Special Section: Terrorist Attacks on America

Viewpoint: A New Anti-Terrorism Alliance

William C. Potter and Anna B. Vassilieva

Last week's terrorist tragedy affords U.S. and Russian leaders an unusual second chance to right their troubled relationship. If properly pursued, a joint effort to combat international terrorism could lead the parties to the kind of post-Cold War partnership only apparent in rhetoric to date.

The confluence of U.S. and Russian interests in waging a war against terrorism is substantial. Common ground includes genuine Russian empathy for the U.S. discovery of its vulnerability to terrorist action. Russian officials and the populace at large believe they have long borne the burden of fighting terrorists, and welcome the U.S. declaration of war on a common enemy. This sense of shared purpose is most clear with respect to the need to eliminate Osama bin Laden and his network of fanatical Islamic terrorists. They are perceived in Moscow to constitute a grave threat to Russia's national integrity, especially along its southern borders.

The tantalizing prospect for U.S.-Russian cooperation to counter terrorism was evident in the extraordinary joint statement issued by NATO and Russia on September 13. It condemned the attacks on the United States and promised intensified cooperation to fight the scourge of terrorism. At the same time, Russian officials were meeting in the capital of Tajikistan with diplomats from India, Iran, Uzbekistan, and the host country to discuss possible military and other means to aid the anti-Taliban coalition.

Promising as these developments are, there also are major obstacles to overcome. Principal among these are enormous differences in the geostrategic interests of the two states--especially with respect to Central Asia, a divergence in the lists of state sponsors of terrorism, a deep divide separating U.S. and Russian perspectives on Chechnya, and bureaucratic resistance in both capitals to intelligence-sharing that might inadvertently reveal sensitive collection methods and assets.

Russia, for example, remains very wary of growing U.S. oil and gas interests in Central Asia and the Caucasus, which it fears will further diminish Russian political and military influence in these former territories of the Soviet Union. Thus, although one cannot altogether rule out Russian approval for coordinated U.S.-Russian military action against Afghanistan, it is highly unlikely that Moscow would sanction U.S. use of its military bases in Tajikistan for such purposes.

Similarly, the convergence of U.S. and Russian views about the Taliban's role as a promoter of terrorism does not extend to any of the parties on the Department of State's list of state sponsors. Indeed, Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria all maintain good political relations with Moscow. Were any of these states to be implicated in terrorist attacks on the United States, Russia would probably insist upon UN Security Council support before joining in punitive action.

Significant suspicions in Moscow about U.S. motivations regarding national missile defense and NATO enlargement, and equally pronounced reservations in Washington about the Russian commitment to halt the export of nuclear and missile technologies to "rogue states" compound the difficulty of forging an extensive counter-terrorism partnership. What then, might one realistically expect to emerge in the way of U.S-Russian cooperation?

One modest, practical step to strengthen anti-terrorism collaboration would be to create and maintain under the auspices of the NATO-Russian Joint Permanent Council a joint database on international terrorist incidents. Such a register, including incidents involving the acquisition, use, or threat to use weapons of mass destruction, could yield vital information on evolving terrorist means and motivations.

It also should be possible to institutionalize and routinize the exchange of information about terrorist activities between U.S. and Russian security and intelligence services. Although similar exchanges previously have been agreed to in the realm of illicit nuclear trafficking (without noticeable effect), circumstances are conducive to meaningful cooperation as long as there remains strong support for the activity at the highest political levels.

Finally, it is necessary and feasible to initiate immediately a series of "Track Two" dialogues among U.S. and Russian non-governmental experts on terrorism. A priority topic for their discussion should be how to prod their governments into meaningful anti-terrorism cooperation.