CNS - July 14-18, 2003 - Congressional Record Weekly Update

Mr. SPRATT moves that the managers on the part of the House at the conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the Senate amendment to the bill H.R. 1588 be instructed to insist upon the provisions contained in section 3111 of the House bill.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 7(b) of rule XXII, the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Spratt) and the gentleman from California (Mr. Hunter) each will control 30 minutes.

I offer this motion simply to ask the House to stand by a bipartisan compromise that we struck last May in marking up the defense authorization bill, the bill we are now sending formally to conference which deals with the development of low-yield nuclear weapons .

Members of the House may have read, they may have heard that the Bush administration is pushing to repeal the so-called ban on low-level nuclear weapons research. They disavow any intention of building such weapons , but they at least seek the flexibility to conduct research in that realm. Let me tell everybody, they basically won that argument. Both the House and the Senate defense authorization bills propose changes to current law that allow the flexibility of research into low-yield nuclear weapons .

The administration said this was a problem, the Department of Energy said it was a problem, existing law, so we have changed it. We have addressed the problem. I was an author of the so-called Spratt-Furse amendment in 1993. I believe that the language of that amendment as it now stands as amended in the committee mark is sensible and a fair compromise. That is what I am asking the House to do, to stand behind it.

Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Skelton), the ranking member on our committee.

While there are many reasons to support this motion, let me say that one key reason for supporting it is that the provisions contained in section 3111 of the House bill are largely the same legislation adopted by this body in the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 which, of course, was last year's defense bill.

The House adopted that legislation after considerable and very careful deliberations and on a bipartisan basis led by the gentleman from South Carolina. We authorized research but retained the prohibition on development activities that could lead to the production of a destabilizing and unnecessary new low-yield nuclear weapon. We also described permissible activities necessary to address the safety and reliability of those issues.

Mr. Speaker, being a student of history, the war in Iraq and Desert Storm some 12 years ago now have taught us that stealth technology, standoff capability and precision munitions are the key to future warfare. New conventional technologies have changed the way we fight and, if anything, will

The House position on low-yield nuclear weapons makes sense. I urge my colleagues to support the motion to instruct conferees.

Mr. Speaker, this provision which is in the House-passed bill is a provision that was agreed to by the vice-chairman of the committee, the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon), and the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Spratt) last year. It was restated this year. It is the House position going into conference. For that reason, we are certainly not going to urge anybody to vote against it.

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Reyes), the ranking member on the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the motion to instruct conferees offered by my friend and colleague, the gentleman from South Carolina.

Earlier this year, the administration proposed a complete repeal of a law that has been on the books for over a decade, the Spratt-Furse ban on research and development of new nuclear weapons with yields below five kilotons. The Spratt-Furse ban is not a complete ban. It bans just R&D of new low-yield nuclear weapons . It permits R&D on new weapons with yields above five kilotons. It permits R&D of modifications to existing nuclear weapons regardless of their yield.

It also permits our national laboratories to conduct R&D on low-yield nuclear weapons for the purposes of counterproliferation, that is, how to detect a low-yield nuclear terrorist device and devise ways in which to disable them.

The Spratt-Furse ban also permits R&D of low-yield nuclear weapons if it is necessary to help keep our nuclear arsenal safe and reliable.

When asked, Department of Energy officials admitted that there is no military requirement for a new low-yield nuclear weapon, and they had no plans to develop one anytime soon.

They simply wanted to repeal the Spratt-Furse ban because they maintain that it somehow has a chilling effect on the freedom of their scientists to look at any nuclear weapon option regardless of whether or not there is a military need.

During the markup of the defense authorization, the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Spratt) offered an amendment that was adopted by the full committee by a voice vote, and I think this is a very sound compromise. The Spratt amendment permits research on new low-yield nuclear weapons , but draws the line on moving past research and into development. In short, the Spratt amendment makes sure that the Congress will be a coequal partner with the executive branch if there is any decision to move past research and actually start developing new low-yield nuclear weapons . I think that the Spratt amendment makes good sense and protects Congress's right to fully participate on any future decision to start up development of new low-yield weapons . I urge all of my colleagues to support this motion to instruct.

Let me take just a minute to explain the state of play and why it is important that the House provisions prevail over the Senate provision. The Senate defense authorization bill repeals these provisions in their entirety, but then backfills the gap with language that requires specific authorization of Congress to move from development into production of low-yield nuclear weapons . This amounts, really, to restating what the law already is, that to do something this significant with respect to a new product money has to be authorized and appropriated.

The House bill is similar in consequence but better, in my opinion, because it makes it absolutely clear that any movement beyond just research will require Congress to change by law the nuclear weapons policy of the United States. The House and Senate both addressed these specific concerns raised by the administration and the weapons labs and the Department of Defense to permit more flexibility in basic research, but our version contains a stronger guarantee that the Congress is going to be a partner in any decision to go beyond the scope.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from California (Mrs. Tauscher).

Mr Speaker, I would like to offer my strong support for the motion to instruct which sends an important message that it is the will of the House to maintain the ban on development of low-yield nuclear weapons , and I commend the chairman of the full committee for his initiative to work with us on this.

Nuclear weapons will remain a crucial part of America's arsenal for the foreseeable future. They provide a hedge against potentially hostile nuclear powers and underpin security commitments to our allies. Today, however, the United States is addressing the threat of weapons of mass destruction from North Korea, India, Pakistan, and a growing list of countries.

As we have seen in Afghanistan and in the global war on terrorism, when the United States leads with a purpose, the rest of the world will follow. And just as the world follows our lead on tackling common enemies, it also reacts when we take provocative and destabilizing action. I believe strongly that until our war fighters have a military requirement for a new nuclear weapon or have exhausted conventional alternatives, Congress should maintain its ban on the development of such weapons .

Preventing the development of new nuclear weapons would not affect the RNEP study with focuses on existing warheads. It would not prevent any of the ideas that are currently being explored regarding missile systems. In addition to having no military requirement for them, new nuclear weapons are not the answer to threats being used to justify them. Nuclear weapons of any yield have a limited penetration ability and will never surgically destroy hardened targets. They offer no guarantee of destroying chemical and biological agents without releasing them into the atmosphere. Detonated in an urban area, even a 1-kiloton nuclear bomb would kill tens of thousands of civilians and hinder friendly troops.

Preserving the ban on new nuclear weapons is a small step that would also help restore the belief that the United States intends to fight the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction . I hope my colleagues would support this motion to recommit.

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Holt), a nuclear physicist who understands what is at stake here better than possibly anybody in the House.

Mr. HOLT. Mr. Speaker, I thank my friend from South Carolina for yielding me this time.

The direction in which the administration has been leading our Nation on nuclear weapons is becoming increasingly dangerous. That is why I wrote to President Bush in April, a letter co-signed by 33 of my colleagues here, to underscore our concern that our Nation's leaders not adopt a mindset of viewing nuclear weapons as just an extension of the continuum of conventional military options available to the United States. It is important that we maintain the nuclear distinction.

I rise to support this motion because it gives us the opportunity to invoke at least one cautionary restraint on this dangerous path. Both the House and Senate versions of this bill eliminate the Spratt-Furse ban that has been in place since 1993. And this Senate language, especially, would allow Pandora's box to be opened to allow, in effect, unfettered research into low-yield nuclear weapons . As a scientist, I can talk about the studies that some of my scientific colleagues have prepared about why some of the newly conceived weapons like the bunker buster would not work as proposed, why they would be dirty, why they would be unwieldy; but I choose instead to focus for just a moment on the more important strategic and tactical questions.

moving in that direction. U.S. battlefield commanders have said over and over again that they have long recognized the folly of battlefield nukes. The weapons and especially these newly conceived weapons put our troops at risk and are not useful in advancing military campaigns. And very important, this work would be sending the wrong message to our allies and to potential adversaries around the world. They would view the adoption of this bad, particularly the bad Senate language as further evidence that America is bent upon developing and procuring a new generation of nuclear weapons . As we go to war around the world in part to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons , we should not be sending the signal that we are bent on developing and procuring a new generation of nuclear weapons .

So the Spratt motion is a very constructive step that provides, I think, an important safeguard that actually will help to make our country and our world more secure.

I thank the gentleman for his comments, and I rise to make one correction. The House bill does have language which we would like to retain. The gist of this motion is let us stand by the House language and reject the Senate language.

I rise in support of the motion to instruct and I rise to thank the gentleman from California (Mr. Hunter), the distinguished chairman of my former committee, for his acceptance of this motion.

Certainly this motion reflects a bipartisan compromise that has been worked out not just in this Congress but in the past Congress, and when that happens we should seize the moment. It does allow expanded research, but it stops short of allowing the development or the fabrication of new nuclear weapons . That is an essential step for this Congress to take, partly to make sure that we do not send the wrong signal to the rest of the world and partly to make sure that the institutional prerogatives of this House are protected when decisions of that magnitude are faced at any time.

There is, of course, an important strategic deterrent role for nuclear weapons , but 10 years ago or more we stepped back from the brink with Russia. We stepped back from maintaining or developing tactical nuclear weapons . We do not need to go down that path again because if we do, we risk losing further our standing in the international community. Our arguments about nonproliferation will seem hollow.

We are today continually concerned about weapons of mass destruction held by adversaries or held by other countries where we believe there is some risk to our security in the world. We do not advance those arguments about weapons of mass destruction if we start to develop new nuclear weapons that can only be used in a tactical way, whatever they are called. The nuclear Earth penetrator is one. We really need to make sure that we are exercising the kind of responsible leadership in this area that the world expects of us and that will redound to the benefit of our own national security.

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Markey).

Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Speaker, the Cold War is over and the good news, to my friends, is we won and the Soviet Union lost. We do not need a new arms race with ourselves. We do not now need to send a signal to countries around the world who harbor desires to obtain nuclear weapons that we believe that it is still worth our while to invest in a new generation of nuclear weapons which are more usable in battleground situations. We must avoid being viewed as the drunk preaching temperance from a bar stool. If we want to convince others to embrace our view that nuclear weapons are not usable, we must ourselves act in a way that does not leave the misimpression that we are still engaging in the same kind of mindless development of another generation of nuclear weapons that only encourages countries like North Korea, countries like Iran, which each have active nuclear weapons programs, that they are wise in pursuing that course.

So the resolution that we are considering right now is one which is saying to the rest of the world we understand their concern about an initiation of another nuclear arms race, and we understand the consequences for regions around the world where there are bad actors, bad countries trying to develop nuclear weapons programs. We brought the country of Iraq to its knees militarily in 3 weeks. Our problem is not destroying any country's military capacity. Our real problem is in controlling the country after we do so, and nuclear weapons do not add to our capacity to accomplish those goals. So this is, in my opinion, a wise approach to take. The gentleman from South Carolina as usual is trying to draw a very fine line between programs that have already been put in place and do protect our country and new programs which would potentially add to an acceleration of an arms race, a nuclear arms race around the world.

We now must turn our attention to Iran and North Korea. The only way to deal with it is with strong diplomacy, active diplomacy. Additional nuclear weapons will not help us, and that is why this resolution must pass.

Mr. Speaker, in conclusion, let me simply put in context why we have this particular provision before us and why we are emphasizing it in this motion to instruct. The Spratt-Furse prohibition on low-yield nuclear weapons was a follow-up to the decision by President Bush, the first President Bush, on September 27, 1991, a historic day.

That day he announced the withdrawal of all land-based tactical nuclear weapons from our overseas bases, particularly those in Europe, and all sea-based tactical nuclear weapons from surface ships, submarines, and naval aircraft. We decided to forgo the development of the follow-on to Lance, a battlefield tactical nuclear missile, and we sent a signal to the world by all of these decisions that we were serious about minimizing the role and possible uses of nuclear weapons early in a conflict and especially for tactical or theater purposes. We said that our arsenal in the future in effect would be a strategic arsenal, a strategic determinant, and we would not use nuclear weapons for tactical and theater purposes anymore, such as the Davy Crockett, to take out tanks or nuclear artillery, rounds, and sea-based mines and things of that kind.

This move away from tactical nuclear weapons prompted the Soviet Union to move in the same direction; and Gorbechev shortly announced the elimination of their warheads, their land-based tactical nuclear missiles, mines, and artillery shells. He announced that he was removing warheads from surface-to-air missiles and removing sea-based tactical nukes on naval aircraft.

Taken together, these steps marked a major step away from tactical nuclear weapons and a step toward global security. The initiative by the first Bush administration helped us persuade Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Belarus to forswear nuclear weapons after the breakup of the Soviet Union. It also made it easier for the United States and our European allies to convince much of the rest of the world to extend indefinitely the nuclear proliferation treaty, or NPT.

Now, the NPT is not the final, definitive answer to our proliferation concerns, but the world would be a lot riskier place without it. It definitely makes it harder for nations or terrorist groups to obtain nuclear materials and nuclear know-how, and it establishes the authority of the war community to question and inspect the activities of States that are a signatory to this treaty.

I think a return by the United States back to the days of tactical nuclear weapons , especially nuclear weapons designed to be more usable by virtue of low yields, would send a troubling signal, a signal that nuclear weapons just maybe are useful for tactical purposes, battlefield purposes, strategic purposes, and were really just an extension of conventional weapons for the same tactical purposes. It would indicate that we see tactical utility in these weapons , and it would reverse the

Now, there are some who will say that we need to do this because we have to have weapons to take on deep, hard targets. The actual numbers are classified, of course, but even if we can improve the ability of our nuclear weapons to burrow in the hard terrain and into geologic formations such as granite, simple physics tells us we are going to come up way short of reaching the underground bunkers that we are really worried about, like those in North Korea.

Some say that we need these new weapons , these low-yield weapons , deeper penetrators, because we need the heat and the gamma rays and the X-rays of a nuclear weapon to destroy the chemical and biological agents that might be stored in deep underground bunkers. But if the fireball and the X-rays and the gamma rays are to reach the bunker, then we need to use, we are told by qualified experts, weapons that are much, much bigger than 5 kilotons; and using even a 5 kiloton weapon has consequences that have to be dealt with, fallout, for example.

Alternatively, if we want to use the pressure and blast of a nuclear weapon to crush a bunker, then we already have weapons to do that job.

Supporters of full repeal also say that our restraint thus far on developing these tactical theater and battlefield nuclear weapons has not really had any effect on nations that are bent upon acquiring them, North Korea being a prominent example, but I am not so sure about that. Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan in a momentous decision all decided to rid their countries of nuclear weapons . Brazil, South Africa, South Korea, and Taiwan have taken similar steps; and numerous countries have signed the NPT.

So before we repeal this long-standing language in the code, we should keep in mind the effects that surround us and also, also I think we should point out what is already in this bill. This bill will reduce the amount of time it takes to resume underground nuclear testing. This bill will call for a review of nuclear weapons for ``bunker-busting'' missions, the so-called Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator. This bill will call for building a brand-new, multi-billion-dollar facility to produce plutonium pits for nuclear weapons . Just the beginning, planning money, but these things that are in here of a still-robust nuclear policy but one that is slanted towards strategic usage and not tactical usage.

Mr. Speaker, I commend the chairman of our committee for his generosity and collegiality in allowing us to reach an agreement on this. I know it is a compromise for him. He has his doubts, and we have our disagreements. But, nevertheless, I appreciate his kindness in doing it.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Speaker, I just want to thank the gentleman for his participation as a great member of the committee. I did have and do have my reservations about his position, but it was an agreement between the gentleman from Pennsylvania and the gentleman from South Carolina and it is the position of the House. We are now going into conference with the other body, and I think it is appropriate to carry the House position forward.

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, reclaiming my time, I have gratitude for the gentleman's agreeing to the amendment. As long as it passes by voice vote, I will not ask for a record vote on final passage.

Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the motion. The Administration and the Republicans in Congress have made clear their intent to explore new, low-yield nuclear weapons . Before we head down that path, we need to remember two things.

(1) The Cold War is over and I have good news for my friends on the other side of the aisle. We won! The Russians are no longer our adversaries. Remember, President Bush has told us he's looked into President Putin's eyes and found him to be a man he could deal with! Let's stop fighting the last war. The Russians are no longer a threat and I see no reason why we should allow the development of mini-nukes because somebody in Russia may have talked about the possibility of developing new weapons . They're probably only talking about doing that because they hear all of this talk about new nuclear weapons being developed by the U.S. What does this mean? It means that the only reason to develop mini-nukes is to start a new arms race. But that begs the question: with whom would we have this arms race? No nation in the world has a conventional military that can compare with ours. The only country that has a nuclear arsenal that compares to ours is Russia, and we're paying them to dismantle their nuclear weapons ! Where's the beef behind this threat?

(2) These so called mini-nukes are still nuclear weapons . They may be smaller, but they will still kill tens of thousands of people, will still produce radioactive fallout and contaminate the countryside, and will still carry the stigma of being nuclear weapons . We already have big nuclear weapons , and medium-sized nuclear weapons , and small nuclear weapons . In fact, some of our nuclear weapons are ``dial-a-yield'', meaning we can select the yield of the weapon--and some of them can be ``dialed'' down to less than 1 kiloton, which, by the scale of nuclear weapons , is pretty mini. We used to have a weapon with a yield of less than a kiloton that weighted only 163 pounds--we called that the SADM or Special Atomic Demolition Munition. Is that what we want? To have kicked out the nuclear-seeking Saddam, only to replace him with our own nuclear SADM?

I would urge my colleagues to remember these two things: that to develop mini-nukes would be to start an arms race with ourselves, and that a mini-nuke is still a nuclear weapon, with all the associated consequences. We simply cannot preach nuclear temperance from a barstool. We cannot tell Iran, North Korea and other countries not to develop nuclear weapons while simultaneously developing our own new weapons .

I urge you to support this Motion to Instruct. Let's not turn back the clock and start a new ``mini'' arms race.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Bass). Without objection, the previous question is ordered on the motion.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion to instruct offered by the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Spratt).

Mr. HOBSON. Mr. Chairman, it is my pleasure to submit to the House for its consideration the fiscal year 2004 Energy and Water Development Appropriations Bill. On Tuesday, July 15th, the Appropriations Committee unanimously approved the bill, and I believe it merits the support of the entire membership of the House. I want to thank all the members of the subcommittee for their help in bringing the bill to the floor today. I particularly want to thank Mr. Visclosky for his help and cooperation. I also want to thank the Chairman of the Appropriations Committee, Mr. Young, and the ranking minority member, Mr. Obey for allowing us to move forward in such an expeditious manner.

Mr. Chairman, this bill provides annual funding for a wide variety of programs, which include such diverse matters as maintenance of the Nation's nuclear weapons stockpile, navigation improvements, environmental cleanup, flood control, advanced scientific research, and nuclear waste disposal.

Total spending in the fiscal year 2004 Energy and Water Development Bill is $27,080,000, the same as the subcommittee's 302b allocation. This is an increase of $942 million over fiscal year 2003 and $134 million over the President's budget request. The bill I present to the House today is fiscally responsible, and meets the major needs of the members of the House.

�. Mr. Chairman, another area of concern is the portion of the Department of Energy's budget request that deals with the nuclear weapons complex. The Department continues to ask Congress to fund a Cold War nuclear arsenal, and the infrastructure necessary to maintain that arsenal, even though we no longer face a Cold War adversary. As President Bush said when he announced reductions to the nuclear stockpile on November 13, 2001, ``The United States and Russia have overcome the legacy of the Cold War.'' AT that time, he pledged that the United States would reduce our stockpile to 1,700 to 2,200 operationally deployed warheads over ten years because, as he said, ``the current levels of our nuclear forces do not reflect today's strategic realities.'' I couldn't agree more. We do not need thousands of warheads to deter a nuclear attack anymore, but the Department of Energy and the Department of Defense want Congress to continue to pay for a Cold War stockpile. It is time the DOE and the DOD begin to shrink the footprint of the nuclear weapons infrastructure to reflect the President's decision to reduce our nuclear arsenal. DOD is rethinking the kinds of forces it needs to respond to the threats of the new century, and will go through another round of BRAC to bring down its footprint. The National Nuclear Security Administration should go through a similar process and take a hard look at its workforce and facility needs for a smaller stockpile. Accordingly, we have not approved all of the increase requested for weapons activities in fiscal year 2004.

Mr. Chairman, in this Bill we have also attempted to send a signal to the Department of Energy and the Russian government with regard to the Nuclear Nonproliferation program. At the end of May of this year, the Department had unobligated balances in this program of almost $600 million. That is money just sitting at DOE headquarters. In addition, by this fiscal year, the Department estimates that it will have uncosted balances of over $1.1 billion. I view this as poor management. We are fully supportive of the nuclear nonproliferation mission, but we have to question whether we are achieving the program goals when over a billion dollars goes unspent. We need to figure out what is wrong and fix it before this issue endangers support for the program.

Mr. HOLT. Mr. Chairman, today I rise in support of this appropriations bill and also to highlight the need for increased funding for basic science programs at the Department of Energy� I also want to commend Mr. Hobson and the committee for reducing funding for study of a new generation of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons on the battlefield would be a nightmare, and reasonable battlefield commanders say they would never want them. Nuclear ``bunker buster'' bombs are flawed in concept and we should not be spending money to pursue them.

Mrs. TAUSCHER. Mr. Chairman, I would like to commend Mr. HOBSON and Ranking Member VISCLOSKY for offering a strong bill that ensures that the United States continues to have a robust nuclear deterrent and the infrastructure to support it.

As the former ranking member of the Armed Services panel to oversee the National Nuclear Security Administration, I am especially pleased that the committee report highlights the need for the NNSA to focus on its primary mission of maintaining the viability of the existing stockpile.

The committee's cuts in funding for new nuclear weapons and for the robust nuclear earth penetrator are vital steps toward restoring U.S. leadership in fighting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Indeed, not only does the military not have any requirements for these weapons, but developing them would send a strong signal to other countries that the pursuit of nuclear weapons is legitimate and necessary.

At a time when we are facing a changing security environment it would seem prudent to strengthen the core missions of the nuclear establishment such as our science based stockpile stewardship rather than embark on potentially dangerous new missions that would have a destabilizing effect.

In this regard, I am pleased to see full support for the National Ignition Facility, a key Stockpile Stewardship Program facility which is being build in my district.

Recently NIF brought the first four of its 192 beams online and has demonstrated full power and full performance on those beams. Those four beams now constitute the most powerful laser in the world.

NIF will begin to do experiments to provide data to the Stockpile Stewardship Program this year--while it continues to commission additional laser beams on the path to full facility operation in FY2008.

A critical element of the committee's action is the support for growth in the Experimental Support Technologies, which provide the technologies to use NIF.

I also strongly urge the chairman to work with me and other members of the Armed Services Committee to move forward on the work necessary to refurbish the W-80. The W-80 fills a unique niche in our nuclear deterrent.

The work called for in the budget request will lay the groundwork for improving the safety, security and reliability of the W-80.

It is important that the budget request for the NNSA work on the W-80 be supported so that the production plant work can be effectively managed.

Finally, I am concerned about the language in section 301 mandating that the Department of Energy automatically compete labs that have been managed by a particular contract for more than 50 years.

The decision to chose a given contractor to manage a particular laboratory with its specific needs, is an exceedingly complex one, involving all manner of judgments concerning the

relative value of factors such as the ability of a given contractor to attract and retain the strong technical workforce required to focus on issues of supreme national security importance to our country.

These issues deserves in-depth scrutiny and study, not an automatic competition of the contract. Neither the Department of Defense, NSF or NASA treats its contractors this way, and I am concerned that DOE would be asked to do so.

On the water side, I understand the committee's rationale for not including funding for the CALFED program.

The program must be authorized by Congress this year and I am working with my colleagues from California to advance a comprehensive reauthorization bill this year.

The federal government must be an active partner with California to heal the Delta's ecosystem and prepare for the state's growing population.

Mr. MATHESON. Mr. Chairman, I strongly oppose the Advance Weapons Concepts funding in this appropriations bill. While I was pleased to see that the Energy and Water Appropriators chose to reduce funding for the ``Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator,'' I am still concerned that this bill provides $5 million for the weapon.

We live in an era when terrorism and national security concerns dominate the political landscape, as well they should. No one is arguing about the need to find new technologies with which our Nation can combat deeply buried targets, particularly those held by terrorists. Supporters of the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator, argue that the current funding is strictly limited to weapons research and development in Department of Energy labs.

This claim ignores the obvious end result of such funding--weapons design does not occur in a vacuum. In order for our soldiers to use nuclear weapons in combat, these weapons must first be physically tested, most likely at the Nevada Test Site. The Federal Government's poor record on weapons testing and containment of fallout is lengthy and disappointing, at best.

I have already seen too many Americans succumb to then-unforeseen consequences of nuclear weapons. The price of new usable nuclear weaponry is too high for this great Nation, once again, and I reiterate my opposition to the advance weapons concepts funding.

Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time and for all his work and cooperation, and I rise to speak on some of the positive elements of this bill.

This bill includes my amendment on Iran's program to develop nuclear weapons and is particularly relevant given recent developments in Iran. Iran continues to claim that its nuclear research program's only goal is to promote peaceful activities. Last week, however, Iran confirmed that it had successfully tested its mid-range missile, the Shahab-3, which can reach Israeli soil. And last month, the International Atomic Energy Agency stated Iraq has secretly processed nuclear material. Iran continues its game with the IAEA over signing the new nuclear safeguards protocol. Iran is a country with huge oil and natural gas reserves and clearly does not need nuclear power for its energy consumption.

My amendment, as incorporated in this bill, therefore, calls on the International Atomic Energy Agency to ensure that Iran's nuclear program is used only for peaceful purposes and urges the United States representatives to the IAEA to help develop guidelines for early identification of any Iranian noncompliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. And, finally, Iran should sign and ratify the new nuclear safeguards protocol to this treaty.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in strong support of H.R. 1950, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for fiscal years 2004 and 2005. At this time, I want to commend both our chairman, the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hyde), and our senior ranking member, the gentleman from

California (Mr. Lantos), of the House Committee on International Relations for their outstanding leadership in bringing to the floor the State Department reauthorization bill which has strong bipartisan support.

This bill includes an historic measure offering recognition to a Palestinian state if performance benchmarks can be reached; increases U.S. capacity at the United Nations, where rogue regimes are increasingly trying to hijack the agenda; initiates a new effort to promote free media abroad; and provides the State Department with tools to confront the alarming spread of ballistic missiles.

Mr. Chairman, this bill also includes three amendments which I offered during full committee markup on May 7, 2003, three of which were accepted by unanimous consent and have now been included in the full text of H.R. 1950.

One amendment expresses a sense of Congress relating to the Soviet nuclear tests in Kazakhstan and calls for the Secretary of State to establish a joint working group with the government of Kazakhstan to assist in assessing the environmental damage and health effects caused by Soviet nuclear tests Semipalatinsk.

The other amendment requires the State Department to prepare and transmit to Congress a report that contains a description of the extent to which the government of Pakistan has closed all known terrorist training camps operating in Pakistan and Pakistani-held Kashmir, has established serious and identifiable measures to prohibit the infiltration of Islamic extremists across the line of control into India, and has ceased the transfer of weapons of mass destruction, including any associated technologies, to any third country or terrorist organization.

Mr. PALLONE. Madam Chairman, a few weeks ago, President Bush announced a $3 billion aid package to Pakistan. I do not support the provisions of military aid in that package. However, President Bush was willing to put some conditions on the Pakistan aid package. Those conditions were, one, Pakistan must exemplify its effort to decrease crossborder terrorism in Kashmir; two, Pakistan must end support of nuclear nonproliferation in rogue nations; and, three, Pakistan must exemplify steps toward returning to a democracy.

Madam Chairman, this bill today includes language included by the gentleman from American Samoa that is consistent with the first two conditions outlined by the President. It requires the State Department to prepare a report that contains a description of the extent to which Pakistan has closed all known terrorist training camps operating in Pakistan and Pakistani-held Kashmir, has established serious and identifiable measures to prohibit the infiltration of Islamic extremists across the Line of Control into India, and has ceased the transfer of weapons of mass destruction.

Because this important language is included in the bill, I rise in support of this legislation and only wish to make the point that it is equally as important for Pakistan to return to democracy in order to ensure future peace and stability in South Asia.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 382, noes 42, not voting 10, as follows:

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Linder) (during the vote). Members are advised 2 minutes remain in this vote.

Ms. LINDA T. S�NCHEZ of California, Mr. BERRY and Mr. GREENWOOD changed their vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''

The title of the bill was amended so as to read: ``A bill to establish the Millennium Challenge Account to provide increased support for certain developing countries; to authorize the expansion of the Peace Corps; to authorize appropriations for the Department of State for fiscal years 2004 and 2005; and to authorize appropriations under the Arms Export Control Act and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 for security assistance for fiscal years 2004 and 2005, and for other purposes.''.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to take from the Speaker's table the bill (H.R. 1588) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2004 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed Forces, and for other purposes, with a Senate amendment thereto, disagree to the Senate amendment, and agree to the conference asked by the Senate.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California?

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, I yield to the gentleman from California for the purpose of explaining this request.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the distinguished gentleman from Missouri for yielding.

This unanimous-consent request allows the House and Senate Armed Services Committees to formally begin conference.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California?

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, the Chair appoints the following conferees:

From the Committee on Armed Services, for consideration of the House bill and the Senate amendment, and modifications committed to conference: Messrs. HUNTER, WELDON of Pennsylvania, HEFLEY, SAXTON, MCHUGH, EVERETT, BARTLETT of Maryland, MCKEON, THORNBERRY, HOSTETTLER, JONES of North Carolina, RYUN of Kansas, GIBBONS, HAYES, Mrs. Wilson of New Mexico, Messrs. CALVERT, SKELTON, SPRATT, ORTIZ, EVANS, TAYLOR of Mississippi, ABERCROMBIE, MEEHAN, REYES, SNYDER, TURNER of Texas, Ms. LORETTA SANCHEZ of California, and Mr. Cooper.

From the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, for consideration of matters within the jurisdiction of that committee under clause 11 of rule X: Mr. Goss, Mr. Hoekstra, and Ms. Harman.

From the Committee on Agriculture, for consideration of sections 1057 and 2822 of the House bill, and modifications committed to conference: Messrs. GOODLATTE, LUCAS of Oklahoma, and STENHOLM.

From the Committee on Education and the Workforce, for consideration of sections 544, 553, 563, 567, 907, 1046, 1501, 1502, and 1504 through 1506 of the House bill, and sections 233, 351, 352, 368, 701, 1034, and 1036 of the Senate amendment, and modifications committed to conference: Messrs. CASTLE, KLINE and GEORGE MILLER of California.

From the Committee on Energy and Commerce, for consideration of sections 601, 3113, 3201, and 3517 of the House bill, and sections 601, 701, 852, 3151, and 3201 of the Senate amendment, and modifications committed to conference: Messrs. TAUZIN, BARTON of Texas, and DINGELL.

From the Committee on Financial Services, for consideration of sections 814 and 907 of the House bill, and modifications committed to conference: Mr. Oxley, Mr. King of New York, and Mrs. Maloney.

From the Committee on Government Reform, for consideration of sections 315, 323, 551, 805, 822, 824, 828, 829, 1031,

1046, 1050, 1057, Title XI, Title XIV, sections 2825 and 2826 of the House bill, and sections 326, 801, 811, 813, 822, 831 through 833, 841, 852, 853, 1013, 1035, 1102 through 1104, and 2824 through 2826 of the Senate amendment, and modifications committed to conference: Mr. Tom Davis of Virginia, Mr. Shays, Mrs. Jo Ann Davis of Virginia, and Messrs. PUTNAM, TURNER of Ohio, WAXMAN, VAN HOLLEN, and DAVIS of Illinois.

From the Select Committee on Homeland Security, for consideration of section 1456 of the House bill, and modifications committed to conference: Messrs. COX, SHADEGG and THOMPSON of Mississippi.

From the Committee on House Administration, for consideration of section 564 of the Senate amendment, and modifications committed to conference: Messrs. NEY, MICA, and LARSON of Connecticut.

From the Committee on International Relations, for consideration of sections 1047, 1201, 1202, 1209, Title XIII, sections 3601, 3611, 3631, 3632, 3634, 3635, and 3636 of the House bill, and sections 323, 343, 921, 1201, 1202, 1204, 1205, 1207, 1208, Title XIII and section 3141 of the Senate amendment, and modifications committed to conference: Messrs. HYDE, BEREUTER, and LANTOS.

From the Committee on the Judiciary, for consideration of sections 661 through 665 and 851 through 853 of the Senate amendment, and modifications committed to conference: Messrs. SENSENBRENNER, SMITH of Texas, and CONYERS.

From the Committee on Resources, for consideration of sections 311, 317 through 319, 601, and 1057 of the House bill, and sections 322, 330, and 601 of the Senate amendment, and modifications committed to conference: Messrs. POMBO, GILCHREST, REHBERG, RAHALL, and UDALL of New Mexico.

From the Committee on Science, for consideration of sections 852 and 911 of the Senate amendment, and modifications committed to conference: Messrs. BOEHLERT, SMITH of Michigan, and HALL of Texas.

From the Committee on Small Business, for consideration of section 866 of the Senate amendment, and modifications committed to conference: Mr. Manzullo, Mrs. Kelly, and Ms. Vel�zquez.

From the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, for consideration of sections 312, 601, 907, 1049, 1051 and 2824 of the House bill, and sections 324, 601, and 2821 of the Senate amendment, and modifications committed to conference: Messrs. YOUNG of Alaska, PETRI, and CARSON of Oklahoma.

From the Committee on Veterans' Affairs, for consideration of section 565 of the House bill, and sections 644 and 707 of the Senate amendment, and modifications committed to conference: Messrs. SMITH of New Jersey, BILIRAKIS, and FILNER.

From the Committee on Ways and Means, for consideration of section 701 of the Senate amendment, and modifications committed to conference: Messrs. THOMAS, MCCRERY, and STARK.

2B) Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams - Defense Appropriations Act 2004

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I will make a statement while I am trying to locate the amendment I am going to offer. The 2004 budget request included no funding for the establishment of additional weapons of mass destruction civil support teams. There are currently 32 teams that are certified and operational. The plan is to field a total of 55 teams to ensure there is at least 1 team established in each State and territory.

The Senate Armed Services Committee included additional manpower and funding to establish 12 additional teams in fiscal year 2004. We included additional National Guard manpower for these teams, but we did not provide operation and maintenance or procurement funding.

I will send an amendment to the desk and ask that we consider it. This amendment conforms our bill to that of the Senate-passed national defense authorization bill regarding what we call CSTSs of the funds provided to the Department of Defense. This amendment would earmark $39.3 million in operation and maintenance funds, $25.9 million in procurement, and $1 million in research and development funds. I present the amendment as one that is offset and merely allocates funds to these teams as required by the Senate-passed authorization bill. I believe it has the support of my colleague Senator Inouye.

The Senator from Alaska [Mr. Stevens], for himself and Mr. Warner, proposes an amendment numbered 1232.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

SEC. 8124. Amounts appropriated by this Act may be used for the establishment and support of 12 additional Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams, as follows:

(1) Of the amount appropriated by title II under the heading ``OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE, ARMY'', up to $23,300,000.

(2) Of the amount appropriated by title II under the heading ``OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE, ARMY NATIONAL GUARD'', up to $16,000,000.

(3) Of the amount appropriated by title III under the heading ``OTHER PROCUREMENT, ARMY'', up to $25,900,000.

(4) Of the amount appropriated by title IV under the heading ``RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST AND EVALUATION, DEFENSE-WIDE'', up to $1,000,000.

Mr. STEVENS. I ask for the immediate consideration and adoption of this amendment.

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I have long advocated the creation of 23 additional full-time National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams and have supported the location of at least one team in each state and territory of the United States. I am pleased that last year the Congress passed--and the President signed into law--a defense authorization bill that required that these important teams be created.

I am also pleased that earlier this year the Senate passed a defense authorization bill that includes $88.4 million for 12 new teams in fiscal year 2004. I thank the Chairman and Ranking Member of the Armed Services Committee for their support on this issue, and for including language in the report accompanying the fiscal year 2004 DoD authorization bill urging the Pentagon to include funding for the remaining eleven teams in its fiscal year 2005 budget request.

I also want to thank the Chairman and the Ranking Member of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee for their work on this issue. I wonder if the managers would engage with me in a brief colloquy on this subject.

Mr. FEINGOLD. It is my understanding that the bill as amended by the Chairman includes the full $88.4 million authorized by the Armed Services Committee for 12 new Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams. I ask the Chairman of the Committee and the Senator from Hawaii [Mr. INOUYE] if that is the case?

Mr. FEINGOLD. So it is your understanding that the funding included in the bill currently before the Senate includes sufficient funding to man, equip, and train 12 new civil support teams?

Mr. SESSIONS. As the Chairman and Ranking Member are aware, for the last 7 years, since 1997, the Department of Defense has sponsored a unique biomedical research effort called the Neurotoxin Exposure Treatment Research Program or NETRP. This program conducts medical research that has wide applications in protecting and treating our soldiers, as well as advancing medical research that can lead to a cure for Parkinson's disease, which afflicts more than one million Americans.

The program addresses the protection of American soldiers from a wide range of exposures including chemical warfare agents, potential toxins in military uniforms and jet fuel, and radiation from radar and communications systems. Findings from this military research then have broad application to those diagnosed with Parkinson's and other neurodegenerative disorders.

This year's House of Representatives DOD Appropriations bill includes an increase in NETRP funding from the 2003 level of $21.25 million to $31 million--a solid investment in protecting our soldiers that can have the added benefit of saving or vastly improving the lives of millions of Americans.

Mr. STEVENS. I can assure the Senator from Alabama that I will give consideration during conference to the House proposal to increase NETRP funding levels.

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I rise to add my thoughts to the debate on the Defense appropriations bill for fiscal year 2004.

I wish to take this opportunity to thank all our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and members of the Coast Guard for their hard work in the ongoing fight against terrorism, their efforts in Iraq, and the many other missions to which they have been assigned. These dedicated men and women have volunteered to undertake, often at great personal sacrifice, the task of protecting the American people and our way of life. We owe a huge debt of gratitude to the members of the United States Armed Forces for their selfless service.

I am pleased that this bill appropriates an average pay raise of 4.15 percent for military personnel and lowers servicemembers' out-of-pocket housing costs from 7.5 to 3.5 percent.

I am pleased that the Appropriations Committee has fully funded at the authorized level the 12 additional full-time Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams, WMD-CST, included in the Senate-passed Department of Defense authorization bill. These teams, which are staffed by full-time members of the National Guard, will play an integral part in aiding first responders in their crucial work in the immediate aftermath of a terrorist attack. I have been a longtime supporter of the creation of these teams and am encouraged that we are well on our way to assuring that every State will have at least one full-time WMD-CST.

I am also pleased that funding for controversial data-mining programs, like the Terrorism Information Awareness Program and the Combat Zones That See Program, have been zeroed out in this bill. The untested and controversial intelligence procedure known as data-mining is capable of maintaining extensive files containing both public and private records on each and every American. Most Americans believe their private lives should remain private. Data-mining programs run the risk of intruding into the lives of individuals who have nothing to do with terrorism but who trust that their credit reports, shopping habits, and doctor visits would not become a part

of a gigantic computerized search engine, operating without any controls or oversight.

Unfortunately this enormous spending bill also contains many unnecessary items. I continue to be deeply concerned about the priorities of the Pentagon and about the process by which we consider the Department of Defense authorization and appropriations bills, a concern I have voiced every year that I have been a Member of this body. This bill includes $9.1 billion for missile defense, despite the fact that it is an unproven program. We also continue to pour billions of dollars into duplicative fighter aircraft programs. These are just two of many examples of excess.

Despite the almost $370 billion appropriated, this bill still does not accurately reflect the true cost of the defense budget. This bill stays within the Department of Defense allocation only by rescinding $3 billion from prior supplemental appropriations and counting those funds against this year's spending. Even worse, this bill contains absolutely no funding for the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, relying instead on future supplemental appropriations. These accounting tricks will not stop the ballooning of the national debt.

I was also disappointed that the Senate tabled the amendment to fully fund the President's AIDS initiative. I was thrilled by the commitment to fighting AIDS articulated by President Bush in his State of the Union Address, and I believe that the Congress should follow through on his historic and admirable pledge. Because I recognize that the AIDS pandemic is so devastating, because the pandemic causes the kind of instability and social collapse that present real security problems, I supported this amendment. But before I did, I studied it carefully because I needed to be certain that the offset would not diminish the resources available to the men and women of our armed forces currently deployed in dangerous missions in Iraq and elsewhere. Close scrutiny gave me confidence that the senior Senator from West Virginia had carefully crafted the offset to ensure that it would not do harm to our troops.

I will vote for this bill. This legislation includes good elements, such as the pay increases for military personnel and the funding for the establishment of much-needed WMD-CSTs. However, poor fiscal practices and accounting gimmicks cannot hide the fact that expensive, unproven, and redundant weapons programs continue to drain away scarce resources.

Mr. McCONNELL. I announce that the Senator from Texas (Mrs. HUTCHISON) is necessarily absent.

Mr. REID. I announce that the Senator from Florida (Mr. GRAHAM), the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. KERRY), the Senator from Connecticut (Mr. LIEBERMAN), and the Senator from Georgia (Mr. MILLER) are necessarily absent.

I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. KERRY) would vote ``yea.''

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber desiring to vote?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate insists on its amendments and requests a conference with the House on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses.

The PRESIDING OFFICER appoints Mr. Cochran, Mr. Specter, Mr. Domenici, Mr. Bond, Mr. McConnell, Mr. Shelby, Mr. Gregg, Mrs. Hutchison, Mr. Burns, Mr. Inouye, Ms. Collins, Mr. Byrd, Mr. Leahy, Mr. Harkin, Mr. Dorgan, Mr. Durbin, Mr. Reid of Nevada, and Mrs. Feinstein conferees on the part of the Senate.

Mr. TAUZIN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on H.R. 2122.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Louisiana?

There was no objection.

Mr. TAUZIN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 4 minutes.

Today, Mr. Speaker, the House will address one of President Bush's top initiatives in the war against terror, Project Bioshield.

Mr. Speaker, it is absolutely critical that America's public health emergency system be prepared to respond to new and emerging threats, and we are here today to take care of that job. This bipartisan legislation is about the safety and security of American families and of our country. America is stepping up to the profound threat of terrorism and other public health emergencies, and I am proud to report that H.R. 2122 combines smart policy and provides additional resources to prepare the Nation for bioterrorism threats and for other public health emergencies.

The chairman and ranking member of both the committees of jurisdiction and the Select Committee of Homeland Security have arrived at this consensus product that is before us today. I would like to thank the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Dingell), the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Tom Davis), the gentleman from California (Mr. Waxman), the gentleman from California (Mr. Cox), the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Turner) for their cooperation and hard work on this bill. This bipartisan spirit is similar to last year's effort on the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act that Senator Kennedy and I had the privilege to move through the Congress last year.

Project Bioshield will spur the research and development of new vaccines, drugs, and other countermeasures to deal with these biological, chemical, nuclear or radiological agents that pose a material threat to our Nation's security. The list includes, among other dangerous agents, such things as anthrax, botulinum toxin, the plague, ebola, and other similar viruses, many of which lack any effective treatment or antidote today.

The bill before us accomplishes this goal by doing two important things. First, it provides the needed flexibility in a range of areas from government contracting rules to peer review to personnel matters in order to speed up government-sponsored research and development into these deadly agents. Second, it creates a special reserve fund of money for the government to purchase these countermeasures that may ultimately be developed in response to the President's call. Without this clear commitment of funding in future years, private sector companies that are capable of such development simply will not undertake the heavy investment and risk associated with developing products to deal with agents that do not affect significant populations today and hopefully never will.

At our urging, the House has already provided an advanced appropriations of $5.6 billion over the next 10 years for this purpose, and this is all consistent with our authorization in the House budget resolution.

The bill also provides new authority to the Secretary of Health and Human Services to authorize in times of emergency the use of unapproved products whose benefits in treating or preventing infection outweigh the risk. Under current law, the only way an individual can receive an unapproved product is pursuant to a clinical investigation. But in time of national emergency, when this Nation is under attack, it may be necessary to give such investigational drugs on a large scale basis to millions of Americans. H.R. 2122 provides that if there is such an emergency, and if no adequate alternative therapy is available, the Secretary can authorize the use of a drug, device, or vaccine in such a flexible manner.

While we have made improvements to the administration's initial proposal in certain areas, our bill stays close to that original proposal, granting all the additional flexibilities and authorities requested by the President and even expanding them in some cases to further encourage companies to heed our call for innovation.

Once again, I want to applaud the leadership of President Bush and the truly bipartisan work of this body across multiple committees of jurisdiction to protect our country and to promote public health security from the many new dangers that we face today.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. BROWN of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 3 1/2 minutes.

Mr. Speaker, this legislation is the product of a good-faith bipartisan process. I want to thank the gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. Tauzin), the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Bilirakis), as well as the ranking member, the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Dingell), for their work on this bill.

The United States and the global community of which we are part can only benefit from the development of bioterrorism countermeasures. Because the very existence of countermeasures renders bioterrorism less lethal and, therefore, less attractive to would-be terrorists, new countermeasures, therefore, serve a dual purpose. They are both an antidote and a deterrent to future attacks.

For the sake of national and international security, it makes sense to invest in both basic and advanced research aimed at producing new bioterrorism countermeasures. When an opportunity to produce one of these countermeasures presents itself, it makes sense to capitalize quickly on that opportunity. That is the logic behind this legislation.

The bill establishes an expedited process for Federal support of countermeasure research and a procurement process to encourage private sector investment in this research. At the same time, Mr. Speaker, the legislation is

[Page: H6928]

not a blank check. Congress has a responsibility to weigh competing funding priorities and set funding levels appropriately.

In that context, it is appropriate to reiterate a concern that I raised last week while we debated the Labor, Health and Human Services appropriations bill. Bioterrorism funding is essential and important. The legislation before us is essential and important, but our investment in bioterrorism should not and must not come at the expense of research focusing on cancer and other health threats.

Let me repeat that. Our investment in bioterrorism should not and must not come at the expense of research focusing on cancer and other health threats. The appropriations bill we passed last week here funds the National Institutes of Health at a level barely sufficient to support existing research projects, much less new research. That is a direct outgrowth from the tax cut that this Congress passed recently and the tax cuts for the wealthiest, most privileged citizens this Congress passed 2 years ago. It means we have not had enough money to appropriate for basic research, for medical research for the National Institutes of Health. It means it may be difficult for us in the future to deal with bioterrorism funding as fully as we should.

This Congress has made choices by giving tax cuts to the wealthiest, most privileged citizens, and as a result has made far too many cuts in health care; and health care is clearly inadequately funded, as our committee has discussed over and over again.

Mr. Speaker, finding ways to prevent and to treat and to cure disease is an enduring national priority. Interest in it does not wax, does not wane. Our investment in it should not either. We need to make these decisions in a way that serves the public and serves the interest of more medical research. We have a responsibility to balance priorities to provide adequate resources to prepare the country for a possible bioterrorist attack while maintaining strong support for other medical research priorities.

Mr. Speaker, I hope we can work on a bipartisan basis to restore the momentum that we once had behind groundbreaking medical research while continuing to move forward in the area of bioterrorism preparedness. This legislation before us today promotes the latter goal, and I urge my colleagues to support it. I thank the gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. Tauzin), the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Bilirakis), the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Dingell), the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Markey), and others who worked on this legislation.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Markey), my good friend.

Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Brown) for yielding me time.

I rise for the purpose of entering into a colloquy with the gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. Tauzin).

I want to commend the chairman and his staff along with the gentleman from California (Mr. Cox); the ranking member, the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Dingell); and the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Brown); and the ranking member, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Turner) for all of their hard work and for working with me and my staff in a bipartisan fashion that ultimately led to a resolution of all of the concerns which I raised with the legislation.

I do have, however, two outstanding issues that I wish to clarify at this time. Mr. Speaker, I have concerns that relate to the emergency use section of Project Bioshield. Specifically, I want to be sure that once a declaration of an emergency is terminated or revoked, that current law applies and it will then be impermissible for anyone to move such drugs, devices or biologics in interstate commerce without going through the proper approval process. Is this the case under the legislation?

Mr. TAUZIN. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MARKEY. I yield to the gentleman from Louisiana.

Mr. TAUZIN. The gentleman is correct. Like you, I too want to ensure that unapproved products are available in times of emergency. And while we allow the FDA to make products available during such time of emergency, absent such emergency, current law applies. We do allow for the shipments of such therapies in limited circumstances, namely, where a physician authorizes the continued treatment of an individual who initially received the drug during an emergency. However, this is the only exception. Absent that, present law applies to these unapproved products.

Mr. MARKEY. I thank the gentleman.

Secondly, I very much appreciate the gentleman's work on crafting language to ensure that the countermeasures developed under this legislation are, where necessary, subject to the same export control laws and regulations as other chemical and biological agents and their associated countermeasures. One of the new responsibilities the Secretary of HHS is directed to assume is to review new countermeasures both in the R&D phase as well as in the procurement phase of the Bioshield Program. The Secretary is encouraged to consult with other Federal agencies who play a role in setting export control policy and to recommend whether the new countermeasure or countermeasure R&D should be added to the various lists of controlled technologies that cannot be transferred to other countries without prior permission.

Is it your understanding that the Secretary should do this as expeditiously as possible, and that each beneficiary of Bioshield funds be directed as part of the contract or grant to abide by all applicable U.S. export laws governing the transfer of technology and R&D?

Mr. TAUZIN. The gentleman is absolutely correct. The Secretary should perform these reviews as expeditiously as possible once the R&D or procurement has started so as to prevent any exports of countermeasures or countermeasure R&D that could harm our U.S. national security.

Mr. MARKEY. I just want to thank the chairman. He has worked very hard and long on this legislation. I want to thank the gentleman's staff and Kendra Bodner from my staff for working out this language.

Mr. TAUZIN. Let me thank the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Markey). He raised a great number of concerns as we went true this process. I want to thank the gentleman for the way in which he worked with Members on both sides of the aisle so we cannot only take care of those concerns but produce a great product for the security of our country, and he has added immeasurably to that effort.

Mr. MARKEY. Good job, Mr. Chairman, and good job to everyone who has worked on this bill on both sides of the aisle.

Mr. TAUZIN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. LaTourette).

Mr. LaTOURETTE. Mr. Speaker, I thank the chairman for yielding to me for the purpose of a colloquy in order to clarify the intent of two provisions.

This legislation authorizes the director of the National Institute of Allergies and Infectious Diseases to issue grants to non-Federal entities for the construction and operation of specialized research facilities. A second provision of the bill authorizes the Secretary of HHS to take control of these facilities in the event or threat of bioterror emergency.

As you know, the Public Buildings Act of 1959, which is under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, governs the construction, acquisitions, repair and alteration of public buildings, including many laboratories and research facilities.

Mr. Chairman, am I correct that nothing in this legislation exempts the Secretary of HHS or the director of the institute from the requirements of the Public Buildings Act?

Mr. TAUZIN. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. LaTOURETTE. I yield to the gentleman from Louisiana.

Mr. TAUZIN. The gentleman is absolutely correct. These provisions do not preempt the Public Buildings Act to the extent that it would otherwise apply to such activities.

[Time: 14:15]

Mr. LaTOURETTE. Mr. Speaker, it is also my understanding that the facilities authority granted to the Secretary of HHS and the Director of the Institute of Diseases is intended only for

[Page: H6929]

special use facilities, which do not meet the definition of a public building under the Public Buildings Act. Is that also correct?

Mr. TAUZIN. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman will continue to yield, that is also correct. The Project Bioshield Act authorizes the construction of highly specialized laboratories, all of which I would expect to be biosafety level 3 or 4 laboratories unsuitable for general purpose use. Project Bioshield does not authorize the construction of ``public buildings'' as defined by the Public Buildings Act of 1959.

Mr. LaTOURETTE. Mr. Speaker, lastly, it is my understanding that the march in authority granted the Secretary of HHS is intended to give the Secretary control of these facilities for a limited period of time only. Is that also correct?

Mr. TAUZIN. If the gentleman would continue to yield, that is also correct. The authority allows the Secretary to take control of these facilities only during, and as necessary to respond to, public health emergencies affecting national security. Under the Bioterrorism Response Act passed last year, a public health emergency can be declared by the Secretary for up to 90 days at a time; and although the Secretary may extend the designation for multiple 90-day periods, it is not the intention of this legislation to allow the Secretary to control a facility for the useful life of that facility.

Mr. LaTOURETTE. Mr. Speaker, I thank the chairman for the clarification.

Mr. BROWN of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. TAUZIN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

(Mr. TAUZIN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks, and include extraneous material.)

Mr. TAUZIN. Mr. Speaker, I think we have a couple of other Members who need to do colloquies.

While we are waiting, I wanted to take this time, Mr. Speaker, to refer to a letter received today from the Secretary of Health and Human Services, Secretary Tommy Thompson, dated July 16, 2003; and I want to place the letter in the RECORD at this point.

THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH

AND HUMAN SERVICES,

Washington, DC, July 16, 2003.
Hon. BILLY TAUZIN,
Chairman, Committee on Energy and Commerce, House of Representatives, Washington, DC.

DEAR CHAIRMAN TAUZIN: Thank you for your leadership on H.R. 2122, the Project BioShield Act of 2003. This legislation is a critical step toward strengthening our ability to protect Americans against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats.

H.R. 2122 would: (1) speed the Government's ability to turn promising scientific discoveries into necessary countermeasures by one-third or more; (2) authorize funding to purchase critical new countermeasures targeted against the most worrisome threats; and (3) allow the Food and Drug Administration to make promising treatments quickly available to Americans in emergency situations.

I would like to address two issues that have arisen as the House takes up this vital priority. First, I share Representative Wamp's interest in building domestic capacity to produce countermeasures. In implementing Project BioShield, I will do everything in my power to purchase from domestic sources. To have a secure supply, we must build capacity within the United States and my department is committed to achieving that objective. The essential purpose of Project BioShield is to ensure we have necessary and timely countermeasures. We cannot achieve this goal by relying on foreign sources. Building a robust domestic capacity to produce countermeasures is, therefore, at the very heart of Project BioShield.

Second, I agree with Representative Jackson-Lee that the Strategic National Stockpile must serve all areas of the Nation, including rural areas. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has positioned stockpile assets to deliver needed medical supplies anywhere in the country within 12 hours. I have a personal understanding of the challenges that rural areas face and share Representative Jackson-Lee's interest in rural America. My department is pro-actively working with state and local health departments to ensure the effective and timely delivery of stockpile assets to both rural and urban parts our Nation.

If I can provide you or the members of the Committee with any further information or if I can otherwise be of assistance, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Sincerely,
TOMMY G. THOMPSON.

Mr. Speaker, I wanted to refer to it because the Secretary refers to several concerns raised by other Members of the House, of which I also share with him, and I think we will have a colloquy on one of those.

The first is a concern by the gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. Wamp) whose interest is in building domestic capacity to produce countermeasures; and, indeed, the Secretary indicates in his letter that it is indeed his desire to make sure those countermeasures are developed within this country. We cannot achieve the goal of securing our country if indeed we rely upon foreign sources for these measures; and, therefore, the building of robust domestic capacity to produce these countermeasures is at the very heart of the Bioshield Project.

I wanted to assure my friend, the gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. Wamp), that I share the Secretary's comments and his intentions in that regard.

Secondly, the gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee) was concerned that strategic national stockpile must be developed in such a way as to serve rural areas of the country, not simply the urban areas of our country, because rural areas can be affected by these bioterrorism threats just as easily, obviously, as urban areas. The Secretary indicates that the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has positioned stockpile assets anywhere in the country, delivery within 12 hours, in effect making sure that rural areas are not left out of the protection of this bill and the other bioterrorism bills that have passed the House and are part of the Centers for Disease Control stockpiles and distribution system.

So that those two concerns by our colleagues are addressed in this letter, and I wanted to share with those colleagues my agreement with the Secretary on both of those points.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. BROWN of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself as much time as I may consume.