might well have avoided the embarrassment of the flawed intelligence on weapons of mass destruction--or the misleading use of that intelligence--which formed the basis of our war against Iraq.

   Surely, the people of America would be safer today had these reforms been undertaken.

   So today, and in remarks in the next 2 days, I would like to review with my colleagues the conclusions of the House-Senate joint inquiry.

   We have learned that intelligence failures played a central role in the events of 9-11. Let me illustrate some of those failures:

   The Central Intelligence Agency, CIA, was tracking two of the hijackers and knew that they had been to a summit meeting of terrorists in Malaysia in early January of 2000. However, the CIA failed to inform the Federal Bureau of Investigation, FBI, the Federal Aviation Administration, FAA, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, INS, or Customs officials that these individuals were on their way to the United States. The result is that when they arrived on a commercial airliner in the United States in order to execute their dastardly plan, they were welcomed into our country by unwitting entry agents.

   These same two hijackers were living with an FBI asset, but the informant failed to ask basic questions. Others in the FBI recognized the danger of Islamic extremists using airplanes as weapons of mass destruction, but their warnings were ignored by superiors. Still others failed to understand the legal avenues available to them that may have allowed available investigative techniques to be used to avert the 9-11 plot.

   Current national security strategy demands more accurate intelligence than ever before:

   Terrorists must be found before their strikes. This will require intelligence agents capable of penetrating their cells to provide intelligence early enough to frustrate the terrorists' intentions;

   If preventive or pre-emptive military actions are to be a central part of our national security strategy, to maintain its credibility of those actions with the American people and the world, will require the support of the most credible intelligence;

   If we are to frustrate the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, America must provide an intelligence capability for all of those regions of the world which are suspect.

   Now, as never before, intelligence matters.

   In responding to the events of 9-11, Congress created a joint committee consisting of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees. A bipartisan, bicameral panel of this type had never before been formed in the 213 years of the U.S. Congress. Our effort reflected the unique circumstances and the national unity we all felt in the immediate aftermath of 9-11.

   One of the principal reasons for conducting the inquiry in this way was to give our recommendations the maximum credibility, above the usual cries of partisanship that frequently taint the work of congressional committees. The importance of our task cannot be understated. We sought to identify the problems in the intelligence community that allowed the 9-11 attacks to go undetected and propose solutions to those problems.

   In the end, we were successful in identifying the problems because we all understood how much was at stake and that our enemy would not rest while we attempted to fix our problems. We were less successful in securing consideration of the solutions from the intelligence agencies, the White House, and the Congress.

   The fact that we conducted this bipartisan, bicameral inquiry and submitted recommendations creates a new heightened level of congressional responsibility. If the terrorists are successful in another attack in the United States, the American people will demand to know what the institutions of government learned from 9-11, and how the intelligence agencies, the White House, and the Congress used that knowledge to harden the United States against future terrorist attacks. Congress was largely able to avoid accountability for 9-11. Mark my words: There will be no avoidance of responsibility for the next attack.

   There will be no avoiding responsibility for the President. September 11, 2001, was a wake up call--it told us we had severe deficiencies in our intelligence community. If 9-11 was a wake up call, the failure to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq was a report card on how far we have come since 9-11 in correcting the problems in our intelligence community. The grade we received on that report card is F. The President and Congress have failed to initiate the reforms recommended by a series of review panels and our bipartisan, bicameral joint committee of inquiry.

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   This failure of the President and the Congress has contributed to yet another intelligence failure.

   What troubles me more than the President's unwillingness to make the necessary changes is his unwillingness to even admit that our Nation has a problem. Just last week, the President responded to questions about the inaccuracies of his statements about Iraq's WMD capability by saying he has ``great confidence in our intelligence community.'' How can he have great confidence in our intelligence community after it has been proven confused before September 11 and completely wrong on the threat posed by Iraq?

   The expected appointment by the President of a commission to review the intelligence on which the war in Iraq was predicated is not an excuse to delay reform of America's intelligence community. Rather, I am concerned that it appears as though the goal is simply to avoid political accountability and embarrassment. America continues to be in a state of denial. A White House aide was quoted over the weekend as saying, ``We cannot afford another one of those''--referring to the public outcry after the misstatement of intelligence in the 2003 State of the Union speech.

   It has now been more than a year since the joint inquiry made its recommendations. This is a good time to review the progress made in implementing those recommendations and to identify critical areas of reform that have not yet been addressed. Unfortunately, this is not going to be a report card that we would like to show to our parents--or to our voters. There has been little accomplished with regard to most of the recommendations.

   The joint inquiry report made nineteen recommendations for reform. Today I would like to discuss those recommendations that fall into the category of specific actions to combat terrorism.

   In speeches on Tuesday and Wednesday, I will deal with those that involve intelligence community reform and those that deal with the FBI and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act process.

   Of the nineteen recommendations, there are six that contain specific actions to combat terrorism. Recommendation No. 2 directs ``the National Security Council to expedite their efforts to examine and revamp existing intelligence priorities.'' It further directs the President to ``take action to ensure that clear, consistent, and current priorities are established and enforced throughout the Intelligence Community. Once established, these priorities should be reviewed and updated on at least an annual basis to ensure that the allocation of Intelligence Community resources reflects and effectively addresses the continually evolving threat environment. Finally, the establishment of Intelligence Community priorities, and the justification for such priorities, should be reported to the House and Senate Intelligence Committees on an annual basis.''

   It was very clear from the work of the joint inquiry that the intelligence community had not adapted or changed its intelligence priorities to reflect the changing nature of the world. While some modifications had been made since the end of the Cold War, our intelligence priorities remained states like Russia, China, Iran and Iraq. In spite of the fact that George Tenet, the Director of Central Intelligence, had declared war on al-Qaida in 1998, al-Qaida was not at or even near the top of the intelligence priority list on September 11, 2001. Only on September 12, 2001, did al-Qaida become priority number one.

   It was also clear from our investigation that there was no formal process for regularly updating and reviewing intelligence priorities to ensure that they reflected changes in the security environment. Bureaucratic inertia worked to keep old priorities on the list long after they should have dropped down in favor of emerging threats. While George Tenet may have recognized that non-state actors like al-Qaida needed more attention, this was not widely known or accepted throughout the Intelligence Community that he heads. When asked if he was aware that George Tenet had declared war on al-Qaida in 1998, a former director of the National Security Agency, NSA, our Nation's electronic eavesdropping agency, responded that yes, he was aware that George Tenet had said that, but he did not think it applied to him or his organization.

   A formal process that was clearly understood throughout our government would have prevented some of the problems we identified. One example involves the Predator unmanned aerial vehicle, a pilotless drone capable of long-duration flight and armed with high resolution cameras and an ability to fire missiles at targets on the ground. The Predator has proven to be one of the most effective intelligence collection assets we have in the war on terror. Unfortunately, it took far too long to build the Predator because of internal disputes in the administration. This type of aircraft was not a priority for the Air Force and its production was therefore delayed several months. The lack of established and accepted intelligence priorities was a major cause of the delay in fielding the Predator.

   This issue of setting new priorities was also raised by the National Commission on National Security in the 21st Century, also known as the Hart-Rudman Commission. This Commission, which issued its final report in February of 2001, included a recommendation that ``the President order the setting of national intelligence priorities through National Security Council guidance to the Director of Central Intelligence.''

   Unfortunately, at the time the Joint Inquiry issued its report almost 2 full years after the Hart-Rudman Commission had made its recommendation sufficient progress had not been made in setting national intelligence priorities. Therefore, we included a recommendation on this point. Our investigation determined that the failure to have clear, consistent and current intelligence priorities that were understood by the entire intelligence community was a significant contributing factor to the failure of intelligence on 9-11.

   Since the joint inquiry issued its report, some progress has been made in establishing a systematic process for establishing intelligence priorities. However, it is not clear that these priorities are being communicated to the domestic intelligence agencies responsible for our security here at home.

   Recommendation No. 3 focuses its directive on the counter terrorism components of the intelligence, military, law enforcement, and homeland security agencies, which will be key in counter terrorism. This recommendation directs the National Security Council to ``prepare, for the President's approval, a U.S. government-wide strategy for combating terrorism, both at home and abroad, including the growing terrorism threat posed by proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and associated technologies.''

   There should be an intelligence component of this strategy that identifies domestic and foreign based threat levels, programs, plans and budgets to address the threat posed by Osama bin Laden and al-Qaida, Hezbollah, Hamas, and other international terrorist groups. The strategy should include specific efforts to improve human intelligence, better utilize technology to analyze and share data, enhance domestic intelligence, maximize the effective use of covert action, which is action taken by the United States Government where the role of the United States is hidden, develop programs to deal with terrorist financing, and facilitate the ability of CIA and military special operations forces to conduct joint operations against terrorist targets.

   The joint inquiry found that there was no commonly agreed-upon approach among the federal agencies for dealing with terrorism. Each agency or department seemed to have its own ideas about fighting terrorism, and they were all independent actors. Success in the war on terror will require a coherent, coordinated effort that can only be accomplished by having everyone work toward a common goal outlined in a national strategy. Prior to 9-11, the CIA was trying, albeit unsuccessfully, to penetrate foreign terrorist organizations and disrupt their operations. Unfortunately at the FBI, fighting the war on terror meant calculating the threat by counting the number of known terrorists, not how many were estimated to have been placed in American communities. The FBI was waiting for acts of terror to occur and then trying to arrest and convict the guilty party.

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   The need for a national strategy to combat terrorism has been the subject of several other commission reports. The Gilmore Commission, also known as the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, in its second report in December of 2000, recommended that ``the next President should develop and present to the Congress a national strategy for combating terrorism within one year of assuming office.''

   The broad recommendation to develop a national strategy, as well as what should be included as specific components of that strategy, is broadly supported by virtually everyone who has analyzed our intelligence capabilities.

   In addition to the recommendation of the Gilmore Commission calling for a national strategy to combat terrorism, other commissions have made recommendations that are consistent with the full joint inquiry recommendation on developing a national strategy. For instance, the Hart-Rudman Commission, the Gilmore Commission, and the Bremer Commission, also known as the National Commission on Terrorism, in its report of June 2000, all made recommendations calling for improving and intensifying our human intelligence efforts with respect to terrorism.

   We should remember that until the hijackers stood up on those four airplanes and took control, it was as if their plot had been undetected. It was as if their conspiracy represented no violations of American laws or regulations. Good intelligence is our principle line of defense against these types of terrorist plots. Only by penetrating these organizations and by bringing together all available raw intelligence into cohesive analytical products will we ever be able to feel confident that we can avoid future tragedies. That is the only way we will get the timely, accurate intelligence that is required to disrupt sophisticated modern terrorist organizations like al-Qaida. Improving our human intelligence capability must be Job Number One in responding to global terrorists.

   Penetrating these organizations will require a new, more aggressive human intelligence capability. Osama and his cohorts are unlikely to turn up at an embassy cocktail party. We must be capable of getting human sources close to the leaders of these organizations. John Walker Lindh was a misguided California college student who became a member of al-Qaida and even met Osama bin Laden. Unfortunately, John Walker Lindh did not work for the CIA.

   The Bremer Commission includes a recommendation to increase funding for technology development to exploit terrorist communications, and devotes an entire section to improving efforts to attack terrorist financing. The Gilmore Commission recommends improving technological applications to enhance analysis and dissemination, as well as improving domestic intelligence collection.

   In response to the good work done by the Gilmore Commission and the recommendation of our Joint Inquiry, a national strategy to combat terrorism was issued by the Bush Administration in February of 2003. It is difficult to understand how a President who claims that defeating terrorism is the principle mission of his presidency took 17 months to produce a strategy to accomplish that mission. And even the strategy that was produced is inadequate

   when it comes to defining the intelligence components of that strategy. Instead, it calls on the intelligence community to review its capabilities and make recommendations for improvement. Why would it take 17 months to task the intelligence community to do such an assessment?

   The strategy that was produced after this long delay does not meet the requirements published in the recommendation of the joint inquiry. The Bush administration's strategy is not so much a strategy as a list of objectives. What is lacking is clear guidance on how we can achieve these objectives. What is also lacking is a level of specificity that will allow all agencies in our government to work towards this common set of priorities and goals through the common strategy.

   Recommendation No. 4 calls for the establishment of a National Intelligence Officer for Terrorism on the National Intelligence Council. The National Intelligence Council works directly for the Director of Central Intelligence and is responsible for providing coordinated analysis of foreign policy issues for the President and other senior policymakers. To date, no such position has been established. The lack of a central coordinator for terrorism analysis has been a continuing shortcoming in the Intelligence Community. While there are some outstanding individuals doing analysis on terrorism in several of the intelligence community's component organizations, there is no single focal point for policymakers to direct analytical requests on terrorism.

   A more recent example of the need for an NIO for Terrorism is the debate over Iraq's connection to al-Qaida. While the CIA consistently reported that they had uncovered no reliable evidence of any links between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaida, others in the government--particularly at the Defense Department and the White House--made repeated statements about a solid link. Implementing this recommendation would give us a point of ultimate accountability.

   The joint inquiry found that there was some confusion as to who to go to with intelligence queries on terrorism, and there was no arbiter within the community to help reconcile various approaches or conflicting analyses of terrorism. We found too much mis-communication and an inability to identify who was responsible with regard to terrorism analysis. There was no individual who could coordinate a National Intelligence Estimate on terrorism, something that may have helped bring the seriousness of the threat posed by al-Qaida to members of the intelligence community outside of CIA. A National Intelligence Estimate is the highest level of intelligence analysis produced by the intelligence community and represents the best estimate of the entire intelligence community.

   Without the establishment of this position, there is also a lack of outreach to academia and the private sector on terrorism issues, something that is needed in this critical fight. We have national intelligence officers for each geographic region as well as several crosscutting issues, such as conventional military issues, strategic and nuclear programs, and economics and global issues. It is a sign of the continuing lack of organizational restructuring to deal with the terrorist threat that we still have no national intelligence officer for terrorism, yet we have one for economics. This should not be very hard to do, yet one full year after issuing our recommendations it has not been done.

   Recommendation No. 18 of the joint inquiry report calls on Congress and the administration to ensure the full development within the Department of Homeland Security of an effective all-source terrorism information fusion center. This center should have full access to all terrorism related intelligence and data, participate in the intelligence requirements process, and ``integrate intelligence information to identify and assess the nature and scope of terrorist threats to the United States in light of actual and potential vulnerabilities.''

   One example of an intelligence fusion center that functions effectively is the Joint Interagency Task Force South in Key West, Florida. This organization fuses intelligence information from a wide variety of sources in a single facility which is jointly manned by military, law enforcement, intelligence and foreign government officials. What makes this organization particularly effective is that it is able to directly control operational activity to respond immediately to the intelligence it gathers. If it identifies a ship traveling toward the United States that it believes is carrying illegal narcotics, it can direct a Coast Guard vessel to intercept and search that ship.

   The failure to bring together all the available intelligence on terrorism and to analyze it in a way that is most useful in preventing attacks was most evident in our inquiry. The FBI had smart agents working in field offices throughout the country who identified troubling trends, such as an unusual interest in flight training among some foreign visitors. Unfortunately, the FBI was not organized in a way that allowed all intelligence on terrorism to go to a central location so that it could

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be analyzed as a whole. That problem was compounded by the fact that there was little to no information sharing between the FBI, responsible for counter-terrorism within the United States, and the CIA, responsible for foreign intelligence collection outside the United States of America. Too much fell through the cracks.

   This recommendation was directly supported by the legislation, passed by Congress and signed by the President, that established the Department of Homeland Security. That legislation authorized an intelligence component in the new Department to do exactly as was recommended by the joint inquiry, including the requirement that this new intelligence component have full access to available intelligence information. Senators Shelby, Lieberman, and Thompson deserve particular credit for their efforts to ensure that the new Department of Homeland Security have a robust intelligence organization. The intelligence component of the Department of Homeland Security was envisioned to be the one place where our domestic vulnerabilities are evaluated and mapped against all threats to the homeland. The idea was that the threats could come from a variety of sources, not just terrorists, and one agency needed to be responsible for having the entire picture on its radar screen.

   Unfortunately, the administration has chosen to gut the intelligence function at the Department of Homeland Security. The position of director of intelligence for the new department has been vacant for much of the time the department has been in existence. This is indicative of the lack of attention and significance it is given. The staff is totally inadequate for the mission outlined in the legislation that established the department.

   Instead, the administration has chosen to create a new organization at the CIA called the Terrorist Threat Integration Center, TTIC. While this new organization may address some of the problems that we have identified, it does not meet the requirements set out in the legislative authorization, nor does it meet the criteria set out in the Joint Inquiry recommendation.

   Finally, I would like to address Recommendation No. 19 of the joint inquiry report. This recommendation calls on ``the intelligence community, and particularly the FBI and CIA, to aggressively address the possibility that foreign governments are providing support to or are involved in terrorist activity targeting the United States and U.S. interests. The FBI and CIA should aggressively and thoroughly pursue related matters developed through this Joint Inquiry that have been referred to them for further investigation.''

   Mr. President, this may be the most important--and at the same time, the most troubling recommendation. Significant evidence of foreign government involvement in the 9-11 attacks was uncovered by the joint inquiry.

   It is incomprehensible why this administration has refused to aggressively pursue the leads that our inquiry developed. One example of the failure to pursue leads that point to foreign government involvement is the refusal of the FBI to aggressively follow the money trail that flowed from officials of a foreign government to at least some of the terrorists. In spite of being provided evidence by our committee, the FBI and the administration refused to use all the law enforcement tools at their disposal to follow the money trail. Why would the administration not use all of its available powers to track this money? In addition, the question of whether other terrorists were getting similar support was not pursued. Therefore the extent of the involvement of the foreign government has never been fully investigated. Recent press reports indicate that there is even more suspicious activity than was known at the time we issued our report.

   Another example of the failure to aggressively pursue the sources of foreign support of terrorism is reported on Page A14 of today's Washington Post. A panel which was established by the United Nations to pursue sources of support of al-Qaida has been disbanded. Our government joined with Russia and Chile to sponsor a resolution at the United Nations that disbanded the panel investigating al-Qaida's financing.

   We are talking about the possible involvement of foreign governments in the 9-11 attacks. If a government was involved in those attacks, we should leave no stone unturned to identify the extent of that involvement and hold those responsible accountable. There should be no sanctuary from justice for those involved with terrorists, no matter who might be embarrassed by such revelations.

   I wish I could be more specific in discussing the involvement of foreign governments in the 9-11 plot. Unfortunately, the administration will not allow me to do so. After 7 months of effort to de-classify the report that we filed on December 20, 2002, the CIA, the FBI and other agencies decided to keep significant portions secret. In particular, there are 27 pages that were virtually completely censored. These are pages 396 through 422 from Part Four of the report, which is entitled, ``Finding, Discussion and Narrative Regarding Certain Sensitive National Security Matters.''

   This censorship is troubling for a number of reasons. First, it reduces the information available to the public about some of the most important government actions--or to be more accurate, inactions--prior to September 11. Second, it precludes the American people from asking their government legitimate questions, such as:

   Was there a reason that some, but not all, of the terrorists were receiving foreign support while they were in the United States?

   Or is it not more likely that they were all receiving similar support?

   What evidence do we have that the infrastructure of support that existed prior to 9-11 has been dismantled?

   Or is it not more likely that such an infrastructure is still in place for the next generation of terrorists?

   How many trained operatives of al-Qaida, Hezbollah, and other international terrorist organizations are there inside the United States of America?

   What are the skills and capabilities of these operatives?

   What was the scale and skills of Iraqi operatives inside the United States prior to the war in Iraq and at the current date?

   What was the comparative threat to the people of the United States of Iraq and the trained agents of international terrorists placed inside our country?

   Has the number, skill set, funding or ability to avoid disclosure of international terrorist operatives within the United States of America been enhanced by support from foreign governments?

   How professional and aggressive have been the efforts of agencies such as the FBI and the CIA in answering those questions?

   And, how was the information that our government might have had prior to September 11th utilized after September 11th to enhance the security of our homeland and American interests abroad?

   Unfortunately, almost 2 1/2 years after the tragedy, the administration and the Congress--in the main--have not initiated the reforms necessary to reduce the chances of another 9-11. Given the seriousness of that situation, some of what was withheld from this report bordered on the absurd. For examples of the absurdity, some of the information censored from these pages actually appears in other parts of the report. Let me cite three examples.

   First, much of the censored information about Omar al-Bayoumi is available on pages 173-175. Mr. Bayoumi was an employee of the Saudi Civil Aviation Authority and a suspected Saudi intelligence agent based in California. He had extensive contacts with two of the Saudi hijackers, Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi. The same day that Bayoumi picked up the hijackers at a restaurant in Los Angeles, he had attended a prior meeting at the Saudi consulate in Los Angeles. Bayoumi co-signed a lease for the two hijackers, paid their first month's rent, hosted a welcome party for them, helped them get driver's licenses and flight school applications. He also introduced them to others who served as their translator and in other support roles.

   Second, much of the censored information about Osama Bassnan, another Saudi national who was a neighbor of the two hijackers in San Diego, which appears on pages 175 through 177.

   Third, much of the information about a San Diego business manager which was censored also appears on pages 179 and 180.

   I would note that the declassified sections of the report point out that, despite public assurances from U.S. officials that Saudi Arabia has cooperated in counter terrorism efforts, the Joint Inquiry received testimony that Saudi officials in fact ``had been uncooperative and often did not act on information implicating Saudi nationals.''

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   What this indicates is that in the months following the release of our recommendation that the administration ``aggressively'' address the foreign government involvement in 9-11, the Bush administration not only failed to pursue and investigate foreign government involvement, the administration misused the classification process to protect the foreign governments that may have been involved in 9-11. There is no reason for the Bush administration to continue to shield make-believe allies who are supporting, either directly or indirectly, terrorists who want to kill Americans.

   The recommendations we have made here are consistent with recommendations made by other bodies that have been formed to analyze our intelligence structure over the last decade. The political reality is that there is a broad agreement that these reforms need to be made, yet there is institutional resistance that has been too great to overcome.

   Congress has assumed responsibility for reform of the intelligence community. Now is the time to act so that we might receive the appreciation of the American people for reducing the likelihood of another tragedy like 9-11. The consequence of inaction will be legitimate, strong and unavoidable criticism should we be struck again.

   If 9-11 was not a big enough shock wave to overcome the resistance to change, what will it take?

   I ask unanimous consent that The Washington Post article ``U.N. Dissolves Panel Monitoring Al Qaeda'' be printed in the RECORD.

   There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

   U.N. Dissolves Panel Monitoring Al Qaeda

   group had criticized security council

(By Colum Lynch)

    United Nations.--The U.N. Security Council quietly dissolved a high-profile independent U.N. panel last month that was established more than 2 1/2 years ago to prevent the al Qaeda terrorist network from financing its war against the United States and its allies, U.S. and U.N. officials said.

    The move comes six weeks after the panel, headed by Michael Chandler of Britain, concluded in a stinging report that a number of Security Council sanctions against al Qaeda had failed to constrain the terrorist network.

    But Security Council members have denied the move was retribution for the panel's conclusions, saying that the quality of the group's work was uneven and that the group had outlived its usefulness.

    The 15-nation council on Friday adopted a new resolution sponsored by the United States, Russia and Chile that would replace Chandler's panel with what they say will be a more professional body. The new panel is expected to keep monitoring the global war against terrorism but would be subject to closer Security Council coordination and oversight.

   The dispute underscores the challenge of managing an international counterterrorism operation through an organization whose 191 members are frequently criticized for failing to cooperate. It also reflects growing frustration among members that sanctions have done little to interrupt the flow of money and arms to al Qaeda.

   Chandler criticized the decision, saying it would undercut the United Nations' capacity to combat al Qaeda. He suggested that his panel's demise was a result of pressure from influential U.N. members who had been singled out in his reports for failing to take adequate measures to combat al Qaeda.

   ``A number of people were uncomfortable with our last report,'' Chandler said. He said that the Security Council was sending the wrong message and that one of the ``key elements'' of a successful counterterrorism strategy is ``a strong independent monitoring group.''

   Chandler's five-member panel--the monitoring group on al Qaeda--was established in July 2001 to ensure compliance with an arms embargo against the Taliban and a freeze on its financial assets for harboring Osma bin Laden. The mission's mandate was expanded after the Taliban fell in January 2002, granting it broad powers to monitor international compliance with a U.N. financial, travel and arms ban.

   Chandler's reports have provided periodic snapshots of the international campaign against terrorism, often highlighting failings in governments' responses to the al Qaeda threat. In August 2002, after a lull in al Qaeda activities, Chandler provided a prescient forecast of the network's resurgence. ``Al Qaeda is by all accounts `fit and well' and poised to strike,'' the report warned. It was followed by deadly strikes in Bali, Indonesia; Casablanca, Morroco; and Saudi Arabia.

   ``The group functioned very well, providing hard-hitting reports to the Security Council which painted a picture of what was really going on,'' said Victor Comras, a former State Department official who helped write the Dec. 2 report.

   ``I am at a loss to understand why the United States is one of the main players in redrafting the new resolution and allowing the monitoring group to lapse,'' he added. ``The United States was the greatest beneficiary of the monitoring group because it gave them a lever to name and shame'' countries that failed to combat terrorists.

   One U.S. official said that last thing the United States wants is to ``muzzle'' the United Nations. But he said that although Chandler's panel was effective ``at getting headlines,'' his propensity for antagonizing member states could ultimately undermine U.S. efforts to harness the United Nation's support in its anti-terror campaign. Chandler's group ``did a good job,'' said James B. Cunningham, the deputy U.S. ambassador to the United Nations. ``But we are trying to make the committee more effective.''

   Some U.S. and U.N. diplomats said Chandler needlessly alienated potential allies and constituents at the United Nations, including some in the United States. Chandler's 2002 report irked Bush administration officials by casting doubt on the success of the U.S.-led effort to block al Qaeda financing. The Bush administration also challenged the veracity of Chandler's assertion in an earlier report that the Treasury Department had ignored warnings from SunTrust Banks that a key plotter in the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks had previously transferred large sums of money to an account at a Florida bank branch.

   Chandler infuriated officials from Liechtenstein, Italy and Switzerland with the Dec. 2 report that illustrated how two U.N.-designated terrorist financiers. Youssef Nada and Ahmed Idris Nasreddin, lived, traveled and operated multimillion-dollar businesses in their countries in violation of U.N. sanctions.

   Liechtenstein's U.N. ambassador, Christian Wenaweser, one of Chandler's sharpest critics, complained that the Chandler investigation was shoddy and that he failed to adequately acknowledge his government's role in helping build the case against two alleged terrorist financiers. ``We don't question the usefulness of the monitoring group. Quite the contrary. But they have to have a clear mandate and guidelines on how they should and shouldn't do their work,'' Wenaweser said. ``They didn't bother to verify basic facts; they got some things wrong. Travel dates. Spelling of names. Some of the stuff was silly.''

   Chile's U.N. ambassador, Heraldo Mun 6oz, the U.N. terrorism committee's chairman, said the new eight-member panel--called the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team--would give ``more teeth'' to U.N. anti-terror efforts by strengthening the committee's expertise in finance and border controls, and improving its capacity to analyze terrorist trends.

   ``I would like a monitoring team that is efficient, that is independent and that can closely collaborate with the committee,'' Mun 6oz said.

   Mr. GRAHAM of Florida. Thank you, Mr. President.

   I yield the floor. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

   The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will call the roll.

   The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

   Mr. GREGG. I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

   Mr. GREGG. I ask unanimous consent I be allowed to speak for up to 20 minutes in morning business.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

4B) David Kay and Weapons of Mass Destruction

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the order of the House of January 20, 2004, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Stearns) is recognized during morning hour debates for 5 minutes.

   Mr. STEARNS. Mr. Speaker, I am here to sort of elaborate on David Kay's comments dealing with weapons of mass destruction. He is a chief weapons of mass destruction hunter for the United States and he resigned recently, but he made some very interesting statements regarding Iraq's pursuit of the WMD and the possible deception of Iraqi scientists against Saddam Hussein regarding weapons programs. I think it is important to look at the totality of what David Kay said and not just what some of the political pundits have pulled out of his speech. He said that the CIA and other intelligence agencies did not realize that Iraq scientists had presented ``ambitious but fanciful weapons programs to Saddam Hussein,'' and had them use the money that they were going to use for these things for other purposes.

   At present, we have not found a huge stockpile of WMD. The search continues. However, we know a few facts. According to a recent New York Times story, Dr. Kay also reported ``Iraq attempted to revise its efforts to develop nuclear weapons in 2000 and 2001, but never got as far towards making a bomb as Iran and Libya did.'' He also said ``Baghdad was actively working to produce a biological weapon, using the poison ricin until the American invasion last March.'' We have all become familiar with this toxin given recent events in the news because of what happened at the Senate office building yesterday.

   Many of this administration's detractors have begun using Kay's statements to bolster their particular points of view regarding weapons of mass destruction and Iraq. But let us not forget that the Clinton administration also declared Iraq had WMD and was actively pursuing those types of programs. Dr. Kay's information then supports the assertion of the Clinton administration that Saddam Hussein was pursuing weapons of mass destruction programs.

   Saddam Hussein made it clear that he wanted to see the State of Israel and the United States destroyed. He saw himself as a lion standing up to the powerful United States. Although he could not directly attack the United States, it is not unreasonable to conclude that he would transfer weapons of mass destruction, the technology, the weapons themselves and items to a terrorist organization, or to any other rogue nation, to use in a direct attack on our soil; and that is why the President's proposal to look at all of the intelligence activities dealing with weapons of mass destruction, not just in Iraq, but also in other rogue nations, is very important and he is to be commended.

   Dr. Kay said the CIA and other agencies failed to recognize that Iraq had all but abandoned its efforts to produce large quantities of chemical or biological weapons after the first Persian Gulf War in 1991. He also stated that contrary to certain allegations, he was convinced that the analysts were not pressed by the Bush administration to make certain their prewar intelligence reports conformed to a White House agenda on Iraq.

   The allegations that our intelligence agencies failed to detect the supposed deception within the Iraqi Government and its weapons programs goes to the heart of our problem that many of our colleagues have talked about over the years regarding our intelligence ability. We are far too short of human intelligence, the exact kind of intelligence that can provide what is going on in the minds of our adversaries. CIA does not have people on the inside, to the best of our knowledge. Satellite coverage is great, electronic signals and intercepts are vital, but without human assets on the ground, these intelligence items can project an incomplete picture. They cannot tell what the officials are thinking and what the mood is on the street, or alert analysts to the possibility of deceptive tactics within a particular government.

   As a Nation, we must continuously learn from our success and failures. I support President Bush's national security policy and his decision to seek a separate intelligence inquiry. Our credibility is vital if we are to bring more Nations into this fight against terrorism, but we must look at David Kay's statements in their totality.

   Mr. Speaker, I commend President Bush for seeking this commission.

4C) Iraq Intelligence Commission

   Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, the vital interest of our national security is critical to our understanding of the degree to which we can cope with the circumstances involving the intelligence failure we have now experienced over this past year or more. Two important voices have been added to the growing chorus, raising questions about the accuracy and the veracity of the allegations the administration used to take this country to war.

   Just yesterday Secretary Powell made clear the importance of the prewar claims, suggesting that the case for war was much weaker without the allegations of existing stockpiles of weapons. When asked whether he would have recommended an invasion last year if he knew then what he knows now, Secretary Powell said:

   I don't know, because it was the stockpile that presented the final little piece that made it more of a real and present danger and threat to the region and to the world.

   A year ago this week, Secretary Powell made a lengthy presentation to the United Nations Security Council about the grave threat posed by Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. The Secretary of State did not speak of ``weapons of mass destruction-related program activities,'' but of existing stockpiles--existing stockpiles of horrendous weapons and the means to deliver them. In large measure because of the alarming assertions by Secretary Powell and similar claims by President Bush, Vice President Cheney, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, National Security Adviser Rice, and many other senior administration officials, a majority of Congress voted to give the President the authority to send troops to wage war against Iraq.

   Late last month, Secretary Powell had something decidedly different to say. For the first time since his U.N. presentation he explicitly acknowledged the strong possibility his claims about Iraq's weapons were untrue, telling reporters on his trip to Georgia:

   ..... what the open question is: how many stocks [the Iraqis] had, if any? And if they had any, where did they go? And if they didn't have any, then why wasn't that known beforehand?

   A few days later, Dr. David Kay, Chief Weapons Inspector in Iraq until a couple of weeks ago, told the Armed Services Committee here in the Senate the administration's prewar intelligence on Iraq was, in his words, ``all wrong.'' While several nonpartisan experts have reached similar conclusions about our intelligence and raised concerns about the accuracy of the administration statements on this issue, hearing Secretary Powell and Dr. Kay, two of this Nation's most respected and knowledgeable officials, speak in this manner, has raised some questions at home and abroad about the foundation of the administration's case for going to war against Iraq.

   Given the significance of these questions, a broad, thorough, nonpartisan review of both the intelligence community's assessment of the threats posed by Iraq and the administration's use of this information is essential to restoring the trust of the American public and the international community in this administration and in the intelligence system itself.

   The reason is clear. The most effective means to counterterrorism and the many other national security challenges facing this Nation today is by gaining and maintaining the support of the American people and assembling a international coalition. Accurate, unimpeachable intelligence is one of the most crucial tools the President has at his disposal for rallying the American people and the world. If the President is to successfully convince Americans of the need to send daughters and sons into harm's way and urge our allies to support America's course of action, our intelligence must be seen as absolutely credible and accurate. National security experts of both parties have

   begun to warn that the lack of any weapons of mass destruction in Iraq after the administration's grave predictions in the runup to the war is undermining America's credibility, not only on Iraq but on other national security challenges as well.

   For example, the United States increasingly believes that North Korea has used the last couple of years to create additional nuclear material and weapons. However, officials in South Korea and China have raised questions about these conclusions, in part by pointing to our intelligence community's failures in Iraq. This failure to reach a consensus on the threat posed by North Korea has greatly complicated efforts to effectively confront a nation that already possesses nuclear weapons and has been characterized as the world's greatest weapons proliferator.

   Given these stakes, one would think the President would be the first to demand a full and complete accounting of the accuracy and use of Iraq prewar intelligence. Yet up until this past weekend, the President has stubbornly insisted there was nothing wrong with that intelligence or the alarming assertions that he and senior administration officials made in the days leading up to the start of the war in Iraq. In a remarkable about-face this past week, administration officials said publicly that the President will support the establishment of an independent commission, provided he appoints the commissioners and defines the scope of their work. As in other instances, the administration is apparently seeking to both convince the America public it supports a thorough investigation at the same time it stacks the deck against such an investigation effort ever occurring.

   Although one of the major questions that needs to be addressed is whether senior administration officials exaggerated the nature of the threat to Iraq, the President is attempting to make the case that actions by these officials are best investigated by a commission whose members are appointed by and report to those very officials in the White House.

   There is little reason to believe a commission appointed and controlled by the White House will have the independence and credibility necessary to investigate and bring closure to these crucial issues. Consider this: At the same time the Secretary of State was suggesting that it was an open question whether Iraq had any weapons of mass destruction and the chief weapons

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inspector in Iraq was concluding that Iraq did not have any stockpiles of weapons before the war, Vice President Cheney was on national radio still suggesting that it was just a matter of time until such weapons could be found.

   If the President's senior advisers are still arguing that the prewar intelligence was right, can the American people be certain that commissioners handpicked by the White House to undertake an investigation defined by the White House will follow the facts wherever they lead?

   It would be a shame to have such an important commission start its work under the shadow of such doubt. We can avoid ever having to ask those questions by forming a truly independent commission that can rise above those concerns. I strongly believe the Congress can and should establish a truly independent commission to examine the collection, analysis, dissemination, and use by policymakers of intelligence on Iraq. Twice the Senate has voted to establish just such a commission that would be given access

   to all relevant information, appointed on a bipartisan basis by the congressional leadership of the House and Senate. I voted for this proposal both times.

   Although supporters of this commission fell short both times, I continue to believe that after putting our troops in harm's way we owe it to them to get to the bottom of this question. We owe them a truly independent investigation, conducted in the same way that our Armed Forces carry out their duties every day in Iraq, with honor and with integrity. I fear the process being started by the administration is neither, but it is not too late to establish a commission of which we can all be proud.

   I yield the floor.

   Mr. KENNEDY. Will the Senator be good enough to yield?

   Mr. DASCHLE. I am happy to yield to the Senator from Massachusetts.

   Mr. KENNEDY. First, I thank the Senator for an excellent statement.

   Earlier today the Armed Services Committee had meant to meet. We were going to have Secretary Rumsfeld up before the committee. I intended to ask him two or three questions on the issue of intelligence, but since the Senator is on his feet now, I am wondering if he would be willing to respond to a question or two and help clear this up in my mind.

   What we have now, as I understand it, is the intelligence agencies saying that they provided the intelligence to the administration and that they were not intimidated. I intended to ask the Secretary whether he was aware of the Defense Intelligence Agency's own intelligence report that stated--and I am quoting. This has been published. It was declassified and published in the news sources--this is the Defense Intelligence Agency:

   ..... there is no reliable information on whether Iraq is producing and stockpiling chemical weapons, or where Iraq has--or will--establish its chemical warfare agent production facilities.

   That was in September of 2002. Yet a month later, just as Congress was about to vote, the National Intelligence Estimate stated very precisely that:

   Iraq probably has stocked at least 100 metric tons and possibly as much as 500 metric tons of chemical weapon agents--much of it added in the last year.

   I was just wondering, if I can raise this point, here we have the Defense Intense Intelligence Agency giving one report. Then, if we look at the State Department Bureau of Intelligence, this is what the State Department Bureau of Intelligence concluded:

   The activities we have detected do not ..... add up to a compelling case that Iraq is currently pursuing what INR would consider an integrated and comprehensive approach to get nuclear weapons ..... INR considers the available evidence inadequate to support such a judgment.

   The Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence.

   Mr. KYL. Could we have regular order?

   Mr. KENNEDY. Regular order. I believe I have the floor.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator may yield for a question but not for a statement.

   Mr. KENNEDY. I am making the predicate. If the Senator from Arizona is not pleased with it, that is his problem.

   The third intelligence report was the Department of Energy disagreed that the famous tubes were for nuclear weapons. The State Department's Intelligence Bureau also concluded that the tubes were ``not intended for use in Iraq's nuclear weapons program.''

   Finally, Greg Thielmann, retired State Department official, who served as director of the Office of Strategic Proliferation and Military Affairs in the Bureau of Intelligence, said last July:

   Some of the fault lies with the performance of the intelligence community, but most of it lies with the way senior officials misused the information they are provided.

   He said:

   They surveyed the data, and picked out what they liked. The whole thing was bizarre. The Secretary of Defense had this huge Defense Intelligence Agency, and he went around it.

   I just ask, are these the kinds of questions that we hope an independent kind of commission might be helpful to resolve? When the administration's own Defense Intelligence Agency, the State Department agency, and the Energy Intelligence Agency came up with similar conclusions as Dr. Kay prior to the time the Senate voted on this issue, don't you think the American people are entitled to know what the facts are, not just the intelligence information made available but how it was used by the administration and by the President?

   Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, I appreciate the question, as well as the predicate offered by the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts.

   The answer is yes, I am troubled by one fact that is now undeniable. That fact is, we were given bad information, information that now is much clearer than it was 6 months or 12 months ago, information that many of our colleagues have used repeatedly on which to base decisions fundamental to their interpretation of circumstances and ultimately the vote they cast on the resolution committing this country to a course of action.

   I was troubled by a report I read just this morning that there are many in the intelligence community who are becoming increasingly angered and frustrated that all of this responsibility has been put on their shoulders. The report by one intelligence officer was: ``We did our job. We reported the information. It isn't us.''

   My question is, If it is not the intelligence community, who is responsible? Why did we get bad information? Was it the collection and analysis or was it the use of that information once it was collected and analyzed? We do not know the answer to that today. But we do know our best opportunity for collecting the answers to

   the questions posed by the Senator from Massachusetts is an independent counsel.

   What does it say of the independence of those potential commissioners when someone is suggesting to them, we want you to take this job to investigate us; we want you to have the authority to investigate us, with the implication that the detrimental consequences of an adverse investigation could weigh heavily on the commission itself.

   I don't think there is any doubt about the need for independence, about the need to look at past precedent when we have established commissions of this kind. We need to know beyond a shadow of a doubt that this commission will have the opportunity to go wherever the facts lead them.

   The way the President and this administration are proposing this investigation be done flies in the face of past precedent, with that cloud that hangs over any investigation that could not be as open, honest, and ultimately successful as it needs to be.

   I yield the floor.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois.

   Mr. DURBIN. It is my understanding that under the previous unanimous consent I am recognized for 10 minutes.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.

4D) U.S. Intelligence

   Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, I thank the minority leader, Senator Daschle, as well as my colleague from Massachusetts, Senator Kennedy, for raising this timely and important question about intelligence. I also salute Senator Bob Graham of Florida, who announced his retirement. His departure will be a great loss to this institution.

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   I was fortunate enough to serve on the Senate Intelligence Committee which Senator Graham chaired, and I still continue that service. He was an extraordinary leader, not just on that committee but when it came to the policies of protecting America. His has been a clarion voice from the beginning that the war on terrorism continues unabated and should continue despite the diversion of Iraq. We still have a war on terrorism, much broader in scope, that has to be considered on a daily basis.

   I come to the floor and want to be careful of the words I say. I do not want to disclose anything I have been told in the Senate Intelligence Committee. That is certainly the policy which should be followed by every member of that committee. We are given a rare opportunity to see the intelligence community and its work from inside. Because we are given that opportunity, we are warned not to share that information. So the points I am about to make relate exclusively to that information which has been made public and declassified. It raises an important issue.

   All of this information points in one direction. What happened to the United States of America prior to the invasion of Iraq relative to weapons of mass destruction of that country represents, in my mind, the greatest failure of intelligence in America since the fall of the Soviet Union. Recall, not that long ago, when our intelligence community and those in charge of national defense and security failed to see the collapse of the Soviet Union, a superpower, our premier enemy for decades, until it actually happened. Despite all of the millions of dollars and thousands of people, we missed it.

   Here we have a similar situation. Prior to our invasion of Iraq, we were told by the intelligence community they had identified--and this is unclassified, declassified information--they had identified 550 suspected sites within Iraq where we would find weapons of mass destruction. And the level of certainty for each of those sites was different, but for a discrete number of those sites the intelligence community told us: We believe that when we go into Iraq and go directly to this location, we will find weapons of mass destruction, nuclear weapons, chemical and biological weapons.

   So I asked Dr. Kay--and others have as well--after you had completed your investigation, after you had looked at those sites, what did you find? And the answer was: Nothing, nothing whatever.

   We accumulated this information; we said, through our intelligence sources, we have 550 known locations; and we were wrong in every instance.

   How can that be? How can the intelligence community have missed it?

   The second element, the unmanned aerial vehicles, flying over locations, mapping different things, viewing different locations, prepared, if necessary, to fire on hostile situations--these unmanned aerial vehicles were identified by the intelligence community and the administration as a threat not only to the Middle East but to the United States of America. We were told these unmanned aerial vehicles would be used to deliver chemical and biological weapons against the United States of America.

   I can state now in published reports we know that the UAVs were not designed for this purpose. We missed it completely. Sadly, I can say there is additional information which has not been disclosed which also casts doubt on that conclusion.

   Why is it important? Because Members of the Senate were called to the White House, asked to vote for the use-of-force resolution, and told that the reason for the necessity of an invasion was the unmanned aerial vehicles and their threat to the United States of America. They were given partial information--in fact, misleading information--about the danger associated with the unmanned aerial vehicles.

   All of this raises serious questions, questions Senator Daschle and others have addressed. This is what it comes down to: This should not be a matter of either the Democrats in the Senate or the Republicans in the Senate protecting their President. I will say this: If an open, honest, independent investigation finds anything was done wrong under the Clinton administration leading up to this intelligence failure, so be it. If they find anything wrong in this intelligence operation under President George W. Bush was responsible for this breakdown, so be it.

   The American people deserve an honest answer. They are more concerned about the safety and security of America than they are about the political safety and security of any President. And that is exactly the way it should be.

   Now, more than ever, intelligence is critical. Since 9/11 we understand the war on terrorism and its success by the United States depends on solid intelligence, acted on responsibly by political leaders. We need to ask these hard questions, and we need the panel of an independent commission that will come up with the answers.

   Senator JON CORZINE, my colleague from New Jersey, has been proposing this independent commission for months. I have supported it. Many have resisted it, saying we do not need it. Well, thank goodness, after Dr. Kay's report, even the White House has conceded we need this independent commission. I think, frankly, we need it now more than ever.

   We need sound and solid intelligence gathering. We need it to be evaluated in a proper fashion, and we need the political leaders in America to deal with it in a responsible way. We must ask the hard questions, whether this has been done leading up to the invasion of Iraq, and continuing with our war against al-Qaida and terrorism elements all across the United States of America and around the world.

   Mrs. BOXER. Will my friend yield for a question?

   Mr. DURBIN. I am happy to yield to the Senator from California.

   Mrs. BOXER. I thank the Senator very much for his clear, as usual, laying out of this issue. I want to pick up on the word ``independent,'' ``independent commission.''

   Does my friend agree that to get to an independent commission, all the members should not be appointed by the administration that has just been part of this error?

   Mr. DURBIN. I say to the Senator from California, it is important that this be viewed as a nonpartisan effort. In order for that to occur, we either need to find those people who are beyond reproach from the political side or make certain there is an appointment on both sides, Democrats and Republicans working together.

   Why in the world would we allow this commission to go forward under the shadow of suspicion that it has a partisan agenda? We do not need that. As a country, we do not need that. Once and for all, we need to turn to men and women who have served this country, and served it in terms of our national defense, and who have no political agenda, who are really focused on the defense of our country.

   Mrs. BOXER. I would agree with that because otherwise I do not think the American people will trust the commission. If the commission were to be appointed by, say, the majority leader of the Senate--certain Members--and then the Democratic leader of the Senate, that is another example. We could get a couple from the House Democrats, House Republicans, and then the President, and not an artificial

   date: By the way, you can't come back and talk to us until 2005 after the election. The American people are very wise.

   So I am really glad the President, as you said, has come around to say we need to take a look at this. But I think the way he is approaching this does not pass the smell test for a lot of my folks back home.

   Mr. DURBIN. I say to the Senator from California, there is another element, and that is this matter involving former Ambassador Joe Wilson, and his wife, who was serving this country in an intelligence capacity and whose identity was disclosed to columnist Robert Novak as part of political retribution.

   I can tell you, having spoken to people who have given their lives to the intelligence community, and risked their lives for America on a regular basis, they were angry and demoralized by this leak from the White House.

   I think in order to get the proper answers to the important questions about the role of the intelligence community, we should try to make it as nonpartisan as possible, try to bring in the professionals who are viewed by both political parties as people of respect and people who ask the right questions, so the intelligence community will come forward with honest and objective answers.

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   The bottom line is not who wins this political battle in the hearts and minds of the American people. The bottom line is, who will win in terms of America's national security and defense. We need sound and solid intelligence now more than ever. The President's admission last week that there was a failure of intelligence leading up to the invasion of Iraq has really called on all of us to rise above party.

   I think the Senator from California and the Senator from South Dakota are moving in the right direction toward an independent, bipartisan, and nonpartisan approach. I hope we do get this done quickly.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.

   Under the previous order, there are 10 minutes allocated to the majority.

   Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the majority be given an extra 5 minutes in morning business; 5 minutes for Senator Kyl, 5 minutes for Senator Lott, 5 minutes for Senator Chambliss.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

   Without objection, it is so ordered.

   Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I express my appreciation to the assistant minority leader for that request.

4E) Intelligence Investigation

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I think we need to respond to some of what has been said here this morning because the implication is very disturbing. It is not just that some of the intelligence of the United States--and by the way, all of the other intelligence agencies around the world might not have been totally accurate--but that somebody might have been misleading us. That is the charge. That is the implication. It leads to this notion we could not trust the President to look into what might have been wrong with the intelligence, that there is a ``shadow of suspicion'' here.

   Well, the shadow of suspicion is being cast by our colleagues on the other side by the innuendo that is throughout the comments they have been making here this morning and that we have read elsewhere. I think that is a very bad thing. Especially when our troops are fighting abroad trying to win this war on terror, to suggest that not

   only is the intelligence we are gathering not entirely accurate but that there were deliberate attempts by people in the administration to mislead the American people, and to mislead the Congress, that, I think, is what is very disturbing.

   What are some of the strains of that? I heard one of them on the radio this morning: Well, Vice President Cheney went down to the CIA and talked to them. He must have been trying to intimidate them to come up with some preordained conclusion to sort of cook the books a little bit.

   There is no evidence of that whatsoever. David Kay has discounted that as a possibility. Nobody from the intelligence agencies, under questioning, has suggested that was the case.

   Indeed, the question is, if the Vice President had not gone down to the intelligence agencies and asked the tough questions of the CIA people, and said, are you sure you are correct about this, then our friends on the other side would be complaining the administration did not even bother to doublecheck the information. So when politics are involved, you cannot win. But I do not think we should allow these suspicions from the political side of things to dictate the kind of action we take.

   Another question: Secretary Powell went to the CIA. I think he spent something like 3 days with them, with these people going over and over and over the evidence, saying: Are you absolutely certain of this? And remember, before he made his presentation to the United Nations, he took some of the material out, some of the material he did not think was verifiable, that they could not nail down well enough. He wanted to make sure what he took to the United Nations was solid.

   The Vice President and the Secretary of State are not the only people who have been involved. We have intelligence from other countries, such as the Israelis, the British. We have the United Nations itself, and the inspectors who came back with their reports.

   At the end of the day, the reason why the international community passed resolutions asking for Saddam Hussein to comply with his commitment to come clean on what he had was because the whole world thought he had these weapons of mass destruction.

   Now, since then, we have not been able to find everything. We have found some things. But one of the things we have not found are the chemical artillery shell warheads. We thought those were going to be used against our troops. Every day the war occurred, we were briefed on the so-called red line, the point at which we thought the Iraqis were going to shoot artillery shells with chemical weapons at our troops. Our troops had to put on all the heavy equipment in order to try to fight through that if, in fact, the attack occurred, and there was some surprise when it did not occur. We had to, of course, bomb the warehouses we thought it was in. We bombed the artillery pieces. We sent millions of leaflets to the commanders saying: Don't you dare fire chemical weapons at our troops or we will take you before the criminal court when this is all done. We disrupted their command and control, and we thought that is what prevented them from firing those artillery shells. But the point is, we thought they had them. We thought they were going to be used against our troops.

   This was not a matter of the President or the Vice President or anybody in the administration trying to mislead anybody. Maybe the intelligence was not entirely accurate, but I urge my colleagues on both sides of the aisle, in conducting this debate, to try to do it from the higher plain, not from the suspicion that the President of the United States is trying to deliberately mislead the American people, but to acknowledge maybe there was something wrong with part of our intelligence and that is worth looking into.

   That is precisely what the President has said he wants to have done because obviously he is just as concerned about this as anybody else is. It is for that reason he has asked for an investigation into the intelligence to find out whether it was correct, if it wasn't, why not, and what can we do about that in the future.

   I urge my colleagues, in conducting this debate, let's do so from a higher plain than one in which we sow the seeds of politics and blame and suspicion, as has been done around here. We can conduct this debate on a much higher plain than that.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi.

   Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I believe I have 5 minutes under the unanimous consent agreement.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.

   Mr. LOTT. I thank Senator Kyl and Senator Reid for making sure we have this time. I, too, think we need to sober up a little bit and look at the facts of what is involved.

   First, it is an election year. Politics will come into play in everything we do. I don't mean that necessarily critically of us or either side. It is a fact. I suspect that it is having a hand in what we are seeing now.

   Secondly, the fact is, we do have some problems with our intelligence community. It is not new. It didn't come up over the last 10 months or the last 10 years. It probably goes back to the mid-1970s when we had the Pike and the Church commissions that forced changes in the intelligence community from which we have never quite recovered. That is when we started getting away from human intelligence and relying on satellites and computers and technology. That is a big problem.

   We can go back and point to things we didn't know or information we should have had back in the 1980s and 1990s that we didn't have. For us to take a look at our intelligence community and ask questions about why they have not done some things or they have gotten some things wrong is perfectly legitimate. The most important question should be, what are we going to do about it? Instead of pointing the finger of blame, trying to put some scalp on the wall and say: We nailed somebody because this information may not have been completely accurate, we should ask: What did we know? Did we need to know more? Were there inaccuracies? If so, what were they, and what are we going to do about it? Do we need to completely reconstruct our intelligence community?

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Do we need to make some changes at the head of some of these agencies? I don't know yet. But that should be our approach because we are going to need our intelligence community. We need it this very day.

   Senator Kyl was making the point. Our troops are in the field today all over the world, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan. They are working with the intelligence community today to try to make sure they know what is going on and what is happening, what the threats are. We don't want to undermine them. At the same time, if we are going to make improvements or changes, the sooner we can do it, the better.

   The other thing is, what did we know. It is almost as if there were no weapons of mass destruction. We knew they had weapons of mass destruction--chemical, biological. They tried to get nuclear capability. We know they killed their own people. They used chemical weapons on the Iranians. I was talking to a constituent this morning who was in Bazra back in the early 1990s, who talked about how simple it was to produce chlorine gas. Yet if you looked at the plant, you could be told, this is just a plastics plant. But it is very simple to make chlorine gas. It is very toxic, and that was what was used, I believe, against the Iranians. So we know they had these weapons of mass destruction.

   Did they dismantle them, destroy them? Where did they destroy them? Why did Saddam Hussein give out bad information? Was he being lied to? Yes. Was he lying to the world community? Yes. There are all kinds of problems or questions such as that.

   Did they move these weapons to Syria, Iran? We know they had them. That is a fact. We still don't know exactly what happened to them, and that is a danger.

   What are we going to do about it? Let's become a government of commissions. It is really easy. Pass it off to a commission--the base-closure procedure, the 9/11 investigation, Social Security, intelligence. Let the Congress just say: We know nothing; we see nothing; we hear nothing. Let's let somebody else do it.

   By the way, I have watched these commissions. Just because you have Republicans and Democrats, are you going to call them independent? How about an independent commission set up by the President that might have people who weren't clearly Republican or Democrat? How about experts on intelligence, people who have been at the CIA and the FBI, people who are not identified in the political area? If you want a real independent commission, that might be the way to do it.

   I have another question: Why don't we do our own work? What do we have the intelligence committee for? The more I am on there, the more I think maybe we should not have it the way it is presently constituted. We are not going to wait for the Senate Intelligence Committee to put out its report. We are not going to wait on the House, bipartisan, Select Intelligence Committee to put out its report. No, we are going to rush pellmell and create a commission before we even see the report.

   I suspect the report from the Senate Intelligence Committee is going to be more aggressive than a lot of people might think. I think we are going to ask a lot of legitimate questions. How about letting the Iraqi survey team, the group that is out there still looking, do their work. But, no, it is a political year. We are going to use this to question all kinds of people.

   The President got information on which he relied. The Senate got information it relied on. If there was inaccurate information, we ought to find out why and determine what we are going to do about it. We need to back off a little bit because we are dealing with people's lives. How we act in the intelligence area is going to be very important in the next few months.

   I yield the floor.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia.

   Mr. CHAMBLISS. I thank the Senator from Arizona and the Senator from Mississippi for including me in this time because this is the most critical issue, obviously, facing not just the administration but the American public today. It is an issue which has already been adequately addressed, but it is not a new issue.

   The fact of failures within the intelligence community is not something newly discovered. We knew following 9/11 that there were deficiencies within our intelligence community that probably allowed September 11 to happen. What have we done since that time?

   As the Senator from Mississippi said: It was time to step up to the plate after 9/11, fix the problems. That is what we did in a bipartisan way, and we have done that since that point in time.

   Now we are moving into an election year, and we are seeing sniping for political reasons and not solving problems for the right reasons. The problem continues to be out there, the problem of deficiencies within the intelligence community. It is not new. It is the same problem. It is a little bit different area.

   We, as Members of this body and as Members of the House of Representatives, have an obligation to the American people to find out what went wrong. But let's not politicize it. Let's figure out what was wrong. By the way, when you look at the deficiencies in our intelligence community and you try to point the finger at them, you can't stop there. If you are going to point it at our intelligence community, what about the French intelligence community that believed exactly the same thing as our intel community? What about the German community, the British community? Every intelligence agency in the world had the same information and the same facts that we had.

   Our President was presented with the facts that every other head of state was presented, but it was the Americans who were the target of the bad guys around the world. It was the Americans who were the victims on September 11 and were the potential victims thereafter. Our President exercised good, sound judgment based upon the information that he had and based upon the information that every other head of state had.

   We can talk about the fact that we ought not to politicize the commission but we have, in fact, politicized the issue. There is a major, fundamental difference in trying to say that intelligence was faulty and at the same time trying to intimate that this administration exercised misleading acts. That is something entirely different, and that is an issue that we can debate long and hard. But it is simply not a fact substantiated by any of the evidence. Whereas the fact that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction had been substantiated time and time again since 1992, as the Senator from Mississippi delineated. It has been substantiated by intelligence communities from every other country in the world up until the time the Iraqi conflict began. There was no misleading on the part of this administration based upon the facts with which they were presented.

   Let me address one item in particular that the Senator from Illinois stated. He and I both serve on the Intelligence Committee. This issue relative to the UAVs and the possible--I emphasize ``possible''--use by Saddam Hussein of UAVs to distribute biological weapons being an issue:

   He knows good and well that we received information that indicated it was a possibility. We don't know for sure that was their intention, but we know good and well that it was a possibility.

   So we could go down the line item by item with each of the statements that have been made. I will go back and conclude with what the Senator from Mississippi said. We can argue and take 10 minutes on each side to discuss this, but what the American people expect is leadership. What this administration is exhibiting is leadership. This body ought to do the same. We ought to exercise leadership to the American people because that is what we were sent here to do. We could come together and say we know what happened; now let's find the answer; let's figure out what the solution is to the problem at hand within our intelligence community in a bipartisan way, and nobody disputes that is the way we ought to act.

   I say what we need to do is quit debating the issue and move forward now with finding out what the problem was, and let's do what is in the best interest of the American people, and that is continue to work hard to make America a safe place.

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   I yield the floor.

4F) Intelligence Operations

   Mr. CORZINE. Mr. President, I rise to speak on an issue about which I have spoken a number of times and which I passionately believe needs to be addressed--frankly, it is one that is well past the maturation stage where it should have been addressed--and that is an independent look at our intelligence operations, particularly as they relate to the pre-Iraqi invasion and how conclusions were drawn, so that can speak to the American people about the facts we had.

   It is an issue which I think is essential to the national security of the American people. If we don't learn from our mistakes, we are bound to make those mistakes again. It is high time we have gotten around to it.

   In the past few days, the administration and the world have come to understand and acknowledge on a broad basis the colossal intelligence failures that led us to war, a war that may have led to good ends, but the Nation clearly didn't come to those conclusions on the basis of the information we now seem to be discovering.

   There is a question about means to an end that I think is pretty simple in the kinds of discussions I think all of us have in the families and in the communities in which we live. I don't think we want to get into a position where means justify ends when they don't relate to them. I just point that out as some of this discussion has evolved.

   On January 8, Secretary of State Colin Powell addressed the lack of connection between Iraq and al-Qaida, stating;

   I've not seen a smoking gun, concrete evidence about that connection.

   We were told something different.

   Then the President, in his latest State of the Union Address, referred only to weapons of mass destruction and related program activities, whatever that is--a far cry from the active nuclear program and stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons warned of in his last State of the Union Message in 2003.

   It was last week's testimony from David Kay, the man responsible for the weapons search in Iraq, that finally brought this matter to maturity and captured the attention of the Nation, the administration, and the world, and that has really changed the whole context of this debate and discussion.

   Dr. Kay, a man who told us last fall that Iraq's nuclear programs were only at the most rudimentary level, told the Senate Armed Services Committee there was no evidence of stockpiles of chemical or biological weapons.

   David Kay has made an important recommendation--one that I think has been obvious for a number of months--that an independent inquiry be established so that the American people, so that the allies of the United States and those who would work with us, so that all of us who are involved in policymaking know we have the facts that allow us to make good decisions so that we are not committing the lives of our men and women in our military to efforts that are based on false premises, whether those are intentional or unintentional.

   We need to have the right answers, and that recommendation apparently has now led--some might say forced--the President to announce he will name a panel to look at the intelligence issues related to Iraq.

   I welcome the President's reversal on this critical need, and I suspect we will

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see a reversal of support for that

   concept among my colleagues, about which there have been some healthy debates in the last months.

   This is about the Nation's national security, make no mistake. We need to understand on a collection basis, on an analysis basis, and, yes, on a use basis, just exactly how we got to the kinds of conclusions we did. The means need to be understood so that we can connect them with the end, so that we don't make the same mistakes again and again.

   I have serious concerns, however, at least from early reports about what the details of the President's plan for this commission will be, that the response is inadequate--I think seriously inadequate. This needs to be an independent commission.

   How do we get to an independent commission? How do we make certain that the judgments we get are not designed or at least limited to only a mission defined by those we are actually looking at? And second, will that commission be allowed to explore the use of intelligence, or the misuse, if you will?

   I haven't seen the details. I don't think any of us have. We are reading press reports. But if they are true, it would give the appearance that we don't want to have a commission that is going to deal with the fundamental crux of a lot of these questions. Quite obviously, if we don't deal with the crux of the questions, then are we going to get results that create credibility with the American people, with this body, with the world, on whom we need to count to do things as we go forward? Are we going to get to those kinds of conclusions?

   If that is not the case, then I don't think we are headed in the right direction. I am very afraid we are moving into something that may satisfy a call for a commission to investigate our intelligence, but not yet at the fundamental problems that led us to this particular decision in Iraq, but also can be and may have well been replicated in other areas.

   I actually think the President is right to talk about it in a broader context. It is just an issue of, sequentially, which one do we look at first. Even by the inspection on the ground, we are told that 15 percent of the issues haven't been examined on the ground in Iraq. We need to deal with where our men and women are being killed now, as opposed to putting off and putting together all of these various issues.

   We have what some people might say is a tactical issue with respect to Iraq and a strategic problem with our intelligence operations in a more general context. Fine, we should look at a broader scope of issues to get to the restructuring of our intelligence operations, but we need to deal with the reality of, how did our intelligence serve us so poorly, how were the conclusions so far off the mark? Was there a problem with collection? Was there a problem with analysis? Or was there a problem in selectivity and use of the intelligence provided?

   As I said, it was last summer when I first offered legislation to establish an independent commission. I think we ought to get to a truly bipartisan, independent commission, one that is not unlike what we see with the 9/11 Commission, headed by the former Governor of New Jersey, a Republican, who is doing, in my view, an incredible service to our Nation. It is a diligent, independent, bipartisan approach to find out the facts that led to that tragedy with which all of us live each and every day,

   whether it is in your local hometown, like it is the case in mine, or whether it is in the broader context of the Nation.

   Given the fact that we have had Presidential claims that Iraq had sought to purchase uranium in Africa, which could not be justified or substantiated by intelligence, is enough to ask the question whether intelligence was properly used. It clearly was not, because the President himself has denied that that should have been in the State of the Union.

   So how did that intelligence get misused? How did that come about? Similarly, with regard to the aluminum tube issue, on which a whole host of folks have spoken out both publicly, and I have read some things privately, that call into question whether that was ever a viable concept for intelligence to be used as one of the justifications for entering into this conflict.

   How can that happen? We need to have certainty and independence in judging how we got to the collection, the analysis, and the use of the intelligence. I think that is important if we are going to go forward with certainty and credibility with regard to our efforts in using our intelligence for proper and effective policy formulation in the years ahead. We need it so we can speak to the world with credibility, and it will not take place, in my view, if we do not have that independent commission.

   So I want to reemphasize the point that use of the information is also very important. We have seen time after time, and opinion after opinion, of a number of people, outside of the David Kay remarks, that much of the use has actually been disputed within the intelligence community. I cite in particular an officer from the State Department, Gregg Thielmann--and I will try to get his particular title--who has made the assertion that we are basically operating under faith-based interpretations of a lot of information. He goes back and cites the Nigeria uranium and the use of aluminum tubes, disputes about stockpiles that were reported, and many elements of different perspectives with regard to the intelligence that was available to policymakers.

   How did we get such a one-sided view? I think some people would argue it might be misuse. Some may argue it is selectivity. I think we need an independent commission so we can get to the bottom of these. I think we need to understand how the administration could make public statements that contradicted some of the analysis or failed to incorporate the balance that was actually involved in the communities' reports. Why did these reports Congress mandated under the very resolution that granted the President the authority to go to war include some of those unsubstantiated claims I talked about? Were members of the intelligence community pressured to produce analyses that conformed to the administration policies? They even set up an extra body within the Defense Department to derive points of view that would be used in the Defense Department independent of traditional agencies that are involved in the intelligence. Did the administration officials seek to bypass that normal process by cherry-picking?

   I think all of these questions are real and they are ones that need to be independently analyzed. There are plenty of outside experts. I think a lot of people have heard about the Carnegie Endowment study that reported last week, and I quote:

   Administration officials systematically misrepresented the threat from Iraq's WMD and ballistic

   missile programs.

   They may not have all of the information. That is why we need a commission to straighten this out and to give us all confidence that we can go forward.

   I spoke about Mr. Thielmann, who was the former director of the Office of Strategic Proliferation and Military Affairs in the State Department. He is incredibly offended by the difference between the information he saw and presented to the Secretary of State, as the one who is responsible for collating that, and what he has seen stated in the public. So how did those kinds of differences come to pass? Why are we dealing with such discrepancies?

   The commission I proposed would be established by law independent of any executive orders to change its mission, change its role, change its scope. Its members would be selected by the leadership of both parties, balanced, kind of like the 9/11 Commission which I think people would argue as being very independent and is on the right track; receive an independent budget so there would not be issues about how thoroughly they might be able to pursue particular avenues of research; and would be directed to examine every aspect of this critical problem; obviously all elements of the collection, all elements of the analysis, and all elements of use from top to bottom, from our intelligence operatives to the White House.

   By the way, in my view, Congress looks to provide the checks and balances that are expected through our constitutional offices.

   I think this commission should be thorough and we need an end result

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that gives us all confidence that when we make decisions that send 120,000, 130,000 or 150,000 of our men and women into battle that they are fighting a war based on information that was intended to give pure advice as best understood. I do not think the looking back--20/20 hindsight is always better, but looking back, one has to question whether the claims that Saddam Hussein posed a dire and immediate threat to the United States were real. It is important that we have a full examination, particularly when there were other alternatives that would not have necessarily cost American lives, such as continued pursuit of U.N. inspections which were claimed to have been ineffective, further diplomacy pointless, when in fact apparently all of those efforts at U.N. inspections and other things had actually been successful. There has been a huge failure, one that is very real in the lives of the families who have given up their sons and daughters, and I think one that morally requires we have an independent, bipartisan commission that gets to answers independently of any of us who have been involved in the decisionmaking, because if we do not have that I think we are going to always have questions of credibility as we go forward.

   So I hope we can work together. I certainly intend to offer either on a stand-alone basis or in an amendment format an additional opportunity to support a truly independent and bipartisan commission that can get to the bottom of something I think is fundamental to the national security of this Nation, and make sure all of our sons and daughters are fighting wars and protecting America with the kind of information that is there for the best interests of us executing our policies, not for the best execution of our political desires.

   I yield the floor.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Missouri.

   Mr. BOND. Mr. President, I want to answer some of the concerns raised by my colleague from New Jersey. Basically what he is describing is the Intelligence Committee. For 8 months, our staffs have interviewed over 200 people. They have gone through thousands of pages of documents. We have investigated all of the charges and all of the concerns that have been raised.

   There will be a preliminary report provided to the members of the Intelligence Committee on Thursday. Starting afresh with another congressional commission is not warranted. The report of the Intelligence Committee has not been seen.

   There are certain things that we know we have seen supported. I believe everybody believes David Kay is credible. When he testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee on January 28 this year, he said: I think the world is far safer with the disappearance and the removal of Saddam Hussein. I have said I actually think this may be one of the cases where it was even more dangerous than we thought. I think when we have the complete record you are going to discover that after 1998 it became a regime that was totally corrupt, individuals were out for their own protection. In a world where we know others are seeking WMD, the likelihood at some point in the future of a seller and buyer meeting up would have made that a far more dangerous country than even we anticipated with what may turn out not to be a fully accurate estimate.

   There is no question about it not being a fully accurate estimate. This is one of the areas where I think all of us would agree, we did not have as good intelligence as we should have. We didn't have as good intelligence in the 1990s, when we should have. And President Clinton, on February 17, 1998, said:

   If Saddam rejects peace and we have to use force our purpose is clear. We want to seriously diminish the threat posed by Iraq's weapons of mass destruction program.

   Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, a day later, said:

   Iraq is a long way from here but what happens there matters a great deal here. For the risks that the leaders of a rogue state will use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons against us or our allies is the present greatest security threat we face.

   Sandy Berger, the National Security Adviser, said on that same day:

   He will use those weapons of mass destruction again as he has 10 times since 1983.

   All of the people who are making these statements have access to the intelligence information that we as Senators get. We realize, based on what David Kay stated, that we badly underestimated the ballistic missile capability. As a matter of fact, Senator Graham of Florida was prescient in a letter he wrote. In a letter dated December 5, 2001, signed by many others, he said:

   There is no doubt Saddam Hussein has reinvigorated his weapons program. Reports indicate biological, chemical and nuclear programs continue apace and may be back to prewar status. In addition Saddam continues to redefine ``delivery system'' and is doubtless using the cover of a licit missile program to develop long range missiles that will threaten the United States and our allies.

   That one was right on the mark because that is what we found.

   What are the needs? Obviously, when there are not people who speak Arabic, when we do not have unofficial agents in the country, we are missing out on one of the important elements of a good intelligence program. But, you know something. It is not just Iraq. We didn't know how far Libya was along until Muammar Qadhafi, not wanting to be pulled out of a spider hole by an American soldier standing over him with a grenade, decided he would come clean. We were unaware of how far Iran has gone. And, clearly, prior to the first gulf war, we did not know just how far advanced Saddam Hussein's programs were.

   We also know--and David Kay was clear about this--that we cannot account for weapons of mass destruction that he had. There didn't have to be a large stockpile. A suitcase full of anthrax or ricin, or even a handful, can be a great terrorist weapon, and we will be lucky if we find that small amount, particularly after you look at the lengthy program of denial, deception, and destruction in which he engaged.

   There is a lot of intelligence that was lacking with respect to Saddam Hussein. We have to do a better job. The purpose of the Senate Intelligence Committee, one of five or six committees already investigating it, is to find out not only what we lacked but also to recommend changes because the one area on which we would agree is that we have to have a better system of intelligence. What we learn is going to put us on that track.

   I know the staff has worked hard. I am looking forward to

   the report. I will be surprised if it does not confirm what David Kay says and lay out some recommendations. The President has a responsibility as well. We have an oversight responsibility. If he wants people to look at it, to tell him how to improve it: Good luck. Go ahead. But we have the Iraqi Survey Group, internal investigations, and I believe probably the best investigation is what the Senate Intelligence Committee has done.

   I apologize. I know my colleague from Illinois wants to speak so I will yield the floor.

   Mr. CORZINE. Will the Senator from Missouri be willing to take a question with regard to the Senate Intelligence effort?

   Mr. BOND. I will be happy to.

   Mr. CORZINE. First of all, I compliment him. I am quite supportive of the Senate Intelligence Committee doing a total rundown on both the collection and the analysis that led both to the Iraq situation and some of the failures he mentioned with regard to Iran and Libya and different points of view. God knows the Pakistani dissemination of technology we have read about in the newspapers in recent months is a pretty horrific proliferation issue about which I think all of us should be concerned.

   But there is this fundamental issue of whether intelligence has been misused and whether we are getting the checks and balances in looking at the collected and analyzed information. Are we looking at the full range of possibilities?

   I ask my colleague from Missouri, am I correct that the chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee said that studying the use of the intelligence information was really not part of the efforts the Senate Intelligence Committee would take on in this process? I think the record would be specific. But is that the case or not?

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Missouri.

   Mr. BOND. Mr. President, to respond to that question, what the Intelligence Committee looks at is what is the intelligence that was gathered. There

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have been some suggestions that the intelligence was influenced or colored by pressure from the administration. David Kay said absolutely not. He said he talked to the analysts, there was absolutely no information--there was absolutely no information--and he said that really the intelligence community owes an apology to the President--and I would say to the American people--for not having done it better. But they are dealing with a very inexact science.

   If you follow what other elected officials had said prior, during the 1990s, 2001, 2002--what they were saying shows that they used the same intelligence. We are looking at the intelligence, the national intelligence estimates and all those things. We look at it, and if you want to second-guess, if you want to argue that we should not have gone into Iraq, I think David Kay answers that and says the world is far safer. It was a much more dangerous situation than we thought.

   Yes, there are errors. There are areas where we overestimated his capability. There are areas where we underestimated his capability. But the fact remains that Saddam Hussein had so much weaponry, it is going to take 18 months just to destroy it. He still may have chemical and biological weapons. We look at what the intelligence is.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

   Mr. DURBIN. I ask unanimous consent to be recognized in morning business for 30 minutes.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

   Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, let me say at the outset I commend my colleague from New Jersey, Senator Corzine, who came to this floor several months ago and said we need an independent commission to look at the intelligence that led up to an invasion of Iraq, and the use of that intelligence, and called for a vote on that issue. I don't remember the final outcome of that vote, but I know I stood with him because I thought it was the right thing to do. Many people on our side of the aisle and the other side of the aisle resisted that suggestion, saying the Senate Intelligence Committee would be able to do this investigation.

   But the Senator from New Jersey has hit the nail on the head. Senator Roberts, the chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, made it clear long ago that our committee, the Senate Intelligence Committee, would not look into the use of intelligence but, rather, whether it was accurately gathered and presented to the policymakers. That is a critically important question and one that would be part of any valid investigation.

   But equally important, if not more, is whether or not that information, once given to the policymakers, was honestly communicated to the American people. I can think of nothing worse in this open forum of government than to have the suggestion that there were misrepresentations made to the American people on something as critical as a decision to invade a sovereign nation.

   That is the question before the Senate.

   This week's Newsweek cover story is based on Dr. David Kay's testimony last week before Congress. It has pictures of the leaders of the Bush administration and the quote from Dr. Kay, ``We Were All Wrong.''

   The obvious question is, Where was the error made? Was it just in the collection of intelligence data or was it in the portrayal of that data, the description of that data to the American people? That is a painful question and a delicate question but an important question.

   Senator Corzine has said for many months we need to have people come and ask that question, both questions, in an honest and bipartisan way. I salute him for his leadership on this issue. I know he has been frustrated by the rejection of the Senate for his proposal, but now it is full circle. Now, even the President, who once opposed him, says it is time to move to a commission.

   Mr. CORZINE. Will the Senator yield?

   Mr. DURBIN. I am happy to yield.

   Mr. CORZINE. It seems to me it is absolutely essential we understand how the President of the United States can put those 16 words--which were in absolute conflict with the information that generally was available in the Intelligence Committee, if I read that properly--into the State of the Union Message of 2003 with regard to aluminum tubes and with regard to uranium and then later the whole discussion, particularly Secretary Powell's presentation to the U.N. of the use of aluminum tubes. This was also in very strong contradiction to much of the information that is now available. We could go on, with unmanned aerial vehicles and a whole series of other issues.

   So somehow or another there were disputes about the response that one should make with regard to collection and analysis of data. And that gets at the fundamental question of how did we use or misuse the intelligence that was presented. To not come up with an answer that is credible to the American people, credible to policymakers in this body, and credible to our allies and the world community is a failure of leadership on our part. It becomes absolutely essential that any independent commission needs to deal with the use, not just the collection and analysis.

   Is that how the Senator from Illinois feels?

   Mr. DURBIN. Yes, which is why I supported the early resolution. I hope the Senate will return to that. I hope we can find a way to choose people who are fair arbiters. There is a fear on the other side that something will be done to embarrass the administration before an election, especially a feeling we should let the chips fall where they may. Can't we find people in this country--I think we can--who will be honest, dispassionate, and nonpartisan?

   At issue is not just a question of who comes out ahead on the political ledger sheet. The question before the Senate is one of the most important elements for America's national defense and security. If we had planes being flown in Iraq that were crashing, if we had tanks that could not shoot straight, if we had a lot of equipment over there that was failing, we would hear very quickly from the press, from the public, from the Pentagon, that we need an investigation.

   Here we have a failure of something equally important, a failure of intelligence. We need to get to the bottom of it. If we are going to be successful in any war on terrorism, we need the very best intelligence in the world. Clearly, our

   intelligence failed us in the leadup to the invasion of Iraq.

   We find ourselves today in a situation which is likely to be long term, costing American taxpayers $1 billion a week but, more importantly, continuing to cost American lives. That is a compelling reason to move on this with dispatch.

   I sincerely hope Senator Corzine's suggestion is followed up on as quickly as possible.

   Mr. DORGAN. Will the Senator yield?

   Mr. DURBIN. I am happy to yield.

   Mr. DORGAN. I ask the Senator from Illinois if it is not the case that the gathering of intelligence--today, tonight, tomorrow morning, yesterday--might be the very function that determines whether our country is able to determine and prevent a future terrorist attack against our country; isn't the intelligence-gathering system that important?

   Mr. DURBIN. I say to the Senator from North Dakota, more important than it has ever been, since September 11. It is only with valid, credible, good intelligence that we are able to anticipate someone who is trying to cause harm to the American people or to strike us in our territory or to, frankly, attack our special interests around the world. Intelligence is a critical part of our national defense.

   Mr. DORGAN. I inquire if the gathering of intelligence is so critical--and the Newsweek magazine describes it as a failure in the description by Mr. Kay, the top weapons inspector--if, in fact, it is a failure, then I would expect that the President of the United States, the Congress, and the American people would demand, on an urgent basis, that we figure out what happened, what is wrong, and how to fix it. Not later, now. The safety and security of this country depends on it.

   With respect to the issue of intelligence, we ought to now understand, having the vision in the rearview mirror, the issue is not what we think but, rather, what we know when a country changes a doctrine, as the President did, with respect to preemptive attacks. If you talk about preemption

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you better know things rather than think things.

   I went back and reread the presentation to the United Nations by the Secretary of State. When he made that presentation, I thought to myself, that is a masterful presentation. And what he did, interestingly enough, is say: We know the following; we know the following; we know. And he put pictures up and he put up pieces of information--we know this from human resources; we know this from inspections; we know this from satellite photos.

   They did not know it. What he said we knew turns out to have been fundamentally wrong.

   So it seems to me the President, the Congress, and the American people ought to demand on an urgent basis there be an independent commission to find out what on Earth happened and how do we fix it.

   Let me make one final point, if I might. Can there really be an independent commission, when a President, who did not want a commission in the first place, and said in recent weeks he did not want a commission, now will say our executive branch and our administration will create a commission that is independent? Can that really be a commission? Or is it not the case that a truly independent commission would be one that follows the course that we usually follow on urgent issues, and that is, we put in law, a law from Congress, that creates and funds a commission and

   creates a truly independent body to take a hard look at what happened.

   The executive branch cannot possibly have a commission that investigates itself. This is not about politics. There is no political way to talk about safety and security of the American people and our great reliance on intelligence.

   This is not about Republicans or Democrats. This is about the future of this country and getting it right. It is critically important.

   The Senator from New Jersey and what he has been talking about for months about this independent commission is right on the mark, as is the Senator from Illinois. I am pleased to join him in this discussion about how important intelligence really is.

   I ask that 10 minutes be added to the Senator's allocation for his presentation.

   Mr. DURBIN. I think the Senator said something important in relation to the September 11 commission, a commission which is headed up by former Republican Governor Kean of New Jersey, which has asked for an extension of time, so on a bipartisan basis they can ask all the questions as to whether or not we did anything wrong that led up to September 11, and what we could have done to prevent it.

   Former President Bill Clinton said to a gathering of Senators, I am prepared to testify before that commission. I am prepared to cooperate with them completely. If there was any shortcoming or failing in my administration, so be it. It is more important that the American people know that we have done everything in our power to make this a safer nation.

   That should be the attitude of all Members. We should swallow our political pride and say this is not about partisanship. If an error was made by any President, Democrat or Republican, which has put us in harm's way or endangered America's security, don't we deserve to know that? The fact that the Senate Intelligence Committee has drawn a line and said they are not going to even ask the question as to whether the intelligence was misused by any member of the Bush administration tells me they are being politically protective. They are protecting the political interests of the White House instead of the paramount concern, which should be protecting the American people.

   I hope, frankly, there is an independent commission that asks hard questions of those in the Clinton administration and President George W. Bush's administration and any administration that might have some bearing on the intelligence capacity of America and on the protection of this great Nation.

   I thank the Senators who joined in on this important issue.

4G) Iraq Intelligence Lapses

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee) is recognized for 5 minutes.

   Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, the blessings of this Nation are that we are a Republic, a constitutional Republic, that the Founding Fathers were wise enough to establish three distinct branches of government. I take that distinction and that constitutional mandate very seriously and believe that the congressional legislative branch has a responsibility of oversight over the executive as the judiciary remains as an independent component.

   The administration of this government, the executive, engaged in a debate in the fall of 2002 that suggested to the American people that we were about to be attacked by Iraq. It was a vigorous debate. There was great, if you will, challenge to the administration's facts; and they waged a very public, if you will, campaign to convince the American people and to convince the United States Congress that we were about to be imminently attacked. It was a serious campaign, Mr. Speaker; it was a serious moment in our history. Members of this Congress took that debate very seriously.

   I recall very vividly great emotion on the floor of the House, great indecision, indecisiveness, great concern and conflictedness about whether we should go to war, whether or not the words of the President mentioned and the Axis of Evil that was then ultimately mentioned in the winter of 2003 was actually factual; but the administration was convinced. They have pushed the intelligence community to the point of representing to all of us that this information was factual.

   Let me share with my colleagues words from the administration: ``Simply stated, there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction ,'' Vice President DICK CHENEY, August 26, 2002.

   ``Right now, Iraq is expanding and improving facilities that were used for production of biological weapons ,'' President Bush, September 12, 2002.

   ``The Iraqi regime possesses and produces chemical and biological weapons . It is seeking nuclear weapons ,'' Bush, October 7, 2002.

   ``We have also discovered through intelligence that Iraq has a growing fleet of manned and unmanned aerial vehicles that will be used to disburse chemical and biological weapons across broad areas. We are concerned that Iraq is exploring ways of using the UAVs for missions targeting the United States,'' Bush, October 7, 2002.

   ``We know for a fact that there are weapons there,'' White House Spokesman, Ari Fleisher, January 9, 2003.

   ``The evidence indicates that Iraq is reconsidering its nuclear weapons program. Saddam Hussein has held numerous meetings with the Iraqi nuclear scientists, a group he calls his nuclear mujahadeen, his nuclear holy warriors. Satellite photographs reveal that Iraq is rebuilding facilities at sites that have been part of its nuclear program in the past,'' Bush, October 7, 2002.

   Mr. Speaker, I will be offering in the next couple of days the Protect America's National Security Act of 2004, the PANS Act of 2004. That is to demand congressional hearings by the Select Committee on Homeland Security, Committee on the Judiciary, the Committee on Armed Services, and Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, absolutely demanding that an inquiry be made on the question of the level of intelligence that was utilized to convince this Congress, both the House and the Senate, of the decision to go to war.

   I am against the bipartisan commission that has been offered by the President. Why? Because the President will be making the appointments regardless of the fact of whether they will be Democrats and Republicans. The President, the administration, the executive will be setting the time of the start and the completion of its work. I am concerned that any report and any investigation on the question of the type of intelligence that was given at the time of the decision made to go to war be challenged and it be an oversight by the Congress of the United States.

   I refuse to allow this Congress to abdicate its responsibility under the Constitution to give oversight of the question of whether or not the intelligence given was both legitimate and substantial and the basis on which it was made.

   To the American public, you deserve an answer. To the American public, you deserve that your congressional representatives engage in a process to investigate where there is no time set, where there is no end set, by the very executive that presented the intelligence.

   In addition, we should hurry this report. This report should be done within a 6-month period because it is time sensitive. Why is it time sensitive, Mr. Speaker? Because intelligence is a basic infrastructure of security of America. It determines how we secure our borders, it determines aviation security, it determines the difference or the different levels of alert that we propose day after day after day.

   It is crucial that the Congress rises to the level of oversight. It is interesting that we wish to push this very important work off to a civilian, if you will, commission which the very entity that we are investigating will be the one that will select both the participants and the procedures. Congress needs to use its subpoena powers and its investigatory powers in order to ensure that the American people have the truth.

   I ask my colleagues, Mr. Speaker, to join me in co-sponsoring the Protect America's National Security Act of 2004, which will ask for the general numbers of the CIA budget so that we will know, as was suggested by a former Reagan administration official.

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   I would like to thank my colleagues for taking the time to speak out tonight about this issue that is critical to the long-term survival of our Nation. I do not mean to use hyperbole. However, I truly believe that so much rides on our foreign intelligence gathering system. Our foreign policy, our trade policies, how we run our borders, what level of alert we are at, how we should live our day-to-day lives--it all is based on our understanding of what is happening in the world around us. If we are continually making decisions based on false assumptions and wrong interpretations, we could face a future full of 9/11s and unnecessary wars like the one still raging in Iraq today.

   In the run-up to war, top Administration officials, and the President himself, were making statements daily about the deadly weapons that Saddam Hussein was pointing at the American people. We heard that they had stockpiles of biological and chemical weapons . We heard they were trying to buy materials for nuclear weapons ; they had mobile weapons labs, and programs to develop more. One by one, these claims have been refuted. Last week, we heard Dr. David Kay, our own chief weapons inspector for the past year, testify that those claims were false.

   However, we went to war based mostly on those claims. The war that has taken the lives of more than 500 brave U.S. soldiers, killed tens of thousands of Iraqis, cost us hundreds of billions of dollars, and diminished our standing in the world community. We have to find

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out how this tragedy occurred, and make sure it doesn't happen again. The American people are calling for answers, and we need them urgently. On Friday, the President declared that he wants answers too. I commend him for that, but I am concerned that no matter how well-intentioned he is--the truth will not come out of his Administration.

   I am worried that a commission hand-picked by the executive branch, with an agenda and schedule crafted by the executive branch, will be incapable of producing an objective and useful assessment of executive branch failures. It is a fundamental human trait that groups tend to close ranks to shield themselves from scrutiny when they know they have made mistakes. That is why the framers of the Constitution built a system of checks and balances into our great government. The President has the power to veto any law Congress passes, and in return, Congress has a strict duty of oversight over the executive branch and the Agencies.

   It would be a gross dereliction of our duties, if Congress sits idly by and assumes that the Administration will take care of this problem. In fact, we have already seen that the President's Commission is getting off on the wrong foot. We are getting reports that it is too broad in scope, and may not yield any answers until next year. That is unacceptable. Our national security depends on reliable intelligence information. Furthermore, the President has stated that we are in a global ``War on Terror.'' we have soldiers on the ground around the world fighting that war. They, their families, and the American people, deserve to know what they are fighting for, and what dangers they may face. We simply don't have months or years to waste before we get around to fixing our intelligence-gathering system. We may be vulnerable now, so we cannot rest until we address this problem.

   Congressional leadership should immediately launch a series of full and comprehensive hearings, including Homeland Security, Judiciary, Armed Services, and Intel Committees from both the House and Senate. Within six months, we need to report back to the American people how the Administration could have been so far off the mark on Iraqi weapons . We must learn from that mistake first. After that, we can move on to broader issues.

   None of us knows what a real investigation will yield. It will take hard work to fully understand the function of our intelligence gathering agencies, since they are largely secret from the American people, and most Members of Congress. Even simple questions like, ``Are we putting enough money into Intel?'' is tough to answer since the CIA budget is top secret. I think we need to take a look at that policy. Funding of special programs should obviously be guarded. However, I think maybe the American people should have a general idea of how much we are spending on intelligence gathering, in total. Only then can they decide if they are getting their money's worth.

   But more important then the financing is the functionality. Do we have adequate manpower? Do we have reliable data? Are we interpreting that data properly? Have we compromised our analysis by poisoning it with politics and partisanship?

   The American people deserve answers. This isn't about politics; it is about prudence.

4H) Excerpts from David Kay’s Testimony

   Mr. KYL. Mr. President, with respect to the other subject which I wish to briefly deal with, this afternoon several of our Democratic colleagues have criticized the President and the administration and invoked the name of David Kay, a weapons inspector, to make the point that they claim proves the administration somehow misled the American people and the rest of the world in making the case for taking military action against Iraq. That is not true. I think it is time people start quoting David Kay properly to see just exactly what he said. I am briefly going to do that.

   I have a few excerpts from his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on January 28 of this year. Senator McCain asked him this question:

   [Y]ou agree with the fundamental principle here that what we did was justified and enhances the security of the world by removing Saddam Hussein from power?

   David Kay:

   Absolutely.

   Senator Kennedy asked this interesting question:

   Many of us feel that the evidence so far leads to only one conclusion: that what has happened was more than a failure of intelligence, it was the result of manipulation of the intelligence to justify a decision to go to war. .....

   David Kay responding:

   All I can say is if you read the total body of intelligence in the last 12 to 15 years that flowed on Iraq, I quite frankly think it would be hard to come to a conclusion other than Iraq was a gathering, serious threat to the world with regard to WMD.

   And WMD, as we know, is weapons of mass destruction .

   How about its violations of the United Nations resolutions? Somehow the impression has been created that maybe it was just a fraud, that Iraq

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really wasn't in violation of those resolutions, that somehow the weapons of mass destruction never existed. Here is what David Kay said:

   In my judgment, based on the work that has been done to this point of the Iraq Survey Group, and in fact, that I reported to you in October, Iraq was in clear violation of the terms of Resolution 1441. Resolution 1441 required that Iraq report all of its activities: one last chance to come clean about what it had. We have discovered hundreds of cases, based on both documents, physical evidence, and the testimony of Iraqis, of activities that were prohibited under the initial U.N. Resolution 687 and that should have been reported under 1441, with Iraqi testimony that not only did they not tell the U.N. about this, they were instructed not to do it, and they hid material.

   Going on:

   Iraq was in clear material violation of 1441. They maintained programs and activities, and they certainly had the intentions at a point to resume their program. So there was a lot they wanted to hide because it showed what they were doing was illegal. I hope we find even more evidence of that.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.

   Mr. KYL. Mr. President, if we are going to be quoting David Kay and talking about the state of our intelligence, go to the transcript and present a more fair and balanced picture than has been done today.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas.

4I) Musharraf’s Role in Nuclear Exchange

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Pallone) is recognized for 5 minutes.

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   Mr. PALLONE. Mr. Speaker, I rise this evening to again discuss Pakistani government transfer of nuclear technology to rogue nations such as North Korea, Iran and Libya.

   Pakistan's behavior has been publicized for months and months, but all of the blame for nuclear exchange has thus far been placed on the scientists involved, particularly Abdul Qadeer Khan at the Khan Research Laboratories. Although criminal action has been pursued against Khan, I have remained very concerned over President Musharraf's and his senior advisors' direct role in assisting covert nuclear weapons programs in North Korea, Iran, and Libya.

   In the past few days, scientists involved in the Pakistani nuclear program as well as opposition leaders in the Pakistani Parliament have charged that Musharraf, in fact, had knowledge of the nuclear exchange, and the Pakistani military was directly involved. Mr. Speaker, I am simply outraged. Musharraf likely knew that the exchanges took place, and is not being honest about his connection to the activity at the Khan Research Laboratories. He is stretching the truth in order to protect himself as well as his relationship to the United States, and to guarantee the continued flow of military funding from international sources, including the United States.

   In the past, I have requested that President Bush reimpose Symington sanctions on Pakistan. Under the 1977 Symington amendment, these sanctions were imposed banning Pakistan from receiving economic and military assistance as a result of importing uranium enrichment technology. After 9/11, this ban was waived by President Bush. Given the evidence, in combination with Musharraf's intent to deceive us about his knowledge of Pakistan's exports of nuclear technology, I feel that it is more important than ever for President Bush to reimpose Symington sanctions. Furthermore, it is imperative that the United States stop providing military assistance to Pakistan until democracy is restored and terrorist violence in Kashmir comes to an end.

   Mr. Speaker, Pakistan has been an ally in the war against global terror, but the United States and Pakistan are at a crossroads. Pakistan's government's participation in nuclear exchange, under Musharraf, has helped to create a nuclear black market in Iran, Libya and North Korea to thrive. I shouldn't even have to mention the devastating effects of uranium enrichment materials falling into the hands of terrorist groups, but this in fact is a concern that has been facilitated by Pakistan.

   The Bush administration has been praising Musharraf for removing Dr. Khan from his position as advisor to the Pakistani Prime Minister, but it is high time that the administration open its eyes to the reality of the situation and take immediate action against Pakistan.

4J) Report on Trip to Libya, Iraq, Afghanistan, Uzbekistan and Military Hospital in Germany

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. King of Iowa). Under the Speaker's announced policy of January 7, 2003, the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon) is recognized for 60 minutes as the designee of the majority leader.

   Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, the topic of my Special Order this evening, and I think I will be joined by other Members from both sides, is our recent trip to Libya, Iraq, Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, and our military hospital for our troops in Germany. But before I get into my comments about the trip, let me put some specific quotes from Dr. Kay, who has just been referred to by a previous speaker, who made the allegation that Dr. Kay said there was no basis for our activity in Iraq.

   Mr. Speaker, let me put the actual quote in the RECORD, not something that is paraphrasing, but the actual quote. In an interview that Dr. Kay conducted on NBC TV, he was asked to comment on whether it was prudent to go to war. Dr. Kay said, ``I think it was absolutely prudent. In fact, I think at the end of the inspection process, we will paint a picture of Iraq that was far more dangerous than we even thought it was before the war.''

   Mr. Speaker, that is not me paraphrasing; that is not me summarizing or putting my own spin on what Dr. Kay said. That is a direct quote from Dr. Kay, and the American people and our colleagues need to understand that as we analyze what has been said in the findings of the Kay report, that we actually look at those statements, as opposed to trying to spin them. Some of our colleagues on the other side, especially those running for the Presidency, have tried to put a spin on what Dr. Kay said. It is more important for the American people and for our colleagues to look at in actuality what he said.

   But, Mr. Speaker, there is one more point I want to make on this whole effort of the spin of Dr. Kay, which ties into our trip, because of the 45 meetings that we held over the 7 days, visiting eight different countries and traveling 25,500 miles in military aircraft, including a military aircraft to get over, a Navy plane, C-130s and

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Blackhawk helicopters in Iraq, I think the most significant meeting we had was in Iraq, and that meeting was with the individual who is actually responsible for the Iraqi Survey Group, which is actually doing the search for weapons of mass destruction.

   Now, Mr. Speaker, many of our colleagues in this room and many of the people around America have been convinced by the media that Dr. Kay was in charge of the investigation for weapons of mass destruction. Mr. Speaker, that is wrong. Dr. Kay was a consultant to the general who was in charge of the Iraq Survey Group, and that general is a two star general by the name of Keith Dayton.

   On our trip to Iraq, in Baghdad we were taken to the Fusion Center, where all of the intelligence is brought for the Iraqi Survey Group to do their work, and for 90 minutes members of the Republican Party and the Democrat Party who were a part of my bipartisan delegation had a chance to listen to the actual leader of the inspection process in Iraq give us an update.

   I want to share with our colleagues, Mr. Speaker, what General Dayton said. First of all, he was perplexed. He was frustrated. He could not understand why David Kay came back to America and made this public report when he had not yet, first of all, talked to the individual who was responsible for the Iraqi inspection process, General Dayton. In fact, all of the individuals that we met who were overseeing the 1,500 people who are involved in the Iraq survey team were equally frustrated.

   We learned, for instance, that when David Kay left Iraq, he was not entirely happy, because he was dissatisfied that General Dayton had other missions besides the search for weapons of mass destruction and actually had troops assigned to efforts like looking for our POW-MIA Scott Spiker, and also were involved in the anti-terrorism efforts on the ground. David Kay became upset and told this to General Dayton, that there were assets being diverted away from his efforts to look for weapons of mass destruction. That was one of the reasons why David Kay left the Iraqi theater to come back to America.

   Mr. Speaker, I have not seen that in the American media. I have not heard that story yet brought forward. But the individual in charge of the Iraq Survey Group, General Keith Dayton, told us that when we had our meeting with him in Baghdad.

   Mr. Speaker, we also learned that Dr. Kay had not been in Iraq for the last several months, during which time he could have had an exchange, an update of the work that was being done by the Iraq Survey Group. So, Mr. Speaker, I think it is essentially important that we take an additional step here.

   Now, Dr. Kay has issued a report that I think stands on its own and speaks for itself. It does not help when Members of this body or the media or candidates for the Presidency misinterpret what David Kay said. But we need to go beyond that, Mr. Speaker. We need to bring over the individual who was actually responsible for the weapons of mass destruction search in Iraq. That is not Dr. Kay; that is General Keith Dayton. General Dayton has that responsibility, and it is he who oversees those 1,500 people.

   General Dayton told us that they are in fact enthusiastic about the work they are doing. He explained to us the process now under way to send teams into the rivers of Iraq, the lakes of Iraq, the bodies of water where they have leads that perhaps weapons of mass destruction were dumped, and they are now conducting that search.

   They also told us, General Dayton and his colleagues, that there are literally millions of pages and volumes of documents that have yet to be searched that can provide leads as to where weapons of mass destruction might be.

   I can tell you after visiting the ``spider hole'' up in Takrit where Saddam Hussein was holed up for a number of days, that our military personnel went over top of that site a dozen times and never found Saddam Hussein. Now, that hole was rather large. So if we could not find a hole with Saddam in it for 8 or 9 months, then I think we certainly owe it to General Dayton to give him the time to continue the search for the evidence that he thinks in fact his team can come up with.

   So the point is, Mr. Speaker, that on this meeting in Iraq with the general in charge of the survey team for weapons of mass destruction, we got a clearly different picture from that that is being portrayed by the American media, both in terms of Dr. Kay's report and the spin that has been made on that report.

   Today, Mr. Speaker, Secretary Rumsfeld appeared before our Committee on Armed Services in the House, and I was the first Member of Congress that was invited to ask questions of Secretary Rumsfeld. I laid all of this out to him, and I asked him if he did not think it was time to do what the famous media person, Paul Harvey, used to say at the end of his stories: and now we will hear the other half of the story.

   Mr. Speaker, today I requested of Secretary Rumsfeld that Major General Keith Dayton be brought back to America to testify before the Congress about the work that he is directing right now on looking for weapons of mass destruction. Then Members of Congress can ask him about the conditions under which David Kay operated, that he was in fact a consultant to General Dayton. Then we can ask the questions about the circumstances under which Dr. Kay left Iraq. Was there friction? What was that friction? Then we can ask the most important question for the American people of a two star general who is apolitical and is not going to put any kind of a spin on his statement, What is your current effort in Iraq and do you expect and do you anticipate the ability to find weapons of mass destruction over the next several months?

   I can tell you, Mr. Speaker, what he told us unconditionally is that they are very much into this search. It has not ended; it is not winding down. In fact, they have placed more in the way of assets and resources into the search for weapons of mass destruction.

   Now, oftentimes in this city we do not pay attention to the facts. We try to spin things. So I think it is extremely important that we bring over General Keith Dayton to give us a firsthand accounting of the search for weapons of mass destruction and to give us the other half of the story to the findings of Dr. Kay, who was a consultant to General Dayton.

   Mr. Speaker, let me get back to the trip that we took, the bipartisan trip, which in fact was the first trip to Libya by Americans since 1969.

   My job as a member of the Committee on Armed Services for the past 17 years has been to make sure that we give our military the best equipment, the best technology, and the best training to allow them to continue to be the best military on the face of the Earth, and we have done that. I am a self-described hawk in terms of supporting our military.

   But, Mr. Speaker, as the vice chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, I consider my number one priority to be the avoidance of war, because war has always got to be the last choice, because when we commit our troops to war, then we put America's sons and daughters into harm's way, knowing full well that some or perhaps many of them will not return to their families.

   So over the past 17 years, while serving on the Committee on Armed Services, making sure our military has the equipment they need, is properly trained, and has the financial support that they deserve, I have spent an equal amount of time on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction technology and trying to find ways to take those enemies of ours and those would-be enemies of ours and turn them into, if not allies, at least countries that we can work with.

   My primary focus has been with the former Soviet states, where I have traveled almost 35 times and established a relationship with the parliaments of all of those former nations that were once a part of the Soviet Union. For the past 13 years, with my colleague, the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Hoyer), we have co-chaired a formal effort with the Duma in the Russian Government, the legislative body of that country, to establish a close relationship of friends and partners. We have had some ups and downs, but the fact is that we are still working aggressively together.

   We have done the same thing with Ukraine, with the Rada; with Moldova, with the Parliament; with Georgia,

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with their Parliament; with Azerbaijan and with Armenia. We have done it with Uzbekistan, and we are now reaching out to other countries that were once a part of the Soviet Union to bring all of those countries into a level of cooperation and understanding with us.

   Mr. Speaker, the Soviet Union and its republics were the source of much of the technology that ended up in the hands of the Libyans, the Iraqis, the Iranians, the North Koreans and the Syrians. In fact, Mr. Speaker, during the 1990s, I must have given 100 speeches on what we saw occurring on a regular basis, the transfer of technology from Russia and China and those former Soviet states into the hands of those five countries that I just mentioned. Time and again there were violations of arms control agreements. But the response of the administration in the nineties was to pretend we did not see it, because the administration was more concerned with keeping Boris Yeltsin in power, even when the people of Russia had come to believe that he was no longer a credible leader for their nation.

   Mr. Speaker, we did the same thing in reaching out to other countries, like China, that in fact were heading towards a course of perhaps being an enemy of the U.S.; leading six delegations to that Nation; being the only elected official asked to speak two times at the National Defense University of the People's Liberation Army in Beijing.

   Finally, Mr. Speaker, last May, after 2 years of planning, I was proud to take the first delegation of Members of Congress, again a bipartisan delegation, into Pyongyang, North Korea, the goal there being to support the President and continuing the dialogue of the six nations to eventually resolve the conflict between North Korea, South Korea and the rest of the world.

   In fact, Mr. Speaker, following the next round of six-way talks at the end of this month, I will again lead a delegation back into North Korea to continue a positive effort to support our President in finding a peaceful solution to the Korean nuclear crisis, again to avoid war, because of the consequence of putting America's sons and daughters into harm's way.

[Time: 20:45]

   Now, I also fully realize, Mr. Speaker, that that is not always possible, and one case in point was Iraq. We gave Saddam Hussein 18 chances to abide by U.N. resolutions, 18 opportunities to come clean, to basically come forward and tell the world what he had been doing. And the response of Saddam Hussein was to thumb his nose at us and at the rest of the world and to defy the world community. As a result, the President was left with no choice when he asked us to support him in a resolution of war.

   For the life of me, Mr. Speaker, I cannot understand the logic of those in this body and the leader of France, Jacques Chirac, and the leader of Germany Gerhard Schroeder who criticized President Bush for going into Iraq to remove Saddam Hussein. Because what is interesting is, just 4 short years ago, many of these same people criticizing President Bush from this body, as well as Jacques Chirac and Gerhard Schroeder, were the very individuals pushing Bill Clinton into a war in Yugoslavia to remove Milosevic from power. And guess what, Mr. Speaker? When Schroeder and Chirac and some of the Members of this body who are criticizing President Bush pushed Bill Clinton into an armed conflict, they did not go to the U.N. for a resolution, because they knew full well that Russia would veto any such resolution of the Security Council. So what did they do? Bill Clinton, Gerhard Schroeder, and Jacques Chirac, supported by many of those in this body who have been criticizing President Bush, did not go to the U.N. as George Bush did, they went to NATO.

   Now, Mr. Speaker, NATO is a defensive body. It was organized as a defensive entity to defend Europe and the NATO countries from an attack by a nation like the Soviet Union. NATO was never meant to be an offensive organization. But in 1999, many of those same people, including many of those Democrat candidates for President today, were out there supporting Jacques Chirac and Gerhard Schroeder and Bill Clinton in using NATO for the first and only time ever in its history as an offensive invasion force into a non NATO country.

   So we invaded Yugoslavia. We bombed Serbia. We removed Milosevic, who was a war criminal. But what is so confusing to me, Mr. Speaker, is that those same people who were on Bill Clinton's band wagon to invade Serbia and Yugoslavia because Milosevic was a war criminal, all of a sudden, having supported George Bush, even though he went to the U.N. for the 17th and 18th time, even though Saddam Hussein has been characterized by everyone, from Max Vanderstadt, the U.N. Human Rights Advisor, to Amnesty International as the worst human rights abuser since Adolf Hitler, did not want to support the effort in Iraq. Sounds like politics to me, Mr. Speaker. It does not sound like much consistency or substance.

   How can you be for removing a war criminal like Milosevic from power and not going through the U.N., but using NATO as an offensive force, and then 4 years later, criticize President Bush after having gone to NATO for the 17th and 18th time, after having given Saddam Hussein every opportunity, and then, in the end, who decided we had to remove this war criminal, this user of weapons of mass destruction, as he did against the Kurds, as he did against the Iranians, from power. It does not make sense to me, Mr. Speaker, unless, of course, you add in the political equation.

   But again, in that case, I thought the military action was justified, but I would say in the case of North Korea and Libya and perhaps Iran, if we can avoid conflict, we should take every opportunity to explore that to its end.

   That is why, Mr. Speaker, almost a year ago, at a conference on world energy issues in Houston, Texas, I challenged major international energy corporations to come together and establish an International Energy Advisory Council, to specifically focus on the use of energy as a mechanism to avoid war and as a mechanism to help us solve regional conflicts that could lead to major escalations of war. That group, headed up by Jeffrey Waterers, had an initial meeting in Washington, D.C. in July in the Rayburn Office Building, where Chalabi came over from Iraq and spoke to the energy leaders about Iraq postwar. We had major leaders from the State Department and DOD came into speak, and allowed the energy corporations, including those from Iraq and Iran, to come together and see if energy could not provide a partial solution to the crisis both in Iraq as well as other crises around the world.

   In October, a second forum was held in London, again attended by all of the major leaders around the world in the energy industry, which I could not attend. But following that meeting, I set up a private meeting with Colonel Gadhafi's son, Saif al Saleem al Gadhafi, a 34-year-old, London-educated, Ph.D. candidate at the London School of Economics, who today is apparently, according to some pundits, in line to succeed his father as the leader of Libya.

   I wanted to meet this individual, because we had mutual interests, to see whether or not there was a possibility of breaking new ground with Libya politically, of seeing whether or not there would be a movement away from the policies of the past, which I had heard to be rumored back in the middle part of last year, unaware of what was happening with our own private discussions within our government. In January of this year, the meeting with Saif al Gadhafi took place. He and I had a long discussion. We talked about Libya's past relationship with the U.S. and the West. We talked about the horrible bombings, the terrible tragedy of Lockerbie, the bombings in Berlin, the linkage of Libyan state-sponsored terrorism, and I told Saif, we can never forgive and never forget. Likewise, he told me it was difficult for he and his father to forget that we had bombed their home and in fact killed his 1 1/2 year old sister. But we both said it was time to look to the future as opposed to the past.

   But Saif was one who was looking to settle the past problems with the Lockerbie victims' families, to look at putting to rest those issues where Libya had done horrible things, and that perhaps it was time to move

   into a new direction. So he invited me to

[Page: H380]

bring a delegation of our colleagues to Tripoli. I said I would gladly take that invitation. Two days later, a formal written invitation came to my office in Washington from the chairman of the People'S Congress in Libya, inviting me to bring a delegation in. We secured a military plane and we decided our trip would involve not just Libya, but a trip that the White House had been encouraging me to take with Members to Iraq and Afghanistan.

   So the plane was secured, and from the Speaker's list of Members who were asked to go to Libya and Afghanistan, we assembled a delegation, a bipartisan delegation, including my good friend, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Ortiz) who would have been here tonight, but he had a death of a close friend and is down back in his district; the gentleman from New York (Mr. Israel), a Democrat; the gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. Alexander), a Democrat; the gentlewoman from Michigan (Mrs. Miller), a Republican; the gentleman from California (Mr. Gallegly), a Republican; the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Souder), a Republican; and the gentleman from California (Mr. Issa), a Republican. The gentlemen from California (Mr. Gallegly) and (Mr. Issa) joined us the day before we left. They were not a part of the delegation going on to Iraq and Afghanistan; they only joined us for the Libyan portion of the trip.

   And I would say, Mr. Speaker, any Member of Congress could have come with us on that trip into Libya. We had over 100 empty seats on our aircraft. So any Member of Congress could have joined us if they had just called and expressed an interest, as the gentlemen from California did the day before we left.

   Mr. Speaker, our trip to Libya and the other countries was exhausting. As I mentioned earlier, we traveled 25,500 miles, we visited 8 countries, and we had 45 meetings. Members of our delegation on some nights got less than 2 hours sleep. When we arrived in Kuwait, before going into Iraq, we arrived at 4 o'clock in the morning from our plane, got to our hotel and had to be up at 6 o'clock in the morning for the military to take us into Baghdad. So I want to congratulate the members of the delegation that were on this trip because of their outstanding service to the country in performing an extremely difficult task, completing the mission that we set out for ourselves.

   But I want to talk specifically about what we actually did and, in the end, I will ask to put our trip report in the Congressional Record.

   We did not know what to expect in Libya, Mr. Speaker, because no one had been there from our country for the past 35 years. We were not sure what the response would be. In fact, we were told by the White House and the National Security Council that the Libyans did not want any presence of the U.S., they certainly did not want to see the flag flown, and they did not want America in any way displayed because it would upset the people of the country. In fact, up until the 11th hour, they did not want us to land our military plane at the Tripoli Airport. How wrong they were.

   When we arrived in Tripoli, Mr. Speaker, and our plane pulled up to the tarmac, the number one spot in front of the air terminal at the main Tripoli Airport, there was a whole core of individuals from the leadership of Libya waiting to meet us. Officials from the government of the country, the foreign ministry, the people's Congress, all out there welcoming the Americans back to their nation. In fact, there was a huge media entourage, TV cameras, reporters who were there to ask us questions about why we were there and to follow us through our initial meeting which was held in the lobby of the Tripoli Airport.

   The welcome was unbelievable; unbelievably positive.

   As we sat down and talked about our agenda for the 2 days we were going to be there, I had asked for less than a dozen meetings. Mr. Speaker, not only was every meeting that I asked for granted to us, but they even went beyond and gave us meetings we had not asked for. We met with the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister, the Vice Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, the minister in charge of removing weapons of mass destruction from Libya. We met with the foundation established by Saif al Gadhafi, the same foundation overseeing the refunding of the money that is owed to those victims' families of the Lockerbie disaster. We met at the largest university in Libya, Al Fateh University, which has 75,000 students. We met with the leaders of the Libyan-American Friendship Society, which was started in 2000, where 400 people waited for 3 hours for us to arrive in this large tent to welcome us openly with American flags flying outside of the tent and inside of the tent, with children dressed up in colorful costumes to sing for us, with young people reciting poetry for us and speeches welcoming America back to Libya.

   Everyplace we went, Mr. Speaker, every person we met, every group we talked to was hungry and starving for a new positive relationship with America.

   In fact, during our first day in downtown Tripoli, I asked the delegation to break away with me to go on an unplanned event, to walk 3 or 4 blocks away from the hotel, and to go into the marketplace, the old city, the shopping district, where hundreds of shops and local stores are there for the Libyan citizens to buy their materials, their clothing, their housewares, their pots and pans, and the things that they need for their own lives. The delegation walked together, without any preannouncement, without guards around us, without any advanced alert, and we went through the marketplace. Every person we met in the Libyan marketplace in downtown Tripoli was positive. They came up to us, they shook our hands. A young 10-year-old, when the gentlewoman from Michigan (Mrs. Miller) said, Hi, how are you, said back to her, I am fine, how are you? And she said, You speak excellent English. He said, I have been practicing in school.

   We met shopkeepers, an elderly gentleman who was pounding the copper, making pots, who looked up and said, We are glad to have you in our country. We hope it is a new beginning. Everyone we met on the streets of Tripoli, Mr. Speaker, were positive toward America. It overwhelmed us. It was not what we expected, it was not what we were told to expect by our own government back here in our country.

   In fact, Mr. Speaker, Members sitting around the table at the university with the President of the Al Fateh University and about 25 of his department heads; and remember, this is a 75,000 student university, they have major programs in medicine, in law, in health care, in science, in technology, in education, in environment and agriculture. As he went around the room, each of these department heads, all of whom spoke excellent English, give us their background and what department they headed. It was unbelievable, Mr. Speaker. All but two of them were educated here in America. They told us what schools they attended: UCLA, Princeton, Colorado, Michigan, University of Pennsylvania, Louisiana, Georgia, all the major schools of our country.

[Time: 21:00]

   And they told us of their longing to once again reestablish ties with the American educational system and with the American people. In fact, one of the professors at the University, professor of English, Dr. T. T. Tarhuui, wrote a poem entitled ``Members of Congress,'' which I will enter into the RECORD when I place our trip report in at the end so the American people and our colleagues can read the poem he wrote for our visit.

   So the response by the people and the leaders of Libya was unbelievably and overwhelmingly positive. In fact, we asked to see a weapons of mass destruction site. Not only did they take us to their nuclear complex but we had full access to their 10 megawatt research reactor which they opened to look into and to understand what they were doing with radio isotopes and discuss with them their nuclear program; but before we went to that site, they had us sit down with the minister who was in charge of the entire program to allow the IAEA and the U.S. and Great Britain to remove the weapons of mass destruction from that nuclear site and from Libya. In fact, much of that removal took place the same week that we were in Libya on a separate military aircraft.

   But perhaps the most interesting meeting in Libya was with Colonel Qadafi. We did not know what to expect. We were taken to his residence

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that we had bombed in 1986. We saw the devastation still evident. We saw the lessons and the stories about his daughter who was killed. And we were then brought to another part of the complex where there was a large outdoor tent. We were led in and sat down on the sofas arranged in a semi-circle manner and awaited the arrival of Colonel Qadafi. About 5 minutes later, he came into the tent in his glowing purple robed outfit with his hat on, shook our hands, smiled and sat down. And for 2 hours we had a discussion among the group. And then I had a private session with him for 30 minutes.

   In the trip report, Mr. Speaker, are the very quotes that Colonel Qadafi made to our group as transcribed by both our staff director, Doug Roach, and our military escort. We had two separate note takers in that meeting.

   It was a very solemn meeting with Qadafi. For the first 25 or 30 minutes he talked to us in a very low tone, a very deliberate tone. And he said, You know, I am so happy that you are here, he said, but my question is why has it taken over 30 years for someone from your country to sit down with me and talk to me? I could understand if you met with me and you had problems because I had done something wrong, some terrible act, but if you would have met with me and talked with me and then felt that I was lying, you would have been justified in bombing me. But you did not talk to me for over 30 years.

   He said, You do not understand the Libyan people. We understand America. We studied all about it. And I would ask you to help me in my effort to reestablish that relationship with your country.

   Now, Mr. Speaker, we made no apologies to Colonel Qadafi. We let him and his leaders know that the past actions of his government and some of his people were outrageous and will never be forgiven nor forgotten. But we also said it is time to move into a new direction.

   We praised him personally for the public statements that he has made about his willingness to remove his weapons of mass destruction and about his willingness to turn over a new page in a relationship with the West.

   He talked about his country's coming into the arms control regimes that for decades they have not been a part of. And for that we thanked him. And we said to Colonel Qadafi, Your words are important and we praise them, but words will not carry the day. You must show us with your actions that you truly are serious with removing the weapons of mass destruction, about changing the ways of the past, about working with us on the problem of terrorism, about rooting out those cells that exist in your country, and about laying down a new foundation for the future.

   We told him that we would judge Libya and their colonel's comments based on substance as opposed to words and dialogue. But we also told him that if that process continued that we were sure that one day a normalization of relations would occur. And when that day came, we in the Congress, Democrats and Republicans, were prepared to help our President establish a new relationship with the people and the institutions of Libya.

   Our meetings with Qadafi were productive, were candid, and were designed to convey a positive message of support for the leadership of our President in stating that Libya has become a model of moving in the right direction away from terrorism.

   One of the things that Colonel Qadafi said to us was that he was taking tremendous heat from the other Arab leaders in the region who were making fun of him, who were criticizing him and calling him because of his decision to renounce weapons of mass destruction. And his concern was that America not abandon him if, in fact, he continues to do the kinds of things that have happened over the past several weeks with both the IAEA, Great Britain, and the United States.

   So, Mr. Speaker, I think our trip to Libya was extremely positive. We were not there to become a patsy for anyone. We were not there to try to brush over what has happened in the past. We were there to do what I said earlier is my top job as the vice chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, to avoid another war, to find a way not to appease anyone, but to continue on the path that our President has laid down, to turn a former terrorist nation, a nation that has been involved in state-sponsored activity in a new direction to becoming friends with the U.S.

   The second part of our trip moved us to Iraq. We had amazing meetings with the troops. We had time with Ambassador Bremer, with General Sanchez. We asked them to give us updates on the troops' activities, on the stability inside of that country.

   We had a meeting with Dr. Pachachi, who is the leader of the governing council. We had several of his colleagues there with us as we talked about the plan to hand Iraq over to his people. And he thanked us for that support. We assured him that America was there for the

   long haul; and that even though the political rhetoric of this election year will cause Democrats and Republicans to criticize each other, that we were not going to as Americans abandon what we had started in Iraq.

   We then went out with the troops, Mr. Speaker. I mentioned we talked at length with the Iraq survey team. I will not review that because I did it at the beginning of my Special Order. But we went out and had other meetings as well in Iraq. In fact, we traveled up to Tikrit. We went in a C-130, and we saw the terrible trauma that our C-130 pilots are under as they have to evasively fly into airports to do unbelievable maneuvers so they can avoid the surface-to-air missiles that still exist in Iraq.

   On the ground up in the Tikrit area, we were able to take Blackhawk helicopters out into the troop areas to meet with troops, to go to the spider hole where Saddam had been holed up, to visit with our Special Forces. In fact, we were able to be a part of a ceremony as one of our young Special Forces, Mr. Reyes, Sergeant Reyes, reenlisted. We became a part of that ceremony to honor him for his commitment to our country.

   We had a tremendous interaction with the general in charge of the 4th Infantry Division, General Odierno, who gave us a personal update as to the encounters that were taking place on a daily basis. In fact, I had a very moving experience there with General Odierno because one of my constituents, a 24-year-old young man who I had nominated to West Point, was killed in an attack back in the latter part of 2003.

   As General Odierno was describing to us some of the attacks on his troops, he talked about a young 24-year-old that he had come to know, an outstanding leader whose convoy was attacked, whose troops came under heavy fire, who himself was hit, and in spite of his own injuries, continued to protect and save the lives of at least one and possibly two other soldiers before his life was snuffed out.

   As the general talked, and as I described to him the 24-year-old that I had nominated to West Point, the general asked me his name. And I said Bernstein. He said Congressman, that is who I was talking about. He went to school with my son at West Point. I happen to have a 3-page letter with me from Lieutenant Bernstein's parents thanking me for the praise we had acknowledged for him to his family, including comments from those who knew the lieutenant, who had been touched by him during his brief life. I gave a copy of that letter to the general. He was very moved and presented me with the unit coin which I will present to the Bernstein family in remembrance of their son, a brave American hero.

   Our visit with the troops in both Iraq and Afghanistan, Uzbekistan was to assess what they needed. We came back with the idea that they need more linguistic support, they need more UAVs, and we need better benefits and support for our Guard and Reservists who are serving so well. And that message was conveyed throughout the trip.

   In leaving Iraq, we went to Islamabad and then flew into Afghanistan into the capital city of Kabul where we met with King Zahir Shah to assess his continuing role as the leader of that country, someone who helped us get the Afghanis to convene Aloya Jirga to bring together the leaders to establish a constitutional government.

   In following the meeting with King Zahir Shah, we met with the leader of the government of Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai. He talked to the success only made possible by the leadership of the

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United States. In between we met with more of our troops.

   Then we flew from Kabul up to our K2 base in Uzbekistan, a former Soviet military site where we spent a day and a half with the troops. Each member of our delegation walked through the wards. We went to the bedsides of those soldiers, some who had shrapnel wounds, some who had been shot in the leg, some who had piercings of the eyes, some who had skin diseases. And we told them that they were our heroes.

   We met with those that were on the way out in transition, that were coming back to the States. In fact, we offered seats to 12 of those young soldiers who came back with us to America and then were taken to the Army medical facility here in Washington, D.C. for further treatment and eventual transport back to their districts.

   We had two town meetings in the military base in K2. As we stayed overnight, we had dinner one night and breakfast the next morning with the troops. And during the evening and the morning, we had town meetings to allow the troops to tell us what was on their minds. They told us the good things and bad things; but without any question, Mr. Speaker, the morale of our troops in every visit we made was overwhelmingly positive. They knew why they were there. They were positive for being there. And they were happy that we came.

   We delivered 10,000 Valentine's cards, made by schoolchildren all over America. We delivered 25 cases of Tasty Cakes so the troops could get a fresh taste of America and the treats that come from my hometown city of Philadelphia. We even brought over shirts from the Philadelphia Eagles. Unfortunately, not many wanted them because the Eagles had lost a terribly embarrassing game before in the playoffs, but we gave them out anyway.

   Mr. Speaker, our trip was an overwhelming success. I am proud of those Members of Congress that went on this journey to try to improve relations with these nations, with these emerging democracies, and the conversion of this former arch enemy of ours.

   Now, Mr. Speaker, I would like to yield to the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Souder) for whatever time he would like to consume, one of the stars on this trip. He was the only member of the delegation not on the Committee on Armed Services, the other five were; but he is a strong supporter of our military and, more importantly, he is the chairman of the oversight committee that oversees all of our anti-narcotics and abuse efforts worldwide. He has been a leader in helping the President and the administration deal with the problems of narcoterrorism, and he and his staff were there to specifically focus on that issue, and he did it extremely well at every stop. But it was a pleasure to have him with us. He has traveled in the past with me to Russia. And I was proud to have him as a colleague on this trip.

[Time: 21:15]

   Mr. SOUDER. Mr. Speaker, I first want to praise the gentleman for his continuing efforts in this often, and previously, ignored region of the world. He has been an expert in Russia for a long time. I believe he said 33 different trips to Russia, someone who is a familiar face there, who will go nose to nose with the Russians, and at the same time the Russians know he will be back again and again and again. He is our friend while he is also arguing with us.

   I have watched the gentleman practice that in tough negotiations with Russia and prepare himself for the other types of things that he has been working with in this troubled region of the world.

   He has spent time in the Ukraine, in Georgia. His commitment to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan and the so-called ``Stans'' was there long before we had the focus in the recent post-9/11 issues. The gentleman was interested in this for a long time since the Republicans came into control in Congress and even before that in his career.

   His efforts in North Korea. He has been in the world hot spots before they were known as the world hot spots; therefore, the particular trip that we were able to do, as the gentleman has explained tonight, we cannot overstate the gentleman's role and the connections and how these things are connected.

   Because the gentleman is involved in the energy, he got to know Mohammar Khadafi's son, who would enable us to get into places we were never able to get in and help facilitate the breakthrough that we are having in Libya. The gentleman deserves that credit. No matter how many times it is said, the fact remains that we were able to get into places that we were not able to get into, that Americans would not have been able to get into had the gentleman not been spending a lot longer than just the most recent time, but time way before that. I thank the gentleman very much for that.

   Let me kind of reinforce a couple of things that the gentleman said. First, I would like to start with Libya because there were many of us, and let me just in my little piece that I got to say to the leader, Mr. Khadaffi, it was very clear. I said, look, I am a fundamentalist Christian. I am a strong supporter of Israel. I am one of your critics. But at the same time, and I did not particularly like some of the things he was claiming to be, this great democracy and how great socialism was working. We did not agree. But he said it in a debating type of way, probably a little nicer than some of the debate we had here earlier this evening. It was a good discussion. He seems to want to start to communicate.

   While I found some of the things he said offensive or in disagreement, the bottom line is he took a huge step to open up a country that was previously and still is on our terrorist list, that may be networking; and those of us who have seen all sorts of classified things know we have Libyan suspects all over the world for potential networks suspects. If he shuts this down, if he shuts this nuclear development down, look, I am willing to sit through a few lectures. I am willing to talk. If somebody can be moved off the terrorist list, if somebody can be moved off the nuclear list, we can sit down and talk. It does not mean that we are apologizing or that we are agreeing with past things. Okay. What is done is done.

   If we have a chance at a time when we are under assault all over the world to find a friend who wants to fight al Qaeda, who wants to take on bin Laden, who wants to dismantle, and on the whole I would just as soon they did health research and tried to figure out how to put their nuclear research into desalinization of water. They want our help to try to figure out how to get more water in Libya so they can irrigate. And that is a lot better than developing bombs to blow up our people.

   His comment that you referred to where he said, we do not know much about Libya, partly we will never know that much about Libya. And some of it was rhetoric and frustration we hear all around the world. But you know what, we did just not know much about Libya. I love to study history. We did not know hardly anything about Libya. Apparently, our government does not either.

   They were telling the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon) that we cannot land there. We do not know how we will be received. They will be hostile. There will be no press coverage. And we landed, and there is not any other way to state this, it was the friendliest place I've even been on a CODEL.

   Everybody was so excited to see us. Once the leader said, this is okay, all this Americanism is pouring out. The gentleman mentioned the university. They want to get our education. The 38 of the top 40 people have been educated in America. The U.S.-Libyan Friendship Society, there is hundreds of people waiting 3 hours to have lunch with a few Congressmen.

   The excitement of the whole trip there, you go, something is a disconnect. We do not understand. And at one of the dinners where the Libyan husband of an American citizen asked me, Are you guys over here just to tick off the French? And I said, What? I said, I hate to be an ignorant American here, but why would we be ticking off the French? He said, You do not understand. In North Africa, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, the French and the Italians are viewed as the occupiers. The Americans came in in World War II and liberated us. We like America. And I am thinking, no, no, these are the guys that hate us.

   It is not that we just do not know much about Libya; we do not know anything. We had it backwards. If they

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are willing to work with us, hey, look, it is trust but verify. They could have taken us into a nuclear facility.

   The gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon) knew more than I did because he has been to Russia so many times, he goes, oh, that is a Russian system. Were you working with this university? Were you working with that university? It is clear that the pressure that President Reagan put on communism to get the fall of the Berlin Wall and the change in Russia meant that it also dried up a lot of the assistance they were getting in Libya. And then they had to go into the market to pick up a few

   things. That knowledge, while the gentleman knows a lot, quite frankly, he said repeatedly, look, there is only so much we can do. The President makes these decisions. We can input. We can help once it goes through, how to put these plans together, but the bottom line is we want nuclear scientists to look at their nuclear facilities. We want experts to verify what we have heard.

   What we see is they need it economically. His son, who is the next potential leader, wants to change the country. He is being schooled at the London School of Economics. When you go into Tunisia, you can see the differences between there and Libya. So can all their people next door. They have reasons to want to change. He does not want to be caught in a spider hole like Saddam was.

   All the evidence suggests that this is real. What the chairman said, to go up to Libya, was a huge breakthrough. The administration is moving rapidly and this may be one of the biggest things in our life time that saves lots. And it is much to the gentleman's credit, and it was a great stop in Libya.

   I only want to mention one thing about Iraq because I agree with everything the gentleman has stated about that, from everything to morale to others; but I supported and the gentleman mentioned about getting General Dayton in here and the weapons of mass destruction, trying to understand that the consultants somehow got more high profile than the people that are actually running the weapons of mass destruction program, that there are multiple directions here; but what I wanted to comment on particularly was the spider hole itself.

   It taught me something else with this that I have been trying to communicate back home as well. That hole was not very big. I am not a particularly big person, maybe a little overweight but not that much, but I did not fit into the hole very well. The bigger you were, the tighter it was. The taller you were, the tighter it was. It was a very small hole.

   What we heard was that there was inside information, we had already been to that farm twice looking for it, looking for him. Saw nothing. Then inside information, not voluntarily given, told them where it was. They went in with Special Forces and still did not find it. Found a different hole. Then they had to go back and get a drawn map to go.

   First off, if you think of the hole as very small and the part where he would go down into basically like a casket with a higher ceiling, there was not much room when you got down in there. You could not move barely at all.

   No wonder he was disoriented. If he had American troops tromping around above him while they are making several visits with a little tube going down, he was probably getting very little oxygen, it was dark, there was no food, it is not like it is a lighted well-structured cell. It was a little dirt box that he was in. And if it is that hard by the time they put the grass over the top of it and something over the top of that, there was no way even Special Forces with a map could find it. Put this in the context of weapons of mass destruction.

   If you cannot find Saddam when you have a map from his top staffers, and you have your top forces searching for it with a map and it takes you two runs, we may never find some of this stuff. Just because we do not find it does not mean it does not exist. We have already proven it was worthwhile to go in there because they were clearly developing.

   The other thing was in going down to the Believer's Palace at the bottom, when we went down and saw the supposed place where he would feed back all this stuff to us and we were one of the first groups, I believe they had just opened up the basement there, and you saw the ability to put 200 of his special guards and his cabinet and himself in there. What we saw was not only the masks that you always hear about, chemical and biological masks, but they had controls on the wall for different types of chemical and biological weapons to control the air systems and other things. This guy was not preparing for conventional war.

   Whether he was preparing now or a year from now or 2 years from now may be debated, but he was getting ready to fight an unconventional war.

   In Afghanistan, which was one of my primary goals to talk again to President Karzai, who I met here as well as the former King, about narcotics. Afghan heroin is again flooding the market. We have major obligations here with Afghanistan. As the King said in Rome, the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon) took the first delegation in. We followed shortly after that, and the King told me at that time, we used to grow all sorts of crops where they now do poppy, and Afghanistan is often remembered when there is trouble, but then you forget us because we are a poor country that gets run over by all the major powers. My people are hungry.

   I have never seen a country without a middle class or even nice hotels. It was a suburb of hell, quite frankly, in Kabul. They need help. Yet at the same time, I think 85 percent of the people turned out in a recent election even though al Qaeda was threatening to kill them. They are excited. They have a multiparty system, multicandidates running.

   We have to figure out how to get them off the heroin because their farmers are not making that much from heroin. It is going to middle men. And these middle men that are making the money are often tied to the terrorist networks. They use narcotics, human trafficking and other illegal substances to fund it. So what I was trying to explain and President Karzai has been helpful, the general, the nephew I think of the King, said that we need Special Forces, Afghani Special Forces to go in after the heroin because the RPGs and the bombs and the suicide bombers are getting funded in Afghanistan largely by the fact that when the heroin poppy goes into market, that money then gets to middle men who take that money to buy armaments and to build al Qaeda and other terrorist networks around the world.

   It is a very close link between drugs and terrorism, a very close link to reestablishing the control in Afghanistan. They have the will. They are turning out to vote at greater rates than we are. They are excited about the freedom. Women have their first freedom. We have an American-educated leader who really is dynamic in what he wants to do in Afghanistan, a King who has shown his commitment for 40 years and then transferring it to democratic power there.

   I was hopeful for Afghanistan even though it is a very tough country that has been abused by every major power through world history for hundreds and hundreds of years. This was an eye-opening trip. It was a tremendous privilege to be allowed on it.

   I commend the gentleman for leading a breakthrough in Libya, major steps in Iraq, and showing the courage to go into Afghanistan even when people were telling us, the day we were still going in, do not go in there. It is not safe right now; we went in. President Karzai was able to go in front of his media and say, look, the Americans are here. They are backing us up. They are not bailing out just because two suicide bombers hit us in the last few days and somebody hit an ammunition dump. We are not retreating. This is real. It is not just the President; it is the Congress that is behind you.

   I thank the gentleman for his leadership.

   Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I want to add a comment about the role of this body and members of foreign policy.

   There are some who say that Members of Congress should not travel overseas or travel to countries that we are having problems with.

   I will say that is absolutely, totally wrong. There are some within the State Department who take offense to the fact that Members of Congress will

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travel to countries like this. Let me say to my colleagues in this body, many of you will be here for 10 years or 20 years. If you focus on one country or a group of countries, you will have far more opportunities to specialize in that country than a State Department official who spends 3 years in one post and moves on someplace else.

   There is a very real and substantive role for Members of Congress to play, and we must play it. This is not a case where the executive branch controls everything and we are just subservient to them. We are an equal part of the Federal Government, and we have the responsibility because we appropriate the dollars, we levy the taxes, and we oversee the way the money is spent, to travel to these countries, to open doors, to look for new ways to establish relationships, and to support the administration, which we did on this trip as we have on every major trip. But there is a role for the Congress to play.

   I am convinced that Members of Congress can play an extremely constructive role because we do not have to act as diplomats. We do not have to watch how we sit, how we sip our tea, what words did we use, because we are not representing the President. We are not representing the Secretary of State. We are representing ourselves. The members of Congress on this CODEL, as it has been on every CODEL that I have been a part of, did a fantastic job on behalf of America.

[Time: 21:30]

   Mr. Speaker, I would like to at this point in time place the trip report in the RECORD, filed as a part of our process as we do for every trip that gives the American people and our colleagues a complete, factual understanding of what we did, where we went and how we represented our country.

   I am proud of this delegation, Democrats and Republicans alike, opening new doors to help in the security of not just America but of all those countries that want peace around the world.

   Congressional Delegation (CODEL) Weldon to Libya, Tunisia, Kuwait, Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, and Germany--January 25-31, 2004

   SUMMARY

   A bipartisan congressional delegation (CODEL) led by Representative Curt Weldon (R-PA), traveled to Tripoli, Libya; Tunis, Tunisia; Kuwait City, Kuwait; Baghdad, Balad Air Base, and Ad Dawr, Iraq; Islamabad, Pakistan; Kabul, Afghanistan; Karshi Kharnabad (``K2''), Uzbekistan; and Ramstein Air Base and Landstuhl Regional Medical Center, Germany January 25-31, 2004. The delegation met with the leadership of Libya, Afghanistan, and Iraqi Governing Council representatives, the former Kuwaiti Ambassador to the United States, reviewed U.S. military operations and visited personnel supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in Kuwait and Iraq and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Uzbekistan. The delegation included:

Representative Curt Weldon (R-PA)
Representative Solomon Ortiz (D-TX)
Representative Steve Israel (D-NY)
Representative Rodney Alexander (D-LA)
Representative Candice Miller (R-MI)
Representative Elton Gallegly (R-CA)
Representative Mark Souder (R-IN)
Representative Darrell Issa (R-CA)

   A listing of the complete delegation and key personnel contacted at each location is provided at attachments 1 and 2, respectively.

   Libya, January 25-26

   The delegation was the first bipartisan congressional delegation to meet with Colonel Moammar Gaddafi in 35 years. Fourteen other meetings were held with senior ministry, legislative, educational, and charitable foundation officials. The discussions with Colonel Gaddafi and all other senior leaders were extraordinarily positive regarding the potential for normalized relations between Libya and the U.S. The delegation encouraged the Libyan leader to follow through on his encouraging public statements regarding elimination of Libyan weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs, with swift, verifiable elimination of those programs. Further, the delegation spoke with Libyan leaders regarding numerous public and private cooperative science, technology, environmental, health care, economic development, and energy-related programs that could be developed and instituted immediately upon normalization of relations. The delegation also delivered introductory letters from American University students to students of Al Fateh University in Tripoli.

   Colonel Gaddafi thanked Chairman Weldon for making the visit possible: ``coming at a very critical time''--observing that he wished that ``such a meeting could have taken place thirty years ago'' and stating his hope ``to be able to compensate for what we missed.'' He commented at length on the need for countries to communicate and engage in dialogue before taking up arms against one another. He denied any responsibility for the night club bombing in 1986 that led to the U.S. bombing of Libya and the death of his step daughter:

   ``For 30 years we haven't discussed anything with each other ..... taking the wrong approach right from the beginning, with wars, losses, damage, loss of valuable time, without a good, specific reason for doing so ..... The picture of Gaddafi (in the U.S.) is not a real one. When I took the decision on elimination of weapons of mass destruction, I did it for my people, out of conviction ..... If I had the atomic bomb I would put it on the table. There is no reason for Libya and the United States not to have good relations. The right course is the one you have taken: to come here and meet ..... the policies were wrong in the past. We can't rectify such wrongs ..... We have to compensate for what we have missed..... I highly value your visit because it is necessary that you know us very well. Because once you know us well, then you will take the appropriate policy decisions.''

   He further commented regarding what he believed to be a lack of knowledge in the U.S. about Libya's government:

   ``Americans don't even know the governing system in Libya. We know the governing system in the U.S.: the White House, the NSC (National Security Council), Congress ..... We know about the Pentagon. We know about the newspapers, one by one. We even know the writers. We know names of companies and specializations. Nevertheless, Americans don't know anything about our congresses, peoples' committees, revolutionary committees, social structure, leadership, or anything about the Green Book.''

   Colonel Gaddafi also mentioned criticism from Arab countries he said was aimed at Libya for deciding to eliminate its WMD programs:

   ``In the past year there have been bad mediators. Tunisia, Egypt and other Arab countries see it as not in their best interest for Libya and the United States to have good relations. These countries are benefiting from the embargo and seek a continuation of the embargo for their own interests. How would you expect them to work for good relations between Libya and America? The Arabs are waging a fierce campaign against us for deciding to get rid of WMD. I hope they are not successful in taking revenge against us. I hope that even Libyans are not sorry for taking such a step. It all depends on your supporting us. It does deserve support and encouragement so that Libyans won't be disappointed.''

   Chairman Weldon stated that before coming to Libya the delegation had been told by U.S. officials of the positive attitude taken by Libyans in cooperating with the survey of Libyan WMD programs and initial steps to eliminate WMD programs:

   ``There is no doubt in my mind that your policies and leadership will lead to normalized relations between our countries. Even President Bush, in his recent State of the Union message, mentioned Libya as a model for other countries. You have to understand that President Bush has been criticized by elements of our society for calling Libya a model, just as you have been criticized by Arab leaders who want to see Libya and America stay apart.''

   Chairman Weldon indicated that normalization of relations between the two countries would permit initiatives to be undertaken between the Libyan General Peoples' Congress and the U.S. Congress, much like has been done with the Russian Duma and other parliaments, to further governmental and non-governmental cooperation between peoples of the two countries, leading to better understanding, peaceful cooperation, and providing for a better quality of life for all peoples: ``The path forward will not be easy, good things have to be worked for ..... I am convinced that if we work as hard on our side as you have on your side, we can start a new chapter in our relationship, without make judgments about your country or your culture, but to work together, as partners.''

   Kuwait-Iraq, January 26-28

   The delegation traveled to Baghdad to meet with and receive updates from L. Paul Bremer, Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority; General Sanchez, Commander, Joint Task Force Seven; the Iraq Survey Group, responsible for the search for weapons of mass destruction; representatives of the primary factions of the Iraqi Governing Council; and the Deputy Commanding General, 1st Armored Division, responsible for the security of Baghdad.

   Four members of the delegation met with Sheik Saud al Sabah, former Kuwaiti Ambassador to the United States, to renew acquaintances and discuss the general political, economic, and military situation in the region. Sheik Sabah has personally established a fund for families of U.S. military personnel killed in the 1991 Gulf War.

   Coalition Provisional Authority

   Ambassador Bremer indicated that work continues on formulating the strategic framework for Iraqi security, its economy, and political transition. He noted that while the security situation had improved, there still exists a major terrorist threat. He further stated that the ``consumption economy'' is working well, but structural problems exist, largely due to the distorting economic effects of five cents a gallon gasoline. The focus is in getting capital into the economy. Work continues, as well, on the transition to a National Assembly by July 1, 2004.

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Differences within the Governing Council and among the general populace on the selection of delegates by caucus or direct election continue to cause significant debate and public demonstrations. Ambassador Bremer noted that an announcement is due in the near future from the United Nations on its recommendations on elections in Iraq based on the results of a study completed by a visiting United Nations team.

   CJTF-7

   General Sanchez indicated that the number of attacks by former regime elements, foreign terrorists, and others had continued to decline since the capture of Hussein, now averaging less than 20 per day, down from a high of 50 per day.

   Iraqi Governing Council

   The delegation met with four members of the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC), representing the primary political and religious factions within Iraq. The President of the IGC, Dr. Adrian Pachachi, a secularist, indicated the Council was in the final phase of establishing basic laws, establishing the details of a provisional government, and completing the constitution. Dr. Pachachi further indicated his belief that the draft constitution covers every conceivable right: freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, the rule of law, etc. Three of the four council members--Dr. Pachachi, the Sunni, and Shia IGC Members--were unanimous in stating their views that it is an oversimplification to conclude that individual Iraqi religious affiliation dictates the views of the Iraqi people on various policy issues: ``the reality is that the fanatics are a tiny minority, but very vocal and very well organized.'' The Sunni IGC member indicated that Sunni and Shia will vote on the issues, not on the basis of religion, but on the substance of the issues under consideration--``the educated middle class in Iraq is much more open minded.''

   The Kurdish member stated that the Kurds live under a different system and different culture, observing that they have suffered under Iraqi rule, and ``have the right to establish their own way.'' Dr. Pachachi, acknowledged that ``from the beginning we have recognized that the Kurds are distinct, that their special status will be maintained. We are in the process of agreeing to that arrangement.'' Dr. Pachachi further indicated that the problem at hand is deciding the best way to select members of the legislature: ``The problem is that it will be difficult to have credible elections in such a short period ..... If the UN doesn't believe elections are possible, they will likely propose other possibilities.''

   Iraq Survey Group

   Major General Keith Dayton, Director of the Iraqi Survey Group, provided a classified update on the search for weapons of mass destruction and counter terrorism programs. A common misperception is that Dr. Kay headed the hunt for WMD. While Dr. Kay has been a very valuable advisor in the hunt for WMD, General Dayton has headed the group responsible for the hunt for WMD since its inception in June 2003, and with Dr. Kay's departure, will continue to head the group.

   What can be said about the delegations' discussions is that there, the people in the trenches actually doing the day-to-day searches, collecting, and analyzing the data and material, expressed a sense of ``frustration and dismay'' over ``what Dr Kay is doing''--or at least some of the media's characterizations of ``what Dr. Kay is doing,'' as he exits from his high visibility role in the hunt for WMD.

   The ISG has responsibilities beyond the sole search for WMD. Although not the Commander of the ISG, but responsible as the special advisor for WMD, apparently Dr. Kay sought total control of all the assets under the ISG for the sole purpose of the hunt for WMD. It was a matter of ``all or nothing.'' And when he didn't get all of the assets--even when those assets were increased to provide additional funds for areas other than the search for WMD, Dr. Kay objected, ultimately being a factor in his departure.

   Those responsible for the search for WMD in Iraq believe that while no large stockpiles of WMD have yet to be uncovered, no shortage of leads exist--with literally tens-of-millions of documents remaining to be fully examined and considerable leads and circumstantial evidence to be pursued--``with much remaining to be done.''

   General Dayton believes the declared failure by some to yet find large stockpiles of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons is premature and ignores the significance of the evidence that has been found about the undisputed activities in each of these areas providing evidence of future intentions and breakout capabilities being pursued and proven to have existed. In the nuclear area, Dr. Kay said as recently as January 28 that, ``Look, the man had the intent to acquire these weapons, he invested huge amounts of money in them. The fact is he wasn't successful.''

   In the end, Dr. Kay's judgment, regardless of the disappointment resident in the ISG, came down on the side of the continued search. In an interview on NBC in which he was asked to comment on whether it was prudent to go to war, Dr. Kay said ``I think it was absolutely prudent. In fact, I think at the end of the inspection process we'll paint a picture of Iraq that was far more dangerous than we even thought it was before the war .....''

   Balad Air Base-Ad Dawr

   At Balad Air Base, the delegation met with the Commanding General of the 4th Infantry Division, Major General Mike Odierno and the Commander, Third Brigade, 4th ID, Colonel Fred Rudesheim. The delegation also visited the capture site of Saddam Hussein at Ad Dawr. At each stop the Members had an opportunity to meet with military personnel from their home states and districts.

   Afghanistan, January 29

   The delegation met with President Hamid Karzai and the former King of Afghanistan, Zahir Shah. President Karzai expressed his appreciation to the delegation for the many sacrifices made by America to further political stability, economic progress, and increased employment in Afghanistan and for America's continued war on terrorism ..... ``Our people know what America has done.'' He described the Loya Jirga process, the adoption of the Afghan Constitution, patterned after the U.S. Constitution, and the anticipated general elections.

   President Hamid Karzai

   President Karzai cited the key importance of Pakistan to stability in Afghanistan, by not interfering in Afghan affairs, yet assisting in elimination of the Taliban threat. The President and the delegation discussed the significant problem of continued high levels of poppy cultivation in Afghanistan. President Karzai acknowledged. Afghanistan's failed efforts to eliminate poppy cultivation and described the government's plan to destroy poppy fields, while assisting farmers in alternative crop cultivation, interdiction of drug routes, and destruction of heroin production labs. The President concluded that for Afghanistan to emerge as a nation-state it has to destroy the poppy crop: ``to destroy terrorism, we must destroy poppies.'' The delegation cited its support and commitment to Afghanistan, ``for the long haul.''

    His Highness, Zahir Shah

   The former King, Zahir Shah, thanked the delegation for U.S. assistance in establishing peace and security in Afghanistan. He observed that the political process in Afghanistan is based on a tribal structure--a democracy that functions within a tribal structure--with the same goals as the people in America.

    Uzbekistan, January 29-30

   Following meetings in Kabul, the delegation traveled to Karshi-Kharnabad (``K2''), Uzbekistan, to visit U.S. military personnel supporting OEF. In addition to being able to speak informally at the evening and breakfast meals with personnel from their districts, the delegation received mission orientated briefings, toured a mission aircraft, and viewed a static display of a Uzbek Air Force SU-27.

   Germany, January 30-31

   Commander, USAF Europe and U.S. Consul General

   General ``Doc'' Foglesong and Consul General (CG) Peter Bodde discussed NATO-related military and regional political issues. General Foglesong described the challenges posed by making the NATO Response Force (NRF) viable given the current limited expeditionary capabilities of the NRF. He also described the efforts at re-sizing NATO and U.S. operations--``mining manpower positions''--and the use of ``reach back capabilities'' to allow functions in the U.S. such as intelligence to support the European theater instead of having to have the capability resident in Europe. General Foglesong further described efforts to develop niche capabilities among NATO partners to preclude all nations from having to have all military capabilities with some developing expeditionary capabilities for billeting, some with medical, others with civil engineering, etc.

   Representative Souder expressed his deep concern regarding Austria's, France's, Turkey's and Germany's various degrees of lack of support for U.S. operations in Iraq. He also commented on the cumbersome rules of engagement within NATO in the war in Kosovo. General Foglesong indicated his ``cautious optimism'' about relations and support in dealing with the countries within NATO: ``They recognize that terrorists don't recognize borders.''

   Representative Ortiz, expressing frustration, observed that ``it would be nice if the State Department would consider us (Congress) equal players,'' indicating the both State and Defense Departments frequently take action without consultation or regard for the views of Congress.

   Chairman Weldon concluded that regardless of the some troubling aspects in the execution of foreign policy and some military operations, ``the American peoples' support and the support of Congress for the troops are solid and unequivocal--and the troops need to know that.''

    Contingency Aero-medical Staging Facility & Lanstuhl Regional Medical Center

   The delegation visited with injured military personnel from Afghanistan and Iraq at the Landstuhl Regional Medical Center and Aero-medical Staging Facility at Ramstein Air Base. The delegation was pleased to provide transportation for ten soldiers, awaiting transportation to the U.S. to continue their treatment at Walter Reed Army Medical Center for injuries suffered in Iraq.

Political, Economic, and Security Environment

   The CODEL visit to Libya came shortly after Libyan leader Moammar Gaddafi's pledge to rid his country of weapons of mass destruction.

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   The Iraq visit took place six weeks after the capture of Saddam Hussein near Ad Dawr and nine months after the declared end to major combat operations in Iraq. In October 2003, Congress had approved President Bush's $87 billion fiscal year 2004 supplemental request for military, intelligence, and reconstruction costs in Iraq and Afghanistan. Acts of terrorism being conducted by former regime elements, fundamentalist extremists, foreign terrorists, and common criminals against coalition forces and Iraqi civilians continued to cause casualties, although at a reduced rate since Hussein's capture and the end of Ramadan. The Iraqi people, particularly the police, have increasingly become the target of the random terrorist attacks.

   The Afghanistan visit came shortly after the adoption of the Afghanistan constitution by the ``Loya Jirga.'' Lingering Taliban elements and Al Qaeda continued efforts to threaten the evolution of democratic Afghanistan through intimidation and sporadic terrorist attacks against coalition forces, non-governmental international aid organizations and Afghans.

   OVERVIEW

   A bipartisan congressional delegation (CODEL) comprised of eight Members of Congress, led by Representative Curt Weldon (R-PA), traveled to Tripoli, Libya; Tunis, Tunisia; Kuwait City, Kuwait; Baghdad, Balad Air Base, and Ad Dawr, Iraq; Islamabad, Pakistan; Kabul, Afghanistan; Karshi Kharnabad (``K2''), Uzbekistan; and Ramstein Air Base and Landstuhl Regional Medical Center, Germany January 25-31, 2004. The delegation met with the leadership of Libya and Afghanistan, representatives of the Iraqi governing Council (IGC), the former Kuwaiti Ambassador to the U.S., reviewed U.S. military operations and visited personnel supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in Kuwait and Iraq and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Uzbekistan. In addition, thousands of Valentines Day cards from U.S. school children as well as other gifts were presented to U.S. troops serving in OIF and OEF in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Uzbekistan in the war against terrorism.

   Tripoli, Libya, January 25-26

   The delegation was the first bipartisan congressional delegation to visit Libya and meet with Colonel Moammar Gaddafi in 35 years.

   Arrival Meeting

   The delegation was met by a delegation led by Abdullatife Aldali, Chairman of the Tripoli Conference, who welcomed the delegation: ``We look forward to a new relationship between Libya and America.''

   Following an introduction of the delegation, Chairman Weldon indicated the delegation was in Libya to open a new chapter in U.S.-Libyan relations, to listen and learn from its Libyan counterparts: ``There are strong U.S. interests in both political parties to be friends with Libya, to work to resolve common concerns. We don't come here to represent the Secretary of State or the President, but as representatives of a coequal branch of the United States Government, looking forward to normalized relations between our countries.'' Chairman Weldon described many of the inter-parliamentary relationships Congress has with the parliaments in Russia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and the European Parliament and indicated his hope that there would one day be a similar relationship with the General Peoples' Congress Great Jamahiriya of Libya.

   Representative Ortiz indicated that there is much to be gained by both countries by being friends and thanked the hosts for their warm welcome.

   Overview of Ministry, Legislative, Educational, & Foundation Meetings

   The delegation met with Colonel Gaddafi for two hours and had fourteen other meetings with senior ministry, legislative, educational, and charitable foundations. The delegation spoke with the Libyan leaders about cooperative governmental and non-governmental programs that could be developed and instituted, much like has been done with the parliaments of other countries. Chairman Weldon noted that discussions regarding such programs could be started immediately upon normalization of relations.

   Chairman Weldon prefaced each of the discussions with Libyan leaders with an explanation of the congressional role in the U.S. federal system of separate, but equal branches of government: ``We are not here to negotiate, that is the responsibility of the executive branch of our government. But after you take the necessary steps to follow through on your stated intention to eliminate your WMD programs, Congress can encourage our President and Secretary of State to expedite normalization of relations with your country. Following that, we can work with you, like we have with a number of other parliaments around the world, to establish governmental and non-governmental programs to bring our two countries closer together and improve the welfare of both our peoples.'' The discussions with Colonel Gaddafi and all other senior leaders with whom the delegation met were extraordinarily positive regarding the potential for normalized relations between Libya and the U.S.

   Colonel Gaddafi

   Colonel Gaddafi thanked Chairman Weldon for making the visit possible: ``coming at a very critical time,'' observing that he wished that ``such a meeting could have taken place thirty years ago'' and stating his ``hope to be able to compensate for what we missed.'' He commented at length on the need for countries to communicate and engage in dialogue before taking up arms against one another. He denied any responsibility for the night club bombing in 1986 that led to the U.S. bombing of Libya and the death of his step daughter:

   ``For 30 years we haven't discussed anything with each other ..... taking the wrong approach, right from the beginning, with wars, losses, damage, loss of valuable time, without a good, specific reason for doing so ..... The picture of Gaddafi in the U.S. is not a real one. When I took the decision on elimination of weapons of mass destruction, I did it for my people, out of conviction ..... If I had the atomic bomb I would put it on the table. There is no reason for Libya and the United States not to have good relations. The right course is the one you have taken: to come here and meet ..... the policies were wrong in the past. We can't rectify such wrongs ..... We have to compensate for what we have missed. .....I highly value your visit because it is necessary that you know us very well. Because once you know us well, then you will take the appropriate policy decision.''

   He further commented at length at what he believed to be a lack of knowledge in the U.S. about Libya's government:

   ``You don't even know the governing system in Libya. We know the governing system in the U.S.: the White House, the NSC (national security council), Congress. We know about the Pentagon. We know about the newspapers, one by one. We even know the writers. We know names of companies and specializations. Nevertheless, Americans don't know anything about our congresses, peoples' committees, revolutionary committees, social structure, leadership, or anything about the Green Book.''

   Colonel Gaddafi commented on the criticism he said was aimed at Libya for deciding to eliminate its WMD programs:

   ``In the past there have been bad mediators. Tunisia, Egypt and other Arab countries see it as not in their best interests for Libya and the United States to have good relations. They are benefiting from the embargo and seek a continuation for their own interests. How would you expect them to work for good relations between Libya and America? The Arabs are waging a fierce campaign against us for deciding to get rid of WMD. I hope they are not successful in taking revenge against us. I hope that even Libyans are not sorry for taking such a step. It all depends on your supporting us. It does deserve support and encouragement so that Libyans won't be disappointed.''

   Chairman Weldon stated that before coming to Libya the delegation had been told by U.S. officials of the positive attitude taken by Libyans in cooperating with the survey of Libyan WMD programs and initial steps to implement the WMD program elimination.

   ``There is no doubt in my mind that your policies and leadership will lead to normalized relations between our countries. Even President Bush, in his recent State of the Union message, mentioned Libya as a model for other countries. You have to understand that President Bush has been criticized by elements of our society for calling Libya a model, just as you have been criticized by Arab leaders who want to see Libya and America stay apart.''

   Chairman Weldon indicated that normalization of relations between the two countries would permit initiatives to be undertaken between the Libyan General Peoples' Congress and the U.S. Congress, much like has been done with the Russian Duma and other parliaments, to further government and non-governmental cooperation between peoples of the two countries, leading to better understanding, peaceful cooperation, and providing for a better quality of life for all people: ``The path forward will not be easy, but most good things you have to work hard for . . . I am convinced that if we work hard on our side as you have on your side, we can start a new chapter in our relationship, not to judge your country, your culture, but to work together, as partners.''

   The delegation encouraged the Libyan leader to follow through on his encouraging public statements regarding elimination of Libyan weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs, with swift, verifiable elimination of WMD programs.

   General Peoples' Congress Great Jamahiriya

   Zinati Zinati, Speaker of the General Peoples' Congress Great Jamahiriya, welcomed the delegation and expressed his appreciation for the ``extraordinary effort'' the delegation took to be in Libya: `` This is evidence of the great will on your part to develop, promote and enhance relations between our two countries.'' The Speaker provided the delegation with a general overview of the structure of the ``basic congresses'' and the General People's Congress, the annual legislative agenda, and the Libya legislative procedures.

   Chairman Weldon noted that the delegation was the first U.S. bipartisan delegation to visit Libya in over 35 years. He expressed his appreciation for the warm reception and how this portended very productive discussions. The Chairman also cited the gratifying experience of the delegation shortly after the official arrival when the delegation had been able to take advantage of a short period before the beginning of the official itinerary to visit the nearby souq (market). There, the delegation had an opportunity to meet several Libyans, including small children, shopping and tending their stores, who

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in each and every case warmly greeted the members of the delegation, often in English.

   Chairman Weldon indicated that the delegation had come to Libya to praise Col Gaddafi for the ``bold steps he had taken to begin to bring our countries back together.''

   ``The positive steps Libya has taken in settling international claims against Libya; agreeing to rejoin international non-proliferation organizations and treaties; and declared intentions to deal with weapons of mass destruction have been very well received around the world. In fact the focus of the world is on Libya. It is a positive focus, that can lead to normalized relations between our countries. We came to let your Congress know that once normalized relations can be established, that our Congress can work with you, like we have done with the parliaments of Ukraine, Russia, Europe, and other parliaments to establish cooperative programs for the benefit of both our peoples.''

   Chairman Weldon further described the detailed program established with the Russian Duma outlined in A New Time, A New Beginning, as described in attachment 3, prepared by members of the U.S. Congress, that was promulgated for the purpose of providing a catalyst for Russia and the U.S. to work together to benefit the peoples of both countries. He explained that a similar program and process for implementation could be established between Libya and the U.S. once normalized relations could be achieved. He further states ``that, something more fundamentally important that can occur is to change the image of Libya in America, and the world. The American people have a limited knowledge of Libya. By enhancing our formal relationship between our parliaments we would have an opportunity to further understanding between our peoples.''

   Representative Ortiz commented that ``someone has a vision to get us together and I want to thank my Chairman for his vision.'' Mr. Ortiz quoted LBJ (Lyndon Baines Johnson):

   ``Let's sit down and reason together.'' Adding, ``that is what we are here to do today. There have been incidents that have caused us to drift apart. We can't change history, but we don't want to repeat it ..... We have taken the first step. I come from Texas and we have had a great relationship with Libya in the past. We have only been here a few hours, but I like what I see and I like what I hear. For the sake of the future generations, we need to give them a chance to hope, to dream, and to plan. We pledge we will do everything to strengthen the bonds between our two countries.''

   Chairman Weldon thanked the Speaker for the efforts of Saif al Saleem al Gaddafi, Colonel Gaddafi's son, and Abdulmagid Mansouri, a member of the International Energy Advisory Council for their efforts in facilitating the visit of the delegation. Chairman Weldon further stated that: ``I am happy we are opening a new door between our countries and I want to keep that door open and not repeat the tragedies of the past.''

   Suleiman Al Shahoumi, Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the General Peoples' Congress, observed that:

   ``Libya is a small country that inherited an ancient system with people living in poverty and experiencing starvation. The revolution in 1969 sought to bring up the level of life for the Libyan people. The Libyan people have chosen a political system--a direct democracy--in harmony with Libya's culture and principles in life ..... A system based on placing all authority in the hands of the people, distributed through 450 Peoples' Basic Congresses. This system is independent and balanced ..... The policies of these congresses support national liberation for states and nations and call for the respect of human rights and condemns all forms of terrorism. This policy also believes that the only way to resolve conflicts is through dialogue, calling for peace, stability, and order and cooperation between peoples and states. This policy believes that prosperity is achieved through democracy and development. Therefore Libya, thanks to the revolution, has been able to provide all types of rights to the people: utilities, education, human resources, housing, fresh water--all related to mankind. In spite of the term human rights not being precisely defined, my country has signed onto all treaties related to human rights.''

   Secretary Shahoumi, commenting on terrorism, cited the difficulty in ``differentiating between terrorism and the legitimate right of nations and peoples to fight for their freedom and human rights.'' He added that, ``we deny and refuse the ways of connecting terrorism and Islam because we believe terrorism has no religion, has no state or country or home, and has no nationality.''

   In commenting on weapons of mass destruction, the Secretary noted that ever since the 1969 Revolution, Libya has been calling for making the Middle East a region free of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons:

   ``But nobody has ever responded to this initiative. Therefore because of no response to our initiative, we thought as a small country, a modest way to protect ourselves was to establish WMD as part of our defense policy. However, after breakthroughs in resolving conflicts like UTA and Lockerbie and because of serious thoughts of the international community to get rid of WMD, Libya decided to formally announce its decision to dismantle its WMD programs. In this regard, we wish to express our deep appreciation for the positive international response to our initiative and we again call for making the region a WMD-free zone. As a step to that end, Libya has signed all relevant treaties and conventions related to this topic, including treaties banning all types of experiments related to WMD ..... And we call on your support to make the Middle East a WMD-free zone.''

   The Secretary further provided his view that the people of Libya believe and have in fact published a White Book on the topic of peace in the Middle East. He indicated the White Book makes a ``practical and persuasive case'' for making Israel and Palestine a ``bi-state country,'' modeled after South Africa, with Muslims, Jews, and Christians all living together with ``all rights and duties.''

   Representative Issa observed that Libya's stated intent to eliminate its WMD programs represents a ``huge step'' toward the goal of a WMD-free Middle East: ``Your offer made in Beirut two years ago to normalize relations with Israel was also a huge step ..... I will have to admit that I am a little cynical that Palestinians and Jews should join into one country so readily. Your dream is still a good one. Either option is acceptable to me. I hope you will join us in seeking either option as an acceptable approach to achieving peace in the Middle East.''

   Prime Minister

   Prime Minister Shokri Ghanem observed that strained relations between Libya and the U.S. existed due to ``misunderstandings or misfortunes,'' and Libya wishes to change that.

   Representative Issa stated that it is important to sustain the momentum that has developed in normalizing relations: ``Momentum is like magic when it works ..... it is about expectations. Colonel Gaddafi turned on a dime in an amazing way. With no missteps, the U.S. could have an Embassy here in 300 days.''

   Prime Minister Ghanem stated that ``with good intentions, with each party trying to understand one another,'' differences can be worked out: ``When we talk we understand one another. You are a big country--a super power--we are a small country, yet neither of us has a monopoly on wisdom. We have a duty to one another, and should not listen to a third party. We are very interested in going the whole way. We suffered from terrorism more than you. We failed to communicate. We need to talk.'' Chairman Weldon added: ``Honesty and candor are critical.''

   Representative Gallegly mentioned the change that has taken place in American attitudes and the high level of apprehension that exists since 9/11. He further commented on the ``extremely warm welcome'' the delegation had received. He added that ``the press can often become the wedge, frequently seeing the glass as half empty. We can't let the press control the debate on this issue.'' Prime Minister responded that: ``the people are open and warm and have no grudges whatsoever.''

   Prime Minister Ghanem concluded that after 9/11 the whole world is different: ``We can work together. Libya is a small country. When we talk and listen you can find wisdom in a small country. You will find us a good ally. The United States was the number one place we sent our students. We would like to do that again.''

   Foreign Minister

   Foreign Minister Abdulrakman Shalgam stated: ``it is an honor for us to start a new era of relations with the U.S. ..... I believe this is a chance for you to learn about our people. Our expectation, our ideas and thoughts can benefit from international peace ..... In the past there was a joint misunderstanding. It is the mission for both of us to clear up that misunderstanding ..... Certain circumstances caused a misunderstanding. We started a bit late, but better late than never. It is an honor to be receiving the first delegation from America.''

   Chairman Weldon stated that the delegation didn't know what to expect in coming to Libya: ``Your people have overwhelmed us with their warm greetings--in your markets and in all of our meetings ..... The eyes of the world are on Libya because of what you have done. Your decision to rid your country of WMD and rejoin related treaties has caused Libya to become the centerpiece for discussion all over our country. The highest respect we can give is coming here personally ..... As you know, we are not here to negotiate, that is not our job. But if you continue the path you have chosen, as an equal branch of our government, we believe we can institute a process that will benefit both of our peoples. We have spoken with your Congress about that day and talked to them about the work we have done with other parliaments. We are excited, optimistic, and with your leadership, we believe normalized relations can be established.''

   Representative Ortiz observed that he never believed that one day he would be in Tripoli. He also spoke of the warm greetings extended to the delegation.

   Gaddafi International Foundation for Charitable Associations the Gaddafi Human Rights Foundation & The Libyan Red Crescent

   The delegation visited with officials of the Gaddafi International Foundation for Charitable Associations, the Gaddafi Human Rights Foundation, and the Libyan Red Crescent to discuss their programs.

   Al Fateh University

   The delegation met with the President of Al Fateh University, department heads, and

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delivered introductory letters from American University students to students of the University. Professor Tarhuui read a poem that he had prepared to celebrate the delegation's visit, attachment 4.

   Baghdad, Iraq, January 27

   The delegation traveled to Baghdad to meet with and receive updates from L. Paul Bremer, Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority; General Sanchez, Commander, Joint Task Force Seven; the Iraq Survey Group, responsible for the search for weapons of mass destruction; representatives of the primary factions of the Iraqi Governing Council; and the Deputy Commanding General, 1st Armored Division, responsible for the security of Baghdad.

   Coalition Provisional Authority

   Ambassador Bremer indicated that work continues on formulating the strategic framework for Iraqi security, its economy, and political transition. He indicated that while the security situation had improved, there still exists a major terrorist threat. He further indicated that the ``consumption economy'' is working well, but structural problems exist, largely due to the distorting effects of five cents a gallon gasoline. The focus is in getting capital into the economy. Work continues, as well, on the transition to a National Assembly by July 1, 2004. Differences within the Governing Council and among the general populace on the selection of delegates by caucus or direct election continue to cause significant debate and public demonstrations. An announcement is due in the near future from the United Nations on its recommendations on elections in Iraq based on the results of a study completed by a visiting United Nations team.

   CJTF-7

   Lieutenant General (LTG) Ricardo Sanchez, the senior U.S. military officer in Iraq (Commending General V Corps and Coalition Joint Task Force 7), provided an update on combat, security, and U.S. military personnel issues. General Sanchez indicated that the number of attacks by former regime elements, foreign terrorists, and others had continued to decline since the capture of Hussein, averaging less than 20 per day, down from a high of 50 per day.

   Iraqi Governing Council

   The delegation met with four members of the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC), representing the primary political and religious factions within Iraq. The President of the IGC, Dr. Adnan Pachachi, a secularist, indicated the council was in the final phase of establishing basic laws, establishing the details of a provisional government, and completing the constitution. Dr. Pachachi indicated his belief that the draft constitution covers every conceivable right: freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, the rule of law, etc. Three of the four members--Dr. Pachachi, the Sunni, and Shia IGC Members were unanimous in stating their views that it is an oversimplification to conclude that religious affiliation dictates the views of the Iraqi people: ``the reality is that the fanatics are a tiny minority, but very vocal and very well organized.'' The Sunni IGC member indicated that Sunni and Shia will vote on the issues, not on the basis of religion, but on the substance of the issues under consideration--``the educated middle class in Iraq is much more open minded.''

   The Kurdish member stated that the Kurds live under a different system and culture, that they have suffered under Iraqi rule, and ``have the right to establish their own way.'' Dr. Pachachi acknowledged that ``from the beginning we have recognized that the Kurds are distinct, that their special status will be maintained. We are in the process of agreeing to that arrangement.'' Dr. Pachachi further indicated that the problem at hand is deciding the best way to select members of the legislature: ``The problem is that it will be difficult to have credible elections in such a short period ..... If the U.N. doesn't believe elections are possible, they will likely propose other possibilities.''

   Iraq Survey Group

   Major General Keith Dayton, Director of the Iraqi Survey Group, provided a classified update on the search for weapons of mass destruction and counterterrorism programs. A common misperception is that Dr. Kay headed the hunt for WMD. While Dr. Kay has been a very valuable advisor in the hunt for WMD, General Dayton has headed the group responsible for the hunt for WMD since its inception in June 2003, and with Dr. Kay's departure will continue to head the group.

   What can be said about the delegation's discussions is that there, the people in the trenches actually doing the day-to-day searches, collecting, and analyzing the data and material, expressed a sense of ``frustration and dismay'' over ``what Dr. Kay is doing''--or at least some of the media's characterization of ``what Dr. Kay is doing,'' as he exits from his high visibility role in the hunt for WMD.

   The ISG has responsibilities beyond the sole search for WMD. Although not the Commander of the ISG, but responsible as the special advisor for WMD, apparently Dr. Kay sought total control of all the assets under the ISG for the sole purpose of the hunt for WMD. It was a matter of ``all or nothing.'' And when he didn't get all of the assets--even when those assets were increased to provide additional funds for areas other than the search for WMD, Dr. Kay objected, ultimately being a factor in his departure.

   Those responsible for the search for WMD in Iraq believe that while no large stockpiles of WMD have yet to be uncovered, no shortage of leads exist--with literally tens-of-millions of documents remaining to be fully examined and considerable leads and circumstantial evidence to be pursued--``with much remaining to be done.''

   General Dayton believes the declared failure by some to yet find large stockpiles of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons is premature and ignores the significance of the evidence that has been found about the undisputed activities in each of these areas providing evidence of future intentions and breakout capabilities being pursued and proven to have existed. In the nuclear area, Dr. Kay said as recently as January 28 that, ``Look, the man had the intent to acquire these weapons, he invested huge amounts of money in them. The fact is he wasn't successful.''

   In the end, Dr. Kay's judgment, regardless of the disappointment resident in the ISG, came down on the side of the continued search. In an interview on NBC in which he was asked to comment on whether it was prudent to go to war, Dr. Kay said ``I think it was absolutely prudent. In fact, I think at the end of the inspection process we'll paint a picture of Iraq that was far more dangerous than we even thought it was before the war .....''.

   1st Armored Division

   Brigadier General Mark Hertling, Deputy Commanding General, 1st Armored Division, provided an update on security and Iraqi police training programs within Baghdad.

   Kuwait, January 27

   Four members of the delegation met with Sheik Saud al Sabah, former Kuwaiti Ambassador to the United States, to renew acquaintances and discuss the general political, economic, and military situation in the region. Sheik Sabah has personally established a fund for families of U.S. military personnel killed in the 1991 Gulf War.

   Balad Air Base & Ad Dawr, January 28

   Major General Ray Odierno, Commanding General, 4th Infantry Division, and Colonel Frederick Rudesheim, Commander, 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 4th ID, escorted the delegation to the site of Saddam Hussein's capture near Ad Dawr and briefed the delegation on operations and reconstruction efforts in his area of responsibility.

   Islamabad, Pakistan January 29

   AMB Nancy J. Powell briefed the delegation on issues relating to the bilateral relationship between the United States and Pakistan, and responded to members' questions.

   Chairman Weldon asked if Usama Bin Ladin were in Baluchistan (the southern tribal area bordering Afghanistan), and if he were being protected by Pakistani government officials. AMB Powell responded that she does not believe there are Al Qaeda sympathizers among the Pakistani leadership, but the question of Taliban supporters is ``trickier.'' She noted that in general, Pakistani cooperation has been excellent: Khalid Sheikh Mohammed was taken down by Pakistani elements, and that another high value target was captured within 90 minutes of transmitting U.S. intelligence to Pakistani forces.

   Chairman Weldon followed up with a question concerning the likelihood of assassination of President Musharraf AMB Powell responded that it is always a danger--he recently survived two attempts on his life, which Musharraf blames on Al-Qaeda. AMB Powell pointed out that the 1988 plane crash that claimed the life of President Zia is still surrounded by questions.

   Chairman Weldon asked how extensive our contacts with Pakistani officials were. AMB Powell responded that we lost contact with an entire generation of Pakistani officers when Pakistan was under sanctions between 1990-2001, but just this last year we brought 75 junior officers into our training programs. Chairman Weldon also asked about the F-16s that Pakistan bought but were denied under sanctions, and AMB Powell replied that they had been paid back.

   Chairman Weldon suggested that Chairman Souder lead an effort to create a tripartite interparliamentary exchanges with Pakistani, Indian, and U.S. legislators. AMB Powell remarked that this would be particularly helpful to Pakistani parliamentarians: they passively await legislation drafted by the government; they have no staff; no working committee system.

   Kabul, Afghanistan January 29

   The delegation met with President Hamid Karzai and the former King of Afghanistan Zahir Shah. President Karzai expressed his appreciation to the delegation for the many sacrifices made by America to further political stability, economic progress, and increase employment in Afghanistan and for America's continued war on terrorism ..... ``Our people know what America has done.'' He described the Loya Jirga process, the adoption of the Afghan Constitution, patterned after the U.S. Constitution, and the anticipated general elections.

   President Hamid Karzai

   President Karzai cited the key importance of Pakistan to stability in Afghanistan by not interfering in Afghan affairs, yet assisting in elimination of the Taliban threat. The President and the delegation discussed the significant problem of continued high levels of poppy cultivation in Afghanistan. President Karzai acknowledged Afghanistan's failed efforts to eliminate poppy cultivation

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and described the government's plan to destroy poppy fields, while assisting farmers in alternative crop cultivation, interdiction of drug routes, and destruction of heroin production labs. The President concluded that for Afghanistan to emerge as a nation-state it has to destroy the poppy crop: ``to destroy terrorism, we must destroy poppies.'' The delegation cited its support and commitment to Afghanistan, ``for the long haul.''

   His Highness, Zahir Shah

   The former King, Zahir Shah, thanked the delegation for U.S. assistance in establishing peace and security in Afghanistan. He observed that the political process in Afghanistan is based on a tribal structure--a democracy that functions within a tribal structure--with the same goals as the people in America.

   Karshi-Kharnabad, Uzbekistan, January 29-30

   The delegation remained overnight at Karshi-Kharnabad (``K-2''), Uzbekistan following meetings in Kabul to visit U.S. military personnel supporting OEF. In addition to being able to speak informally at the evening and breakfast meals with personnel from their districts, the delegation received mission orientation briefings and visited unit assigned aircraft and a static display of a Uzbek SU-27 provided by the Uzbek Air Force.

   Ramstein and Lanstuhl Medical Center Germany, January 30-31

   General ``Doc'' Foglesong and Consul General Bodde

   General ``Doc'' Foglesong and Consul General (CG) Peter Bodde discussed NATO-related military and regional political issues. General Foglesong described the challenges posed by making the NATO Response Force (NRF) viable given the current limited expeditionary capabilities of the NRF. He also described the efforts at re-sizing NATO and U.S. operations--``mining manpower positions''--and the use of ``reach back capabilities'' to allow functions in the U.S. such as intelligence to support the European theater instead of having to have the capability resident in Europe. General Foglesong further described efforts to develop niche capabilities among NATO partners to preclude all nations from having to have all military capabilities with some developing expeditionary capabilities for billeting, some with medical, others with civil engineering, etc.

   Representative Souder expressed his deep concern regarding Austria's, France's, Turkey's and Germany's various degrees of lack of support for U.S. operations in Iraq. He also commented on the cumbersome rules of engagement within NATO in the war in Kosovo, ``when eight foreign ministers were involved in approving target lists.'' General Foglesong cited need for ``balance'' in each of these relations and for future planning, the need to assess our abilities to deploy into and out of various countries and determine which countries will allow the U.S. to ``kinematically execute'' from their bases.

   The delegation also discussed the status of relationships with the French and German governments. General Foglesong and CG Bodde highlighted a number of efforts by Germany to assist the U.S., e.g., providing air base security to permit U.S. security personnel to be deployed to support operations like OIF and OEF. General Foglesong indicated his optimism in dealing with the countries within NATO: ``They recognize that terrorists don't recognize borders.''

   Representative Ortiz, expressing frustration, observed that ``it would be nice if the State Department would consider us (Congress) equal players,'' indicating that both DOD and DOS frequently take action without consultation or regard for the views of Congress. Chairman Weldon also noted what seems to be apparent ``disconnects'' between the State Department, DOD, and NSC on foreign policy issues.

   Chairman Weldon concluded that regardless of the many troubling aspects in the execution of foreign policy and some military operations, support for the troops is solid and unequivocal and the troops need to know that.

   Contingency Aero-medical Staging Facility & Lanstuhl Regional Medical Center

   Colonel Brenda McEleney provided the delegation a tour of the Contingency Aero-medical Staging Facility where they were able to visit with a number of troops awaiting transportation to Walter Reed Medical Center.

   Colonel Steven Older and Colonel Carol Gilmore provided the delegation a tour of the Landstuhl Regional Medical Center where the delegation was able to meet with a number of military personnel recovering from injuries sustained in Iraq.

   The delegation provided transportation from Ramstein Air Base to Andrews Air Force Base for ten soldiers en route to Walter Reed Army Medical Center where they were to receive further treatment for injuries sustained in Iraq.

DELEGATION

   MEMBERS

   Representative Curt Weldon (R-PA), Representative Solomon Ortiz (D-TX), Representative Steve Israel (D-NY)*, Representative Candice Miller (R-MI), Representative Rodney Alexander (D-LA), Representative Elton Gallegly (R-CA)**, Representative Mark Souder (R-IN), Representative Darrell Issa (R-CA)**.

   PROFESSIONAL STAFF

   Doug Roach, Harald Stavenas, Richard Mereu**, Marc Wheat***.

   U.S. ARMY ESCORTS

   Lt Colonel Craig Collier, Lt Colonel Gregg Blanchard, Sgt Thai Kov, Sgt Hugh Griffin.

   *Kuwait-Iraq only.

   **Libya only.

   ***29-31 Jan.

KEY PERSONNEL

   LIBYA
Colonel Moammar Gaddafi
Shokri Ghanem, Prime Minister
Abdulrakman Shalgam, Foreign Minister
Zinati Mohammad Zinati, Speaker of the General Peoples' Congress
Matoug M. Matoug, Deputy Prime Minister for Service Affairs (weapons of mass destruction)
Honorable Suleiman Al Shahoumi, Secretary of Foreign Affairs at the General Peoples' Congress
Dr. Abdulhafed M. Jaber, Director, Technical Cooperation Office, Ministry of Service Affairs (weapons of mass destruction)
Abdulatife Aldali, Chairman of Tripoli Conference (Mayor of Tripoli)
Abdulmagid Mansuri, Member, International Energy Advisory Council
Tajura Nuclear Research Center
Professor E.F. Ehtuish, Chairman, Board on the Environment
Saleh Saleh, General Manager, Gaddafi International Foundation for Charity Associations
Dr. Giuma Atigha, Gaddafi Human Rights Foundation
Dr. Mohamed Lutf Farhat, President, Al-Fateh University
Dr. Muftah M. Etwilb, Director of International Relations, Libyan Red Crescent
Libyan-American Friendship Association

   BAGHDAD
Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) (c/o CPA Legislative Affairs, 1401 Wilson Blvd, Floor 5, Arlington, VA 22209-2306)
Dr. Adnan Pachachi, President, Iraqi Governing Council (secularist)
Dr. Roj Schaways, Iraqi Governing Council Member (Kurd)
Dr. Muwaffak A1 Rubuic, Iraqi Governing Council Member (Shiia religious leader)
Samir Sumaidaie, Iraqi Governing Council Member (Sunni)
Ambassador Richmond, UK Special Representative to Iraq
Lieutenant General (LTG) Ricardo Sanchez, the senior U.S. military official in Iraq (Commanding General V Corps and Coalition Joint Task Force 7) (HQ CJTF-7 CPA Command Group, Unit 91400, APO AE 09342-1400)
Major General Keith Dayton, Commander, Iraqi Survey Group (c/o CPA Legislative Affairs, 1401 Wilson Blvd, Floor 5, Arlington, VA 22209-2306)
Brigadier General Mark Hertling, Deputy Commanding General, 1st Armored Division (Unit 93054 APO AE 09324-3053)
Robert Kelley, Legislative Counselor to Ambassador Bremer (c/o CPA Legislative Affairs, 1401 Wilson Blvd, Floor 5, Arlington, VA 22209-2306)
Lt Colonel Richardson, Distinguished Visitors Bureau (Security detail) (c/o CPA Legislative Affairs, 1401 Wilson Blvd, Floor 5, Arlington, VA 22209-2306)

   KUWAIT
Sheik Saud al Sabah, former Kuwaiti Ambassador to the United States
Joe Porto, U.S. Embassy Control Officer (US Embassy, Unit 69000, APO AE 000009000)

   BALAD AIR BASE
Major General Ray Odierno, Commanding General, 4th Infantry Division (ID) (APO AE 92628)
Colonel Frederick Rudesheim, Commander, Third Brigade, 4th ID, APO AE 09323

   ISLAMABAD, PAKISTAN
Nancy Powell, U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan, (Unit 62200, APO AE 09812-2200)
Joel Reifman, economic section/control officer, U.S. Embassy

   KABUL, AFGHANISTAN
Hamid Karzai, President of Afghanistan
Zahir Shah, former King of Afghanistan
Sardar Abdulwalij, General, retired (nephew and associate of H.E. Zahir Shah)
Zalmay Khalilzad, U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan
Hank Tucker, political-military section/control officer, U.S. Embassy

   KARSHI-KHARNABAD, UZBEKISTAN
Jon R. Purnell, U.S. Ambassador to Uzbekistan (pouch address: 7110 Tashkent Place, Dulles, VA 20189-7110)
Colonel Scott Wagner, Installation Commander (Unit HHC 213 ASG APO AE 09311)
Lt. Colonel Hosil Mirzaev, Uzbekistan Air Force, (SU-27 display)

   RAMSTEIN AIR BASE AND LANDSTUHL REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, GERMANY
General Robert (Doc) H. Foglesong, Commander, U.S. Air Forces Europe
Lt General Arthur J. Lichte, Vice Commander, U.S. Air Forces Europe
Peter W. Bodde, Consul General, U.S. Embassy, Frankfurt (American Consulate General, Siesmayerstrasse 21, 60323 Frankfurt, Germany)
Brigadier General Rosanne Bailey, Commander, 435th Air Base Wing
Colonel Philip Lakier, Deputy Surgeon General, USAF, Europe
Colonel Brenda McEleney, Deputy Commander, 435th Medical Group

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Colonel Steven Older, Acting Commander, Landstuhl Regional Medical Center
Colonel Carol Gilmore, Landstuhl Regional Medical Center
Larry Wright, Vice Consul, U.S. Consulate, Frankfurt

   C-40 AIRCRAFT CREW (FLEET LOGISTICS SUPPORT SQUADRON-VR 59, 1050 BOYINGTON DR. FT WORTH, TEXAS 76127-5000)
Commander Bill Snyder, Aircraft Commander
Lt. Commander Benjamin White, Copilot
AE2 Michael Marr, crew chief
AK2 Lyndal Crow, Loadmaster
AD1 James Davis, flight attendant
HM2 Letty Owour, flight attendant
AM2 Shawn Smith, maintenance technician
MAI Daniel Topper, security
MA2 John Eagles, security
MA2 Jason Stafford, security
MA3 Daniel Veccholla, security

A New Time; A New Beginning

   A New Time, A New Beginning was published in 2001 under the leadership of Representative Curt Weldon (PA-7), co-chairman of the Duma-Congress Study Group, to provide a comprehensive bipartisan program for cooperation between the United States and Russia. It was endorsed by nearly one-third of the members of Congress and provides 108 recommendations for U.S.-Russia cooperation in the following 11 major subject areas: Agricultural Development, Cultural/Education Development, Defense and Security, Economic Development, Energy/Natural Resources, Environmental Cooperation, Health Care, Judicial/Legal Systems, Local Governments, Science and Technology, and Space and Aeronautics.

   Members of Congress
Welcome, men of Congress.
To the land of bless.
Here, peace is the belief.
And love is man's relief.
We are a nation of norms.
Disbelievers in terror of all forms.
Destructive arms is not our goal.
We are for peace, body and soul.
Our guide is sweetness and light,
First in beauty, first in might.
Think not of terror
Man's imposed horror.
Such sickly deeds
Are but evil seeds
That cause man to fall
And end the universe for all.

   Dr. T.T. Tarhuui

   Professor of English,

   Al Fateh University

   Tripoli Libya

END

4K) Activities of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I rise today in order to update my colleagues in this body on the recent activities of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence with respect to Iraq. This is a subject that has been in the headlines consistently for many different reasons. But my purpose in rising today is to report to the Senate, for it is an important day in that the Intelligence Committee members, as of this afternoon, will be presented the working draft of what the staff has been working on for better than 7 months.

   In June of last year, nearly 8 months ago, the Intelligence Committee began a formal review of U.S. intelligence into the existence of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs, Iraq's ties to terrorist groups, Saddam Hussein's threat to regional stability and security in the Persian Gulf, and his violation--obvious violation--of human rights.

   This review was initiated as part of the committee's continuing oversight of the U.S. intelligence community's activities and programs, which is always continuing. Our committee staff had, for the previous several months, already been examining the intelligence activities regarding Iraq, including the intelligence community's support to the United Nations weapons inspections in Iraq and the community's analysis and collection of reporting related to the alleged Niger-Iraq uranium deal.

   On June 20, 2003, however, Vice Chairman ROCKEFELLER and I issued a press statement. We announced a joint commitment to continue the committee's thorough review of prewar U.S. intelligence. In that press statement, Senator Rockefeller and I agreed to examine the following: the quantity and quality of U.S. intelligence on the Iraqi regime's weapons of mass destruction programs, its ties to terrorist groups, the regime's threat to stability and security in the region, and its repression of its own people.

   We also agreed to look at the objectivity and the

   reasonableness, independence, and accuracy of the judgments reached by the Intelligence Community; whether those judgments were properly disseminated to policymakers in the executive branch and the Congress; whether--and this is very important--any influence was brought to bear on anyone to shape their analysis to support policy objectives; finally, other issues we might mutually identify in the course of the committee's review.

   I laid out three phases of the committee's overall Iraq review. First, to evaluate the quantity and quality of the intelligence underlying prewar assessments concerning Iraq; second, to determine whether the analytical judgments contained in those assessments were objective, independent, and reasonable; third, to evaluate the accuracy of those assessments by comparing them with the results of the ongoing investigative efforts in Iraq.

   This afternoon, as I have stated, our committee members will begin reading and reviewing the staff's draft report, which does contain the committee's efforts to complete the first and second phases of the review. The third and final phase will be completed when the Iraq survey group completes its work in Iraq.

   Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

   Mr. ROBERTS. I am delighted to yield.

   Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I am privileged to serve on the committee with the Senator. There has been criticism, raising the inference that we have not in the Senate been addressing this with the depth and sincerity and interest we should.

   I take great umbrage at that. Under the leadership of the chairman and, indeed, myself, we are the ones who brought David Kay up. We are the ones who put David Kay on the stand, the Intelligence Committee first, and before the Armed Services Committee immediately following, and subjected him to cross-examination after the delivery of his report. His report is a mixed one in certain ways, in my judgment, but nevertheless in no way were we not taking the initiative to bring this to the forefront.

   I say also, yesterday the Armed Services Committee heard from the Secretary of Defense. The distinguished chairman was present. He is a member of that committee. Again, the first questions on WMD and precisely the question of whether or not there was any manipulation or distortion came from the Chair, myself, addressed directly to the Secretary.

   Any objective analysis of the reports out of that hearing this morning--it was covered by the press--he faced it head on and answered those questions.

   As we are speaking, I just departed the television where Director Tenet is now addressing the Nation. So I think the President and his principal deputies are facing square on these complex issues, as is the Senate.

   I commend the chairman, and perhaps he will agree with my observations.

   Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I fully agree with the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee, and I am very proud to serve on that committee, as well as privileged being the chairman of the Intelligence Committee.

   We discussed this at great length. All members of these committees discussed it at great length. We have a responsibility to the American people to

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fully investigate this and to publicly, when we can, when we are not dealing with any classified information, tell the American people what they should know and have a right to know. We are proceeding in that fashion. We are taking this very seriously, which is why I am trying to summarize now for the Senate and for all those who may be interested in this issue precisely what we have done to date in regard to the Intelligence Committee.

   The Senator is exactly right, he has taken the lead in the Armed Services Committee with the appropriate people within the military, and I thank him for his contribution.

   Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank the Senator.

   Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, our review in the Intelligence Committee began in earnest in early June of last year when the intelligence community did provide our committee with 19 volumes--19 volumes, floor to ceiling--and they contained approximately 15,000 pages of intelligence assessments and sources and source reporting underlying the assessments of the Hussein regime's WMD programs. They also pertained to ties to terrorist groups, the threat to stability and security in the region, as I have said before, and the repression of his own people.

   Our committee staff began immediately to read and analyze every report provided to determine how intelligence analysts reached their conclusions and whether any assessments were not supported by the intelligence provided to the committee.

   Our committee staff endeavored to the greatest extent possible to disregard--to disregard--postwar revelations concerning Iraq in order to replicate the same analytical environment enjoyed by the intelligence community analysts prior to the war.

   In late August and early September of 2003, our committee staff did request additional intelligence to substantiate the intelligence community's assessments which staff judged were not sufficiently supported by the intelligence that had been previously provided. Not only did we ask for the original information, but when we were not satisfied, we asked for more; we demanded more.

   Our committee staff began to receive this additional supporting intelligence in October of 2003. In late October, the staff requested any intelligence which had not already been provided that contradicted the intelligence community's prewar analysis in regard to Iraq.

   For example, the committee staff requested intelligence that showed Iraq had not reconstituted its nuclear program, had not renewed the production of chemical agents, and had abandoned an offensive biological weapons program. In early November of 2003, the intelligence community wrote to the committee that it was working to provide the contradictory intelligence we requested.

   In the same letter, the community stated it had uncovered an additional six volumes of intelligence material that supported its assessments on Iraq's WMD programs, and the community did provide the contradictory intelligence information in late November.

   I want my colleagues to realize that this has been an extremely thorough undertaking. During the 8 months of the committee's review, our committee staff submitted almost 100 requests for supplemental intelligence information, received over 30,000 pages of documents in response to those requests, and reviewed and analyzed each document that was provided.

   Additionally, our committee staff have interviewed more than 200 individuals, including intelligence analysts, senior officials within the Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of Defense, Department of Energy, Department of State, National Ground Intelligence Center, the Air Force, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

   They have also questioned former intelligence analysts, national intelligence officers, operations officers, collection managers, signals intelligence collectors, imagery analysts, nuclear experts with the International Atomic Energy Agency, ambassadors, former United Nations inspectors, Department of Defense weapons experts, State Department officials, and staff members of the National Security Council.

   Additionally, the committee has held three hearings on aspects of United States intelligence on Iraq, a hearing on the Iraq-Niger connection, a briefing by the CIA and State Department inspectors general on their review of the Iraq-Niger issue, and a hearing on the history and the continuity of weapons of mass destruction assessments that pertain to Iraq.

   These efforts have enabled our committee staff to develop a full understanding of the quantity and quality of intelligence reporting supporting the intelligence community's prewar assessments.

   Our committee staff have also gained an understanding of how intelligence analysts throughout the community used that intelligence to develop their assessments on these issues and how those assessments were actually disseminated to policymakers, and whether those assessments were reasonable, objective, independent, or if there was any political

   consideration and, again, whether any influence was brought to bear to shape their analysis to support any policy objective.

   The professional bipartisan staff of the Intelligence Committee I think has done an outstanding job. It is a very complete job. For the next 3 weeks, however, it will be the members of the committee, our turn to do our work by reading and reviewing and suggesting any changes to the report.

   I only hope that members will not prejudge the report. Let me repeat that. I only hope that members will not prejudge the report--there has been activity in the past indicating plans to do just that; I hope that does not happen--and that they will take the time to actually read the information in order to make informed critiques of the material.

   This report can have a profound impact--it will have a profound impact--on the future of our intelligence community as we face the threats of a new century. However, this can only be done if colleagues on both sides of the aisle put aside election year politics and review the facts in an objective and unbiased manner.

   Mr. President, how much time do I have remaining?

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kansas has 9 minutes remaining.

   Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I wish to read a statement by Winston Churchill which I think has application to the inquiry we are conducting in the Intelligence Committee and the whole issue in regard to the credibility and the timeliness of intelligence prior to the war in Iraq. Sir Winston Churchill said this upon hearing about the attack on Pearl Harbor:

   Silly people, that was the description many gave in discounting the force of the United States. Some said they were soft, others that they would never be united--

   Let me repeat that.

   That they would never be united, that they would never come to grips. They would never stand bloodletting. Their system of government and democracy would paralyze their war effort.

   Let me repeat that.

   Their system of government and democracy would paralyze their war effort.

   Now we will see the weakness of this numerous but remote, wealthy and talkative people.

   Referring to Americans.

   But, I have studied the American Civil War fought out to the last desperate inch. American blood flowed in my veins. I thought of a remark made to me 30 years before: The United States is like a gigantic boiler. Once the fire is lighted under it, there is no limit to the power it can generate. It is a matter of resolve.

   I am concerned in what appears to be almost a blast furnace of politics at a very early time, in an even-numbered year--and I understand that. I know politics is not bean bagged, and I know that my colleagues have very serious differences of opinion, as we will on the committee, but I hope what Sir Winston said: ``Some said they were soft, others that they would never be united ..... their system of government and democracy would paralyze their war effort,'' is not true in regard to the global war on terrorism. I have some concerns about that.

   I indicated at the first, when I knew it was our responsibility and obligation, in working with the distinguished vice chairman of the Intelligence Committee, that we would do our job and that we would do it just as bipartisan as we possibly could, that it would be

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thorough. It is my view that this draft report, and then what the Members will agree to, will be the most thorough review of the intelligence community in the last decade. I also said that we will make every effort to hold public hearings, because the American people have a right to know, and we will let any political chips fall any way they want to fall.

   I yield the floor.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time? Under the previous order, the majority leader controls the next 23 1/2 minutes and the Senator from California then would control 23 1/2 minutes. The Senator from Mississippi.

   Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, with the Senator's agreement I will go ahead and proceed since we did have, I think, about 27 or so minutes.

   Mr. ROBERTS. I yield the floor. May I inquire as to how much time I have remaining?

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kansas has 5 minutes remaining.

   Mr. ROBERTS. I ask unanimous consent that that time be yielded to the distinguished Senator from Mississippi.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is so ordered.

   The Senator from Mississippi is recognized for 5 minutes.

4L) State of Intelligence

Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, George Tenet gave a speech today at Georgetown that was profoundly disturbing to me and I want to visit about it for a moment.

   I am not on the Senate Intelligence Committee. I am not someone who claims to have substantial knowledge or detailed knowledge about all of these issues. I spend a great deal of time concerned about economic issues and think I know something about some of those, but I do not pretend to be an expert in foreign policy or intelligence issues.

   I, as have all of my colleagues, have sat in rooms with a label called ``top

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secret'' and listened to briefings, top-secret, classified briefings from Mr. Tenet, from the Vice President, from National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, from Secretary Powell, and others. I, like others, have watched what has happened in recent weeks with the testimony from David Kay in which he came to the Senate as a witness and said, look, we got it all wrong. We were all wrong about the intelligence with respect to Iraq.

   I listened to David Kay describe his assessment of the intelligence system--again, this is the top weapons inspector, appointed by President Bush--and what he said was, this country got it all wrong. Its intelligence service got it all wrong. He said, they failed the President.

   They did not just fail the President of the United States, if they failed. They failed the President and they failed those in Congress who they looked right in the eye as they gave top-secret briefings to us about their assessment of intelligence. They failed the American people, in my judgment. So this failure was much greater than just a failure to properly inform the President.

   This country has an enormous stake in making sure we have an intelligence community that works, one we support, and one we are proud of. Why? Someplace this afternoon there are intelligence agents who are pouring over the thinnest of hints about what terrorists might be deciding to do to murder Americans, to attack an American city, to commit a terrorist act against our country, and we must rely on those intelligence agents and the intelligence community to understand it and to get it right,

   not to exaggerate it, not to misinterpret it, but to understand it and get it right. The safety and security of this country depends on it.

   None of us wants the intelligence community to be held up in anything other than the highest esteem. I want to be able to say the intelligence community gets it and gets it right. But I cannot do that at the moment.

   Something is wrong, and we must fix it. When the top weapons inspector comes to the Congress and says, look, the intelligence was all wrong, it failed the President, you don't need much more than that to understand somebody has to be accountable. We have to, posthaste, begin to fix that which failed us.

   I have not heard of all of Mr. Tenet's presentation; I just heard the highlights a bit ago in which he was defending the CIA. But let me describe one of the reasons I found Mr. Tenet's remarks so distressing.

   Last evening I happened to be watching something on ``60 Minutes.'' They were interviewing a gentleman named Greg Thielmann. Mr. Thielmann had been in charge of analyzing Iraqi weapons threats for Secretary of State Colin Powell's Intelligence Bureau. He was the one who, after 25 years, became the Acting Director of the Office of Strategic Proliferation and Military Affairs. He was responsible, before he retired, for analyzing the Iraqi weapons threat.

   He and his staff had the highest security clearances. They saw virtually everything, whether it came in to the CIA or the Defense Department. He was, by all accounts, admired by everyone, and had a long and distinguished career.

   During the ``60 Minutes'' interview, Mr. Thielmann describes watching the February 5, 2003, presentation Secretary Powell made to the United Nations. He says at the time Secretary Powell made that presentation he was nonplused by what Secretary Powell was saying. He says what Powell was saying about a range of things was not at all in concert with the intelligence the State Department had. About the charge that Iraq was importing aluminum tubes to use in a program to build nuclear weapons--he said:

   This is one of the most disturbing parts of Secretary Powell's speech for us.

   He is talking now of those who were part of the intelligence-gathering part of the State Department.

   Intelligence agents intercepted the tubes in 2001, and the CIA said they were parts for a centrifuge to enrich uranium--fuel for an atom bomb. But they got information from the Oak Ridge National Laboratory--those are the scientists who enrich uranium for our bombs, our nuclear weapons--and the experts there advised that the tubes were all wrong for a bomb program and the aluminum, apparently, it turns out, after further inspection, was exactly what the Iraqis wanted for artillery.

   So they sent the word up to Secretary Powell this is not about nuclear weapons, it is about artillery, and the fellow who is at the Oak Ridge Laboratory, Houston Wood, said:

   I guess I was angry, that's the best way to describe my emotions. I was angry at that.

   Mr. Thielmann was talking now about Secretary Powell's speech to the United Nations. He said he found that the tubes could not be what the CIA thought they were. They were too heavy, three times too thick, and certain to leak.

   The transcript says:

   ``Wasn't going to work. They would have failed,'' says Wood. .....

   And they reached that conclusion in 2001.

   They reported to Secretary Powell's office that they were confident the tubes were not for a nuclear program. And then nothing happened. About a year later, when the administration was building the case for the war, the tubes were resurrected on the front page of the New York Times. And Mr. Wood says:

   I thought when I read that there must be some other tubes that people were talking about. I just was flabbergasted that people were still pushing that those might be centrifuges.

   The New York Times reported that senior administration officials insisted the tubes were for an atom bomb program.

   Again, Mr. Wood, the expert from Oak Ridge Laboratories, says:

   Science was not pushing this forward. Scientists had made their determination, their evaluation, and now we didn't know what was happening.

   The scientists had already said this cannot be for the development of nuclear weapons.

   So in his United Nations speech, Secretary Powell acknowledged there was a disagreement about the aluminum tubes, but he said most experts agreed with the nuclear theory. Mr. Powell said:

   There is controversy about what these tubes are for. Most U.S. experts think they are intended to serve as rotors in centrifuges used to enrich uranium.

   Most of the experts--nearly all of the experts--are at Oak Ridge. And Mr. Houston Wood, at Oak Ridge, claims he does not know anyone in academia or a foreign government who would disagree with his appraisal.

   He said: I don't know a single person anywhere who believed that these aluminum tubes were for a nuclear program.

   Now, I do not understand this. It appears to me that information was available that would have debunked several key portions. I have not talked about the alleged yellowcake purchase from Niger, which was in the President's State of the Union Address, which turned out to have been wrong, or the UAVs, the most sensitive of information, which turned out to be wrong.

   Mr. Thielmann, who was, again, the top official at the State Department for the gathering of intelligence for presentation to Secretary Powell, talked about some of the slides Secretary Powell was using. He talked about the stockpile of between 100 and 500 tons of chemical weapons. He said part of the stockpile was clearly in these bunkers. He was showing slides:

   The four that are in red squares represent active chemical munitions bunkers. How do I know that, how can I say that? Let me give you a closer look.

   Up close, Powell said you could see a truck for cleaning up chemical spills. It is a signature for a chemical bunker.

   Quote:

   It's a decontamination vehicle in case something goes wrong.

   But again, Mr. Thielmann, who is the top intelligence person who is providing information to Powell, said:

   My understanding is that these particular vehicles were simply fire trucks. You cannot really describe [that] as being a unique signature.

   In fact, it is interesting, when the weapons inspectors showed up over there, that is what they discovered, it was firetrucks. And in other circumstances, that which was part of the slides shown, they were trucks with cobwebs in them and had not been used for a long while. There was no evidence of weapons of mass destruction.

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   So this is a ``60 Minutes'' presentation from the last evening, in which a top intelligence person, with all the clearances, having seen all the intelligence, says Secretary Powell, and others, would have had the intelligence to deal with these questions easily.

   This debate is not about pulling Saddam Hussein out of a rat hole. Saddam Hussein was more than a rat. Saddam Hussein was an evil man who killed thousands, perhaps hundreds of thousands. It is the case our country has opened mass graves the size of football fields, and those graves contain the skeletons of thousands and thousands and thousands of Iraqis. The world is much better off because Saddam Hussein has been apprehended and no longer runs the country of Iraq.

   But the question for this country--and it is an important question--is, when the call is made the next time--perhaps an hour from now, perhaps a month from now--to have our intelligence community make an accurate assessment, will they make an assessment that is accurate? Will they fail us? Will they fail the President? Will they fail our country? This is a very significant issue.

   Mr. Tenet's speech today was not only defensive, but Mr. Tenet's speech failed, in my judgment, to acknowledge what the country has widely acknowledged, starting with David Kay and others, that the intelligence failed us with respect to Iraq. And that bothers me a great deal.

   Now, I know there will be people who come to the floor of the Senate, and they will say none of this really matters. Saddam Hussein was a bad guy. He was; no question about that. But if you say that good intelligence does not matter, then don't sleep very well tonight because terrorists want to commit terrorist acts in this country. Terrorists want to kill people in this country. The only way we are going to make certain we protect this country is through good, strong intelligence.

   I worry a great deal about an intelligence community that does not seem to be accountable, does not get it right, and no one cares. The President ought to be furious about what is happening. The Congress ought to be apoplectic about what is happening. Both should demand on an urgent basis a complete, thorough review of what went wrong and how to fix it--not tomorrow, not yesterday, but right now. I don't see that urgency at all. What I see is the President finally getting pushed and nudged the last couple days, saying: I will put together an independent commission that can investigate intelligence, only under pressure.

   Then we have people who come to the floor and say: There is no problem here. Saddam Hussein was a bad guy found in a rat hole. It is better that he is in jail.

   Every single one of us--Republicans, Democrats, the White House, and the Congress, and especially the American people--must rely on a strong system of intelligence that gets it right to protect this country's long-term security. To the extent that, as David Kay indicated, it failed and to the extent that, as so many others have testified, circumstance after circumstance that was alleged was not accurate, and to the extent now that Mr. Tenet continues today to seem to believe all was well and all those who are critical are somehow just plain wrong, America is weakened for that.

   We will strengthen ourselves when we understand we must rely on good intelligence. And if we have not received good intelligence, we must fix that system now. It must be done posthaste. It must be job one. There is an urgency for us to take action now to make certain the next intelligence assessment, perhaps an hour from now, to try to protect this country will be an assessment that is accurate and one upon which we can rely.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.

   Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I wish to respond to a few of the comments our colleague from North Dakota has just made. I begin with the proposition that it does help to have been on the Senate Intelligence Committee or to be a member of the committee today to conduct a more thoughtful, reasoned discussion of this debate than has generally been characterized by the media accounts.

   People in the media tend to try to capsulize everything in an attention-grabbing headline way when in fact intelligence is a very complex, difficult proposition that needs to be handled and approached in the most cautious and careful manner.

   I think it is important for those people who have been on the committee or, as the Senator from Missouri sitting next to me noted, currently just received briefings as a member of the committee--it is important for them to be able to respond when comments have been made such as those just concluded.

   David Kay did not say we got it all wrong. I invite anyone who would like to bring to this floor a quotation from David Kay that says ``we got it all wrong'' to do so. He did not say that. I know that is what opponents of the Bush administration wish he had said, but he didn't say that. Let me quote to you some of the things he did say.

   He was asked a question by Senator McCain testifying before the House Armed Services Committee:

   You agree with the fundamental principle here that what we did was justified and enhanced the security of the United States and the world by removing Saddam Hussein from power?

   David Kay:

   Absolutely.

   But then Senator Kennedy asked a question that kind of got to some of the points our colleague from North Dakota just made. He asked:

   Many of us feel that the evidence so far leads only to one conclusion: that what has happened was more than a failure of intelligence, it was the result of manipulation of the intelligence to justify a decision to go to war.

   David Kay:

   All I can say is if you read the total body of intelligence in the last 12 to 15 years that flowed on Iraq, I quite frankly think it would be hard to come to a conclusion other than Iraq was a gathering, serious threat to the world with regard to WMD.

   That is exactly the conclusion that other Members of this body articulated. I won't quote names, but I remember several of my colleagues, including a Member on the other side of the aisle, saying pretty much the same thing.

   President Clinton said almost exactly the same thing. In fact, in 1998, we overwhelmingly passed a resolution in this body authorizing President Clinton to take action to remove the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq precisely because of this. The intelligence that existed then, that existed before then, and that existed before our most recent conflict with Iraq all verified what David Kay said was true.

   So far from saying that we got it all wrong, David Kay is saying we were perfectly justified in taking the action we took. Part of getting it all wrong would have been the information that we had regarding the violations of the U.N. resolutions. What did David Kay think about that?

   He said:

   In my judgment, based on the work that has been done to this point of the Iraq Survey Group, and in fact, that I reported to you in October, Iraq was in clear violation of the terms of Resolution 1441. Resolution 1441 required that Iraq report all of its activities: one last chance to come clean about what it had. We have discovered hundreds of cases, based on both documents, physical evidence and the testimony of Iraqis, of activities that were prohibited under the initial U.N. Resolution 687 and that should have been reported under 1441, with Iraqi testimony that not only did they not tell the U.N. about this, they were instructed not to do it and they hid the material.

   Iraq was in clear and material violation of 1441. They maintained programs and activities, and they certainly had the intentions at a point to resume their program. So there was a lot they wanted to hide because it showed what they were doing was illegal. I hope we find even more evidence of that.

   This is what David Kay actually said. One of the arguments made was that, somehow or other, the CIA and our intelligence community were pressured by the Bush administration to somehow modify the intelligence to suit their nefarious purposes, the implication being that the administration wanted to go to war and needed to somehow manipulate the intelligence to reach that conclusion.

   Here is what David Kay said about that:

   And let me take one of the explanations most commonly given: Analysts were pressured to reach conclusions that would fit the political agenda of one or another administration. I deeply think that is a wrong explanation. And never--not in a single case--was the explanation, ``I was pressured to do

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this.'' The explanation was, very often, ``The limited data we had led one to reasonably conclude this. I now see that there's another explanation for it.'' And each case was different, but the conversations were sufficiently in depth and our relationship was sufficiently frank that I'm convinced that, at least to the analysts I dealt with, I did not come across a single one that felt it had been, in the military term, ``inappropriate command influence'' that led them to take that position.

   Some people in saying, well, maybe we didn't get it all wrong, but what was the real state of intelligence here and did it comport with what we thought we knew--I thought the colloquy between Senator McCain and David Kay at this hearing was most interesting.

   Senator McCain:

   Saddam Hussein developed and used weapons of mass destruction; true?

   David Kay:

   Absolutely.

   Parenthetically, I would note, this is not an answer from a man who is saying we got it all wrong because, remember, the allegation had been that Saddam Hussein had developed and used weapons of mass destruction. So he didn't say: We got it all wrong. He said: Absolutely.

   Senator McCain then:

   He used them against the Iranians and the Kurds; just yes or no.

   David Kay:

   Oh, yes.

   Senator McCain:

   OK. And U.N. inspectors found enormous quantities of banned chemical and biological weapons in Iraq in the '90s?

   David Kay:

   Yes, sir.

   Senator McCain:

   We know that Saddam Hussein had once a very active nuclear program.

   David Kay:

   Yes.

   Senator McCain:

   And he realized and had ambitions to develop and use weapons of mass destruction.

   David Kay:

   Clearly.

   Senator McCain:

   So the point is, if he were in power today, there is no doubt that he would harbor ambitions for the development and use of weapons of mass destruction. Is there any doubt in your mind?

   David Kay:

   There's absolutely no doubt. And I think I've said that, Senator.

   There is one final thing I would like to talk about that David Kay actually said. Senator Clinton asked him a question at that hearing as follows:

   I think that rightly does raise questions that we should be examining about whether or not the U.N. inspection process pursuant to 1441 might not also have worked without the loss of life that we have confronted both among our own young men and women, as well as Iraqis.

   David Kay:

   Well, Senator Clinton, let me just add to that. We have had a number of Iraqis who have come forward and said, ``We did not tell the U.N. about what we were hiding, nor would we have told the U.N. because we would run the risk of our own''--I think we have learned things that no U.N. inspector would have ever learned given the terror regime of Saddam and the tremendous personal consequences that scientists had to run by speaking the truth. That's not to say, and it's not incompatible with the fact that inspections accomplish a great deal in holding a program down. And that's where the surprise is. In holding the program down, in keeping it from break out, I think the record is better than we would have anticipated. I don't think the record is necessarily better than we thought with regard to getting the final truth, because of the power of the terrorist state that Saddam Hussein had.

   The bottom line is that David Kay recognizes that, while the U.N. inspectors found certain things, the inspections that he performed were even more helpful because of the pressure that the Iraqis had been under when Saddam Hussein was in power. But what David Kay said--if you read all of the rest of the testimony--was basically this: There are many things we found about Saddam Hussein's weapons program. We even found some weapons, and we talked to a lot of Iraqis who told us that he had every intention of reinitiating the programs once the sanctions were lifted. Everything was in place for him to do that.

   The thing that puzzled David Kay is that we had not found the stocks of chemical weapons, primarily. We knew that he had artillery shells, some of which were filled with chemical agents, and others that could be filled with chemical agents, and that he had large stocks of those agents, as well as some biological agents.

   How do we know that is true? Because the Iraqis admitted that and the U.N. inspectors confirmed it. He admitted it in 1998. He never explained what happened to those stocks thereafter.

   Now, one would think that when he admits that he has the stuff--and we know that he used that same kind of weapon before--that if he doesn't prove to us that he got rid of it--in fact, he offers no explanation about where it is--you have to assume that he hasn't. It would be imprudent to assume otherwise.

   So to suggest that David Kay came back and said, no, we got it all wrong, that is wrong. What he puzzles about was why we had not found this stock of artillery shells.

   Before the military activity was taken, all of the Senators were invited every day at 9 o'clock to go to the secure area of the Capitol to visit with the general and CIA people who briefed us on the status of the war. Every morning, if colleagues will remember, one of the things they briefed us on was how close our troops were getting to the red line--that line around Baghdad--where we had information that artillery with chemical shells could be lobbed against our soldiers. We did everything we could to stop that. We bombed warehouses of artillery, and we were trying to take out the command and control that would issue the orders. We dropped millions of leaflets on the military commanders of the Iraqis, saying they would be war criminals if they carried out orders to fire those artillery shells against our troops.

   We were surprised when we took the Baghdad Airport and they had not fired the artillery shells. We thought they were going to use them. We went to a lot of trouble to take them out. Maybe we took them out. Maybe we ruined their plan with command and control. Maybe they had gotten rid of them by then. Maybe they buried them or sent them to Syria.

   Secretary Rumsfeld testified yesterday that there are about five different scenarios that could explain why we have not found the artillery shells so far. David Kay says he is not sure we will ever find them, or that they existed on the day we went to war against Iraq. Maybe they had been destroyed, although you would wonder why Saddam Hussein didn't tell anybody about it. Maybe they were sent to other countries or maybe they were given to terrorists. That would be a terrible thing, but we don't know.

   Obviously, we had no evidence that they no longer existed. At one time, they existed. So it is far from David Kay

   saying we got it all wrong; he is saying that we got it all right, except--and I am paraphrasing here--for the fact that we cannot explain what happened to those weapons, and he wonders whether they existed when we went to war.

   What does George Tenet have to say about it? Our colleague says that George Tenet's comments were defensive. Maybe they were a little defensive. If you have been the subject of attack for several weeks about how you got it all wrong, you would be defensive, too.

   I found his speech today to be a very interesting presentation, a careful presentation about what, in fact, we knew, why we knew it, and why it would not have been prudent for us not to take action on it. I thought this to be particularly interesting.

   One of the things that he said was:

   To understand a difficult topic like Iraq takes patience and care. Unfortunately, you rarely hear a patient, careful, or thoughtful discussion of intelligence these days. But these times demand it because the alternative--politicized, haphazard evaluation, without the benefit of time and facts--may well result in an intelligence community that is damaged and a country that is more at risk.

   I don't find that defensive. Rather, I find it an attempt to try to put this discussion into a thoughtful, careful way of analyzing where we were right and where we were wrong, and how to make sure we are as right as possible in the future. He went on to say:

   By definition, intelligence deals with the unclear, the unknown, the deliberately hidden. What the enemies of the United States hope to deny, we work to reveal. The question being asked about Iraq in the starkest terms is, were we right or were we wrong? In

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the intelligence business, you are almost never completely wrong or completely right.

   He goes on to detail the information we had about the missile program of the Iraqis. I would like to say to colleagues, with respect to the missile program, it appears that we got it right. He talks about what we thought we knew, what he told the President we thought we knew, and what we believe is the case of our military actions. And with respect to their efforts to develop missiles that were in violation of U.N. resolutions, they appear to have gotten that pretty well right.

   His conclusion on that was this, and I will quote it:

   My provisional bottom line on the missiles: We were generally on target.

   He says that because he urges us to consider the fact that there is still a great deal of information left to be discovered in Iraq. They are nowhere near complete in their effort to try to find what Saddam Hussein had and to analyze how dangerous it was.

   With respect to that general proposition, I want to quote this:

   And to come to conclusions before the war other than those we reached, we would have had to ignore all the intelligence gathered from multiple sources after 1998.

   He detailed many here. He said:

   My provisional bottom line on missiles: We were generally on target.

   Regarding the unmanned aerial vehicles, he said:

   My provisional bottom line today: We detected the development of prohibited and undeclared unmanned aerial vehicles. But the jury is still out on whether Iraq intended to use its newer, smaller, unmanned aerial vehicle to deliver biological weapons.

   With regard to nuclear weapons, he said:

   My provisional bottom line today: Saddam did not have a nuclear weapon, he still wanted one, and Iraq intended to reconstitute a nuclear program at some point. We have not yet found clear evidence that dual-use items Iraq sought were for nuclear reconstitution. We do not yet know if any reconstitution efforts had begun. But we may have overestimated the progress Saddam was making.

   That is in contrast to what he said before the first gulf war when he noted that that colored the way they approached their analysis with respect to his nuclear program.

   Then, with respect to a biological program, he said:

   My provisional bottom line today: Iraq intended to develop biological weapons. Clearly, research and development work was underway that would have permitted a rapid shift to agent production if seed stocks were available. But we do not yet know if production took place. And just as clearly, we have not yet found biological weapons.

   Finally, with regard to the chemical weapons, he said:

   My provisional bottom line today: Saddam had the intent and capability to quickly convert civilian industry to chemical weapons production. However, we have not yet found the weapons we expected.

   I will quote a little more on this point:

   I have now given you my provisional bottom lines, but it is important to remember that estimates are not written in a vacuum. Let me tell you some of what was going on in the fall of 2002.

   He proceeds to detail several kinds of sources that came to the attention of the intelligence community, sources which provided information which no rational intelligence leader would have ignored: Saddam Hussein calling together his nuclear weapons committee--I am not going to go into all of this detail. He quotes, ``A stream of reporting from a different sensitive source'' that caused the intelligence community to advise the President, the Vice President, and others that they believed Saddam Hussein was actively trying to pursue these programs.

   He said:

   So what do I think about all of this today? Based on an assessment of the data we collected over the past 10 years, it would have been difficult for analysts to come to any different conclusions than the ones we reached in October of 2002.

   That is what George Tenet said. You can say he is being defensive. I say it is important for George Tenet to speak out and to explain to the American people how difficult it is to get intelligence, what we thought we knew at the time, what he advised our leaders of, what we think we know today.

   He also noted the fact they have instituted efforts internally to try to discover why they didn't know things perhaps they should have known, how they can do it better in the future.

   When you combine that with what David Kay said about the fact there was no evidence that our leadership in any way pressured our intelligence community to come to different conclusions, you have to stand up to the people who gathered this intelligence and presented it to the leaders. They maybe didn't get it all right, but they did their best. And with respect to our leadership, there is no reason to believe they didn't treat this information with the utmost of seriousness and honesty; that they presented it to the American people, exactly as George Tenet said today. They presented it in an honest way and that it would have been irresponsible of them to have acted any differently, to have presented it any differently given the information that had been presented to them.

   I think that had the President, knowing what he now knows and all of this would eventually come out even though a lot of it is classified information, if the President had not taken action and, God forbid, something had happened, a lot of people on the Senate floor, in the Senate, around the country, and certainly pundits would be saying: Why did President Bush ignore these warnings? Why did he ignore what the intelligence community came up with?

   There are some people who are saying that with respect to the attack of 9/11 when the President had virtually nothing, in fact, when we had obviously no reason to believe that on September 11 there would be an attack from the airliners that would be used by the al-Qaida terrorists, and yet with virtually nothing to go on, people are saying the President should have known and done something about it.

   With all of the evidence we had about Saddam Hussein and all of the evidence with regard to Iraq, to have ignored that would have been absolutely irresponsible. My colleagues who are criticizing him today for acting would then be criticizing him for not acting, I believe.

   In a political season, you are darned if you do and darned if you don't. We understand that. But I think it is important, as George Tenet asked us to do, especially for those of us in the Senate, especially those of us who served on the Intelligence Committee, to urge people to approach this subject from a sober, careful, nonpoliticized point of view because lives are at stake.

   We make decisions and the executive branch and military make decisions based upon our intelligence. We have to make sure that the way we restructure intelligence, the funding decisions that we make, and the other things we do are not based upon quick judgments, on political judgments certainly, but rather are based upon a calm analysis, a reflection based upon perspective and certainly an understanding of the difficulties that the intelligence community faces.

   When you do all of that, I think you can come to no other conclusion than what David Kay came to, that George Tenet said, the President, the Vice President, Secretary Powell, before the United Nations, that there was a problem here that could not be ignored.

   It would be absolutely wrong for anybody to suggest today that we got it all wrong and that for some reason that is President Bush's fault and certainly not for anyone to suggest that somehow or another our leadership misled the American people in order to go to war. That would be the absolute height of irresponsibility. No President, Republican or Democrat, I can think of would ever do such a thing.

   I am disappointed that some--and I am not referring to anybody in this body at this point--that some people would actually suggest that would be the case. But when we talk about the intelligence the way it has been discussed here today, it leads to that kind of conclusion. I think that is unfortunate.

   I urge all of my colleagues to try to discuss this in a relatively impassioned way, a carefully constructive way so working together we can craft the kind of policies that will provide for our security in the future, protection of the American people, and certainly the protection of the people we send into harm's way to protect us.

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