DPRK Report

The following bimonthly 'DPRK Report' is the product of a joint project between the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, California, USA) and the Institute for Contemporary International Problems (ICIP, Russian Diplomatic Academy, Moscow, Russia). It is funded by a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation and is written in Moscow by analysts affiliated with the ICIP.

The DPRK Report, No. 1 (May-June 1996)

Internal Situation

Despite the obvious social and economic difficulties of in the DPRK, the North Korean regime does not show visible signs of crumbling. Tough party and administrative control over all spheres of public and personal lives of the citizens and massive ideological brainwashing help the leadership to maintain political and social stability. The regime is sticking to its traditional policies and is refraining from any attempts to reform the system.

Kim Jong Il is the unquestionable leader of the country, and he has surrounded himself with a group of obedient subordinates. The closest confidants of Kim Jong Il are three brothers: Kim En Nam (member of the Politburo of the CC of the KWP, Deputy Premier of the Administrative Council, and Minister of Foreign Affairs); Kim Du Nam (a five-star general and Head of the Military Department of the CC of the KWP); and Kim Gi Nam (Secretary of the CC of the KWP and head of the Propaganda Department of the CC of the KWP). There are two other members of the inner circle of Kim Jong Il's advisors: his sister Kim Gen Khee (head of the Light Industry department of the CC of the KWP) and her husband Tyon Son Taek (head of the Department on the Affairs of the Group of the Three Revolutions of the CC of the KWP).

A number of other persons play significant roles in the leadership: Choe Gwang (Minister of the People's Armed Forces); Kye Ung Tae (Secretary of the CC of the KWP in charge of the "power" ministries); Kim Yong Sun (supervisor of relations with the United States and Japan); and Kim Guk Tae (in charge of training party cadres).

In order to consolidate the regime, Kim Jong Il consistently takes steps to strengthen the armed forces and their participation in the government. The majority of the top military brass hold high party, executive, and legislative posts. Choe Gwang is a member of Politburo; he and Li Ul Sol, Li Ha Il, Kim Gwang Jin, and Oh Ryong Ban are members of the Military Committee of the CC. Kim Du Nam and Oh Gyk Ryol are heads of departments of the CC. Choe Gwang is vice chairman of the National Defense Commission of the DPRK, and Kim Gwang Jin , Li Ha Il, Li Ul Sol are members of this commission. Many are members and alternative members of the CC of the KWP and deputies of the Supreme People's Assembly of the DPRK.

However, it would be wrong to assume that the military chiefs play an independent role and in any way confront the civilian establishment. The armed forces are simply a vehicle used by Kim Jong Il and his inner circle to implement their strategies. It is significant that North Korean propaganda statements insisting on the necessity of increasing the defense capabilities of the country invariably emphasize the fact that this is the direct instruction of the party.

All in all, an analysis of the situation in the top echelons of power in the DPRK and in the society at large shows that the North Korean regime, despite difficulties, retains considerable reserves of strength. It is too early to expect its immediate demise. Social and economic troubles are so far neutralized by ideological, military, and security measures.

A high-level delegation of the Russian parliament (State Duma) paid a visit to the DPRK on April 26-29, 1996. The delegation included representatives of all parliamentary factions and groups and was headed by the State Duma speaker Gennady Seleznev.

The purpose of the visit was to continue efforts of the Russian government aimed at overcoming the current difficulties in Russo-North Korean relations. Gennady Seleznev was chosen to head the delegation due to the fact that he is a member of the Russian Communist Party and had established prior links with Pyongyang authorities (in 1992 Mr. Seleznev had toured the DPRK in the capacity of the editor-in-chief of the communist newspaper "Pravda" and, in 1995, he had gone to North Korea again as leader of a delegation of the communist faction in the State Duma).

The choice of the delegation head helped to make this visit quite successful, along with the definite interest of Pyongyang in the improvement of bilateral relations.

The Russian delegation was received by a wide range of North Korean officials: Vice President Li Jong Ok; acting Premier Hong Song Nam; Deputy Premier and Foreign Minister Kim En Nam; Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Supreme People's Assembly (SPA) and party secretary for international affairs Hwang Jang Yop; and Chairman of the SPA Yang Hyong Sop. As for Kim Jong Il, he declined to meet with the Russian delegation under the pretext of mourning for his deceased father.

The most substantive meetings were with Kim En Nam, who in fact is number two in the North Korean leadership, and with Hong Song Nam, who heads the Korean part of the Joint RF-DPRK Commission on trade, economic, scientific, and technical cooperation.

Kim En Nam gave an analysis of the overall situation in bilateral relations. According to his opinion, "there are no objective obstacles" to the development of Russo-North Korean relations. However, "serious difficulties" do exist, especially created by the articles in the Russian media insulting the DPRK and its leaders, as well as by the exports of military equipment from Russia to South Korea. Kim En Nam explained that it was precisely because of these "difficulties" that Pyongyang had to postpone examination of the draft of the new treaty on the foundations of friendly relations between Russia and the DPRK. Moscow sent this draft to the North Korean side last August in order to replace the old treaty of 1961 on friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance, which "did not suit new realities." Kim En Nam stressed that the conditions for the signing of a new document "had not ripened."

The arguments of Pyongyang do not sound very logical. The proposed draft is aimed at lowering, not raising the level of closeness between the two states; it does not contain the military alliance clause included in the current treaty. The North Korean refusal to act on the draft can only be explained by the fact that the DPRK is highly interested in the preservation of an alliance with Russia. Pyongyang wanted to wait for the results of the June-July presidential elections in Russia, and if the communist candidate won, to insist on the prolongation of the existing treaty obligations of the two sides.

Hong Song Nam emphasized Pyongyang's interest in the restoration of economic ties with Russia, since the DPRK's economy "has been historically oriented to Russia." Mr. Hong gave a very high evaluation of the first session of the Joint Russian-DPRK Commission on Trade, Economic, Scientific, and Technical Cooperation (which took place last April). Pyongyang very much hopes to put back into production those enterprises that had been built in the past by the Soviet Union (plants producing car batteries, microelectrical engines, electrical cords, etc.). Mr. Hong explained that this would enable the DPRK to start repaying its debts to Russia (3.7 billion rubles, in 1991 prices). Mr. Hong tried hard to convince the Russian side of the necessity of constructing a gas pipeline from Yakutia (Sakha) to South Korea, passing through the territory of North Korea. Presumably any other venue "will make the pipeline much more expensive."

In conversations with Russian parliamentarians, North Korean officials rejected the widespread notion of "a severe social and economic crisis" in the country. They only admitted "serious difficulties," especially with grain supplies, but they pointed out that the whole nation was "united around the great leader Kim Jong Il" and had "a firm resolution" to overcome all difficulties. It was also stressed that the DPRK intended to continue construction of "socialism of the Korean type" without any reforms.

The DPRK side characterized the situation on the Korean peninsula as "complicated and tense." This was blamed on the policies of Seoul and "extremist military circles of the United States." The North Koreans gave assurances that Pyongyang simply resisted provocations of the South and did not have the slightest intention of attacking the ROK.

Officials sounded quite skeptical about the Seoul-Washington proposal on four-power negotiations towards a Korean settlement (including South Korea, the United States, North Korea, and China). As Pyongyang sees it, the idea is purely South Korean. The DPRK authorities are presumably trying to learn more about this proposal, but American Congressman B. Richardson, who was visiting Pyongyang at that time, allegedly "could not explain the essence of the initiative." North Koreans showed an interest in Russia's participation in the Korean settlement because of "the traditions in Russian-DPRK relations and Russia's geopolitical location." During the visit of the G. Seleznev's delegation to the DPRK, there were no discussions of an ideological nature, with the possible exception of remarks by some members of the Russian delegation, who called former Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev and then-Defense Minister Pavel Grachev (fired in June) "agents of the American imperialism." The North Koreans did not react to these remarks.

On June 4, the State Duma Committee on Geopolitics again held hearings on the Korean problem. The initiative invariably comes from the chairman of this committee, Mr. Mitrofanov, who claims to be "foreign minister" of the "shadow" cabinet of Mr. Zhirinovsky, leader of the extremist nationalist Liberal Democratic party of Russia (LDPR).

Mr. Mitrofanov's main motive seems to be self-promotion. He attempts to convince everyone of his ability to do more for the settlement in Korea than the entire Russian Foreign Ministry. In the past, Mr. Mitrofanov's initiatives addressed to President B. Yeltsin, Prime Minister V. Chernomyrdin, and Foreign Minister E. Primakov literally shocked all those people who in any way comprehend the nuances of the Korean problem. The thrust of Mr. Mitrofanov's position is the denunciation of Russian policies in Korea and a rejection of all moves and proposals by the Russian government.

The last round of hearings in the Geopolitics Committee confirmed the very low intellectual level and ignorance of the legislators attempting to influence the Kremlin. Let us examine the real essence of Moscow's positions vis-a-vis Korea and their interpretation by the Geopolitics Committee.

• During the last two years, the Russian government has been trying to maintain equal, balanced relations with the DPRK and the ROK. This policy is believed to correspond to the national interests of Russia and to be conducive to peace and stability on the Korean peninsula. Only through such an approach can the security of Russia and of all other countries in the Far East be guaranteed. For some reason, however, Mr. Mitrofanov and his colleagues decided to discuss the security aspects of the Korean problem, completely ignoring South Korea and talking only about Russia's relations with North Korea.
• The Geopolitics Committee put the entire blame for the deterioration of Russian-North Korean relations after 1991 on Moscow. Mr. Mitrofanov and others claimed that the Kremlin had terminated ties with the DPRK and had joined the international anti-North Korean chorus and that Russian officials and the media had spread lies about North Korea. As a result, North Koreans, who "loved" Russians and Russia, "had no choice but to consider us--at least--as an unfriendly country."

Russian diplomats who participated in the hearings explained to the legislators that the deterioration of Moscow-Pyongyang cooperation was a logical and objective result of the transformation of Russia. Russia had ceased to be a communist state and consequently the ideological union between Russia and the DPRK could not continue. Moscow had stopped all foreign aid and Pyongyang certainly could not be an exception in this regard.

• Mr. Mitrofanov attacked the Foreign Ministry for its "passive" attitude towards improving relations with the DPRK. Foreign Ministry officials denied the charge and explained that Moscow was taking serious measures to restore ties with Pyongyang and, incidentally, saw reciprocity on the part of North Koreans. It has been agreed by both sides to develop bilateral contacts on the basis of the following principles: respect for mutual souvereignty, non-interference in the internal affairs of each other, and freedom to choose one's own social model. Lately, the political and economic dialogue between Russia and the DPRK has become more vigorous. A Russian governmental delegation, headed by Vice Premier Vitaly Ignatenko, visited North Korea. The first session of the Joint Russian-DPRK Commission on Trade, Economic, Scientific, and Technical Cooperation was held. A State Duma delegation (mentioned above), headed by the speaker of the Duma, also toured the North. Finally, there was a round of consultations at the level of Deputy Foreign Ministers.
• Mr. Mitrofanov accused Russian diplomacy of not objecting to the idea of four-power negotiations on the Korean settlement. Foreign Ministry officials stressed that Moscow was firmly against the idea and instead proposed holding a six-power conference on the same issue (the four power mentioned plus Russia and Japan). Mr. Mitrofanov ridiculed the Foreign Ministry proposal.
• The Geopolitics Committee members denounced Russia's role in putting pressure on the DPRK in the nuclear field. A representative of the Foreign Ministry informed the deputies of the U.S.-DPRK agreements on the nuclear issue and said that Russia, welcoming these developments, was ready to join them if Moscow's interests and role would be guaranteed.
• The parliamentarians insisted on the resumption of the Russian military supplies to the DPRK. The response from the Foreign Ministry was that Russia could do this only in order to meet the defensive requirements of Pyongyang (not offensive), as well as on the basis of commercial profitability and taking into consideration the overall security situation in the Far East. Mr. Mitrofanov favored subsidies for the supplies of weapons to "a friendly North Korean state."
• Mr. Mitrofanov and his fellow-deputies harshly criticized South Korea's policies toward Russia. From their point of view, Seoul treats Russia as a second-rate state, insulting and downgrading it. Russia must warn and threaten South Korea with strong actions to make it more respectful. Economic cooperation with the ROK was described by the deputies as in fact useless and futile. The Foreign Ministry officials rejected all these arguments and emphasized the importance and the advanced stage of the Russo-South Korean partnership.

In their conclusion, the Foreign Ministry officials called upon the deputies to cooperate in the promotion of Russian national interests in the Far East, instead of groundlessly attacking Russian diplomacy.