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Special Section: Terrorist Attacks on America

Adversaries to Allies?

William C. Potter and Nikolai Sokov

One of the most intriguing questions in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks is the potential for U.S.-Russian military cooperation. Although the possibility of collaboration is real, its achievement will require extraordinary diplomatic skill and political risk-taking.

Three areas of military cooperation are underway or under consideration: exchange of intelligence information about persons identified as terrorists and their bases of operation; U.S. use of Russian military facilities in Central Asia and/or those of other former Soviet states, and direct Russian participation in joint military action.

The least controversial form of cooperation, which is already taking place, is intelligence sharing. The offer to make available information on Osama bin Laden and his organization was made by Russian Defense Minister Sergei B. Ivanov shortly after news of the terrorist attacks. It was followed by a meeting between senior Russian and U.S. intelligence officials. Although both U.S. and Russian intelligence agencies are wary of revealing sensitive information, Moscow has begun to share current intelligence and past knowledge about Afghanistan gained from ten painful years of war.

More problematic is Russian readiness to support U.S. access to Soviet-era military bases in Central Asia. Relevant facilities include two Russian bases in Tajikistan, a military installation in Turkmenistan over which Russia is reported to exercise de facto control, and a former Soviet airbase in Afghanistan controlled by the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance. Less subject to Russian influence are major Uzbek military facilities.

Russia and the Central Asian states have sent mixed signals about the availability of these assets. Russia has vacillated between pledging to work with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to defeat the scourge of terrorism and stating its opposition to NATO operations in Central Asia. Most recently, the pendulum appears to have swung in the direction of some form of military accommodation. According to Russian media reports, U.S. surveillance and search and rescue aircraft already have arrived in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Turkmenistan, however, is unlikely to do anything that would jeopardize its neutrality or friendly ties with the Taliban. Senior Russian military officials appreciate the perceived need in the U.S. to retaliate at the source. However, the memory of the Soviet nightmare in Afghanistan and the inadequacy of Russia's own military assets have quelled that inclination. These reservations by the military and widespread unease in Moscow about the rise of U.S. economic and political influence along Russia's soft underbelly are powerful disincentives for military collaboration with the United States in Central Asia. Nevertheless, one should not discount the strength of two countervailing pressures.

The first and most apparent one is the deep support among the Russian people and across the Russian political spectrum for forceful action to combat terrorism. Less obvious, but perhaps more significant, is the priority President Vladimir V. Putin has attached to moving Russia forward economically. This goal is intimately linked to his success in gaining inclusion for Russia in what is often referred to as a new economic and security community. Russian military cooperation with the U.S. to fight international terrorism is probably perceived by Putin as a golden opportunity to achieve membership in this community.

The extent of U.S.-Russian military cooperation is likely to hinge on the willingness of both sides to make key concessions. The U.S. must treat Russia as an equal and integral partner rather than a short-term, junior associate. The U.S. also will need to make sincere efforts to forge a truly multilateral coalition and to seek an international legal mandate to employ military force. This latter requirement will be difficult to obtain.

Russia will need to decide with whom it casts its fate. It will be hard-pressed to participate as an active anti-terrorism coalition partner unless it is prepared to reconsider its close ties to states such as Iraq, Libya, and Syria, whom Washington regards as sponsors of international terrorism.

It is uncertain if there is sufficient political will in either Russia or the United States to forge even a limited military alliance. However, if it were to materialize, it would finally give real meaning to the end of the Cold War.


William C. Potter is Director of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. Nikolai Sokov, a former Russian diplomat, is a Senior Associate at the Center.


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