Special Section: Terrorist Attacks on America

Russian Military Capabilities in Central Asia

Michael Jasinski, Research Associate
NIS Nonproliferation Program

September 17, 2001

View a map of Afghanistan and the surrounding region. Recent Russian training exercises and military reorganizations demonstrate the increased emphasis on the threat from the south. On September 1, 2001, the Urals and Volga Military Districts (MDs) were merged into a single district (designated Volga-Urals) headquartered in Yekaterinburg (Sverdlovsk Oblast) . At the same time the command staff of the Volga MD became the headquarters of the new Second Combined Arms Army (CAA). The main responsibility of these new formations is to fulfill Russia's obligations under the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Collective Security Treaty, which commits Russia to defend other CIS member states. Both the new military district commander, Colonel General Aleksandr Baranov, and the Second CAA commander, Major General Aleksey Verbitskiy, have had recent combat experience in Chechnya. Forces assigned to the Second CAA include the 201st Motorized Rifle Division (MRD) currently stationed in Tajikistan, and the 27th MRD based in the Orenburg Oblast. The district will also control any Russian components of the Collective Rapid Deployment Forces being assembled by the Central Asian states and Russia.[1,2] Prior to this merger, both districts were engaged in planning for Central Asian contingencies. For example, in April 2000, the Urals and Volga MDs conducted a command post exercise under Chief of the General Staff Anatoliy Kvashnin's supervision, the scenario for which involved securing CIS borders and launching pre-emptive strikes against terrorist bases on Afghan territory.[3]

Russian military forces stationed in Central Asia are relatively small, and the current war in Chechnya makes the prospect of their reinforcement unlikely, except in the case of a military emergency. The Russian military presence in Central Asia is limited to Tajikistan. It includes the 201st MRD that has been stationed in Central Asia since 1945 and took part in Soviet operations in Afghanistan in the 1980s. However, the division has only about 6,000-7,000 troops (many of them Tajiks), approximately half of its authorized strength. Nevertheless, it has a relatively high proportion of contract soldiers and is considered to be an elite unit, sometimes described as the prototype unit of the future Russian Army. The division's forces tend to operate in company combat teams that support the Russian Federal Border Service checkpoints covering Tajikistan's border with Afghanistan and China. Although both the Russian border guard and army units frequently fight skirmishes with illegal border crossers, these appear to be drug smugglers rather than militants. According to the division's records, no large-scale engagements have been fought since 1995.[4] The largest engagement involving Russian troops in Central Asia since 1991 reportedly took place in July 1993, when 25 Russian soldiers and border guards were killed as a border checkpoint was overrun by the rebels.[5]

Reports on the strength of the Russian Federal Border Service contingent in Tajikistan vary. Some estimates place its strength at some 20,000 troops as of early 1998, following a reduction of approximately 2,500-3,500 troops in late 1997.[6] According to other reports, in early 1998, there were only 14,500 Russian border guards, down from 16,000 in 1997. Most of the servicemen in the border guard units are reportedly Tajik citizens.[7] In 1997, Boris Yeltsin issued a decree allowing Russian officers to serve in Tajik units as military advisors.[6]

Until September 2000, the Russian military presence in Tajikistan included an attack aviation regiment armed with Su-25 [NATO name 'Frogfoot'] aircraft. In September 2000, the regiment was reduced to an "air group," consisting of one attack squadron. In contrast to the 201st MRD, the aircraft and crews for the air group are rotated through from regiments based in Russia. The aircraft reportedly have not seen much action, flying mostly reconnaissance missions since 1996.[8] According to some reports, Russian forces are also supported by a few squadrons of Mi-24 [NATO designation 'Hind'] attack helicopters under Federal Border Service control.[6]

In the event of a wider conflict, these forces would likely receive reinforcements. Operational plans for repelling an invasion from Afghanistan using additional units have reportedly already been drawn up. According to the Russian Army's Airborne Forces, these units include the 51st Separate Airborne Brigade, whose subunits have mountain warfare training and have experienced combat in Chechnya. The 51st Brigade is considered to be one of the most combat-ready units in Russia. Moreover, Airborne Forces commander General Georgiy Shpak visited Tajikistan in early 2001, conducting what some military observers termed "reconnaissance."[9]

A stepped up Russian military effort would also likely involve aviation assets, the use of which was threatened in 2000. However, even at that time, it was noted that Russian heavy bombers might not be very effective in carrying out strikes against Afghanistan or rebel formations because Long Range Aviation bombers cannot use conventional precision-guided weapons and would have had to rely on free-fall, unguided bombs.[10] Russian tactical aircraft (such as the Su-25) operating from Tajik bases could also strike targets in northern parts of Afghanistan.

Although the Central Asian states are heavily dependent on Russian military assistance, Russian military presence in the region is not universally welcomed, which limits the extent and effectiveness of potential cooperation between Russian and local armed forces. Uzbekistan, in particular, has been opposed to the idea of creating a Russian military base in Tajikistan and until April 2001, did not permit Russian combat aircraft flights through its airspace. Its government has also accused Russia of failing to fulfill its obligations to supply Uzbekistan with military equipment and ammunition.[11]

Sources:
[1] Vladimir Petrov, "Ural priblizilsya k Pamiru," Grani.Ru Web Site, http://www.grani.ru/, 27 August 2001.
[2] Sergey Avdeyev, Dmitriy Safonov, "Semerka, shesterka...pusk," Izvestiya, 24 August 2001; in WPS Oborona i Bezopasnost, 27 August 2001; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru/.
[3] "Rossiya i zainteresovannyye tsentralnoaziatskiye respubliki gotovyatsya k unichtozheniyu lagerey terroristov na territorii Afganistana," Nezavisimaya gazeta, 26 April 2000, p. 2; in WPS Oborona i Bezopasnost, 28 April 2000; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru/.
[4] Sergey Babichev, Yuriy Pirogov,"Odin den rotnoy takticheskoy gruppy," Krasnaya zvezda, 27 September 2000; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru/.
[5] Viktor Nosatov, "Dni i nochi nad Pyandzhem," Krasnaya zvezda, 23 February 2001; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru/.
[6] Yuriy Karnakov, "Rossiya pytayetsya zakrepit svoye voyennoye prisutstviye v Tadzhikistane," Russkiy telegraf, 19 January 1998, p. 2; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru/.
[7] "Rashireniye zony vliyaniya talibov mozhet znachitelno ushchemit interesy Rossii v tsentralnoy Azii," WPS Oborona i Bezopasnost, 21 August 1998; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru/.
[8] Sergey Babichev, Sergey Balakleyev, "Nebo nad Pyandzhem," Krasnaya zvezda, 6 October 2000; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru/.
[9] Vadim Saranov, "Let do voyny," Versiya, 3-9 July 2001, p. 2; in WPS Oborona i Bezopasnost, 13 July 2001; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru/.
[10] Aleksandr Simonenko, "Long Arms with Powerful Fists," Armeyskiy sbornik, 1 May 2000, pp. 45-49; in "Strategic Air Commander on Future Roles for Long-Range Aviation," FBIS Document CEP20000706000289.
[11] Yuriy Chernogayev, "Anatoliy Kvashnin operedil boyevikov," Kommersant, 27 April 2001, p. 3; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru/.

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