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1A) Ratification of the Additional Protocols Agreement

PROTOCOL TO THE AGREEMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY REGARDING SAFEGUARDS IN THE UNITED STATES--TREATY DOCUMENT 107-7 -- (Senate - March 31, 2004)

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   Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the consideration of Calendar No. 16, Treaty Document No. 107-70, on today's Executive Calendar.

   I further ask that the treaty be considered as having passed through its various parliamentary stages up to and including the presentation of the resolution of ratification; further, that the committee conditions and understandings be agreed to, that any statements be printed in the Congressional Record as if read, and that the Senate immediately proceed to a vote on the resolution of ratification; further, that when the resolution of ratification is voted upon, the motion to reconsider be laid upon the table, the President be notified of the Senate's action, and that following the disposition of the treaty, the Senate return to legislative session.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

   Without objection, it is so ordered. The treaty will be considered to have passed through the various parliamentary stages up to and including the presentation of the resolution of ratification.

   The resolution of ratification reads as follows:

[(Treaty Doc. 107-7) The Protocol to the Agreement of the International Atomic Energy Agency Regarding Safeguards in the United States, with 2 conditions and 8 understandings;]

   Resolved (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring therein),

   SECTION 1. SENATE ADVICE AND CONSENT SUBJECT TO CONDITIONS AND UNDERSTANDINGS.

   The Senate advises and consents to the ratification of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the United States of America and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United States of America, with Annexes, signed at Vienna June 12, 1998 (T. Doc. 107-7) subject to the conditions in section 2 and the understandings in section 3.

   SEC. 2. CONDITIONS

   The advice and consent of the Senate under section 1 is subject to the following conditions, which shall be binding upon the President:

   (1) CERTIFICATIONS REGARDING THE NATIONAL SECURITY EXCLUSION, MANAGED ACCESS, AND DECLARED LOCATIONS.--Prior to the deposit of the United States instrument of ratification, the President shall certify to the appropriate congressional Committees that, not later than 180 days after the deposit of the United States instrument of ratification--

   (A) all necessary regulations will be promulgated and will be in force regarding the use of the National Security Exclusion under Article 1.b of the Additional Protocol, and that such regulations shall be made in accordance with the principles developed for the application of the National Security Exclusion;

   (B) the managed access provisions of Articles 7 and 1.c of the Additional Protocol shall be implemented in accordance with the appropriate and necessary inter-agency guidance and regulation regarding such access; and

   (C) the necessary security and counter-intelligence training and preparation will have been completed for any declared locations of direct national security significance.

   (2) CERTIFICATION REGARDING SITE VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS.--Prior to the deposit of the United States instrument of ratification, the President shall certify to the appropriate congressional Committees that the necessary site vulnerability assessments regarding activities, locations, and information of direct national security significance to the United States will be completed not later than 180 days after the deposit of the United States instrument of ratification for the initial United States declaration to the International Atomic Energy Agency (in this resolution referred to as the ``Agency'') under the Additional Protocol.

   SEC. 3. UNDERSTANDINGS.

   The advice and consent of the Senate under section 1 is subject to the following understandings:

   (1) IMPLEMENTATION OF ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL.--Implemenation of the Additional Protocol will conform to the principles set forth in the letter of April 30, 2002, from the United States Permanent Representatives to the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Vienna Office of the United Nations to the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

   (2) NOTIFICATION TO CONGRESS OF ADDED AND DELETED LOCATIONS.--

   (A) ADDED LOCATIONS.--The President shall notify the appropriate congressional Committees in advance of declaring to the Agency any addition to the lists of locations within the United States pursuant to Article 2.a(i), Article 2.a.(iv), Article 2.a.(v), Article 2.a.(vi)(a), Article 2.a.(vii), Article 2.a.(viii), and Article 2.b.(i) of the Additional Protocol, together with a certification that such addition will not adversely affect the national security of the United States. During the ensuing 60 days, Congress may disapprove an addition to the lists by joint resolution for reasons of direct national security significance, under procedures identical to those provided for the consideration of resolutions under section 130 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2159).

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   (B) DELETED LOCATIONS.--The President shall notify the appropriate congressional Committees of any deletion from the lists of locations within the United States previously declared to the Agency pursuant to Article 2.a.(i), Article 2.a.(iv), Article 2.a.(v), Article 2.a.(vi)(a), Article 2.a.(vii), Article 2.a.(viii), and Article 2.b.(i) of the Additional Protocol that is due to such location having a direct national security significance, together with an explanation of such deletion, as soon as possible prior to providing the Agency information regarding such deletion.

   (3) PROTECTION OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.--The Additional Protocol will not be construed to require the provision, in any manner, to the Agency of ``Restricted Data'' controlled by the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.

   (4) Protection of confidential information.--Should the President make a determination that persuasive information is available indicating that--

   (A) an officer or employee of the Agency has willfully published, divulged, disclosed, or made known in any manner or to any extent contrary to the Agreement between the United States of America and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United States of America and the Additional Protocol, any United States confidential business information coming to him or her in the course of his or her official duties relating to the implementation of the Additional Protocol, or by reason of any examination or investigation of any return, report, or record made to or filed with the Agency, or any officer or employee thereof, in relation to the Additional Protocol; and

   (B) such practice or disclosure has resulted in financial losses or damages to a United States person;

   the President shall, not later than 30 days after the receipt of such information by the executive branch of the United States Government, notify the appropriate congressional Committees in writing of such determination.

   (5) Report on consultations on adoption of additional protocols in non-nuclear weapon states.--Not later than 180 days after entry into force of the Additional Protocol, and annually thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional Committees a report on measures that have been taken or ought to be taken to achieve the adoption of additional protocols to existing safeguards agreements signed by non-nuclear weapon states party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

   (6) Report on united states assistance to the agency for the purpose of additional protocol implementation and verification of the obligations of non-nuclear weapon states.--Not later than 180 days after the entry into force of the Additional Protocol, and annually thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional Committees a report detailing the assistance provided by the United States to the Agency in order to promote the effective implementation of additional protocols to safeguards agreements signed by non-nuclear weapon states party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the verification of the compliance of such parties with Agency obligations.

   (7) Subsidiary arrangements and amendments.--

   (A) The subsidiary arrangement.--The Subsidiary Arrangement to the Additional Protocol between the United States and the Agency, signed at Vienna on June 12, 1998 contains an illustrative, rather than exhaustive, list of accepted United States managed access measures.

   (B) Notification of additional subsidiary arrangements and amendments.--The President shall notify the appropriate congressional Committees not later than 30 days after--

   (i) agreeing to any subsidiary arrangement with the Agency under Article 13 of the Additional Protocol; and

   (ii) the adoption by the Agency Board of Governors of any amendment to its Annexes under Article 16.b.

   (8) Amendments.--Amendments to the Additional Protocol will take effect for the United States in accordance with the requirements of the United States Constitution as the United States determines them.

   SEC. 4. DEFINITIONS.

   In this resolution:

   (1) Additional protocol.--The term ``Additional Protocol'' means the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the United States and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United States of America, with Annexes and a Subsidiary Agreement, signed at Vienna June 12, 1998 (T. Doc. 107-7).

   (2) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on International Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives.

   (3) Nuclear non-proliferation treaty.--The term ``Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty'' means the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968, and entered into force March 5, 1970.

   Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, today the Senate considers the Additional Protocol to the Agreement between the United States and the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA, Regarding Safeguards in the United States.

   Last February, at the National Defense University, President Bush called on the Senate to ratify the U.S. Additional Protocol, and today, I am pleased to bring this resolution of ratification to the floor on behalf of the Committee on Foreign Relations.

   The United States signed the Additional Protocol in Vienna on June 12, 1998, and President Bush submitted it to the Senate on May 9, 2002. The State Department submitted the implementing legislation to Congress on November 19, 2003. At the administration's request, I introduced the implementing legislation in the Senate last December.

   Since Senate ratification of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, the NPT, in 1969, and our Voluntary Offer to accept IAEA safeguards in 1980, 188 states have now approved the NPT. The NPT and the IAEA's existing safeguards agreements sufficed to forestall nuclear weapons programs in the world's advanced industrial states, several of which were weighing the nuclear option 40 years ago. Unfortunately, the NPT and the IAEA's existing safeguards agreements have been insufficient to prevent the diversion of resources in Non-Nuclear Weapon States determined to cheat. At the same time, we have witnessed an increase in the global availability of nuclear weapons materials, reprocessing and enrichment technologies. To ensure that materials and technologies are devoted only to peaceful uses, it is in the interest of the United States that the IAEA have the power to conduct intrusive inspections and verify imports and exports of sensitive materials and equipment in states suspected of diverting resources to a weapons program. The Additional Protocol, when universally ratified and implemented by all member states of the IAEA, will not solve all of our proliferation problems, but Senate ratification will further ensure that U.S. efforts to persuade all member states to adopt the Additional Protocol will be supported by concrete U.S. action.

   When the NPT was constructed, in order to gain its acceptance by states without weapons or complete fuel cycles, the world allowed for peaceful uses of the atom by states who forswore weapons. This was an outgrowth of the U.S. ``Atoms for Peace Program.'' Thus, Article IV of the NPT states:

   Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.

   Those last words, ``in conformity with Article I and II of this Treaty,'' are key in our consideration of the Additional Protocol. Non-Nuclear Weapon States under Article II of the NPT are obliged not to undertake any steps toward development of a weapon, and in so doing, secure their right to peaceful uses of the atom; peaceful uses verified by the IAEA under safeguards. When the Committee on Foreign Relations reported the NPT to the Senate in 1968, it did so with some reservations concerning this safeguards system. As the committee report noted:

   [T]he implementation of the treaty raises uncertainties. The reliability and thereby the credibility of international safeguards systems is still to be determined. No completely satisfactory answer was given to the Committee on the effectiveness of the safeguards systems envisioned under the treaty. But [the Committee] is equally convinced that when the possible problems in reaching satisfactory safeguards agreements are carefully weighed against the potential for a worldwide mandatory safeguards system, the comparison argues strongly for the present language of the treaty.

   Today, many have come to the realization that the existing framework of the NPT, as verified by status quo safeguards, is unable to provide adequate verification of Non-Nuclear Weapon States' obligations and alert the world community to broken commitments to the IAEA and under the NPT.

   I believe that acting today to ratify the Additional Protocol will put us back on the right track, a track toward complete verification and effective enforcement of Article II.

   In 2003, the international community was confronted with two cases involving declared Non-Nuclear Weapon

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States violating their commitments under the NPT by pursuing nuclear

   weapon programs.

   Iran's clandestine drive toward a nuclear weapons capability was partly exposed by an Iranian resistance group and confirmed by the IAEA. Then, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom concluded separate negotiations with Tehran in which the regime agreed to abandon its uranium enrichment program and to cease all efforts to pursue nuclear weapons. Iran signed an Additional Protocol with the IAEA last December. In January, Iranian Foreign Minister Kharrazi appeared to hedge on Iran's commitment by suggesting that Tehran had agreed ``to the suspension, not stopping, of the uranium enrichment process.'' Then, last February, in his latest report on Iran, IAEA Director General ElBaradei noted that inspectors had found in Iran technical designs for so-called ``P-2'' centrifuges similar to those the Agency discovered in Libya, designs not declared to the IAEA. Iran has also failed to declare a pilot uranium enrichment facility, importation of many nuclear fuel cycle components, and experiments with plutonium separation.

   Lastly, with regard to Iran, there are extremely disturbing press accounts of inspectors finding traces of highly enriched Uranium-235, which could have but one use, in a nuclear weapon. The United States has made no secret of our view that Iran is developing nuclear weapons.

   In Libya, we witnessed an important nonproliferation success. Following intense negotiations with the Bush administration and the United Kingdom, Libya admitted that it had WMD programs and agreed to abandon these efforts and work with international treaty regimes to verify Libya's commitment. I applaud President Bush and his team for a victory in the war against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Through our experience in Libya, we have learned of the extent of the nuclear proliferation network run by Pakistan's ``father of the bomb,'' A.Q. Khan. Similarly, we have also seen the dangers posed by exports of sensitive technologies by many European and Asian countries that contributed to Libya's nuclear weapons program. It is important to note in this regard how the Additional Protocol incorporates and provides for reporting on the Nuclear Suppliers' Group, NSG, Trigger List items in Annex II as well as uranium mining, enrichment and reactor activities in Annex I.

   Events in Iran and Libya are important to our consideration of the Additional Protocol. In 1980, the Senate ratified the U.S. commitment to voluntarily accept safeguards to demonstrate a firm commitment to the IAEA and to the NPT. As a Nuclear Weapon State party to the NPT, the United States is not required to accept any safeguards. Our decision sent an important message to the world: the preeminent superpower, with a large civilian nuclear power industry, could accept IAEA safeguards.

   The Additional Protocol seeks to fill holes in the existing patchwork of declarations and inspections. It will require the declaration of many locations and activities to the IAEA not previously required, and allow, with less than 24 hours' notice, inspections of such locations.

   The United States, as a declared Nuclear Weapon State party to the NPT, may exclude the application of IAEA safeguards on its activities. Under the Additional Protocol, the United States also has the right to exclude activities and sites of direct national security significance in accordance with its National Security Exclusion contained in Article 1.b. This provision is crucial to U.S. acceptance of the Additional Protocol and provides the basis for the protection of U.S. nuclear weapons-related activities, sites, and materials as a declared nuclear power.

   The Additional Protocol does not contain any new arms control or disarmament obligations for the United States. Although there are increased rights granted to the IAEA for the conduct of inspections in the United States, the administration has assured the Committee on Foreign Relations that the likelihood of an inspection occurring in the United States is very low. Nevertheless, should an inspection under the Additional Protocol be determined to be potentially harmful to U.S. national security, the United States has the right, through the National Security Exclusion, to prevent the inspection.

   For the past 9 months, the majority and minority staffs of the committee have been working closely with the administration to craft a resolution of ratification that will gain broad support in the Senate. On January 29, the committee held a hearing with administration witnesses. On March 4, the resolution of ratification before the Senate today was approved at a committee business meeting by a vote of 19 to 0. I thank Senator Biden and his staff for their cooperation in this effort. I am pleased to inform all Members that the administration fully supports the committee's recommended resolution of ratification, without changes.

   In sum, I believe the Additional Protocol is necessary to further ensure effective verification and enforcement of the Article II obligations of Non-Nuclear Weapon States. Continued enjoyment of Article IV rights should come only with an increase in our ability to verify compliance with obligations to the IAEA and under the NPT. I do not believe that the Additional Protocol will be a burden for the United States, given that our ratification and implementation of the Protocol does not constitute a statement about U.S. adherence to nonproliferation commitments, but rather as a demonstration of our continued leadership in furtherance of the nonproliferation objectives contained in it. It is a first step toward realization of the objectives set forth by President Bush last February.

   I urge my colleagues to support the committee's resolution of ratification and to ratify the Additional Protocol.

   Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I am very pleased to recommend that the United States Senate give its advice and consent to ratification of the Additional Safeguards Protocol between the United States and the International Atomic Energy Agency, the IAEA. Ratification of the Additional Protocol will make a real contribution to U.S. nuclear non-proliferation efforts, and it will do so without putting at risk any sensitive national security information.

   As my colleagues surely know, the Additional Protocol is an outgrowth of the world's discovery in 1991 that Iraq had come perilously close to developing a nuclear weapon, without the IAEA realizing it. One reason for Iraq's near-success was that the IAEA was allowed to inspect only those facilities that Iraq declared to it. If a uranium enrichment facility was across the hall from a declared facility--and in some cases it was about that bad--the IAEA had no mandate to inspect it. We, the world, and the IAEA itself realized that a revised safeguards regime was needed.

   The Additional Protocol that was developed to address this concern requires a signatory to provide yearly reports covering more nuclear facilities than those included in the declarations required by the so-called ``comprehensive'' safeguards agreements that have defined the IAEA's role in recent decades. It also allows the IAEA to inspect non-declared facilities, if the organization believes that illegal nuclear activities may be taking place there. This is a significant expansion of IAEA inspection rights, and it's something that the United States rightly wants to be adopted by all the non-nuclear weapons states under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (the NPT).

   The United States, as a recognized nuclear weapons state under the NPT, is not required to provide information to the IAEA or to accept IAEA inspections. In 1967, however, when the NPT was being negotiated, President Lyndon Baines Johnson announced that the United States would voluntarily submit to safeguards on nuclear materials. He did this to assuage the concerns of non-nuclear weapons states that feared that the five nuclear weapons states would otherwise enjoy an unfair commercial advantage regarding their nuclear power industries. Accordingly, a U.S.-IAEA safeguards agreement, also known as the ``Voluntary Offer,'' has been in place since 1980. Truth be told, this Voluntary Offer is more symbolic than real; until 1994, the IAEA only applied safeguards to two commercial power reactors and two fuel fabrication facilities in the United States, from a list of 250 eligible facilities. In recent years, it has inspected

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only sites for which the United States requested inspections, like the site where we store the highly enriched uranium we removed from Kazakhstan.

   Our willingness to accept IAEA safeguards helped to secure the world's agreement to the NPT. Similarly, our stated willingness to accept the Additional Protocol was crucial to gaining the world's agreement, in 1995, to the indefinite extension of the NPT. And our ratification of the Additional Protocol will strengthen our ability to convince more non-nuclear weapons states to sign their own additional protocols.

   When the Additional Protocol enters into force, the United States will submit additional information on civil nuclear facilities on an annual basis and identify additional civilian facilities, a small number of which might someday be inspected. All implementation activities under the Additional Protocol will be subject to a ``National Security Exclusion,'' however, that will allow our Government to exclude the application of the Additional Protocol wherever it would result in ``access by the Agency to activities with direct national security significance to the United States or to locations or information associated with such activities.'' Just as under the Voluntary Offer, the United States will retain the trump card of not declaring a facility, not submitting certain information, or denying or halting an inspection if our national security interests come into play. If we decide to permit an IAEA inspection, we will also have the right to employ ``managed access'' to protect national security information. (All countries will have the right to use managed access to protect confidential business information; because the United States is a recognized nuclear weapons state, we will have the right to use managed access more broadly.)

   The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has looked carefully at how our special rights would be invoked and whether sensitive facilities will be prepared to accept an IAEA inspection if the President or the interagency process decides to permit that inspection. We are satisfied that a Federal agency with a legitimate national security concern will have no difficulty ensuring that sensitive information is protected.

   The resolution of ratification that the Committee recommends will ensure that the U.S.-IAEA Additional Protocol does not enter into force until the President certifies that all the necessary regulations will be in place and all the necessary site vulnerability assessments will have been completed within 180 days of entry into force. (No reporting to the IAEA is required until 180 days after entry into force, so no inspections of newly-declared facilities would occur before then.) The resolution of ratification also addresses the protection of classified and proprietary information, the addition or deletion of locations from U.S. reports to the IAEA, U.S. intent to use its special rights as a nuclear weapons state under the NPT, and the adoption of subsidiary arrangements or amendments under the Additional Protocol. In short, the Committee has covered all the bases to ensure that adoption of the Additional Protocol will support our nuclear non-proliferation policy without endangering sensitive national security information.

   The resolution of ratification also calls for annual reports on U.S. efforts to get all the non-nuclear weapon states to adopt additional protocols and on U.S. help to the IAEA to conduct effective inspections. Those are important efforts that every member of this body should support. For all the difficulties it faces in gaining access to sites of concern, the IAEA has shown a real determination to get into those sites. Getting more states to sign and implement

   additional protocols will help the IAEA to gain that access. And once they get in, IAEA inspectors have shown a real ability to uncover information that rogue states thought they had concealed. But they are vitally dependent upon member states--and especially the United States--for the equipment and training that enable them to know what to look for and how to detect it in a manner that is scientifically valid, maximizes detection capabilities, and preserves a chain of custody so as to leave no doubt about the validity of their analysis.

   U.S. ratification of our Additional Protocol is only one step among many that are needed to make nuclear non-proliferation work. Even to bring the Additional Protocol into force, we will then need to enact implementing legislation; the Executive branch will then have to promulgate appropriate regulations; and preparations for possible IAEA inspections will have to be completed.

   In addition, the United States must marshal all its foreign policy tools to move states of concern away from nuclear weapons and to foster further international cooperation on non-proliferation. Some good work has been done in recent months. Libya signed an agreement with the United States and the United Kingdom to give up its weapons of mass destruction and long-range ballistic missile programs. The Proliferation Security Initiative was created and cooperating states agreed to coordinate their interdiction efforts while adhering to international law. The permanent members of the United Nations Security Council agreed on a draft resolution to bar proliferation to non-state entities.

   At the same time, however, much remains to be done. For example, North Korea continues to move toward having a large enough nuclear arsenal that it might contemplate using it, or even selling or giving away some of its nuclear weapons or fissile material. Meanwhile, although we have engaged in six-party talks that included North Korea, both we and the North Koreans have yet to give our negotiators the authority to get down to business and discuss a phased agreement under which North Korea would gradually dismantle all its nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missile programs, in return for various security assurances and diplomatic or economic benefits. So nothing significant has yet been achieved on the diplomatic front, while the clock keeps ticking on the nuclear weapons front. And we face the risk that South Korea, a crucial player on this issue, will develop a policy that is at odds with ours.

   The situation regarding Iran is also difficult, although much has been achieved in the last year. Exposure of Iran's two decades of lying and deception regarding its nuclear activities has led Iran to sign the Additional Protocol and to permit IAEA inspections that have proven quite embarrassing to Iran. Pursuant to an agreement with the foreign ministers of the United Kingdom, France and Germany, Iran has also agreed to suspend all its uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities. Iran has tried to backtrack on its commitments, and I personally have no confidence that Iran has come clean on its nuclear weapons efforts. So we must continue to press Iran to realize that its national interest will best be served by rejecting nuclear weapons. We must work to maintain solidarity with our European allies, with the Russian Federation, with Japan, and with the IAEA to send the message that Iran's real choice is between international acceptance and world rejection. I don't think that Iran wants to become another North Korea. We must make clear that the path of nuclear weapons can lead only to such a fate, and also that the path of non-proliferation will lead to a better future for Iran and all of its people.

   We must also work to make the international nuclear non-proliferation regime still more effective. One element of the NPT is a promise to non-nuclear weapons states that, in return for forswearing nuclear weapons, they will enjoy the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology. That bargain has become frayed. Iran, Iraq and North Korea have all used their ostensibly civilian facilities to mask covert weapons programs.

   In Iran and North Korea, we were at least able to sound the alarm. Both states had secret efforts to produce weapons-grade plutonium and highly enriched uranium and were caught. In Iraq, however, absent the Gulf War of 1991, Saddam Hussein might have obtained highly enriched uranium without anybody realizing it.

   A smarter state, using a civilian program as the rationale, could build uranium enrichment facilities, spent fuel reprocessing cells, and the like--and properly report these efforts to the IAEA. It could acquire weapons-grade plutonium or highly enriched uranium, and place the material under IAEA safeguards. In other words, it could become a potential nuclear weapons

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power without violating safeguards. Then it could withdraw from the NPT, and develop and assemble nuclear weapons in a short time.

   That's the challenge we need to address. How do we counter not just states that do things in a ham-handed manner, but states that skillfully exploit the loopholes of the NPT? The Additional Protocol can help make it much harder to hide a covert nuclear program, if we persuade the rest of the world to sign such protocols as well. But how can we combat the ``breakout'' scenario?

   One idea gaining currency is to allow non-nuclear weapons states to continue to possess civilian nuclear programs, but not a closed nuclear fuel cycle. A state could have civilian nuclear reactors to produce electrical power, but must import the nuclear reactor fuel and return any spent fuel. This would ensure that a state did not obtain fissile material needed for a nuclear weapon.

   IAEA Director General Mohammed El-Baradei would allow only multinational facilities to produce and process nuclear fuels, and give legitimate end-users assured access to these fuels at reasonable rates. Gen. Brent Scowcroft and Dr. William Perry recently endorsed this proposal, adding that states that refuse this bargain should be subject to sanctions. President Bush has not endorsed multinational facilities, but called upon members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group to refuse to export enrichment and reprocessing equipment to any state that does not already possess full scale enrichment and reprocessing plants.

   Any agreement on revising the nuclear non-proliferation regime will be difficult to achieve. Non-nuclear weapons states will ask what they will get for surrendering a well established right. States with nuclear fuel industries may worry that they will go out of business if only a few multinational facilities are allowed to operate enrichment and reprocessing activities. But the United States and other concerned states should set a goal of reaching a consensus in time for next year's NPT Review Conference. We have a window of opportunity, and we should use it.

   There is another bargain central to the NPT, one that this administration largely prefers to ignore. In return for forswearing nuclear weapons, non-nuclear weapons states received a commitment from the five permanent nuclear powers, reaffirmed as recently as 2000, to seek eventual nuclear disarmament.

   Nobody, including me, expects the United States to give up its nuclear deterrent any time in the foreseeable future. But the administration's drive to research and possibly produce new nuclear weapons--including low-yield nukes--is a step in the wrong direction. It signals to the rest of the world that even the preeminent global power needs new nuclear weapons to assure its own security.

   The administration threatens to take another backward step on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty. An FMCT has been a U.S. objective for eight years, and this administration castigated other countries for preventing negotiations from starting. Now that there is a chance of success, however, the administration says that we may refuse to negotiate. This only undermines solidarity with our allies, which have worked for years to help us convince other countries to negotiate.

   For all the flaws of the NPT, it is an essential treaty. It has been vital to encouraging states like Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, South Africa, Brazil and Argentina to end their nuclear weapons programs. The United States must work to improve the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and it must also do all that it can to abide by the bargains between the nuclear ``haves'' and the nuclear ``have nots'' that underlie world willingness to eschew the most awesome and awful weapons mankind has ever invented.

   In conclusion, I want to congratulate and thank my chairman, Senator DICK LUGAR, for his fine leadership in bringing this resolution of ratification to fruition. It was not an easy task, and he demonstrated exceptional leadership. I am grateful also to our staffs, especially Ken Myers, III and Thomas Moore on the majority side, and Edward Levine and Jofi Joseph on the Democratic side. Finally, I want to commend the interagency committee that worked with us, and especially Ms. Susan Koch of the National Security Council staff. She is a real professional, and we would not have gotten to this day without her.

   Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, I ask for a division vote on the resolution of ratification.

   The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. A division vote is requested. Senators in favor of the resolution of ratification will rise and stand until counted.

   Those opposed will rise and stand until counted.

   On a division vote, two-thirds of the Senators present having voted in the affirmative, the resolution of ratification is agreed to.

END

1B) IAEA Safeguards Agreement

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT -- (Senate - April 01, 2004)

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   Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I rise today to congratulate the Senate for ratifying the International Atomic Energy Agency--IAEA--Safeguards Agreement by unanimous consent last night.

   The Additional Protocol will augment the IAEA's safeguards monitoring system and provide early warning about illicit nuclear weapons-related activities under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

   By acting swiftly to ratify the treaty, the United States Senate has sent a clear signal to the international community that the United States is committed to not only maintaining a leadership role in the effort to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons but also to work closely with other nations in that endeavor.

   We know that we cannot go it alone and we will need the help of our friends and allies.

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   In addition, the Additional Protocol will strengthen the IAEA in its work in dealing with nuclear programs in Iran, Libya and elsewhere and encourage other countries to ratify their own additional protocols.

   Clearly, there is much work to be done and the international community will face additional challenges in the near future. Nevertheless, I am pleased that the United States Senate has taken this important step to protect our citizens and our national security interests.

END

3A) Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2004

S. 2279. A bill to amend title 46, United States Code, with respect to maritime transportation security, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.

   Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, less than 1 year ago, we wrapped up work on the port security bill that was signed into law as the Maritime Security Act of 2002, MTSA. That act mandated and outlined changes that are needed to shore up security in our ports, and established for the first time a system to coordinate, plan and implement port security at U.S. seaports. While this was landmark legislation, much still needs to be done with respect to the implementation of the requirements mandated by this law.

   I am very dissatisfied with the current Administration's disinterest in paying for port security, and would point out that we are approaching a crisis, as Federal mandates are being rolled out for security without Federal support. I have tried over and over to focus the attention of the Administration on this crucial need and pushed to no avail in the Senate to get the resources necessary to address this problem. But to date, I have gotten little support. In addition to appropriating much needed funds for port security, it has become apparent that keeping up with security needs at our ports is an ever evolving task, and that we may have to refocus our efforts and push harder to ensure that we coordinate our policies and maximize the limited resources that we have in this area.

   Today, in order to keep up with these needs, I am introducing the ``Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2004'', along with Senator MCCAIN, and Senator BREAUX. I am pleased to have worked on this with Senator MCCAIN, the Chairman of our Committee, as I often remark, while he has no coastline, he has worked with those of us who do have ports to work on these crucial port security issues. I am also pleased to introduce this legislation with Senator BREAUX, for he has truly been one of the leading advocates of the importance of maritime shipping and the merchant marine in the U.S. Senate. He has done invaluable work for us on the Commerce Committee, and is a true expert in the field. He will be sorely missed for his expertise on all maritime issues, although I am sure, that in the future, he will still be the Captain of some small boat, yacht, or maybe even a ship.

   Even though the Coast Guard, Customs and other agencies charged with the implementation of these measures have aggressively taken initial steps necessary to set up our future structure for seaport security there is still much to do, and effective action needs to occur to help coordinate and crystallize security policies and objectives. The Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2004 would attempt to mandate a coordinated Federal approach to several areas of concern in port security. It would also attempt to set performance standards for certain areas in port security and add a few enhancements to last year's legislation. Most importantly the bill would require a user fee to be established to help pay for the port security mandates.

   Specifically, this bill would impose in rem liability to secure payment of penalties and fines under the Act and to help ensure compliance with the security requirements imposed by the MTSA. The bill would also include provisions to increase security in waterside cargo areas, and ensure that cargo contents of imported marine cargo containers would be required to be cleared

   within 5 days of entering a U.S. port, or alternatively removed after 5 days without being cleared, to a regulated warehouse where it would be opened and reviewed to verify its contents. This would in no way change any claim to possession of the goods. Importantly, the bill would require DHS to evaluate the policies and practices of sealing empty containers. According to the Federal Maritime Commission, over 4 million containers were imported into the United States empty. At a recent hearing, a representative from the ILWU longshoremen's union pointed out that treatment of empties and the sealing practices of these containers varied from locale to locale. This bill would require an analysis of current practices at U.S. ports in order to determine what steps need to occur in order to make sure that the transport of empty containers does not present a threat of terrorism, and whether a Federal policy is justified in this area.

   The bill would require the Administration to produce a coordinated plan for collecting, analyzing, and disseminating maritime intelligence information collected by Federal agencies on ships, cargo, crew members and passengers. This intelligence is used to determine which ships, cargo, or crew warrant further inspection. This section of the bill requires further development of a maritime intelligence system to collect and analyze information concerning the crew, passengers and cargoes carried on vessels operating in waters under the jurisdiction of the United States. This mandate essentially restates existing law since it appears that the agencies have actually grown further apart since the passage of the Maritime Transportation Security Act. The provision in this bill would require a plan on how the Administration will coordinate collection and analysis of maritime information, and how agency personnel might be co-located to maximize resources and coordinate analysis. This plan must also indicate when long range vessel tracking will be integrated into this intelligence information. Additionally, the plan would require the government to analyze private sector resources to evaluate how they could be used to help monitor and differentiate legitimate moves of trade from those actions and players that are more suppositious. The Federal Government does not have a lot of experience monitoring commercial maritime activity, and I believe they will have to employ private sector expertise to assist in this endeavor.

   The report shall also consider the abilities of the Department of Navy to collect and analyze commercial maritime information. The U.S. Navy probably has the most resources dedicated to the evaluation of commercial shipping activities, but are precluded from sharing this information. In light of our need for better information on commercial shipping, this policy has to be reevaluated. A maritime intelligence system needs to be set up to work together so that Federal agencies, State, local and the private sector can coordinate their law enforcement activities. Maritime intelligence on commercial ocean shipping is currently gathered by the Coast Guard, Customs, INS, and other agencies such as the Federal Maritime Commission under separate systems. Only the Coast Guard and the Navy currently work together. We lag far behind in this area, and each agency is operating independent of others. We are not getting the full picture of what is happening out there. It is crucial that we have the best information available so that we can target our relatively limited resources with maximum efficiency. Further, the information has to be disseminated in a fashion to maximize its utility, while still protecting that information which needs to be kept confidential. Collection and analysis of commercial maritime information is a key element of our port security that needs more focus and has to be addressed if we are to adequately protect our Nation.

   Importantly, the bill will require the Administration to come up with cargo security plans to evaluate targeting systems to determine whether they are effective in deterring and protecting against potential acts of terrorism from cargo. In the event that targeting is inadequate protection, DHS would be required to increase the amount of cargo being non-intrusively inspected or x-rayed by two over the next year. The bill would also require the consolidation of intermodal cargo security programs that have the same security goals while establishing criteria and

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performance goals for these security programs, which are currently operating completely independent of each other, and require certain other cargo security program enhancements. Voluntary cargo security programs are not the answer to the important problem of securing our Nation from terrorist attacks. Firm standards and goals must be in place to ensure that items that we know we don't want in marine containers are not actually in marine containers. The legislation will also require a report on the amount of actual inspections that are being done at foreign seaports.

   While the Container Security Initiative was rolled out with great fanfare to work with foreign ports to inspect cargo before they get to U.S. ports, the question remains whether we are actually getting much bang for the buck. The fundamental question that needs to be addressed is whether foreign nations have been willing to use their security screening equipment for our benefit, and to what degree have they been willing to screen cargo for the benefit of our Nation. The legislation will require a report to determine whether this program needs adjustment, or is a cost-effective measure to ensure safe cargo movements into the U.S., and to update us on the progress in the installation of a system of radiation detection at U.S. ports.

   Additionally, this legislation will redirect our efforts to help ensure that we can verify that security is in place to prevent an act of terrorism, and not place us in a position of having to rely on documentation and the attestations or documentation of third parties in order to determine whether we need to take actions to protect the public. The Administration has not even started to implement the certification program required to certify ``secure systems of transportation,'' 46 U.S.C. 70116, and they must get going on this vital initiative. Otherwise, it would only take one good liar to breach our system of defense. Although I understand we cannot inspect every piece of cargo, we have a credible system in place to actively increase cargo inspections, and implement a system that would ultimately allow us to reopen U.S. ports to commerce, in the event of an attack.

   Additionally, the bill also would require a report from the Coast Guard on the benefits of utilizing joint operational centers at United States seaports to implement area security plans. This report should incorporate lessons learned from the three centers that have already been established, such as ``Operation SeaHawk'' in Charleston, SC, and consider which security programs could be effectively fused into these joint operational centers. The Commandant of the Coast Guard would be required by this bill to report on the effectiveness of these centers for port security and determine if it would be beneficial and cost effective to establish centers in additional areas that pose a significant security risk, and to utilize them to implement area security plans.

   The bill will also make sure that port security grants are reviewed and approved, as was mandated under the terms of the MTSA, and all grants are subject to the review of the Coast Guard Captain of the Port, the regional Maritime Administration representative, and other Transportation Security Administration security officials as well as other DHS security experts, before the grants are approved. This grant program is not open-ended, it is intended to help the private sector and

   State and municipal governments achieve compliance with Federally approved facility plans and area maritime security plans, and the changes to the statute will ensure that the grant program operates the way we intended it to operate.

   The bill also requires the Maritime Administration and the State Department to evaluate existing foreign assistance programs to determine whether the existing aid programs can be utilized to help foreign nations achieve compliance with the international standard set for port security. The MTSA requires the Coast Guard to set up a mechanism to review the practices of foreign ports to ensure that they have implemented adequate security measures, and ultimately, they can take steps that would result in the closure of commerce from ports in non-compliance with international security standards. It is in the best interests of everyone potentially impacted by such a policy implication, if we review our foreign aid programs to determine whether aid can be used to implement the necessary security measures.

   The bill also requires the Maritime Administration to work with the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, FLETC, and other DHS port security agencies such as TSA, Coast Guard and Customs to determine how to supplement their training programs to include a greater familiarization with commercial maritime practices. Port security law enforcement is much different in the aftermath of September 11, and officials involved in regulation and policing shipping will now have to approach it from a different perspective, and to be able to identify anomalies and irregularities, in order to best focus our limited police resources over an immense volume of trade. It is my understanding that the Maritime Administration has been utilizing resources at the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy and working with FLETC to formalize port security training. I think that this change will help our Federal agencies bolster their existing training programs, and achieve a greater understanding of potential security issues that could arise, and will be a healthy addition to work already done by the Maritime Administration and FLETC.

   The bill rewrites the DHS mandate to conduct research and development, and would require the Science Directorate within DHS to be more accountable to Congress for those actions they are taking to develop the types of technology necessary to address security at our seaports. Importantly, the bill also requires the Coast Guard to evaluate the security risks and policies very carefully of nuclear facilities on or adjacent to navigable waterways to ensure that we have security policies in place to prevent acts of terrorism from occurring from on or under navigable waterways. Most nuclear facilities are on or adjacent to navigable waterways, and I want the Coast Guard to exercise the highest degree of security in their treatment of these facilities and the threat posed as a result of maritime commerce or the proximity to navigable waterways.

   Most importantly, this bill attempts to address the fundamental issue that will face the nation as we implement the MTSA--will sufficient funding be in place to assure that our ports and agencies will robustly pursue security, or we will have to rely on sham security programs, or efforts severely restricted by funding that result in de minimus or desultory security efforts. When the Senate and House conferenced on the port security bill in the fall of 2002, the Senate conferees insisted on establishing direct funding for port security programs through a user fee, identical to the airline security fee, which would help defray the significant costs for the new port security mandates. The Administration declined to dedicate any resources for port security, and they declined to support the Senate's user fee. Unable to reach agreement with the House conferees and

   the Administration, I agreed to authorize just the necessary funds, but the President was required by law to report to Congress within 6 months on a funding proposal to assist States and their ports in complying with security mandates for Federal security plans. That report has never been prepared and is 9 months overdue.

   When the President's budget for FY 2004 came out, after the U.S. Coast Guard had estimated that it would take $7.4 billion of funding in order to comply with the port security requirements, there was no funding for port authority compliance in that year's budget resolution. I offered an amendment to the FY 2004 Budget Resolution which was unanimously accepted to add $1 billion to help defray the first year costs of port security--ultimately it was dropped from Conference. Two weeks later, the President was presented with a direct opportunity to fund port security programs: Congressional consideration of his emergency supplemental appropriations bill to pay for the war in Iraq and bolster homeland security. Again, the Administration funding request included no funding for port authorities to help them comply with the Federal mandate, so I offered an amendment to add $1 billion to the supplemental specifically to help ports meet the new security mandates. Despite unanimous approval in

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the Senate 3 weeks earlier, the amendment was opposed by the Administration and defeated on the Senate floor on a straight party line vote.

   Last year, I made another effort to address the port security funding inadequacies during consideration of the FY 2004 Homeland Security Appropriations bill. Again, the Administration proposed no funding for port security grants in their 2004 request, so I offered an amendment to the bill to direct $300 million specifically to port security grants without increasing the overall cost of the bill. The Administration opposed the funding increase, and the amendment was defeated largely along party lines with only three Republicans supporting the amendment.

   Until this year's budget the President has not requested one dime specifically for port security. He has opposed efforts to mandate the funds be raised from the users of the system, and this year's budget request is for only $46 million. Despite opposition from the White House, Congress has directed appropriations that have resulted in grants of $450 million to ports to help ensure compliance with the Federal security mandates, and so I know that this issue is an area of major concern. Ultimately, the funding issues must be addressed, and this bill proposes a user fee to pay for the costs of compliance of port security. I had considered the possibility of authorizing the Administration to either generate funds for port security via a user fee, or alternatively mandate that funds be directly transferred from funds collected by Customs duties, but because of jurisdictional issues determined not to do so. The maritime industry supports this approach, and I am not opposed to this approach, but want only to ensure, that one way or another, we have the necessary funding in place to set up the system of port security that this nation deserves. Simply put, there is just too much at stake to hope that security emerges.

   This bill seeks to continue the work to correct the security and terrorism prevention needs at our maritime borders. There is much to be done and there is a continued need for government and industry cooperation. This bill works on some of that need, yet the major need is funding for port security, which I hope that we will be able to address in the Senate very soon.

   I ask unanimous consent the text of the bill to be printed in the RECORD.

   There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

   S. 2279

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

   SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

    (a) SHORT TITLE.--This Act may be cited as the ``Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2004''.

    (b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.--The table of contents for this Act is as follows:

   Sec..1..Short title; table of contents

   Sec..2..In rem liability; enforcement; pier and wharf security costs.

   Sec..3..Maritime information.

   Sec..4..Intermodal cargo security plan.

   Sec..5..Joint operations center for port security.

   Sec..6..Maritime transportation security plan grants.

   Sec..7..Assistance for foreign ports.

   Sec..8..Federal and State commercial maritime transportation training.

   Sec..9..Port security research and development.

   Sec..10..Nuclear facilities in maritime areas.

   Sec..11..Transportation worker background investigation programs.

   Sec..12..Security service fee.

   Sec..13..Port security capital fund.

   SEC. 2. IN REM LIABILITY; ENFORCEMENT; PIER AND WHARF SECURITY COSTS.

    (a) IN GENERAL.--Chapter 701 of title 46, United States Code, is amended--

    (1) by redesignating section 70117 as 70120; and

    (2) by inserting after section 70116 the following:``.70117..In rem liability for civil penalties and certain costs

    ``(a) IN GENERAL.--Any vessel subject to the provisions of this chapter, which is used in violation of this chapter or any regulations issued hereunder shall be liable in rem for any civil penalty assessed pursuant to section 70120 and may be proceeded against in the United States district court for any district in which such vessel may be found.

    ``(b) REIMBURSABLE COSTS.--

    ``(1) IN GENERAL.--Any vessel subject to the provisions of this chapter shall be liable in rem for the reimbursable costs incurred by any valid claimant related to implementation and enforcement of this chapter with respect to the vessel, including port authorities, facility or terminal operators, shipping agents, Federal, State, or local government agencies, and other persons to whom the management of the vessel at the port of supply is entrusted, and any fine or penalty relating to reporting requirements of the vessel or its cargo, crew, or passengers, and may be proceeded against in the United States district court for any district in which such vessel may be found.

    ``(2) REIMBURSABLE COSTS DEFINED.--In this subsection the term `reimbursable costs' means costs incurred by any service provider, including port authorities, facility or terminal operators, shipping agents, Federal, State, or local government agencies, or other person to whom the management of the vessel at the port of supply is entrusted, for--

    ``(A) vessel crew on board, or in transit to or from, the vessel under lawful order, including accommodation, detention, transportation, and medical expenses; and

    ``(B) required handling under lawful order of cargo or other items on board the vessel.``§70118. Enforcement by injunction or withholding of clearance

    ``(a) INJUNCTION.--The United States district courts shall have jurisdiction to restrain violations of this chapter or of regulations issued hereunder, for cause shown.

    ``(b) WITHHOLDING OF CLEARANCE.--

    ``(1) If any owner, agent, master, officer, or person in charge of a vessel is liable for a penalty or fine under section 70120, or if reasonable cause exists to believe that the owner, agent, master, officer, or person in charge may be subject to a penalty under section 70120, the Secretary may, with respect to such vessel, refuse or revoke any clearance required by section 4197 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (46 U.S.C. App. 91).

    ``(2) Clearance refused or revoked under this subsection may be granted upon filing of a bond or other surety satisfactory to the Secretary.``§70119..Security of piers and wharfs

    ``(a) IN GENERAL.--Notwithstanding any provision of law, the Secretary shall require any uncleared, imported merchandise remaining on the wharf or pier onto which it was unladen for more than 5 calendar days to be removed from the wharf or pier and deposited in the public stores or a general order warehouse, where it shall be inspected for determination of contents, and thereafter a permit for its delivery may be granted.

    ``(b) PENALTY.--The Secretary may impose an administrative penalty of $5,000 for each bill of lading for general order merchandise remaining on a wharf or pier in violation of subsection (a).''.

    (b) Conforming Amendment for In Rem Liability Provision in Chapter 701.--Section 2 of the Act of June 15, 1917 (50 U.S.C. 192) is amended--

    (1) by striking ``Act,'' each place it appears and inserting ``title,''; and

    (2) by adding at the end the following:

    ``(d) IN REM LIABILITY.--Any vessel subject to the provisions of this title, which is used in violation of this title, or any regulations issued hereunder, shall be liable in rem for any civil penalty assessed pursuant to subsection (c) and may be proceeded against in the United States district court for any district in which such vessel may be found.

    ``(e) INJUNCTION.--The United States district courts shall have jurisdiction to restrain violations of this title or of regulations issued hereunder, for cause shown.

    ``(f) WITHHOLDING OF CLEARANCE.--

    ``(1) If any owner, agent, master, officer, or person in charge of a vessel is liable for a penalty or fine under subsection (c), or if reasonable cause exists to believe that the owner, agent, master, officer, or person in charge may be subject to a penalty or fine under subsection (c), the Secretary may, with respect to such vessel, refuse or revoke any clearance required by section 4197 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (46 U.S.C. App. 91).

    ``(2) Clearance refused or revoked under this subsection may be granted upon filing of a bond or other surety satisfactory to the Secretary of the Department in which the Coast Guard is operating.''.

    (c) EMPTY CONTAINERS.--Within 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall review United States ports and transmit to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation and the House of Representatives Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure a report on the practices and policies in place to secure shipment of empty containers. The Secretary shall include in the report recommendations with respect to whether additional regulations or legislation is necessary to ensure the safe and secure delivery of cargo and to prevent potential acts of terrorism involving such containers.

    (d) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.--The chapter analysis for chapter 701 of title 46, United States Code, is amended by striking the last item and inserting the following:

``70117. In rem liability for civil penalties and certain costs``70118. Enforcement by injunction or withholding of clearance``70119. Security of piers and wharfs``70120. Civil penalty''.

   SEC. 3. MARITIME INFORMATION.

    Within 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall submit a report to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation and the House of Representatives Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure that provides a preliminary

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plan for the implementation of section 70113 of title 46, United States Code. The plan shall--

    (1) provide the identification of Federal agencies with maritime information relating to vessels, crew, passengers, cargo, and cargo shippers;

    (2) establish a timeline for coordinating the efforts of those Federal agencies in the collection of maritime information;

    (3) establish a timeline for the incorporation of information on vessel movements derived through the implementation of sections 70114 and 70115 of title 46, United States Code;

    (4) include recommendations on co-locating agency personnel in order to maximize expertise, minimize cost, and avoid redundancy;

    (5) include recommendations on how to leverage information on commercial maritime information collected by the Department of the Navy, and identify any legal impediments that would prevent or reduce the utilization of such information outside the Department of the Navy;

    (6) include recommendations on educating Federal officials on commercial maritime operations in order to facilitate the identification of security risks posed through commercial maritime transportation operations;

    (7) include recommendations on how private sector resources could be utilized to collect or analyze information, along with a preliminary assessment of the availability and expertise of private sector resources;

    (8) include recommendations on how to disseminate information collected and analyzed through Federal maritime security coordinator while considering the need for nondisclosure of sensitive security information and the maximizing of security through the utilization of State, local, and private security personnel; and

    (9) include recommendations on how the Department could help support a maritime information sharing and analysis center for the purpose of collecting information from public and private entities, along with recommendations on the appropriate levels of funding to help disseminate maritime security information to the private sector.

   SEC. 4. INTERMODAL CARGO SECURITY PLAN.

    (a) IN GENERAL.--In addition to the plan submitted under section 3, within 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall submit a report to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation and the House of Representatives Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure containing the following:

    (1) Secure systems of transportation (46 U.S.C. 70116).--A plan, along with timelines, for the implementation of section 70116 of title 46, United States Code. The plan shall--

    (A) provide an update on current efforts by the Department of Homeland Security could be incorporated into the certification process outlined in section 70116 to ensure the physical screening or inspection of imported cargo;

    (B) provide a preliminary assessment of resources necessary to evaluate and certify ``Secure Systems of Transportation'', and the resources necessary to validate that ``Secure Systems of Transportation'' are operating in compliance with the certification requirements; and

    (C) contain an analysis of the feasibility of establishing a user fee in order to be able to evaluate, certify, and validate ``Secure Systems of Transportation''.

    (2) RADIATION DETECTORS.--A report on progress in the installation of a system of radiation detection at all major United States seaports, along with a timeline and expected completion date for the system. In the report, the Secretary shall include a preliminary analysis of any issues related to the installation of the radiation detection equipment, as well as a cost estimate for completing installation of the system.

    (3) NON-INTRUSIVE INSPECTION AT FOREIGN PORTS.--A report--

    (A) on whether and to what extent foreign seaports have been willing to utilize screening equipment at their ports to screen cargo, including the number of cargo containers that have been screened at foreign seaports, and the ports where they were screened;

    (B) indicating which foreign ports may be willing to utilize their screening equipment for cargo exported for import into the United States, and a recommendation as to whether, and to what extent, United States cargo screening equipment will be required to be purchased and stationed at foreign seaports for inspection; and

    (C) indicating to what extent additional resources and program changes will be necessary to maximize scrutiny of cargo in foreign seaports.

    (4) COMPLIANCE WITH SECURITY STANDARD PROGRAMS.--A plan to establish, validate, and ensure compliance with security standards that would require ports, terminals, vessel operators, and shippers to adhere to security standards established by or consistent with the National Transportation System Security Plan. The plan shall indicate what resources will be utilized, and how they would be utilized, to ensure that companies operate in compliance with security standards.

    (b) EVALUATION OF CARGO INSPECTION TARGETING SYSTEM FOR INTERNATIONAL INTERMODAL CARGO CONTAINERS.--

    (1) IN GENERAL.--Within 6 months after the date of enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Inspector General of the Department of Homeland Security shall evaluate the system used by the Department to target international intermodal containers for inspection and report the results of the evaluation to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation and the House of Representatives Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. In conducting the evaluation, the Inspector General shall assess--

    (A) the effectiveness of the current tracking system to determine whether it is adequate to prevent international intermodal containers from being used for purposes of terrorism;

    (B) the sources of information used by the system to determine whether targeting information is collected from the best and most credible sources and evaluate data sources to determine information gaps and weaknesses;

    (C) the targeting system for reporting and analyzing inspection statistics, as well as testing effectiveness;

    (D) the competence and training of employees operating the system to determine whether they are sufficiently capable to detect potential terrorist threats; and

    (E) whether the system is an effective system to detect potential acts of terrorism and whether additional steps need to be taken in order to remedy deficiencies in targeting international intermodal containers for inspection.

    (2) INCREASE IN INSPECTIONS.--If the Inspector General determines in any of the reports required by paragraph (1) that the targeting system is insufficiently effective as a means of detecting potential acts of terrorism utilizing international intermodal containers, then within 12 months after that report, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall double the number of containers subjected to intrusive or non-intrusive inspection at United States ports or to be shipped to the United States at foreign seaports.

    (c) REPORT AND PLAN FORMATS.--The Secretary and the Inspector General may submit any plan or report required by this section in both classified and redacted formats if the Secretary determines that it is appropriate or necessary.

   SEC. 5. JOINT OPERATIONS CENTER FOR PORT SECURITY.

    The Commandant of the United States Coast Guard shall report to Congress, within 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, on the potential benefits of establishing joint operational centers for port security at certain United States seaports. The report shall consider the 3 Joint Operational Centers that have been established at Norfolk, Charleston, San Diego, and elsewhere and compare and contrast their composition and operational characteristics. The report shall consider--

    (1) whether it would be beneficial to establish linkages to Federal maritime information systems established pursuant to section 70113 of title 46, United States Code;

    (2) whether the operational centers could be beneficially utilized to track vessel movements under sections 70114 and 70115 of title 46, United States Code;

    (3) whether the operational centers could be beneficial in the facilitation of intermodal cargo security programs such as the ``Secure Systems of Transportation Program'';

    (4) the extent to which such operational centers could be beneficial in the operation of maritime area security plans and maritime area contingency response plans and in coordinating the port security activities of Federal, State, and local officials; and

    (5) include recommendations for the number of centers and their possible location, as well as preliminary cost estimates for the operation of the centers.

   SEC. 6. MARITIME TRANSPORTATION SECURITY PLAN GRANTS.

    Section 70107(a) of title 46, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:

    ``(a) IN GENERAL.--The Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Border and Transportation Security shall establish a grant program for making a fair and equitable allocation of funds to implement Area Maritime Transportation Security Plans and to help fund compliance with Federal security plans among port authorities, facility operators, and State and local agencies required to provide security services. Grants shall be made on the basis of the need to address vulnerabilities in security subject to review and comment by the appropriate Federal Maritime Security Coordinators and the Maritime Administration. The grant program shall take into account national economic and strategic defense concerns and shall be coordinated with the Director of the Office of Domestic Preparedness to ensure that the grant process is consistent with other Department of Homeland Security grant programs.''.

   SEC. 7. ASSISTANCE FOR FOREIGN PORTS.

    Section 70109 of title 46, United States Code, is amended--

    (1) by striking ``The Secretary'' in subsection (b) and inserting ``The Administrator of the Maritime Administration''; and

    (2) by adding at the end the following:

    ``(c) FOREIGN ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS.--The Administrator of the Maritime Administration, in coordination with the Secretary of State, shall identify foreign assistance programs that could facilitate implementation of port security antiterrorism measures in foreign countries. The Administrator and the Secretary shall establish a program to utilize those programs that are capable of implementing port security antiterrorism

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measures at ports in foreign countries that the Secretary finds, under section 70108, to lack effective antiterrorism measures.''.

   SEC. 8. FEDERAL AND STATE COMMERCIAL MARITIME TRANSPORTATION TRAINING.

    Section 109 of the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (46 U.S.C. 70101 note) is amended--

    (1) by redesignating subsections (c) through (f) as subsections (d) through (g), respectively; and

    (2) by inserting after subsection (b) the following:

    ``(c) FEDERAL AND STATE COMMERCIAL MARITIME TRANSPORTATION TRAINING.--The Secretary of Transportation shall establish a curriculum, to be incorporated into the curriculum developed under subsection (a)(1), to educate and instruct Federal and State officials on commercial maritime and intermodal transportation. The curriculum shall be designed to familiarize those officials with commercial maritime transportation in order to facilitate performance of their commercial maritime and intermodal transportation security responsibilities. In developing the standards for the curriculum, the Secretary shall consult with each agency in the Department of Homeland Security with maritime security responsibilities to determine areas of educational need. The Secretary shall also coordinate with the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in the development of the curriculum and the provision of training opportunities for Federal and State law enforcement officials at appropriate law enforcement training facilities.

   SEC. 9. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT.

    (a) IN GENERAL.--Section 70107 of title 46, United States Code, is amended by striking subsection (i) and inserting the following:

    ``(i) RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT.--

    ``(1) IN GENERAL.--As part of the research and development program within the Science and Technology directorate, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall conduct investigations, fund pilot programs, award grants, and otherwise conduct research and development across the various portfolios focused on making United States ports safer and more secure. Research conducted under this subsection may include--

    ``(A) methods or programs to increase the ability to target for inspection vessels, cargo, crewmembers, or passengers that will arrive or have arrived at any port or place in the United States;

    ``(B) equipment to detect accurately explosives, chemical, or biological agents that could be used to commit terrorist acts against the United States;

    ``(C) equipment to detect accurately nuclear or radiological materials, including scintillation-based detection equipment capable of signalling the presence of nuclear or radiological materials;

    ``(D) improved tags and seal designed for use on shipping containers to track the transportation of the merchandise in such containers, including `smart sensors' that are able to track a container throughout its entire supply chain, detect hazardous and radioactive materials within that container, and transmit that information to the appropriate law enforcement authorities;

    ``(E) tools, including the use of satellite tracking systems, to increase the awareness of maritime areas and to identify potential terrorist threats that could have an impact on facilities, vessels, and infrastructure on or adjacent to navigable waterways, including underwater access;

    ``(F) tools to mitigate the consequences of a terrorist act on, adjacent to, or under navigable waters of the United States, including sensor equipment, and other tools to help coordinate effective response to a terrorist action; and

    ``(G) applications to apply existing technologies from other areas or industries to increase overall port security.

    ``(2) IMPLEMENTATION OF TECHNOLOGY.--

    ``(A) IN GENERAL.--In conjunction with ongoing efforts to improve security at United States ports, the Director of the Science and Technology Directorate, in consultation with other Department of Homeland Security agencies with responsibility for port security, may conduct pilot projects at United States ports to test the effectiveness and applicability of new port security projects, including--

    ``(i) testing of new detection and screening technologies;

    ``(ii) projects to protect United States ports and infrastructure on or adjacent to the navigable waters of the United States, including underwater access; and

    ``(iii) tools for responding to a terrorist threat or incident at United States ports and infrastructure on or adjacent to the navigable waters of the United States, including underwater access.

    ``(B) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.--There are authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary of Homeland Security $35,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2005 through 2009 to carry out pilot projects under subparagraph (A).

    ``(3) ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISIONS.--

    ``(A) NO DUPLICATION OF EFFORT.--Before making any grant, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall coordinate with other Federal agencies to ensure the grant will not be used for research and development that is already being conducted with Federal funding.

    ``(B) ACCOUNTING.--The Secretary of Homeland Security shall by regulation establish accounting, reporting, and review procedures to ensure that funds made available under paragraph (1) are used for the purpose for which they were made available, that all expenditures are properly accounted for, and that amounts not used for such purposes and amounts not expended are recovered.

    ``(C) RECORDKEEPING.--Recipients of grants shall keep all records related to expenditures and obligations of funds provided under paragraph (1) and make them available upon request to the Inspector General of the Department of Homeland Security and the Secretary of Homeland Security for audit and examination.''.

    (b) ANNUAL REPORT.--Within 30 days after the beginning of each fiscal year from fiscal year 2005 through fiscal year 2009, the Director of the Science and Technology Directorate shall submit a report describing its research that can be applied to port security to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, the House of Representatives Committee on Science, and the House of Representatives Select Committee on Homeland Security. The report shall--

    (1) describe any port security-related research, including grants and pilot projects, that were conducted in the preceding fiscal year;

    (2) describe the amount of Department of Homeland Security resources dedicated to research that can be applied to port security;

    (3) describe the steps taken to coordinate with other agencies within the Department to ensure that research efforts are coordinated with port security efforts;

    (4) describe how the results of the Department's research, as well as port security related research of the Department of Defense, will be implemented in the field, including predicted timetables;

    (5) lay out the plans for research in the current fiscal year; and

    (6) include a description of the funding levels for the research in the preceding, current, and next fiscal years.

   SEC. 10. NUCLEAR FACILITIES IN MARITIME AREAS.

    (a) WATERWAYS.--Section 70103(b) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following:

    ``(5) WATERWAYS LOCATED NEAR NUCLEAR FACILITIES.--

    ``(A) IDENTIFICATION AND SECURITY EVALUATION.--The Secretary shall--

    ``(i) identify all nuclear facilities on, adjacent to, or in close proximity to navigable waterways that might be damaged by a transportation security incident;

    ``(ii) in coordination with the Secretary of Energy, evaluate the security plans of each such nuclear facility for its adequacy to protect the facility from damage or disruption from a transportation security incident originating in the navigable waterway, including threats posed by navigation, underwater access, and the introduction of harmful substances into water coolant systems.

    ``(B) RECTIFICATION OF DEFICIENCIES.--The Secretary, in coordination with the Secretary of Energy, shall take such steps as may be necessary or appropriate to correct any deficiencies in security identified in the evaluations conducted under subparagraph (A).

    ``(C) REPORT.--As soon as practicable after completion of the evaluation under subparagraph (A), the Secretary shall transmit a report, in both classified and redacted format, to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, the House of Representatives Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, and the House of Representatives Select Committee on Homeland Security--

    ``(i) describing the results of the identification and evaluation required by subparagraph (A);

    ``(ii) describing the actions taken under subparagraph (B); and

    ``(iii) evaluating the technology utilized in the protection of nuclear facilities (including any such technology under development).''.

    (b) VESSELS.--Section 70103(c)(3) of title 46, United States Code, is amended--

    (1) by striking ``and'' after the semicolon in subparagraph (F);

    (2) by striking ``facility.'' in subparagraph (G) and inserting ``facility; and''; and

    (3) by adding at the end the following:

    ``(H) establish a requirement, coordinated with the Department of Energy, for criminal background checks of all United States and foreign seamen employed on vessels transporting nuclear materials in the navigable waters of the United States.''.

   SEC. 11. TRANSPORTATION WORKER BACKGROUND INVESTIGATION PROGRAMS.

    Within 120 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security, after consultation with the Secretary of Transportation, shall transmit a report to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation and the House of Representatives Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure--

    (1) making recommendations (including legislative recommendations, if appropriate or necessary) for harmonizing, combining, or coordinating requirements, procedures, and programs for conducting background checks under section 70105 of title 46, United States Code, section 5103a(c) of title 49, United States Code, section 44936 of title 49, United States Code, and other provisions of Federal law or regulations requiring background checks for individuals engaged in transportation or transportation-related activities; and

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    (2) setting forth a detailed timeline for implementation of such harmonization, combination, or coordination.

   SEC. 12. SECURITY SERVICE FEE.

    (a) IN GENERAL.--Chapter 701 of title 46, United States Code, as amended by section 2, is further amended by adding at the end the following:``§70121. Security service fee

    ``(a) IN GENERAL.--

    ``(1) SECURITY FEE.--Within 90 days after the date of enactment of the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2004, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall assess and collect an international port security service fee on commercial maritime transportation entities that benefit from a secure system of international maritime transportation to pay for the costs of providing port security services. The amount of the fees assessed and collected under this paragraph and paragraph (2) shall, in the aggregate, be sufficient to provide the services and levels of funding described in section 70122(c).

    ``(2) INTERNATIONAL TRANSSHIPMENT SECURITY FEE.--The Secretary shall also assess and collect an international maritime transshipment security user fee for providing security services for shipments of cargo and transportation of passengers entering the United States as part of an international transportation movement by water through Canadian or Mexican ports at the same rates as the fee imposed under paragraph (1). The fee authorized by this paragraph shall not be assessed or collected on transshipments from--

    (A) Canada after the date on which the Secretary determines that an agreement between the United States and Canada, or

    (B) Mexico after the date on which the Secretary determines that an agreement between the United States and Mexico,

   has entered into force that will provide equivalent security regimes and international maritime security user fees of the United States and that country for transshipments between the countries.

    ``(b) SCHEDULE OF FEES.--In imposing fees under subsection (a), the Secretary shall ensure that the fees are reasonably related to the costs of providing services rendered and the value of the benefit derived from the continuation of secure international maritime transportation.

    ``(c) IMPOSITION OF FEE.--

    ``(1) IN GENERAL.--Notwithstanding section 9701 of title 31 and the procedural requirements of section 553 of title 5, the Secretary shall impose the fees under subsection (a) through the publication of notice in the Federal Register and begin collection of the fee within 60 days of the date of enactment of the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2004, or as soon as possible thereafter. No fee shall be assessed more than once, and no fee shall be assessed for international ferry voyages.

    ``(2) MEANS OF COLLECTION.--The Secretary shall prescribe procedures to collect fees under this section. The Secretary may use a department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States Government or of a State or local government to collect the fee and may reimburse the department, agency, or instrumentality a reasonable amount for its services.

    ``(3) SUBSEQUENT MODIFICATION OF FEE.--After imposing a fee under subsection (a), the Secretary may modify, from time to time through publication of notice in the Federal Register, the imposition or collection of such fee, or both. The Secretary shall evaluate the fee annually to determine whether it is necessary and appropriate to pay the cost of activities and services, and shall adjust the amount of the fee accordingly.

    ``(4) LIMITATION ON COLLECTION.--No fee may be collected under this section except to the extent that the expenditure of the fee to pay the costs of activities and services for which the fee is imposed is provided for in advance in an appropriations Act.

    ``(d) ADMINISTRATION OF FEES.--

    ``(1) FEES PAYABLE TO SECRETARY.--All fees imposed and amounts collected under this section are payable to the Secretary.

    ``(2) INFORMATION.--The Secretary may require the provision of such information as the Secretary decides is necessary to verify that fees have been collected and remitted at the proper times and in the proper amounts.

    ``(e) RECEIPTS CREDITED AS OFFSETTING COLLECTIONS.--Notwithstanding section 3302 of title 31, any fee collected under this section--

    ``(1) shall be credited as offsetting collections to the account that finances the activities and services for which the fee is imposed;

    ``(2) shall be available for expenditure only to pay the costs of activities and services for which the fee is imposed; and

    ``(3) shall remain available until expended.

    ``(f) REFUNDS.--The Secretary may refund any fee paid by mistake or any amount paid in excess of that required.

    ``(g) SUNSET.--The fees authorized by subsection (a) may not be assessed after September 31, 2009.''.

    (b) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.--The chapter analysis for chapter 701 of title 46, United States Code, as amended by section 2, is amended by adding at the end the following:

   ``70121. Security service fee''.

   SEC. 13. PORT SECURITY CAPITAL FUND.

    (a) IN GENERAL.--Chapter 701 of title 46, United States Code, as amended by section 11, is further amended by adding at the end the following:``§70122. Port security capital fund.

    ``(a) IN GENERAL.--There is established within the Department of Homeland Security a fund to be known as the Port Security Capital Fund. There are appropriated to the Fund such sums as may be derived from the fees authorized by section 70121(a).

    ``(b) PURPOSE.--Amounts in the Fund shall be available to the Secretary of Homeland Security--

    ``(1) to provide financial assistance to port authorities, facility operators, and State and local agencies required to provide security services to defray capital investment in transportation security at port facilities in accordance with the provisions of this chapter;

    ``(2) to provide financial assistance to those entities required to provide security services to help ensure compliance with Federal area maritime security plans; and

    ``(3) to help defray the costs of Federal port security programs.

    ``(c) ALLOCATION OF FUNDS.--

    ``(1) FUNDS DERIVED FROM SECURITY FEES.--From amounts in the Fund attributable to fees collected under section 70121(a)(1) and (2)--

    ``(A) no less than $400,000,000 (or such amount as may be appropriate to reflect any modification of the fees under section 70121(c)(3)) shall be made available each fiscal year for grants under section 70107 to help ensure compliance with facility security plans or to help implement Area Maritime Transportation Security Plans;

    ``(B) funds shall be made available to the Coast Guard for the costs of implementing sections 70114 and 70115 fully by the end of fiscal year 2006;

    ``(C) funds shall be made available to the Coast Guard for the costs of establishing command and control centers at United States ports to help coordinate port security law enforcement activities and implementing Area Maritime Security Plans, and may be transferred, as appropriate, to port authorities, facility operators, and State and local government agencies to help them defray costs associated with port security services;

    ``(D) funds shall be made available to the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Border and Transportation Security for the costs of implementing cargo security programs, including the costs of certifying secure systems of transportation under section 70116;

    ``(E) funds shall be made available to the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Border and Transportation Security for the costs of acquiring and operating nonintrusive screening equipment at United States ports; and

    ``(F) funds shall be made available to the Transportation Security Administration for the costs of implementing of section 70113 and the collection of commercial maritime intelligence (including the collection of commercial maritime transportation information from the private sector), of which a portion shall be made available to the Coast Guard and the Customs Service only for the purpose of coordinating the system of collecting and analyzing information on vessels, crew, passengers, cargo, and intermodal shipments.

    ``(2) TRANSSHIPMENT FEES.--Amounts in the Fund attributable to fees collected under section 70121(a)(3), shall be made available to the Secretary to defray the costs of providing international maritime transshipment security at the United States borders with Canada and Mexico.

    ``(d) UTILIZATION REPORTS.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall report annually to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation and the House of Representatives Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure on utilization of amounts received from the Fund.

    ``(e) LETTERS OF INTENT.--The Secretary of Homeland Security, or his delegate, may execute letters of intent to commit funding to port sponsors from the Fund.''.

    (f) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.--The chapter analysis for chapter 701 of title 46, United States Code, as amended by section 11, is amended by adding at the end the following:

   ``70122. Port security capital fund''.

4B) Iraq WMD Debate

   Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, I have listened to the debate that has been swirling around the country with respect to Iraq. The debate comes up again with respect to the commission which is currently meeting.

   I cannot respond to all of the specifics that come along. I am tempted to, but I will not because I want to spend the time that is allotted to me by setting the total record before those who might be listening so we can understand that many of the original statements or original positions with respect to Iraq that are being repeated over and over again are, in fact, false.

   I remember our colleague across the aisle, the late Senator Moynihan from New York, one of my dear friends and one of the Senators for whom I have the highest regard, quoted something. He probably didn't think of it himself, but it was more or less his mantra, as he said to me: ``Everyone is entitled to his own opinion but not to his own facts.''

   We keep hearing things said over and over again with respect to the war in Iraq as if they were fact. It is time to set the overall record straight.

   We heard one statement that there was absolutely no connection between 9/11 and Iraq. The other one we hear over and over again is the reason we went into Iraq is because we thought Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction. Some make it a little more stark than that.

   There was a group that marched on the Utah State Legislature wearing T-shirts that said, ``Bush Lied To Us. There Were No WMDs,'' as if the President of the United

   States George W. Bush himself alone was the only authority for the notion that there were weapons of mass destruction; and, once again repeating the false position that the only reason we went into Iraq is because we believed they had weapons of mass destruction.

   To quote another individual not nearly as well known as Pat Moynihan but my high school history teacher, she would always say to us, ``You cannot cut the seamless web of history.'' I want to take this opportunity to lay out the whole seamless web of the history of terrorism and do our best to understand it so we can realize the first statement that there was no connection between Iraq and 9/11 and the second statement that the only reason we went in is because Bush lied to us about weapons there, are not true. And I hope we can get the dialog back to the facts.

   I am distressed at what has happened to the dialog on this issue. I must comment. On television was the former Vice President of the United States with his hand with a clenched fist raised, the blood vessels standing out on his neck, screaming at the top of his voice, speaking of the President, ``He has betrayed this country.''

   To say the President has betrayed his country is to accuse him of treason, which is one of the crimes specifically listed in the Constitution as an impeachable offense. We have not heard that kind of rhetoric from a politician as highly placed as Al Gore since the 1950s. And the politician who used to speak like that was a member of this Chamber. His name was Joe McCarthy, and the President whom he accused of treason was Harry Truman.

   Let us step away from that kind of rhetoric in this debate and review the facts.

   I had the opportunity of attending the Kissinger Lecture at the Library of Congress which was given by George Shultz, former Secretary of State. It was one of the most cogent and lucid statements of where we are with respect to the war on terror I have ever heard. An update of that appeared in today's Wall Street Journal. I would like to quote from that those points which address the issues I have talked about, and ask unanimous consent that the entire piece be printed in the RECORD following my remarks.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

   (See exhibit 1).

   Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, former Secretary of State George Shultz begins with this comment:

   We have struggled with terrorism for a long time. In the Reagan administration, I was a hawk on the subject. I said terrorism is a big problem, a different problem and we have to take forceful action against it. Fortunately, Ronald Reagan agreed with me but not many others did. [Don Rumsfeld was an outspoken exception.]

   Twenty-five years ago, it was on the radar screen of an American administration--in this case one headed by Ronald Reagan--that terrorism was a problem.

   Secretary Shultz goes on to discuss this and then makes this comment:

   Today, looking back on the past quarter century of terrorism, we can see that it is the method of choice of an extensive, internationally connected ideological movement dedicated to the destruction of our international system of cooperation and progress. We can see that the 1981 assassination of President Anwar Sadat, the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, the 2001 destruction of the Twin Towers, the bombs on the trains in Madrid, and scores of other terrorist attacks in between and in many countries, were carried out by one part or another of this movement. And the movement is connected to states that develop awesome weaponry, with some of it, or with expertise, for sale.

   Let me emphasize that last sentence again. Speaking of international terrorism that was involved in all of these things, going back to the assassination of Sadat in 1981, he says:

   And the movement is connected to states that develop awesome weaponry, with some of it, or with expertise, for sale.

   All right. Do we have an example of such a state that has developed awesome weaponry that may be for sale? Yes.

   Quoting again from Secretary Shultz, he speaks directly of Saddam Hussein and Iraq. He adds to this Kim Jong Il of North Korea, and then says:

   They seize control of state power and use that power to enhance their wealth, consolidate their rule and develop their weaponry. As they do this, and as they violate the laws and principles of the international system, they at the same time claim its privileges and immunities, such as the principle of non-intervention into the internal affairs of a legitimate sovereign state. For decades these thugs have gotten away with it. And the leading nations of the world have let them get away with it.

   Yes, we have heard much on this floor about America must not invade another sovereign state. That is precisely what Secretary Shultz is talking about when he says, these states that develop awesome weaponry and cooperate with terrorism for the purpose of

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upsetting the international order, then claim the immunities of the international order for themselves--as he says: ``such as the principle of non-intervention into the internal affairs of a legitimate sovereign state.''

   He goes on to summarize all that happened in Iraq. And again, those who will read the entire piece as it appears following my statement can get all of those details. But after he recites the details of what Saddam Hussein has done, he turns to David Kay, the man who is quoted again and again as the authority for the statement on the T-shirt that says: ``Bush Lied To Us.''

   Well, let's see what David Kay really said. I said in my previous statement David Kay told this Congress, testifying before the Armed Services Committee, that Saddam Hussein was, in fact, more dangerous than we thought when we started the war. But these are the portions of David Kay's position Secretary Shultz chooses to highlight, and I think they are the right ones to bring out.

   Quoting again:

   As Dr. David Kay put it in a Feb. 1 interview with Chris Wallace, ``We know there were terrorist groups in state still seeking WMD capability. Iraq, although I found no weapons, had tremendous capabilities in this area. A marketplace phenomena was about to occur, if it did not occur; sellers meeting buyers. And I think that would have been very dangerous if the war had not intervened.''

   Sellers of what? Buyers of what? Who would the sellers be? Who would the buyers be? The sellers, obviously, would be the Iraqis. The buyers would be the terrorists. And what are we talking about?

   Back to Secretary Shultz:

   When asked by Mr. Wallace what the sellers could have sold if they didn't have actual weapons, Mr. Kay said: ``The knowledge of how to make them, the knowledge of how to make small amounts, which is, after all, mostly what terrorists want. They don't want battlefield amounts of weapons. No, Iraq remained a very dangerous place in terms of WMD capabilities, even though we found no large stockpiles of weapons.''

   Just think about that for a second: the knowledge to make them.

   If I could give a very homely example, last week my wife and I were celebrity chefs at the March of Dimes gala, and we won a prize, and people all said: Is this an old family recipe? We had to admit, no, we called a chef in Salt Lake City at one of the finest restaurants there, who happens to work as a judge at these kinds of celebrity cook-ins, and he gave us a recipe he thought would win. We have been celebrity chefs four times. We have called him all four times. We have won three out of four.

   The capacity to tell somebody how to make something will produce that something just as much as having that something yourself. This chef did not participate, but his recipes participated, and his recipes won. All we had to do was be the willing buyers in the case; and he was the willing seller. I will add, just for the record, no money changed hands with respect to the recipe. But the example is there, and that is what David Kay is talking about.

   Going back to Secretary Shultz, he says:

   ..... in the long run, the most important aspect of the Iraq war will be what it means for the integrity of the international system and for the effort to deal effectively with terrorism. The stakes are huge and the terrorists know that as well as we do. That is the reason for their tactic of violence in Iraq. And that is why, for us and for our allies, failure is not an option. The message is that the U.S. and others in the world who recognize the need to sustain our international system will no longer quietly acquiesce in the take-over of states by lawless dictators who then carry on their depredations--including the development of awesome weapons for threats, use, or sale--behind the shield of protection that statehood provides. If you are one of these criminals in charge of a state, you no longer should expect to be allowed to be inside the system at the same time that you are a deadly enemy of it.

   Secretary Shultz concludes his piece with this comment:

   If we put this in terms of World War II, we are now sometime around 1937. In the 1930s, the world failed to do what it needed to do to head off a world war. Appeasement never works. Today we are in action. We must not flinch. With a powerful interplay of strength and diplomacy, we can win this war.

   Put it in context, put it in the historic pattern, and we realize this is all connected and that the action with respect to Iraq was a very proper, significant, indeed, essential part of the overall war on terrorism. If we had not moved ahead, we would have been irresponsible.

   The summary is in the callout that is put in the paper that says:

   The U.S. had no choice: We had to oust Saddam Hussein, or face the gravest threat.

   Mr. President, may I ask how much time I have remaining?

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 4 1/2 minutes.

   Mr. BENNETT. If I might use that 4 1/2 minutes, then, to address the fundamental question of the future nobody talks about. We are spending all of this time rehashing the past. Here is the fundamental question of the future: What happened to Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction? The assumption raised by the statement that ``Bush lied to us about the weapons'' is that the weapons never existed.

   Well, the first person to convince me the weapons existed was Madeleine Albright. The first President to tell me the weapons existed was William Jefferson Clinton.

   The first group that insisted weapons were there was working for the United Nations. This was not a partisan thing put together by George W. Bush. The weapons were clearly in Iraq, and the question is not why didn't Bush tell us the truth about them; the question is, what happened to them? That is the question we need to address. That is the question of the future we are ignoring in all of this debate about who said what at what point in the past.

   As I see it, there are four possibilities of what happened to the weapons Saddam Hussein had. No. 1, we got them all in the bombing in 1998. We must remember, as we try to truncate the history, the war in Iraq began in 1991. The U.N. resolution that called for the war was never suspended. It was renewed with acts of war in 1998. A heavy 4-day period of solid bombing is an act of war. President Clinton carried that out with the approval of this Congress. So the first possibility is that bombing destroyed all of the weapons of mass destruction.

   The second possibility, Saddam Hussein himself dismantled his stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction in an effort to convince the U.N. inspectors they were not there so the inspectors would leave him alone and he could go back to building them after the inspectors were gone. There is some suggestion that was in fact what happened, that he did not intend to disarm, as U.N. Resolution 1441 required he do. All he intended to do was deceive, and that is where the weapons went.

   Possibility No. 3, they were trucked over the border. Some of them got into Syria or other places and into the hands of others who still have them.

   And possibility No. 4, they are still in Iraq and we simply have not found them. When people ask me, which of these four possibilities do you think is the most likely, I say: All of the above. I believe we destroyed a good portion of his weapons in the 1998 bombing. I believe he himself dismantled others in a deliberate attempt to deceive the U.N. inspectors. I believe some of them did get out of the country and are in the hands of other bad actors somewhere. And I believe there are probably still some hidden away somewhere in the desert in Iraq.

   Unless the first answer is the only one that is correct and they were all destroyed in the bombing, they are still around somewhere. The capacity to build them was still around, as David Kay pointed out, before we went in and removed that.

   If there are some of them still around, why aren't we looking for them? Why aren't we paying attention to where they might be? I believe the American military is still on the alert for them. I believe the American intelligence community is still looking to where they might be. But in the debate we have here on the Senate floor, this question is never raised. It is never given any attention. Instead we spend all of our time looking backward and trying to assign blame instead of looking forward and trying to solve problems.

   I commend Secretary Shultz's presentation to all. It is a clear historic perspective over a quarter century from one of our senior statesmen that makes it clear the rhetoric surrounding this issue has been inappropriate and focused on the wrong thing.

   I yield the floor.

   Exhibit 1

[From the Asian Wall Street Journal, Mar. 29, 2004]

   An Essential War

(By George P. Shultz)

   We have struggled with terrorism for a long time. In the Reagan administration, I was a hawk on the subject. I said terrorism is a big problem, a different problem, and we have to take forceful action against it. Fortunately, Ronald Reagan agreed with me, but not many others did. (Don Rumsfeld was an outspoken exception).

   In those days we focused on how to defend against terrorism. We reinforced our embassies and increased out intelligence effort. We thought we made some progress. We established the legal basis for holding states responsible for using terrorists to attack Americans anywhere. Through intelligence, we did abort many potential terrorist acts. But we didn't really understand what motivated the terrorists or what they were out to do.

   In the 1990s, the problem began to appear even more menacing. Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda were well known, but the nature of the terror threat was not yet comprehended and our efforts to combat it were ineffective. Diplomacy without much force was tried. Terrorism was regarded as a law enforcement problem and terrorists as criminals. Some were arrested and put on trial. Early last year, a judge finally allowed the verdict to stand for one of those convicted in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. Ten years! Terrorism is not a matter that can be left to law enforcement, with its deliberative process, built-in delays, and safeguards that may let the prisoner go free on procedural grounds.

   Today, looking back on the past quarter century of terrorism, we can see that it is the method of choice of an extensive, internationally connected ideological movement dedicated to the destruction of our international system of cooperation and progress. We can see that the 1981 assassination of President Anwar Sadat, the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, the 2001 destruction of the Twin Towers, the bombs on the trains in Madrid, and scores of other terrorist attacks in between and in many countries, were carried out by one part or another of this movement. And the movement is connected to states that develop awesome weaponry, with some of it, or with expertise, for sale.

   What should we do? First and foremost, shore up the state system.

   The world has worked for three centuries with the sovereign state as the basic operating entity, presumably accountable to its citizens and responsible for their well-being. In this system, states also interact with each other--bilaterlly or multilaterally--to accomplish ends that transcend their borders. They create international organizations to serve their ends, not govern them.

   Increasingly, the state system has been eroding. Terrorists have exploited this weakness by burrowing into the state system in order to attack it. While the state system weakens, no replacement is in sight that can perform the essential functions of establishing an orderly and lawful society, protecting essential freedoms, providing a framework for fruitful economic activity, contributing to effective international cooperation, and providing for the common defense.

   I see our great task as restoring the vitality of the state system within the framework of a world of opportunity, and with aspirations for a world of states that recognize accountability for human freedom and dignity.

   All established states should stands up to their responsibilities in the fight against our common enemy, terror; be a helpful partner in economic and political development; and take care that international organizations work for their member states, not the other way around. When they do, they deserve respect and help to make them work successfully.

   The civilized world has a common stake in defeating the terrorists. We now call this what it is: a War on Terrorism. In war, you have to act on both offense and defense. You have to hit the enemy before the enemy hits you. The diplomacy of incentives, containment, deterrence and prevention are all made more effective by the demonstrated possibility of forceful preemption. Strength and diplomacy go together. They are not alternatives; they are complements. You work diplomacy and strength together on a grand and strategic scale and on an operational and tactical level. But if you deny yourself the option of forceful preemption, you diminish the effectiveness of your diplomatic moves. And, with the consequences of a terrorist attack as hideous as they are--witness what just happened in Madrid--the U.S. must be ready to preempt identified threats. And not at the last moment, when an attack is imminent and more difficult to stop, but before the terrorist gets in position to do irreparable harm.

   Over the last decade we have seen large areas of the world where there is no longer any state authority at all, an ideal environment for terrorists to plan and train. In the early 1990s we came to realize the significance of a ``failed state.'' Earlier, people allowed themselves to think that, for example, an African colony could gain its independence, be admitted to the U.N. as a member state, and thereafter remain a sovereign state. Then came Somalia. All government disappeared. No more sovereignty, no more state. The same was true in Afghanistan. And who took over? Islamic extremists. They soon made it clear that they regarded the concept of the state as an abomination. To them, the very idea of ``the state'' was un-Islamic. They talked about reviving traditional forms of pan-Islamic rule with no place for the state. They were fundamentally, and violently, opposed to the way the world works, to the international state system.

   The United States launched a military campaign to eliminate the Taliban and al Qaeda's rule over Afghanistan. Now we and our allies are trying to help Afghanistan become a real state again and a viable member of the international state system. Yet there are many other parts of the world where state authority has collapsed or, within some states, large areas where the state's authority does not run.

   That's one area of danger: places where the state has vanished. A second area of danger is found in places where the state has been taken over by criminals or warlords. Saddam Hussein was one example. Kim Jong Il of North Korea is another.

   They seize control of state power and use that power to enhance their wealth, consolidate their rule and develop their weaponry. As they do this, and as they violate the laws and principles of the international system, they at the same time claim its privileges and immunities, such as the principle of non-intervention into the internal affairs of a legitimate sovereign state. For decades these thugs have gotten away with it. And the leading nations of the world have let them get away with it.

   This is why the case of Saddam Hussein and Iraq is so significant. After Saddam Hussein consolidated power, he started a war against one of his neighbors, Iran, and in the course of that war he committed war crimes including the use of chemical weapons, even against his own people.

   About 10 years later he started another war against another one of his neighbors, Kuwait. In the course of doing so he committed war crimes. He took hostages. He launched missiles against a third and then a fourth country in the region.

   That war was unique in modern times because Saddam totally eradicated another state, and turned it into ``Province 19'' of Iraq. The aggressors in wars might typically seize some territory, or occupy the defeated country, or install a puppet regime; but Saddam sought to wipe out the defeated state, to erase Kuwait from the map of the world.

   That got the world's attention. That's why, at the U.N., the votes were wholly in favor of a U.S.-led military operation--Desert Storm--to throw Saddam out of Kuwait and to restore Kuwait to its place as a legitimate state in the international system. There was virtually universal recognition that those responsible for the international system of states could not let a state simply be rubbed out.

   When Saddam was defeated, in 1991, a cease-fire was put in place. Then the U.N. Security Council decided that, in order to prevent him from continuing to start wars and commit crimes against his own people, he must give up his arsenal of ``weapons of mass destruction.''

   Recall the way it was to work. If Saddam cooperated with U.N. inspectors and produced and facilitated their destruction, then the cease-fire would be transformed into a peace agreement ending the state of war between the international system and Iraq. But if Saddam did not cooperate, and materially breached his obligations regarding his weapons of mass destruction, then the original U.N. Security Council authorization for the use of ``all necessary force'' against Iraq--an authorization that at the end of Desert Storm had been suspended but not cancelled--would be reactivated and Saddam would face another round of the U.S.-led military action against him. Saddam agreed to this arrangement.

   In the early 1990s, U.N. inspectors found plenty of materials in the category of weapons of mass destruction and they dismantled a lot of it. They kept on finding such weapons, but as the presence of force declined, Saddam's cooperation declined. He began to play games and to obstruct the inspection effort.

   By 1998 the situation was untenable. Saddam had made inspections impossible. President Clinton, in February 1998, declared that Saddam would have to comply with the U.N. resolutions or face American military force. Kofi Annan flew to Baghdad and returned with a new promise of cooperation from Saddam. But Saddam did not cooperate. Congress then passed the Iraq Liberation Act by a vote of 360 to 38 in the House of Representatives; the Senate gave its unanimous consent. Signed into law on October 31, it supported the renewed use of force against Saddam with the objective of changing the regime. By this time, he had openly and utterly rejected the inspections and the U.N. resolutions.

   In November 1998, the Security Council passed a resolution declaring Saddam to be in ``flagrant violation'' of all resolutions going back to 1991. That meant that the cease-fire was terminated and the original authorization for the use of force against Saddam was reactivated. President Clinton ordered American forces into action in December 1998.

   But the U.S. military operation was called off after only four days--apparently because President Clinton did not feel able to lead the country in war at a time when he was facing impeachment.

   So inspections stopped. The U.S. ceased to take the lead. But the inspectors reported

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that as of the end of 1998 Saddam possessed major quantities of WMDs across a range of categories, and particularly in chemical and biological weapons and the means of delivering them by missiles. All the intelligence services of the world agreed on this.

   From that time until late last year, Saddam was left undisturbed to do what he wished with this arsenal of weapons. The international system had given up its ability to monitor and deal with this threat. All through the years between 1998 and 2002 Saddam continued to act and speak and to rule Iraq as a rogue state.

   President Bush made it clear by 2002, and against the background of 9/11, that Saddam must be brought into compliance. It was obvious that the world could not leave this situation as it was. The U.S. made the decision to continue to work within the scope of the Security Council resolutions--a long line of them--to deal with Saddam. After an extended and excruciating diplomatic effort, the Security Council late in 2002 passed Resolution 1441, which gave Saddam one final chance to comply or face military force. When on December 8, 2002, Iraq produced its required report, it was clear that Saddam was continuing to play games and to reject his obligations under international law. His report, thousands of pages long, did not in any way account for the remaining weapons of mass destruction that the U.N. inspectors had reported to be in existence as of the end of 1998. That assessment was widely agreed upon.

   That should have been that. But the debate at the U.N. went on--and on. And as it went on it deteriorated. Instead of the focus being kept on Iraq and Saddam, France induced others to regard the problem as one of restraining the U.S.--a position that seemed to emerge from France's aspirations for greater influence in Europe and elsewhere. By March of 2003 it was clear that French diplomacy had resulted in splitting NATO, the European Union, and the Security Council ..... and probably convincing Saddam that he would not face the use of force. The French position, in effect, was to say that Saddam had begun to show signs of cooperation with the U.N. resolutions because more than 200,000 American troops were poised on Iraq's borders ready to strike him; so the U.S. should just keep its troops poised there for an indeterminate time to come, until presumably France would instruct us that we could either withdraw or go into action. This of course was impossible militarily, politically, and financially.

   Where do we stand now? These key points need to be understood:

   There as never been a clearer case of a rogue state using its privileges of statehood to advance its dictator's interest in ways that defy and endanger the international state system.

   The international legal case against Saddam--17 resolutions--was unprecedented.

   The intelligence services of all involved nations and the U.N. inspectors over more than a decade all agreed that Saddam possessed weapons of mass destruction that posed a threat to international peace and security.

   Saddam had four undisturbed years to augment, conceal, disperse, otherwise deal with his arsenal.

   He used every means to avoid cooperating or explaining what he has done with them. This refusal in itself was, under the U.N. resolutions, adequate grounds for resuming the military operation against him that had been put in abeyance in 1991 pending his compliance.

   President Bush, in ordering U.S. forces into action, stated that we were doing so under U.N. Security Council Resolutions 678 and 687, the original basis for military action against Saddam Hussein in 1991. Those who criticize the U.S. for unilateralism should recognize that no nation in the history of the United Nations has ever engaged in such a sustained and committed multilateral diplomatic effort to adhere to the principles of international law and international organization with the international system. In the end, it was the U.S. that upheld and acted in accordance with the U.N. resolutions on Iraq, not those on the Security Council who tried to stop us.

   The question of weapons of mass destruction is just that: a question that remains to be answered, a mystery that must be solved. Just as we also must solve the mystery of how Libya and Iran developed menacing nuclear capability without detection, of how we were caught unaware of a large and flourishing black market in nuclear material, and of how we discovered these developments before they got completely out of hand and have put in place promising corrective processes. The question of Iraq's presumed stockpile of weapons will be answered, but that answer, however it comes out, will not affect the fully justifiable and necessary action that the coalition has undertaken to bring an end to Saddam Hussein's rule over Iraq. As David Kay put it in a February 1 interview with Chris Wallace, ``We know there were terrorist groups in state still seeking WMD capability. Iraq, although I found no weapons, had tremendous capabilities in this area. A marketplace phenomena was about to occur, if it did not occur; sellers meeting buyers. And I think that would have been very dangerous if the war had not intervened.''

   When asked by Mr. Wallace what the sellers could have sold if they didn't have actual weapons, Mr. Kay said: ``The knowledge of how to make them, the knowledge of how to make small accounts, which is, after all, mostly what terrorists want. They don't want battlefield amounts of weapons. No, Iraq remained a very dangerous place in terms of WMD capabilities, even though we found no large stockpiles of weapons.''

   Above all, and in the long run, the most important aspect of the Iraq war will be what it means for the integrity of the internationals system and for the effort to deal effectively with terrorism. The stakes are huge and the terrorists know that as well as we do. That is the reason for their tactic of violence in Iraq. And that is why, for us and for our allies, failure is not an option. The message is that the U.S. and others in the world who recognize the need to sustain our international system will no longer quietly acquiesce in the take-over of states by lawless dictators who then carry on their depredations--including the development of awesome weapons for threats, use, or sale--behind the shield of protection that statehood provides. If you are one of these criminals in charge of a state, you no longer should expect to be allowed to be inside the system at the same time that you are a deadly enemy of it.

   September 11 forced us to comprehend the extent and danger of the challenge. We began to act before our enemy was able to extend and consolidate his network.

   If we put this in terms of World War II, we are now sometime around 1937. In the 1930s, the world failed to do what it needed to do to head off a world war. Appeasement never works. Today we are in action. We must not flinch. With a powerful interplay of strength and diplomacy, we can win this war.

END

4C) The War in Iraq

THE WAR IN IRAQ

Mr. CONRAD. Mr. President, I asked for time today not to speak on this issue, but on the war against terror and the war in Iraq. These issues have come much more to the public attention as a result of the events of the last several weeks. As I have watched those events unfold, I have felt more strongly the need to come to this floor to speak up and to talk about where I believe we have taken a wrong path in the war on terror, where I believe we have gotten the priorities wrong.

   When we were attacked on September 11, 2001, we recognized we were at war with a terrorist organization that would stop at nothing, a terrorist organization that would turn civilian airliners into flying bombs that would kill nearly 3,000 innocent Americans. The President and the American people recognized al-Qaida posed an immediate threat to this country. We agreed that defeating al-Qaida was our top national security priority, and we vowed to bring Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaida terrorist organization to justice. As President Bush said in convening his cabinet at Camp David after the 9/11 attacks: ``There is no question that this act will not stand. We will find those who did it. We will smoke them out of their holes, we will get them running, and we will bring them to justice.''

   We had an outpouring of sympathy, good will, and cooperation from all over the world, as we began the war on terrorism. Today, it has now been 930 days since the attacks of 9/11. And Osama bin Laden is still at large.

   We have not found him. We have not smoked him out of his holes, and we have not brought this mass murderer of innocent Americans to justice after 930 days. In fact, Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaida organization continue to mount attacks. Just 3 weeks ago, al-Qaida claimed responsibility for the bombings in Madrid, Spain. Spanish authorities have arrested Islamic terrorists in connection with that tragic attack, and al-Qaida continues to threaten further attacks against this country.

   When I saw the news footage of the bombings in Spain and when I heard al-Qaida threatening more attacks on America, it deeply angered me. I believe it raises several questions. Most fundamentally, why have we not, to use the President's words, smoked Osama bin Laden out, run him down and brought him to justice? Why is Osama bin Laden still able to threaten our country more than 2 years after we agreed that putting an end to his threats was our top priority? Why, if his organization has been disrupted and Osama bin Laden has been isolated, as some in the administration claim, are Islamic terrorists linked to al-Qaida able to organize and coordinate significant synchronized attacks such as the ones in Madrid? How is he still able to produce and distribute these tapes and messages exhorting others to kill more Americans?

   As I asked these questions, it reminded that on April 30, 2001, less than 5 months before the 9/11 attacks, CNN reported that the Bush administration's release of the annual terrorism report contained a serious change from previous reports. Specifically, CNN reported that ``there was no extensive mention of alleged terrorist mastermind Osama bin Laden,'' as there had been in previous years. When asked why the administration had reduced the focus, ``a senior Bush Department official told CNN the U.S. Government made a mistake in focusing so much

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energy on Bin Laden.'' In retrospect, that was a shocking misjudgment of the priorities in fighting terrorism. But I fear that even after 9/11, the administration has continued its failure to focus on al-Qaida.

   A Newsweek article from last fall reported:

   ..... bin Laden appears to be not only alive, but thriving. And with America distracted in Iraq, and Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf leery of stirring up an Islamist backlash, there is no large-scale military force currently pursuing the chief culprit in the 9/11 attacks.

   It is not just Newsweek. USA Today reported just this past weekend:

   In 2002, troops from the 5th special forces group who specialize in the Middle East were pulled out of the hunt for Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan to prepare for their next assignment: Iraq. Their replacements were troops with expertise in Spanish cultures.

   Mr. President, I want to repeat that because this to me does not add up. It does not make common sense.

   In 2002, troops from the 5th special forces group who specialize in the Middle East were pulled out of the hunt for Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan to prepare for their next assignment: Iraq. Their replacements were troops with expertise in Spanish cultures.

   The CIA, meanwhile, was stretched badly in its capacity to collect, translate and analyze information coming from Afghanistan. When the White House raised a new priority, it took specialists away from the Afghanistan effort to ensure Iraq was covered.

   I find these reports deeply disturbing. We know who attacked us on 9/11. It was al-Qaida. It was not Iraq. Yet we have top Pentagon and intelligence officials saying that we shifted resources away from al-Qaida to focus on Iraq. We have 130,000 U.S. troops in Iraq, but only 11,000 in Afghanistan. What Earthly sense does this make? Al-Qaida attacked America, not Iraq.

   Those 11,000 troops are doing important work in Afghanistan--keeping the peace and recently renewing efforts to mop up Taliban strongholds that have been gathering strength. And the administration now has plans for a spring offensive to go after bin Laden. But according to our own officials, for most of the past 2 years, we had no large-scale military force dedicated to pursuing Osama bin Laden and al-Qaida.

   So I have to ask, why not? Why was there no large-scale military force pursuing bin Laden for most of the past 2 years? Why did we allow our post-9/11 focus on bin Laden to be distracted? Why have we let new al-Qaida organizations grow up all around the world to attack us and our allies?

   It seems to me the administration's priorities were misplaced. We allowed our attention to be diverted by Saddam Hussein and Iraq.

   Many of us did not believe there was sufficient evidence to justify a preemptive attack on Iraq in the first place. We believed it was not in the national security interests of the United States to attack Iraq; that instead, we ought to keep our eye on the ball and keep the pressure on al-Qaida and Osama bin Laden because it was they--al-Qaida and Osama bin Laden--who attacked America on September 11, not Iraq.

   We feared attacking Iraq would leave us responsible for occupying and rebuilding a country in a profoundly dangerous and undemocratic region of the world, tying down resources we needed to meet other threats, including Iran, North Korea, and al-Qaida.

   We feared that attacking and occupying Iraq would deepen and energize anti-American sentiment in the Islamic world, helping to fuel recruitment by al-Qaida and other radical Islamist terror organizations.

   And we feared that a war with Iraq would inevitably slow down our efforts to capture Osama bin Laden.

   In my statement on this Senate floor just minutes before the Senate voted to authorize the President to go to war in Iraq, I said:

   I believe defeating the terrorists who launched the attacks on the United States on September 11 must be our first priority before we launch a new war on a new front. Yet today, the President asks us to take action against Iraq as a first priority. Mr. President, I believe that has the priority wrong.

   That is what I said moments before the vote authorizing the President to go to Iraq. I believe it was right then. I believe it is even more clearly right now.

   I also warned:

   The backlash in the Arab nations could further energize and deepen anti-American sentiment. Al-Qaida and other terrorist groups could gain more willing suicide bombers.

   I think we have seen, tragically, that this was true. Our troops in Iraq are constantly under attack. Our allies, including most recently the Spanish people, have been victimized by terrorists.

   I warned that the cost of invasion and occupation of Iraq could be extremely high, diverting resources from other national priorities. And that, too, has turned out to be accurate. CBO now estimates that the cost of the war and occupation in Iraq will total more than $300 billion.

   In just the last couple of days, the American people have learned that all of these concerns were shared at the very highest level of the White House. But the President ignored those warnings.

   The top counter-terrorism adviser to President Bush, Richard Clarke, recently published a book detailing his experiences with the war on terrorism. In it, Clarke writes that President Bush and other top officials urged him to find a link between 9/11 and Iraq, even though he told them that there was no such link.

   He writes that the shift of focus from al-Qaida to Iraq ``launched an unnecessary and costly war in Iraq that strengthened the fundamentalist, radical Islamic terrorist movement worldwide.''

   As Clarke put it on ``60 Minutes'' the weekend before last:

   Osama bin Laden had been saying for years, ``America wants to invade an Arab country and occupy it, an oil-rich Arab country.'' He had been saying this as part of his propaganda.

   So what did we do after 9/11? We invaded an oil-rich and occupy an oil-rich Arab country which was doing nothing to threaten us. In other words, we stepped right into bin Laden's propaganda. And the result of it is that al-Qaida and organizations like it, offshoots of it, second generation al-Qaida have been greatly strengthened.

   These are the words of Mr. Clarke, the former Bush counter-terror official who has just published a book on the subject. I spent part of this weekend reading the book by Mr. Clarke. It is entitled ``Against all Enemies.'' I would urge my colleagues and those who might be listening or watching to get that book and read it. Whether one agrees with his conclusions or not, Mr. Clarke is warning and alerting us, based on a lifetime of experience in four different administrations over 30 years fighting terrorists, of where we may have gone wrong. These are lessons that are absolutely essential for us to learn.

   Mr. Clarke was not only an official in this Bush White House. He was also an official, an anti-terror chief, in the Clinton administration. Before that, he was in the previous Bush administration at a high level of responsibility. Before that, he served in the Reagan administration. This is a man of credibility. This is a man of qualifications. This is a man of deep experience who is attempting to warn us of mistakes that are being made.

   The charges he is making are serious charges. We know who attacked our country on 9/11. It was not Saddam Hussein or Iraq. It was Osama bin Laden and al-Qaida. But because the administration wanted to go to war in Iraq, Clarke suggests, we not only diverted resources from the hunt for Osama bin Laden and the al-Qaida leadership, we strengthened al-Qaida and gave it time and space to develop offshoots that will continue to threaten this country even if we do eventually capture bin Laden, which I pray we do.

   It is not just Mr. Clarke who is making these assertions. Read the book by Secretary of the Treasury O'Neill. I have read that book, ``The Price of Loyalty,'' as well. He makes clear the Bush administration, in its earliest weeks, were focused on attacking Iraq.

   So I think we need to ask why we allowed ourselves to be distracted by Saddam Hussein. We need to ask why we took the focus off of finding Osama bin Laden and bringing him to justice? And we need to ask why the President decided that going after Iraq not al-Qaida and Osama bin Laden--was the priority, and see how that judgment has stood the test of time.

   The President and his top officials made two main arguments for going to war in Iraq: Iraq was allied with al-Qaida, and Iraq had weapons of mass destruction that it could use to attack this country. That is what he told the American people when he was persuading the Congress and the American

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people that we should launch a war against Iraq.

   In recent days and weeks, the evidence shows we have been pursuing the wrong priorities. Let us look at what we know now.

   On the question of a link to al-Qaida, the polling shows that 70 percent of Americans believe Saddam Hussein was behind September 11. Over half believe that Iraqis were the hijackers of the planes. Let me repeat that. The polling shows 70 percent of Americans believe Saddam Hussein was behind September 11. Fifty percent believe it was Iraqis on the

   planes that attacked the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.

   The fact is, of course, not a single Iraqi was among the hijackers of the airliners that were turned into flying bombs. The vast majority of the 19 hijackers were Saudi Arabians, as, of course, is Osama bin Laden. Fifteen of the 19 were Saudis. Two were from the United Arab Emirates, one from Egypt and the other from Lebanon.

   Not a single Iraqi was involved in the attack. That is the fact.

   However, the American people believe there is a link because again and again the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of Defense, and other top administration officials have done everything they could to link Saddam Hussein and al-Qaida in the minds of the American people.

   They offered up two specific assertions to support this allegation: One, the Vice President and others in the administration said repeatedly that there was a link because one of the hijackers, Mohammed Atta, had met with an Iraqi agent in Prague. But what does the most recent evidence show?

   The fact is, the CIA and the FBI have concluded this report was simply not true. It was not true because Mohammed Atta was not in Prague; he was in the United States, in Virginia Beach, VA, preparing for the 9/11 attacks.

   As The Washington Post reported on September 29:

   In making the case for war against Iraq, Vice President Cheney has continued to suggest that an Iraqi intelligence agent met with a September 11, 2001, hijacker 5 months before the attacks, even as the story was falling apart under scrutiny by the FBI, CIA and the foreign government that first made the allegation.

   Second, the President and other top officials said al-Qaida maintained a training camp in Iraq, but what they did not tell the American people was that the training camp was in a part of Iraq controlled by the Kurds, not by Saddam Hussein. The Kurds, by the way, are our allies. Once again, this is a disturbing bit of information used in a way that I believe fundamentally misled people.

   Yet Vice President Cheney, as recently as last fall, said that Iraq was ``the geographic base of the terrorists who have had us under assault for many years, but most especially on 9/11.''

   President Bush himself was forced to correct the record just a few days later, when a reporter asked him about the Vice President's statement. The President was very clear. He said there is no evidence that Saddam Hussein was involved in the 9/11 attacks on this country. Here it is in the New York Times, September 18, 2003, ``Bush Reports No Evidence of Hussein Tie to 9/11.''

   But that did not stop the administration from making statements over and over again linking Iraq with al-Qaida, and with terrorists more generally, to create the impression the war in Iraq was part of our response to the 9/11 attacks and the war on terrorism. As Richard Clarke, the top counter-terrorism official in the White House during 2001 and 2002, puts it:

   The White House carefully manipulated public opinion, never quite lied, but gave the very strong impression that Iraq did it.

   They did know better. We told them. The CIA told them. The FBI told them. They did know better. And the tragedy here is that Americans went to their death in Iraq thinking that they were avenging September 11, when Iraq had nothing to do with September 11. I think for a commander in chief and vice president to allow that to happen is unconscionable.

   These, again, are the remarks of the top counter-terrorism official in the Bush administration.

   In fact, it is unlikely there would be any strong linkage between Iraq and al-Qaida because Saddam Hussein was secular, Osama bin Laden is a fundamentalist. In many ways, they are mortal enemies.

   I graduated from an American Air Force base high school in Tripoli, Libya--in North Africa--in 1966. Anybody who has lived in that culture understands very well the deep divisions between those who are secular and those who are fundamentalists. It is a deep division.

   But it is as though our administration in Washington is unaware of it because, repeatedly, they have suggested the two were tightly linked. In fact, they were sworn enemies. Who do you think it is we are digging up in those graves in Iraq? They are, by and large, fundamentalists whom Saddam Hussein found profoundly threatening to his secular regime.

   I think it is time for America to think very carefully about the path we are going down and to think very carefully about whether the strategy this administration has adopted is a strategy to secure our future, or whether there is a better strategy to be pursued.

   What we do know is Osama bin Laden and al-Qaida organized the attack on the United States. That is who is responsible. That is who we should be going after. Instead, what we are hearing is that military and intelligence resources were shifted to Iraq, taking resources away from the search for Osama bin Laden. I have to ask again, Why? Why are we spending time and energy trying to prove a link with Saddam instead of spending the same time and energy trying to find Osama bin Laden and defeating al-Qaida?

   The other thing that was asserted repeatedly in making the case that Iraq should be the priority, rather than al-Qaida, was that there were weapons of mass destruction in Iraq--nuclear weapons, chemical and biological weapons. The President and top officials repeatedly warned of Saddam's efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction, and nuclear weapons in particular.

   We had rhetoric about nuclear holy wars and mushroom clouds, and the statements were assertions. The administration did not say that Iraq might--or might not--have weapons of mass destruction. It asserted affirmatively that, without a doubt, Iraq had these weapons and that they posed an immediate threat to this country.

   This chart lists a few of the many administration statements on Iraq's nuclear weapons. The first one is a quote of the Vice President in a speech to the VFW National Convention. He said:

   Simply stated, there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein has weapons of mass destruction.

   We have quote after quote from this administration. The President said:

   The Iraqi regime is seeking nuclear weapons. The evidence indicates that Iraq is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program.

   Ari Fleischer, the President's press spokesman said:

   We know for a fact there are weapons there.

   It goes on and on. Secretary Powell said:

   He has so determined that he has made repeated covert attempts to acquire high specification aluminum tubes from 11 different countries, even after inspections resumed.

   And, again, Vice President Cheney:

   We know he is out trying once again to produce nuclear weapons. We believe Saddam has in fact reconstituted nuclear weapons.

   These were the statements made over and over by this administration. On chemical and biological weapons, the story was the same. The administration repeatedly asserted that Saddam had revived his chemical and biological weapons program and had stockpiles of weapons that posed a grave, immediate danger to the United States.

   We all knew that Iraq had possessed and used chemical weapons in the 1980s. And we all knew that intelligence had not conclusively demonstrated that all these weapons had been destroyed. But the administration went well beyond that consensus, suggesting that there was new evidence of renewed chemical and biological weapon production.

   This next chart I have lists a few of the many administration statements on Iraq's chemical and biological weapons. Again, the President's chief

   spokesman said:

   The President of the United States and the Secretary of Defense would not assert as plainly and bluntly as they have that Iraq has weapons of mass destruction if it was not true and if they did not have a solid basis for saying it.

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   That was Ari Fleischer.

   Again, later the next year:

   We know for a fact that there are weapons there.

   Secretary Powell:

   We know that Saddam Hussein is determined to keep his weapons of mass destruction, is determined to make more.

   President Bush:

   The Iraqi regime has actively and secretly attempted to obtain equipment needed to produce chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons.

   Again, President Bush:

   Intelligence gathered by this and other governments leaves no doubt that the Iraqi regime continues to possess and conceal some of the most lethal weapons ever devised.

   The President's chief spokesman Ari Fleischer:

   Well, there is no question that we have evidence and information that Iraq has weapons of mass destruction, biological and chemical particularly ..... all this will be made clear in the course of the operation, for whatever duration it takes.

   Mr. President, assertion after assertion. These statements, and dozens more like them, painted a frightening picture of the threat posed to this country by Iraq. They created a mood in this country that built support for attacking a country that had not first attacked us or our allies, and to do so for the first time in our history.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

   Mr. CONRAD. I ask for an additional 5 minutes.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is so ordered.

   Mr. CONRAD. Again, these statements did not suggest that ``maybe'' Saddam had weapons of mass destruction. They did not suggest that ``probably'' Saddam had weapons of mass destruction. They stated clearly and unequivocally that he had them. There was one only problem with these statements. All the evidence that has emerged since the war suggests that they were wrong. All the evidence we have now shows the administration knew at the time the statements were made that its own intelligence undercut the statements it was making.

   What we know now is that we have occupied Iraq for 10 months. We have full, unrestricted access to the whole country, more than 1,000 investigators searching for illegal weapons, and they have found none. Saddam did not have nuclear weapons or any serious effort to acquire them in the near term. I think this quote from the January 28 Washington Post sums up the most recent finding:

   ``U.S. weapons inspectors in Iraq found new evidence that Saddam Hussein's regime quietly destroyed some stockpiles of biological and chemical weapons in the mid-1990s,'' former chief inspector David Kay said yesterday.

   The discovery means that inspectors have not only failed to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq but also have found exculpatory information ..... demonstrating that Saddam Hussein did make efforts to disarm well before President Bush began making the case for war .....

   ``If weapons programs existed on the scale we anticipated,'' Kay said, ``we would have found something that leads to that conclusion. Instead, we found other evidence that points to something else.

   I think the attached graphic from the Washington Post sums up the gap between the statements and what

   we now know. On biological weapons, evidence since March of 2003? No. No weaponized agents found.

   On chemical weapons?

   No. No weapons found. Appears none were produced after 1991.

   On nuclear weapons?

   No. No evidence of any active program.

   I do not fault the administration for thinking that there might be weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. I myself thought it probable that Saddam possessed these weapons. But for me the real question was whether these weapons posed such a serious, imminent threat that they justified a preemptive attack on Iraq. Did we have solid evidence of an immediate danger? For me, at the time, the answer was no. Today, with the benefit of hindsight, with the Bush administration's own top weapons inspector acknowledging that the pre-war statements were wrong and that Saddam, in fact, was disarming before the war, the answer is even clearer: No.

   I am not the only one who has reached that conclusion. For example, former President Reagan's Secretary of the Navy, James Webb, recently wrote:

   Bush arguably has committed the greatest strategic blunder in modern memory. To put it bluntly, he attacked the wrong target. While he boasts of removing Saddam Hussein from power, he did far more than that. He decapitated the government of a country that was not directly threatening the United States and, in so doing, bogged down a huge percentage of our military in a region that never has known peace. Our military is being forced to trade away its maneuverability in the wider war against terrorism while being placed on the defensive in a single country that never will fully accept its presence.

   There is no historical precedent for taking such action when our country was not being directly threatened. The reckless course that Bush and his advisers have set will affect the economic and military energy of our Nation for decades. It is only the tactical competence of our military that, to this point, has protected him from the harsh judgment that he deserves.

   In my view, it was a clear alternative to a preemptive attack that had worked for us for more than half a century--aggressive containment and isolation. The Soviet Union had biological and chemical weapons. We never attacked them. China had biological and chemical weapons. We didn't attack them. Cuba had missiles. We didn't attack them. In every one of those cases we used containment, and it worked. But we did not use containment in Iraq. We broke with our history and launched a preemptive attack on a country that had not first attacked us or our allies.

   Now we have the responsibility for trying to occupy and rebuild Iraq. Now we have moved resources out of the hunt for Osama bin Laden to deal with the dangers of the occupation of Iraq, and we have not yet succeeded in capturing bin Laden or shutting down al-Qaida.

   I again must ask why have we not brought Osama bin Laden to justice? Why do we allow ourselves to be distracted by a war with Iraq when we have other, better options that allow us to keep the focus on al-Qaida?

   It has been more than 30 months. It has been 930 days since the 9/11 attacks on this country, but Osama bin Laden is still at large. We all hope he will soon be caught, but every day our attention is diverted is another day America is at risk. That makes me question our policy.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's additional 5 minutes have expired.

   Mr. CONRAD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent for 5 minutes to conclude my remarks.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is so ordered.

   Mr. CONRAD. Mr. President, I thank my colleagues for their patience.

   That makes me question our policy. It makes me question why for most of the last two years we have had no large-scale force hunting for bin Laden. It makes me question why our military and intelligence assets that could be hunting down al-Qaida have instead been diverted to Iraq. It makes me concerned when intelligence experts tell us al-Qaida has used that breathing space to decentralize its operations so it will be harder to disrupt and destroy al-Qaida in the future, even if we do capture bin Laden.

   In the past few weeks, the administration has announced it has stepped up the hunt for Osama bin Laden. Sending a few thousand troops now is certainly a positive step. But I must ask with all due respect, could we have captured Osama bin Laden months ago had we kept the focus on al-Qaida? Could we have prevented the Madrid attack had we kept the focus on dismantling al-Qaida rather than going to war in Iraq?

   Where was the effort to find Osama bin Laden for the past two years? And why do we not have tens of thousands of troops rather than just a few thousand to hunt him down so he does not remain free to plot against this country and our allies?

   As Flynt Leverett, former CIA analyst and National Security Council staffer for President Bush, observed in a Washington Post article this past Sunday:

   We took the people out [of Afghanistan] who could have caught them. But even if we got bin Laden or [his top aide Ayman] Zawahiri now, it is two years too late. Al-Qaeda is a very different organization now. It has had time to adapt. The administration should have finished this job.

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   I can only reach one conclusion. We have been distracted. We have been diverted. We have taken our eye off the ball. We have lost focus on the real war on terrorism--the war on al-Qaida and the terrorists who viciously attacked our country.

   To put it bluntly, we have lost time and momentum and initiative in the war on the terrorists who actually attacked us while we went after a dictator--vicious and nasty as he was--who posed little

   immediate threat to this country.

   If we look across the evidence, I believe in many ways the United States simply made a mistake of judgment on what was most important. The President and his advisers believed--and I believe they sincerely believed--the priority was to go after Iraq. But the evidence we now have suggests they were chasing red herrings rather than real evidence of a national security threat.

   Don't get me wrong. The world is better off without Saddam Hussein in power in Iraq. But going to war with Iraq at the expense of our credibility and at the expense of our readiness to deal with other threats, at the expense of vigorously hunting down al-Qaida and bin Laden, has been the wrong priority.

   That is exactly what concerned this Senator, that a preemptive war against Iraq--a country that had a low-level threat against this country, according to our own intelligence agencies--has distracted us from going after the man and the organization that attacked this country. It was not Iraqis who attacked this country. It was al-Qaida that attacked this country. Saddam Hussein was not the heart of that operation. Osama bin Laden was the leader of that operation.

   It was Osama bin Laden and al-Qaida that engineered the vicious attacks on America on September 11. It is unacceptable that Osama bin Laden is still at large and broadcasting threats against this country 930 days after the attacks of September 11.

   So I ask a final time: Why? Why has bin Laden eluded capture for 930 days? Why are we not focusing our efforts on bringing him to justice and defeating his network of terror?

   I think the American people deserve an answer to that question. I think Members of this Chamber deserve an answer to that question. Holding Osama bin Laden and al-Qaida to account for this attack should be our top priority. It is time to refocus our priorities and to win the war against al-Qaida. Stopping bin Laden and al-Qaida before they can launch another attack that kills innocent Americans should be our highest national security priority.

   I thank the Chair. I yield the floor.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Utah.

   Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, it is my understanding there is a unanimous consent agreement in place as to who might speak. I ask unanimous consent that I be recognized for 5 minutes ahead of those in queue.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is no order. The Senator is recognized.

   Mr. BENNETT. I thank the Chair.

   Mr. President, I listened with interest to my friend Senator Conrad. And he is my friend. We use that term around here loosely, but he is in fact a good friend. I differ with him very fundamentally.

   I have learned in the superheated atmosphere of the Senate that I must make this disclaimer: I do not challenge his patriotism, but I challenge his accuracy and his conclusions.

   I think we should also understand that as we differ on this, we are not attacking someone's patriotism. That canard has been thrown across the aisle at those of us who stand to defend the President and differ with our colleagues.

   I will return to the floor at a later time for more extensive comments on Senator Conrad's speech. But I want to make these points which I think get neglected over and over and were neglected in his presentation.

   He quoted David Kay, the President's arms inspector, as saying they are admitting now there are no weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. What he failed to quote from David Kay was the statement that after concluding his inspection in Iraq, David Kay came to the conclusion that Saddam Hussein was in fact more dangerous than we thought he was when we launched the war. I think that is the point that keeps being ignored and must be emphasized again.

   Senator Conrad says we didn't invade Russia when they had weapons of mass destruction; that we didn't invade China when they had weapons of mass destruction; and, why, therefore, did we invade Iraq when it turns out they didn't have them? We did it because we thought he had the weapons of mass destruction, and we thought that made him dangerous. It is not the possession of the weapons that is the problem. It is the danger that is the problem.

   Great Britain has weapons of mass destruction, but they are in no sense dangerous. We thought Saddam Hussein was.

   It is unfair to quote David Kay as saying there were no weapons and then not finish the quotation with his statement that even without weapons Saddam Hussein was more dangerous than we thought when we entered the war.

   If you are going to use David Kay as your authority, you must use David Kay's entire conclusion. Saddam Hussein was, according to David Kay, more dangerous than we thought.

   Yet somehow he is being cited as to the source to say we should not have gone ahead.

   This next major thrust of his statement was: Well, because we got distracted with Iraq, we have not dealt with al-Qaida and terrorism. That is the subject which I will address at some length when the Senator from Tennessee is finished.

   The fact is, you cannot single out al-Qaida as a terrorist group as if it operates in a vacuum. I remember my high school history teacher saying, over and over to us: You cannot cut a seamless web of history. You cannot divide the threat of terror into neat little sections and say, we can deal with the one and the others do not really matter.

   I will be discussing and presenting on the floor here at a relatively close future time the statement that appeared this morning in the Wall Street Journal that is a summary of the Kissinger lecture, given at the Library of Congress, by George Shultz. I had the privilege and honor of hearing George Shultz present that lecture. In it he makes the clear point that the war on terror, the threat from terror, goes all the way back to his experience in the Reagan administration, when he was Secretary of State. And it manifests itself in a variety of places and in a variety of ways.

   There is no distraction in the war on terror by virtue of what we are doing in Iraq. Saddam Hussein financed terror. Saddam Hussein countenanced terror. Saddam Hussein provided sanctuary for terrorists. If we were going to launch a war on terror, and said we were going to rule out Iraq as part of that war, we would have been irresponsible.

   Yes, the first attack went against al-Qaida and al-Qaida's sanctuary in Afghanistan. But al-Qaida fled and sought sanctuary elsewhere. And one of the main places where terror found sanctuary and finance was in Iraq. And we thought Iraq was dangerous enough to invade, in fulfillment--as George Shultz points out--of the clear United Nations mandate that went back decades. We acted in accordance with that mandate. We enforced the United Nations resolutions in full compliance with United Nations procedure and the vote of both Chambers of this Congress.

   It was not a distraction. It was part of the overall recognition on the part of the Bush administration that this was not a law enforcement problem where we needed to identify the criminal, arrest him, and prosecute him. This was, indeed, a true war, across a wide spectrum of challenge, where we had to deal with dangerous problems, the most dangerous of which, again, according to David Kay--who has been quoted by those who are attacking the administration--was Saddam Hussein: more dangerous than we thought when we launched the war.

   I think we should keep that in mind as we go forward in this debate.

   I yield the floor.

4D) Iraq

IRAQ

   Before I do that, Mr. President, I have been sitting here listening for a while. I think it is important to complete the story of what the Senator from North Dakota was saying.

   Let me be specific about this. As I heard his remarks, he was basically saying the President of the United States made a mistake when he decided the United States should use force to change the regime in Iraq.

   I suppose one could come to that conclusion. There were some in the Senate who did. But I think it is important, if we are going to begin to read quotations and comments from those who have come to that conclusion today, that we finish the story, as Paul Harvey said.

   Here is the rest of the story. Here is what others were saying, others were thinking, at the time President Bush had to look at the whole world and look at this different world that we are in and make a decision.

   It is true that it has been against the traditions of the United States to make a preemptive strike. That was a major discussion during the Cuban missile crisis. Bobby Kennedy brought that up in the councils. He was right to do that. And I am sure in President Bush's councils that was discussed.

   But, suddenly, we were facing a different kind of enemy. We were facing terrorists. And we had just experienced an unexpected attack. There are some even today who say that someone should have imagined that a handful of men would hijack two airplanes and fly them into the World Trade Center. Maybe someone should have. But I can assure you that during the 1990s, there was no one running for President of the United States who expressed that thought or who had that thought in the remotest back of his mind that such a thing like that could happen. Terrorism, yes. But that kind of attack? No.

   So, suddenly, we are in this new environment. And the President of the United States is doing what I would hope any President would do of either party when confronted with radically different circumstances. He asked some questions and he took some action.

   Now, it is important for us to remember that at the same time the President was making decisions about whether we should invade Iraq to defend ourselves, to prevent a terrorist attack--because there was a threat there to American lives and American safety--there were others in our Government who also had a chance to consider that information, and to talk about it, and to vote on it.

   We voted on it here. I was not here yet, but I remember the overwhelming majority--bipartisan majority--in this Senate that authorized the use of military force against Iraq. And I can remember very well what was said.

   So if the issue is whether a prudent President--who is sworn to uphold the oath to defend the United States of America--made a wise judgment to challenge Saddam Hussein, whether he could have done that based upon the facts presented to him, let's take a look at what other people, other well-informed people were saying and thinking at the time.

   The distinguished Senator from North Dakota read some quotations. Let me read some more. Here is a member of the Senate's own Intelligence Committee, the Senator from West Virginia, Mr. Rockefeller, one of our most distinguished and wisest Senators, a man who has been a Governor, with whom I have served, a man who is also on the Foreign Relations Committee. Here is what the Senator from West Virginia, speaking on the Senate floor, said on October 10 of the year 2002, about the time the President of the United States was looking at this information. Senator Rockefeller said:

   There is unmistakable evidence that Saddam Hussein is working aggressively to develop nuclear weapons and will likely have nuclear weapons within the next 5 years. He could have it earlier if he is able to obtain fissile missile materials on the outside market, which is possible--difficult but possible.

   We should also remember we have always underestimated the progress that Saddam Hussein has been able to make in the development of weapons of mass destruction.

   Now, that was not the Vice President of the United States. That was not Secretary Rumsfeld. That was not President Bush. That was the Senator from West Virginia, a member of our Intelligence Committee, a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, who was coming up with his own conclusions.

   Here is another quotation made on the Senate floor on October 9, 2002, about the same time. This came from the distinguished junior Senator from Massachusetts, Senator JOHN KERRY:

   I believe the record of Saddam Hussein's ruthless, reckless breach of international values and standards of behavior, which is at the core of the cease-fire agreement, with no reach, no stretch, is cause enough for the world community to hold him accountable by the use of force if necessary.

   That was Senator Kerry, at about the time that President Bush was having to make this terrible decision.

   I want to move on to other issues. But I don't think it serves our purpose as a country to dredge up comments that show some second-guessing, some second thoughts on one side, but not look back at what other distinguished, fairminded reasonable men and women were saying.

   Here is what Senator Biden said at about the same time on the Senate floor, October 9, 2002:

   If the world decides it must use force for his failure to abide by the terms of surrender, then it is not preempting, it is enforcing. It is enforcing, it is finishing a war he reignited, because the only reason the war stopped is he sued for peace.

   And finally, here is what the Senator from New York, Mrs. Clinton, said on October 10, 2002:

   In the 4 years since the inspectors left, intelligence reports show that Saddam Hussein has worked to rebuild his chemical and biological weapons stock, his missile delivery capability, and his nuclear program. It is clear, however, that if left unchecked, Saddam Hussein will continue to increase his capability to wage biological and chemical warfare and will keep trying to develop nuclear weapons.

   Those are the conclusions of the distinguished Members of the other side who know a lot about this, the same conclusion President Bush had. We don't have to listen to what the administration tells us here. We have our committees. We travel the world. Some of us have been in other administrations. We read. We listen. We talk. We come to our own conclusions. The conclusions of most Senators was the same as the conclusion of the President, that as terrible as it was, this was a time we needed to act.

   There is one other quotation I would like to mention before I turn to the Welfare Reform Act. This is a comment of a former President of the United States who has, to his great credit, not backed away insofar as I have heard from this remark. President Bill Clinton said, on February 17, 1998, in an address for the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Pentagon staff:

   Now let us imagine the future. What if he fails to comply and we fail to act or we take some ambiguous third route which gives him yet more opportunities to develop this program of weapons of mass destruction and continue to press for the release of the sanctions and continue to ignore the solemn commitments that he made. Well, Saddam Hussein will conclude that the international community has lost its will. He will then conclude that he can go right on and do more to rebuild an arsenal of devastating destruction. And some day, some way, I guarantee you, he will use the arsenal. And I think every one of you who has really worked on this for any length of time believes that, too.

   That was President Clinton in 1998 in an address to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Pentagon staff.

   The No. 1 issue on all of our minds is the war in Iraq. But I would hope we could look forward and not look backward in recrimination. That is not too much to hope in a Presidential election year. I believe the people of this country want President Bush and Senator Kerry to say where do we go from here, how do we win the peace, how do we secure freedom, how do we get the men and women home from Iraq and Afghanistan, what can we do to help

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their families. That is what the focus ought to be rather than reading long, incomplete lists of second-guessing quotations to try to pin the blame on a decision that was broadly and widely shared based upon information that had been piled up over 10 or 12 years. That does not serve our process well.

4E) Media Coverage of Foreign Policy, Libya

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the Speaker's announced policy of January 7, 2003, the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon) is recognized for 60 minutes.

   Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, in this country, in this city, sometimes the American media just does not get it. Tonight I rise to lay in the Congressional Record and for the American people two stories that have not gotten the attention they deserve regarding foreign policy and regarding the actions of two nations in two regions that are extremely important to the security of America and the world.

The first, Mr. Speaker, involves Serbia. Mr. Speaker, this nation went to war and for the first and only time convinced our NATO allies to use NATO as an offensive military entity to invade a non-NATO country in 1999 to remove a sitting head of state, Milosevic, from office for war crimes for which he is now being tried…

********************

…Mr. Speaker, the second story that has not been fully covered by the American media except for perhaps one newspaper, the Washington Times, is what occurred in Libya less than 1 month ago. Mr. Speaker, the President of the United States deserves significant credit for a story that has largely gone unreported in the mainstream American media. I did not see headlines on our national newspapers about what happened in Libya. I did not see headlines about the 90-minute speech that Muammar Qaddafi gave to his people on March 2. And so tonight, Mr. Speaker, I also want to talk about the untold story of Libya.

   Mr. Speaker, approximately 8 months ago, after having helped form the International Energy Advisory Council made up of private energy corporations around the world, I was told by the representative of Libya, Abdul Majid Al -Mansouri, who is today here in Washington, that Libya was about ready to complete a major turnaround. I was intrigued. I asked to learn more. He told me that Qaddafi's son, Saif Islam Al-Qaddafi, wanted to meet with me and that if I came to London in October for a meeting of the International Energy Advisory Council, I could listen to Saif Islam Al-Qaddafi tell me the story of the change that was about to occur in Libya.

   I could not make that trip in October, Mr. Speaker, but I did meet with Saif Islam Al-Qaddafi in January. We met for 3 hours and this young, 31-year-old, London-educated Ph.D. candidate in economics told me that his father was in the midst of a massive turnaround of this nation. Libya, which we have not had contact with for 29 years and which has been a major source of terrorism around the world, was about ready to change in a very dramatic way.

   I was intrigued when Saif Islam Al-Qaddafi told me the story in the meeting that we had, and I said I was interested in potentially taking a delegation of our colleagues to visit with Qaddafi himself. While meeting with Saif, he made a cellular phone call and came back and said, you're going to be invited into Tripoli within the next several days.

   Two days later, Mr. Speaker, a letter arrived from the Libyan parliament, the People's Congress, of what they call the Jamahiriya, their form of government, they call it a democracy, and that letter invited me to bring a delegation into Tripoli to visit.

   Working with the military and assembling a bipartisan delegation of our

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colleagues, as I always do, seven of us left Washington to visit Libya and then on to visit our troops in Iraq and Afghanistan and spending a night at our military medical hospital at the military Air Force base in Ramstein, Germany. In fact, we brought 12 of our injured military personnel back home to America.

   We spent 2 days in Tripoli, Mr. Speaker, 14 meetings in two days. We visited all the top officials of the country: Prime Minister Ghanem, the foreign minister, the minister in charge of removing weapons of mass destruction from Libya. We met with the leadership of Al Fateh University, a university with 75,000 students. We met with the leadership of the Qaddafi Foundation, which is now settling the claims of the families of the victims of the Lockerbie downing, that terrible tragedy that occurred, killing over 100 American citizens; and we met with Qaddafi himself.

   We also traveled through the marketplace unannounced to gauge what the response of the Libyans would be to our visit. We had been told by officials at the National Security Council here in America that we would not be welcomed, the American flag would not be welcomed. Nothing could have been further from the truth. The reception was warm, and the attitude of every Libyan

   citizen that we met was positive. When they found out we were Americans, they put their hands out to shake our hands, they hugged us, and they thanked us for coming.

   Our meeting with Qaddafi was held in his tent, across the field filled with camels from his home that we had bombed in 1986. The home is still in the same shape that it was back then, with the furniture and the holes in the walls exactly as it was after the bombing, which, as we all know, killed his year-and-a-half-old daughter.

   The meeting with Qaddafi in the tent was a difficult one for those of us on the delegation because no one had met with Qaddafi from America. No one had been in Libya from America for 29 years. We were the first.

   When we met with Qaddafi, we told him that we were glad to be invited there. We were happy that his statements were such that he was renouncing terrorism and had pledged to give up his weapons of mass destruction and that we would judge him not by his words but by his actions.

   We also told him, Mr. Speaker, that we would never forgive and never forget what Qaddafi and the Libyans had done in helping to support terrorism around the world, especially the bombing of Pan Am 103 and the bombing in a Berlin nightclub that killed two young American GIs. But we told him that if he did what he said he was going to do in removing weapons of mass destruction, then our government would move quickly to establish a new direction in our relationship.

   Our trip was a successful trip, Mr. Speaker, so much so that as we left Libya that first trip back in early February I was invited to come back on March 2 and deliver a speech to the people of Libya at the 27th session of what they call the great Jamahiriya, the assemblage of the leadership of the governing bodies throughout the country. Again we assembled a bipartisan delegation, and this time I called Senator JOE BIDEN and asked him if he would join us to have both bodies and both parties involved. He agreed, Mr. Speaker, but could not be with us on our plane so was provided a separate plane by the White House and landed the day that we were leaving, although we waited to greet him at the airport terminal to give him a briefing on Qaddafi's speech.

   On our trip to Libya the second time, Mr. Speaker, we spent a day in Tripoli. We went back to Al Fateh University. We met with the students. We were in classrooms. We met with the faculty, the deans. We met with the Libyan Foundation. They told us about their plans for a massive human rights campaign. They explained to us their efforts to move Libya back into the family of nations. They talked about their efforts to deal with health care issues like AIDS. They talked about the Red Crescent and their attempt to bring Libya into the fold of the International Red Cross. They talked about Libya's efforts to deal with the human rights concerns of all Libyan people.

   We thanked them for their time and then moved on the next day to Sirte, the city where Qaddafi is from. In Sirte 2 days earlier, the leaders of the 53 African nations had assembled for meetings about the unity of Africa with Libya in a leadership role. When visiting Sirte, we were taken out to the site of one of the largest manmade construction projects in the world, the project that Libya has been undertaking for over 20 years, to build the largest manmade river on the face of the earth, some 7,000 kilometers. This manmade river, in concrete pipes that are 12 feet in diameter, is supplying water to areas of the desert to convert them into arable usage for agriculture and farming and for the people to live on.

   While we were there meeting with officials from all over the world, from the African nations, Europe, the Far East, China, South America, Central America, the Middle East, we prepared for the evening event, the opening session of the great Jamahiriya. We were ushered into the auditorium that probably seated 1,000 people, Mr. Speaker, and in that auditorium were 600 members of the elected bodies of the government of Libya, representing small towns, large cities, trade groups, educators, and a diverse section of the Libyan population. Some were dressed in traditional attire. Others were dressed in western dress, all of them sitting waiting for the speakers to begin the opening session. Over 100 countries were there, Mr. Speaker, leaders of the foreign ministries, ambassadors, foreign ministers themselves and parliamentary heads.

   They brought our delegation in, Mr. Speaker, and placed the American Members of Congress in the front row for all to see. The session began with speeches by the Speaker of the Libyan parliament. That was followed by a speech from a female leader of the Libyan parliament who talked about women's issues in Libya. And then we had a speaker from the European parliament, the Egyptian government, the French parliament and several other countries from around the world.

   Within about 30 minutes, Mr. Speaker, I was introduced to speak on behalf of our delegation. I spoke for approximately 15 minutes, beginning and ending my comments with Arabic to show some sensitivity to these people who we had considered our enemy for 29 years.

   When I finished my speech and sat down, another speaker spoke for 2 or 3 minutes, and then Colonel Qaddafi himself was introduced. Mr. Speaker, the fireside chat, because that is what it was, it was not really a speech, there were no notes, the fireside chat that Muammar Qaddafi gave on live TV throughout Libya that night carried by Al-Jazeera but by no western media source, not one TV station, not CNN, not Fox, not ABC, NBC, CBS, none of them, but carried live throughout the Arab world, especially in Libya, was a speech that I equated with, at the end, the tearing down of the Berlin Wall and the event that eventful day in Moscow back in 1992 when President Boris Yeltsin stood atop the tank outside the Moscow White House surrounded by 100,000 Russian people and he proclaimed that communism was dead, that the Soviet Union was no longer a nation.

   This speech was of equal importance because, for 90 minutes, Muammar Qaddafi, the symbol of terrorism throughout the world, the individual who funded the IRA in Ireland, who funded the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, who funded the radical Palestinians and who openly admitted that to his people that night, this speaker told his people that he had been wrong for 25 years. He sat there and he said, we supported all of these terrorist groups. We supported them with our money and with our efforts. And what did it get us? It got us isolation. It got us constant rebuke by nations of the West, Europe, America, and other nations around the world. It brought us sanctions by the U.N. and by America. It isolated us and our economy.

   He went on to say, we were a major supporter of Nelson Mandela in South Africa when he was imprisoned. But when Nelson Mandela came out of prison, he became a best friend of America.

[Time: 22:45]

   He said, How can Nelson Mandela, the man we supported, be a best friend of America and we be America's enemy? He said, There is something wrong.

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   As we sat there listening along with our European and other friends from around the world, our mouths were open. We could not believe the words he was saying to his own people. He referred to our delegation in the room at least five times; and he said, We are happy to have the Americans here for the first time in 3 decades. But he said, My speech and my decision is not because of the Americans alone. It is because we have decided that what is best for Libya and its people is to destroy and get rid of all of our weapons of mass destruction.

   And so to his people, after admitting that he had been wrong for 25 years in supporting terrorism, Moammar Kadafi said, We no longer want any weapons of mass destruction; and we are giving it all up to the British, to the Americans, to the U.N.

   And, in fact, they have done that, Mr. Speaker. We brought back boatloads of materials, nuclear material down at Oakridge which Secretary Abraham showed off to the people of America just a week ago. Nuclear fuel rods back to Russia, chemical agents and precursors, mustard gas that we are now destroying. The material to build weapons of mass destruction were in the hands of Moammar Kadafi; and here he was telling his people, No longer do we need or do we want these kinds of materials.

   And then he went on to say, Mr. Speaker, in this amazing speech that America was never an enemy of Libya. He said, If America was our enemy, they would have taken us over. When we kicked them out of their military base in Tripoli, they would have stopped us and would have kept their position there, their troops there, and they would have attempted or would have successfully dominated our people and our country; but America did not do that.

   And so for 90 minutes, Mr. Speaker, in a speech that largely went unheard outside of Libya and the Middle East, which is a terrible tragedy, Moammar Kadafi did a 180 degree turnaround. Amazing, Mr. Speaker.

   But what was so disappointing is there were no headlines in the paper the next day. In fact, the only Washington reporter in the room that night was a reporter that I was able to get into the country, Ken Timmerman who writes for UPI and the Washington Times. Ken Timmerman on his own, because he could not fly with us on our plane, flew 36 hours and arrived in Libya at 4:00 a.m. in the morning. He went to all of our meetings.

   Nothing was closed. And I was able to get him a meeting personally with Colonel Kadafi. He asked all the tough questions, and he laid it all out in the Washington Times. But it was not in The Washington Post. It was not in New York Times. It was not in the Philadelphia Enquirer. It was not in the major newspapers of America, Mr. Speaker, this major change put forth by Moammar Kadafi. I would hope it was not because of bias, and I have really criticized the White House for not coming out and taking credit for this dramatic turnaround of our former enemy.

   The liberals left over from previous administrations are already starting to write their op-eds; it was not because of President Bush's policy. Let me tell the Members, Mr. Speaker, none of those who wrote those op-eds sat where I did for 2 1/2 hours across the seat from Moammar Kadafi. So all of their rhetoric is just that, rhetoric. I sat across from Moammar Kadafi in his den, and I met with him for 45 minutes alone with his interpreter; and I, Mr. Speaker, as much as anyone else on this planet know what was in Moammar Kadafi's mind when he made the decision. And for those pundits who are today suggesting that it had nothing to do with our activities in Iraq and Afghanistan, I would say, Mr. Speaker, they are full of you know what. They are simply attempting to politicize a result that was, to a large extent, caused by the foreign policy of our President.

   Mr. Speaker, I would grant to those colleagues assembled in our body here that that was not the only reason; but Moammar Kadafi himself told me that he realized that it was not worth the risk of having America come in and do to him what we did to Saddam Hussein. There were other issues. The influence of his 31-year-old son, Saif Islam Al Kadafi, had a major impact on his father. The need for a modernization of the Libyan economy had a major impact. But for someone to say, as various people have done in op-eds running around the country, that the foreign policy of this President had nothing to do with Moammar Kadafi's decision, they are just lying. They are naive. In fact, they are stupid. And I can say that, Mr. Speaker, because I am the only American that has sat across from Moammar Kadafi in the last 2 months, for 2 hours and 45 minutes in one sitting and another hour in a second sitting. I understand what caused the decision.

   Mr. Speaker, after the speech there was a huge round of applause from the assembled Libyan citizens in the auditorium and again the speech was carried live on Libyan TV; then they ushered our delegation back to the auditorium where they wanted us to greet Colonel Kadafi. Representatives from over 100 nations were following us all over the world. The Chinese had a delegation headed by the leader of their Parliament, the European Parliament, the French Parliament, all the African countries, the Middle Eastern countries, South America, Europe, Russia. They were all there. Even North Korea was there, Mr. Speaker.

   They put us up at the front of the line, the Americans. I walked up and put my hand out to shake Colonel Kadafi's hand; and I said, Your speech was extremely impressive. I think it will go down in history as a major event that will impact the world.

   He said, Congressman, I sat in the back in my office in the back of the auditorium and listened to your speech, and I enjoyed it very much.

   And I said, Would you do me the honor of signing my speech?

   So, Mr. Speaker, on that night of March 2, after 29 years, Colonel Kadafi, in front of our delegation and those with us from other nations, signed the speech. After he signed the speech, Mr. Speaker, he admired a pin that I had on my lapel. When we travel on CODELs, as all of our colleagues know, we wear the pin of our country and the pin of the flag of the country we are visiting. Our military escorts had given us pins with the American-Libyan flag interconnected. Kadafi admired the one on my lapel. I took it off, and I handed it to him. I said, Here, this is for you.

   He put it in his hand and thanked me. And his top assistant standing next to him, who is a personal friend of mine, looked at me and said, Congressman, put the pin on his lapel.

   So, Mr. Speaker, after 29 years of hatred between America and Libya, after bombings and killings that have killed innocent people, Moammar Kadafi wore the pin with the American flag and told us that he would follow through on each and every commitment that he had made to our State Department and to our President. In fact, it was amazing as all the delegations behind us, including the French, had to shake Kadafi's hand while the flag of America emblazoned his lapel.

   Our delegation, Mr. Speaker, was bipartisan; and our delegation consisted of Democrats and Republicans from throughout the country who were there for this historical evening and this historical speech.

   It is just a national tragedy, Mr. Speaker, an international tragedy, that the media throughout the world did not cover this event, did not have the photographs, did not have the text of what Moammar Kadafi told his people. But we will tell the story, Mr. Speaker, and we will go around and continue to support this administration in removing the weapons of mass destruction material that Kadafi has been giving us through his government.

   This week, Mr. Speaker, Majid Al-Mansouri is in America. He is visiting with our leaders. He is interacting with Members of Congress, and he is here as a private citizen but a close adviser to both Prime Minister Ghanem and Saif Islam Al Kadafi to establish contacts with Americans. So I will be calling upon our colleagues in this body to spend some time with Majid Al-Mansouri as he describes in detail the efforts now under way.

   Secretary Burns visited Libya last week and has begun the formal process of moving toward establishing an embassy in Tripoli and an embassy here in Washington.

   Mr. Speaker, this is an unbelievable story. I wish the White House would take more credit. Typically, politicians are always taking credit for things

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they had nothing to do with, and here is our President not even talking about the historical nature of Kadafi's turnaround. That is why I am here tonight, Mr. Speaker. I am here because the American media has not told the story except for the Washington Times and Ken Timmerman. And I am here to tell all those cynics that the turnaround is real. We must encourage this turnaround, continue to support the Lybians as the Kadafi Foundation fights for human rights, fights for the kind of health care needs, fights for the continuation of movement toward free and fair elections that we take for granted sometimes in this country.

   Two stories, Serbia and Libya, that need to be told in every newspaper in America.

4F) Pakistan Named Major Non-NATO Ally

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Carter). Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Pallone) is recognized for 5 minutes.

   Mr. PALLONE. Mr. Speaker, I rise on the House floor this evening to discuss Pakistan's recent designation as a major non-NATO ally.

   Last week, Secretary of State Colin Powell visited India and Pakistan to support the efforts that have been made by both nations to seek peace. For the first time in decades, relations between India and Pakistan were easing; and as a result, confidence-building measures were being established, such as transportation across the border and cricket games between the two countries.

   Although both countries are on a slow, yet steady, path for improved economic defense and political relations, unfortunately that balance has been damaged, in my opinion, by the Bush administration's favorable treatment of Pakistan in naming it a major non-NATO ally.

   Mr. Speaker, although we have advocated for the U.S. to view India and Pakistan as two separate, distinct nations, at the same time we have advocated for fair treatment based on record of democracy, commitment to ending terrorism, and a variety of values important to the United States. India is a strong, vibrant democracy of over 50 years, and Pakistan is a rogue nation under military rule. India's nuclear program is civilian controlled, and Pakistan's nuclear program was sold to nations such as Libya, Iran, and North Korea to assist illegal, covert nuclear weapons programs. India is protecting its citizens from terrorism in Kashmir, and Pakistan has sponsored terrorist activity in its own backyard.

   It seems clear that the U.S. and India are natural allies based on our shared values. The reason why the U.S. and Pakistan are now allies is a result of the shared effort to end global terrorism. However, based on all the reasons I just stated above, I am taken aback by the new designation that the U.S. has bestowed upon Pakistan as a major non-NATO ally. Not only was I surprised, but India as a nation was surprised as well. Secretary Powell had just met with India's leaders, but he did not mention the new status of Pakistan that was soon to be announced.

   Naming Pakistan a major non-NATO ally is completely inconsistent with U.S. policies. Pakistan is not a democratic nation. Pakistan supports terrorism in Kashmir, and Pakistan has engaged in nuclear activity for which it has recently pardoned a key scientist who aided covert nuclear programs to rogue nations. The result of this new designation, I think, has the potential to be devastating.

   Not only was India surprised and disappointed, but further, Pakistan's new role will lead to severe implications in the South Asia region. It is unclear what the title ``major non-NATO ally'' means and what it means in legal terms, but the most immediate concern is that a rapid and large-scale supply of American military equipment could flow from the United States to Pakistan, including the possibility of F-16s. In accordance with the Pressler amendment of 1990, Pakistan was not afforded major military supplies until post-9/11, in which case specific counterterrorism supplies had been provided.

   But this is very concerning because U.S. military supplies given to Pakistan for use against Russia and China have been historically used against India. Given the current climate of the conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, any additional weapons provided to Pakistan will likely be used to escalate this conflict between the two nations and has the potential to build up a full-scale arms war.

   In addition, this new designation has the impetus for breaking down negotiations in peace talks between the two nations that have just gotten underway. Pakistan's newly established access to U.S. military supplies could serve as an impediment to any further Indo-Pakistani talks.

   Mr. Speaker, I cannot understand why the U.S. has afforded Pakistan this major non-NATO ally status. Pakistan has a history of abusing military and nuclear equipment, and yet we are allowing them to have access to depleted uranium ammunition, special privilege in bidding for certain U.S. Government contracts, radar systems, attack helicopters, and airborne early warning systems.

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   In exchange for Pakistan's assistance to the U.S. in the war against terrorism, the U.S. has already allocated $3 billion worth of assistance, half of which is directed toward Pakistan to buy military equipment from the United States. The Bush administration must reevaluate their policies towards Pakistan. The new designation of major non-NATO ally is unfair, inappropriate and, most importantly, in my opinion, dangerous given the volatile nature of the South Asia region.

END

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