Special Section: Terrorist Attacks on AmericaUzbekistan's Alliance with the United States: Benefits and RisksKenley Butler, Research Associate
Since the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, the five Central Asian nations—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—have found themselves at the center of U.S. attempts to form an anti-terrorism coalition against the Taliban and Usama bin Laden in Afghanistan. Of the five countries, Uzbekistan has emerged as the most important with regards to U.S. military cooperation. The staging ground for the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Uzbekistan shares a border with Afghanistan and has large air bases near the Afghan border. Uzbekistan's importance to the Western coalition was underscored by U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's meeting with Uzbek President Islam Karimov in Tashkent on October 5, two days before the U.S. missile strikes on Afghanistan began. At the meeting, the United States and Uzbekistan agreed to cooperate in three main areas. First, Uzbekistan opened its airspace to U.S. military aircraft. Second, the two parties agreed to exchange intelligence. Third, Uzbekistan agreed to lend the United States one of its air bases for the use of cargo planes, helicopters, and personnel involved in search and rescue and humanitarian operations.[1] According to unidentified Uzbek government sources, advance U.S. military and engineering personnel are on the ground at Khanabad air base, near the Uzbek city of Karshi, which is located 500 kilometers south of Tashkent and 200 kilometers north of the Afghan border.[2,3] At a press conference following the meeting on October 5, Karimov stated that Uzbek territory will not be used to stage air strikes or ground invasions and that U.S. special forces will not be deployed on Uzbek territory, though he did not rule out such operations in the future. According to Karimov, the two sides are negotiating a document that will specify mutual commitments, obligations, and guarantees.[1] Karimov will certainly want to include previously stated prerequisites for U.S.-Uzbek cooperation: no involvement of Uzbek troops in Afghanistan; guarantees for the security of Uzbek territory; and technical assistance to Uzbek forces.[4] Although details of the October 5 U.S.-Uzbek agreement are still reportedly under discussion, the Uzbek-U.S. agreement discussed on October 5 will likely bring both benefits and risks to the Karimov government in Tashkent. Possible Benefits to Uzbekistan Although both Rumsfield and Karimov indicated that there were no specific quid pro quos involved in the arrangement, it is likely that Uzbekistan will gain the following in an alliance with the U.S.-led anti-terrorism coalition in Afghanistan:
Possible Risks to Uzbekistan According to October 8, 2001 reports, U.S. military operations in Afghanistan have not had an immediate effect on daily life in Uzbekistan. There were no sharp rises in prices at Tashkent bazaars and the black market rate for dollars remained constant.[7] Anatoliy Djurayev, Uzbek Minister of Internal Affairs characterized the situation in Uzbekistan on October 8 as peaceful, and added that there were no reported disturbances from the estimated 10,000 Afghan refugees in the country.[8] The peace observed on the streets of Tashkent belies the possible risks that Uzbek involvement in U.S.-led military action in Afghanistan may bring. According to Russian reports, sources in the Uzbek military have not ruled out the possibility of armed incursions into Uzbekistan and other Central Asian countries by small groups led by the Taliban or IMU. These same Uzbek sources, however, consider a large-scale land attack unlikely because the Taliban forces lack sufficient troops and means to conduct such an attack and to engage the Northern Alliance forces. Some military analysts believe that if Taliban forces were to attack Uzbekistan, they might do so through Turkmenistan, which has relatively unsecured borders. According to reports, Uzbek border units have laid mines on the Uzbek-Turkmen border and instituted identification checks at border points.[6] Perhaps even more dangerous than the risk of an outside attack is the risk of inciting internal unrest among those opposed to Karimov's repressive domestic policies. Since the February 1999 bombings in Tashkent, the Uzbek government has imprisoned over 5,000 individuals, including those with alleged links to Islamist groups, devout Muslims, human rights activists, and members of secular opposition groups.[9] An Uzbek government official said that the new wave of repression likely to come from the Uzbek government is a dangerous prospect.[5] The new repression could drive the country's religious, poor, and disaffected to the very groups the U.S.-Uzbek agreement hopes to destroy. Conclusion Although actual details of the October 5 U.S.-Uzbek agreement are unclear, it is certain that Uzbekistan will obtain security and financial benefits from its alliance with the United States. The chief imam of a Tashkent mosque, in comparing U.S. support for Karimov to U.S. support for the Shah of Iran during the 1970s, warned that the Uzbek government will use the U.S. campaign in Afghanistan for its own interests.[5] If these interests include intensified crackdowns on its own people, Uzbekistan may well run the risk of further destabilizing Central Asia and complicating the situation in Afghanistan. Sources: |
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