Special Section: Terrorist Attacks on America

Will the Newly Independent States Participate in a Military Action Against Terrorists?

Nikolai Sokov
Senior Research Associate
NIS Nonproliferation Program

September 17, 2001

The terrorist attack against the United States on September 11 almost immediately generated expectations that Russia would actively cooperate in combating terrorism, including possible military action against the Taliban, a fundamentalist Islamic organization controlling about 90 percent of Afghanistan. This group harbors Usama bin Laden, a Saudi millionaire accused of masterminding both the most recent and a number of earlier terrorist attacks against the United States.

These expectations are reasonable. Russia has long viewed the Taliban as a major threat both to itself and to the stability of Central Asia, its "soft underbelly." Russia claims that the Taliban and Usama bin Laden's organization train and finance the insurgency in Chechnya, against which Russia is waging its second war in less than 10 years. In May 2000, Russian officials even discussed strikes against Chechen training camps in territory controlled by Taliban.

Following the terrorist attack on September 11, Vladimir Putin was the first foreign leader to call the United States to express condolences (he spoke to National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice) and has subsequently talked several times to President George W. Bush, discussing cooperation against terrorism. [1]

Shortly after the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) invoked its Article V commitment (attack against one is attack against all), the Russia-NATO Permanent Joint Council (PJC) assembled for an extraordinary session to express "anger and indignation" at the attack and pledged to "intensify their cooperation under the Founding Act to defeat this scourge."[2]

Following a U.S. request, Russia immediately discontinued maneuvers it had started in the Northern Pacific to avoid misunderstandings and reduce the burden on U.S. Air Force, which was following them.[3]

Several areas of U.S.-Russian cooperation have been discussed: exchange of information, direct Russian participation in a military action, and the use of Russian and other Newly Independent States (NIS) military based by the United States.

Exchange of Information

Information sharing is the most obvious and the least controversial area of cooperation. Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Ivanov made the offer to share intelligence almost immediately after the attack.[4] The day after the tragedy in New York, a special representative of Russia's Foreign Intelligence service met with a high-ranking representative of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to share information about the perpetrators. According to Russian sources, bin Laden's organization, together with the Islamic Front of Uzbekistan, and the Taliban are behind the attack; the group which conducted it included two Uzbeks.[5] Information sharing has obvious limitations because all intelligence services are reluctant to disclose certain kinds of data, but the intention to pursue this avenue has been clear.

Another kind of information Russia can share is extensive knowledge of Afghanistan obtained during the 1979-1989 war the Soviet Union conducted there. As the United States plans military action, practical advice can be quite valuable, and Russia seems bent on giving it.[6]

Participation of Russian Troops in Military Action

While the Russian government approves of exchange of information, its attitude toward joint military operations is definitely negative. An unnamed official explained it in a simple, but convincing way: "We were there and do not want to return,"[7] hinting at the negative memories of the 10 year war the Soviet Union waged in Afghanistan. The Russian representative to the PJC, Sergei Kislyak, emerging from the September 13 meeting, said that Russia's participation in any possible operation inside Afghanistan was not discussed at all.[8] Chief of the General Staff Anatoli Kvashnin noted that U.S. armed forces were sufficiently strong to conduct operations on their own and did not need the help of the Russian army,[9] and from the purely military point of view he is probably right. (For background information on Russia's Afghan policy please see Russian Policy Toward Afghanistan.)

The Use of NIS Military Bases by U.S. Military

Military assets in the NIS can serve as important staging grounds and bridgeheads for an attack on the Taliban, greatly increasing chances for success and decreasing the costs of the operation. Reportedly, the United States has begun discussing some of these assets with relevant states. These include Russian Air Force bases, as well as two bases in Tajikistan controlled by the Russian 201st division, the air force base in Mary (Turkmenistan), near Tashkent (Uzbekistan), and in Bagram in Northern Afghanistan, which was built by the Soviet military in the 1980s.[10] Russia holds many, although not all, keys to the area, and its cooperation might be essential if the United States plans to attack the Taliban from the north. (For more information, see Russian Military Capabilities in Central Asia.)

An obvious bridgehead into Taliban-controlled territory is the Northern Alliance -- the armed opposition to the Taliban, which controls about 10 percent of the territory of Afghanistan in the north, adjacent to Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. Its leader, Ahmad Shah Massoud, was assassinated shortly before the terrorist attack against the United States. The new commander, Muhammad Fahimkhan, was presented by the Northern Alliance leaders to a special urgent meeting of representatives of Russia, Iran, India, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan for their approval.[11] This meeting demonstrated the extent to which these countries influence the Northern Alliance, and it would be difficult to enlist the Afghan opposition without their consent.

The Russian attitude toward the use of military facilities in the NIS by the United States may, at first glance, seem rather cool. On September 14, Sergei Ivanov declared that NATO military operations in Central Asia were impossible because states in that area were members of the Tashkent Treaty on Collective Security,[12] hinting that discussion of this kind should involve Moscow. In the meantime, Moscow officials unanimously denied media reports that the United States had approached them with an official request about the use of military facilities in Russia or elsewhere in the NIS.

Instead, the United States requested cooperation directly from three Central Asian countries that have a common border with Afghanistan -- Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. The former asked for additional time to respond and pointedly noted that it wanted to consult Russia first, [13] confirming that the route through Moscow was unavoidable. On September 16, the Tajik government denied media reports about U.S. plans to use their territory for deployment of troops,[14] although it did not rule that out either. [15] The Russian 201 division deployed in Tajikistan was, in the meantime, put on alert, ostensibly to guard against infiltration from the Taliban.[16] Groups of "volunteers" from different Russian regions are being urgently sent to strengthen it.

Turkmenistan is a different story. It does not have strong links to Russia (although unofficial reports suggest that Russia has de-facto control over the military base in Mary), and might decide on its own whether it allows the use of its airspace and territory by the United States. On the other hand, the Turkmen government has refrained from anti-Taliban rhetoric and actions, maintaining a rather positive relationship with the Taliban because it does not want to repeat the fate of its neighbors, particularly Tajikistan, which has been destabilized by Islamic extremists. Turkmenistan promised the United States all necessary cooperation, but avoided specifics.[17]

Uzbekistan, which has suffered considerably from destabilization caused by Islamic fundamentalist movements, initially embraced joint action with enthusiasm. It promised "all possible forms of cooperation." [18] However, it tempered its position a bit only days later.[19]

Overall, the picture in Central Asia has been somewhat mixed. States of that region are prepared to support U.S. attack against the Taliban, but the details remain to be determined or, at least, are being kept a closely guarded secret. In addition to active American diplomacy in the region, Russian President Vladimir Putin has also spent much time on the phone with leaders of all the Central Asian states, coordinating policy and, apparently, developing a joint response. The outcome of these complex negotiations is difficult to predict. (For more information on Central Asian security regimes and basing issues, see Central Asia: A Staging Ground for Retaliatory Strikes? and Internal Conflicts and Security Concerns in Central Asia and Afghanistan.)

American media organizations have not paid sufficient attention, it seems, to yet another regional group, the Shanghai Six (recently renamed the Shanghai Cooperative Organization) which consists of Russia, China, and four Central Asian states (Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan). A Shanghai Six meeting at the level of prime ministers assembled only days after the attack against the United States to discuss the threat of terrorism, reemphasizing coordination of member states' policies. These decisions are likely to affect the policies of at least two of the three states mentioned above -- Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.

A response to any U.S. requests of cooperation is likely to be developed in concert, with Russia playing the leading role. One can surmise that the outcome of Putin's deliberations both with the United States and with Central Asian leaders in the last few days has been positive, since on September 17 unnamed sources in the Russian Ministry of Defense suddenly announced that Moscow might, in fact, allow the use of military infrastructure in the region.[20]

Rationale Behind the Russian Approach