Congressional Record Weekly Update

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1A) The Case Against Saddam Has Been Made
Mr. WILSON of South Carolina. Mr. Speaker, I am a newcomer to Congress. I have been here only 8 months. I also have the distinction of being the only Member who is a member of the National Guard still drilling. At this time I have had, of course, my first August recess.

During the August recess, the issue that came up the most was the issue already discussed, and that is the danger of Iraq. We now have a bloodthirsty dictator who has access to chemical, nuclear , and biological weapons; he has the ability with ballistic missiles to send them against American allies and against American troops that are stationed throughout the Middle East.

Mr. Speaker, I believe that we should put our faith in the President, the intelligence agencies that we have, the wonderful military that we have, and the civilian military officials that we have before us. We need to understand there was a vote on September 14, 2001, right here in Congress, almost unanimously, to provide for military action against those who harbor or support terrorists, and the intent of that was to stop future terrorist attacks on the United States.

America has been attacked, and we are under threat. This is not a speculation as to the future; it has occurred. It will occur again if we do not take action to defend our civilian citizens.

1B) Success at Vinca
Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I rise to remind my colleagues that an important milestone in our progress toward reducing the risks of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction took place about 2 weeks ago.

   Events like September 11 would have been far worse if terrorists had access to weapons of mass destruction. Since September 11, appreciation of this threat has increased dramatically. Many of us have spoken on the need to rein in the forces of international terrorism and any possibility that they may gain the use of such weapons.

   The milestone to which I refer is the successful removal of enough weapons-grade uranium from the Vinca Institute of Nuclear Sciences near Belgrade, Yugoslavia to make more than two nuclear bombs. This removal was accomplished through coordination among government and private groups, including contributions from Yugoslavia and Russia, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the Nuclear Threat Initiative.

   I especially salute the contributions made by the Nuclear Threat Initiative, headed by Ted Turner and our former colleague Senator Sam Nunn. This episode represents another critical effort from the NTI. I'm very honored to serve on the Board of the NTI, along with Senator LUGAR. There will always be aspects of international efforts that are difficult to handle through government channels, where the private resources of the NTL may be vital.

   But even as we congratulate ourselves over this victory, we need to recognize that it is very small in the overall scale of the problem. Estimates are that weapons-grade uranium exists at over 350 sites in over 50 countries. Some of these have very small quantities, but many of these locations have enough material for one or more bombs. Some of these sites include research reactors, provided by either the United States or the Soviet Union, fueled by highly enriched uranium which could be diverted for weapons use.

   And we also need to examine why it required such complex coordination to accomplish this work and explore how Congress can simplify the process in the future. This part of the puzzle has a much simpler solution, because the tools to accomplish this are now part of the Senate-House conference on the Armed Services authorizing legislation.

   Let me briefly explain why the Vinca operation required so much coordination. The Yugoslavian government very logically required that any Vinca solution address both fresh fuel and spent fuel from their research reactor. The fresh fuel was highly enriched uranium, and our government was able to assist because it represented a proliferation threat for weapons of mass destruction. That cooperation is authorized through the 1991 Nunn-Lugar and the 1996 Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Legislation.

   But the spent fuel at Vinca, which is not useful for making a nuclear weapon, could pose both an environmental concern as well as a dirty bomb threat, depending on its level of radioactivity. The former represents work that is clearly beyond the authorization of our Government's nonproliferation mission and the latter represents work that is not authorized.

   Now since September 11, there have been volumes of testimony on the threat posed by highly radioactive materials and their potential use as dirty bombs. But today, despite these concerns, there are no statutes which address the government's authority to offer help to other countries regarding dirty bomb threats.

   I am pleased to note that the Domenici-Biden amendment to the Senate Armed Services legislation provides authorizations to enlarge the ability of the government to step into such situations. With final passage of that amendment in the Armed Services legislation, we can provide important new tools to our government.

   Under that amendment, programs to address dirty bomb issues are specifically authorized, including assistance to any country requesting our aid. And of equal importance, programs to broaden our ability to address fissile material issues around the world, not just associated with the former Soviet Union, are authorized along with new approaches to speed up the conversion of highly enriched uranium to material unusable for weapons.

   Even with this amendment, I am sure there will be many opportunities for private groups, like the NTI, to step in and plug gaps in Government programs. But with this amendment, we will vastly simplify future operations at the hundreds of remaining sites.

   The Domenici-Biden amendment enjoyed broad support in the Senate, and I appreciate that Senators LUGAR, LANDRIEU, HAGEL, CARNAHAN, MURKOWSKI, BINGAMAN, and LINCOLN joined us in introducing it.

   It is my hope that the success at Vinca, along with the sobering realization that we need to repeat this success hundreds of times to fully address the threat of proliferation of materials suitable for nuclear bombs, will encourage the Conferees from both the House and the Senate to ensure that provisions of the Domenici-Biden amendment are in the Armed Services authorization bill that will eventually emerge from Conference.

1C) Letter to President Bush Regarding Iraq
Mr. Speaker, I, too, just returned from a month in my district, and spent a good deal of time traveling the district and talking with my constituents. I have a district that in fact voted in the majority for George Bush, and yet, I found, widely traveling my district, talking to diverse groups of constituents, a lot more questions than certainty about the President's position on Iraq. In fact, there is a great deal of misgiving in my district, as I believe there is abroad in the land.

   The gentleman who preceded me made an eloquent case on a number of points, and I will not repeat those but I will emphasize a few others.

   I am today sending a letter, along with 17 other Members of Congress, to the President. We are pleased that the President has now recognized the constitutional authority of the Congress to declare war and about the fact that he will come to Congress for approval for a war against Iraq.

   At this point, I would venture and hope that Congress would not be willing to grant such approval to the President, given the lack of specificity and the many questions that need to be answered.

   Among the questions that need to be answered are the following:

   What is the threat posed by Saddam Hussein to the United States? UNSCOM said they destroyed 90 to 95 percent of their weapons of mass destruction. Is there convincing evidence of renewed production of chemical and biological weapons? Is there evidence that Iraq has successfully produced a nuclear weapon? Is there evidence Iraq has produced a reliable delivery system for weapons of mass destruction?

   Are there new developments that mean Iraq poses an imminent threat to the United States, and therefore requires immediate attention? A year ago, the administration did not seem to think that. What has changed in that intervening time? If not, would a policy of enforcing no-fly zones, vigorous weapons inspections, military sanctions be effective in containing and/or reducing the perceived threat, given the success of such strategies over the last decade?

   Is there any convincing evidence that Iraq planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, or harbored such organizations or persons? That would give some authority to act without a specific grant from Congress, but the administration has not made that case.

   Is there convincing evidence that Iraq has shared its knowledge of biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons, or the weapons themselves, with other nations or terrorist organizations? How does the threat of Iraq doing so compare with the threat posed by Iran, Pakistan, China, North Korea, or a number of other nations that are known to possess weapons of mass destruction, some of whom are known to be sharing and selling such information?

   How does the administration intend to assure Iraq does not become balkanized? This was the problem that was confronted by Colin Powell and the father of President Bush when they decided not to go to Baghdad, as they said at the time.

   Will Iraq become balkanized? If it does, what happens with Turkey? What happens with the Kurds wanting their own nation? What happens with the Shi'as in Iran? What happens with the long-term prospects for the governance of Iraq itself?

   I witnessed a Republican Senator saying we were going to rule Iraq. The United States of America is going to rule Iraq alone, without allies? Has anybody really thought about what that would mean?

   What are the potential disruptions to the United States economy? We have some problems here at home. I have a lot of unemployed people in my district, the highest unemployment rate in the Nation in my State.

   What are the potential economic disruptions that might come from a war with Iraq? Would it lead to a disruption of oil supplies? Would it drive up the price of oil dramatically, as it did in the last Gulf War? How much would such a war cost the United States of America and its taxpayers? What are the risks to our troops? What are the risks in terms of a long-term occupation?

   We have not yet resolved the situation or stabilized the situation in Afghanistan, which is a country that had no discernible military, no weapons of mass destruction. They did harbor terrorists. It was a rogue regime. But yet, the United States of America, with a substantial number of allies around the world, has yet to bring settled conditions to that country. Yet, we are about to depart for a much larger nation who has not been involved, as far as has been revealed to Congress or the people of the United States, in the attacks upon our country, has not posed a credible threat to the United States or our allies. However, we are off on another adventure.

   Is this left-over business from George Bush's father's administration? It seems like a number of the most hawkish people in his administration are people who served in his father's administration, who still regret the fact that they did not pursue the war to an end then, and they want to revisit the issue.

   Many questions need to be answered before this Congress should extend authority to the President to wage a war against Iraq, the first preemptive war in the history of the United States of America.

1D) Support for Force in Iraq
Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, as we contemplate military action against Iraq, I wish to bring to the attention of my colleagues the rationalization, in the opinion of the junior Senator from Alaska, of the circumstances surrounding the risk to allow Saddam Hussein to continue to develop weapons of mass destruction. It is no secret that over an extended period of time, Saddam Hussein and Iraq have been developing this capability. It not only includes chemical weapons and biological weapons, but a delivery system. Clearly, we have seen as a consequence of the Persian Gulf war the capability of a delivery system reaching Israel. In addition to that, we have every reason to believe he is developing his nuclear capability.

   The question to which we have to relate is, of course, the obligation as to how to thwart this exposure from the standpoint of the United States' role as not only the peacekeeper of the world but the recognition that if the United States does not do it, it probably will not be done.

   I bring that reference up to simply highlight a comparison. Had we known in advance of 9/11 the contemplated exposure--not only to the United States, but the peace of the world, as we knew the world prior to that time and the recognition that a number of aircraft was going to be used as weapons and the consequences associated with the aircraft that went into the World Trade Center in New York, the Pentagon, and, of course, the exposure in Washington and other areas of the United States associated with the activities at that time--we would have taken some action, Mr. President.

   There is no question about it because we knew the ramifications of not taking such action.

   What I am saying is we have a dilemma in the sense of a recognized concentration of weapons of mass destruction being controlled by an individual who is not only uncontrollable but one who has, over an extended period of time, initiated actions such as we have seen during the Persian Gulf war where he saw fit to invade Kuwait with the intention of going into Saudi Arabia with the objective of controlling the wealth of the oil provinces of that part of the world. That was his objective, make no mistake about it.

   If he could have prevailed in Kuwait and gone into Saudi Arabia, he would have controlled a good portion of Mideast oil and, hence, the wealth and cashflows of the area.

   The consequences of that, as we see Saddam Hussein again amassing this threat as a consequence of his development of weapons of mass destruction, brings us to the evaluation of what action we should take. Is it inevitable that sooner or later Saddam Hussein will use these weapons of mass destruction, and against whom?

   We have had an opportunity to observe a pattern of Saddam Hussein in the time since the Persian Gulf war. If one can perhaps simplify it, we have initiated a no-fly zone over Iraq since about 1992. In initiating that no-fly zone, we have taken out some of his targets. He has attempted to shoot some of our aircraft down that are patrolling the area.

   There is another inconsistency that stands out even more openly, and that is the realization that during this time we have been buying oil from Saddam Hussein, hundreds of thousands of barrels a day. In September of 2001, we set a record by importing nearly 1.2 million barrels of oil per day from Saddam.

   It is almost as if we would take his oil, put it in our airplanes, and go take out his targets. That is rather ironic. I think it is rather inconsistent, and it shows certainly an inconsistency in our foreign policy.

   What does he do with the money he receives from the United States? Why, he takes care of his Republican Guard, the group that keeps him alive, and develops more weapons of mass destruction and perhaps aims them at our ally Israel. Maybe that is an oversimplification of foreign policy. Nevertheless, that is what has been going on over a period of time. So we have become, to some extent, perhaps a partner because we are providing Saddam Hussein indirectly, through the purchase of his oil, with a cashflow that allows him to develop his weapons of mass destruction.

   Others might say that is inconsistent logic because someone else would buy his oil if the United States did not. I am not going to pursue that, other than to state a fact: We are buying hundreds of thousands of barrels of oil from Saddam Hussein. He is developing weapons of mass destruction. Where does he get the money? A portion of it comes from oil sales to the United States.

   So as we contemplate our decision on initiating an action against Saddam Hussein, we have to look back to the circumstances surrounding 9/11 where, had we known that the threat was what it turned out to be, we would have initiated an action. We did not know. We did not initiate an action.

   We can criticize our security. We can criticize the CIA and the other intelligence agencies for inadequate information. Nevertheless, the fact remains, we did not know. Had we known, we would have taken action.

   In the case of Saddam Hussein, clearly we know he is

   developing weapons of mass destruction. So the point is, should we take action? If we do not, who will? What is the actual threat? We do not know, but it is clearly a choice. We are giving Saddam Hussein a choice of either surrender--in other words, open up your country to the U.N. inspectors--or be prepared for the ultimate alternative, and that is basically to be subjected to a conflict that could go on for some time.

   I see my good friend, the senior Senator from West Virginia, is seeking recognition. I will conclude with one reference: That we need to consider again the obligation that the energy conferees have. The conference is in order. The issues are being discussed. There is an issue, and it is the issue of opening up ANWR that is within the authority of the conference to bring back to the Senate for action. As the President well knows, the House has included ANWR in its bill and the issue is before the conference.

   At a time when we are contemplating an action against Saddam Hussein, which certainly would result in an upheaval in the Mideast, it is imperative each Member recognize his or her obligation to address this with some finality. It simply makes sense to authorize the opening of this area so we can reduce our dependence on Mideast oil, particularly the sources we currently get our oil from, including Iraq and Saddam Hussein.

   There is going to be an invitation by the conference to invite Members to ANWR, to Kaktovik, on September 13. Members should avail themselves of the opportunity to see for themselves that it could be opened up safely.

   I yield the floor.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia.

   Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from Alaska for his comments. There will come a time when the Senate should debate this question.

   I compliment the distinguished Senator from Alaska on his concerns with respect to Saddam Hussein. I believe he said we have every reason to believe Saddam Hussein has developed a nuclear capability. I hope I am not misquoting the Senator.

   In the days ahead, we will want to know what the evidence is. I do not intend to get into any long debate at this point about the matter because we have a bill before us with a pending amendment. We need to get on with that, but no Senator is seeking recognition at this point.

   Perhaps Saddam Hussein has developed such a nuclear capability. When the able Senator says we have every reason to believe he has, that is not quite the point. Where is the evidence?

   Of course, it is to be expected that some people in this country will assign unpatriotic reasons for the asking of questions by Senators. We have a right to ask questions, we have a duty to ask questions, because we are living in a very perilous time.

   The war drums are beating all around us. I want to listen to what is said. I want to listen to what the President has to say. I want to listen to what he is going to say at the United Nations. I hope the United Nations will respond. I am not saying we in the Congress have to have authorization by the United Nations. Authorization is contained right here in this little book I hold in my hand, the Constitution of the United States. This Congress has the power to declare war.

   I, for one, am not going to hang my vote on an authorization by the U.N. for us in this Congress to do thus and so. We should know what the United Nations has to say. I think the United Nations should take a position. If the straits are as dire as we hear, then the United Nations ought to be concerned. And the United Nations ought to give the world the benefit of its opinion. I am glad the President is going to the United Nations.

   I am breaking our own rules here. I ask unanimous consent, although the Pastore rule may not have run its course, I may speak on a different subject.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

   Mr. BYRD. The United Nations, I think, has a duty to let the world know where it stands and what its opinion is. If this country is going to eventually go into a difficult situation, as may confront us, if war is declared by this legislative branch, or if war is approved, authorized, by this legislative branch, then we in the United States should not have to go it alone.

   But when we say we have every right to believe that Saddam Hussein has developednuclear capability, well, we have every right in our minds to think perhaps he has, and we can easily convince ourselves, but is that enough? Where is the evidence?

   I, for one, intend to ask questions as we go along. It is not unpatriotic to ask questions. I intend to ask questions. I have a right to ask questions. Where is the evidence? We might think about that as we go along.

1E) More Questions than Answers on War with Iraq
Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Madam President, I rise today to express my growing concern that we may shortly be faced with a decision to unilaterally invade another nation-state, and that is the State of Iraq. This concern has been heightened by the news of today's assassination attempt of Afghan President Hamid Karzai in Kandahar. Earlier on, a car bomb exploded in central Kabul, killing at least 22 people.

   This event, in my view, underscores the point that our primary focus must remain on our immediate war on terrorism being waged in troubled Afghanistan, where our soldiers are on the front line. As a matter of fact, preliminary reports indicate it was Americans who took down the attempted assassins.

   While I welcome President Bush's recent statement indicating he will seek congressional approval of such a use of force, I believe any action in Iraq at this time, without allied support, without United Nations support, and without a compelling case for just cause, would be both morally wrong and politically mistaken.

   I just returned from a trip to Europe. As part of my role as chairman of the Appropriations Subcommittee on Military Construction, I toured U.S. military bases and met with a variety of individuals. They included members of the intelligence community, the military, and the International Atomic Energy Agency.

   I was shocked at how dramatically perceptions in Europe have shifted since September 11 toward our country. All of the sympathy and concern we received in the wake of the terrorist attacks has apparently vanished, replaced by the sense that the United States is becoming an arrogant and aggressive power, a nation that simply gives orders, a nation that neither listens nor hears.

   When I was in Europe, much attention was given to the absence of Presidential participation at the Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg. And this, on top of our rejection of the Kyoto treaty, our casting of aspersions on international accords such as the International Criminal Court, the Anti-Ballistic Missile and Landmine treaties, has led to a growing belief, right or wrong, that the United States is using its power in an increasingly unilateral and somewhat arrogant manner.

   Above all, there is our approach to Iraq and our perceived readiness to invade that nation unilaterally.

   I believe we have to ask many critical questions, most of which are unanswered.

   Questions about the ongoing war on terrorism. How do we stay the course, root out terrorism and, at the same time, initiate war with a nation-state which, to this day, remains unconnected to 9/11.

   Questions about the extent of Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction and about who will get to them first.

   Questions about going it alone in Iraq.

   Questions about casualties and cost.

   Questions about collateral human damage--civilians killed in the short term and in the long run.

   Questions about the future of Iraq, about whether we can honestly expect a democracy to be created out of a nation consumed by tribal factionalism.

   And questions about what the long-term impact might be on the Arab world, on the Middle East. What if Iraq attacks Israel? What will we do, and what will the world do?

   Present United States policy toward Iraq stands in stark

   contrast to how we conducted Operation Desert Storm just over a decade ago. Then, the first Bush administration spent several months building a broad-based coalition that included 30 nations, including many in the Islamic world. It sought and received resolutions supporting the use of force against Iraq from the United States Congress and the United Nations Security Council, and American and international public opinion stood firmly behind such action. Today, no nation is firmly allied with the United States on this issue.

   At the very least, I believe we should launch a major diplomatic effort with the United Nations, our allies, and our Arab friends, with the goal of delivering an ultimatum to Saddam Hussein: Either open up or go down.

   If he does not comply with this demand, it will give the United States added moral and diplomatic strength to any future effort. It will help unite the world community behind us.

   Additionally, I am very concerned that the United States stay the course on our war against terrorism. To date, there is no direct connection between Saddam Hussein's Iraq and the 9/11 attacks that has been substantiated.

   This means staying the course in our war against terrorism, part of which exists in Afghanistan. The government of Hamid Karzai is fragile at best. Today should show that. During its first 6 months in power, two Cabinet officials have been assassinated. Today, President Karzai himself barely escaped an assassination attempt, and a major act of terrorism has killed many in central Kabul. The Karzai government must have security and stability, or it will perish and so will democracy.

   Additionally, we know the Taliban and al-Qaida lurk in the remote mountains, waiting for an opportune moment to come back. If Afghanistan cannot be stabilized, if its streets and homes cannot be made secure, and if its first democratic government cannot survive, this will be a very serious setback.

   Afghanistan is our beachhead in the war on terror. We cannot lose it, or we lose the war on terror. We must put al-Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah, and a host of other terrorist groups out of business before they can strike out again at America and our interests.

   That is why concentrating on this war--the critical war against terrorism--is so important.

   An attack on Iraq at this time would only deflect from this war, by diverting attention and forces away from bringing to justice the perpetrators of 9/11. Can we afford to do this?

   If there is an imminent threat to the United States or to our interests, then we must act. At this moment, however, I do not believe such a threat exists. No one doubts that Iraq has chemical or biological weapons and the means to deliver them. They have used them on at least three occasions, but they have not used them in the last 10 years, and I believe they know what will happen if they do use them.

   What is less clear, however, is the status of Iraq's nuclear weapons capability. In 1981, Israel destroyed the Osiraq reactor provided by France. While Iraq continues to seek to develop nuclear capability, there is no evidence I have found that Iraq is nuclear capable today. So there is no imminent threat.

   Secretary Rumsfeld has claimed that if we wait for Iraq to develop nuclear weapons, then it will be too late. He is right. The key is to find a way to stop Iraqi nuclear ambition, and stop it now, which is why opening Iraq's borders to a search and destroy mission for weapons of mass destruction, conducted by our allies, our friends in the Arab world, and the United Nations, is critical.

   I believe this requires renewed diplomatic efforts on our part, with the United Nations, with our allies, and with friendly Arab nations. We must stop Iraq from becoming nuclear capable. And the world in turn must respond. Otherwise, an attack becomes the only alternative.

   As Gen. Wesley Clark recently stated:

   In the war on terrorism, alliances are not an obstacle to victory. They're the key to it.

   By acting unilaterally, the United States not only runs the risk of isolating these long-standing allies, but also of solidifying the entire Arab world sharply against us. This may not result in any direct or traditional military response against the United States, but what about a personal jihad throughout this country--a jihad of bombs and other terrorist acts carried out throughout the world?

   There are people out there eminently capable and able to finance doing just that.

   With the Israeli-Palestinian conflict not yet under control, a United States attack on Iraq would certainly fuel the fire of Islamic fanaticism, uniting the Arab world against the West and Israel. The consequences could be unprecedented and beyond our present comprehension.

   The Israeli-Palestinian situation should be our highest priority. This conflict must be resolved. The United States must use its influence and leadership here, with the Israelis, the Palestinians, and the surrounding Arab world. Here, too, we must stay the course.

   At the same time, there is some troubling evidence today of the preparation of a second front in southern Lebanon to attack Israel in the event we attack Iraq. Ambassador Dennis Ross recently told me of thousands--he mentioned 10,000--extended-range Katyusha rockets that have been moved through Syria from Iran and into southern Lebanon, for an attack on Israel. He said they had been extended so that they could hit at the major Israeli industrial zone north of Haifa. I believe this has been confirmed.

   In the face of all of this, assume we do attack Iraq. Consider that we mobilize 250,000 to 300,000 soldiers, our aircraft carriers, our B-52s, our 117s. This will not be

   another Desert Storm where exposed Iraqi troops are routed in the open desert, overwhelmed by American airpower.

   This war will be waged in Baghdad, in Tikrit, and in other cities. It will be waged from house to house and palace to palace, from street to street and school to school and hospital to hospital.

   We will certainly kill many Iraqis, and how many of our own will be killed? And will we stay the course once the body bags start coming back to Dover? Will Americans stand up and say, ``More''? I think not.

   Then there are the thousands of innocent Iraqi civilians civilians already brutalized by the last 12 years--who will become casualties in this war.

   America has never been an aggressor nation unless attacked, as we were at Pearl Harbor and on September 11, or our interests and our allies were attacked. We have never initiated a major invasion against another nation-state, which leads to the question of whether a preemptive war is the morally right, legally right, or the politically right way for the United States to proceed.

   Lastly, there is the immensely complicated question of the Iraqi nation Saddam Hussein now has and what will happen if he is overthrown. Have we really thought out our options here? Have we taken into account the deep tribal factionalism and divisions, the bitter and often bloody rivalries among the Shia majority, the ruling Sunni minority, and the Kurds, that lie at the very root of Iraq? Will we protect the Kurds from possible genocide? How long will we stay to secure a new government? And who would replace Saddam Hussein?

   Let's be realistic. A democracy is not likely to emerge. One must look closely at the history of Iraq to draw such a conclusion, and I have.

   Madam President, I would like to quote from the recently published book, ``The Reckoning: Iraq and the Legacy of Saddam Hussein'' by Sandra Mackey. She writes:

   When [Saddam Hussein] finally loses his grip on power either politically or physically, he will leave Iraq much as it was when the British created it--torn by tribalism and uncertain in its identity. It is this Iraq that threatens to inflict its communal grievances, its decades of non-cooperation, and its festering suspicions and entrenched hatreds on the Persian Gulf, the lifeline of our global economy.

   In light of such conditions, is the United States ready to be an occupational force? It could take many years for the seeds of a stable pluralist society to flourish in Iraq. Are we really ready to spend a generation there?

   Given what is at stake here--American lives, American prestige, and America's respect for the rule of law--we find ourselves at a critical crossroad.

   Again, according to Sandra Mackey:

   ..... the time is fast approaching when the United States, for a series of perilous reasons, will be forced to look beyond Hussein to Iraq itself. That is when all Americans will pay the price for what has been a long night of ignorance about the land between the rivers.

   In closing, I am very happy to see that President Bush will now seek congressional approval regarding military action. So this debate has just begun.

   I look forward to working with my colleagues in the Congress to ensure we not only ask the questions but see that the answers are moral, see that they are legal, see that they are befitting the greatest democracy on Earth, and see whether they are worth, for the first time, the United States of America making a unilateral attack on another nation-state.

   I yield the floor, and I suggest the absence of a quorum.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Edwards.) The clerk will call the roll.

   The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

   Mrs. CARNAHAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

1F) The Menace of Iraq
Mr. SPECTER. Madam President, I have sought recognition to discuss the present grave concern in the United States, and for that matter, around the world, about the menace posed by Saddam Hussein and Iraq.

   I am pleased to note that the President has announced his intention to come to Congress to seek authorization before there is any military action taken by the United States as to Iraq. Senator Harkin and I had introduced a resolution back in July asking that congressional authority be obtained before any military action. The President, as Commander in Chief, under the Constitution certainly has the authority to act in times of emergency. When there is time for discussion, deliberation, debate, and decision, then under the Constitution, it is the authority of the Congress to act.

   The events are moving very fast. There have been briefings of Members of the Congress by the Administration and there is a great concern, which I have personally noted in my State, Pennsylvania, on a series of town meetings across the State. Everywhere I traveled there was concern as to what action would be taken as to Iraq.

   There was no doubt that the United States has learned a very bitter lesson from 9/11; we should have taken preemptive action against Osama bin Laden and al-Qaida. We had evidence against civilians in Mogadishu in 1993, and embassy bombings in 1993. In all of those events, bin Laden was under indictment. We knew about his involvement in the USS Cole and his proclamation for a worldwide jihad; preemptive action should have been taken.

   Taking preemptive action against a nation-state would be a change in policy for the United States. It is my view that we ought to exhaust every alternative before turning to that alternative--economic sanctions, inspections, diplomacy.

   We have seen a number of people very close to President Bush and to the first President Bush, come out and caution against action. We have seen General Brent Scowcroft, the national security adviser to President George Herbert Walker Bush, come out and raise a great many concerns about taking action without support from our allies. We have seen former Secretary of State James Baker raise an issue about going to the United Nations for inspections, which I think is a very sound point.

   It is my hope that President Bush will go to the United Nations and will press to have inspections of Iraq proceed. The obligation for Iraq to submit to those inspections is an obligation which runs to the United Nations. Iraq's commitments to the UN have been flouted.

   Former Secretary of State Baker makes the cogent suggestion that the United Nations ought to be called upon to take military action to enforce those inspection rights, if Saddam Hussein does not acquiesce.

   Certainly, if Saddam Hussein continues to stiff the UN, to thumb his nose at the UN, and thumb his nose at the international community, then there will be a stronger basis for the United States to act, if we decide that our national interests compel us to do so.

   There is an obvious difficulty in communicating to the American people all that President Bush and the intelligence agencies know about the threat posed by Iraq and posed by Saddam Hussein. There is a problem, as we have seen from our experience, in telling the Congress, even in closed session, even in top secret briefings, where that information, regrettably, is disclosed to the press. Leaks in Washington are epidemic. However, if the Congress is to discharge its duty to pass on the question of what is tantamount to a declaration of war, a resolution authorizing the use of force, we have to know the basis on which we are acting.

   There have been strong suggestions that there is very substantial evidence pointing to a clear and present danger now. We do know Saddam has chemical weapons. We do know he has used them on his own people, the Kurds. We do know he has used them in the Iran-Iraq war. There is substantial evidence about weapons of mass destruction and biological weapons. As best we know, Saddam Hussein does not yet have nuclear weapons, but how long it would take him to develop them is a question.

   For the Congress to act, we really have to have this information, and the President has intimated, really suggested, that more information will be coming to the Congress. So far, I do not think we have seen the indicators of a clear and present danger, but that is something which will have to be taken up.

   This is an issue which is now, obviously, on the front burner. There are indications that the President will seek a vote by the Congress before we adjourn. So it is a matter which will require very intensive consideration and analysis. However, it is my hope that when the President makes his speech at the United Nations next week, he will call on the UN to enforce the UN's inspection rights.

   Recently, Senator Shelby and I made a trip to Africa. Included in that trip was a visit to the Sudan. I had attempted to go there in the past and was advised against it because of the civil war, which has been raging in that country. We talked to U.S. intelligence personnel in the Sudan and found that they have worked out an arrangement with the Government of Sudan to make surprise inspections of weapons manufacturing locations and also on laboratories--going in with no notice, breaking locks, and taking photographs. They have concluded that, as to the installations they had identified and inspected, they were satisfied that there were no weapons of mass destruction being pursued by the Government of Sudan.

   That could be a model to go after as to inspections in Iraq. Of course, it still leaves open the possibility that there are some locations about which we do not know. It leaves open the possibility that some of the weapons of mass destruction could be transported, could be moved around. However, I think it would be a very significant step. Then, if Saddam and Iraq refused to honor their commitments, it would put us on the high ground to take action in our own national interest.

   I yield the floor. In the absence of any other Senator seeking recognition, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER (Ms. CANTWELL). The clerk will call the roll.

   The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

   Mr. REID. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

   Mr. REID. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the time for debate on the Interior appropriations be extended for 10 minutes.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

1G) The Price of War
Mr. PAUL. Mr. Speaker, Thomas Jefferson spoke for the founders and all our early Presidents when he stated, ``Peace, commerce and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none, which is one of the essential principles of our government.''

   The question is, whatever happened to this principle and should it be restored? We find the 20th century was wracked with war; peace was turned asunder and our liberties steadily eroded. Foreign alliances and meddling in the internal affairs of other nations became commonplace. On many occasions, involvement in military action occurred through U.N. resolutions or a Presidential executive order, despite

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   Since World War II, nearly 100,000 deaths and over a quarter million wounded, not counting the many thousands claimed to have been affected by Agent Orange and the Persian Gulf War Syndrome, have all occurred without a declaration of war and without a clearcut victory. The entire 20th century was indeed costly with over 600,000 killed in battle and an additional million wounded.

   If liberty had been truly enhanced during that time, less could be said about the imperfections of the policy. The evidence, however, is clear that we as a people are less free and the prosperity we still enjoy may be more illusionary than many realize.

   The innocent victims who have suffered at the hands of our militarism abroad are rarely considered by our government; yet, they may well be a major factor in this hatred now being directed toward America. It is not currently popular to question corporate or banking influence over the foreign policy that replaced that of Washington and Jefferson. Questioning foreign government influence on our policies, although known about for years, is not acceptable in the politically correct environment in which we live.

   There is little doubt that our role in the world dramatically changed in the 20th century, inexorably evolving from that of strict noninterventionism to that of sole superpower with the assumption that we were destined to be the world's policeman.

   By the end of the 20th century, in fact, this occurred. We have totally forgotten that for well over 100 years we followed the advice of the founders by meticulously avoiding overseas conflict. Instead, we now find ourselves in charge of an American hegemony spread to the four corners of the Earth.

   As the 21st century begins, there is not a country in the world that does not depend upon the U.S. for protections or fears her wrath if they refuse to do her bidding. As the 20th century progressed, American taxpayers were required to finance with great sacrifice financially and freedom-wise the buying of loyalty through foreign aid and intimidation of those others who did not cooperate.

   The question, though, remains, has this change been beneficial to freedom and prosperity here at home and has it promoted peace and trade throughout the world? Those who justify our interventionist policies abroad argue that the violation of the rule of law is not a problem considering the benefits we receive from maintaining the American empire, but has this really taken into consideration the cost in lives lost, the damage to long-term prosperity as well as the dollar cost and freedoms we have lost?

   What about the future? Has this policy of foreign intervention set the stage for radically changing America and the world in ways not yet seen? Were the founders completely off track because they lived in different times, or was the foreign policy they advised based on an essential principle of lasting value? Choosing the wrong answer to this question could very well be deadly to the grand experiment in liberty begun in 1776.

   The transition from nonintervention to our current role as world arbiter in all conflicts was insidious and fortuitous. In the early part of the 20th century, the collapse of the British Empire left a vacuum which was steadily filled by a U.S. presence around the world. In the latter part of the century, the results of World War II and the collapse of the Soviet system propelled us into our current role.

   Throughout most of the 20th century it was our competition with the Soviets that prompted our ever-expanded presence around the world. We are where we are today almost by default, but does that justify its being in our best interests?

   Disregarding for the moment the moral and constitutional arguments against foreign intervention, a strong case can be made against it for other reasons. It is clear that one intervention begets another. The first problem is rarely solved and the new ones are created.

   Indeed, in foreign affairs a slippery slope does exist.

   In recent years, we too often slipped into war through the back door with the purpose rarely defined or understood and the need for victory ignored. A restrained effort of intervention frequently explodes into something that we do not foresee. Policies end up doing the opposite of their intended purpose with unintended consequences resulting.

   The result then is that the action taken turns out to be actually detrimental to our national security interest; yet no effort is made to challenge the fundamental principle behind our foreign policy. It is this failure to adhere to a set of principles that has allowed us to slip into this role and, if unchallenged, could well undo the liberties we all cherish.

   Throughout history, there has always been a great temptation for rulers to spread their influence and pursue empire over liberty. Resisting this temptation to power rarely has been achieved. There always seems to be a natural inclination to yield to this historic human passion. Could it be that progress and civilization and promoting freedom require ignoring this impulse to control others, as the founders of this great Nation advised?

   Historically, the driving force behind world domination is usually an effort to control wealth. The Europeans were searching for gold when they came to the Americas. Now it is our turn to seek control over the black gold which drives much of what we do today in foreign affairs.

   Competing with a power like the Soviet Union prompted our involvement in areas of the world where the struggle for the balance of power was the sole motivating force. The foreign policy of the 20th century replaced the policy endorsed by our early Presidents and permitted our steadily growing involvement overseas in an effort to control the world's commercial interests with a special emphasis on oil.

   Our influence in the Middle East evolved out of concern for the newly created State of Israel in 1947 and to securing control over the flow of oil in that region. Israel's needs and Arab oil have influenced our foreign policy for more than half a century. In the 1950s, the CIA installed the Shah in Iran. It was not until the hostage crisis of the late 1970s that the unintended consequence occurred. This generated the Iranian hatred of America and led to the takeover by the reactionary Khomeini and the Islamic fundamentalists and caused greater regional instability than we anticipated.

   Our meddling in the internal affairs of Iran was of no benefit to us and set the stage for our failed policy in dealing with Iraq. We allied ourselves in the 1980s with Iraq in its war with Iran and assisted Saddam Hussein in his rise to power. As recent reports reconfirm, we did nothing to stop Hussein's development of chemical and biological weapons and at least indirectly assisted in their development. Now, as a consequence of that needless intervention, we are planning a risky war to remove him from power; and as usual, the probable result of such an effort would be something that our government does not anticipate like a takeover by someone much worse. As bad as Hussein is, he is an enemy of the al-Qaeda and someone new well may be a close ally of the Islamic radicals.

   Although our puppet dictatorship in Saudi Arabia has lasted for many decades, it is becoming shakier every day. The Saudi people are not exactly friendly towards us, and our military presence on their holy soil is greatly resented. This contributes to the radical fundamentalist hatred directed toward us. Another unfavorable consequence to America, such as a regime change not to our liking, could soon occur in Saudi Arabia. It is not merely a coincidence that 15 of the 9-11 terrorists are Saudis.

   The Persian Gulf War fought, without a declaration of war, is in reality still going on. It looks like that 9-11 may well have been a battle in that war perpetrated by fanatical guerrillas. It indicates how seriously flawed our foreign policy is.

   In the 1980s we got involved in the Soviet-Afghanistan war and actually sided with the forces of Osama bin Laden, helping him gain power. This obviously was an alliance of no benefit to the United States, and it has come back to haunt us.

   Our policy for years was to encourage Saudi Arabia to oppose communism by financing and promoting Islamic fundamentalism. Surely the shortcomings of that policy are evident to everyone.

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   Clinton's bombing of Sudan and Afghanistan on the eve of his indictment over Monica Lewinsky shattered a Taliban plan to expel Osama bin Laden from Afghanistan. Clinton's bombing of Baghdad on the eve of his impeachment hardly won any converts to our cause or reassured the Muslim people of the Middle Eastern countries of a U.S. balanced policy. The continued bombing of Iraq over these past 12 years, along with the deadly sanctions, resulted in hundreds of thousands of needless Iraqi civilian deaths, has not been beneficial to our security and has been used as one of the excuses for recruiting the fanatics ready to sacrifice their lives and demonstrating their hatred toward us.

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   Essentially all Muslims see our policy in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as being openly favorable toward Israel and in opposition to the Palestinians. It is for this reason they hold us responsible for Palestinian deaths since all the Israeli weapons are from the United States. Since the Palestinians do not even have an army, and most have to live in refugee camps, one should understand at least why the animosity builds, even if our pro-Israeli position can be explained.

   There is no end in site. Since 9-11, our involvement in the Middle East and in Saudi Arabia has grown significantly. Though we can badger those countries whose leaders depend on us to keep them in power to stay loyal to the United States, the common people of the region become more alienated. Our cozy relationship with the Russians may not be as long-lasting as our current administration hopes. Considering the $40 billion trade deal recently made between Russia and Saddam Hussein, it is more than a bit ironic that we find the Russians now promoting free trade as a solution to a difficult situation while we are promoting war.

   This continuous escalation of our involvement overseas has been widespread. We have been in Korea for more than 50 years. We have promised to never back away from the China-Taiwan conflict over territorial disputes. Fifty-seven years after World War II we still find our military spread throughout Europe and Asia. And now the debate ranges over whether our national security requires that we, for the first time, escalate this policy of intervention to include anticipatory self-defense and preemptive war.

   If our interventions of the 20th century led to needless deaths and unwon wars and continuous unintended consequences, imagine what this new doctrine is about to unleash on the world. Our policy has prompted us to announce that our CIA will assassinate Saddam Hussein whenever it gets the chance, and that the government of Iraq is to be replaced. Evidence now has surfaced that the United Nations inspection teams in the 1990s definitely included American CIA agents who were collecting information on how to undermine the Iraqi government and continue with their routine bombing missions.

   Why should there be a question of why Saddam Hussein might not readily accept U.N. inspectors without some type of assurances? Does anybody doubt that control of Iraqi oil supplies, second only to Saudi Arabia, is the real reason U.S. policy is belligerent toward Saddam Hussein? If it is merely to remove dictators around the world, this is the beginning of an endless task.

   In the transition from the original American foreign policy of peace, trade and neutrality to that of world policemen, we have sacrificed our sovereignty to world government organizations such as the U.N., the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO. To further confuse and undermine our position, we currently have embarked on a policy of unilateralism within these world organizations. This means we accept the principle of globalized government when it pleases us, but when it does not, we should ignore it for our own interest's sake.

   Acting in our own interest is to be applauded, but what we are getting is not a good alternative to one-world government. We do not get our sovereignty back, yet we continue to subject ourselves to great potential financial burden and loss of liberty as we shift from a national government with constitutional protection of rights to an international government where our citizens' rights are threatened by treaties we have not even ratified, like the Kyoto and the international criminal court treaties.

   We cannot depend on controlling the world government at some later date, even if that seems to be what we are able to do now. The unilateralist approach of domination over the world's leaders, and arbitrary ignoring of certain mandates, something we can do with impunity because of our intimidating power, serves only to further undermine our prestige and acceptability throughout the world. And this includes the Muslim countries as well as our European friends. This merely sets the stage for both our enemies and current friends to act in concert against our interest when the time comes. This is especially true if we become financially strapped and our dollar is sharply weakened and we are in a much more vulnerable bargaining position.

   Unilateralism within a globalist approach to government is the worst of all choices. It ignores national sovereignty, dignifies one-world government, and places us in the position of demanding dictatorial powers over the world community. Demanding the right to set all policy and exclude ourselves from jurisdictional restraints sows the seeds of future discontent and hostility. The downside is we get all the bills, risk the lives of our people without cause, and make ourselves the target for every event that goes badly. We get blamed for the unintended consequences not foreseen and become the target of the terrorists that evolve from the radicalized fringes.

   Long-term foreign interventionism does not serve our interest. Tinkering on the edges with current policy will not help. An announced policy of support for globalist government, assuming the financial and military role of world policemen, maintaining an American world empire while flaunting unilateralism, is a recipe for disaster. U.S. unilateralism is a far cry from the nonintervention that the Founders advised.

   The term foreign policy does not exist in the Constitution. All members of the Federal Government have sworn to uphold the Constitution and should do only those things that are clearly authorized. Careful reading of the Constitution reveals Congress has a lot more responsibility than does the President in dealing with foreign affairs. The President is the Commander-in-Chief, but cannot declare war or finance military action without explicit congressional approval. A good starting point would be for all of us in the Congress to assume the responsibility given us to make sure the executive branch does not usurp any authority explicitly given to the Congress.

   A proper foreign policy of nonintervention is built

   on friendship with other nations, free trade and maximum travel, maximizing the exchanges of goods and services and ideas. Nations that trade with each other are definitely less likely to fight against each other. Unnecessary bellicosity and jingoism is detrimental to peace and prosperity and incites unnecessary confrontation. And yet today that is about all we hear coming from the politicians and the media pundits who are so anxious for this war against Iraq.

   Avoiding entangling alliances and meddling in the internal affairs of other nations is crucial, no matter how many special interests demand otherwise. The entangling alliances we should avoid include the complex alliances in the U.N., the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO. One-world government goals are anathema to the nonintervention and free trade. The temptation to settle disputes and install better governments abroad is fraught with great danger and many uncertainties.

   Protecting our national sovereignty and guaranteeing constitutional protection of our citizens' rights are crucial. Respecting the sovereignty of other nations, even when we are in disagreement with some of their policies, is also necessary. Changing others then becomes a job of persuasion and example, not force and intimidation, just as it is in trying to improve the personal behavior of our fellow citizens here at home.

   Defending our country from outside attack is legitimate and is of the highest priority. Protecting individual liberties should be our goal. This does not mean, however, that our troops follow

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   While foreign visitors should be welcome, no tax-supported services should be provided. Citizenship should be given with caution and not automatically by merely stepping over a national boundary for the purpose of giving birth.

   A successful and prosperous society comes from such a policy and is impossible without a sound free-market economy, one not controlled by a central bank. Avoiding trade wars, devaluations, inflations, deflations, and disruption of free trade with protectionist legislation are impossible under a system of international trade dependent on fluctuating fiat currencies controlled by world central banks and influenced by powerful financial interests. Instability in trade is one of the prime causes of creating conditions leading to war.

   The basic moral principle underpinning a noninterventionist foreign policy is that of rejecting the initiation of force against others. It is based on nonviolence and friendship unless attacked, with determination for self-defense while avoiding confrontation, even when we disagree with the way other countries run their affairs. It simply means that we should mind our own business and not be influenced by the special interests that have an axe to grind or benefits to gain by controlling other foreign policy. Manipulating our country into conflicts that are none of our business and of no security interest provides no benefits to us, while exposing us to great risk financially and militarily.

   Our troops would be brought home under such conditions, systematically and soon. Being in Europe and Japan for over 50 years is long enough. The failure of Vietnam resulted in no occupation and a more westernized country now doing business with the United States. There is no evidence that the military approach in Vietnam was superior to that of trade and friendship. The lack of trade and sanctions have not served us well in Cuba or in the Middle East. The mission for our Coast Guard would change if our foreign policy became noninterventionist. They, too, would come home, protect our coast, and stop being the enforcers of bureaucratic laws that either should not exist or should be a State function.

   All foreign aid would be discontinued. Most evidence shows this money rarely helps the poor but instead solidifies power in the hands of dictators. There is no moral argument that can justify taxing poor people in this country to help rich people in poor countries. Much of the foreign aid, when spent, is channeled back to weapons manufacturers and other special interests in the United States who are the strong promoters of these foreign aid expenditures, yet it is all done in the name of humanitarian causes.

   A foreign policy for peace and freedom would prompt us to give ample notice, and then we would promptly leave the international organizations that have entangled us for over a half a century. U.S. membership in world government was hardly what the Founders envisioned when writing the Constitution.

   The principle of mark and reprisal would be revived, and specific problems, such as terrorist threats, would be dealt with on a contract basis, incorporating private resources to more accurately target our enemies and reduce the chances of needless and endless war. This would help prevent a continual expansion of a conflict into areas not relating to any immediate threat. By narrowing the target, there is less opportunity for special interests to manipulate our foreign policy to serve the financial needs of the oil and military weapons industries.

   The Logan Act would be repealed, thus allowing maximum freedom of our citizens to volunteer to support their war of choice. This would help diminish the enthusiasm for wars the proponents have used to justify our world policies and diminish the perceived need for a military draft.

   If we followed a constitutional policy of nonintervention, we would never have to entertain the aggressive notion of preemptive war based on speculation of what a country might do at some future date. Political pressure by other countries to alter our foreign policy for their benefit would never be a consideration. Commercial interests of our citizens investing overseas could not expect our armies to follow them and to protect their profits.

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   A noninterventionist foreign policy would not condone subsidies to our corporations through programs like the Export-Import Bank and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation. These programs guarantee against losses while the risk takers want our military to protect their investments from political threats. This current flawed policy removes the tough decisions of when to invest in foreign countries and diminishes the pressure on those particular countries to clean up their political acts in order to entice foreign capital to move into their country. Today's foreign policy encourages bad investments. Ironically this is all done in the name of free trade and capitalism, but it does more to export jobs and businesses than promote free trade. Yet when it fails, capitalism and freedom are blamed.

   A noninterventionist foreign policy would go a long way toward preventing 9/11 type attacks upon us. The Department of Homeland Security would be unnecessary and the military, along with less bureaucracy in our intelligence-gathering agencies, could instead provide the security the new department is supposed to provide. A renewed respect for gun ownership and responsibility for defending one's property would provide additional protection against potential terrorists.

   There are many reasons why a policy for peace is superior to a policy of war. The principle that we do not have the moral authority to forcibly change government in foreign lands just because we do not approve of their shortcomings should be our strongest argument. But rarely today is a moral argument in politics worth much.

   The practical argument against it because of its record of failure should certainly prompt all thoughtful people to reconsider what we have been doing for the past many decades.

   We should all be aware that war is a failure of relationships between foreign powers. Since this is such a serious matter, our American tradition as established by the founders made certain that the executive is subservient to the more democratically responsive legislative branch on the issue of war. Therefore, no war is ever to be the prerogative of a President through his unconstitutional use of executive orders, nor should it ever be something where the legal authority comes from an international body such as NATO or the United Nations. Up until 50 years ago, this had been the American tradition.

   Nonintervention prevents the unexpected and unintended consequences that inevitably result from well-intended meddling in the affairs of others.

   Countries like Switzerland and Sweden, who promote neutrality and nonintervention, have benefited for the most part by remaining secure and free of war over the centuries. Nonintervention consumes a lot less of the Nation's wealth. With less wars, the higher the standard of living for all citizens. But this, of course, is not attractive to the military-industrial complex which enjoys a higher standard of living at the expense of the taxpayer when a policy of intervention and constant war preparation is carried out.

   Wisdom, morality and the Constitution are very unlikely to invade the minds of the policymakers that control our foreign affairs. We have institutionalized foreign intervention over the past 100 years by the teachings of all our major universities and the propaganda that the media spews out. The powerful influence over our policy, both domestic and foreign, is not soon going to go away.

   I am convinced, though, that eventually restraint in our interventions overseas will be guided by a more reasonable constitutional policy. Economic reality will dictate it. Although political pressure in times of severe economic downturn and domestic strife encourages planned distractions overseas, these adventures always cause economic harm due to the economic costs. When the particular country or empire involved overreaches, as we are currently doing, national bankruptcy and a severely weakened currency call the whole process to a halt.

   The Soviet system, armed with an aggressive plan to spread its empire

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   Maintaining an overseas empire is incompatible with the American tradition of liberty and prosperity. The financial drain and the antagonism that it causes with our enemies, and even our friends, will finally force the American people to reject the policy outright. There will be no choice. Gorbachev just walked away and Yeltsin walked in, with barely a ripple. A nonviolent revolution of unbelievable historic magnitude occurred and the Cold War ended. We are not immune from such a similar change.

   This Soviet collapse ushered in the age of unparalleled American dominance over the entire world and along with it allowed the new expanded hot war between the West and the Muslim East. All the hostility directed toward the West built up over the centuries between the two factions is now directed toward the United States. We are now the only power capable of paying for and literally controlling the Middle East and its cherished wealth, and we have not hesitated. Iraq, with its oil and water and agricultural land, is a prime target of our desire to further expand our dominion. The battle is growing ever so tense with our acceptance and desire to control the Caspian Sea oil riches. But Russia, now licking its wounds and once again accumulating wealth, will not sit idly by and watch the American empire engulf this region. When time runs out for us, we can be sure Russia will once again be ready to fight for control of all those resources in countries adjacent to her borders. And expect the same from China and India. And who knows, maybe one day even Japan will return to the ancient art of using force to occupy the cherished territories in their region of the world.

   The most we can hope for will be, once the errors of our ways are acknowledged and we can no longer afford our militarism, we will reestablish the moral principle that underpins the policy of ``peace, commerce and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none.'' Our modern-day war hawks represent neither this American principle nor do they understand how the love of liberty drove the founders in their great battle against tyranny.

   We must prepare for the day when our financial bankruptcy and the failure of our effort at world domination are apparent. The solution to such a crisis can be easily found in our Constitution and in our traditions. But ultimately, the love of liberty can only come from a change in the hearts and minds of the people and with an answered prayer for the blessings of divine intervention.

2A)

2B)

3A) War Should Not Be First Instrument of Foreign Policy
Mr. DOGGETT. Mr. Speaker, overshadowing all of our hopes and dreams for our families and for our country is the daily talk of war. This Administration's apparent intent to launch a go-it-alone invasion of another country is unprecedented in American history, it is unprecedented in ignoring the warnings of military experts, it is unprecedented in rejecting the advice of our allies and, most importantly, unprecedented in the dangers posed for the safety of American families everywhere.

At one time ``regime change'' was the now-abandoned goal of our foreign policy toward an island 90 miles off our shores. Immediate success is even less certain for a regime on the other side of the world through a means uniformly rejected at present by the countries of the region. Of course, Saddam Hussein is a menace, as was Libya's Muammer Qaddafi, as was Josef Stalin. But able policymakers of both parties found ways to contain such threats without starting what could become another world war.

Mr. President, unite our country and the world to eliminate weapons of mass destruction ; do not divide us by making war the first instrument of your foreign policy.

3B) Weapons of Mass Destruction Civic Support Act of 2002
S. 2908. A bill to require the Secretary of Defense to establish at least one Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Team in each State, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Armed Services.

   Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, today, I am introducing the Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Act of 2002. This bill would require the Secretary of Defense to establish at least one Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Team, WMD-CST, in each State by September 30, 2003. The cost of establishing, training, equipping, and operating these new teams would be paid for from existing fiscal year 2003 resources, thus requiring no additional spending.

   I am pleased to be joined in this effort by Senators LEAHY, LIEBERMAN, KOHL, REID of Nevada, SARBANES, TORRICELLI, and JEFFORDS.

   WMD-CSTs are comprised of 22 full-time National Guard personnel who are specially trained and equipped to deploy and assess suspected nuclear, chemical, biological, or other threats

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   The emerging chemical, biological, and other threats of the 21st century present new challenges to our military and to local first responders. The WMD-CSTs play a vital role in assisting local first responders in investigating and combating these new threats. The September 11 terrorist attacks emphasize the need to have full-time WMD-CSTs in each State. As the events of that day so clearly and tragically demonstrated, local first responders are on the front lines of combating terrorism and responding to other large-scale incidents. As we rethink the security needs of our country, we should support the creation of an additional 23 full-time WMD-CSTs as soon as possible. Establishing these additional full-time teams will improve the overall capability of Wisconsin and the other 18 States with part-time teams to prepare for and respond to potential threats in the future.

   According to the National Guard Bureau, WMD-CSTs performed 694 operational missions between September 11, 2001, and August 26, 2002. These missions fall into three categories: ``response,'' ``standby,'' and ``assist.''

   Response missions occur when a team is deployed to sample a suspected or known hazardous substance. Since September 11, WMD-CSTs have deployed on 151 response missions, most of which were to investigate reports of suspicious white powder in the wake of the anthrax attacks of last fall. Other response missions included reports of the presence of unknown liquids or of suspicious pieces of mail.

   There have been 74 standby missions during this same time frame. On these missions, WMD-CSTs deploy to provide expertise to a specific community for the visit of a dignitary such as the President or a Governor, or for a large-scale event. In the past year, WMD-CSTs have been on standby for events including the Major League Baseball All-Star Game in Milwaukee, the 2002 Winter Olympics and Paralympics in Salt Lake City, the World Series, the Super Bowl, and Mardi Gras.

   Assist missions give WMD-CST members the opportunity to use their technical expertise to assist or provide advice to local first responders or other organizations and to participate in conferences and other events that focus on how to respond to attacks. In the past year, CSTs have performed 469 assist missions in support of local, State, and Federal agencies including law enforcement, hospitals, health departments, state emergency management agencies, the American Red Cross, the Coast Guard, the Secret Service, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug Enforcement Agency, and the United States Navy.

   As I noted earlier, a WMD-CST was deployed to be on standby during this year's baseball All-Star game, which took place in my home State. Because Wisconsin has only a part-time WMD-CST, the Minnesota team was deployed on a standby mission to Milwaukee for this event. The members of Wisconsin's part-time WMD-CST also participated in this deployment. According to the Wisconsin National Guard, if Wisconsin had a full-time team, deployment of the Minnesota team would not have been necessary.

   In light of the tragic events of September 11, the presence of at least one WMD-CST in each State is all the more imperative. These terrorist attacks, and the subsequent mobilization of tens of thousands of National Guardsmen and Reservists, also underscore the need to provide adequate resources for and to ensure full-time manning of the National Guard. As we move to establish at least one 22-member WMD-CST in each State, I call on the Pentagon to allocate the necessary resources to ensure adequate National Guard personnel end-strengths to provide for full-time manning and for the additional personnel necessary for these new teams.

   I am pleased that this bill is supported by the Wisconsin National Guard and by the National Guard Association of the United States.

   I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the RECORD.

   There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

   SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Team Act of 2002''.

   SEC. 2. ESTABLISHMENT OF AT LEAST ONE WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION CIVIL SUPPORT TEAM IN EACH STATE.

    (a) REQUIREMENT.--The Secretary of Defense shall ensure that there is established, by not later than September 30, 2003, at least one Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Team in each State.

    (b) DEFINITIONS.--In this section:

    (1) The term ``Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Team'' means a team that--

    (A) provides support for emergency preparedness programs to prepare for or to respond to any emergency involving the use of a weapon of mass destruction (as defined in section 1403 of the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 2302)); and

    (B) is composed of members of National Guard who are performing duties as members of the team under the authority of subsection (c) of section 12310 of title 10, United States Code, while serving on active duty as described in subsection (a) of such section or on full-time National Guard duty under section 502(f) of title 32, United States Code.

    (2) The term ``State'' includes the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and Guam.

    (c) FUNDING.--The costs of establishing Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams to comply with the requirement in subsection (a), and the costs of training and equipping the teams established to comply with such requirement, may be paid (to the extent properly allocable on the bases of purpose and period of availability) out of funds authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2003 for purposes as follows:

    (1) For the Army, for--

    (A) military personnel;

    (B) operation and maintenance;

    (C) other procurement; or

    (D) military construction.

    (2) For the Air Force for military personnel.

    (3) For the Department of Defense for the chemical and biological defense program.

   By Mr. SMITH of Oregon:

&

4A) Directorate of Science and Technology
SEC. 135. DIRECTORATE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY.

    (a) PURPOSE.--The purpose of this section is to establish a Directorate of Science and Technology that will support the mission of the Department and the directorates of the Department by--

    (1) establishing, funding, managing, and supporting research, development, demonstration, testing, and evaluation activities to meet national homeland security needs and objectives;

    (2) setting national research and development goals and priorities pursuant to the mission of the Department, and developing strategies and policies in furtherance of such goals and priorities;

    (3) coordinating and collaborating with other Federal departments and agencies, and State, local, academic, and private sector entities, to advance the research and development agenda of the Department;

    (4) advising the Secretary on all scientific and technical matters relevant to homeland security; and

    (5) facilitating the transfer and deployment of technologies that will serve to enhance homeland security goals.

    (b) DEFINITIONS.--In this section:

    (1) COUNCIL.--The term ``Council'' means the Homeland Security Science and Technology Council established under this section.

    (2) FUND.--The term ``Fund'' means the Acceleration Fund for Research and Development of Homeland Security Technologies established under this section.

    (3) HOMELAND SECURITY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT.--The term ``homeland security research and development'' means research and development applicable to the detection of, prevention of, protection against, response to, and recovery from homeland security threats, particularly acts of terrorism.

    (4) OSTP.--The term ``OSTP'' means the Office of Science and Technology Policy.

    (5) SARPA.--The term ``SARPA'' means the Security Advanced Research Projects Agency established under this section.

    (6) TECHNOLOGY ROADMAP.--The term ``technology roadmap'' means a plan or framework in which goals, priorities, and milestones for desired future technological capabilities and functions are established, and research and development alternatives or means for achieving those goals, priorities, and milestones are identified and analyzed in order to guide decisions on resource allocation and investments.

    (7) UNDER SECRETARY.--The term ``Under Secretary'' means the Under Secretary for Science and Technology.

    (c) DIRECTORATE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY.--

    (1) ESTABLISHMENT.--There is established a Directorate of Science and Technology within the Department.

    (2) UNDER SECRETARY.--There shall be an Under Secretary for Science and Technology, who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The principal responsibility of the Under Secretary shall be to effectively and efficiently carry out the purposes of the Directorate of Science and Technology under subsection (a). In addition, the Under Secretary shall undertake the following activities in furtherance of such purposes:

    (A) Coordinating with the OSTP, the Office, and other appropriate entities in developing and executing the research and development agenda of the Department.

    (B) Developing a technology roadmap that shall be updated biannually for achieving technological goals relevant to homeland security needs.

    (C) Instituting mechanisms to promote, facilitate, and expedite the transfer and deployment of technologies relevant to homeland security needs, including dual-use capabilities.

    (D) Assisting the Secretary and the Director of OSTP to ensure that science and technology priorities are clearly reflected and considered in the Strategy developed under title III.

    (E) Establishing mechanisms for the sharing and dissemination of key homeland security research and technology developments and opportunities with appropriate Federal, State, local, and private sector entities.

    (F) Establishing, in coordination with the Under Secretary for Critical Infrastructure Protection and the Under Secretary for Emergency Preparedness and Response and relevant programs under their direction, a National Emergency Technology Guard, comprised of teams of volunteers with expertise in relevant areas of science and technology, to assist local communities in responding to and recovering from emergency contingencies requiring specialized scientific and technical capabilities. In carrying out this responsibility, the Under Secretary shall establish and manage a database of National Emergency Technology Guard volunteers, and prescribe procedures for organizing, certifying, mobilizing, and deploying National Emergency Technology Guard teams.

    (G) Chairing the Working Group established under section 108 of the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-188).

    (H) Assisting the Secretary in developing the Strategy for Countermeasure Research described under subsection (k).

    (I) Assisting the Secretary and acting on behalf of the Secretary in contracting with, commissioning, or establishing federally funded research and development centers determined useful and appropriate by the Secretary for the purpose of providing the Department with independent analysis and support.

    (J) Assisting the Secretary and acting on behalf of the Secretary in entering into joint sponsorship agreements with the Department of Energy regarding the use of the national laboratories or sites.

    (K) Assisting and supporting the Secretary, in coordination with other Directorates and entities outside the Department, in conducting appropriate risk analysis and risk management activities consistent with the mission and functions of the Directorate.

    (L) Carrying out other appropriate activities as directed by the Secretary.

    (3) RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT-RELATED AUTHORITIES.--The Secretary shall exercise the following authorities relating to the research, development, testing, and evaluation activities of the Directorate of Science and Technology:

    (A) With respect to research and development expenditures under this section, the authority (subject to the same limitations and conditions) as the Secretary of Defense may exercise under section 2371 of title 10, United States Code (except for subsections (b) and (f)), for a period of 5 years beginning on the date of enactment of this Act. Competitive, merit-based selection procedures shall be used for the selection of projects and participants for transactions entered into under the authority of this paragraph. The annual report required under subsection (h) of such section, as applied to the Secretary by this subparagraph, shall--

    (i) be submitted to the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the Senate, the Committee on Government Reform of the House of Representatives, the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives; and

    (ii) report on other transactions entered into under subparagraph (B).

    (B) Authority to carry out prototype projects in accordance with the requirements and conditions provided for carrying out prototype projects under section 845 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 (Public Law 103-160), for a period of 5 years beginning on the date of enactment of this Act. In applying the authorities of such section 845, subsection (c) of that section shall apply with respect to prototype projects under this paragraph, and the Secretary shall perform the functions of the Secretary of Defense under subsection (d) of that section. Competitive, merit-based selection procedures shall be used for the selection of projects and participants for transactions entered into under the authority of this paragraph.

    (C) In hiring personnel to assist in research, development, testing, and evaluation activities within the Directorate of Science and Technology, the authority to exercise the personnel hiring and management authorities described in section 1101 of the

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    (D) With respect to such research, development, testing, and evaluation responsibilities under this section (except as provided in subparagraph (E)) as the Secretary may elect to carry out through agencies other than the Department (under agreements with their respective heads), the Secretary may transfer funds to such heads. Of the funds authorized to be appropriated under subsection (d)(4) for the Fund, not less than 10 percent of such funds for each fiscal year through 2005 shall be authorized only for the Under Secretary, through joint agreement with the Commandant of the Coast Guard, to carry out research and development of improved ports, waterways, and coastal security surveillance and perimeter protection capabilities for the purpose of minimizing the possibility that Coast Guard cutters, aircraft, helicopters, and personnel will be diverted from non-homeland security missions to the ports, waterways, and coastal security mission.

    (E) The Secretary may carry out human health biodefense-related biological, biomedical, and infectious disease research and development (including vaccine research and development) in collaboration with the Secretary of Health and Human Services. Research supported by funding appropriated to the National Institutes of Health for bioterrorism research and related facilities development shall be conducted through the National Institutes of Health under joint strategic prioritization agreements between the Secretary and the Secretary of Health and Human Services. The Secretary shall have the authority to establish general research priorities, which shall be embodied in the joint strategic prioritization agreements with the Secretary of Health and Human Services. The specific scientific research agenda to implement agreements under this subparagraph shall be developed by the Secretary of Health and Human Services, who shall consult the Secretary to ensure that the agreements conform with homeland security priorities. All research programs established under those agreements shall be managed and awarded by the Director of the National Institutes of Health consistent with those agreements. The Secretary may transfer funds to the Department of Health and Human Services in connection with those agreements.

    (d) ACCELERATION FUND.--

    (1) ESTABLISHMENT.--There is established an Acceleration Fund to support research and development of technologies relevant to homeland security.

    (2) FUNCTION.--The Fund shall be used to stimulate and support research and development projects selected by SARPA under subsection (f), and to facilitate the rapid transfer of research and technology derived from such projects.

    (3) RECIPIENTS.--Fund monies may be made available through grants, contracts, cooperative agreements, and other transactions under subsection (c)(3) (A) and (B) to--

    (A) public sector entities, including Federal, State, or local entities;

    (B) private sector entities, including corporations, partnerships, or individuals; and

    (C) other nongovernmental entities, including universities, federally funded research and development centers, and other academic or research institutions.

    (4) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.--There are authorized to be appropriated $200,000,000 for the Fund for fiscal year 2003, and such sums as are necessary in subsequent fiscal years.

    (e) SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COUNCIL.--

    (1) ESTABLISHMENT.--There is established the Homeland Security Science and Technology Council within the Directorate of Science and Technology. The Under Secretary shall chair the Council and have the authority to convene meetings. At the discretion of the Under Secretary and the Director of OSTP, the Council may be constituted as a subcommittee of the National Science and Technology Council.

    (2) COMPOSITION.--The Council shall be composed of the following:

    (A) Senior research and development officials representing agencies engaged in research and development relevant to homeland security and combating terrorism needs. Each representative shall be appointed by the head of the representative's respective agency with the advice and consent of the Under Secretary.

    (B) The Director of SARPA and other appropriate officials within the Department.

    (C) The Director of the OSTP and other senior officials of the Executive Office of the President as designated by the President.

    (3) RESPONSIBILITIES.--The Council shall--

    (A) provide the Under Secretary with recommendations on priorities and strategies, including those related to funding and portfolio management, for homeland security research and development;

    (B) facilitate effective coordination and communication among agencies, other entities of the Federal Government, and entities in the private sector and academia, with respect to the conduct of research and development related to homeland security;

    (C) recommend specific technology areas for which the Fund and other research and development resources shall be used, among other things, to rapidly transition homeland security research and development into deployed technology and reduce identified homeland security vulnerabilities;

    (D) assist and advise the Under Secretary in developing the technology roadmap referred to under subsection (c)(2)(B); and

    (E) perform other appropriate activities as directed by the Under Secretary.

    (4) ADVISORY PANEL.--The Under Secretary may establish an advisory panel consisting of representatives from industry, academia, and other non-Federal entities to advise and support the Council.

    (5) WORKING GROUPS.--At the discretion of the Under Secretary, the Council may establish working groups in specific homeland security areas consisting of individuals with relevant expertise in each articulated area. Working groups established for bioterrorism and public health-related research shall be fully coordinated with the Working Group established under section 108 of the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-188).

    (f) SECURITY ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY.--

    (1) ESTABLISHMENT.--There is established the Security Advanced Research Projects Agency within the Directorate of Science and Technology.

    (2) RESPONSIBILITIES.--SARPA shall--

    (A) undertake and stimulate basic and applied research and development, leverage existing research and development, and accelerate the transition and deployment of technologies that will serve to enhance homeland defense;

    (B) identify, fund, develop, and transition high-risk, high-payoff homeland security research and development opportunities that--

    (i) may lie outside the purview or capabilities of the existing Federal agencies; and

    (ii) emphasize revolutionary rather than evolutionary or incremental advances;

    (C) provide selected projects with single or multiyear funding, and require such projects to provide interim progress reports, no less often than annually;

    (D) administer the Acceleration Fund to carry out the purposes of this paragraph;

    (E) advise the Secretary and Under Secretary on funding priorities under subsection (c)(3)(E); and

    (F) perform other appropriate activities as directed by the Under Secretary.

    (g) OFFICE OF RISK ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT.--

    (1) ESTABLISHMENT.--There is established an Office of Risk Analysis and Assessment within the Directorate of Science and Technology.

    (2) FUNCTIONS.--The Office of Risk Analysis and Assessment shall assist the Secretary, the Under Secretary, and other Directorates with respect to their risk analysis and risk management activities by providing scientific or technical support for such activities. Such support shall include, as appropriate--

    (A) identification and characterization of homeland security threats;

    (B) evaluation and delineation of the risk of these threats;

    (C) pinpointing of vulnerabilities or linked vulnerabilities to these threats;

    (D) determination of criticality of possible threats;

    (E) analysis of possible technologies, research, and protocols to mitigate or eliminate threats, vulnerabilities, and criticalities;

    (F) evaluation of the effectiveness of various forms of risk communication; and

    (G) other appropriate activities as directed by the Secretary.

    (3) METHODS.--In performing the activities described under paragraph (2), the Office of Risk Analysis and Assessment may support or conduct, or commission from federally funded research and development centers or other entities, work involving modeling, statistical analyses, field tests and exercises (including red teaming), testbed development, development of standards and metrics.

    (h) OFFICE FOR TECHNOLOGY EVALUATION AND TRANSITION.--

    (1) ESTABLISHMENT.--There is established an Office for Technology Evaluation and Transition within the Directorate of Science and Technology.

    (2) FUNCTION.--The Office for Technology Evaluation and Transition shall, with respect to technologies relevant to homeland security needs--

    (A) serve as the principal, national point-of-contact and clearinghouse for receiving and processing proposals or inquiries regarding such technologies;

    (B) identify and evaluate promising new technologies;

    (C) undertake testing and evaluation of, and assist in transitioning, such technologies into deployable, fielded systems;

    (D) consult with and advise agencies regarding the development, acquisition, and deployment of such technologies;

    (E) coordinate with SARPA to accelerate the transition of technologies developed by SARPA and ensure transition paths for such technologies; and

    (F) perform other appropriate activities as directed by the Under Secretary.

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    (3) TECHNICAL SUPPORT WORKING GROUP.--The functions described under this subsection may be carried out through, or in coordination with, or through an entity established by the Secretary and modeled after, the Technical Support Working Group (organized under the April, 1982, National Security Decision Directive Numbered 30) that provides an interagency forum to coordinate research and development of technologies for combating terrorism.

    (i) OFFICE OF LABORATORY RESEARCH.--

    (1) ESTABLISHMENT.--There is established an Office of Laboratory Research within the Directorate of Science and Technology.

    (2) RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT FUNCTIONS TRANSFERRED.--There shall be transferred to the Department, to be administered by the Under Secretary, the functions, personnel, assets, and liabilities of the following programs and activities:

    (A) Within the Department of Energy (but not including programs and activities relating to the strategic nuclear defense posture of the United States) the following:

    (i) The chemical and biological national security and supporting programs and activities supporting domestic response of the nonproliferation and verification research and development program.

    (ii) The nuclear smuggling programs and activities, and other programs and activities directly related to homeland security, within the proliferation detection program of the nonproliferation and verification research and development program, except that the programs and activities described in this clause may be designated by the President either for transfer to the Department or for joint operation by the Secretary and the Secretary of Energy.

    (iii) The nuclear assessment program and activities of the assessment, detection, and cooperation program of the international materials protection and cooperation program.

    (iv) The Environmental Measurements Laboratory.

    (B) Within the Department of Defense, the National Bio-Weapons Defense Analysis Center established under section 161.

    (3) RESPONSIBILITIES.--The Office of Laboratory Research shall--

    (A) supervise the activities of the entities transferred under this subsection;

    (B) administer the disbursement and undertake oversight of research and development funds transferred from the Department to other agencies outside of the Department, including funds transferred to the Department of Health and Human Services consistent with subsection (c)(3)(E);

    (C) establish and direct new research and development facilities as the Secretary determines appropriate;

    (D) include a science advisor to the Under Secretary on research priorities related to biological and chemical weapons, with supporting scientific staff, who shall advise on and support research priorities with respect to--

    (i) research on countermeasures for biological weapons, including research on the development of drugs, devices, and biologics; and

    (ii) research on biological and chemical threat agents; and

    (E) other appropriate activities as directed by the Under Secretary.

    (j) OFFICE FOR NATIONAL LABORATORIES.--

    (1) ESTABLISHMENT.--There is established within the Directorate of Science and Technology an Office for National Laboratories, which shall be responsible for the coordination and utilization of the Department of Energy national laboratories and sites in a manner to create a networked laboratory system for the purpose of supporting the missions of the Department.

    (2) JOINT SPONSORSHIP ARRANGEMENTS.--

    (A) NATIONAL LABORATORIES.--The Department may be a joint sponsor, under a multiple agency sponsorship arrangement with the Department of Energy, of 1 or more Department of Energy national laboratories in the performance of work on behalf of the Department.

    (B) DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY SITE.--The Department may be a joint sponsor of Department of Energy sites in the performance of work as if such sites were federally funded research and development centers and the work were performed under a multiple agency sponsorship arrangement with the Department.

    (C) PRIMARY SPONSOR.--The Department of Energy shall be the primary sponsor under a multiple agency sponsorship arrangement entered into under subparagraph (A) or (B).

    (D) CONDITIONS.--A joint sponsorship arrangement under this subsection shall--

    (i) provide for the direct funding and management by the Department of the work being carried out on behalf of the Department; and

    (ii) include procedures for addressing the coordination of resources and tasks to minimize conflicts between work undertaken on behalf of either Department.

    (E) LEAD AGENT AND FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION.--

    (i) LEAD AGENT.--The Secretary of Energy shall act as the lead agent in coordinating the formation and performance of a joint sponsorship agreement between the Department and a Department of Energy national laboratory or site for work on homeland security.

    (ii) COMPLIANCE WITH FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION.--Any work performed by a national laboratory or site under this section shall comply with the policy on the use of federally funded research and development centers under section 35.017 of the Federal Acquisition Regulation.

    (F) FUNDING.--The Department shall provide funds for work at the Department of Energy national laboratories or sites, as the case may be, under this section under the same terms and conditions as apply to the primary sponsor of such national laboratory under section 303(b)(1)(C) of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 (41 U.S.C. 253 (b)(1)(C)) or of such site to the extent such section applies to such site as a federally funded research and development center by reason of subparagraph (B).

    (3) OTHER ARRANGEMENTS.--The Office for National Laboratories may enter into other arrangements with Department of Energy national laboratories or sites to carry out work to support the missions of the Department under applicable law, except that the Department of Energy may not charge or apply administrative fees for work on behalf of the Department.

    (4) TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER.--The Office for National Laboratories may exercise the authorities in section 12 of the Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980 (15 U.S.C. 3710a) to permit the Director of a Department of Energy national laboratory to enter into cooperative research and development agreements, or to negotiate licensing agreements, pertaining to work supported by the Department at the Department of Energy national laboratory.

    (5) ASSISTANCE IN ESTABLISHING DEPARTMENT.--At the request of the Under Secretary, the Department of Energy shall provide for the temporary appointment or assignment of employees of Department of Energy national laboratories or sites to the Department for purposes of assisting in the establishment or organization of the technical programs of the Department through an agreement that includes provisions for minimizing conflicts between work assignments of such personnel.

    (k) STRATEGY FOR COUNTERMEASURE RESEARCH.--

    (1) IN GENERAL.--The Secretary, acting through the Under Secretary for Science and Technology, shall develop a comprehensive, long-term strategy and plan for engaging non-Federal entities, particularly including private, for-profit entities, in the research, development, and production of homeland security countermeasures for biological, chemical, and radiological weapons.

    (2) TIMEFRAME.--The strategy and plan under this subsection, together with recommendations for the enactment of supporting or enabling legislation, shall be submitted to the Congress within 270 days after the date of enactment of this Act.

    (3) COORDINATION.--In developing the strategy and plan under this subsection, the Secretary shall consult with--

    (A) other agencies with expertise in research, development, and production of countermeasures;

    (B) private, for-profit entities and entrepreneurs with appropriate expertise and technology regarding countermeasures;

    (C) investors that fund such entities;

    (D) nonprofit research universities and institutions;

    (E) public health and other interested private sector and government entities; and

    (F) governments allied with the United States in the war on terrorism.

    (4) PURPOSE.--The strategy and plan under this subsection shall evaluate proposals to assure that--

    (A) research on countermeasures by non-Federal entities leads to the expeditious development and production of countermeasures that may be procured and deployed in the homeland security interests of the United States;

    (B) capital is available to fund the expenses associated with such research, development, and production, including Government grants and contracts and appropriate capital formation tax incentives that apply to non-Federal entities with and without tax liability;

    (C) the terms for procurement of such countermeasures are defined in advance so that such entities may accurately and reliably assess the potential countermeasures market and the potential rate of return;

    (D) appropriate intellectual property, risk protection, and Government approval standards are applicable to such countermeasures;

    (E) Government-funded research is conducted and prioritized so that such research complements, and does not unnecessarily duplicate, research by non-Federal entities and that such Government-funded research is made available, transferred, and licensed on commercially reasonable terms to such entities for development; and

    (F) universities and research institutions play a vital role as partners in research and development and technology transfer, with appropriate progress benchmarks for such activities, with for-profit entities.

    (5) REPORTING.--The Secretary shall report periodically to the Congress on the status of non-Federal entity countermeasure research, development, and production, and submit additional recommendations for legislation as needed.

    (l) CLASSIFICATION OF RESEARCH.--

    (1) IN GENERAL.--To the greatest extent practicable, research conducted or supported by the Department shall be unclassified.

    (2) CLASSIFICATION AND REVIEW.--The Under Secretary shall--

    (A)(i) decide whether classification is appropriate before the award of a research

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    (ii) if the decision under clause (i) is one of classification, control the research results through standard classification procedures; and

    (B) periodically review all classified research grants, contracts, cooperative agreements, and other transactions issued by the Department to determine whether classification is still necessary.

    (3) RESTRICTIONS.--No restrictions shall be placed upon the conduct or reporting of federally funded fundamental research that has not received national security classification, except as provided under applicable provisions of law.

    (m) OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY.--The National Science and Technology Policy, Organization, and Priorities Act is amended--

    (1) in section 204(b)(1) (42 U.S.C. 6613(b)(1)), by inserting ``homeland security,'' after ``national security,''; and

    (2) in section 208(a)(1) (42 U.S.C. 6617(a)(1)), by inserting ``the National Office for Combating Terrorism,'' after ``National Security Council,''.

   SEC. 136. DIRECTORATE OF IMMIGRATION AFFAIRS.

    The Directorate of Immigration Affairs shall be established and shall carry out all functions of that Directorate in accordance with division B of this Act.

4B) National Bio-Weapons Defense Analysis Center
SEC. 161. NATIONAL BIO-WEAPONS DEFENSE ANALYSIS CENTER.
(a) ESTABLISHMENT.--There is established within the Department of Defense a National Bio-Weapons Defense Analysis Center (in this section referred to as the ``Center'').
(b) MISSION.--The mission of the Center is to develop countermeasures to potential attacks by terrorists using biological or chemical weapons that are weapons of mass destruction (as defined under section 1403 of the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 2302(1))) and conduct research and analysis concerning such weapons.

4C) Statement of Justification Regarding Australia Group
To the Congress of the United States:

Consistent with the resolution of advice and consent to ratification of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, adopted by the Senate of the United States on April 24, 1997, I hereby certify pursuant to Condition 7(C)(i), Effectiveness of the Australia Group, that:
Australia Group members continue to maintain equally effective or more comprehensive controls over the export of: toxic chemicals and their precursors; dual-use processing equipment; human, animal, and plant pathogens and toxins with potential biological weapons applications; and dual-use biological equipment, as that afforded by the Australia Group as of April 25, 1997; and

The Australia Group remains a viable mechanism for limiting the spread of chemical and biological weapons--related materials and technology, and the effectiveness of the Australia Group has not been undermined by changes in membership, lack of compliance with common export controls and nonproliferation measures, or the weakening of common controls and nonproliferation measures, in force as of April 25, 1997.

The factors underlying this certification are described in the enclosed statement of justification.

George W. Bush.
The White House, September 4, 2002.

5A) Homeland Security Act of 2002
SA 4471. Mr. LIEBERMAN submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill H.R. 5005, to establish the Department of Homeland Security, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

    Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following:

   SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``National Homeland Security and Combating Terrorism Act of 2002''.

   SEC. 2. ORGANIZATION OF ACT INTO DIVISIONS; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

    (a) DIVISIONS.--This Act is organized into 3 divisions as follows:

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    (1) Division A--National Homeland Security and Combating Terrorism.

    (2) Division B--Immigration Reform, Accountability, and Security Enhancement Act of 2002.

    (3) Division C--Federal Workforce Improvement.

    (b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.--The table of contents for this Act is as follows:

   Sec..1..Short title.

   Sec..2..Organization of Act into divisions; table of contents.

   DIVISION A--NATIONAL HOMELAND SECURITY AND COMBATING TERRORISM

   Sec..100..Definitions.

   TITLE I--DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

   Subtitle A--Establishment of the Department of Homeland Security

   Sec..101..Establishment of the Department of Homeland Security.

   Sec..102..Secretary of Homeland Security.

   Sec..103..Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security.

   Sec..104..Under Secretary for Management.

   Sec..105..Assistant Secretaries.

   Sec..106..Inspector General.

   Sec..107..Chief Financial Officer.

   Sec..108..Chief Information Officer.

   Sec..109..General Counsel.

   Sec..110..Civil Rights Officer.

   Sec..111..Privacy Officer.

   Sec..112..Chief Human Capital Officer.

   Sec..113..Office of International Affairs.

   Sec..114..Executive Schedule positions.

   Subtitle B--Establishment of Directorates and Offices

   Sec..131..Directorate of Border and Transportation Protection.

   Sec..132..Directorate of Intelligence.

   Sec..133..Directorate of Critical Infrastructure Protection.

   Sec..134..Directorate of Emergency Preparedness and Response.

   Sec..135..Directorate of Science and Technology.

   Sec..136..Directorate of Immigration Affairs.

   Sec..137..Office for State and Local Government Coordination.

   Sec..138..United States Secret Service.

   Sec..139..Border Coordination Working Group.

   Sec..140..Executive Schedule positions.

   Subtitle C--National Emergency Preparedness Enhancement

   Sec..151..Short title.

   Sec..152..Preparedness information and education.

   Sec..153..Pilot program.

   Sec..154..Designation of National Emergency Preparedness Week.

   Subtitle D--Miscellaneous Provisions

   Sec..161..National Bio-Weapons Defense Analysis Center.

   Sec..162..Review of food safety.

   Sec..163..Exchange of employees between agencies and State or local governments.

   Sec..164..Whistleblower protection for Federal employees who are airport security screeners.

   Sec..165..Whistleblower protection for certain airport employees.

   Sec..166..Bioterrorism preparedness and response division.

   Sec..167..Coordination with the Department of Health and Human Services under the Public Health Service Act.

   Sec..168..Rail security enhancements.

   Sec..169..Grants for firefighting personnel.

   Sec..170..Review of transportation security enhancements.

   Sec..171..Interoperability of information systems.

   Sec..172..Extension of customs user fees.

   Subtitle E--Transition Provisions

   Sec..181..Definitions.

   Sec..182..Transfer of agencies.

   Sec..183..Transitional authorities.

   Sec..184..Incidental transfers and transfer of related functions.

   Sec..185..Implementation progress reports and legislative recommendations.

   Sec..186..Transfer and allocation.

   Sec..187..Savings provisions.

   Sec..188..Transition plan.

   Sec..189..Use of appropriated funds.

   Subtitle F--Administrative Provisions

   Sec..191..Reorganizations and delegations.

   Sec..192..Reporting requirements.

   Sec..193..Environmental protection, safety, and health requirements.

   Sec..194..Labor standards.

   Sec..195..Procurement of temporary and intermittent services.

   Sec..196..Preserving non-homeland security mission performance.

   Sec..197..Future Years Homeland Security Program.

   Sec..198..Protection of voluntarily furnished confidential information.

   Sec..199..Authorization of appropriations.

   TITLE II--NATIONAL OFFICE FOR COMBATING TERRORISM

   Sec..201..National Office for Combating Terrorism.

   Sec..202..Funding for Strategy programs and activities.

   TITLE III--NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COMBATING TERRORISM AND THE HOMELAND SECURITY RESPONSE

   Sec..301..Strategy.

   Sec..302..Management guidance for Strategy implementation.

   Sec..303..National Combating Terrorism Strategy Panel.

   TITLE IV--LAW ENFORCEMENT POWERS OF INSPECTOR GENERAL AGENTS

   Sec..401..Law enforcement powers of Inspector Ge