As stated by Linton Brooks, the administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration, in testimony before the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces of the Senate Armed Services Committee:

   I have a bias in favor of the lowest usable yield because I have the bias in favor of something that is the minimum destruction. ..... I have a bias in favor of things that might be usable.

   The language approved by the majority of the Armed Services Committee would repeal the ban on the development of low yield nuclear weapons. Without this ban, there is no impediment in law to research, development, testing, production, or deployment of new low yield nuclear weapons.

   The bill also provides the National Nuclear Security Administration with funds the administration requested to continue work on a robust nuclear earth penetrator. This effort would modify one of two existing high yield nuclear weapons to create a nuclear weapon that will penetrate rock. Both weapons being looked at for possible modification are high yield nuclear weapons with yields approximating 30 and 70 times the nuclear explosive power of the Hiroshima bomb.

   Without a requirement that that nuclear earth penetrator weapon be authorized by Congress, there is no legal impediment to its development, testing, production, or deployment.

   At a time when the United States is trying to dissuade other countries from going forward with nuclear weapons development, when we strongly oppose North Korea pulling out of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, and when we suggest that indeed we may use military force to prevent North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons, when we are spending billions of dollars to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, materials, and technology, these proposed actions by the administration would send the opposite message we are trying to give to the world. We are telling others not to go down the road to nuclear weapons, but instead of being a leader in the effort to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, we are recklessly driving down that same road.

   The United States should not follow a policy that we do not tolerate in others.

 In the area of ballistic missile defense, one of the problems lies in what is not in the bill rather than what is in the bill. The missile defense program continues to move along, spending billions of dollars without performance criteria. Moreover, the Department of Defense has cancelled plans for 9 of the 20 ground-based midcourse interceptors that have been planned from 2003 to 2007. Surely we have an obligation to test the limited ballistic missile defense and to understand the extent to which it will or will not work. Yet one of the key tests the Department proposed to cancel is the most significant test. It was scheduled before the end of the fiscal year 2004. We restored that funding in committee.

   If we want a missile defense system that actually works, rather than one that sits on the ground and soaks up money, we should not be cancelling tests. The administration actually requested that operational testing not be required on a limited missile defense system. We refused that request and we struck the language the administration had proposed.

   Again, thankfully, our bill restores an intercept test with a missile defense program in 2004. More needs to be done to assure that this system is tested adequately and proven to really work. The rest of the canceled tests should be restored. There will be debate on these and other areas relating to the Department of Defense authorization bill.

SENATOR KENNEDY.

My principal concern with this legislation involves the provisions that authorize the fateful change of course in our longstanding policy on nuclear weapons. Of all challenges our country has faced over the past half century, the prevention of nuclear war is by far the most important. It is no accident that in all the years and the half century since World War II, no nuclear weapon has ever been used in any of the conflicts that have taken place anywhere on Earth. Few in 1945 would have predicted that extraordinary success, and few today would disagree that the effective world leadership of the United States under Presidents of both political parties on nuclear arms control throughout those years has been primarily responsible for that success.

   The danger today is that with the passing of the World War II generation in our own country and nations throughout the world, a new generation of leaders has been rising to power who did not live through the dawn of the nuclear age themselves and for whom the mushroom clouds over Hiroshima and Nagasaki are images from history, not vivid recollections from their own lives. Greater vigilance is clearly needed to continue the success of our nuclear arms control policy since 1945 and ensure that nuclear weapons are not used by any nation in the future.

   Preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear materials to other nations and to terrorists is the most urgent aspect of that challenge today. We all pray the Bush administration will be successful in the current negotiations with North Korea and that the tenuous progress made in recent weeks will improve so a successful conclusion can be achieved.

   Many of us are increasingly concerned, however, that with Congress and the Nation preoccupied over the past year with the war against terrorism and the war in Iraq that the administration has been quietly laying the groundwork for a far-reaching and highly dangerous U turn in our longstanding policy against the first use of nuclear weapons.

   Because of their unique and massive destructive power, nuclear weapons have always been kept separate from other weapons as part of our strong commitment to do all we can to see they are never used again. The Bush administration's proposal to veer away from that commitment should have been a wake-up call for Congress and the Nation many months ago.

   In the decade after the first two nuclear bombs were used in World War II and the nuclear arms race began with the Soviet Union, nations and peoples throughout the world began to realize both the danger posed by the use of nuclear weapons and the danger from the testing of nuclear weapons. To deal with those dangers, a remarkable series of international treaties was proposed, negotiated, and approved that had broad support in the world community, restrained the nuclear arms

   race between the United States and the Soviet Union, and dramatically reduced the spread of nuclear weapons to other nations.

   An excellent chronology of the many significant events in the history of nuclear weapons, beginning with the discovery of radioactivity in 1896, is available on the Web sites of the Global Security Institute which was founded by our former colleague Senator Alan Cranston to enhance our understanding of these issues. I urge Members of the Senate to consult with it.

   One of the landmark achievements in reducing the spread of nuclear weapons was the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty which came into effect in 1968 and under which nuclear and nonnuclear nations alike agreed to halt the development of these weapons. Currently 185 nations have signed the extension of the NPT. The reason the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty has been so successful is the presumption that nuclear weapons will not be used by the principal nuclear powers except in the most extreme circumstances. For 25 years Republican and Democratic administrations alike have emphasized our commitment not to use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear nations. This assurance to other nations that nuclear weapons will not be used against them has been a major factor in avoiding nuclear war, slowing the nuclear arms race, and preventing the proliferation of these weapons to other countries and to terrorists.

   Control of current nuclear stockpiles is especially critical. The danger is very real that terrorists may be able to acquire nuclear material or even nuclear warheads. Even before 9/11, Congress and the administration had recognized this significant threat and, under the leadership of our former colleague Senator Nunn and our colleague Senator Lugar, we enacted a threat reduction program in 1991 to safeguard and reduce the nuclear arsenals of Russia and other former Soviet states. The Nunn-Lugar program has been effective in deactivating or destroying literally thousands of nuclear warheads and intercontinental ballistic missiles and hundreds of tons of fissionable material. Nevertheless, we have done far from enough to prevent the proliferation of these weapons.

   Shortly before President Bush's inauguration, a task force reported that the most urgent national security threat to the United States today is the danger that weapons of mass destruction or weapons-usable material in Russia could be stolen, sold to terrorists, or

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   In January of 2002, the administration released a nuclear posture review that could take us in a new and far more dangerous direction. The review blurs the line between conventional and nuclear weapons. It suggests that certain events might compel the United States to use nuclear weapons first, even against nonnuclear nations. It also relies much more heavily on a nuclear threat by America in dealing with the difficult challenges we face in the world. The administration has even indicated it might use nuclear weapons in response to a chemical or biological attack. There is no justification for that kind of escalation. Our conventional weapons are more than adequate to deal with that threat. We gain no greater deterrence by threatening to go nuclear. It makes no sense to break down the firewall we have always maintained between nuclear weapons and other weapons and that has succeeded so well for so long in preventing nuclear war.

   Other nations have complied with this basic principle, too. A nuclear weapon is not just another item in our arsenal, and it is wrong to treat it as if it were. In fact, the Nuclear Posture Review specifically discusses circumstances in which the United States might engage in the first use of nuclear weapons, such as a North Korean attack on South Korea, or a military confrontation over the status of Taiwan.

   The administration also appeared to be considering the use of nuclear weapons against Libya, Syria, Iraq, and Iran. We reap what we sow. If we brandish our own nuclear weapons, we only encourage other nations to do all they can to develop their own.

   It is ominous as well that the administration is asking the Nation's weapons laboratories to consider the possibility of resuming nuclear testing in order to protect our current stockpile and meet new requirements in the future. They want funds in the budget to be used to prepare for testing new nuclear weapons and to cut in half the time needed to do so. They have asked the Department to consider global strike capabilities with new nuclear weapons, which would have to be tested as well. It makes no sense to abandon our moratorium on nuclear testing. That moratorium has stood for over a decade, and it has served us well.

   The pending bill continues this dangerous shift in other ways as well. Last year, the administration received $15 billion. The current bill proposes another $15 billion this year to study the feasibility of modifying existing warheads to create what they call a robust nuclear earth penetrator, a bunker buster, with 10 times the size of the Hiroshima blast, to be used to destroy hardened enemy targets buried deeply underground. It is difficult to believe that any administration in its right mind would propose such a weapon. A nuclear explosion in a bunker could spew tons of radioactive waste into the atmosphere, with a devastating plume that could poison huge areas in its path. Surely, if there is any need for such a weapon, we can develop a conventional weapon to achieve the purpose of the bunker buster.

   In yet another far-out nuclear proposal, the Bush administration has proposed to lift the current statutory ban on low-yield nuclear weapons, which now prevents the development of weapons with yields under 5 kilotons--about half the size of the Hiroshima blast. The precision-guided conventional munitions and standoff weapons we have today make these many nukes unnecessary. They would be no more effective than conventional munitions and would be far more dangerous to our troops and to our planet.

   In the debate in recent weeks on tax policy, President Bush has criticized the Senate and come out strongly against what he called ``iddy-biddy'' tax cuts. What we should be really against is iddy-biddy nukes.

   The hardliners in the Bush administration seem to believe that the longstanding firewall between nuclear and conventional weapons is obsolete and is making us more vulnerable to nuclear blackmail. They claim that lowering the threshold for using nuclear weapons will make our own nuclear threat a stronger and more credible deterrent. That is the last thing we need.

   The clear and present danger of the administration's change in nuclear policy is that it will encourage other nations to develop nuclear deterrents of their own. The entire world will be at greater risk that these weapons will

   be used--and used against us.

   Unfortunately, the real debate on these all-important issues of nuclear policy is only just beginning. Certainly, these issues demand far more attention than Congress and the country have been giving them. They have been eclipsed for too long by the war on terrorism and the war against Iraq. We can ignore them no longer. We have an obligation to our Nation and our people, and to all nations and all peoples, to see that nuclear weapons are never used again.

   In the debate in the coming days, I intend to offer an amendment to maintain the firewall between conventional and nuclear weapons. It strikes the provision repealing the prohibition on low-yield nuclear weapons that was put in place in the 1994 National Defense Authorization Act. That act prohibits research, testing, and development on low-yield nuclear weapons, and there is no reason to weaken it.

   Some suggest we should compromise and allow at least a little research. I say to the Senate, don't let the administration even start down that road. Don't feed the nuclear addiction. It is essential to continue to prohibit even the research on any such weapons. We do not want our descendents, surveying a devastated planet, to say that in this legislation the United States breached this firewall and took the decisive, shameful step that led to nuclear war.

SENATOR SESSIONS.

Briefly, Mr. President, we did talk about the nuclear posture of the United States. President Bush has proposed a reduction in nuclear weapons that is, in fact, reducing American nuclear weapons by one-half. That is a good direction.

   Oddly, we remain the only nuclear power in the world that does not have the capacity at this point to build another nuclear weapon. Other nations are either building nuclear weapons or have the capability and have not eliminated it. First of all it would be unwise, in my view, to freeze ourselves at a low number and never be able to increase it, which simply sets out a target that any nation in the world, if they could reach that number, would then be a nuclear power on parity with the United States. We do not need to do that.

   I think the President is wise to not renounce unequivocally that he would never use a nuclear weapon before it has been used on us, particularly when people have the ability to threaten us with biological and chemical weapons that could cause even more loss of life than a single nuclear weapon. We need to keep our poise here. The President is reducing nuclear weapons. He is not expanding our number of nuclear weapons. The Defense Department and the President have not allowed the politically correct crowd or other groups to pressure him into saying we would never use a weapon before it is used on us.

SENATOR REED.

  Finally, let me cover a topic that will receive a great deal of attention over the next couple days. That is the issue of nuclear policy. I have grave concerns over some of the provisions in the bill. Under the guise of maintaining flexibility and keeping all options open, this bill approves and encourages the administration to continue its push to develop, test, deploy, and possibly use nuclear weapons. I heard my colleague Senator Levin earlier today referencing the quote by former Ambassador Brooks, the head of NSSA, who said his bias is to something that can be used. For many decades, our bias was against even thinking about the use of nuclear weapons if we could avoid it.

   One of the consequences of the proposal for a low-yield nuclear weapon, for a robust nuclear earth penetrator is, if not a fact, an observation that as you make weapons such that their collateral damage is minimal, there is a tendency to use them. We have to ask ourselves in our recent conflict in Baghdad, would we have dropped dumb bombs in the middle of crowded neighborhoods in an attempt to attack the leadership of Iraq? It would have been a much harder call. But because we had precision weapons with low collateral damage, as a result the call was much easier--a tough call, nevertheless, but easier.

   I fear that as we move down this path for low-yield nuclear weapons, more usable nuclear weapons, the threshold, the inhibition against use will come down also. This is just not another tool in our tool kit. Nuclear weapons have been, since Hiroshima and Nagasaki, a weapon every nation has tried to avoid using in combat. I hope we can continue that effort, but I fear the language, the momentum, the incentives that have created these exceptions in the bill are driving us down the wrong path.

   We should respond by amending the legislation to reflect the continuing desire to put nuclear weapons outside of use, to delegitimize their use in conflict. We will have opportunity over the next several days to debate in much more detail the issue of nuclear weapons, the issue of missile defense.

   I believe this legislation overall is sound. If we could make successful amendments to some of the provisions with respect to missile defense and particularly the provisions with respect to nuclear weapons, we can send to conference a bill of which we will all be very proud. I hope in the next few days we can do that.

   Strike section 3131.

   Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I think the Senator probably knows this would strike the Spratt-Furse language.

   Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, we understood a number of Senators were going to introduce it.

   Mrs. FEINSTEIN. I was 12 years old when the Enola Gay went out of the Pacific. I remember that big mushroom cloud on the San Francisco Chronicle and then, for months afterward, I remember the pictures that came back from Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It may well be that we are too far removed from that day to really understand the repercussions of what this bill is going to begin to allow to happen in the United States. What is going to be allowed to happen is a reopening of the door to nuclear development which has been closed for decades.

   This amendment would strike section 3131, and that is the repeal of the Spratt-Furse language which prohibits the development of so-called low-yield nuclear weapons. This prohibition of nuclear development was adopted in the 1994 Defense authorization bill. It has been the law of the land for the last decade.

   The language of Spratt-Furse--I would like to read it--says that with respect to U.S. policy, ``it shall be the policy of the United States not to conduct research and development which could lead to the production by the United States of a new low-yield nuclear weapon, including a precision low-yield warhead. The Secretary of Energy may not conduct or provide for the conduct of research and development which could lead to the production by the United States of a low-yield nuclear weapon which, as of the date of the enactment of this act, has not entered production.''

   And then it has a section on the effect on other research and development, and it says that nothing in this section shall prohibit the Secretary of Energy from conducting or providing for the conduct of research and development necessary to design a testing device that has a yield of less than 5 kilotons; secondly, to modify an existing weapon for the purpose of addressing safety and reliability concerns, or, three, to address proliferation concerns.

   President Bush is right when he says the greatest threat facing the United States lies in the global proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorist access to these weapons. But by adopting a new approach to national security in the wake of 9/11 that stresses unilateralism and preemption and increases U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons, I am deeply concerned that this administration may actually be encouraging the very proliferation we seek to prevent.

   This bill, left intact, clearly opens the door to the development of new nuclear weapons and will, if left as is, begin a new era of nuclear proliferation, as sure as I am standing here.

   A couple of weeks ago, former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright talked with the Democratic Senate Caucus and she said something interesting. She said, in all of American history, there never has been a greater change in foreign policy and national security than between this administration and the last one.

   Indeed, I deeply believe this bill places America at a crossroad in the conduct of foreign policy, and how we determine nuclear weapons policy will go a long way to determining whether we control nuclear proliferation or expand it. This bill will expand it. Let there be no doubt.

   To my mind, even considering the use of these weapons threatens to undermine our efforts to stop proliferation. In fact, it actually encourages other nations to pursue nuclear weapons by emphasizing their importance.

   For decades the United States relied on its nuclear arsenal for deterrence

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   Today the Soviet Union is gone, but the world is not a safer place. Rather, we have seen new nuclear states emerge--India, Pakistan, and lately North Korea. As we continue to prosecute the war on terror, it should be a central tenet of U.S. policy to do everything at our disposal to make nuclear weapons less desirable, less available, and less likely to be used.

   This bill will do exactly the opposite. Instead of ratcheting back our reliance on nuclear weapons, this administration is looking for new ways to use nuclear weapons and to make them more usable. Does anyone in this Chamber doubt that others will follow? I do not. The administration's Nuclear Posture Review, released in January of 2002, did not focus solely on the role of nuclear weapons for deterrence. It stressed the importance of being prepared to use nuclear weapons in the future. In fact, the review noted that we must now plan to possibly use them against a wider range of countries.

   The Nuclear Posture Review said that we need to develop new types of nuclear weapons so we can use them in a wider variety of circumstances and against a wider range of targets such as hard and deeply buried targets or to defeat chemical or biological agents.

   And indeed, a few months after issuing the Nuclear Posture Review, President Bush signed National Security Presidential Directive 17, saying the United States might use nuclear weapons to respond to a chemical or biological attack.

   In the past, U.S. officials have only hinted at that possibility. But this administration has made it formal policy. In doing so, it has telegraphed the importance of nuclear weapons and the administration's apparent willingness to use them.

   In the legislation before us today, there is language requested by the administration asking Congress to repeal the Spratt-Furse provision--a decade old law that bans research on weapons with yields of 5 kilotons. Now, that is a third the size of the bomb used at Hiroshima.

   I believe Spratt-Furse is an important prohibition with positive security equities for the United States. Since it has been in effect, no nation has developed lower yield nuclear weapons.

   This administration wants to repeal Spratt-Furse for one reason, and one reason only: to build new nuclear weapons, particularly for missions against the hardened bunkers that rogue states may be using to store chemical and biological weapons.

   By seeking to build nuclear weapons that produce smaller explosions and develop weapons which dig deeper, the administration is suggesting we can make nuclear weapons less deadly. It is suggesting we can make them more acceptable to use. But there is no such thing as a clean nuclear weapon that minimizes collateral damage.

   Consider the following facts: According to a Stanford physicist, Sidney Drell, destroying a target buried 1,000 feet into rock would require a nuclear weapon with the yield of 100 kilotons. That is 10 times the size of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima.

   According to Dr. Drell, even the effects of a small bomb would be dramatic. A 1-kiloton nuclear weapon detonated 20 to 50 feet underground would dig a crater the size of Ground Zero in New York and eject 1 million cubic feet of radioactive debris into the air.

   According to models done by the Natural Resources Defense Council, detonating a similar weapon on the surface of a city would kill a quarter of a million people and injure hundreds of thousands more.

   So there really is no such thing as a ``usable nuclear weapon.''

   Moreover, nuclear weapons cannot be engineered to penetrate deeply enough to prevent fallout. Based on technical analysis at the Nevada Test Site, a weapon with a 10-kiloton yield must be buried deeper than 850 feet to prevent spewing of radioactive debris. Yet a weapon dropped from a plane at 40,000 feet will penetrate less than 100 feet of loose dirt and less than 30 feet of rock.

   Ultimately, the depth of penetration is limited by the strength of the missile casing. The deepest our current earth penetrators can burrow is 20 feet of dry earth. Casing made of even the strongest material cannot withstand the physical forces of burrowing through 100 feet of granite, much less 850 feet.

   In addition, the United States already has a usable nuclear bunker buster, the B61-11, which has a ``dial-a-yield'' feature, allowing its yield to range from less than a kiloton to several hundred kilotons. When configured to have a 10-kiloton

   yield and detonated 4 feet underground, the B61-11 can produce a shock wave sufficient to crush a bunker buried beneath 350 feet of layered rock. We have the weapons to do the job. We don't need another.

   But the U.S. military, the strongest and most capable military force the world has ever seen, bar none, has plenty of effective conventional options at hand designed to penetrate deeply into the earth and destroy underground bunkers and storage facilities.

   Those conventional bunker busters range in size from 500 to 5,000 pounds, and most are equipped with either a laser or GPS guidance system. A 5,000-pound bunker buster like the Guided Bomb Unit 28/B is capable of penetrating up to 20 feet of reinforced concrete or 100 feet of earth. It was used with much success in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.

   Other conventional bunker busters were used to take out Saddam Hussein's underground lairs in Operation Iraqi Freedom. In fact, the U.S. military possesses a conventional bunker buster, the GBU-37, which is thought to be capable of taking out a silo-based ICBM. With this conventional arsenal at our disposal, there is little military utility that a low-yield nuclear weapon provides to the U.S. military.

   While I agree that nuclear weapons may have some military utility in certain circumstances, the benefit of the development of new mini-nukes appears to me to be far outweighed by the costs. But with the sought-for repeal of Spratt-Furse, the administration seems to be moving toward a military posture in which nuclear weapons are considered just like other weapons--in which their purpose is not simply to serve as a deterrent but as a usable instrument of military power, like a tank, a fighter aircraft, or a cruise missile.

   But there are several things wrong with that logic. Nuclear weapons are different.

   First, using them--even small ones--would cross a line that has been in place for 60 years. If the Spratt-Furse prohibition is repealed, the development of new nuclear weapons could lead to the resumption of underground nuclear testing in order to test the new weapons. This would overturn the 10-year moratorium on nuclear testing and could lead other nuclear powers, and nuclear aspirants, to resume or start testing, actions that would fundamentally alter future nonproliferation and counterproliferation efforts.

   I understand Secretary of State Powell has written a letter supporting this, and I must express my profound disappointment. I must restate something he said last year on ``The NewsHour With Jim Lehrer.'' I quote Secretary Powell:

   I mean, the thought of nuclear conflict in 2002, with what that would mean with respect to loss of life, what that would mean to the condemnation--the worldwide condemnation--that would come down on whatever nation chose to take that course of action, would be such that I can see very little military, political, or other kind of justification for the use of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons in this day and age may serve some deterrent effect, and so be it; but to think of using them as just another weapon in what might start out as a conventional conflict in this day and age seems to me something that no side should be contemplating.

   This was 1 year ago. What has changed, Mr. President? Why would we open the door to nuclear development at the very time we are trying to say to North Korea this is unacceptable, at the very time we are worried as to whether Pakistan can securitize its nuclear weapons, and whether there may be a nuclear holocaust between Pakistan and India?

   I have never been more concerned about where this Nation is going than I am today. Let me give another example. China has a no-first-use nuclear policy. Their warheads have been stable at between 18 and 24 ICBMs. Yet we

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   Does no one think anybody reads these things? Does no one believe that we do not set the tenor of the world with respect to weapons? We are the largest weapons seller on Earth, and I do not want to see us develop more nuclear weapons, nor do I believe the American people want to see it either. This bill allows that to happen.

   I do not believe this side of the aisle can sit by and let it happen to our children and our grandchildren. Tactical nuclear weapons in the most sophisticated military in the world should play no part.

   I cannot think of a single issue that should more define the political agenda today than whether the United States should go back into the nuclear business again, and repeal of Spratt-Furse is the first step in that direction.

   In the Energy Committee, I suspected this was coming, and I asked Secretary Abraham: Are there any plans? He said no. Last Wednesday, in Defense Appropriations, I asked Secretary Rumsfeld what is going on. He said: Oh, it is just a study. Just a study, baloney. Does anyone really believe that?

   The repeal of Spratt-Furse opens the door for America to begin to develop nuclear weapons again, and I for one do not believe we should sit by and see that happen.

   We are telling others not to develop nuclear weapons. We are telling others not to sell fissile materials. We are concerned when North Korea has plutonium and uranium and Iran begins to start up refining uranium. Yet it is all right for us to go out and begin to develop weapons that are one-third the size of the weapon that hit Hiroshima and killed instantly 175,000 people? I do not think so. And I do not believe that is what the American people stand for either.

   This is a big vote. This is a vote that opens the door. How we can repeal language that says to all the world the United States is not in the nuclear development business, I do not know, but I find it absolutely chilling and even diabolical, particularly when we preach to other nations.

   At a time when we brand as evil certain countries based in part on their pursuit of nuclear arms and weapons of mass destruction, we must be careful how we consider our own options and our own contingencies regarding nuclear weapons. So I urge my colleagues to think very carefully about the implications this defense bill is going to carry throughout the world.

   The 10-year old prohibition on study, on testing, and on developing nuclear weapons is going to be thrown out the window, and it is a major signal that the United States is going to get back into the nuclear arms business.

   I urge this Senate to join Senator Kennedy and I in support of this amendment. I yield time to Senator Kennedy, as much time as he requires.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.

   Mr. KENNEDY. I thank the Chair.

   Mr. President, over the past years, we have had the opportunity to consider the Defense authorization bill, and a number of extremely important weapons systems have been debated on the floor of the Senate. By and large, over that period, we have seen the results in our military.

   All of us recognize the extraordinary performance of our military in these past weeks where they performed with, first, extraordinary courage; second, with extraordinary leadership; and third, with the latest and the best of technology. I think all of us want to make sure those are the items which are going to be there for the security of our military. They are going to be the best trained, best led, and best equipped with the latest technology.

   We ought to consider the various proposals that are before us and ask what is the military significance of any of the matters we are asked to consider on the Defense authorization bill. It is against the background that the Senator from California has pointed out that we ought to examine what is the possible need for this kind of a weapons system and another opening of the debate on the testing of nuclear weapons.

   Make no mistake about it, we may hear that all we are interested in is the design of the nuclear weapon, but we will come back to that because it is the clear intention of the administration to move ahead with not only the design but also the testing of nuclear weaponry.

   We have to ask: How does that affect our national security? How does that affect our national defense? First of all, we ought to be asking ourselves, given the fact that our Armed Forces were in battle over the past weeks, resulting in an enormous success: What came out of that conflict that would make us take this step of lifting the ban on any kind of nuclear test? What happened in Iraq? What was the objective? What was the military objective in Iraq that would make us say what we want to do on the Defense authorization bill is move us back from the successful negotiations over the last 50 years of Republican and Democratic Presidents in moving us away from nuclear proliferation and moving us away from the possibility of nuclear confrontation? That is what the record has been over the last 50 years under Republican and Democratic Presidents alike.

   The Senator from California has reviewed that. We remember times when we came dangerously close--I certainly do--in the Cuban missile crisis to the real possibilities of nuclear conflict and nuclear exchange which effectively would have annihilated the United States and the Soviet Union as we knew it. It came dangerously close, and since that time Republican and Democrat leaders have said, OK, we do not want to see an escalation of the nuclear arms race. We have seen step after step to contain it. One of the most important ways of containing it is to have a moratorium on testing and also to have a battle against the proliferation of weapons.

   What we have with this administration is basically an effort to lift what they call the Spratt amendment, which is a prohibition for research and development into the nuclear weapons. One can call them mini nukes. One can call them small nukes. Basically, I call them low-death weapons because that is what they are. We are talking about the killing of thousands of individuals with these weapons systems, and the administration is attempting to open this whole process again.

   Over the period of the last 5 years we have not had any testing of nuclear weapons by India or by Pakistan, two nuclear powers. We have not seen any testing either by the United States, Russia, or China probably for the last 15 years. Progress was being made. We have seen five countries that have basically gone nonnuke, basically renounced their nuclear weapons in the world. We have been making real progress.

   What do we hear from the other side? We are living in a dangerous world. Well, I hope on the other side they are going to be able to tell us how nuclear weapons are going to solve the problem of dealing with al-Qaida, how nuclear weapons would have solved our problem in dealing with the threats in Morocco this week or Saudi Arabia, for example, the last week.

   What do they intend to do with these nuclear weapons? Well, we hear maybe they can be used in our new, dangerous world to deal with the problems of biological and chemical weapons.

   Have my colleagues read the reports on what would happen if we have nuclear weapons incinerating large storage spaces of gas or chemical weapons, and if those were to fractionate into the air in terms of critical masses, the amount of devastation and death that would mean to thousands or tens of thousands of troops if they were near or hundreds of thousands of civilians who were near?

   What is the singular purpose? What is the military necessity? What do the Joint Chiefs want to do with this weapons system?

   We will hear the other side say, let's not get all worked up about this because all we are trying to do is some research on this issue.

   Listen to what some of the principal spokespeople for the administration say about that. In February, the Pentagon's Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Affairs, Fred Celec, was asked: What would happen if a nuclear bomb could be developed that would crash

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   He said: It will ultimately get fielded.

   And you are talking about all we are trying to do is a little research in this area? Come back to us later on;

   we will come back and talk to you if we are really going to get into testing of nuclear weapons.

   This is what the head of the nuclear affairs weapons system at the Pentagon said: It will ultimately get fielded.

   Then we go to Linton Brooks, who is the administration's nuclear weapons chief at the Department of Energy, who said the same thing to the Armed Services Committee in April: I have a bias in favor of the lowest usable yield because I have a bias in favor of something that is the minimum destruction. I have a bias in favor of things that might be usable.

   There he is, Linton Brooks, the administration's nuclear weapons chief at the Department of Energy. Come on, now. You are talking about we are just going to do a little research and then we will come back and talk to you? Do you think our friends and adversaries around the world are going to believe that is what is going to happen in the United States? They will read those statements and they will start their programs of testing. That is what we are risking.

   For what? We still have not heard from the military as to what it is our conventional bombs cannot do. What is it that our conventional artillery cannot achieve and accomplish? Where were their failings? Where is the potential target out there somewhere in the world? It was never told to us in the Armed Services Committee. It was never revealed to us in the Armed Services Committee.

   Nonetheless, we want to find out if we want to go ahead--with all of the potential dangers that we know in terms of the dangers of proliferation of weaponry and the dangers from testing.

   We have the administration's own Nuclear Posture Review in January of last year outlining the plans for developing new nuclear weapons, including improved weapons and warheads that reduce collateral damage. Do you know what that means in layman's language, reduced collateral damage? That means these smaller nuclear weapons. That is what it means.

   Now, let us look at what these low-death weapons--I call them low-death weapons--could do. We have seen the administration talk about not exploding them even in their testimony before the Armed Services Committee. They refused to rule out the use of any nuclear weapons in the battle with Iraq; although Tony Blair did, our Secretary would not.

   Well, now we have the 5-kiloton, earth-penetrating nuclear explosion. This chart depicts the average wind patterns for a winter day in the Middle East. It depicts a hypothetical attack outside of Damascus, Syria, using the nuclear weapon with a yield of 5 kilotons. The threshold of this ban exploded at a depth of 30 feet. This is the level, approximately 50 feet. This is at 30 feet.

   This blast would cause 230,000 fatalities and another 280,000 casualties from radiation exposure within 2 years of the blast.

   This is a plume pattern developed by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency computer model. We are talking about tens of thousands--hundreds of thousands--of casualties. That is what we are talking about with this weapon system.

   What is the challenge? Are we finding that the Russians are building up to develop this kind of capability? No, we have not heard that. Have we heard the Chinese are now trying to build up their capability somehow to be a threat to us? No, we have not heard that. Have we heard the Pakistanis are going to do it? No. The Indians are going to do it? No, we have not heard they are going to do it. They have actually complied with the test ban treaties by not having any explosions, and they have been working with us in terms of the reduction. Certainly the Russians have in terms of reducing the total number of nuclear weapons.

   We stood on the floor and passed an agreement with Russia not many weeks ago. So what is out there? What is out there that is going to put us on the track toward the reassumption of nuclear testing? What is the threat to us today?

   It seems to me we do live in a dangerous world, with what is called al-Qaida. Everyone in the United States understands it, if they read the newspapers in the last few days and they see what has happened in the Middle East and what has happened in Morocco. We have to ask ourselves: How in the world will this particular weapon system help us deal with that particular threat?

   That reason has not been made.

   The reason for this weapon system other than, well, let's take a chance, we can move ahead, it will be nice to add this to our stockpile, add one more weapon system, seems to be the argument. We have the possibility of going ahead; why not go ahead and do it.

   I don't hear the other questions being raised about the range of activities that are going to take place in countries around the world. Make no mistake, this will release a chain of reactions across this world in nuclear testing. On the one hand, the United States says, look, we are trying to negotiate with the North Koreans in order to reduce the possibilities of nuclear exchange and miscalculation on the Korean peninsula. But do not pay attention to what we do. We are going over here to develop some new nuclear weapons. How does that work? What kind of message does that send in this world today? Who will buy that? Maybe those who support it are going to say how that kind of activity has worked in the recent past, how that kind of threat has resulted in other countries being cowed and intimidated into laying off on that. It will be the contrary.

   Now, should these systems ever need to be developed, other colleagues want to speak about what the dangers would be, as to the possibilities of terrorists being able to purloin, steal, a small weapon system and being able to use that more effectively. We all know it is enormously complicated and difficult for them to do it today--not an impossibility--and we are realistic in terms of trying to do more to make sure that is done, but there is a whole range of additional threats by smaller systems that can cause devastation to hundreds of thousands of people.

   Finally, we see what this administration will do; they will deploy the dangerous nuclear weapons. They could be developed to penetrate, according to their Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Affairs. Linton Brooks: ``I have a bias in things that might be usable.''

   And there is the administration's nuclear policy review that indicates deployed warheads reduce collateral damage. That is what we are talking about. This is a matter of enormous risk.

   If this risk were balanced by the danger, sign me up. But that case has not been made. This would be a remarkable step backward from the firewall established going back to GEN Eisenhowser, all the way through, a firewall between conventional and nuclear.

   This administration, this policy, will break that down. It is wrong. It is not in our national security interests. That ought to be the test. This fails to meet that test.

   I hope our amendment is acceptable.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. CRAPO). The Senator from California.

   Mrs. FEINSTEIN. I ask unanimous consent that Senator Reed from Rhode Island be added as a cosponsor, Senator Durbin of Illinois, I believe Senator Dayton already is, and Senator Bingaman, as well.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

   The Senator from Alabama.

   Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, this is an issue we have considered in the Armed Services Committee, of which I am a member. I note it passed on a vote of 15 to 10 with bipartisan support.

   I hear the opponents to this amendment using words such as ``these matters should not even been contemplated.'' ``We should not even think about a new type of nuclear weapon that may be less dangerous, have less collateral damage than the ones we already have. That is not where the United States should be.''

   I note for my colleagues, the cold war approach to life has changed. We are in a new world environment. We need to be thoughtful about how we go forward. We should not shut off any study, any evaluation, of nuclear weapons in what we might need in the future, what

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   They say if we do anything, if we study, if we go out and do any research, if we even think about what other nations might be doing, we can no longer encourage countries not to proliferate their weapons. I don't think so.

   What is happening now? They say Pakistan, they talk about India, Korea, Iran, and other countries that are, in fact, working on nuclear weapons. They are doing that now, are they not? Aren't they doing that right now, this very minute? The fact we have not done any research or development or built any weapons in over a decade, I suppose, how has that had any impact on what they decide to do? These countries make decisions on what they think might be in their best interest. We have to work with them and encourage them

   not to do certain things.

   If a lot of countries around this world--a lot of them are our Allies like Japan--if they felt we did not have an adequate military capability or option or weapon system that would allow us to effectively defend their interests, they may decide they have to have nuclear weapons, too. The United States has a peacekeeping role in the world. It is a high calling. It requires us to be very thoughtful. We cannot exercise blind fear about the world we are in and the technology that is out there and what is going to happen.

   A lot of people may not know, of all the nuclear powers in the world, this country is the only one incapable at this moment of building a new weapon. We do not have the capability at this point to build new weapons. Despite that, the President has called for a reduction in our nuclear stockpile by one half or more. We are in an unprecedented reduction in the nuclear capability of this country, removing thousands of weapons from our inventories. However, we do not need to stick our head in the sand. We do not need to assume other countries are not out there studying nuclear weapons and will study nuclear weapons whether we study nuclear weapons. That is silly. That has no logical basis.

   Think about it. Whether we have a laboratory somewhere that is studying nuclear weapons, this is going to determine whether Kim Jong Il decides to build new weapons? Whether Iran or China decides to build more weapons? No sir, not at all. That makes no sense whatever.

   We have had smaller weapons in the past. They have been removed from stockpiles. I don't think that destabilized the world during that period.

   They say, well, even though we are reducing our stocks by half, even though we have no weapons program, even though we are not doing nuclear testing, it is our fault. We are somehow destabilizing the world. We are causing Kim Jong Il to create weapons. I don't think it is our fault. I am not part of the ``blame America first'' crowd. Anyone wants to go to the DMZ up there and look into that depraved country of North Korea, stand in that wonderful, free, progressive country of South Korea, and see what he has done to the people of North Korea and has no moral rejection of him and his would-be empire, his regime, and has no sense of compassion for the people he oppresses, and now we are going to blame ourselves for his misbehavior? And we are sending him food to feed his own people because he cannot raise the food to do so? I don't think so.

   I believe this country has a moral responsibility to lead in this world and we will not be an effective leader if we don't maintain leadership in all forms of weaponry--yes, including nuclear weaponry. It is just that simple.

   I hope we do not have to develop any new systems, but I don't see anything wrong with doing some research. We might learn what others are doing out there, too, and that might be important to our national defense.

   We are the premier nuclear power in the world--premier power in general and the premier nuclear power in the world. If we ever got to the point where we had some smaller weapons, why would that make the world more dangerous than the big ones we have, let me ask you? I think that is not where we need to be heading. We need to be rational about where we are. Nuclear power remains a part of our arsenal. A growing number of nations around the world, as they have been from time to time since nuclear power became available, are studying ways to develop their own nuclear power.

   They say we can't use it against al-Qaida. Maybe we can, maybe we can't. Probably we would not use a nuclear weapon against a group like al-Qaida. But who would have thought we would have been at this level of conflict in Afghanistan or Kosovo or Bosnia 15 years ago? Who knows what the future may bring? A great nation, a great Congress, who has a responsibility to protect and defend this Constitution and this Nation, should be thinking ahead to make sure we have the capability, as time goes by, to deal with any threat that faces us. To do otherwise would be irresponsible.

   Let's be clear about this. This amendment we passed 15 to 10 in committee does not authorize building small weapons. It does not authorize testing weapons. It talks about study and research. If any step further than that has to be taken, this Congress would explicitly have to approve it. Then we can hear these debates about whether or not we want to go forward, depending on what the state of the world is at that time.

   I used to be a Federal prosecutor. As I understand the law, it would be a crime to utilize the language in this bill to build one of these weapons or to test one of these weapons because it would not be authorized in law. You cannot use money appropriated by Congress for things not authorized. This language does not authorize testing. It does not authorize building of a nuclear weapon.

   We have also to be concerned in this age of increasing knowledge about nuclear power, with the increasing ability through technology and other capabilities to transmit that knowledge around the world. We ought to be aware that others could step forward and make breakthroughs in nuclear power that could in many ways undermine the leadership we have in the world today. We do not need to have other nations studying nuclear power, nuclear weaponry, and us not.

   Think about this. We have cut our power down substantially. We are cutting down the number of our weapons very substantially--half or more than half. We absolutely cannot make a commitment that we will never do anything else in the future. That would simply set out a marker that would be the goal any nation could seek to attain and then they would be on equal power with the United States of America militarily, in terms of nuclear weapons. We should not do that.

   We need to make it clear to the entire world we care about

   peace, we care about world harmony, but we will not allow our Nation to be vulnerable to attack because our Nation--I can say it with confidence--our Nation stands for peace, prosperity, trade, and freedom in this world. That is what we stand for. A lot of nations don't. If somebody in this body is not capable of making that value judgment, then I think they need to go back and study their history a little bit. So we can stand for right in this dangerous world; we simply have to be militarily strong.

   Americans expect us to be thinking about it and going forward. President Bush supports this amendment that passed with bipartisan support in the committee. Secretary of State Powell supports this amendment, as do Admiral Ellis and General Jumper, two of our key military people who deal with these issues.

   I simply think it would be irrational to prohibit research that could inform future decisions as to whether such weapons would enhance the national security of our country. It would not prejudice our Congress to decide these questions in the future. Let us not fear greater knowledge that would inform our future decisions. Let's make sure this Nation does not have its head in the sand. Let's make sure our Nation is alert to what our capabilities are, what our enemies' capabilities are, and to the need for change if that need arises. I think that is the right approach. I think that is why the Armed Services Committee sent this amendment to the floor as part of this bill.

   I thank Senator Warner for his leadership. He has led us in this way, in a careful way. There is nothing extreme about this amendment. It is the right step at this time.

   I yield the floor.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois.

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   Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, the Senate considers a myriad of topics. Every week those who follow our debates will hear us discuss far-reaching topics from the farm bill to a transportation bill to a tax bill, how to move the economy, how to deal with health care and education. All of those are critically important issues. But I cannot believe I have witnessed in my time on Capitol Hill a more historic debate than what we are undertaking at this moment.

   We are literally talking about whether the United States will initiate a nuclear arms race again. Nothing I can think of meets this, in terms of gravity and its impact on the future of the world.

   If I might, I would like to ask the ranking member of the Armed Services Committee, my colleague from the State of Michigan, if he would be kind enough, before I say a few words here, since he was in on the committee debate on this bill and understands what is included in it, if he would answer a couple of questions relative to this issue of nuclear weapons so we can put this debate in context.

   Is it a fact, I ask the Senator from Michigan, without yielding the floor--is it a fact we are embarking on at least two dramatic changes in the policy of the United States of America toward research and building of nuclear weapons in this legislation?

   Mr. LEVIN. The Senator is correct. There are at least two provisions here.

   Mr. DURBIN. Would the Senator be kind enough to tell me, when we use the term low-yield nuclear weapons, is it not true these are weapons which have about one-third of the killing power of the nuclear weapon used, the atomic bomb

   used in Hiroshima which killed, in a matter of seconds, 140,000 people? Is that true?

   Mr. LEVIN. The Senator is correct. The so-called low-yield weapons indeed are about one-third the power of the weapon that was used at Hiroshima.

   Mr. DURBIN. Could the Senator from Michigan tell us how we are changing our policy in relation to the building or research on these types of low-yield nuclear weapons?

   Mr. LEVIN. Under the law that exists today, the so-called Spratt-Furse language which exists in law today, there is a prohibition on research and development which could lead to the production of a so-called low-yield weapon. Under the bill, that language would be stricken from the law and there would be no such prohibition.

   Mr. DURBIN. Could the Senator also tell me in relation to even more powerful nuclear weapons, the so-called bunker busters--which name, I think, does not do justice to the gravity of the weapon, the severity of the weapon we are considering--I am told by some these weapons have detonation power up to 70 times the power of the bomb we dropped on Hiroshima. Could the Senator from Michigan tell me, in terms of developing and building these new doomsday weapons, 70 times more powerful than the bomb dropped on Hiroshima, what does this bill do?

   Mr. LEVIN. The so-called bunker busters, which is a total misnomer in my book because these are city busters--they may indeed be nation busters or world busters, but nevertheless the so-called bunker busters are two weapons. There is a so-called B-61 weapon, which is about the power of 28 Hiroshimas, and the other one is the B-83, which is up to 71 Hiroshima weapons, in terms of power.

   Mr. DURBIN. If I could put that in context, if the bomb in Hiroshima killed 140,000 people instantly, can the Senator even calculate how many people may be casualties from the largest nuclear weapon which is envisioned by this new piece of legislation?

   My calculations are that up to 9 or 10 million people could be killed with that type bomb.

   Mr. LEVIN. I don't have a calculator. Whatever 140 times 70 would amount to would be that number, assuming the same approximate density in Hiroshima.

   Mr. DURBIN. I thank the Senator from Michigan for his diligent work on this committee.

   Consider the gravity of this debate. Consider for a moment what we are embarking on if we accept President Bush's vision and the administration's vision of the future of America and the world. We have just come off a war in Iraq--a war which once again proved decisively the strength of the American military. We have a military operation without peer in the world, the very best in skill when it comes to men and women in uniform, and the best technology on Earth. We spend upwards of $400 billion a year and more to develop this weaponry and this national defense. When called upon as in Iraq, as in the Persian Gulf, and so many other times, they have shown they are decisive in their goals. Frankly, there is nothing on Earth to match it. I don't think there was a moment in the invasion of Iraq when people said, If we just had another weapon, perhaps this would go more smoothly. Within 3 weeks, we conquered that nation. We brought to bear a dictator and his army. No one ever questioned that we have the most powerful military in the world prepared to do that.

   What the Bush administration tells us is it is not enough. Whatever conventional weaponry we own, it is not enough when we consider the future of the world; and we, as the United States, need to move forward, as the Senator from Michigan has told us, to develop so-called ``low-yield nuclear weapons''--these compact nuclear weapons and these bunker buster nuclear weapons some 70 times the power of what was detonated in Hiroshima. I think this is a dramatic departure in American foreign policy.

   I agree with the Senator from California and thank her for her leadership in offering this amendment, which I cosponsored with the Senator from Massachusetts.

   I hope my colleagues, despite their warm and strong feelings for the President and his administration, will pause for a moment and think about what we are doing today and the road and the course we are about to follow.

   This bill is a declaration that the United States is prepared to launch a nuclear arms race in the world again--a nuclear arms race which is no longer the province of a handful of nations.

   There was a time when ownership of a nuclear weapon reflected a prosperous country with great military capability. Look at North Korea today, as poor as they come, suffering from famine. This country is in the process of developing a new nuclear weapon every single month. To think that the United States could initiate a new nuclear arms race with our research and development and not see this replicated around the world in other countries is naive and wrong and dangerous. That is what is wrong with this proposal of the Bush administration.

   I also ask my colleagues to put in context the Bush administration's overall view of foreign policy, which is a departure from 200 years of thinking in America. President Bush came to this office and said we will no longer wait for nations that are an imminent threat to the United States. Since 9/11, we need to change the strategy, and change the rules. We will now be engaged in preemption. That is, we

   will attack those countries which we think could be a threat to the United States. That is dramatic change. With that dramatic change, coupled with this change in policy, think about what we are saying to the rest of the world. Whether you are a threat to the United States, if we perceive you to be a threat to the United States, we can attack you. Whether you are a threat to the United States, if we perceive you to be a threat, we can use nuclear weapons in attacking you. And we are about to develop several new generations of nuclear weapons to do it.

   Step back for a second, as any rational person would do, and ask, What does some other country in the world do in response to that? I know I am about to be attacked. Whether I threaten the United States, I have to be on guard. If I know they will use nuclear weapons, even if I don't, then what are you going to do? You are going to arm yourself to the teeth, as the North Koreans have done. Develop as many weapons as quickly as you can to let the United States know that if they use preemptive foreign policy and nuclear weapons in that preemption, there will be an answer coming back from that country. That is a recipe for a global arms race. There is no end in sight, if we allow that to occur. It is exactly what is being suggested by this policy.

   The Senator from Alabama came to the floor and said we should be thinking ahead. That is why he supports this. I would say to the Senator I agree with him completely. We should be thinking ahead, and that is why we

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   If we set an example with this new generation of nuclear weapons called for by this bill, how do we then turn to the rest of the world, and say, Stand in place, don't change, let the United States develop new nuclear, but you don't do the same? That isn't going to work. It is not rational. It doesn't show the kind of direct thinking I think we should ask from this administration and every other administration.

   I support the amendment offered by my colleagues to strike the section of the bill that repeals the prohibition on R&D of low-yield nuclear weapons. This is calling for a study for the development of nuclear weapons.

   Sadly, we know the spokesmen for the administration have made it clear that after one study they will be developed, in no uncertain terms. That, of course, is an invitation for a global arms race.

   I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD a letter of May 19 of this year from several prominent scientists across the United States in support of this amendment.

   There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

   May 19, 2003.

   Dear Senator, As scientists and engineers with long experience on nuclear weapons and defense issues, we are writing to urge you to retain the Spratt-Furse law banning development leading to the production of nuclear weapons with yields of less than five kilotons.

   There is no need for the United States to develop new low-yield nuclear weapons beyond those it has already developed and tested. Opponents of the law argue that the ban impedes exploration of nuclear weapons concepts for attacking deep underground targets and destroying chemical and biological agents. However, technical analysis shows that low-yield weapons would not be effective for these tasks. Low-yield earth penetrating weapons cannot burrow deep enough and do not have a large enough yield to destroy deep underground targets; moreover, the explosion would not be contained for even low-yield earth-penetrating weapons, and would necessarily result in large amounts of radioactive fallout. If a nuclear weapon was used to attack chemical or biological agents, it is far more likely that this would result in the dissemination of these agents rather than their destruction.

   Moreover, the law does not restrict research and early development of low-yield weapons, and places no restriction at all on work on higher yield weapons. The law only prohibits later stages of development and engineering that are geared toward production of a low-yield weapon.

   Some opponents of the law argue that maintaining expertise at the U.S. weapons labs requires weapons scientists to explore and develop new weapons concepts, and that ambiguities in Spratt-Furse law have had a ``chilling effect'' on such efforts. However, last week the House Armed Services Committee adopted an amendment that clarifies the wording of the law. We urge you and your colleagues to support such a clarification in the Senate to make clear that the ban permits research and early stages of development, while prohibiting the engineering and development of new low-yield nuclear weapons for deployment.

   Arguments that low-yield weapons serve U.S. interests because they produce less collateral damage and are therefore more usable than high-yield weapons are shortsighted. Any use of nuclear weapons would demolish a firebrake that has held for nearly 60 years and would be a disaster for the world. The United States should be seeking to increase the barriers to using nuclear weapons, not decreasing them.

   Moreover, it is counter to U.S. interests for the United States to pursue new nuclear weapons at a time when the highest U.S. priority is preventing other countries or groups from obtaining them. The perception that the United States is pursuing these weapons and considering their use would give legitimacy to the development of similar weapons by other countries, and would be an incentive to countries that are concerned they may be a target of such weapons to develop their own nuclear weapons as a deterrent.

   The act of repealing this 10-year-old law would send a strong, negative message to the rest of the world about U.S. intentions with respect to maintaining the existing international moratorium on nuclear testing. If the pursuit of new low-yield weapons leads to the resumption of U.S. nuclear testing, this would inevitably lead to testing by other countries--thereby reducing U.S. security and undermining U.S. efforts to stop the spread of nuclear weapons.

   Given the technical realities and limitations of low-yield nuclear weapons, as well as the likely security costs of developing new low-yield nuclear weapons, we urge you to retain the Spratt-Furse law.

   Sincerely,

   Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, let me also say the policy implications of crossing the line toward the use of nuclear weapons and actually making them useful weapons argues most forcefully against developing such weapons.

   I am particularly concerned that this administration's policy of preemption, combined with the policy of first use of nuclear weapons, is an incentive to proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons.

   Let me go back to the point made by the Senator from Massachusetts. The threat we face today is not a threat of nuclear power against the United States. It is a threat of terrorism. No one has rationally suggested that the development of these nuclear weapons can be used as a deterrent against al-Qaida and terrorism. How could our possession of even a low-yield nuclear weapon have stopped September 11? It could not have. We are dealing with asymmetrical power, to use a cliche which you find on Capitol Hill in most committee hearings involving the military. It just says you don't have to match the United States strength. You can find a vulnerability where you have the strength to inflict casualties and damage. That is what happened on September 11.

   Otto Bismarck once said, ``Preventive war is like committing suicide out of fear of death.'' I believe we should remember those words of wisdom.

   Let me elaborate on a few points.

   The September 17, 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States stated as a matter of self-defense that America will act against such emerging threats before they are fully formed to forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries. The United States will, if necessary, act preemptively.

   When you put together a policy of preemption, a policy of first use of nuclear weapons, and a new generation of nuclear weapons, which this bill calls for, it does not make for a safer world. It is an invitation for a world of uncertainty and a world of danger we will be leaving our children.

   I have watched this administration come forward with many proposals I disagree with. I cannot think of any proposal they have suggested which is more dangerous than what we are considering today.

   For those who are following this debate, this is not another routine bill. This bill is about to discard 50 years of American foreign policy and 50 years of American nuclear policy. It is going into uncharted territory with a new approach which invites danger, retaliation, and proliferation. It will, in my mind, increase the likelihood of nuclear confrontation in the future.

   I hope on a bipartisan basis the Senate will adopt the amendment offered by the Senators from California and Massachusetts.

   I yield the floor.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Minnesota.

   Mr. DAYTON. Mr. President, I wanted to say to the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee, who suggested earlier that we alternate back and forth, even though there is no agreement, I would be more than happy to defer to someone on his side.

   Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank our colleague. I am perfectly contented and listening carefully to the debate. At the appropriate time I will make my remarks and then move to table. I

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   Mr. DAYTON. Mr. President, if the chairman wants to wait, I will look forward to hearing his remarks. I have the greatest respect for him, and also many of my colleagues from the other side of the aisle who will offer their comments at a later time.

   At the request of Senator Feinstein, I ask unanimous consent that Senator Jeffords be added as an original cosponsor of the amendment.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

   Mr. DAYTON. I am proud to rise with my very distinguished colleagues who have introduced this measure, Senator Feinstein and Senator Kennedy; they who have eloquently stated, along with the Senator from Illinois, the reasons why this drastic change in American policy is so ill-advised--to resume the testing, development, and deployment of nuclear bombs. That would put the United States back into the front of the world pack of nations now proceeding with nuclear weapons development. We should be leading the world in the opposite direction, to stop the future proliferation of nuclear bombs. We can't do both.

   We can't tell other nations around the world not to build even a single nuclear weapon and then do it ourselves. We already have thousands of nuclear bombs. Yet we are going to tell other governments: You can't have even one.

   We should be negotiating those agreements. We should prevent other nations that do not presently have nuclear weapons from developing them. We should negotiate agreements with North Korea, Iran, whereby they would stop and dismantle their nuclear weapons production in return for economic assistance, food, technological development, whatever it is we can do to improve their peaceful standard of living and help bring them back into the civilized world.

   We should proceed to carry out the agreement which President Bush and President Putin reached over a year ago to consolidate and reduce the nuclear weapons which our two countries have. We should discuss with the new Chinese leadership their doing the same. We should redouble our efforts to track down and purchase and to lock up the nuclear weapons and materials that are loose from the old Soviet Union or from any other source, before they fall into the

   very dangerous hands of terrorist organizations which, if they get nuclear weapons, will use them against us. How can we do all that if we ourselves are developing our own next generation of nuclear bombs? It is crazy. It is crazy to do it. And it is crazy to think that the rest of the world would stand idly by while we proceed to do so.

   Why do we need to do this? We have the most overwhelming military force in the world, as we just demonstrated in Iraq. We have the greatest, most overwhelming military dominance of any nation in the history of the world over every other nation. We must maintain that overwhelming military superiority, and we will. President Bush has proposed increasing our military spending every year that he has been in office, and this Congress has provided him with every dollar he requested. I voted for every one of them myself.

   We are now spending this year more money on our military strength than the next nine nations of the world combined. I agree with my colleague from Alabama who is properly vigilant about what other nations are doing. We do need to look ahead and make sure that we maintain the kind of superiority and dominance which we can then use to prevent nuclear wars or any kind of wars around the world. But we don't need those devices today, and we don't see anybody else in the world developing them. So we should be trying to stop it, not move it forward.

   We don't need the so-called low-yield nuclear devices to win a war, not any war anywhere in the world and not for any time in the foreseeable future. Parenthetically, there is no such thing as a low-yield nuclear device. It is an oxymoron, low-yield nuclear device. There is only one description of these devices: They are nuclear bombs. They are nuclear bombs more powerful than the ones used in Hiroshima and Nagasaki 58 years ago. My understanding is that in terms of yield, in terms of radioactive fallout they may be more constrained, but in terms of the explosive power of these advanced weapons, they go beyond anything that was used in World War II, which is, as we recall, the only time in the history of the planet that nuclear bombs have ever been unleashed by one nation against another.

   It is our responsibility as the leader of the world to assure that they are never used again. Nothing is more dangerous to our national security than the continued development and production and ultimately proliferation of more nuclear weapons anywhere in the world. The reality is we can't prevent their use once they are produced. We can try, and we have. And we will continue to do so. With treaties, through negotiation, we can build a national missile defense system as the President has proposed, as Congress has appropriated initial funding. But even if it could be made to work perfectly, a terrorist group could put a nuclear weapon in a briefcase or in a car's glove compartment and annihilate New York City or San Francisco or Mobile, AL, or Minneapolis, MN.

   We can't prevent the use of one of these nuclear weapons once it has been produced, which is why we can and must stop their production before. We still have a chance to do that. We still have that opportunity, and that is what this administration's priority should be, to put an end to the nuclear arms race and those who want to enter it and to negotiate these agreements. But to do that, we have to set the example. We have to lead the world in the direction we want it to go.

   We can't say, we are the exception; everybody else follow this set of rules, but we are different. We know that our intentions are honorable. We know that we would not use them inappropriately. But we are not viewed that way by anyone else, as we would not view anyone else that way. We have to lead by our actions as well as by our words.

   As others have pointed out, if we were to do this now as we try to put the lid on other nations' development of their nuclear industry weapons industry, it would be catastrophic. In the eyes of the world we would look as though we don't really understand how we are viewed by them.

   This is an historic opportunity. It is so critical that this administration, which has proven that it knows how to win wars with military might--that we have established--which they inherited from President Clinton's administration, shows that we know how to win the peace.

   We know how to win the peace in Afghanistan, where our efforts to rebuild the country have been minimal, tragically, in the last year and a half compared to the scope of the need and the opportunity to showcase the American economic social system, our way of life, so that the people of that country can benefit, and people especially in the Arab nations can see the benefits and advantages of our system. We need to do the same in Iraq--seize control and security there and bring in the U.N. and other nations in efforts to bring that country over to a democracy and a stable government, encourage and assist their economic recovery, and negotiate with others.

   That is the direction in which we need to go, but it is not the direction this administration is going, or cares to go, or knows how to go. It is the wrong signal to send to the rest of the world that we intend to proceed further down the path of our domination militarily and our use of weapons of any level of destruction in order to achieve future goals; and if we proceed in that direction, we must expect that the rest of the world will follow. That would be more dangerously destabilizing to this Nation and to the planet than anything I can imagine.

   I yield the floor.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Chafee). The Senator from South Carolina is recognized.

   Mr. REID. Mr. President, we have a number of speakers who wish to speak on this legislation. I wonder if it would

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   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognized the Senator from South Carolina.

   Mr. GRAHAM of South Carolina. I am glad to yield to the Senator for a moment.

   Mr. REID. I am sorry, I didn't know. We might be better off--we have a number of Senators waiting, so that there will be some order--I wonder how long the Senator from South Carolina is going to speak approximately.

   Mr. GRAHAM of South Carolina. About 5 minutes.

   Mr. REID. I am wondering if it would be appropriate, I say to my friend from Michigan, if we had one on our side, Senator Bingaman, for 20 minutes, and Senator Feingold wishes 20 minutes, and Senator Dorgan wants 5 minutes. I am wondering--if there is someone from the Republican side who wishes to speak interspersed with ours, they would be allowed to speak.

   I ask unanimous consent that following the statement of the Senator from South Carolina, Senator Bingaman be recognized for 20 minutes, and following him, the Senator from Wisconsin for 5 minutes, and then the Senator from North Dakota for 10 minutes.

   Mr. LEVIN. Reserving the right to object, Mr. President, I just suggest two things: One, the interspersed order include Republican speakers, should they desire----

   Mr. REID. That was part of the request.

   Mr. LEVIN. Secondly, there will be additional speakers beyond that. I would not want to suggest that the debate would end then because we have additional speakers.

   Mr. REID. Senator Feinstein is here. She wishes to speak for a considerable period of time. We need to confer with the Senator.

   Mr. LEVIN. Prior to that, Senator Byrd wanted to speak. I wanted to speak for 10 minutes, and Senator Jack Reed of Rhode Island and Senator Akaka want to speak as well.

   Mr. REID. Why don't we lock these in?

   Mrs. FEINSTEIN. I wish the opportunity to speak at the end for 1 hour.

   Mr. REID. I say to my friend, a number of other people wish to speak.

   Mrs. FEINSTEIN. At the end. If it is a unanimous consent agreement, I don't want to be cut off.

   Mr. REID. You will not be cut off. This is just to line speakers up for an hour or so. There is plenty of time for debate after that.

   Mr. GRAHAM of South Carolina. Reserving the right to object, what was the last thing the Senator said?

   Mr. REID. Senator Feinstein wanted to be protected for future time.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request?

   Without objection, it is so ordered.

   The Senator from South Carolina is recognized.

   Mr. GRAHAM of South Carolina. Mr. President, I rise in opposition to the amendment. As quickly as I can--a lot of people want to speak--I will frame the debate for those who are listening.

   The Armed Services Committee was asked by the Pentagon to give some relief on a 10-year prohibition on research and development of low-yield nuclear weapons for a specific military purpose. The Pentagon and others tell us that the warfare of the future is going to have a component to it about which we need to be thinking.

   As we have seen in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other places, the enemies of tomorrow and today have gone underground in a deep fashion--underground not only to hide their forces, but to hide weaponry and to potentially build chemical or biological weapons facilities, underground to develop hydrogen nuclear weapons, underground to protect their troops from the awesome power that we have today.

   The committee, after listening to the Pentagon's request, in the bill we have before us, lifted the ban on research and development to allow the Pentagon to do research and development in this area as they could on any other weapons system.

   The question becomes for the Senate, after having received input from our Department of Defense and those experts who are paid to follow such matters, whether saying no to their request to do research and development only is a wise decision.

   My colleague who previously spoke mentioned the word ``crazy.'' I think it would be incumbent upon us to listen, as the committee has done. And the committee, in a bipartisan fashion, after listening, voted to lift the ban on research

   and development, to go forward and look at the ability to combat the threats of the future by having a low-yield nuclear weapon that could go to the underground chemical or biological weapons factory that may exist in the future--to go to the underground nuclear weapons facility that may exist in the future.

   As we have seen from Afghanistan and Iraq, the enemy has dug deep into the earth. From the last gulf war to Operation Iraqi Freedom, we have seen how the military has modernized and transformed itself. In the first gulf war--Desert Shield and Desert Storm--only about 10 percent of the weapons used were precision-guided munitions. That changed to the point where 90 percent of the weapons used in Operation Iraqi Freedom were precision guided. I argue that that modernization effort, keeping that technological edge, saved a lot of American and Iraqi lives.

   I suggest to my colleagues that this is a dramatic moment in our Nation's history. We have just upgraded the threat level to orange. We have seen last week what is going on in the world--al-Qaida is still alive. They are on the run, but they have the ability to hurt people. They desire nuclear weapons. There are a lot of rogue states that are going to try to pursue a nuclear weapon, or fissile materials, and they will most likely be successful. People are going to enhance their biological and nuclear weapons ability.

   I argue that to stop research and development on a potential weapon that could destroy a terrorist group or prevent a rogue nation from creating a chemical or biological capacity that is deep underground is illogical--just to take it off the table in a blind fashion, trying to say we are doing something that is going to spread nuclear weapons. I don't believe we are.

   Secretary Powell has written a letter on this matter, on May 5, in which he says:

   I do not believe that repealing the ban on low-yield nuclear weapons research will complicate our ongoing efforts with North Korea.

   It is a reality that the enemies of today and tomorrow will go underground. They will go deep into the earth, and they will have laboratories and research facilities available to them to develop weapons of mass destruction. I hope the Senate will listen to the Pentagon and develop a weapon that counteracts that threat. Whether or not we deploy that weapon we will decide later.

   But to take the research component off the table and not even plan for that possibility is very irresponsible. We will take up as a body whether or not to authorize this development, as we should.

   I implore my colleagues, please do not ignore the threats that exist today, an enemy going deep into the Earth where conventional weapons may not be able to destroy that chemical or biological factory or that nuclear weapons program. Let's at least look at the possibility of having a weapons mix in the future that protects us from the evil that exists today.

   I think what the committee has done is very responsible. I congratulate the chairman and all those involved in lifting this ban at the Pentagon's request. History will judge us poorly--who knows what is going to happen down the road--if we as a political body do not listen to what I believe to be a real threat and try to at least talk about and develop a counteraction to that threat for the future. That is what this debate is about.

   If this amendment is adopted, it would tie the hands of the American military in looking at weapons systems to combat a real threat at a time when the threats we face are growing, not lessening. I think that would be a very bad move on the Senate's part. It would tie the hands of the Department of Defense unnecessarily.

   We are not talking about deploying a weapon. We are talking about researching and developing a weapon that may save lives in the future, and I hope the Senate as a whole will follow the lead of the committee and vote this amendment down. I yield the floor.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senator from New Mexico is recognized.

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   Mr. BINGAMAN. I thank the Chair.

   Mr. President, I start by saying I have always been a strong supporter of maintaining our nuclear arsenal. I do believe that nuclear weapons have a significant role in our defense strategy, but their use for us in that defense strategy is to deter others from using nuclear weapons. That has been the essential role they played.

   It has been a very important role. It was an important role in winning the cold war, and it remains an important role for our military. But the amendment that has been put forward by Senator Feinstein and Senator Kennedy is not dealing with nuclear weapons as a deterrent. What it is trying to get at is the change in philosophy that seems to have taken place among some in the administration that nuclear weapons are not just to be used as a deterrent; they are also to be used as a weapon. They are to be used in warfighting. They are to be used to counter preemptive threats that may present themselves to us, and that is a substantial change from what we have done with nuclear weapons in the past. I strongly believe it is important to maintain in law the ban that was put in law sometime ago.

   This Spratt language, named for Congressman SPRATT, whom we all know and respect, was developed in 1994, and it was developed as a follow-on to an action by George H. W. Bush, Sr., our current President's father, when he was in the White House. He made the decision on September 27, 1991, to take out of our inventory nuclear artillery shells, tactical bombs, landmines--the various tactical low-yield nuclear weapons we had fielded at that time, primarily in Europe.

   That decision was made as a follow-on to the end of the cold war. It was a decision which was intended to reduce the risk of some kind of nuclear misstep by a field commander or by accident. It was a step intended to reduce the risk of a nuclear weapon being detonated when, in fact, it was not desired.

   There is a lot of history behind this issue. Some might think, if they just tune in and watch this debate, this is a new idea this administration has come up with: Let's develop new low-yield nuclear weapons; let's do the research and gear up for development.

   The truth is, we have had many so-called low-yield nuclear weapons in our stockpile in the past. Let me review a little bit of that history.

   This first paragraph I have reproduced for folks to look at is the Davy Crockett MK-54 warhead which was a nuclear warhead that was capable of producing the same damage as up to 1,000 tons of TNT. When they talk about low-yield nuclear weapons, they are talking about up to 5,000 tons of TNT. So this is substantially less powerful than that. This was developed back in the fifties. It is technology about which everyone knows. It was launched from a recoilless rifle. This was a weapon capable of being launched that way. One could send it off anywhere. The range was 1.2 to 2.5 miles. As I say, it had a yield of up to 1,000 tons of TNT. This, to me, is an example of some of the history we know about on low-yield nuclear weapons.

   Let me also point to a second example. This is the so-called MADM, the Medium Atomic Demolition Munition. Looking at the photograph, you might say I am talking about the one in the center. I am not. I am talking about the much smaller warhead that is over on the left in this photograph. This could go up to as high as 15,000 tons of TNT. It was in our arsenal until 1986. It was intended for use in destroying dams or bridges, and it was entirely portable. As one can see from the size of this warhead, this would be easily carried by a single person.

   The third example, and the last example I want to show, is this W-79. This is one of the weapons that was in our arsenal and was taken out of our arsenal. This is the so-called neutron bomb. We have heard of the neutron bomb. There was a lot of discussion about the neutron bomb a couple decades ago. It had what was then designated a C-plus safety rating because they determined after a while that they could detonate one of these if there was a stray bullet that hit the high explosive and, therefore, one of the reasons it was taken out of the field as an artillery shell was because of the safety problem involved.

   To give an idea of the detonation of this neutron bomb, it is pictured in this photograph. One can see that the amount of radioactivity, the amount of damage, the collateral damage from it was very substantial.

   Let me go to the last of these charts just to make another point.

   My colleague from South Carolina was saying what we need is a nuclear weapon; we need to see about developing a nuclear weapon that can be used to go deep underground and, thereby, get at chemical weapons fabrication activities or perhaps biological weapons fabrication activities.

   The truth is, if you put one of these weapons on a rocket and send it off, you cannot get it very deep into the ground. If it is a 12-foot long weapon, the maximum it can go is 48 feet into the ground. If it is 100-ton TNT equivalent, the experts tell us you have to bury that at least 140 feet under the ground or else you are going to have radioactive fallout. If you have a 1,000-ton weapon, you have to bury it at least 450 feet when it is exploded to contain the fallout. The truth is, we cannot put this on a rocket and get it down 450 feet. It is just not practical.

   The points I am making are these are not sophisticated weapons. This is not a new technology all of a sudden which someone decided to develop.

   This is technology that was in our arsenal. We are now seeing this administration say, OK, let's come back and once again begin to look at this as a viable part of our warfighting capability. I do not see the justification for it; I do not think it makes sense; and it poses enormous additional risks for us in terms of proliferation potential.

   One of the other comments the Senator from Alabama made a few minutes ago was: We already have a great many nuclear weapons. What can be so wrong about developing some that are small?

   One thing that could be wrong is that the risk of proliferation of much smaller, more portable weapons, is substantially greater. The smaller the weapon, the easier it is to move. These weapons are not sophisticated. These are not like the very large, high-yield weapons that are difficult to reproduce. There are many countries in this world that have the capability to produce low-yield nuclear weapons, and many of them, I am sure, will get more interested as time goes on if they see this is the direction in which we are moving.

   I think Senator Kennedy made reference to the speech Mr. Putin gave last Friday. The article in the New York Times on Saturday summed it up well when speaking of President Putin. He appeared to be responding to the Bush administration's new nuclear strategy announced last year when he said Russia, too, was considering developing new variants of nuclear weapons.

   This was his statement to the Russian Duma. He said: I can inform you that at present the work to create new types of Russian weapons, weapons of the new generation, including those regarded by specialists as strategic weapons, is in the practical implementation stage.

   He did not elaborate, nor did his advisers, though some analysts said he appeared to be referring to Russia's efforts to modernize its nuclear arsenal and to develop low-yield nuclear devices. That remark was greeted with applause.

   This is a dangerous road we start down if we decide to rely more on tactical nuclear weapons and once again commence the development of tactical nuclear weapons. I think it is an unwise course. My own view of our overall defense strategy is that we have always thought it served our interests to emphasize those areas in which we have a comparative advantage.

   We know today, more than perhaps ever in our history, that we have an enormous comparative advantage over any potential adversary in the world in the area of conventional weaponry. We have precision-guided weapons. We have smart weapons. We have demonstrated their use extremely effectively in the recent conflict in Iraq. Our comparative advantage does not lie in developing small, easily transportable nuclear weapons. Many other countries have the capability to do that, and not only countries but perhaps groups as well.

   Once development of those weapons is pursued by us, the likelihood of proliferation increases and the likelihood of similar activities by other countries

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   I know several of my colleagues have said all this provision is, that everyone is getting upset about, is a provision to repeal the ban on research and development, so what could be so wrong with repealing the ban on research and

   development?

   I do think that the reason many of us are concerned is we believe very much that if one of these weapons--if a new type or a new suite of these weapons is developed, it will ultimately be fielded. We believe that is the wrong way to go to maintain our security and to maintain the security of the world in general.

   Fred Celec, who is the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters, recently said that the administration wants the weapon; that is, the robust nuclear earth penetrator--and that is a separate amendment. Senator Dorgan from North Dakota is going to be offering an amendment relating to the robust nuclear earth penetrator sometime later this afternoon. But Mr. Celec said the administration wants the weapon and will move forward with its development and production. If a hydrogen bomb can be successfully designed to survive a crash through hard rock or concrete and still explode, it will ultimately be fielded. That is a news article from the San Jose Mercury.

   So there is reason to be concerned with this provision. Congressman SPRATT, I believe, showed good judgment when he proposed this provision in 1994. The Congress showed good judgment when it adopted this provision as a follow-on to the decision by former President Bush to take these kinds of weapons out of our arsenal. I believe we would do well to keep this ban on research and development in place. I hope my colleagues will agree and support the amendment by the Senator from California and the Senator from Massachusetts.

   I yield the floor.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.

   Mr. WARNER. In terms of alternating now, I think we should have the Senator from New Mexico address the Senate on this issue.

   I yield the floor.

   Mr. LEVIN. I wonder if the Senator from New Mexico will yield for an inquiry.

   Mr. DOMENICI. I am pleased to.

   Mr. LEVIN. Can the Senator give an approximation of how long he will speak?

   Mr. DOMENICI. I will be very brief. An hour and a half.

   Mr. LEVIN. An hour and a half?

   Mr. DOMENICI. No, sir. About 15 minutes.

   Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, the Senator can take such time as he feels necessary.

   Mr. DOMENICI. I understand.

   Mr. WARNER. Because he brings to this debate a very important aspect of many years in the Senate dealing with this subject.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The senior Senator from New Mexico.

   Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I acknowledge upfront the very astute and academically sound argument of my colleague from New Mexico, Mr. Bingaman. While I have been working in this field for the last 25 to 26 years in particular, and the last 10 with more emphasis, this has occurred in the last period of time. My work has come as the United States has prepared its great nuclear weapons laboratories to use new kinds of science to determine the viability and credibility of the existing warheads without underground testing.

   As everyone recalls, this body passed an amendment, rather overwhelmingly, saying we should not use underground testing for our weapons. I have learned since then how little we knew about that proposition when we cast that vote. Nonetheless, it is the law of the land. It has cost the American taxpayer, in my way of looking at it, billions of dollars.

   Frankly, as I look at the risk in the world, I do not think it has saved the world from nuclear weapons as people had thought. Already with that ban, there are new countries with new nuclear weapons, and they did not need underground testing. At least they did not need it as we had assumed they would need it when we stopped ourselves from doing it. Yet we have the greatest scientific community of men and women in the world, believe it or not, accumulated in three laboratories, and about 85 percent of their work goes to that one item.

   How can we make sure that the weapons we have are valid without testing, all of which was done in the hope that nobody else would get bombs, get any nuclear weapons, because an underground test would proliferate the desire, if nothing else, for more nuclear weapons?

   I was not on the Senate floor for the entire argument when that amendment of nonnuclear testing occurred. My great friend Mark Hatfield was a proponent. But I do know the argument was of the type that if we did not do that, we would be inviting other countries to do what is necessary to develop nuclear weapons. If we did not do it, we could dampen that.

   Now, I do not suggest the arguments are analogous.

   It is interesting that this enormous debate is taking place regarding an amendment that says nothing in the repeal of the previous amendment regarding low-yield weapons. ``Nothing in the repeal made by subsection (a) shall be construed as authorizing the testing, acquisition, or deployment of low-yield nuclear weapons.''

   We could say we do not believe what we are saying, that it is not true, if America wants to direct its scientists--the same scientists I just spoke of, incidentally--it will be the same laboratories. They will not invent some new ones. In addition to everything you are doing, you will be given permission to think about, to hypothesize, to ponder, to make pictures of, draw diagrams of low-yield bombs and what they are all about.

   Does it make sense, in the kind of world we live, to say to the greatest scientists in the world--we are spending about $6 billion a year for them to make sure the current nuclear weapons are OK, safe, and will deliver, if called upon, without underground testing, but to say to that same group, you cannot spend any time--you cannot have a department, you cannot have a division, you cannot have your smartest people or even any people in those institutions thinking about low-level nuclear bombs--not making them, not preparing to deploy them, for this statute forbids it.

   Our laboratories are filled with dedicated Americans. They want to do their jobs. They want to do no more or no less than they are authorized. They do not want to be called upon by a congressional committee to respond to doing more than they had authority to do; and clearly they never want to be accused of having done less than they were supposed to.

   On the other hand, does it seem possible we should be saying to these most brilliant of scientists, here on the wall is a statute and regardless of what comes to your great minds about low-level nuclear bombs, stop thinking about it. It is against the law. We do not want you thinking about it.

   Maybe that is a little farfetched. But it is not farfetched to say thinking about it and writing something down about it is against the law, at least if what my colleague from New Mexico says on the floor prevails.

   Those scientists know so much more than us about the world and the changes occurring, and we are wondering about what Russia is going to be doing. There is apt to be 3 or 4 nuclear powers in the next 10 years and there is nothing in the world we can do about it. We can sit on the floor and talk about low yield; maybe that is what they are after. There will be nuclear devices that can be delivered long distances causing huge amounts of damage. They are going to happen. The people working on those are not going to spend one iota of concern on whether we have this provision in our law.

   Some of our scientists might just come up with a great idea about a low-level bomb that could be great for America considering what they see going on in the world, converse to what the argument has been. The argument has been, we will teach the world to do what we are doing. I am suggesting our scientists will say to us, we are learning from the world what we might want to do in order to keep the peace longer and better and be able to tell our adversaries what you are thinking of doing.

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   I thought that was what we were all about. I thought that

   is what Los Alamos scientists are all about. I thought they were part of this great deterrent. I still believe they are. I believe to permit them to work in this area is part of the deterrent. It does not commit the country to build new kinds of weapons. It does not permit us to produce or test new weapons. It does not suggest we should deploy new weapons. It allows our scientists to study and perform research and development options that policymakers in the administration and even in the Congress may want to know more about.

   I know this for sure when I say ``may want to know more about it.'' I say that because these smart people might come to us and tell us, believe it or not, something we do not know. Would that be preposterous to some of us sitting in the Senate? Would it be preposterous that after this prohibition is lifted in 5 years they could come to us and say, We have been studying and here is what we have found. It is something you never had in mind, we never had in mind. But think about it. All of that seems to me to come on the good side.

   On the negative side, I cannot see where researching, thinking about, intellectualizing about low-level waste, is adding to the proliferation of nuclear weapons problem in the world. Remember, even if someone in the administration wanted the new weapons, they could not proceed to full-scale development, the production and deployment, unless Congress authorizes and appropriates funds required to do so. This has not been done. It should not be done without more information or debate, and it will not be done.

   Finally, there are very important intelligence, nonproliferation reasons why our scientists should be able to develop their thinking in these important areas of research. If anyone in this world is thinking about low-level weapons, we must know as much as we can about them. I just said that in a different way a moment ago.

   NNSA, the new semiautonomous agency that controls our weapons development, should challenge their scientists and engineers to think, to explore, to discover, to innovate. By removing the prohibition on research and development on low-level yield weapons, our experts will expand their own understanding and capabilities without artificial restrictions.

   I repeat, if anything comes out of this that is surprising, it will be what we will be able to do to prevent proliferation from happening somehow, somewhere in the world. In fact, I think that is more apt to happen as a result of the thinking and the development that occurs here by our scientists than the reverse. We have no idea what these great minds can be thinking, but the great minds of the other scientists in the world are thinking about them also.

   As a matter of fact, we heard some statements about Russia thinking about them as if we ought to be afraid of that, because if we do not do it, they will not do it. If anyone believes that, they probably would believe almost anything. They are busy looking at whatever kind of new nuclear weapons that do not break any of the agreements with us. We will soon be greatly reducing our arsenals of heavy weapons, and at the same time other countries and their scientists will develop nuclear weapons.

   They will be developing low yield ones, too. They will be developing low yield ones with very different ways of using them than we ever thought. We ought to have the very best looking at how that might happen, if it might happen.

   I yield the floor.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin.

   Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, will the Senator from Wisconsin yield just for a unanimous consent request?

   Mr. FEINGOLD. I yield.

   Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that after Senator Feingold, Senator Inhofe be recognized and then Senator Byrd be recognized after that Senator, and then Senator Talent be recognized after Senator Byrd.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there an objection? Without objection, it is so ordered.

   The Senator from Wisconsin.

   Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I rise in support of the amendment offered by the Senator from California and the Senator from Massachusetts. I am pleased to have cosponsored it. I commend the Senators for offering this important amendment, and I am extremely pleased to be one of a large group of Senators who have come to the floor to express their concern about this policy and to support this amendment.

   I share their concern, as I know that many of our colleagues do, about the provision in the underlying bill that would repeal the 10-year ban on research and development of low-yield nuclear weapons. Lifting this ban could be the first step in the resumption of nuclear testing and the creation of new classes of nuclear weapons which I oppose.

   Our men and women in uniform are facing new threats, but our defense procurement policy remains planted firmly in the cold war by calling for more nuclear weapons. We should not endorse a policy that could start or spark another nuclear arms race.

   I am deeply concerned that the administration's Nuclear Posture Review represents a departure from this country's longstanding nuclear weapons policy. Lifting the ban on low-yield nuclear weapons and funding a feasibility study on the so-called robust earth penetrator and directing the Secretary of Energy to accelerate the readiness posture for the Nevada Test Site from 24 to 36 months to 18 months all point toward a disturbing destination--the resumption of an active nuclear weapons program, including underground testing by the United States.

   These decisions send dangerous signals to our allies and adversaries alike. The United States has urged nonnuclear states and rogue operators not to pursue nuclear programs. But if we, as a nuclear power with enough of these weapons to destroy the world many times over, begin developing mini-nukes or other new forms of these dangerous weapons, I think we run the risk of inviting other countries and other organizations to do so as well.

   I supported the Moscow Treaty earlier this year because, while it is not perfect, it does move us closer to the goal of reducing the strategic nuclear arsenals of the United States and Russia. I don't think we should undermine this worthy goal by now starting down the path toward smaller, more easily transported nuclear weapons that could fall into the wrong hands.

   I recognize that the underlying bill would lift the ban on research and development of low-yield nuclear weapons without authorizing that such weapons be tested, acquired, or deployed by the United States. But I still think this is a perilous first step toward a new class of nuclear weapons. It is one we should not take. I, therefore, urge my colleagues to support the amendment offered by the Senators from Massachusetts and California.

   I yield the remainder of my time and I yield the floor.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma.

   Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, first, let me make real clear things that somehow get lost in the discussion. I have heard it said by the last four or five speakers that doing this is moving forward with the development and production of low-yield nuclear weapons. Nothing could be further from the truth.

   By repealing the ban on low-yield nuclear weapons research, our nuclear weapons experts will be able to explore weapons concepts that could help us to respond to new threats. We ought to treat research and development of low-yield nuclear weapons like research and development of any weapon. For any weapon that we have had, any weapon, conventional or otherwise, we have had to go through this period of time. That doesn't mean we are going to make one. It means we are going to be prepared if need be.

   By repealing the ban as we did in the Senate bill, the administration is still required to specifically request funding at each phase of the research and development as required by the National Advanced Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2003. The Congress has the prerogative whether to authorize and appropriate for such activities. With the many new and emerging threats in the world, we cannot afford to be unprepared.

   I was listening to the Senator from Wisconsin talk about how, somehow, this starts some kind of a nuclear race.

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   Our top military people and diplomatic leaders support repeal of this prohibition: ADM James Ellis, GEN John Jumper, Secretary of State Colin Powell.

   In 1994, Congress prohibited any research and development which could lead to the production of a low-yield nuclear weapon. That is less than 5 kilotons. This is an arbitrary restriction and it impedes the ability of scientists and engineers who support our national defense to explore a full range of scientific and technical concepts for the nuclear weapons stockpile.

   It has a chilling effect on creative thinking when scientists have to consult a lawyer before exploring concepts involving nuclear weapons. It restricts the ability of this or any administration to explore options to modify our nuclear weapons capability to prepare for changing defense needs in the 21st century.

   These needs are changing. I remember 8 years ago, sitting in the Senate Armed Services Committee hearings, when there was a proposal that said we would no longer need ground troops in the next 10 years. It was about 10 years ago. Yet here we come up with the problems that we had in Afghanistan. We had the great battles there, ground troop battles. We went into Iraq. That was on the ground; it wasn't in the air. Now we are looking at other options and possible risks and we don't know what they are going to be.

   The point is, we have to be ready for whatever does come. It is prudent national security policy to allow the administration to consider weapons concepts that would hold at risk deeply buried and hardened targets to defeat chemical and biological agents and reduce collateral damage.

   Reducing collateral damage--if we were to be able to do this research and ultimately it became necessary to have this, we would be able to penetrate deeply into the ground to knock out chemical threats, to knock out biological threats, maybe even nuclear threats, and not cause any collateral damage. In the absence of that, you would have to use something else, a MOAB, for example, that would clear an area of maybe 5 or 10 square miles, killing everything within that range. So it would be an effort to reduce collateral damage.

   Repealing this prohibition would not authorize the administration to build any nuclear weapon. I think it is very important people understand that.

   What happens if all of a sudden there is a changing threat out there and we discover we need to be able to develop a low-yield nuclear weapon, if every Senator in here, every Democrat and every Republican, agreed that we had to have this? If we don't do research and development now, it could be years before we would be able to have it. If we go ahead, then we would be able to have it in a very short period of time.

   I chaired the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Readiness for quite a number of years. I see my colleague from Hawaii over there, who is my ranking member. Of course he chaired it also. We know that the