DPRK Report

THE DPRK REPORT, No. 8 (July-August 1997)

1. Conditions in the North Korean Countryside

According to Russian observers, although the situation in North Korea’s agricultural sector remains grave, it is no longer getting worse. External aid and commercial purchases of grain on the world market have helped North Korea to avert a widespread famine. Basically, the DPRK has enough grain now to feed its population at a minimum level, and, if many citizens still suffer from malnutrition, it is mainly because of distribution problems. Grain is stolen, not shipped on schedule, and poorly stored, among other difficulties.

The North Korean leadership realizes that it cannot rely indefinitely on imported grain and is taking various measures to revive the agrarian sector.

• Peasants are being given pieces of land for individual work. They can grow anything on these plots and have the choice of consuming or selling the produce. Up to 5 percent of the land holdings of state and collective farms have already been distributed in this way, though peasants are warned that this is only a temporary policy. At a later date, the land may be taken away.
• State and collective farms are signing contracts with work brigades for the production of a specified quantity of goods. If the brigade produces more, it becomes the owner of the goods and makes its own decision on what to do with the extra produce.
• Peasants’ markets are being opened throughout the country. Some of them are officially authorized, others (over 70 percent) are simply tolerated by the government. At these markets, state and collective farms, as well as individual peasants, can sell and buy anything they wish. City-dwellers also come to the markets: not only as buyers of food, but also as sellers of manufactured consumer goods. These markets have now become "hubs" of the DPRK’s current economy. Almost anything can be bought and sold there: from grain to shoes, from fishing rods to calves, from vegetables to furniture. Prices are theoretically controlled by the authorities, but in reality they respond to supply and demand. Some prices are as high as in the state-run hard currency stores in Pyongyang. However, in many cases, barter exchanges take place to the satisfaction of both parties involved. The markets are supposed to be open at certain times, mostly on Sunday. In reality, the majority of them function every day and sometimes even in the evenings.
• Local authorities, enterprises, and agencies are being instructed by the central government to provide foodstuffs to their employees as well as to their local populations. There are instances when Pyongyang allocates to a region just 20-30 percent of its rationing quota of foodstuffs, telling regional officials to provide the difference. It is not surprising that under these conditions, local authorities are closing their eyes to irregularities in the functioning of the peasant markets, to speculation, and to other unlawful economic practices. In areas of North Korea adjacent to the Chinese and Russian borders, North Korean peasants are allowed to exchange their belongings and produce for foodstuffs from neighboring countries. Some cross the border without any documents with the tacit consent of local officials.
• Pyongyang is encouraging state and collective farms to use the land as extensively as possible without thinking about the consequences. In many areas, the same plot of land may be planted consecutively with crops of grain, potatoes, barley, and then rice. The agricultural year is being stretched to the maximum to allow time for growing all of these crops.
• Kim Jong Il is personally calling for a new emphasis in agriculture on the production of meat. Citing Switzerland as a country with similar natural conditions, the DPRK leader is insisting on paying the foremost attention to goats: in Switzerland, they feed the population well, providing it with meat, milk, and wool. There are also calls from Pyongyang to improve irrigation systems, to prepare more natural fertilizers, to collect more edible herbs, and to engage in other activities to stimulate food production.

All of the above-mentioned measures, according to Russian observers, will help the North Korean population to survive, but at a very dear price: the whole nation will have to continue concentrating all its energy on finding and securing food. Industry, science, and education are being forgotten and forsaken.

2. Dissenting Views in the DPRK

Some North Koreans scholars, scientists, trade representatives, and diplomats--in conversations with Russians in North Korea--are revealing their dissatisfaction with the current situation in the DPRK, blaming current difficulties on the present leadership and personally on Kim Jong Il.

The critics complain that Kim Jong Il does not possess the talent and knowledge necessary for effective leadership and, moreover, that he is surrounded by "primitive" people who care only about personal luxury and well-being. Dissenters point out that Pyongyang should stop its isolationist, confrontational policies and concentrate on reforms. Chinese reforms are cited as a "perfect example" for North Korea to follow. Reforms in Vietnam also seem to be of considerable interest to North Korean dissenters.

However, according to these North Koreans, the top leadership resolutely opposes copying the Chinese and Vietnamese models. Pyongyang argues through party propaganda channels that the Chinese and Vietnamese-type reforms will undermine the leading role of the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) and create a class of capitalists who will exploit workers and peasants even worse than during the imperial period. KWP propaganda predicts that the reform process both in China and Vietnam will sooner or later provoke political turmoil and a bloody class struggle. The two countries will be thrown back to their positions during prior periods of world history when they were poor, backward, disorganized, and controlled by foreign imperialists.

The DPRK, according to hardliners in the government, will face even graver troubles if it adopts reforms. As soon as the country introduces private enterprise and opens its borders, South Korean "puppet" authorities and greedy capitalists will immediately flood the North and turn it into "hell" overnight.

North Korean dissenters are afraid that due to the narrow-mindedness of the top leadership and its fear of changes, no reforms can be expected in the foreseeable future. The North Korean population will have to continue suffering to the very end--until the full collapse of economic life in the country.

3. Corruption in the North Korean Elite

The shortage of consumer goods, especially foodstuffs, numerous restrictions on economic and social activities, and the totalitarian political system provide ample opportunities for corruption in the DPRK. As can be construed from conversations with North Korean citizens, observations on the scene, as well as items in the

DPRK media and party propaganda channels, corruption has penetrated all layers of the country’s officialdom and encompasses most bureaucrats who are entitled to make even the most trivial decisions.

All important appointments that are not organized by the supreme leader himself take place only after a certain price is paid. In many cases, it is not money but rather fashionable goods like Japanese television sets, cameras, or French perfume. It has become common practice for grateful North Korean ambassadors or foreign trade representatives to open secret accounts for their Pyongyang bosses in banks abroad.

At the local level, bribes are due for additional quantities of grain, permission to travel to the capital city, licenses to sell produce at the peasants’ markets, help in sending one’s children to a good school, allocation of a piece of land for private use, dodging the draft, and for hundreds of other big and small favors. The payment is made in money, goods, luxuries, return services, and even work for the benefactor.

Corruption has become so widespread that it is creating serious social tensions: the majority of people don’t get what they are entitled to, while those who can, are ready to, and know how to give bribes are flourishing. The fight against corruption has taken on the usual forms in a totalitarian society: show trials, severe punishment for the culprits, and an intensive propaganda campaign meant to convince the populace that corruption has no place in a socialist society. However, the phenomenon of corruption continues to grow in this country, which is being hit hard simultaneously by a deep economic, social, and, increasingly, ideological/political crisis.

ICIP

Moscow