DPRK Report

[The following "DPRK Report" is the product of a joint project between the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) of the Monterey Institute of International Studies (Monterey, California, USA) and the Institute for Contemporary International Problems (ICIP) (Moscow, Russia). It is written by Russian analysts associated with the ICIP and edited by the CNS.]

THE DPRK REPORT, No. 21 (November-December 1999)

1. The Russian General Staff’s View of the North Korean Missile Program

The General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces is paying serious attention to North Korean efforts to develop its nuclear and missile potential. These attempts are viewed in Moscow as “one of the most important problems directly affecting…Russia’s national security, as well as regional and global stability.” Preventing this “serious threat” to Russia's security is identified as one of the main tasks facing Moscow.

Russian military officials believe that North Korean, as well as Indian, Pakistani, and Israeli nuclear-missile ambitions, should be checked through a number of approaches.

First of all, Russian officials argue that it is necessary “to strengthen mechanisms within the relevant international agreements,” including the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1970). Other measures are needed as well, including possibly the creation of new nuclear-weapon-free zones and full implementation of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The Russian General Staff considers the rejection by the U.S. Senate of the 1996 CTBT agreement as “a tremendous blow” to the cause of nuclear-missile nonproliferation. Officials note that because of the Senate’s action, Russia “finds it now much more difficult to talk with India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea about nonproliferation issues.”

A related venue of actions is solidifying international regimes regarding controls on nuclear and missile exports. And here, as Russian generals argue: “No double standards are admissible.”

A third approach is to strengthen anti-nuclear and anti-missile efforts by corresponding work to ban chemical and biological weapons. Unfortunately, there are signs that the DPRK possesses both types of weapons.

Finally, Russian officials believe that is also important to prevent illegal transfers of conventional weapons.

The Russian General Staff insists on taking into consideration regional military and political factors which “push various countries, including North Korea, to the nuclear-missile road.” Officials argue that the United States “should in practice adjust its policies vis a vis the DPRK to alleviate North Korean fears.” The Russian military favors a low-key, bilateral approach for influencing the DPRK and others, rather than exerting international pressure on seekers of missile and nuclear arms.

2. DPRK Views of U.S. Missile Defenses

North Korean diplomats explain, in “off-the-record” discussions with Russian experts, that the decision of their government to refrain from missile launches is a tactical move, but it may evolve into a long-term strategy, depending on U.S. behavior. As one DPRK diplomat states: “If

Washington agrees to shelve its National Missile Defense (NMD) plan and adopts a constructive attitude towards our country, then we will not have any reason to build long-range missiles.” Otherwise, according to this and other North Korean diplomats, Pyongyang “will keep its powder dry,” resuming the missile tests and even reconsidering its cooperation with the Agreed Framework.

3. Pyongyang’s Appraisals of ROK President Kim Dae-jung’s Policies

While North Korean propaganda continues to lash out at Seoul’s policies, privately, DPRK officials admit that Kim Dae-jung “has already done a lot to dismantle the hostile anti-Northern policies of his predecessors.” The most valuable thing for Pyongyang, it seems, is the ROK’s encouragement of foreign governments to promote a dialogue and ties with the DPRK. As a scholar from the North points out, “With the help of present South Korean administration, we’ve significantly expanded our relations with a number of countries.” “Seoul,” says another North Korean national, “influences Washington favorably, helping moderates in the U.S. government to push for the unfreezing of ties with the DPRK.”

The North Koreans explain, however, that Pyongyang will not acknowledge its satisfaction with South Korean government publicly “since that would have a negative impact inside the DPRK and would be used by the enemies of the DPRK abroad.”

4. DPRK Hopes to Overcome Its Food Shortage

North Korean officials express hope that the expected normalization of DPRK-U.S. relations will help to improve the food situation in their country. The easing of economic sanctions is expected to lead to the influx of foreign goods, capital, and expertise. Normalization of DPRK-U.S. relations will also be conducive to the acquisition of more aid from other possible donors.

As one high-ranking North Korean economist predicts, his country’s economy will start showing growth in two to three years after the opening of ties with the United States. As can be judged by private conversations, the North Korean leadership feels that the American threat has been reduced lately and that Washington can be expected to make some practical moves to improve relations with the DPRK.

5. The DPRK Military

According to Russian estimates, the DPRK government has been forced to cut its military expenditures due to the lack of funds. In 1999 their level will be 2 percent lower than in the previous year. The relative proportions within the military budget have also changed, with a comparatively larger amount now being spent on missiles and other “high impact” arms, since their effectiveness per money spent is much greater than that of conventional weapons.

The CNS website is located at http://cns.miis.edu. The ICIP can be contacted via e-mail at icipu@glasnet.ru.

Return to the DPRK Report index.