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1A) The So-Called Moscow Treaty
THE SO-CALLED MOSCOW TREATY -- (Senate - March 04, 2003)

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   Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I understand that perhaps today or tomorrow we will have a so-called Moscow Treaty brought to the floor of the Senate for debate. It is a treaty that has its origin in some discussions between our Presidents and the leader of Russia about the issue of nuclear arms and the reduction of nuclear arms.

   I want to say I will vote for this treaty, although I must say it is not much of an agreement and not much of a treaty at all. I don't see any reason someone would vote against it. But I make the point that this is an agreement between two countries--both of which have large stocks of nuclear weapons--to reduce their number of nuclear weapons by taking some and putting them in warehouses and storage facilities and at the end of the process both countries can keep the same number of nuclear weapons they had when they started.

   No nuclear weapons under this agreement will be destroyed, dismantled, or defused.

   And This treaty deals with only strategic nuclear weapons, not theater nuclear weapons. There are thousands and thousands of theater nuclear weapons, such as the nuclear weapons that go on the tips of artillery shells. That is not part of this agreement. It has nothing to do with this agreement.

   Strategic nuclear weapons are the very large warheads that one would put on the tip of an ICBM, for example, or to have in the belly of a bomber, or perhaps on the tip of a missile that is in a submarine.

   Those are the strategic nuclear weapons.

   Between our country and Russia, there are perhaps 10,000, maybe 11,000, strategic nuclear weapons. So you have thousands on each side. Should we be reducing them? Of course. Absolutely.

   But we have a circumstance now where there is a treaty, or an agreement, with Moscow in which, between now and the year 2012, we all the US and Russia have to do is take nuclear weapons and put them in storage. So each side, in the year 2012, can keep if it wants exactly the same number of nuclear weapons. Not one nuclear weapon that exists today needs to be destroyed in the next 9 years--none.

   I do not understand that. I guess it is fine to have agreements just for the sake of having agreements, but of what value?

   We have had examples of effective reductions of nuclear weapons and also delivery vehicles. I have mentioned them in the Chamber on many occasions. Let me do so again.

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   There is a program called the Nunn-Lugar Program, which is named after former Senator Sam Nunn and our current distinguished colleague, Senator Lugar. It is a program that I very strongly support. It makes a great deal of sense. That program actually destroys nuclear warheads and delivery systems that are made excess through the various arms control treaties.

   For example, in my desk I have a piece of metal which I would like to show by unanimous consent.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

   Mr. DORGAN. This piece of metal belonged to a Soviet bomber. This was part of a wing strut on a Soviet bomber. Presumably, this bomber, belonging to the Soviet Union, carried nuclear weapons that could have been dropped on a target here in the United States of America.

   How is it that a Senator on the floor of the Senate has a metal piece from a Soviet bomber? Well, simple. This bomber had its wings sawed off and its fuselage destroyed. How? The U.S. paid for it. We did not shoot the bomber down. This was not the result of hostilities. This was the result of an agreement between our country and the old Soviet Union, now Russia, to actually reduce delivery vehicles, bombers, missiles, submarines, and to actually reduce the number of nuclear weapons.

   So that is how I come to hold in my hand a piece of metal that belonged to a Soviet bomber, and then Russian bomber, that would carry nuclear weapons that would have threatened this country.

   Mr. President, I show you this little tube of ground copper. This used to be in a submarine that carried nuclear weapons on behalf of the old Soviet Union and then Russia. Those nuclear weapons were all aimed at this country, thousands of them. Well, this submarine does not carry nuclear weapons anymore. It was dismantled and destroyed. And I have here, on the floor of the Senate, a piece of ground up copper from the wiring of an old Soviet submarine.

   That makes a lot of sense to me. We are actually reducing the threat by reducing the number of delivery vehicles, bombers, submarines, missiles, and dismantling the number of warheads.

   We have been engaged in that for the last 10 years or so. And I would like to especially say my colleagues, Senator Lugar and Senator Nunn, proposed a program by which we did not have to sink a Soviet submarine and we did not have to shoot down a Soviet bomber in order to destroy weapons of mass destruction

   and their delivery vehicles. We paid for their destruction with large circular saws and with devices in shipyards that destroyed their submarine by agreement.

   By contrast, the agreement that comes to the floor of the Senate this week is kind of a marshmallow. It does not do anything. It is full of air. It says: Oh, let's have each side put more of their nuclear weapons in storage and then pretend we have reduced the number of nuclear weapons. Well, I thought pretend was all about children's books; it is not about the serious business of nuclear arms control.

   There was a rumor, some long while ago, that a terrorist organization had stolen a nuclear weapon and was set to detonate it in a U.S. city. The interesting thing about that rumor was that the intelligence community did not view it as incredible that a nuclear weapon could have been stolen. After all, there where thousands and thousands and thousands in the world, most possessed by two countries--ours and also now Russia.

   So our intelligence community did not believe it was an incredible threat. They believed it was entirely possible someone could have stolen a weapon, particularly from the Russian arsenal that does not have great command and control, I have heard and I have been told. And secondly, it was not something beyond the bounds of reality that, having stolen a nuclear weapon, a terrorist organization would know how to detonate it or could detonate it.

   If ever there needed to be a sober moment, that was it.

   For us to think that the potential stealing of one nuclear weapon, and put in the wrong hands--the hands of terrorists--would threaten this country, or any city in this country, ought to lead us to understand that if we are worried about one nuclear weapon, we ought to be worried about thousands and thousands and thousands of nuclear weapons.

   With both strategic and theater nuclear weapons, there are perhaps as many as 25,000 to 30,000 nuclear weapons in this world. And what are we going to do this week? We are going to come and talk about how we shuffle the inventory of nuclear weapons from one place to another, destroying none of them, and then saying: We have an agreement. What a great agreement. By the year 2012, we will have moved nuclear weapons into storage facilities. And the world is safer.

   Oh, really? How?

   At the same time all of this is occurring, there is a fundamental shift occurring, in addition, with respect to the discussion about nuclear weapons. This administration says: We do not want to continue the antiballistic missile treaty--which has been the center pole of the tent of arms control.

   Instead, this administration says: We want to talk about and consider the possibility of developing new designer nuclear weapons; for example, bunker buster nuclear weapons.

   This administration, and many in this Congress--too many in this Senate--said: We do not support the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty--despite the fact that we have not tested a nuclear weapon for well over a decade.

   There is a fundamental shift going on. This administration has said: We have not ruled out the use of nuclear weapons in certain circumstances. I will not go into them, but they have been in the newspapers.

   I think our responsibility--of all countries in the world--is to be a leader in trying to reduce the number of nuclear weapons in this world, and to try to convince everyone and anyone that no one shall ever again explode a nuclear weapon in anger.

   Pakistan and India both have nuclear weapons. They do not like each other. They have been exchanging weapons fire across the border with respect to Kashmir. Both have nuclear weapons. Do we want, in any way, to signal that the use of nuclear weapons, in any circumstance, is appropriate? Do we want to signal that we actually have a desire to begin producing new types of nuclear weapons, such as bunker buster nuclear weapons?

   I think this country has chosen the wrong path with respect to these policies. We ought to be debating on the floor of the Senate something that has grip to it, something that says: Look, as a world leader, it is our determination to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, and to stop the spread now. And we are going to do that.

   We ought to be saying: It is our judgment that we want to reduce the stockpile of nuclear weapons in this world. And we want to be a leader in doing that. We just have to assume that leadership responsibility.

1B) Time for America to Slow Down and Consider Its Options
Mr. BLUMENAUER. Mr. Speaker, the recent cavalcade of events surrounding the actions of the United States in Iraq and other foreign affairs has compounded the apprehension that many have felt these last 8 months. It is time for the United States collectively to slow down, take a deep breath, step back and consider our options.

   Comments I have received from constituents at home, from my Web site, as well as just simply reading the many conflicting poll results, suggest that most Americans would appreciate a reflective pause.

   Terrorism is the greatest threat to Americans at home and abroad, despite the recent obsession with Iraq . Notwithstanding the performance by the Department of Homeland Security, which resembled a ``Saturday Night Live'' skit with talk of duct tape and plastic, terrorism is still serious business.

   I am not opposed to the United States using force when appropriate. I think most of us now wish we had done so to deal with the genocide in Rwanda. Previously, I supported military action in the Balkans when some of the

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   It is clear that we have mishandled the northern situation; that we have been less than diligent with Pakistan; that we have missed opportunities to retire weapons and nuclear material from the former Soviet Union. Moreover, the administration clearly did not provide adequate money for reconstructing Afghanistan in its most recent budget.

   It is in an effort to highlight this situation that I have chosen to cosponsor a resolution offered by my colleague, the gentleman from Oregon (Mr. DeFazio), to rescind Congress' authorization of force passed last year. Even though this proposal is unlikely to be approved by the House, it is important to send the right signal to the administration. It is not too late to be more strategic and to learn from our past mistakes.

   Most important, especially if we are going to follow the route the administration is pursuing, a proper foundation is critical. If we expect multilateral cooperation and accountability from our friends, allies, and other world powers, we must demonstrate those characteristics ourselves. It would be outrageous if, as part of a deal with Turkey to secure their support, we end up selling out the Kurds in Iraq , the only people that have a modicum of self-determination.

   Should we go to war, the American people are unprepared by the administration for the probable consequences of the inevitable United States short-term victory. Even supporters of the Bush policy admit that a post-Saddam situation in Iraq will very likely resemble Yugoslavia without Tito. There, after hundreds of thousands of lives were lost and billions of dollars spent, we still have 20,000 troops in the Balkans and the region remains a basket case. Our past actions should give people pause.

   The United States gains little by rushing to war with Iraq . We should continue to work with our allies, pursue a program of coercive inspections, and marshall a much broader coalition in support of our effort.

   Just as critically, we must try to stop the situation with North Korea from spinning out of control while reconnecting with South Korea. More time and money and effort should be expended on the Nunn-Lugar program to invest in decommissions of weapons of mass destruction in the former Soviet Union. Pakistan and its activities with the North Koreans and potential links to terrorists need to be elevated in our awareness and policy issues. Nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction are much less likely to come from Iraq than they are from North Korea, from dissident elements in Pakistan, or remnants of the former Soviet Union.

   Most important, we need to acknowledge that the threats posed to America at home and abroad come primarily from terrorism. We should provide resources for the cash-strapped States and localities that have been dealing every day since September 11 with the consequences and potential for terrorism at home. This is beyond homeland security, this is hometown security, and deserves priority.

   Our actions overseas should be appraised carefully as to the impact on our efforts to track down terrorists and prevent future attacks. It is important that the administration and Congress level with the American people that this is an expensive, arduous, complex task. It will require money, commitment, and, most important, patience over the long haul.

   We certainly should be clear about the costs of any action in Iraq , and prepare the American public for the likely consequences our policy will have in that volatile part of the world. Americans may be conflicted about Iraq and anxious as to terrorism, but I know they are willing, as never before in my lifetime, to come together for the protection of their communities and the greater good of our country and peace in the world. Should we not take advantage of their interest and intention, we will regret this lost opportunity for years to come.

1C) Compliance Report on Moscow Treaty
SA 250. Mr. DURBIN proposed an amendment to the resolution of ratification for Treaty Doc. 107-8, The Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions, Signed at Moscow on May 24, 2002; as follows:

    At the end of section 2, add the following new condition:

    (3) COMPLIANCE REPORT.--Not later than 60 days after the exchange of instruments of ratification of the Treaty, and annually thereafter on April 15, the President shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate a report on the compliance of the President with the requirements of condition (a)(8) of the resolution of ratification of the Treaty on Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, with Annexes, Protocols, and Memorandum of Understanding, signed at Moscow on July 31, 1991 (START Treaty), which states that ``[in] as much as the prospect of a loss of control of nuclear weapons or fissile material in the former Soviet Union could pose a serious threat to the United States and to international peace and security, in connection with any further agreement reducing strategic offensive arms, the President shall seek an appropriate arrangement, including the use of reciprocal inspections, data exchanges, and other cooperative measures, to monitor (A) the numbers of nuclear stockpile weapons on the territory of the parties to [the START Treaty]; and (B) the location and inventory of facilities on the territory of the parties to [the START Treaty] capable of producing or processing significant quantities of fissile materials''.

1D) Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions
THE TREATY ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE REDUCTIONS -- (Senate - March 05, 2003)

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   Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I understand that the remaining time is Republican time. I am going to go ahead and start making some comments. We are doing some checking. Maybe I will ask unanimous consent to get some time for my colleague from Oregon. In the meantime, I will go ahead and start my comments.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Colorado is recognized.

   Mr. ALLARD. I thank the Chair. I appreciate the opportunity to add my thoughts to this body's consideration of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions, otherwise known as the Moscow Treaty. My understanding is that this afternoon it will be brought before the Senate. We are at a pivotal moment in our country's history. In many ways, the Senate's advise and consent to this treaty will mark the end of an era of hostility and the beginning of an age of cooperation.

   It is more than a document; it is a signal to the world that the United States and Russia have moved beyond a relationship of conflict and brinkmanship to a relationship of mutual respect and shared values.

   We all remember the super-power rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union, which lasted over 45 years. I believe it is important for this debate to recall the tension and hostility that accompanies that time so that we may fully appreciate what this treaty symbolizes for the future of U.S.-Russian relations.

   In 1947, a little-known foreign service officer named George Kennan under the pseudonym `X' wrote an essay that was published in Foreign Affairs journal that was to define our approach to the Soviet Union for the next fifty years. In his essay, he described the Soviet ideology as the belief in the ``basic badness of capitalism, in the inevitability of its destruction, in the obligation of the proletariat to assist in that destruction and to take power into its own hands.''

   This ideological bent would manifest itself, Mr. Kennan predicted, in an ``innate antagonism'' between the Soviet Union and Western world. He said that we should expect secretiveness, a lack of frankness, duplicity, a wary suspiciousness, and the basic unfriendliness of purpose. Mr. Kennan warned us that the Soviet government might sign documents that might indicate a deviation from this ideology, but that we should regard such actions as a ``tactical maneuver permissible in dealing with the enemy (who is without honor) and should be taken in the spirit of caveat emptor''. As we discovered in the decades following, Mr. Kennan was right.

   The Soviet Union did indeed devote itself to exporting its ideology around the world. Its foreign policy was marked by antagonistic rhetoric and provocative actions. It signed arms control agreements and then violated them. The Soviet Union invaded its neighbors, launched proxy wars, and encouraged revolution and instability. It repeatedly proved capable of exploiting weakness and political divisions. And it was successful at taking advantage of geopolitical realities. As a result, Angola, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Cuba, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras, Granada, Vietnam, Korea, Somalia, Yemen, Greece, and Turkey all become Cold War battlegrounds.

   For the most part, the United States followed Mr. Kennan's advice. We strove to contain Soviet expansionist tendencies. We forced back Soviet advances. We were firm. We were patient. And, in 1991, with the fall of the Soviet Union, our patience paid off.

   It is important that we recognize that the Russia of today is nothing like the Soviet Union of yesterday. Under the leadership of President Putin, economic and political reforms are being enacted. Russia is no longer bound by a defunct ideology. The country has stepped away from its past and has worked with sincerity to help resolve many of the challenges facing the international community.

   Russia has also sought to improve its relationship with the Western world. It went eventually along with inclusion of the Baltic states into the NATO Alliance, despite harboring deep concerns. Russia accepted our withdrawal from the Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty. After September 11, Russia assisted the United States in the war against terrorism by sharing intelligence information and raising no objection to the stationing of U.S. troops in the former Soviet states in Central Asia. Once inconceivable, it is now possible to imagine Russia joining the World Trade Organization and even NATO in the near future.

   Another sign of improved relations between the U.S. and Russia is the treaty currently before us. The Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions is much different from arms control treaties agreed to during the Cold War. The text of treaty epitomizes this new relationship. Both parties pledge to:

   Embark upon the path of new relations for a new century and committed the goal of strengthening their relationship through cooperation and friendship.

   Believe that new global challenges and threats require the building of a qualitatively new foundation for strategic relations between the Parties.

   Desire to establish a genuine partnership based on the principles of mutual security, cooperation, trust, openness, and predictability.

   The Joint Declaration by Presidents Bush and Putin that accompanied the treaty further expounds upon this new relationship. Let me read a couple of pertinent sections from that declaration:

   We are achieving a new strategic relationship. The era in which the United States and Russia saw each other as an enemy or strategic threat has ended. We are partners and we will cooperate to advance stability, security, and economic integration, and to jointly global challenges and to help resolve regional conflicts.

   We will respect the essential values of democracy, human rights, free speech and free media,tolerance, the rule of law, and economic opportunity.

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   We recognize that the security, prosperity, and future hopes of our peoples rest on a benign security environment, the advancement of political and economic freedoms, and international cooperation.

   What is most notable about the Moscow Treaty as submitted to this body is the absence of certain provisions that normally marked Cold War era arms control treaties. Those provisions were based on distrust and antagonism. Instead, this treaty utilizes confidence-building measures based on trust and friendship.

   For instance, the treaty does not establish interim warhead reduction goals or provide a detailed schedule for the reductions. The absence of such goals or schedules gives both sides flexibility over the next nine years to reduce their warheads at a pace of their own choosing.

   Another missing element is precise counting rules. The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty of 1991 provided such complex counting rules that it frequently resulted in overcounting and undercounting. Minor disparities in deployed and ``counting'' forces are no longer a significant issue given the confidence building measures included in the treaty and our positive relationship with Russia.

   It should be noted that the Moscow Treaty does continue the START I verification regime, which permits on site inspections and continuous monitoring. The Moscow treaty also creates a new Bilateral Implementation Commission that will be used to any raise concerns that might arise about treaty compliance and transparency. These measures, plus our own technical means, will provide the U.S. government with significant confidence that it can monitor Russia's activities.

   The Moscow Treaty is similar to previous arms control agreements in one significant way: it does not require the dismantlement of warheads. Neither Russia nor the United States sought the dismantlement for two reasons. First, the dismantlement in the past has been considered inherently unverifiable. There is no established process for dismantling warheads that can provide assurance to each party.

   Second, the U.S. intends to keep some warheads in ``ready reserve.'' Such a reserve is essential if we are to retain the capability to respond to changes in the security environment and quickly replace dysfunctional warheads.

   I also think it is instructive to look at the process by which the Moscow Treaty was put together and how different these negotiations were from negotiations that occurred during the cold war. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld remarked on the difference during a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing last July. Here is what he said:

   ..... it's significant that while we consulted closely and engaged in a process that had been open and transparent, we did not engage in lengthy adversarial negotiations in which U.S. and Russia would keep thousands of warheads that we didn't need, as bargaining chips. We did not establish standing negotiating teams in Geneva with armies of arms control aficionados ready to do battle over every colon and every comma....... An illustration of how far we have come is the START treaty....... It is 700 pages long, and it took nine years to negotiate....... The Moscow treaty ..... is three pages long and it took five or six months to negotiate.

   Let's take a few moments to review some of the Moscow treaty's provisions. The treaty requires the reduction of strategic nuclear warheads by each party to a level of 1,700-2,200 by the end of 2012. Each side currently has about 6,000 warheads. This treaty means a reduction of over 8,000 nuclear warheads.

   The treaty allows both parties to restructure their offensive forces as each sees fit, within the prescribed numerical limit. This provision gives each flexibility to meet the deadline and permit each party to determine for itself the composition and structure of its strategic offensive arms.

   The Treaty mandates that the parties will meet at least twice a year as part of a Bilateral Implementations Commission.

   The Treaty allows each party, in exercising national sovereignty, the ability to withdraw from the treaty upon three months written notice.

   As you can see, the treaty is simple, straight-forward, and gives each party maximum flexibility.

   Last summer, the Senate Armed Services Committee held two important hearings on the national security implications of the treaty. Witnesses included: Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Richard Myers; Combatant Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, Admiral James Ellis; and Deputy Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration of the Department of Energy, Dr. Everet H. Beckner. The witnesses at the Committee hearings unanimously supported ratification of the Moscow Treaty. The Chairman of the Joint chiefs, General Myers said,

   The members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and I all support the Moscow Treaty. We believe it provides for the long-term security interests of our nation. We also believe that it preserves our flexibility in an uncretain strategic environment.

   Admiral Ellis added that,

   This treaty allows me, as the Commander of the nation's Strategic Forces, the latitude to structure our strategic forces to better support the national security pillars of assuring our allies, dissuading those who might wish us ill, deterring potential adversaries and, if necessary, defending the nation....... [I]n my judgment, this treaty provides me the ability to prudently meet those national security needs and to provide a range of deterrent options to the Secretary and the President for their consideration should the need arise.......

   I believe it is important to recognize the flexibility that this treaty gives the United States. While the U.S. nuclear stockpile may contain a large number of warheads, we only have six types of warheads, and none of these have been tested in over a decade. The average age of warheads in the U.S. stockpile is approaching 20 years--and some warheads are much older. Despite the improved effectiveness of the stockpile stewardship program, problems in the stockpile do occur. Having the responsive reserve, as envisioned by the administration, enables us to address problems in the stockpile without compromising our national security interests. This treaty is simple, flexible, and makes sense. It is a signal that the hostility of the cold war has been buried and forgotten. It has been 12 years since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and clearly it is time to move one.

   As we consider this treaty, we should also keep the future in mind. I share Secretary Rumsfeld's vision for future negotiations with Russia as he described it at July 26 Armed Services Committee hearing. He said,

   We are working towards the day when the relationship between our two countries is such that no arms control treaties will be necessary. that's how normal countries deal with each other. The United States and Britain both have nuclear weapons, yet we do not spend hundreds of hours negotiating the fine details of mutual reductions in our offensive systems. We do not feel the need to preserve the balance of terror between us. It would be a worthy goal for our relationship with Russia to evolve along that path.

   I could not agree more with the Defense Secretary's vision. Russia and the United States are no longer adversaries and therefore should not treat each other as such.

   I understand that my good friend, Senator JOHN WARNER, Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, has written to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee expressing his strong support for the Moscow treaty. I join him in that support. I believe the Senate should provide its advice and consent to the ratification of the treaty with no further changes or additional conditions to the resolution of ratification.

   Some of my colleagues may offer well-intentioned amendments that might attempt to add reservations, understandings, or declarations. I appreciate their desire to amend the treaty, but I think we should keep in mind that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee unanimously approved this treaty without amendment, and the resolution of ratification before us today has only tow modest conditions. The President has indicated his opposition to any amendment to the resolution. Therefore, I encourage my colleagues to oppose all amendments. I believe it would be best for our nation security interests if this treaty remained unencumbered by items that will complicate the treaty and reduce our flexibility.

   Mr. President, I thank you for the opportunity to share my views on this important treaty. I look forward to a healthy debate on this issue. I yield the floor.

   I suggest the absence of a quorum.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

   The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

   Mr. WYDEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. ALLARD). Without objection, it is so ordered.

   Mr. WYDEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak for up to 15 minutes on the time the Democrats have with respect to the Estrada nomination.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

   Mr. WYDEN. Thank you very much, Mr. President, for your courtesy earlier in the morning.

1E) Moscow Treaty

   Mr. FRIST. Madam President, the treaty we consider today, known officially as the treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on strategic reductions, is truly remarkable in many respects.

   The treaty is, of course, remarkable because it encompasses the most dramatic reductions in strategic nuclear weapons ever envisioned between two nuclear powers. It is also worth noting that not since 1954 have the two parties held such a low number of strategic nuclear weapons as that which will be enforced by the agreed numerical limits of this treaty.

   Many have observed the extraordinary ease by which this treaty was negotiated and compare its three short pages--indeed, it is just three short pages--to the many thousands of pages of documents negotiated between the United States and the Soviet Union during the cold war.

   This last point is, for me, the most significant of all, for as important as the substance of this treaty is, it is the form--the trust between the United States and Russia--that most shines through.

   Perhaps this treaty should be known by the epitaph: ``Cold War RIP,''

   for it is not unreasonable to hope that this treaty represents and indeed reflects the close of a long era of hostility between these two nations.

   In the past few weeks, I and many of my colleagues have had the opportunity to meet with a variety of Russian Government officials who have become regular and welcome visitors in

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   The United States and Russia are entering a new era of relations. Our two nations confront many of the same challenges in today's world, and we have found common cause in responding to the immediate threat of international terrorism. Intelligence sharing and joint action between our two governments has made both of our countries much safer. We seek broader cooperation between our institutions of government, and to that end, I am hopeful the Senate will be able to enter into a deep and longstanding relationship with the upper House of the Russian legislature, the Federation Council. This indeed will build on the excellent work that was initiated and done by my distinguished colleague in the Senate, Senator Lott from Mississippi.

   Finally, we seek to advance the growing economic relationship between our two countries. Toward that end, I will strongly support legislation to permanently remove the Russian Federation from the Jackson-Vanik agreement.

   I thank Senators LUGAR and BIDEN for their fine efforts to bring this treaty to the Senate floor in a timely manner. When this treaty was submitted to the Senate, the administration set the not unreasonable expectation that the resolution of ratification not exceed the treaty in length. The committee has indeed met that goal in providing the Senate with a well-crafted resolution of ratification that nonetheless addresses several key elements of Senate prerogative.

   I congratulate Chairman LUGAR and Senator Biden for their fine work.

   Finally, I trust that all Senators have indeed had time to review the committee report on the treaty. It is my hope those who wish to discuss it will do the managers the courtesy of coming forth to speak. Although amendments are in order, I think it would be a worthy tribute to the work of the Foreign Relations Committee to support this resolution in its current form. I look forward to its approval.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.

   Mr. LUGAR. Madam President, I thank the distinguished majority leader for his thoughtful commendation of the work of our committee. I appreciate especially the strong endorsement he has given to the treaty and to the procedures that have brought us to this day.

   On behalf of the Committee on Foreign Relations, I am honored to bring the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions, better known as the Moscow Treaty, to the floor for Senate consideration and ratification. The treaty was signed on May 24, 2002, and was transmitted by President Bush to the Senate on June 20, 2002. It reduces operational deployed strategic nuclear warheads to a level of between 1,700 and 2,200 by December 31, 2012.

   This is truly a tremendous accomplishment and deserves the full support of the Senate and the Russian Duma. I believe this treaty is an important step toward a safer world.

   The Foreign Relations Committee held four hearings and numerous briefings on the treaty, starting in July of last year, under the chairmanship of Senator JOE BIDEN. I thank Senator Biden and his staff for the timely consideration the treaty received and for the many opportunities provided to members of the committee to hear testimony and to engage in conversation with experts from the administration and from the private sector.

   Moreover, during the last 2 months, Senator Biden has been an indispensable partner in constructing this resolution of ratification. Its provisions reflect our mutual efforts to construct a bipartisan resolution that could be broadly supported by the Senate.

   The resolution, in fact, was approved unanimously by the Foreign Relations Committee. We are hopeful of a very strong vote on the Senate floor.

   During the course of the committee's consideration of the Moscow Treaty, we received testimony from Secretary of State Colin Powell, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Richard Myers. Each expressed a strong desire for an overwhelming vote of approval. In addition to administration witnesses, we heard from the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Ken Adelman; from the former commander in chief of U.S. Strategic Command, GEN Gene Habiger; and our former colleague, Sam Nunn; as well as numerous representatives of think tanks and interest groups.

   In addition to efforts undertaken in the Foreign Relations Committee, Senators LEVIN and WARNER and the Committee on Armed Services conducted two hearings examining the military implications of the treaty and shared analysis of their findings with us. These letters have been made a part of the record and our committee report.

   Furthermore, the Intelligence Committee conducted a thorough review of the treaty's verification procedures through numerous members only and staff briefings. The Committee on Foreign Relations appreciates the expertise of our colleagues on the Intelligence Committee and what they have lent to this process.

   President Bush and President Putin have assigned a high priority to the timely ratification of the Moscow Treaty. Both point to the treaty as evidence that the U.S.-Russian relationship has turned the corner. Areas of disagreement clearly remain, but we are attempting to develop a partnership in the war against terrorism, and both Russians and Americans believe that political and economic cooperation can increase dramatically in the coming decade.

   On May 1, 2001, in a speech at the National Defense University, President Bush called for a new strategic framework to transform our relationship with Russia ``from one based on a nuclear balance of terror to one based on common responsibilities and common interests.''

   Less than 8 months later, President Bush announced his intention to reduce our nuclear levels unilaterally and invited President Putin to implement similar reductions. This was the beginning of a process that led to a treaty signing during the summit in Moscow last year.

   The Moscow Treaty is unlike arms control agreements we have considered in the past. I remember vividly, as do many of our colleagues, visiting the START I and START II treaty negotiations. The United States and the Soviet Union faced off against each other, against conference tables. They met for years. These negotiations produced extensive treaties and verification annexes that described in detail the requirements mandated by the treaties.

   To be sure, the treaty before us today could have been more expansive, rigid, and demanding. The negotiators could have followed the cold war template for arms control negotiations and entered into a multiyear discussion process.

   That procedure did not serve the best interest of either side. Both sides, Americans and Russians, wanted to move quickly to capitalize on the opportunity to sharply reduce strategic weaponry.

   The agreement benefits not only the cause of arms control, but also the broader United States-Russia relationship. In my opinion, President Bush was wise to conclude the treaty quickly in this form rather than enter into a more lengthy and uncertain negotiation process.

   Russian strategic and nuclear forces are declining. Russian leaders have indicated they would prefer warhead levels to be less than 2,200 by 2012. In fact, Moscow pushed for a limit of 1,500 nuclear warheads and settled for a range of 1,700 to 2,200. It would appear that Moscow is reluctant to accept the resource tradeoffs necessary to maintain a larger force. President Putin inherited a force structure that already was moving toward the deep reductions necessary for START II implementation. Faced with continued resource constraints, he decided to limit further spending on strategic forces while seeking a new treaty to limit the United States and Russian forces in a predictable manner.

   In the past, most critics of strategic arms control treaties objected to the constraints these treaties placed on U.S. forces. They often alleged the treaties would expose U.S. security to unnecessary risk. Critics of the Moscow Treaty, however, have made the opposite complaint. They have said the treaty's constraints do not go far enough. Various analysts have suggested the treaty should include a

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   I share some of the concerns expressed by these critics, but the treaty is an important step forward because it maintains the momentum of an arms control process that has been successful.

   The treaty provides a mutual framework for continuing the destruction of offensive nuclear weapons whose purpose was to target the United States of America. It also underscores the importance of the United States-Russia relationship at a time when we are depending on Russian support for the war on terrorism.

   Nevertheless, important questions remain and will be discussed during this debate. What happens to the nuclear warheads taken from dismantled Russian delivery systems? I have confidence in the United States storage procedures and appreciate the flexibility the treaty permits in our strategic systems, but I am concerned with the parallel Russian process. We must work with Russia to make certain that these dangerous weapons do not fall into the wrong hands. However, there are readily available means to address these deficiencies.

   The primary vehicle for cooperation in reducing warheads to levels set by the Moscow Treaty and addressing the threat posed by warhead security is the Nunn-Lugar cooperative threat reduction program. Without Nunn-Lugar, it is unlikely that the benefits of the treaty will be realized.

   During consideration of the treaty, the committee heard testimony from Secretary Powell asserting that increased Nunn-Lugar assistance would serve as a foundation for the cooperation necessary to meet Russian obligations under the treaty and as additional means of verifying that those obligations are met.

   My concerns about treaty implementation are compounded by the impasse we experienced over the Nunn-Lugar certification

   process last year. Each year, our President is required by law to certify that Russia is ``committed to the goals of arms control.'' In 2002, the administration requested a waiver to this condition, pointing out that unresolved concerns in the chemical and biological arenas made this difficult. Meanwhile, existing Nunn-Lugar activities and projects were permitted to continue, but no new projects were initiated and no new contracts were finalized.

   President Bush requested a permanent annual waiver to the Nunn-Lugar legislation so we could continue with important work. But some in Congress preferred just a 1-year waiver or no waiver at all. Without a permanent waiver, the President would be forced to suspend dismantling assistance each year pending congressional action to waive the requirement. This could lead to delays of up to 6 months or more, just as we experienced last year.

   Let me assure my colleagues, this is not a hypothetical situation. It just happened to us. For more than 6 months, submarines on the Kola Peninsula awaited destruction. Regiments of SS-18 missiles loaded with 10 nuclear warheads apiece were left standing in Siberia, and almost 2 million rounds of chemical weapons in relatively transportable shells awaited elimination at Shchuch'ye. But the Nunn-Lugar program was powerless to address these threats because of congressional conditions drafted over a decade ago.

   American dismantlement experts in Russia were forced to wait and watch as these dangerous weapons systems sat in their silos, docks, or warehouses while the conference committee process between the two Houses of Congress dragged on through the summer.

   Without the changing of congressional conditions on the legislation or the granting of a permanent Presidential waiver, the current situation could reoccur in the years ahead. To say the least, this would delay full implementation of the Moscow Treaty far beyond the envisioned 10-year time period; namely, 2012.

   Let me be clear. The Moscow Treaty alone is insufficient to meet our security needs. The treaty is part of the answer, but without cooperative threat reduction, dismantlement, and warhead security projects, the agreement will not reach its potential in a timely manner.

   Critics of the Moscow Treaty suggest this lack of a new verification regime is a weakness that must be rectified. Some have gone so far as to suggest the treaty be shelved until verification is strengthened. But this point of view sees the treaty through a cold war prism when cooperative threat reduction programs did not exist and both sides were trying to maximize strategic nuclear force levels.

   The Bush administration has been forthright in its recognition of the lack of a verification provision in the Moscow Treaty, including statements in the President's letter of transmittal and the testimony of Secretary Powell before the Foreign Relations Committee.

   The administration's views on verification of the treaty are based upon three basic assumptions: First, the United States and Russia have moved beyond cold war tensions, and the United States would have undertaken these reductions of nuclear warheads regardless of Russia's view--unilateral disarmament. Second, the national security interests of the United States are better served through the flexibility of the Moscow Treaty. And third, Russia is unlikely to have the means or the incentives to violate or withdraw from this agreement.

   I believe the level of verification of the Moscow Treaty is sufficient. American verification experts will have the START I treaty verification procedures in place throughout at least 2009. But perhaps more importantly, the Nunn-Lugar program has placed American dismantlement teams and equipment on the ground in Russia now.

   These teams work on a daily basis with their Russian counterparts to safely dismantle weapons systems. For example, at Surovatika, U.S.-provided equipment is routinely dismantling four ICBMs per month. It is hard to imagine a more complete means by which to verify the dismantlement of weapons than the systematic work occurring under cooperative threat reduction at Surovatika.

   Senator BIDEN and I met with President Bush last June to discuss Senate consideration of the treaty, just after the President returned from his visit at the Moscow Summit. We committed to moving the treaty forward in a responsible, bi-partisan, and expeditious manner. The resolution before us today is a product of close cooperation and consultation. I am pleased to report that it enjoys the strong support of the administration.

   The resolution of ratification contains two conditions and six declarations. I would like to describe each of these provisions for the Senate.

   The first condition requires the President to submit to the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees an annual report on the amount of Nunn-Lugar cooperative threat reduction assistance that Russia will need to meet its obligations under the Treaty. As I mentioned earlier, without U.S. assistance, Russia cannot meet the timetable of its obligations under this treaty. Without the Nunn-Lugar program, it is likely the benefits of this treaty will be postponed or never realized.

   The second condition requires the President to report to the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees on important items related to the treaty, including: 1, Strategic force levels; 2, planned offensive reductions; 3, treaty implementation plans; 4, efforts to improve verification and transparency; 5, status of START I treaty verification extension; 6, information regarding the ability of either side to fully implement the treaty; and 7, any efforts proposed to improve the effectiveness of the treaty.

   The report contained in this condition must be submitted within 60 days of the exchange of instruments of ratification of the Treaty and by April 15 of each following year. The extensive nature of this report protects our critical Senate role in oversight of implementation and ensures that this body will remain an integral part of the process throughout the treaty's life.

   The first declaration has been in each resolution of ratification for arms control treaties since the INF Treaty's resolution of ratification in 1988. It is known to colleagues here as the Byrd-Biden Condition. The condition articulates the Constitutional principles on which the common understanding of the terms of a treaty will be based.

   The second declaration encourages the President to continue efforts to

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   The treaty establishes a Bilateral Implementation Commission, as a diplomatic consultative forum to discuss issues related to implementation of the Treaty. The resolution's third declaration calls on the Executive Branch to provide briefings before and after meetings of the commission concerning: 1, issues raised during meetings; 2, any issues the United States is pursuing through other channels; and 3, Presidential determinations with regard to these issues. This provision has been included to ensure that we remain fully aware of the activities of the Bilateral Implementation Commission.

   During the hearings on the treaty, Secretary Powell and Secretary Rumsfeld testified that non-strategic nuclear weapons remain an important issue and expressed a strong interest in working closely with Russia to reduce associated threats. The resolution's fourth declaration is meant to underscore the threat posed by tactical nuclear weapons. It urges the President to work closely with Russia and to provide assistance on the full accounting, safety, and security of the Russian tactical nuclear weapon stockpile.

   In 1991, President George H. W. Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev announced the removal of their deployed nonstrategic nuclear weapons. In Helsinki in 1997, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed to begin talks on these weapons, but negotiations have failed to materialize.

   Secretary Powell has reported that the inclusion of tactical nuclear weapons was not possible in the Moscow Treaty. Thus far, Russia has declined to engage in discussions on the future of non-strategic systems. This declaration is meant to communicate the Senate's concerns about the threats associated with non-strategic weapons. It is our hope that there will be further dialogue and, if possible, greater efforts to secure these systems.

   The fifth declaration encourages the President to accelerate U.S. reductions where feasible and consistent with U.S. national security requirements so that reductions may be achieved prior to December 31, 2012.

   The final declaration has been included in an attempt to address concerns put forward by some Senators regarding the treaty's withdrawal clause in Article IV. This text follows up on Secretary Powell's commitment to consult with the Senate should the President consider the utilization of the withdrawal provision.

   The Foreign Relations Committee asked the Secretary: ``What role will the Congress have in any decision to withdraw from this treaty?''; and ``Will the administration agree to at least consult closely with this committee before making any such decision?'' The Secretary responded that: ``While it is the President who withdraws from treaties, the administration intends to discuss any need to withdraw from the treaty with the Congress, to include the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, prior to announcing any such action.''

   While I am sympathetic to arguments from Senators regarding the need to maintain Senate prerogatives, the process governing termination and withdrawal is a point of Constitutional debate. Although the Constitution assigns a specific role for the Senate in the treaty ratification process, it is silent on the is due of treaty termination. Furthermore, nothing in the Constitution restricts the President from terminating or withdrawing from a treaty on his own authority.

   Presidents have consistently terminated advice and consent treaties on their own authority since 1980. Twenty-three of the thirty treaties terminated during this period were bilateral; seven were multilateral. Prior to 1980, Senator Barry Goldwater challenged Presidents Carter's termination of the Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan. Senator Goldwater's challenge failed and the treaty was terminated. Since that time, objections have been raised only with respect to Presidents Bush's withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.

   The White House Legal Advisor has long argued that the President is the principle spokesman of the nation in foreign affairs and restrictions on the power have been strictly construed.

   Given the absence of a textual basis conferring the termination power on another branch or an established practice derogating from the President's termination power, it is difficult to envisage such a role for the Senate.

   Proponents of a Senatorial role in this process will often respond by suggesting that the President cannot on his own authority terminate a treaty because it is the ``law of the land.'' Again, the White House suggests this is a fallacy. A terminated treaty no longer has effect in much the same way that a provision of a law or treaty found by the courts to be unconstitutional no longer has effect. However, in neither case is the law repealed.

   Historically there is evidence of only one instance in which the Senate sought by a resolution of advice and consent to limit the President's constitutional power to terminate a treaty. The first condition to the 1919 proposed resolution of advice and consent to ratification of the Versailles Treaty would have provided: ``notice of withdrawal by the United States may be given by a concurrent resolution of the Congress of the United States.'' Vice President Thomas Marshall, addressing the Senate before the vote, called the condition an unconstitutional limitation on the President's powers--a view with which a number of leading scholars of the day concurred. However, the resolution failed to receive the required two-thirds vote and the question has remained moot for the better part of a century.

   Beyond the legal issues which underlie this debate, some have expressed concern that Article IV differs from previous arms control agreements in that it only requires three months notice and permits withdrawal based upon issues related to national sovereignty. Critics point out that the START Treaty allows a Party to withdraw, after giving 6 months' notice and only ``if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests.''

   I do not view the withdrawal provisions as a weakness in the treaty. Instead, I believe it is another manifestation of the improved U.S.-Russian relationship. It should also be pointed out that our bilateral relationship provides us with some confidence that the time and reasons for withdrawal would not necessarily relate to the agreement. As the Secretary of State told the Committee: ``The Moscow Treaty's formulation for withdrawal reflects the likelihood that a decision to withdraw would be prompted by causes unrelated either to the Treaty or to our bilateral relationship. We believe this formulation more appropriately reflects our much-improved strategic relationship with Russia.''

   Mr. President, in performing its constitutional responsibilities with respect to treaties and international agreements, the Senate has to reach a judgment as to whether, on balance, U.S. acceptance of the obligations contained in the treaty serves the national interests of the United States.

   The Moscow Treaty is not without blemishes. The Senate should not be surprised that the treaty is not perfect or that it does not cover every desired area of bilateral arms control. But that is not the point. The proper question is whether on balance, the Moscow Treaty serves the national security of our nation.

   For some, no arms control treaty is good enough. Indeed, the very high stakes of the cold war and the fact that arms control cheating by the Soviet Union represented a potential threat to the survival of the United States led to a legitimate focus on treaties with high standards, especially for verification and the ability to detect even minor violations.

   The cold war is over, and treaty requirements must suit U.S. national interests as they exist today. The Moscow Treaty charts a course towards greater security for both the United States and Russia. I urge my colleagues to ratify this treaty and approve the resolution of ratification without amendment.

   I suggest the absence of a quorum.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Hagel). The clerk will call the roll.

   The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

   Mr. BIDEN. I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

   Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I am pleased to join our esteemed chairman, Senator Lugar, in presenting the Senate this resolution giving the Senate's advice and consent to ratification of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions, known in the vernacular as the Moscow Treaty. Let me state flatly at the outset, I urge my colleagues to support the treaty.

   On February 5, as Senator Lugar noted, the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee approved this resolution unanimously. The committee did so, in my view, for two very good reasons.

   First, the Moscow Treaty should be ratified and implemented. It is true that there is much that the Moscow Treaty does not do, which I will discuss at some length. But virtually all of the witnesses at our hearing recommended the ratification of the treaty because its implementation would be a step toward a more secure world. Reducing each nation's deployed strategic warheads from approximately 6,000 to between 1,700 and 2,200, in my view, will move us further away from the cold war era and may--I emphasize may--and I hope promote a United States-Russian relationship based upon mutual cooperation.

   Second, in my view, while the resolution does not include everything we may want, it does address many of our concerns. It requires significant annual reporting by the executive branch on implementation of the treaty so that the Senate can oversee and support that implementation. These are important gains from an administration that first opposed any treaty at all and then pressed for a clean resolution of ratification. The administration has agreed to support and implement this resolution before the Senate. I think the country will benefit from that.

   But there is much the Moscow Treaty does not do. So in the spirit of not engaging in false advertisement, I think we should speak about that a little bit. It is very unusual, at least in my 30 years as a Senator working on many arms control agreements from the Senate perspective, that an arms control agreement by any standard be put forward the way in which this one has.

   In our hearings, the Secretary of Defense proudly compared the three pages of this treaty to the roughly 300 pages of the START treaty signed by the first President Bush. But that is just the beginning. Traditional arms control agreements usually involve the negotiated level of arms to which the parties will be held. They usually require the destruction of some weapons. Often they specify milestones that must be achieved in reducing those arms and bar withdrawal from the treaty unless there is a good reason to withdraw and the President gives or the other side gives 6 months notice.

   For decades, there has been emphasis on verifying that each party is complying with its obligations. We remember the famous phrase uttered by former President Reagan: Trust but verify.

   In addition, the United States worked to ban MIRV ICBMs in the START II treaty. I know the Presiding Officer knows, but for those who may be listening, the MIRV'd ICBM is a single missile, a single rocket upon which multiple nuclear warheads sit and when the rocket goes off and the head of the missile comes off, it contains more than one nuclear warhead, and you can independently target each of those nuclear warheads, in the vernacular.

   So we have thought for years and years, these are the most destabilizing weapons that existed, and we worked very hard, and the first President Bush worked very hard, to eliminate either side being able to possess these multiple warhead missiles with independently targeted warheads. It was contained in the START II treaty.

   We were hoping in START III to control tactical nuclear weapons. They are the weapons that are shorter range and are used at shorter distances, referred to as tactical nuclear weapons. We had hoped to have a de-alerting of weapons slated for later elimination.

   That is, the purpose we initially started off with was: Look, if we are agreeing we are going to get rid of these weapons, while we are going through the process of destroying them or taking them out of the silos or out of the bellies of submarines or out of the bellies of bombers, what we will do is we will de-alert them. That is, we will pull the plug. They will sit there, but they will not be aimed at anybody. They will not be on alert.

   So for the longest time our objective, for stability reasons and for security reasons, was to get rid of multiple warheads, to make sure we move to include tactical nuclear weapons which are destabilizing so we begin to reduce them and, third, to say while we are getting ready to destroy these weapons, or take them out of the inventory, we will de-alert them. That is, not keep them on a hair trigger.

   None of these objectives was achieved, or for that matter attempted, in the Moscow Treaty we are about to ratify--I hope ratify.

   For starters, the United States unilaterally set this treaty's arms control levels before any negotiation. Indeed, the administration saw no particular reason for this treaty in the first place. Initially they said they would not do it as a treaty.

   According to the Secretary of State:

   We concluded before the Moscow Treaty was negotiated that we could and would safely reduce to 1,700 to 2,200 operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads, regardless of what the Russians did.

   Secretary Powell reports that President Bush then told President Putin:

   This is where we are going. We are going there unilaterally. Come with us or not, stay where you are or not.

   In short, the Moscow Treaty does not codify an agreement. Rather, it codifies two unilateral decisions to reduce strategic forces. That is not a bad thing, but it is not such a significant thing.

   Another way in which the Moscow Treaty differs from previous arms control agreements is that it does not require the elimination of any missiles, any bombers, any submarines, or any warheads. As a result, each party is free to stockpile its officially reduced weapons.

   We used to fight with our conservative friends on this floor who said we could not support such-and-such arms control treaty proffered from President Nixon through to President Ford and President Reagan and President Bush--we could not do it unless we were certain that the missile was destroyed, the warhead was destroyed, the submarine was destroyed. We used to hear what is going to happen is they are going to take these missiles and they are going to hide them in barns and they are going to hide them in the woods and they are going to hide them in camouflaged areas.

   Let's be clear what this treaty does. It says you have to get down to 1,700 to 2,200 of these within the next 10 years or so, but all you have to do is take them out of commission. You don't have to destroy them. You can stockpile them. You can put them in a warehouse. You can pile them up in a barn for ready reload. You can take them back out. You don't have to destroy anything. That is in fact what the United States plans to do with many of its reduced weapons. They are reduced, not destroyed.

   Trident submarines that are taken off nuclear patrol will be converted to other purposes--and could presumably be reconverted to carry strategic nuclear weapons, although at some cost.

   Bombers will also be converted; actually, their re-conversion to strategic nuclear uses might be rather difficult.

   According to recent press stories, the United States might use ICBMs to deliver conventional payloads. That would leave the missiles still available for use with nuclear warheads instead.

   And the administration says that about three-quarters of the reductions may be made simply by ``downloading''--that means by removing bombs and warheads from bombers and missiles, while leaving the delivery vehicles in service.

   What happens to those ``downloaded'' warheads? Of the thousands of warheads that will be ``reduced'' by the United States, many--perhaps almost all--would be retained in some form of reserve status, available to be returned

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   The Secretary of State did not indicate that some warheads would be dismantled. But the administration has yet to earmark a single type of warhead for dismantlement.

   For years, now, the Air Force has been prepared to give up the W-62 warheads on its Minuteman Three missiles.

   They will be replaced by the W-87 warheads that are removed from the Peacekeeper missile, which is to be retired. But the Defense Department seems incapable of letting go of the old warheads.

   I will move on. The Secretary of State did indicate, though, that some warheads would be dismantled, but the administration is yet to earmark a single type of warhead that we are going to dismantle. My support for ratification of this treaty is based in part on the administration's assurances for the record that ``some warheads are to be removed and will be destroyed or dismantled.''

   Since the statement was made, however, there has been no action by the executive branch to turn this into a reality. I expect the administration to live up to Secretary Powell's commitment. If it should fail to do so, this would endanger the process by which the Senate gives advice and consent to the ratification of not only this treaty but every treaty in the future.

   An equal concern for me is the question of what the Russians will do with its reduced weapons. If it follows the lead of the United States, it will try to retain as many missiles and bombers as possible, and it will stockpile its downloaded nuclear weapons rather than dismantling them and disposing of the excess fissile material.

   Under this treaty, Russia can do whatever it wants with its so-called reduced weapons. But we have a stake in Russia's decision on this. That is because of the risk that Russia will not adequately protect the weapons and nuclear materials it has stockpiled.

   It is one thing for us to decommission, reduce our nuclear weapon and stockpile it. We have exceedingly tight security on such material.

   The Russians have incredibly, incredibly insecure facilities because they lack the money to be able to maintain these secure facilities. I worry that if Russia does not destroy them, that they will find themselves--and we will find ourselves--susceptible to the clandestine sale or the actual stealing of these materials, and they will fall into the hands of people who do not have our interests at heart.

   The only threat to our very existence is the accidental launch of Russian missiles, and that is why I still worry about the MIRV'd ICBMs. But perhaps the worst other threat to America is that some Russian nuclear weapons, or material with which they make them, could be stolen or diverted to rogue states or terrorist groups. The more weapons Russia stockpiles, the greater the risk not all of them will be properly safeguarded.

   To combat that danger, our chairman cofounded the Nunn-Lugar program to assist the Soviet Union--and now its successor states--in meeting their arms control obligations.

   Related programs in the Energy Department and the State Department help Russia to safeguard its sensitive materials, and to find civilian careers for its thousands of weapons scientists.

   These programs will have a major role to play in the years to come. With Nunn-Lugar, we can enable Russia to destroy its old delivery vehicles rather than mothballing them. Russian officials have already decided they want to move in that direction.

   Let me put something in focus, by the way. The entire budget for Russia for this fiscal year is roughly $40 billion. The entire Russian military budget is $9 billion.

   My neighboring States of Pennsylvania and New Jersey have budgets bigger than all of Russia. I suspect if you added up all their law enforcement and prison-related budgets, it probably exceeds the entire defense budget of Russia.

   Our defense budget, and I make no apologies for it, is between $350 and $400 billion. So I want us to keep this in focus. The ability of Russia to maintain and/or take the money to destroy this fissile material and mothball nuclear capacity is very limited, increasing the need for Nunn-Lugar, the threat reduction money, to be spent on American scientists with American contractors to go to Russia to destroy these weapons for them because they do not have the money to do it.

   U.S. assistance can also help Russia to secure and dispose of its excess fissile material. That is the stuff that makes nuclear explosions. That is the stuff that is the product from which chain reactions, nuclear chain reactions start.

   That is an urgent and continuing task, with or without this treaty.

   I think the administration understands this. The Secretary of State has laid it out:

   U.S. assistance helps to improve the security of Russia's nuclear weapons by improving their physical protection (fencing, sensors, communications); accounting (improved hardware and software); personnel reliability (better screening); and guard force capabilities (more realistic training).

   These improvements are particularly important because Russia faces a difficult threat environment--political instability, terrorist threats, and insider threats resulting from financial conditions in Russia.

   Translated: The Russian Mafia; translated: Departments seeking money to keep their folks employed doing things that are not in the interest of Russia, and clearly not in the interest of the United States.

   The Secretary of State also assured the Committee that:

   . . . we intend to continue to work with Russia, under the Cooperative Threat Reduction, CTR program, when and to the extent permitted by law, to make its warhead storage facilities more secure.

   Such U.S. assistance will also increase the security of the Russian warheads made excess as provided in the Moscow Treaty.

   The Secretary of State continued:

   If requested by the Russian Federation, and subject to the laws related to CRT certification, the Administration would be prepared to provide additional assistance for removing, transporting, storing, and securing nuclear warheads, disassembling warheads and storing fissile material, dismantling surplus strategic missiles, and disposing of associated launchers.

   I am pleased that the administration accepts the need to use Nunn-Lugar and related programs in implementing this treaty, and that the 2004 budget request has a 9-percent increase for Nunn-Lugar.

   That increase is probably spoken for, however, by the cost of building--belatedly--a chemical weapons destruction facility at Shchuch'ye. So I wonder, at least, whether enough fund are budgeted for Nunn-Lugar; I hope they are but I don't think they are.

   And I hope that the President will prevail upon his own party in the House to give him more than temporary authority to waive certification requirements for these programs.

   Nunn-Lugar efforts cannot achieve their maximum effectiveness if every year or so the funds dry up for months at a time, while waiting for Congress to permit another presidential waiver.

   The laissez-faire nature of the Moscow Treaty is also evident in the timing of its reduction requirement.

   This is very unusual. Under Article I of the Treaty, the reductions must occur ``by December 31, 2012.'' Until that date, there is no reduction requirement. Indeed, until that date, there is nothing barring each party from increasing its force levels.

   A party could even have more weapons than it has today, so long as it does not exceed START Treaty levels before that treaty expires in 2009. I don't expect that, of course, but there is nothing to prohibit it.

   And what happens on December 31, 2012. The treaty expires.

   If a party fails to achieve the reductions required by this treaty, the other party will have little recourse. The treaty codifies legally binding promises, but provides no way to make the Parties live up to them.

   This is a very unusual treaty.

   Most curious of all, perhaps, is the withdrawal provision in Article IV of the treaty. You might think that, with no obligations until the very last day of this treaty's existence, there would be little reason ever to withdraw from it. That is certainly what I think.

   Just in case, however, the treaty has what is probably the most liberal withdrawal clause in any arms control treaty. A party can withdraw with only 3 months' notice.

   There is no need for withdrawal to be due to ``extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this treaty [that]

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   Indeed, there is no requirement in this treaty to state any reason for withdrawal.

   I hope the administration is correct in its view that we no longer need verification. The Secretary of State said, ``in the context of this new relationship, a treaty with a verification regime under the Cold War paradigm was neither required nor appropriate.''

   It may be that we need not care what Russia does. That might explain why the Moscow Treaty leaves it to each party to decide what weapons it is reducing and how it will do that, and sets no benchmarks for measuring progress between now and December 31, 2012.

   To this day, the Russian Federation has yet to say how it defines the term ``strategic nuclear warheads,'' or how its reductions will be made.

   We can only hope that his laissez-faire approach to arms control obligations will not lead to misunderstandings down the road. With no agreed definitions and no benchmarks, I respectfully suggest that there is lots of room for quarrels over whether a party will really be in compliance by December 31, 2012.

   Perhaps voluntary transparency by each party will assure the other that arms reductions are proceeding properly.

   I applaud the decision to establish a transparency committee under the U.S.-Russia Consultative Group on Strategic Security.

   But I am not reassured by the Secretary of State's statement that ``specific additional transparency measures are not needed, and will not be sought, at this time.''

   It may be that continuing U.S. assistance to Russia under the Nunn-Lugar program and other assistance programs will give us such visibility into Russian forces that we will have no need of verification.

   But if we are to rely on that window, then--as I noted earlier--President Bush ought to persuade House Republicans to let him waive the certification requirements that periodically stall the funding of our programs for months at a time

   because if there is no verification and no ability through the threat reduction program to look inside what Russia is doing, then we are operating in the blind.

   When the President requested that authority to waive provisions allowing him to move forward with Nunn-Lugar, it was people in his own party in the House who refused to make that authority permanent.

   Previous Presidents gave special attention to the need to do away with MIRVed ICBMs. The first President Bush achieved that in the START II Treaty.

   But Russia refused to let that treaty enter into force unless we continued to adhere to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. When the current President Bush pulled us out of the ABM Treaty, START II died.

   Why worry about MIRVed ICBMs? A MIRVed missile has multiple warheads. It's cheaper to put several warheads on a single missile than it is to build, house and launch several missiles.

   But if I put 6 or 10 warheads on a missile, and you can take that missile out with only 1 or 2 warheads by attacking first, then my military planners are going to be nervous.

   And that is precisely what can happen if my missile is an ICBM in a fixed silo. It may be powerful, but it is also a sitting duck.

   So my military planners are going to say to me: We need to be able to fire our missiles before the attacking missiles land on them. The nuclear theologians call this: ``Use 'em or lose 'em.'' Put another way, if Russia has MIRV'd ICBMs sitting in silos, and we get to a point--hopefully, that will never happen--in the next year, decade or two decades, and they know that one of our warheads can take out that multiple warhead ICBM they have on the ground, their military planners are going to say: You better strike first with that missile because if you don't, it will be taken out. And we are going to sit here and say: We know that is what their military planners are going to do, so we better take that missile out first.

   That is called destabilizing. That does not lend security or a sense of security. That is why the first President Bush, and every other President before him, said it was important, of any missile you get rid of, to do away with MIRVed warheads because they were destabilizing, they were on a hair trigger.

   This ``use 'em or lose 'em'' strategy is still in play. I will use radars and satellites to tell when somebody is attacking me. My command and control system will allow me to order a launch of my nuclear-tipped missiles within 10 minutes because that is all the time I will have between the warning of a possible attack and when the warheads will start falling on my MIRVed missiles.

   Now, if I am the United States, that works. But if I am Russia, my missile warning network is made of Swiss cheese. Some of my satellites do not even work if I am Russia. I lost some radars when the Soviet Union broke up. And worse yet, my rocket force troops are so poorly paid, so ill-housed, that sometimes they even go berserk and shoot each other. This is not a joke. They really do. So there are risks in basing our deterrent force on MIRVed ICBMs. And if Russia's nuclear-tipped missiles are ever launched in error, we in the United States are the ones most likely to suffer.

   But the administration is confident that none of this will happen. The Secretary of State told the Foreign Relations Committee:

   We cannot conceive of any credible scenario in which we would threaten to launch our strategic forces at Russia. The scenario ..... of Russia believing it faced a ``use it or lose it'' situation with its force of MIRVed ICBMs is therefore not a credible concern.

   As a former press secretary of mine used to say--Evelyn Lieberman--``My lips to God's ears.'' Hopefully, that is true.

   As a result, President Bush felt at liberty to tell President Putin:

   [Y]ou can do whatever you think you have to do for your security. You can MIRV your missiles, you can keep more, you can go lower. Do what you think you need.

   I sincerely hope the relationship between the United States and Russia has truly been transformed and that, as President Bush wrote in his letter of transmittal, ``Russia is not an enemy, Russia is a friend''--a friend, I might add, that is not with us right now on the Security Council and not with us with regard to Iraq, but that is a parenthetical note.

   Most of all, I hope that Russia feels the same way. If President Putin fears a U.S. attack, then it won't matter what President Bush has as his intent.

   If the Russian military fears a U.S. attack, their missiles may stay on a ``hair trigger'' alert even if President Putin does not share their fears.

   In short, the Moscow Treaty is a treaty that is long on flexibility accorded to each party and short on provisions intended to ensure compliance. That emphasis on military flexibility is the hallmark of this administration. It is an understandable response to dangerous times, but I think it is also a vision that ignores many of the political risks.

   This administration has also promoted a nuclear weapons policy that speaks of the use of new ``bunker-buster'' weapons against deeply buried targets, treating nuclear weapons as a handy tool just as any other weapon, and thus lowering the threshold for nuclear war.

   This administration also speaks of possible new nuclear weapons tests. This administration speaks of the possible use of nuclear weapons against states that neither have such weapons nor are allied with states that have them, contradicting previous American statements that we made in order to maintain other countries' support for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

   This administration has indicated possible preemptive attacks, perhaps with nuclear weapons, on states that we fear are preparing to do us harm--again, perhaps even if those states do not have nuclear weapons.

   I do not doubt that if we went through this list, issue by issue, we would find that the administration has understandable reasons for its actions. But in foreign affairs, understandable reasons are not enough. We need a sensible strategy. We need statecraft that offers what Thomas Jefferson called ``a decent respect to the opinions of mankind.''

   In that respect, we risk alienating ourselves from those who could be of

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   The fact is, we cannot take these unilateral positions irrespective, in my view, of world public opinion and then not expect to pay for it down the road somewhere. I would respectfully suggest, parenthetically, I think we are paying for some of that right now in the United Nations Security Council.

   This fixation with military power extends to the Moscow Treaty as well. How should we handle a treaty that calls for significant force reductions but also allows each party to keep its powder dry?

   Retired Senator Sam Nunn, former chairman of the Armed Services Committee, has a good term for the Moscow Treaty. He calls it, not ``the Moscow Treaty,'' but the ``good-faith treaty.'' Senator Nunn adds:

   It expresses--and relies upon--good faith in our common interests and the common vision of our leaders.

   I think it is a pretty good way to characterize this treaty.

   But when he testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Sam Nunn added a very important point about the treaty. He said:

   If it is not followed with other substantive actions, it will become irrelevant at best--counterproductive at worst.

   Let me read that again. He said: ``If it is not followed with other substantive actions''--he means actions in terms of arms control and verification, and the like--``it will become irrelevant at best--counterproductive at worst.'' I share his view.

   I support the Moscow Treaty because, on balance, it enhances our national interests. Put another way: To reject this treaty, in my view, would harm our national interest and, as I said at the outset, the relationship between the United States and Russia.

   The arms reductions in it do not go far enough, in my view, but they are better than nothing. There is no verification provisions, but good faith, information from START verification activities, and Nunn-Lugar may be a good substitute for verification.

   There is a risk that the Russians will rely upon MIRVed ICBMs that raise the threat of an accidental war, but there is also a chance that Russia will destroy those missiles as fast as they can pay for their destruction.

   The flexibility built into this treaty could undermine each party's commitment to reductions and its confidence that the other side will achieve them,

   but the Bush-Putin relationship, which is now being somewhat strained on North Korea and on Iraq, could lead to new patterns of cooperation that make further formal agreements unnecessary.

   May all the good outcomes come to pass, but they require a leap of faith. In the meantime, however, I worked with Chairman Lugar to draft a resolution of ratification that keeps Senator Nunn's admonition in mind. We must build on this treaty in order to ensure its success.

   The resolution before us strengthens congressional oversight of the Moscow Treaty implementation and highlights some of the areas on which the administration should build on the treaty to secure a safer world for ourselves and future generations. The resolution includes two conditions and six declarations. Let me briefly go through them.

   Condition (1) requires an annual report to the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees on how U.S. cooperative threat reduction and nonproliferation assistance to Russia can best contribute to enabling Russia to implement its side of the bargain. Reports subsequent to the initial report will be due on February 15 so that the Senate can take them into account as it considers the budget for programs for which the administration is calling. This is vital because U.S. assistance can bring about the weapons dismantlement the Moscow Treaty fails to achieve.

   Condition (2) requires an annual report to the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committee on U.S. and Russian strategic force levels; each party's planned reductions for the current year; each party's plans for achieving the full reductions by December 31, 2012. Further, it requires reporting on any measure, including verification or transparency measures, taken or proposed by a party to assure each party that the other will achieve its reductions by December 31, 2012.

   Condition (2) also requires information relevant to the treaty learned through START verification, and the status of consideration of extending the START verification regime beyond December 2009 when the START treaty is scheduled to expire; anything calling into question either party's intention or ability to achieve the full Moscow Treaty reductions by December 31, 2012; and any action taken or proposed by the parties to address such concerns. This report will provide a strong foundation for Senate oversight of the treaty's implementation.

   The first declaration in the treaty reaffirms the Biden-Byrd condition on the authoritative nature of executive branch representations to the Senate and its committees during the ratification process insofar as they are directed to the meaning and legal effect of the treaty.

   In other words, it says the President--this President or a future Democrat or Republican President--cannot reinterpret the treaty, cannot give it a meaning different than was suggested to us as what it meant.

   There is a second declaration. It encourages the President to continue strategic offensive reductions beyond those mandated by this treaty to the lowest possible levels consistent with national security requirements and alliance obligations of the United States. Declarations, I might note, for the Presiding Officer, who knows this well, are nonbinding. But this one makes clear that the Moscow Treaty should not be the end of arms control.

   President Bush also issued a joint declaration on May 24, 2002, with Russian President Putin that declared ``their intention to carry out strategic offensive reductions to the

   lowest possible levels consistent with our national security requirements and alliance obligations and reflecting the new nature of their strategic reductions.''

   The joint declaration went on to call the Moscow Treaty a major step in this direction--not the final step, only a major one. The clear implication is that further reductions may follow. This declaration gives the arms reduction process the Senate's blessing, just as we did when considering ratification of START and the START II treaties.

   The third declaration states the Senate's expectation that the executive branch will offer to brief the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees on issues raised in the bilateral implementation commission, which is part of this treaty, on Moscow Treaty issues raised in other channels, and on any Presidential determination regarding such issues.

   Given the lack of verification or transparency provisions in the Moscow Treaty, the bilateral implementation committee established by article III of the treaty may play a major role in assuring that each party knows what the other party is doing and retains confidence that the reductions required by article I will be completed on time--a very important point, on time. Remember, there are no drop-dead dates here.

   The fourth declaration urges the President to engage Russia with the objective of, one, establishing cooperative measures regarding the accounting and security of nonstrategic--that is, or tactical--nuclear weapons, and two, providing U.S. and other international assistance to help Russia improve its accounting and security of these weapons. The first meeting of the U.S.-Russian Consultative Group on Strategic Security established a committee to examine these issues. The administration witnesses listed this as a top priority. This declaration, in my view, adds the Senate's encouragement to pursue the issue of tactical nuclear weapons. It does not call for bilateral agreement on reductions of those weapons because several outside witnesses said no Russian agreement to such reductions was likely.

   The fifth declaration before us encourages the President to accelerate U.S. force reductions where feasible and consistent with U.S. national security and alliance obligations. The Treaty's intended reductions may be achieved prior to December 2012. To me, the wisdom of faster reductions is clear. It will reassure the world of our commitment to reduced nuclear forces to a reasonable level as speedily as we can. They will also ease any possible

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   The Congressional Budget Office report on the treaty cites specific concerns in that regard. But those concerns relate to an effort to complete all reductions by the year 2007.

   I believe in the years after 2007, when the transfer of Peacekeeper warheads to the Minuteman III missile will have been completed, faster reductions will be much more feasible.

   There is declaration 6. It urges the President to consult with the Senate prior to actions relevant to article IV, paragraph 2, which relate to extending or superseding a treaty, or paragraph 3, which relate to withdrawal from the treaty. This declaration builds on the statement of the Secretary of State that ``the administration intends to discuss any need to withdraw from the treaty with the Congress, to include the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, prior to announcing any such action.''

   The Secretary's statement could mean only that the administration would discuss with the Senate the need to withdraw when the decision has already been made. This declaration we have in the resolution goes further,

   by urging the President to consult with the Senate. One may discuss after the decision has been made, but one can only consult before a decision has been taken. The latter is what the Senate expects if this treaty is passed, and this expectation extends beyond the withdrawal issue to cover actions relevant to extending or superseding the treaty. It is vital that the executive branch consult with us when it is considering changes in a treaty. That way, Senators can raise any concern before decisions are made that might jeopardize the chances of securing our advice and consent to ratification.

   The resolution of ratification before us was recommended unanimously by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. I believe it will make a real contribution to the success of this treaty, and I urge all of my colleagues to support it.

   To be sure, the resolution does not address every issue we could raise. It clearly does not speak to every declaration that I think should be included in this treaty, but neither is it the only venue in which to raise those issues. For example, consider what the Foreign Relations Committee's report of the treaty says about the proposal by GEN Eugene Habiger, former commander of U.S. Strategic Command:

   Members of the committee ..... share General Habiger's view that options for reducing alert status should be evaluated by those with significant expertise on the specific weapons systems in question. If the President does not order preparation for such analyses, Congress could require the analyses or establish a commission of weapons systems experts to undertake this task. Such commissions have been created before, some under the auspices of the National Academy of Sciences, and have proven useful in considering issues of such a technical nature.

   Senator Lugar and I do not think this resolution of ratification is a proper vehicle through which to establish such a commission, but unless something has changed, which I know it has not, we will continue to pursue this proposal in a venue other than this treaty.

   The committee's report also addresses two other issues we were unable to incorporate in the resolution of ratification. On verification and transparency, our report says:

   The committee believes that the absence of verification provisions in the Moscow Treaty makes confidence and transparency a high priority issue....... The United States should not only practice transparency, but also promote it, in close coordination with the Russian Federation.

   Our report goes on to say:

   The committee urges the President to use implementation of the Moscow Treaty as a means to foster ..... mutual confidence in the national security field.

   The report also calls attention to the Congressional Budget Office's estimate that further drawdowns in strategic delivery vehicles after 2007 could save some $5 billion.

   Our report adds:

   The committee recommends that the President give particular attention, as the Moscow Treaty implementation proceeds, to the possibility that modest further reductions in strategic delivery systems after 2007 could lead to significant cost savings without endangering the national security.

   The Armed Services Committee and the Foreign Relations Committee can pursue both of these issues as they oversee the implementation of the treaty in the coming years, and I am committed to doing so, and I believe the chairman is as well.

   Some of my colleagues are concerned about still other issues. Several amendments may be proposed today. Some of them are amendments I would like to support, but I will not support any additional amendments because I think it is fair to say, speaking for myself, but I think it reflects the view of the chairman--he may have already mentioned it--we believe that in order to get the cooperation we had to add the total of eight declarations or conditions to this treaty, we would, in fact, oppose other amendments, some positive, some, in my view, very negative. So it will be my dubious distinction of possibly voting against some amendments that I think are useful because I think if that were to happen and we started to load this up, we might very well lose this treaty. I think it is very important.

   It is a mild exaggeration to suggest, but not very far off, that my view is that the value of the treaty is exceeded only by the danger of failing to ratify this treaty, and there is a danger, in my view, of failing to ratify this treaty. This is not a treaty, were I in charge of negotiation--as my Grandfather Finnegan used to say, this is not the whole of it--this is not all of what I would like to have seen in this treaty. I sincerely hope this further changes the atmosphere in the positive direction it has been changing, that this administration and the Russian administration will conclude we should be dealing with MIRV missiles, we should be dealing with tactical nuclear weapons, and we should be dealing with other genuine mutual concerns that we have. I am confident if we reject this treaty, if we bog it down and it does not get the necessary supermajority required, then it will make those possibilities impossible in the near term.

   So in each case, as these amendments are put forward, if they are, I will be guided also by the need to maintain administration support and Senate consensus regarding the resolution of ratification as a whole.

   I say to my Democratic colleagues on my side of the aisle, I do not presume to speak for them all. Generally, I do not think it is appropriate for the chairman or a ranking member to commit his or her party to a single position that that chairman or, in this case, the ranking member takes.

   I respect my colleagues who may come forward with amendments, but I hope they understand my rationale and why I will not be supporting those amendments, even the good ones, because there is no amendment I can see that is so significant that it would cure all the defects or all the things this treaty fails to address. The risk I am concerned about is bogging this treaty down.

   It is a good resolution, I say to the Presiding Officer, who knows that as well as or better than anyone present--he is one of the most informed people in this body on foreign relations and arms control issues. I think it will be implemented. The reporting it requires, I think, will enable us to do our constitutional duty of watching over the treaty in the coming years.

   Let's pass it and then work together to make it a success and work together to take the next steps we have to take.

   I would note to my chairman that there may be a resolution unrelated to any amendment to this treaty calling for the Senate to go on record in a much more forceful way to support a comprehensive non-proliferation strategy and Nunn-Lugar cooperative threat reduction efforts. As I said in the chairman's absence, without verification, there are only two things that give me real solace, and they are the insight we get from the Nunn-Lugar initiatives and cooperative threat reduction, as well as the remaining verification process that exists within the START treaty which will expire three years before this treaty expires.

   But it will not, I assure my colleague, be as an amendment. It will not be as a declaration which we cannot amend. It will not be as a condition to this treaty.

   I thank my colleagues for their indulgence. I do not plan on speaking on

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   I thank the Chair and yield the floor.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Vermont.

   Mr. JEFFORDS. Mr. President, I commend the chairman and ranking member for the work they have done. I can only agree wholeheartedly with the ranking member's comments about the problems this treaty has, although I also intend to vote for it.

   I came to the Senate in 1989. At that time, Vermont was a leader in the effort to reduce nuclear weapons. I, therefore, became very interested in what we could do to reduce the threat of nuclear war.

   In November 1990, I traveled with seven Members of Parliament from the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union. We went to the capital of each of our countries. We worked as hard as we could to raise awareness of the dangers of nuclear war and discuss what could be done to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

   In England, we spoke with people who were involved with nuclear issues. We had a very memorable time with the Speaker of the House of Lords and also the House of Commons and gained insight into the British perspective on these issues.

   We then traveled to Moscow on the evening Soviet President Gorbachev gave his annual economic speech. We were amazed when, following the speech, he spent a great deal of time with us discussing the nuclear issue. He stated that the Soviet Union would certainly welcome a prohibition on nuclear testing. At the end of that meeting, there was one light moment. I brought him a pint of maple syrup. I offered it to him and said that if he were to give a teaspoonful of this to someone, why, they would immediately seek peace. He responded: Do you have a liter? I said: No, but I will get you one. It was an interesting time.

   We flew from there to Washington and met with National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft.

   This is an issue I have followed for many years. I agree with my predecessor, the ranking member, that this treaty is far from perfect. We are engaged in a global struggle to confront the terrorist threat and to curtail the dangers posed by the prospect of nuclear materials in the hands of so-called rogue nations.

   While I will vote for this treaty, I cannot help but feel that the Moscow Treaty represents a tragic waste of opportunity. Instead of capitalizing on the Russian desire to reach agreement on deep cuts in nuclear warheads and instead of seeking destruction of warheads to ensure that Russian nuclear materials never fall into the hands of America's enemies, the Bush administration's distaste for arms control agreements--indeed, for any sort of internationally binding agreement--has prevented it from seizing the opportunity to make the American people more secure.

   There is nothing inherently wrong with the Moscow Treaty. It requires the United States and Russia to reduce their operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons to between 1,700 to 2,200 warheads.

   In a small way, it will make the United States, Russia, and the world a safer place--a very small way. It also is consistent with the previous administration's recommendations in the 1994 Nuclear Posture Review.

   The shame of the Moscow Treaty is not in what it does, but in what it does not do. The treaty represents a lost opportunity. The Bush administration's scorn for arms control blinded it to a golden opportunity presented by negotiation of the Moscow Treaty to address bigger nonproliferation and counterterrorism concerns of the United States.

   The Bush administration came into this negotiation only reluctantly. It repeatedly declared its opposition to the negotiation of a legally binding treaty text, asserting that less formal agreements or statements would suffice.

   Press reports are replete with examples of conflict between the Pentagon, which opposed any limitations on its offensive nuclear weapons and wanted the flexibility to increase nuclear forces, and the State Department, which supported the negotiation of a legally binding agreement.

   In the end, the State Department got its legally binding agreement, and the Pentagon got an agreement that is notable not only for its brevity, but also for its lack of lasting impact.

   While the treaty calls for each side to ``reduce and limit'' its strategic nuclear warheads to within the 1,700 to 2,200 range, the United States made clear early in the negotiation that it would interpret this phrase to apply only to ``operationally deployed'' warheads. In other words, there is no obligation to destroy even a single warhead under the Moscow Treaty.

   Warheads can be removed from their delivery vehicles and stored close by and still count as a ``reduction'' under the treaty. The United States has made clear that it plans to dismantle some warheads, put some in deep storage, and store others as spares.

   The absence of any obligation to destroy warheads leads to one of the treaty's most striking anomalies. The deadline for the reduction of operationally deployed warheads to within the 1,700 to 2,200 range is December 31, 2012. Unless otherwise agreed, the treaty expires the very same day. So the reduction in operationally deployed warheads, which are the only reductions in strategic nuclear weapons required by the treaty, lasts for only 1 day.

   On January 1, 2013, each party will be free from Moscow Treaty constraints on deployment of its strategic nuclear warheads. Moreover, if either the United States or Russia decides at any time in the interim that it wants to redeploy its warheads, it need only provide 90 days notice of withdrawal, and it will be free to do so.

   On May 13, 2002, the President stated that he was ``pleased to announce that the United States and Russia have agreed to a treaty which will substantially reduce our nuclear arsenals to the agreed-upon range of 1,700 to 2,200 warheads. This treaty will liquidate the legacy of the cold war.''

   This statement provides one more example of the President's rhetoric not matching reality. The treaty does not reduce our nuclear warhead arsenals to the range of the 1,700 to 2,200 warheads. Far from it. The White House refused to agree to such reductions. The treaty merely removes warheads from operational deployment. There is no reduction in nuclear arsenals. The legacy of the cold war lives on. It just sits a short distance from our missiles, bombers, and submarines rather than in a deployed posture.

   Faced with the opportunity to lock in reductions of Russian strategic nuclear warheads, the President let ideology get in the way of meaningful agreement. Despite well-publicized concerns over Russia's ability to control its nuclear materials, he passed on an opportunity to assist global efforts against proliferation and terrorist attack by helping Russia deal with its nuclear stockpiles.

   There are a host of additional steps that could have been taken in connection with the negotiation of the Moscow Treaty.

   The President could have acted upon Russian desires to make true reductions in our offensive strategic nuclear weapons. He refused, despite the fact that destruction of Russian nuclear warheads would have eliminated their vulnerability to theft or diversion to terrorists.

   The President could have agreed to Russian proposals for negotiation of a verification regime to track progress toward the 2012 limits on deployed warheads.

   He refused, despite the confidence it would have instilled in the reduction process.

   The President could have expanded the negotiation to cover tactical nuclear weapons.

   He refused, despite the fact that thousands of such weapons exist in Russia and the United States without any sort of monitoring or control by an arms control regime.

   Because of their small size and battlefield application, these weapons are extremely attractive to terrorist organizations, and relatively vulnerable.

   The United States is currently unable to determine the precise number of Russian tactical nuclear weapons, and therefore unable to determine the nature of Russian control over such weapons and whether some might already have been lost or stolen.

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   The President also could have expanded the negotiation to cover the problem of multiple independently targeted warheads known as MIRVs.

   Refusal to do so by the President leaves the American people vulnerable to the loss of several sites from a single missile launch.

   Steps of this sort truly would have matched the President's rhetoric, and they would have made this world far safer for our children.

   The opportunities presented by the Moscow Treaty are now lost. Other opportunities exist, however, to work with Russia and others around the world to fight the proliferation of nuclear weapons, material, and knowledge.

   Such work is critical to our efforts to combat terrorism and to halt the spread of nuclear weapons and know-how to countries such as North Korea, Iran, and Iraq.

   It is my sincere hope that in the future the President will reconsider the narrow approach taken toward the Moscow Treaty, and to other agreements such as the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

   The fight against terrorism and the spread of nuclear weapons must be fought on several fronts.

   Half-hearted efforts like the Moscow Treaty will not meet the needs of the American people and the world.

   Mr. LUGAR. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mrs. DOLE). The clerk will call the roll.

   The assistant bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

   Mr. HAGEL. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

   Mr. HAGEL. Madam President, I rise today to support the resolution of ratification of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions--or, as we call it, the Moscow Treaty--now before the Senate.

   The Moscow Treaty represents a shared commitment by the United States and Russia to step back from the cold war policies of nuclear confrontation and enter into a new era of cooperation. This is to assure that our nuclear weapons no longer threaten either our peoples or our civilization.

   It was the bold vision of President Ronald Reagan, 17 years ago, at the Gorbachev summit in Reykjavik that set in motion this effort to make dramatic reductions in the nuclear weapons arsenals of the United States and then the Soviet Union. President Reagan's vision, once considered by some a fantasy or a negotiating ploy, is becoming the standard by which we should measure our success in arms control.

   The Moscow Treaty avoids the strategic gamesmanship and pitfalls of the SALT treaties, the ABM Treaty, and other negotiations of the cold war.

   The simplicity of this treaty, only three pages in length, betrayed its historic significance for United States-Russian relations and for global security. Its strength is the power of its objective, to dramatically reduce American and Russian strategic weapons.

   On November 13, 2001, President Bush announced that the United States would reduce its strategic nuclear arsenal by two-thirds, from approximately 6,000 nuclear weapons to between 1,700 and 2,200 operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons by December 31, 2012.

   The President made this determination independent of what Russia would do, knowing that these reductions would be in the overall strategic interest of the United States.

   President Putin determined that comparable reductions would also be in his country's own national security interest. On May 24, 2002, Bush and Putin agreed that their commitment to these reductions would take the form of a legally binding treaty.

   The negotiations over the Moscow Treaty did not fall into the traps of previous arms control agreements negotiated with the Soviet Union during the cold war. That is as much a testimony to the new spirit of U.S.-Russian relations and the realities of today's threats as it is to the strength of the treaty. For example, it took the United States Senate 3 years to ratify the START II treaty. It took the Russian Duma 7 years for ratification. And both sides put conditions unacceptable to the other side on the respective ratification agreements. As a result, that agreement never went into force.

   Instead of years of back and forth negotiations, with each side seeking a strategic advantage, the Moscow Treaty illustrates a turning point in America's relationship with Russia. It should provide an environment conducive to future arms control negotiations.

   The Resolution of Ratification before us today introduces just two straightforward conditions that complement rather than complicate the treaty. First, the administration must report to the Senate annually on how the United States plans to reach the required reduction goals. While this resolution does not set a rigid timetable, these reports will allow the Senate to oversee the implementation of this treaty.

   The second condition deals with the

   Cooperative Threat Reduction or Nunn-Lugar programs. Russia is committed to meeting these reductions, but the question remains if Russia has the resources to meet them. The Nunn-Lugar program has been successful in assisting the former states of the Soviet Union to help reduce their nuclear arsenals. The Resolution of Ratification rightly includes Nunn-Lugar programs as instrumental in achieving lasting and durable arms reduction.

   The Moscow Treaty should not be considered as the final chapter in U.S.-Russian arms control, but it is an important and historic step forward. The United States and Russia must do more to prevent the proliferation of dual use technology and weapons of mass destruction to Iran, North Korea, and other countries. The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction programs are crucial to our shared security interests in preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destructions. For us to succeed in making a safer world, Washington and Moscow must be strategic partners, not strategic adversaries.

   The Bush Administration, Chairman LUGAR, Senator BIDEN, and others who have framed the Treaty and the Resolution of Ratification deserve credit and thanks for their leadership and steady focus. I urge my colleagues to vote yes on the resolution without amendments, for the very reasons Senator BIDEN articulated just minutes ago, and to understand the broader context and significance of this treaty for U.S.-Russian relations and global security. I yield the floor.

   I suggest the absence of a quorum.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

   The senior assistant bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

   Mr. DORGAN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

   Mr. DORGAN. Madam President, I will speak briefly today about the treaty we are considering. I spoke about it in brief yesterday and said while I would vote for it, I think it is not much better than nothing with respect to arms control. I will explain a little bit about where I think we are and where I hope we might go on some of these issues.

   I note that Senator Lugar is in the