DPRK Report

[The following “DPRK Report” is the product of a joint project between the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) of the Monterey Institute of International Studies (Monterey, California, USA) and the Institute for Contemporary International Problems (ICIP) (Moscow, Russia). It is written by Russian analysts associated with the ICIP and edited by the CNS.]

THE DPRK REPORT, No. 25 (July-August 2000)

1. North Korean Perspectives on International Relations

Despite the apparent rapprochement in U.S.-DPRK relations, North Korean officials in private still describe the United States as “the only true ‘rogue state’ in the contemporary world.” They argue out that “America is the sole country that totally ignores the United Nations, international laws, and the views of other states.” They also make the case that it is “the sole country that constantly relies on violence to impose its will on others and to achieve its egotistic aims in disregard of world public opinion.” Thus, the thaw in words that seems to have taken place regarding South Korea, has not arrived in regards to the United States.

North Korean officials believe that the main preoccupation of American “ruling circles” today is to “break the will and destroy the potential of Russia as the central remaining obstacle in the way of U.S. domination over vast stretches of the Earth.” They argue that this effort is being conducted through the expansion of NATO and the promotion of national missile defense. According to North Korean officials, the DPRK missile program is “just a poor excuse for the deployment of a system that will make Russia’s missile forces impotent.”

North Koreans predict “a fierce and intense struggle” between Russia and the United States in the immediate future and believe that this circumstance “provides an opportunity for the DPRK to regain its friendship with Moscow, including protection and military aid.”

As for China, North Korean officials tend to think that “despite serious clashes between Beijing and Washington, their mutual cooperation will prevail.” North Korean diplomats argue that “China depends too much on economic ties with the United States and its allies and will not sacrifice these (profitable) relations.” They say that Beijing will continue to “bargain with the Americans and tease them with the ‘Russian card,’ but, in the final analysis, relations with the West are much more important to the P.R.C. than anything else.”

2. North Korean-U.S. Relations

North Korean diplomats do not have high expectations concerning DPRK-U.S. relations. They insist that Washington “will not agree under any president to establish normal ties with the North based upon principles of peaceful coexistence.” North Korean diplomats say that “The ultimate U.S. goal is to destroy the socialist DPRK.” At any give time, however, “Washington uses different methods to achieve this goal at a minimum cost.”

Back in the early 1990s, they say that the United States “wanted to crush North Korea militarily, but it was only the fear of North Korean nuclear weapons that cooled the heads of American leaders.” Washington, they say, “had no choice but to negotiate.” Later, they argue, the Americans “became afraid of North Korean missiles and decided to eliminate this obstacle too before concentrating on strangling the DPRK.”

U.S. promises to assist in the construction of the Sinp’o nuclear reactors and open up trade with the DPRK are viewed by North Korean representatives as “empty and dishonest.” One diplomat concludes that “They (U.S. officials) cannot be believed even in 1 percent of what they say.” What worries Pyongyang is that Washington is “putting pressure on South Korean authorities to block inter-Korean détente.” The United States, North Korean officials argue, “does not like the policy of peaceful coexistence promoted by President Kim Dae-jung, preferring instead a strategy of isolating, weakening, and finally destroying socialism on Korean soil.”

3. Prospective Venues for Cooperation between the DPRK and Russia

Sensing that the DPRK’s strategic importance for Russia is growing under President Putin, Pyongyang hopes that Russia will be able to assist it in solving the following problems:

1. To achieve de facto protection against possible military threats from the United States.
2. To assure Russian backing in bargaining with Washington over nuclear and missile matters.
3. To stir up American interest in accommodating North Korean demands and requests as a means of countering increasing Russian influence with the DPRK.
4. To receive renewed Russian military aid, including spare parts for existing weapons and hardware, as well as new, more technologically advanced armaments.
5. To secure Russian participation in the modernization of industrial facilities built by the Soviet Union during the period from the 1950s to the 1970s.
6. To establish reliable long-term deliveries of Russia oil and gas (by building new pipelines and restoring pre-existing channels of delivery).
7. To instigate competitive sentiments within China in order to extract additional aid and political concessions from Beijing.
8. To promote greater interest in cooperation with the DPRK among the countries of the former Soviet Union.

An analysis of the available data allows one to draw the firm conclusion that North Korea is now placing a high-priority on the achievement of the above-mentioned goals in its relations with Russia.