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1A) Ratification of the Additional Protocols Agreement

PROTOCOL TO THE AGREEMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY REGARDING SAFEGUARDS IN THE UNITED STATES--TREATY DOCUMENT 107-7 -- (Senate - March 31, 2004)

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   Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the consideration of Calendar No. 16, Treaty Document No. 107-70, on today's Executive Calendar.

   I further ask that the treaty be considered as having passed through its various parliamentary stages up to and including the presentation of the resolution of ratification; further, that the committee conditions and understandings be agreed to, that any statements be printed in the Congressional Record as if read, and that the Senate immediately proceed to a vote on the resolution of ratification; further, that when the resolution of ratification is voted upon, the motion to reconsider be laid upon the table, the President be notified of the Senate's action, and that following the disposition of the treaty, the Senate return to legislative session.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

   Without objection, it is so ordered. The treaty will be considered to have passed through the various parliamentary stages up to and including the presentation of the resolution of ratification.

   The resolution of ratification reads as follows:

[(Treaty Doc. 107-7) The Protocol to the Agreement of the International Atomic Energy Agency Regarding Safeguards in the United States, with 2 conditions and 8 understandings;]

   Resolved (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring therein),

   SECTION 1. SENATE ADVICE AND CONSENT SUBJECT TO CONDITIONS AND UNDERSTANDINGS.

   The Senate advises and consents to the ratification of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the United States of America and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United States of America, with Annexes, signed at Vienna June 12, 1998 (T. Doc. 107-7) subject to the conditions in section 2 and the understandings in section 3.

   SEC. 2. CONDITIONS

   The advice and consent of the Senate under section 1 is subject to the following conditions, which shall be binding upon the President:

   (1) CERTIFICATIONS REGARDING THE NATIONAL SECURITY EXCLUSION, MANAGED ACCESS, AND DECLARED LOCATIONS.--Prior to the deposit of the United States instrument of ratification, the President shall certify to the appropriate congressional Committees that, not later than 180 days after the deposit of the United States instrument of ratification--

   (A) all necessary regulations will be promulgated and will be in force regarding the use of the National Security Exclusion under Article 1.b of the Additional Protocol, and that such regulations shall be made in accordance with the principles developed for the application of the National Security Exclusion;

   (B) the managed access provisions of Articles 7 and 1.c of the Additional Protocol shall be implemented in accordance with the appropriate and necessary inter-agency guidance and regulation regarding such access; and

   (C) the necessary security and counter-intelligence training and preparation will have been completed for any declared locations of direct national security significance.

   (2) CERTIFICATION REGARDING SITE VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS.--Prior to the deposit of the United States instrument of ratification, the President shall certify to the appropriate congressional Committees that the necessary site vulnerability assessments regarding activities, locations, and information of direct national security significance to the United States will be completed not later than 180 days after the deposit of the United States instrument of ratification for the initial United States declaration to the International Atomic Energy Agency (in this resolution referred to as the ``Agency'') under the Additional Protocol.

   SEC. 3. UNDERSTANDINGS.

   The advice and consent of the Senate under section 1 is subject to the following understandings:

   (1) IMPLEMENTATION OF ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL.--Implemenation of the Additional Protocol will conform to the principles set forth in the letter of April 30, 2002, from the United States Permanent Representatives to the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Vienna Office of the United Nations to the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

   (2) NOTIFICATION TO CONGRESS OF ADDED AND DELETED LOCATIONS.--

   (A) ADDED LOCATIONS.--The President shall notify the appropriate congressional Committees in advance of declaring to the Agency any addition to the lists of locations within the United States pursuant to Article 2.a(i), Article 2.a.(iv), Article 2.a.(v), Article 2.a.(vi)(a), Article 2.a.(vii), Article 2.a.(viii), and Article 2.b.(i) of the Additional Protocol, together with a certification that such addition will not adversely affect the national security of the United States. During the ensuing 60 days, Congress may disapprove an addition to the lists by joint resolution for reasons of direct national security significance, under procedures identical to those provided for the consideration of resolutions under section 130 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2159).

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   (B) DELETED LOCATIONS.--The President shall notify the appropriate congressional Committees of any deletion from the lists of locations within the United States previously declared to the Agency pursuant to Article 2.a.(i), Article 2.a.(iv), Article 2.a.(v), Article 2.a.(vi)(a), Article 2.a.(vii), Article 2.a.(viii), and Article 2.b.(i) of the Additional Protocol that is due to such location having a direct national security significance, together with an explanation of such deletion, as soon as possible prior to providing the Agency information regarding such deletion.

   (3) PROTECTION OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.--The Additional Protocol will not be construed to require the provision, in any manner, to the Agency of ``Restricted Data'' controlled by the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.

   (4) Protection of confidential information.--Should the President make a determination that persuasive information is available indicating that--

   (A) an officer or employee of the Agency has willfully published, divulged, disclosed, or made known in any manner or to any extent contrary to the Agreement between the United States of America and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United States of America and the Additional Protocol, any United States confidential business information coming to him or her in the course of his or her official duties relating to the implementation of the Additional Protocol, or by reason of any examination or investigation of any return, report, or record made to or filed with the Agency, or any officer or employee thereof, in relation to the Additional Protocol; and

   (B) such practice or disclosure has resulted in financial losses or damages to a United States person;

   the President shall, not later than 30 days after the receipt of such information by the executive branch of the United States Government, notify the appropriate congressional Committees in writing of such determination.

   (5) Report on consultations on adoption of additional protocols in non-nuclear weapon states.--Not later than 180 days after entry into force of the Additional Protocol, and annually thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional Committees a report on measures that have been taken or ought to be taken to achieve the adoption of additional protocols to existing safeguards agreements signed by non-nuclear weapon states party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

   (6) Report on united states assistance to the agency for the purpose of additional protocol implementation and verification of the obligations of non-nuclear weapon states.--Not later than 180 days after the entry into force of the Additional Protocol, and annually thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional Committees a report detailing the assistance provided by the United States to the Agency in order to promote the effective implementation of additional protocols to safeguards agreements signed by non-nuclear weapon states party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the verification of the compliance of such parties with Agency obligations.

   (7) Subsidiary arrangements and amendments.--

   (A) The subsidiary arrangement.--The Subsidiary Arrangement to the Additional Protocol between the United States and the Agency, signed at Vienna on June 12, 1998 contains an illustrative, rather than exhaustive, list of accepted United States managed access measures.

   (B) Notification of additional subsidiary arrangements and amendments.--The President shall notify the appropriate congressional Committees not later than 30 days after--

   (i) agreeing to any subsidiary arrangement with the Agency under Article 13 of the Additional Protocol; and

   (ii) the adoption by the Agency Board of Governors of any amendment to its Annexes under Article 16.b.

   (8) Amendments.--Amendments to the Additional Protocol will take effect for the United States in accordance with the requirements of the United States Constitution as the United States determines them.

   SEC. 4. DEFINITIONS.

   In this resolution:

   (1) Additional protocol.--The term ``Additional Protocol'' means the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the United States and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United States of America, with Annexes and a Subsidiary Agreement, signed at Vienna June 12, 1998 (T. Doc. 107-7).

   (2) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on International Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives.

   (3) Nuclear non-proliferation treaty.--The term ``Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty'' means the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968, and entered into force March 5, 1970.

   Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, today the Senate considers the Additional Protocol to the Agreement between the United States and the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA, Regarding Safeguards in the United States.

   Last February, at the National Defense University, President Bush called on the Senate to ratify the U.S. Additional Protocol, and today, I am pleased to bring this resolution of ratification to the floor on behalf of the Committee on Foreign Relations.

   The United States signed the Additional Protocol in Vienna on June 12, 1998, and President Bush submitted it to the Senate on May 9, 2002. The State Department submitted the implementing legislation to Congress on November 19, 2003. At the administration's request, I introduced the implementing legislation in the Senate last December.

   Since Senate ratification of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, the NPT, in 1969, and our Voluntary Offer to accept IAEA safeguards in 1980, 188 states have now approved the NPT. The NPT and the IAEA's existing safeguards agreements sufficed to forestall nuclear weapons programs in the world's advanced industrial states, several of which were weighing the nuclear option 40 years ago. Unfortunately, the NPT and the IAEA's existing safeguards agreements have been insufficient to prevent the diversion of resources in Non-Nuclear Weapon States determined to cheat. At the same time, we have witnessed an increase in the global availability of nuclear weapons materials, reprocessing and enrichment technologies. To ensure that materials and technologies are devoted only to peaceful uses, it is in the interest of the United States that the IAEA have the power to conduct intrusive inspections and verify imports and exports of sensitive materials and equipment in states suspected of diverting resources to a weapons program. The Additional Protocol, when universally ratified and implemented by all member states of the IAEA, will not solve all of our proliferation problems, but Senate ratification will further ensure that U.S. efforts to persuade all member states to adopt the Additional Protocol will be supported by concrete U.S. action.

   When the NPT was constructed, in order to gain its acceptance by states without weapons or complete fuel cycles, the world allowed for peaceful uses of the atom by states who forswore weapons. This was an outgrowth of the U.S. ``Atoms for Peace Program.'' Thus, Article IV of the NPT states:

   Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.

   Those last words, ``in conformity with Article I and II of this Treaty,'' are key in our consideration of the Additional Protocol. Non-Nuclear Weapon States under Article II of the NPT are obliged not to undertake any steps toward development of a weapon, and in so doing, secure their right to peaceful uses of the atom; peaceful uses verified by the IAEA under safeguards. When the Committee on Foreign Relations reported the NPT to the Senate in 1968, it did so with some reservations concerning this safeguards system. As the committee report noted:

   [T]he implementation of the treaty raises uncertainties. The reliability and thereby the credibility of international safeguards systems is still to be determined. No completely satisfactory answer was given to the Committee on the effectiveness of the safeguards systems envisioned under the treaty. But [the Committee] is equally convinced that when the possible problems in reaching satisfactory safeguards agreements are carefully weighed against the potential for a worldwide mandatory safeguards system, the comparison argues strongly for the present language of the treaty.

   Today, many have come to the realization that the existing framework of the NPT, as verified by status quo safeguards, is unable to provide adequate verification of Non-Nuclear Weapon States' obligations and alert the world community to broken commitments to the IAEA and under the NPT.

   I believe that acting today to ratify the Additional Protocol will put us back on the right track, a track toward complete verification and effective enforcement of Article II.

   In 2003, the international community was confronted with two cases involving declared Non-Nuclear Weapon

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States violating their commitments under the NPT by pursuing nuclear

   weapon programs.

   Iran's clandestine drive toward a nuclear weapons capability was partly exposed by an Iranian resistance group and confirmed by the IAEA. Then, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom concluded separate negotiations with Tehran in which the regime agreed to abandon its uranium enrichment program and to cease all efforts to pursue nuclear weapons. Iran signed an Additional Protocol with the IAEA last December. In January, Iranian Foreign Minister Kharrazi appeared to hedge on Iran's commitment by suggesting that Tehran had agreed ``to the suspension, not stopping, of the uranium enrichment process.'' Then, last February, in his latest report on Iran, IAEA Director General ElBaradei noted that inspectors had found in Iran technical designs for so-called ``P-2'' centrifuges similar to those the Agency discovered in Libya, designs not declared to the IAEA. Iran has also failed to declare a pilot uranium enrichment facility, importation of many nuclear fuel cycle components, and experiments with plutonium separation.

   Lastly, with regard to Iran, there are extremely disturbing press accounts of inspectors finding traces of highly enriched Uranium-235, which could have but one use, in a nuclear weapon. The United States has made no secret of our view that Iran is developing nuclear weapons.

   In Libya, we witnessed an important nonproliferation success. Following intense negotiations with the Bush administration and the United Kingdom, Libya admitted that it had WMD programs and agreed to abandon these efforts and work with international treaty regimes to verify Libya's commitment. I applaud President Bush and his team for a victory in the war against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Through our experience in Libya, we have learned of the extent of the nuclear proliferation network run by Pakistan's ``father of the bomb,'' A.Q. Khan. Similarly, we have also seen the dangers posed by exports of sensitive technologies by many European and Asian countries that contributed to Libya's nuclear weapons program. It is important to note in this regard how the Additional Protocol incorporates and provides for reporting on the Nuclear Suppliers' Group, NSG, Trigger List items in Annex II as well as uranium mining, enrichment and reactor activities in Annex I.

   Events in Iran and Libya are important to our consideration of the Additional Protocol. In 1980, the Senate ratified the U.S. commitment to voluntarily accept safeguards to demonstrate a firm commitment to the IAEA and to the NPT. As a Nuclear Weapon State party to the NPT, the United States is not required to accept any safeguards. Our decision sent an important message to the world: the preeminent superpower, with a large civilian nuclear power industry, could accept IAEA safeguards.

   The Additional Protocol seeks to fill holes in the existing patchwork of declarations and inspections. It will require the declaration of many locations and activities to the IAEA not previously required, and allow, with less than 24 hours' notice, inspections of such locations.

   The United States, as a declared Nuclear Weapon State party to the NPT, may exclude the application of IAEA safeguards on its activities. Under the Additional Protocol, the United States also has the right to exclude activities and sites of direct national security significance in accordance with its National Security Exclusion contained in Article 1.b. This provision is crucial to U.S. acceptance of the Additional Protocol and provides the basis for the protection of U.S. nuclear weapons-related activities, sites, and materials as a declared nuclear power.

   The Additional Protocol does not contain any new arms control or disarmament obligations for the United States. Although there are increased rights granted to the IAEA for the conduct of inspections in the United States, the administration has assured the Committee on Foreign Relations that the likelihood of an inspection occurring in the United States is very low. Nevertheless, should an inspection under the Additional Protocol be determined to be potentially harmful to U.S. national security, the United States has the right, through the National Security Exclusion, to prevent the inspection.

   For the past 9 months, the majority and minority staffs of the committee have been working closely with the administration to craft a resolution of ratification that will gain broad support in the Senate. On January 29, the committee held a hearing with administration witnesses. On March 4, the resolution of ratification before the Senate today was approved at a committee business meeting by a vote of 19 to 0. I thank Senator Biden and his staff for their cooperation in this effort. I am pleased to inform all Members that the administration fully supports the committee's recommended resolution of ratification, without changes.

   In sum, I believe the Additional Protocol is necessary to further ensure effective verification and enforcement of the Article II obligations of Non-Nuclear Weapon States. Continued enjoyment of Article IV rights should come only with an increase in our ability to verify compliance with obligations to the IAEA and under the NPT. I do not believe that the Additional Protocol will be a burden for the United States, given that our ratification and implementation of the Protocol does not constitute a statement about U.S. adherence to nonproliferation commitments, but rather as a demonstration of our continued leadership in furtherance of the nonproliferation objectives contained in it. It is a first step toward realization of the objectives set forth by President Bush last February.

   I urge my colleagues to support the committee's resolution of ratification and to ratify the Additional Protocol.

   Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I am very pleased to recommend that the United States Senate give its advice and consent to ratification of the Additional Safeguards Protocol between the United States and the International Atomic Energy Agency, the IAEA. Ratification of the Additional Protocol will make a real contribution to U.S. nuclear non-proliferation efforts, and it will do so without putting at risk any sensitive national security information.

   As my colleagues surely know, the Additional Protocol is an outgrowth of the world's discovery in 1991 that Iraq had come perilously close to developing a nuclear weapon, without the IAEA realizing it. One reason for Iraq's near-success was that the IAEA was allowed to inspect only those facilities that Iraq declared to it. If a uranium enrichment facility was across the hall from a declared facility--and in some cases it was about that bad--the IAEA had no mandate to inspect it. We, the world, and the IAEA itself realized that a revised safeguards regime was needed.

   The Additional Protocol that was developed to address this concern requires a signatory to provide yearly reports covering more nuclear facilities than those included in the declarations required by the so-called ``comprehensive'' safeguards agreements that have defined the IAEA's role in recent decades. It also allows the IAEA to inspect non-declared facilities, if the organization believes that illegal nuclear activities may be taking place there. This is a significant expansion of IAEA inspection rights, and it's something that the United States rightly wants to be adopted by all the non-nuclear weapons states under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (the NPT).

   The United States, as a recognized nuclear weapons state under the NPT, is not required to provide information to the IAEA or to accept IAEA inspections. In 1967, however, when the NPT was being negotiated, President Lyndon Baines Johnson announced that the United States would voluntarily submit to safeguards on nuclear materials. He did this to assuage the concerns of non-nuclear weapons states that feared that the five nuclear weapons states would otherwise enjoy an unfair commercial advantage regarding their nuclear power industries. Accordingly, a U.S.-IAEA safeguards agreement, also known as the ``Voluntary Offer,'' has been in place since 1980. Truth be told, this Voluntary Offer is more symbolic than real; until 1994, the IAEA only applied safeguards to two commercial power reactors and two fuel fabrication facilities in the United States, from a list of 250 eligible facilities. In recent years, it has inspected

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only sites for which the United States requested inspections, like the site where we store the highly enriched uranium we removed from Kazakhstan.

   Our willingness to accept IAEA safeguards helped to secure the world's agreement to the NPT. Similarly, our stated willingness to accept the Additional Protocol was crucial to gaining the world's agreement, in 1995, to the indefinite extension of the NPT. And our ratification of the Additional Protocol will strengthen our ability to convince more non-nuclear weapons states to sign their own additional protocols.

   When the Additional Protocol enters into force, the United States will submit additional information on civil nuclear facilities on an annual basis and identify additional civilian facilities, a small number of which might someday be inspected. All implementation activities under the Additional Protocol will be subject to a ``National Security Exclusion,'' however, that will allow our Government to exclude the application of the Additional Protocol wherever it would result in ``access by the Agency to activities with direct national security significance to the United States or to locations or information associated with such activities.'' Just as under the Voluntary Offer, the United States will retain the trump card of not declaring a facility, not submitting certain information, or denying or halting an inspection if our national security interests come into play. If we decide to permit an IAEA inspection, we will also have the right to employ ``managed access'' to protect national security information. (All countries will have the right to use managed access to protect confidential business information; because the United States is a recognized nuclear weapons state, we will have the right to use managed access more broadly.)

   The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has looked carefully at how our special rights would be invoked and whether sensitive facilities will be prepared to accept an IAEA inspection if the President or the interagency process decides to permit that inspection. We are satisfied that a Federal agency with a legitimate national security concern will have no difficulty ensuring that sensitive information is protected.

   The resolution of ratification that the Committee recommends will ensure that the U.S.-IAEA Additional Protocol does not enter into force until the President certifies that all the necessary regulations will be in place and all the necessary site vulnerability assessments will have been completed within 180 days of entry into force. (No reporting to the IAEA is required until 180 days after entry into force, so no inspections of newly-declared facilities would occur before then.) The resolution of ratification also addresses the protection of classified and proprietary information, the addition or deletion of locations from U.S. reports to the IAEA, U.S. intent to use its special rights as a nuclear weapons state under the NPT, and the adoption of subsidiary arrangements or amendments under the Additional Protocol. In short, the Committee has covered all the bases to ensure that adoption of the Additional Protocol will support our nuclear non-proliferation policy without endangering sensitive national security information.

   The resolution of ratification also calls for annual reports on U.S. efforts to get all the non-nuclear weapon states to adopt additional protocols and on U.S. help to the IAEA to conduct effective inspections. Those are important efforts that every member of this body should support. For all the difficulties it faces in gaining access to sites of concern, the IAEA has shown a real determination to get into those sites. Getting more states to sign and implement

   additional protocols will help the IAEA to gain that access. And once they get in, IAEA inspectors have shown a real ability to uncover information that rogue states thought they had concealed. But they are vitally dependent upon member states--and especially the United States--for the equipment and training that enable them to know what to look for and how to detect it in a manner that is scientifically valid, maximizes detection capabilities, and preserves a chain of custody so as to leave no doubt about the validity of their analysis.

   U.S. ratification of our Additional Protocol is only one step among many that are needed to make nuclear non-proliferation work. Even to bring the Additional Protocol into force, we will then need to enact implementing legislation; the Executive branch will then have to promulgate appropriate regulations; and preparations for possible IAEA inspections will have to be completed.

   In addition, the United States must marshal all its foreign policy tools to move states of concern away from nuclear weapons and to foster further international cooperation on non-proliferation. Some good work has been done in recent months. Libya signed an agreement with the United States and the United Kingdom to give up its weapons of mass destruction and long-range ballistic missile programs. The Proliferation Security Initiative was created and cooperating states agreed to coordinate their interdiction efforts while adhering to international law. The permanent members of the United Nations Security Council agreed on a draft resolution to bar proliferation to non-state entities.

   At the same time, however, much remains to be done. For example, North Korea continues to move toward having a large enough nuclear arsenal that it might contemplate using it, or even selling or giving away some of its nuclear weapons or fissile material. Meanwhile, although we have engaged in six-party talks that included North Korea, both we and the North Koreans have yet to give our negotiators the authority to get down to business and discuss a phased agreement under which North Korea would gradually dismantle all its nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missile programs, in return for various security assurances and diplomatic or economic benefits. So nothing significant has yet been achieved on the diplomatic front, while the clock keeps ticking on the nuclear weapons front. And we face the risk that South Korea, a crucial player on this issue, will develop a policy that is at odds with ours.

   The situation regarding Iran is also difficult, although much has been achieved in the last year. Exposure of Iran's two decades of lying and deception regarding its nuclear activities has led Iran to sign the Additional Protocol and to permit IAEA inspections that have proven quite embarrassing to Iran. Pursuant to an agreement with the foreign ministers of the United Kingdom, France and Germany, Iran has also agreed to suspend all its uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities. Iran has tried to backtrack on its commitments, and I personally have no confidence that Iran has come clean on its nuclear weapons efforts. So we must continue to press Iran to realize that its national interest will best be served by rejecting nuclear weapons. We must work to maintain solidarity with our European allies, with the Russian Federation, with Japan, and with the IAEA to send the message that Iran's real choice is between international acceptance and world rejection. I don't think that Iran wants to become another North Korea. We must make clear that the path of nuclear weapons can lead only to such a fate, and also that the path of non-proliferation will lead to a better future for Iran and all of its people.

   We must also work to make the international nuclear non-proliferation regime still more effective. One element of the NPT is a promise to non-nuclear weapons states that, in return for forswearing nuclear weapons, they will enjoy the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology. That bargain has become frayed. Iran, Iraq and North Korea have all used their ostensibly civilian facilities to mask covert weapons programs.

   In Iran and North Korea, we were at least able to sound the alarm. Both states had secret efforts to produce weapons-grade plutonium and highly enriched uranium and were caught. In Iraq, however, absent the Gulf War of 1991, Saddam Hussein might have obtained highly enriched uranium without anybody realizing it.

   A smarter state, using a civilian program as the rationale, could build uranium enrichment facilities, spent fuel reprocessing cells, and the like--and properly report these efforts to the IAEA. It could acquire weapons-grade plutonium or highly enriched uranium, and place the material under IAEA safeguards. In other words, it could become a potential nuclear weapons

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power without violating safeguards. Then it could withdraw from the NPT, and develop and assemble nuclear weapons in a short time.

   That's the challenge we need to address. How do we counter not just states that do things in a ham-handed manner, but states that skillfully exploit the loopholes of the NPT? The Additional Protocol can help make it much harder to hide a covert nuclear program, if we persuade the rest of the world to sign such protocols as well. But how can we combat the ``breakout'' scenario?

   One idea gaining currency is to allow non-nuclear weapons states to continue to possess civilian nuclear programs, but not a closed nuclear fuel cycle. A state could have civilian nuclear reactors to produce electrical power, but must import the nuclear reactor fuel and return any spent fuel. This would ensure that a state did not obtain fissile material needed for a nuclear weapon.

   IAEA Director General Mohammed El-Baradei would allow only multinational facilities to produce and process nuclear fuels, and give legitimate end-users assured access to these fuels at reasonable rates. Gen. Brent Scowcroft and Dr. William Perry recently endorsed this proposal, adding that states that refuse this bargain should be subject to sanctions. President Bush has not endorsed multinational facilities, but called upon members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group to refuse to export enrichment and reprocessing equipment to any state that does not already possess full scale enrichment and reprocessing plants.

   Any agreement on revising the nuclear non-proliferation regime will be difficult to achieve. Non-nuclear weapons states will ask what they will get for surrendering a well established right. States with nuclear fuel industries may worry that they will go out of business if only a few multinational facilities are allowed to operate enrichment and reprocessing activities. But the United States and other concerned states should set a goal of reaching a consensus in time for next year's NPT Review Conference. We have a window of opportunity, and we should use it.

   There is another bargain central to the NPT, one that this administration largely prefers to ignore. In return for forswearing nuclear weapons, non-nuclear weapons states received a commitment from the five permanent nuclear powers, reaffirmed as recently as 2000, to seek eventual nuclear disarmament.

   Nobody, including me, expects the United States to give up its nuclear deterrent any time in the foreseeable future. But the administration's drive to research and possibly produce new nuclear weapons--including low-yield nukes--is a step in the wrong direction. It signals to the rest of the world that even the preeminent global power needs new nuclear weapons to assure its own security.

   The administration threatens to take another backward step on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty. An FMCT has been a U.S. objective for eight years, and this administration castigated other countries for preventing negotiations from starting. Now that there is a chance of success, however, the administration says that we may refuse to negotiate. This only undermines solidarity with our allies, which have worked for years to help us convince other countries to negotiate.

   For all the flaws of the NPT, it is an essential treaty. It has been vital to encouraging states like Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, South Africa, Brazil and Argentina to end their nuclear weapons programs. The United States must work to improve the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and it must also do all that it can to abide by the bargains between the nuclear ``haves'' and the nuclear ``have nots'' that underlie world willingness to eschew the most awesome and awful weapons mankind has ever invented.

   In conclusion, I want to congratulate and thank my chairman, Senator DICK LUGAR, for his fine leadership in bringing this resolution of ratification to fruition. It was not an easy task, and he demonstrated exceptional leadership. I am grateful also to our staffs, especially Ken Myers, III and Thomas Moore on the majority side, and Edward Levine and Jofi Joseph on the Democratic side. Finally, I want to commend the interagency committee that worked with us, and especially Ms. Susan Koch of the National Security Council staff. She is a real professional, and we would not have gotten to this day without her.

   Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, I ask for a division vote on the resolution of ratification.

   The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. A division vote is requested. Senators in favor of the resolution of ratification will rise and stand until counted.

   Those opposed will rise and stand until counted.

   On a division vote, two-thirds of the Senators present having voted in the affirmative, the resolution of ratification is agreed to.

END

1B) IAEA Safeguards Agreement

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT -- (Senate - April 01, 2004)

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   Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I rise today to congratulate the Senate for ratifying the International Atomic Energy Agency--IAEA--Safeguards Agreement by unanimous consent last night.

   The Additional Protocol will augment the IAEA's safeguards monitoring system and provide early warning about illicit nuclear weapons-related activities under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

   By acting swiftly to ratify the treaty, the United States Senate has sent a clear signal to the international community that the United States is committed to not only maintaining a leadership role in the effort to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons but also to work closely with other nations in that endeavor.

   We know that we cannot go it alone and we will need the help of our friends and allies.

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   In addition, the Additional Protocol will strengthen the IAEA in its work in dealing with nuclear programs in Iran, Libya and elsewhere and encourage other countries to ratify their own additional protocols.

   Clearly, there is much work to be done and the international community will face additional challenges in the near future. Nevertheless, I am pleased that the United States Senate has taken this important step to protect our citizens and our national security interests.

END

3A) Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2004

S. 2279. A bill to amend title 46, United States Code, with respect to maritime transportation security, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.

   Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, less than 1 year ago, we wrapped up work on the port security bill that was signed into law as the Maritime Security Act of 2002, MTSA. That act mandated and outlined changes that are needed to shore up security in our ports, and established for the first time a system to coordinate, plan and implement port security at U.S. seaports. While this was landmark legislation, much still needs to be done with respect to the implementation of the requirements mandated by this law.

   I am very dissatisfied with the current Administration's disinterest in paying for port security, and would point out that we are approaching a crisis, as Federal mandates are being rolled out for security without Federal support. I have tried over and over to focus the attention of the Administration on this crucial need and pushed to no avail in the Senate to get the resources necessary to address this problem. But to date, I have gotten little support. In addition to appropriating much needed funds for port security, it has become apparent that keeping up with security needs at our ports is an ever evolving task, and that we may have to refocus our efforts and push harder to ensure that we coordinate our policies and maximize the limited resources that we have in this area.

   Today, in order to keep up with these needs, I am introducing the ``Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2004'', along with Senator MCCAIN, and Senator BREAUX. I am pleased to have worked on this with Senator MCCAIN, the Chairman of our Committee, as I often remark, while he has no coastline, he has worked with those of us who do have ports to work on these crucial port security issues. I am also pleased to introduce this legislation with Senator BREAUX, for he has truly been one of the leading advocates of the importance of maritime shipping and the merchant marine in the U.S. Senate. He has done invaluable work for us on the Commerce Committee, and is a true expert in the field. He will be sorely missed for his expertise on all maritime issues, although I am sure, that in the future, he will still be the Captain of some small boat, yacht, or maybe even a ship.

   Even though the Coast Guard, Customs and other agencies charged with the implementation of these measures have aggressively taken initial steps necessary to set up our future structure for seaport security there is still much to do, and effective action needs to occur to help coordinate and crystallize security policies and objectives. The Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2004 would attempt to mandate a coordinated Federal approach to several areas of concern in port security. It would also attempt to set performance standards for certain areas in port security and add a few enhancements to last year's legislation. Most importantly the bill would require a user fee to be established to help pay for the port security mandates.

   Specifically, this bill would impose in rem liability to secure payment of penalties and fines under the Act and to help ensure compliance with the security requirements imposed by the MTSA. The bill would also include provisions to increase security in waterside cargo areas, and ensure that cargo contents of imported marine cargo containers would be required to be cleared

   within 5 days of entering a U.S. port, or alternatively removed after 5 days without being cleared, to a regulated warehouse where it would be opened and reviewed to verify its contents. This would in no way change any claim to possession of the goods. Importantly, the bill would require DHS to evaluate the policies and practices of sealing empty containers. According to the Federal Maritime Commission, over 4 million containers were imported into the United States empty. At a recent hearing, a representative from the ILWU longshoremen's union pointed out that treatment of empties and the sealing practices of these containers varied from locale to locale. This bill would require an analysis of current practices at U.S. ports in order to determine what steps need to occur in order to make sure that the transport of empty containers does not present a threat of terrorism, and whether a Federal policy is justified in this area.

   The bill would require the Administration to produce a coordinated plan for collecting, analyzing, and disseminating maritime intelligence information collected by Federal agencies on ships, cargo, crew members and passengers. This intelligence is used to determine which ships, cargo, or crew warrant further inspection. This section of the bill requires further development of a maritime intelligence system to collect and analyze information concerning the crew, passengers and cargoes carried on vessels operating in waters under the jurisdiction of the United States. This mandate essentially restates existing law since it appears that the agencies have actually grown further apart since the passage of the Maritime Transportation Security Act. The provision in this bill would require a plan on how the Administration will coordinate collection and analysis of maritime information, and how agency personnel might be co-located to maximize resources and coordinate analysis. This plan must also indicate when long range vessel tracking will be integrated into this intelligence information. Additionally, the plan would require the government to analyze private sector resources to evaluate how they could be used to help monitor and differentiate legitimate moves of trade from those actions and players that are more suppositious. The Federal Government does not have a lot of experience monitoring commercial maritime activity, and I believe they will have to employ private sector expertise to assist in this endeavor.

   The report shall also consider the abilities of the Department of Navy to collect and analyze commercial maritime information. The U.S. Navy probably has the most resources dedicated to the evaluation of commercial shipping activities, but are precluded from sharing this information. In light of our need for better information on commercial shipping, this policy has to be reevaluated. A maritime intelligence system needs to be set up to work together so that Federal agencies, State, local and the private sector can coordinate their law enforcement activities. Maritime intelligence on commercial ocean shipping is currently gathered by the Coast Guard, Customs, INS, and other agencies such as the Federal Maritime Commission under separate systems. Only the Coast Guard and the Navy currently work together. We lag far behind in this area, and each agency is operating independent of others. We are not getting the full picture of what is happening out there. It is crucial that we have the best information available so that we can target our relatively limited resources with maximum efficiency. Further, the information has to be disseminated in a fashion to maximize its utility, while still protecting that information which needs to be kept confidential. Collection and analysis of commercial maritime information is a key element of our port security that needs more focus and has to be addressed if we are to adequately protect our Nation.

   Importantly, the bill will require the Administration to come up with cargo security plans to evaluate targeting systems to determine whether they are effective in deterring and protecting against potential acts of terrorism from cargo. In the event that targeting is inadequate protection, DHS would be required to increase the amount of cargo being non-intrusively inspected or x-rayed by two over the next year. The bill would also require the consolidation of intermodal cargo security programs that have the same security goals while establishing criteria and

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performance goals for these security programs, which are currently operating completely independent of each other, and require certain other cargo security program enhancements. Voluntary cargo security programs are not the answer to the important problem of securing our Nation from terrorist attacks. Firm standards and goals must be in place to ensure that items that we know we don't want in marine containers are not actually in marine containers. The legislation will also require a report on the amount of actual inspections that are being done at foreign seaports.

   While the Container Security Initiative was rolled out with great fanfare to work with foreign ports to inspect cargo before they get to U.S. ports, the question remains whether we are actually getting much bang for the buck. The fundamental question that needs to be addressed is whether foreign nations have been willing to use their security screening equipment for our benefit, and to what degree have they been willing to screen cargo for the benefit of our Nation. The legislation will require a report to determine whether this program needs adjustment, or is a cost-effective measure to ensure safe cargo movements into the U.S., and to update us on the progress in the installation of a system of radiation detection at U.S. ports.

   Additionally, this legislation will redirect our efforts to help ensure that we can verify that security is in place to prevent an act of terrorism, and not place us in a position of having to rely on documentation and the attestations or documentation of third parties in order to determine whether we need to take actions to protect the public. The Administration has not even started to implement the certification program required to certify ``secure systems of transportation,'' 46 U.S.C. 70116, and they must get going on this vital initiative. Otherwise, it would only take one good liar to breach our system of defense. Although I understand we cannot inspect every piece of cargo, we have a credible system in place to actively increase cargo inspections, and implement a system that would ultimately allow us to reopen U.S. ports to commerce, in the event of an attack.

   Additionally, the bill also would require a report from the Coast Guard on the benefits of utilizing joint operational centers at United States seaports to implement area security plans. This report should incorporate lessons learned from the three centers that have already been established, such as ``Operation SeaHawk'' in Charleston, SC, and consider which security programs could be effectively fused into these joint operational centers. The Commandant of the Coast Guard would be required by this bill to report on the effectiveness of these centers for port security and determine if it would be beneficial and cost effective to establish centers in additional areas that pose a significant security risk, and to utilize them to implement area security plans.

   The bill will also make sure that port security grants are reviewed and approved, as was mandated under the terms of the MTSA, and all grants are subject to the review of the Coast Guard Captain of the Port, the regional Maritime Administration representative, and other Transportation Security Administration security officials as well as other DHS security experts, before the grants are approved. This grant program is not open-ended, it is intended to help the private sector and

   State and municipal governments achieve compliance with Federally approved facility plans and area maritime security plans, and the changes to the statute will ensure that the grant program operates the way we intended it to operate.

   The bill also requires the Maritime Administration and the State Department to evaluate existing foreign assistance programs to determine whether the existing aid programs can be utilized to help foreign nations achieve compliance with the international standard set for port security. The MTSA requires the Coast Guard to set up a mechanism to review the practices of foreign ports to ensure that they have implemented adequate security measures, and ultimately, they can take steps that would result in the closure of commerce from ports in non-compliance with international security standards. It is in the best interests of everyone potentially impacted by such a policy implication, if we review our foreign aid programs to determine whether aid can be used to implement the necessary security measures.

   The bill also requires the Maritime Administration to work with the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, FLETC, and other DHS port security agencies such as TSA, Coast Guard and Customs to determine how to supplement their training programs to include a greater familiarization with commercial maritime practices. Port security law enforcement is much different in the aftermath of September 11, and officials involved in regulation and policing shipping will now have to approach it from a different perspective, and to be able to identify anomalies and irregularities, in order to best focus our limited police resources over an immense volume of trade. It is my understanding that the Maritime Administration has been utilizing resources at the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy and working with FLETC to formalize port security training. I think that this change will help our Federal agencies bolster their existing training programs, and achieve a greater understanding of potential security issues that could arise, and will be a healthy addition to work already done by the Maritime Administration and FLETC.

   The bill rewrites the DHS mandate to conduct research and development, and would require the Science Directorate within DHS to be more accountable to Congress for those actions they are taking to develop the types of technology necessary to address security at our seaports. Importantly, the bill also requires the Coast Guard to evaluate the security risks and policies very carefully of nuclear facilities on or adjacent to navigable waterways to ensure that we have security policies in place to prevent acts of terrorism from occurring from on or under navigable waterways. Most nuclear facilities are on or adjacent to navigable waterways, and I want the Coast Guard to exercise the highest degree of security in their treatment of these facilities and the threat posed as a result of maritime commerce or the proximity to navigable waterways.

   Most importantly, this bill attempts to address the fundamental issue that will face the nation as we implement the MTSA--will sufficient funding be in place to assure that our ports and agencies will robustly pursue security, or we will have to rely on sham security programs, or efforts severely restricted by funding that result in de minimus or desultory security efforts. When the Senate and House conferenced on the port security bill in the fall of 2002, the Senate conferees insisted on establishing direct funding for port security programs through a user fee, identical to the airline security fee, which would help defray the significant costs for the new port security mandates. The Administration declined to dedicate any resources for port security, and they declined to support the Senate's user fee. Unable to reach agreement with the House conferees and

   the Administration, I agreed to authorize just the necessary funds, but the President was required by law to report to Congress within 6 months on a funding proposal to assist States and their ports in complying with security mandates for Federal security plans. That report has never been prepared and is 9 months overdue.

   When the President's budget for FY 2004 came out, after the U.S. Coast Guard had estimated that it would take $7.4 billion of funding in order to comply with the port security requirements, there was no funding for port authority compliance in that year's budget resolution. I offered an amendment to the FY 2004 Budget Resolution which was unanimously accepted to add $1 billion to help defray the first year costs of port security--ultimately it was dropped from Conference. Two weeks later, the President was presented with a direct opportunity to fund port security programs: Congressional consideration of his emergency supplemental appropriations bill to pay for the war in Iraq and bolster homeland security. Again, the Administration funding request included no funding for port authorities to help them comply with the Federal mandate, so I offered an amendment to add $1 billion to the supplemental specifically to help ports meet the new security mandates. Despite unanimous approval in

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the Senate 3 weeks earlier, the amendment was opposed by the Administration and defeated on the Senate floor on a straight party line vote.

   Last year, I made another effort to address the port security funding inadequacies during consideration of the FY 2004 Homeland Security Appropriations bill. Again, the Administration proposed no funding for port security grants in their 2004 request, so I offered an amendment to the bill to direct $300 million specifically to port security grants without increasing the overall cost of the bill. The Administration opposed the funding increase, and the amendment was defeated largely along party lines with only three Republicans supporting the amendment.

   Until this year's budget the President has not requested one dime specifically for port security. He has opposed efforts to mandate the funds be raised from the users of the system, and this year's budget request is for only $46 million. Despite opposition from the White House, Congress has directed appropriations that have resulted in grants of $450 million to ports to help ensure compliance with the Federal security mandates, and so I know that this issue is an area of major concern. Ultimately, the funding issues must be addressed, and this bill proposes a user fee to pay for the costs of compliance of port security. I had considered the possibility of authorizing the Administration to either generate funds for port security via a user fee, or alternatively mandate that funds be directly transferred from funds collected by Customs duties, but because of jurisdictional issues determined not to do so. The maritime industry supports this approach, and I am not opposed to this approach, but want only to ensure, that one way or another, we have the necessary funding in place to set up the system of port security that this nation deserves. Simply put, there is just too much at stake to hope that security emerges.

   This bill seeks to continue the work to correct the security and terrorism prevention needs at our maritime borders. There is much to be done and there is a continued need for government and industry cooperation. This bill works on some of that need, yet the major need is funding for port security, which I hope that we will be able to address in the Senate very soon.

   I ask unanimous consent the text of the bill to be printed in the RECORD.

   There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

   S. 2279

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

   SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

    (a) SHORT TITLE.--This Act may be cited as the ``Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2004''.

    (b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.--The table of contents for this Act is as follows:

   Sec..1..Short title; table of contents

   Sec..2..In rem liability; enforcement; pier and wharf security costs.

   Sec..3..Maritime information.

   Sec..4..Intermodal cargo security plan.

   Sec..5..Joint operations center for port security.

   Sec..6..Maritime transportation security plan grants.

   Sec..7..Assistance for foreign ports.

   Sec..8..Federal and State commercial maritime transportation training.

   Sec..9..Port security research and development.

   Sec..10..Nuclear facilities in maritime areas.

   Sec..11..Transportation worker background investigation programs.

   Sec..12..Security service fee.

   Sec..13..Port security capital fund.

   SEC. 2. IN REM LIABILITY; ENFORCEMENT; PIER AND WHARF SECURITY COSTS.

    (a) IN GENERAL.--Chapter 701 of title 46, United States Code, is amended--

    (1) by redesignating section 70117 as 70120; and

    (2) by inserting after section 70116 the following:``.70117..In rem liability for civil penalties and certain costs

    ``(a) IN GENERAL.--Any vessel subject to the provisions of this chapter, which is used in violation of this chapter or any regulations issued hereunder shall be liable in rem for any civil penalty assessed pursuant to section 70120 and may be proceeded against in the United States district court for any district in which such vessel may be found.

    ``(b) REIMBURSABLE COSTS.--

    ``(1) IN GENERAL.--Any vessel subject to the provisions of this chapter shall be liable in rem for the reimbursable costs incurred by any valid claimant related to implementation and enforcement of this chapter with respect to the vessel, including port authorities, facility or terminal operators, shipping agents, Federal, State, or local government agencies, and other persons to whom the management of the vessel at the port of supply is entrusted, and any fine or penalty relating to reporting requirements of the vessel or its cargo, crew, or passengers, and may be proceeded against in the United States district court for any district in which such vessel may be found.

    ``(2) REIMBURSABLE COSTS DEFINED.--In this subsection the term `reimbursable costs' means costs incurred by any service provider, including port authorities, facility or terminal operators, shipping agents, Federal, State, or local government agencies, or other person to whom the management of the vessel at the port of supply is entrusted, for--

    ``(A) vessel crew on board, or in transit to or from, the vessel under lawful order, including accommodation, detention, transportation, and medical expenses; and

    ``(B) required handling under lawful order of cargo or other items on board the vessel.``§70118. Enforcement by injunction or withholding of clearance

    ``(a) INJUNCTION.--The United States district courts shall have jurisdiction to restrain violations of this chapter or of regulations issued hereunder, for cause shown.

    ``(b) WITHHOLDING OF CLEARANCE.--

    ``(1) If any owner, agent, master, officer, or person in charge of a vessel is liable for a penalty or fine under section 70120, or if reasonable cause exists to believe that the owner, agent, master, officer, or person in charge may be subject to a penalty under section 70120, the Secretary may, with respect to such vessel, refuse or revoke any clearance required by section 4197 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (46 U.S.C. App. 91).

    ``(2) Clearance refused or revoked under this subsection may be granted upon filing of a bond or other surety satisfactory to the Secretary.``§70119..Security of piers and wharfs

    ``(a) IN GENERAL.--Notwithstanding any provision of law, the Secretary shall require any uncleared, imported merchandise remaining on the wharf or pier onto which it was unladen for more than 5 calendar days to be removed from the wharf or pier and deposited in the public stores or a general order warehouse, where it shall be inspected for determination of contents, and thereafter a permit for its delivery may be granted.

    ``(b) PENALTY.--The Secretary may impose an administrative penalty of $5,000 for each bill of lading for general order merchandise remaining on a wharf or pier in violation of subsection (a).''.

    (b) Conforming Amendment for In Rem Liability Provision in Chapter 701.--Section 2 of the Act of June 15, 1917 (50 U.S.C. 192) is amended--

    (1) by striking ``Act,'' each place it appears and inserting ``title,''; and

    (2) by adding at the end the following:

    ``(d) IN REM LIABILITY.--Any vessel subject to the provisions of this title, which is used in violation of this title, or any regulations issued hereunder, shall be liable in rem for any civil penalty assessed pursuant to subsection (c) and may be proceeded against in the United States district court for any district in which such vessel may be found.

    ``(e) INJUNCTION.--The United States district courts shall have jurisdiction to restrain violations of this title or of regulations issued hereunder, for cause shown.

    ``(f) WITHHOLDING OF CLEARANCE.--

    ``(1) If any owner, agent, master, officer, or person in charge of a vessel is liable for a penalty or fine under subsection (c), or if reasonable cause exists to believe that the owner, agent, master, officer, or person in charge may be subject to a penalty or fine under subsection (c), the Secretary may, with respect to such vessel, refuse or revoke any clearance required by section 4197 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (46 U.S.C. App. 91).

    ``(2) Clearance refused or revoked under this subsection may be granted upon filing of a bond or other surety satisfactory to the Secretary of the Department in which the Coast Guard is operating.''.

    (c) EMPTY CONTAINERS.--Within 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall review United States ports and transmit to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation and the House of Representatives Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure a report on the practices and policies in place to secure shipment of empty containers. The Secretary shall include in the report recommendations with respect to whether additional regulations or legislation is necessary to ensure the safe and secure delivery of cargo and to prevent potential acts of terrorism involving such containers.

    (d) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.--The chapter analysis for chapter 701 of title 46, United States Code, is amended by striking the last item and inserting the following:

``70117. In rem liability for civil penalties and certain costs``70118. Enforcement by injunction or withholding of clearance``70119. Security of piers and wharfs``70120. Civil penalty''.

   SEC. 3. MARITIME INFORMATION.

    Within 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall submit a report to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation and the House of Representatives Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure that provides a preliminary

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plan for the implementation of section 70113 of title 46, United States Code. The plan shall--

    (1) provide the identification of Federal agencies with maritime information relating to vessels, crew, passengers, cargo, and cargo shippers;

    (2) establish a timeline for coordinating the efforts of those Federal agencies in the collection of maritime information;

    (3) establish a timeline for the incorporation of information on vessel movements derived through the implementation of sections 70114 and 70115 of title 46, United States Code;

    (4) include recommendations on co-locating agency personnel in order to maximize expertise, minimize cost, and avoid redundancy;

    (5) include recommendations on how to leverage information on commercial maritime information collected by the Department of the Navy, and identify any legal impediments that would prevent or reduce the utilization of such information outside the Department of the Navy;

    (6) include recommendations on educating Federal officials on commercial maritime operations in order to facilitate the identification of security risks posed through commercial maritime transportation operations;

    (7) include recommendations on how private sector resources could be utilized to collect or analyze information, along with a preliminary assessment of the availability and expertise of private sector resources;

    (8) include recommendations on how to disseminate information collected and analyzed through Federal maritime security coordinator while considering the need for nondisclosure of sensitive security information and the maximizing of security through the utilization of State, local, and private security personnel; and

    (9) include recommendations on how the Department could help support a maritime information sharing and analysis center for the purpose of collecting information from public and private entities, along with recommendations on the appropriate levels of funding to help disseminate maritime security information to the private sector.

   SEC. 4. INTERMODAL CARGO SECURITY PLAN.

    (a) IN GENERAL.--In addition to the plan submitted under section 3, within 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall submit a report to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation and the House of Representatives Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure containing the following:

    (1) Secure systems of transportation (46 U.S.C. 70116).--A plan, along with timelines, for the implementation of section 70116 of title 46, United States Code. The plan shall--

    (A) provide an update on current efforts by the Department of Homeland Security could be incorporated into the certification process outlined in section 70116 to ensure the physical screening or inspection of imported cargo;

    (B) provide a preliminary assessment of resources necessary to evaluate and certify ``Secure Systems of Transportation'', and the resources necessary to validate that ``Secure Systems of Transportation'' are operating in compliance with the certification requirements; and

    (C) contain an analysis of the feasibility of establishing a user fee in order to be able to evaluate, certify, and validate ``Secure Systems of Transportation''.

    (2) RADIATION DETECTORS.--A report on progress in the installation of a system of radiation detection at all major United States seaports, along with a timeline and expected completion date for the system. In the report, the Secretary shall include a preliminary analysis of any issues related to the installation of the radiation detection equipment, as well as a cost estimate for completing installation of the system.

    (3) NON-INTRUSIVE INSPECTION AT FOREIGN PORTS.--A report--

    (A) on whether and to what extent foreign seaports have been willing to utilize screening equipment at their ports to screen cargo, including the number of cargo containers that have been screened at foreign seaports, and the ports where they were screened;

    (B) indicating which foreign ports may be willing to utilize their screening equipment for cargo exported for import into the United States, and a recommendation as to whether, and to what extent, United States cargo screening equipment will be required to be purchased and stationed at foreign seaports for inspection; and

    (C) indicating to what extent additional resources and program changes will be necessary to maximize scrutiny of cargo in foreign seaports.

    (4) COMPLIANCE WITH SECURITY STANDARD PROGRAMS.--A plan to establish, validate, and ensure compliance with security standards that would require ports, terminals, vessel operators, and shippers to adhere to security standards established by or consistent with the National Transportation System Security Plan. The plan shall indicate what resources will be utilized, and how they would be utilized, to ensure that companies operate in compliance with security standards.

    (b) EVALUATION OF CARGO INSPECTION TARGETING SYSTEM FOR INTERNATIONAL INTERMODAL CARGO CONTAINERS.--

    (1) IN GENERAL.--Within 6 months after the date of enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Inspector General of the Department of Homeland Security shall evaluate the system used by the Department to target international intermodal containers for inspection and report the results of the evaluation to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation and the House of Representatives Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. In conducting the evaluation, the Inspector General shall assess--

    (A) the effectiveness of the current tracking system to determine whether it is adequate to prevent international intermodal containers from being used for purposes of terrorism;

    (B) the sources of information used by the system to determine whether targeting information is collected from the best and most credible sources and evaluate data sources to determine information gaps and weaknesses;

    (C) the targeting system for reporting and analyzing inspection statistics, as well as testing effectiveness;

    (D) the competence and training of employees operating the system to determine whether they are sufficiently capable to detect potential terrorist threats; and

    (E) whether the system is an effective system to detect potential acts of terrorism and whether additional steps need to be taken in order to remedy deficiencies in targeting international intermodal containers for inspection.

    (2) INCREASE IN INSPECTIONS.--If the Inspector General determines in any of the reports required by paragraph (1) that the targeting system is insufficiently effective as a means of detecting potential acts of terrorism utilizing international intermodal containers, then within 12 months after that report, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall double the number of containers subjected to intrusive or non-intrusive inspection at United States ports or to be shipped to the United States at foreign seaports.

    (c) REPORT AND PLAN FORMATS.--The Secretary and the Inspector General may submit any plan or report required by this section in both classified and redacted formats if the Secretary determines that it is appropriate or necessary.

   SEC. 5. JOINT OPERATIONS CENTER FOR PORT SECURITY.

    The Commandant of the United States Coast Guard shall report to Congress, within 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, on the potential benefits of establishing joint operational centers for port security at certain United States seaports. The report shall consider the 3 Joint Operational Centers that have been established at Norfolk, Charleston, San Diego, and elsewhere and compare and contrast their composition and operational characteristics. The report shall consider--

    (1) whether it would be beneficial to establish linkages to Federal maritime information systems established pursuant to section 70113 of title 46, United States Code;

    (2) whether the operational centers could be beneficially utilized to track vessel movements under sections 70114 and 70115 of title 46, United States Code;

    (3) whether the operational centers could be beneficial in the facilitation of intermodal cargo security programs such as the ``Secure Systems of Transportation Program'';

    (4) the extent to which such operational centers could be beneficial in the operation of maritime area security plans and maritime area contingency response plans and in coordinating the port security activities of Federal, State, and local officials; and

    (5) include recommendations for the number of centers and their possible location, as well as preliminary cost estimates for the operation of the centers.

   SEC. 6. MARITIME TRANSPORTATION SECURITY PLAN GRANTS.

    Section 70107(a) of title 46, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:

    ``(a) IN GENERAL.--The Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Border and Transportation Security shall establish a grant program for making a fair and equitable allocation of funds to implement Area Maritime Transportation Security Plans and to help fund compliance with Federal security plans among port authorities, facility operators, and State and local agencies required to provide security services. Grants shall be made on the basis of the need to address vulnerabilities in security subject to review and comment by the appropriate Federal Maritime Security Coordinators and the Maritime Administration. The grant program shall take into account national economic and strategic defense concerns and shall be coordinated with the Director of the Office of Domestic Preparedness to ensure that the grant process is consistent with other Department of Homeland Security grant programs.''.

   SEC. 7. ASSISTANCE FOR FOREIGN PORTS.

    Section 70109 of title 46, United States Code, is amended--

    (1) by striking ``The Secretary'' in subsection (b) and inserting ``The Administrator of the Maritime Administration''; and

    (2) by adding at the end the following:

    ``(c) FOREIGN ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS.--The Administrator of the Maritime Administration, in coordination with the Secretary of State, shall identify foreign assistance programs that could facilitate implementation of port security antiterrorism measures in foreign countries. The Administrator and the Secretary shall establish a program to utilize those programs that are capable of implementing port security antiterrorism

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measures at ports in foreign countries that the Secretary finds, under section 70108, to lack effective antiterrorism measures.''.

   SEC. 8. FEDERAL AND STATE COMMERCIAL MARITIME TRANSPORTATION TRAINING.

    Section 109 of the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (46 U.S.C. 70101 note) is amended--

    (1) by redesignating subsections (c) through (f) as subsections (d) through (g), respectively; and

    (2) by inserting after subsection (b) the following:

    ``(c) FEDERAL AND STATE COMMERCIAL MARITIME TRANSPORTATION TRAINING.--The Secretary of Transportation shall establish a curriculum, to be incorporated into the curriculum developed under subsection (a)(1), to educate and instruct Federal and State officials on commercial maritime and intermodal transportation. The curriculum shall be designed to familiarize those officials with commercial maritime transportation in order to facilitate performance of their commercial maritime and intermodal transportation security responsibilities. In developing the standards for the curriculum, the Secretary shall consult with each agency in the Department of Homeland Security with maritime security responsibilities to determine areas of educational need. The Secretary shall also coordinate with the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in the development of the curriculum and the provision of training opportunities for Federal and State law enforcement officials at appropriate law enforcement training facilities.

   SEC. 9. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT.

    (a) IN GENERAL.--Section 70107 of title 46, United States Code, is amended by striking subsection (i) and inserting the following:

    ``(i) RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT.--

    ``(1) IN GENERAL.--As part of the research and development program within the Science and Technology directorate, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall conduct investigations, fund pilot programs, award grants, and otherwise conduct research and development across the various portfolios focused on making United States ports safer and more secure. Research conducted under this subsection may include--

    ``(A) methods or programs to increase the ability to target for inspection vessels, cargo, crewmembers, or passengers that will arrive or have arrived at any port or place in the United States;

    ``(B) equipment to detect accurately explosives, chemical, or biological agents that could be used to commit terrorist acts against the United States;

    ``(C) equipment to detect accurately nuclear or radiological materials, including scintillation-based detection equipment capable of signalling the presence of nuclear or radiological materials;

    ``(D) improved tags and seal designed for use on shipping containers to track the transportation of the merchandise in such containers, including `smart sensors' that are able to track a container throughout its entire supply chain, detect hazardous and radioactive materials within that container, and transmit that information to the appropriate law enforcement authorities;

    ``(E) tools, including the use of satellite tracking systems, to increase the awareness of maritime areas and to identify potential terrorist threats that could have an impact on facilities, vessels, and infrastructure on or adjacent to navigable waterways, including underwater access;

    ``(F) tools to mitigate the consequences of a terrorist act on, adjacent to, or under navigable waters of the United States, including sensor equipment, and other tools to help coordinate effective response to a terrorist action; and

    ``(G) applications to apply existing technologies from other areas or industries to increase overall port security.

    ``(2) IMPLEMENTATION OF TECHNOLOGY.--

    ``(A) IN GENERAL.--In conjunction with ongoing efforts to improve security at United States ports, the Director of the Science and Technology Directorate, in consultation with other Department of Homeland Security agencies with responsibility for port security, may conduct pilot projects at United States ports to test the effectiveness and applicability of new port security projects, including--

    ``(i) testing of new detection and screening technologies;

    ``(ii) projects to protect United States ports and infrastructure on or adjacent to the navigable waters of the United States, including underwater access; and

    ``(iii) tools for responding to a terrorist threat or incident at United States ports and infrastructure on or adjacent to the navigable waters of the United States, including underwater access.

    ``(B) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.--There are authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary of Homeland Security $35,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2005 through 2009 to carry out pilot projects under subparagraph (A).

    ``(3) ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISIONS.--

    ``(A) NO DUPLICATION OF EFFORT.--Before making any grant, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall coordinate with other Federal agencies to ensure the grant will not be used for research and development that is already being conducted with Federal funding.

    ``(B) ACCOUNTING.--The Secretary of Homeland Security shall by regulation establish accounting, reporting, and review procedures to ensure that funds made available under paragraph (1) are used for the purpose for which they were made available, that all expenditures are properly accounted for, and that amounts not used for such purposes and amounts not expended are recovered.

    ``(C) RECORDKEEPING.--Recipients of grants shall keep all records related to expenditures and obligations of funds provided under paragraph (1) and make them available upon request to the Inspector General of the Department of Homeland Security and the Secretary of Homeland Security for audit and examination.''.

    (b) ANNUAL REPORT.--Within 30 days after the beginning of each fiscal year from fiscal year 2005 through fiscal year 2009, the Director of the Science and Technology Directorate shall submit a report describing its research that can be applied to port security to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, the House of Representatives Committee on Science, and the House of Representatives Select Committee on Homeland Security. The report shall--

    (1) describe any port security-related research, including grants and pilot projects, that were conducted in the preceding fiscal year;

    (2) describe the amount of Department of Homeland Security resources dedicated to research that can be applied to port security;

    (3) describe the steps taken to coordinate with other agencies within the Department to ensure that research efforts are coordinated with port security efforts;

    (4) describe how the results of the Department's research, as well as port security related research of the Department of Defense, will be implemented in the field, including predicted timetables;

    (5) lay out the plans for research in the current fiscal year; and

    (6) include a description of the funding levels for the research in the preceding, current, and next fiscal years.

   SEC. 10. NUCLEAR FACILITIES IN MARITIME AREAS.

    (a) WATERWAYS.--Section 70103(b) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following:

    ``(5) WATERWAYS LOCATED NEAR NUCLEAR FACILITIES.--

    ``(A) IDENTIFICATION AND SECURITY EVALUATION.--The Secretary shall--

    ``(i) identify all nuclear facilities on, adjacent to, or in close proximity to navigable waterways that might be damaged by a transportation security incident;

    ``(ii) in coordination with the Secretary of Energy, evaluate the security plans of each such nuclear facility for its adequacy to protect the facility from damage or disruption from a transportation security incident originating in the navigable waterway, including threats posed by navigation, underwater access, and the introduction of harmful substances into water coolant systems.

    ``(B) RECTIFICATION OF DEFICIENCIES.--The Secretary, in coordination with the Secretary of Energy, shall take such steps as may be necessary or appropriate to correct any deficiencies in security identified in the evaluations conducted under subparagraph (A).

    ``(C) REPORT.--As soon as practicable after completion of the evaluation under subparagraph (A), the Secretary shall transmit a report, in both classified and redacted format, to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, the House of Representatives Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, and the House of Representatives Select Committee on Homeland Security--

    ``(i) describing the results of the identification and evaluation required by subparagraph (A);

    ``(ii) describing the actions taken under subparagraph (B); and

    ``(iii) evaluating the technology utilized in the protection of nuclear facilities (including any such technology under development).''.

    (b) VESSELS.--Section 70103(c)(3) of title 46, United States Code, is amended--

    (1) by striking ``and'' after the semicolon in subparagraph (F);

    (2) by striking ``facility.'' in subparagraph (G) and inserting ``facility; and''; and

    (3) by adding at the end the following:

    ``(H) establish a requirement, coordinated with the Department of Energy, for criminal background checks of all United States and foreign seamen employed on vessels transporting nuclear materials in the navigable waters of the United States.''.

   SEC. 11. TRANSPORTATION WORKER BACKGROUND INVESTIGATION PROGRAMS.

    Within 120 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security, after consultation with the Secretary of Transportation, shall transmit a report to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation and the House of Representatives Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure--

    (1) making recommendations (including legislative recommendations, if appropriate or necessary) for harmonizing, combining, or coordinating requirements, procedures, and programs for conducting background checks under section 70105 of title 46, United States Code, section 5103a(c) of title 49, United States Code, section 44936 of title 49, United States Code, and other provisions of Federal law or regulations requiring background checks for individuals engaged in transportation or transportation-related activities; and

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    (2) setting forth a detailed timeline for implementation of such harmonization, combination, or coordination.

   SEC. 12. SECURITY SERVICE FEE.

    (a) IN GENERAL.--Chapter 701 of title 46, United States Code, as amended by section 2, is further amended by adding at the end the following:``§70121. Security service fee

    ``(a) IN GENERAL.--

    ``(1) SECURITY FEE.--Within 90 days after the date of enactment of the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2004, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall assess and collect an international port security service fee on commercial maritime transportation entities that benefit from a secure system of international maritime transportation to pay for the costs of providing port security services. The amount of the fees assessed and collected under this paragraph and paragraph (2) shall, in the aggregate, be sufficient to provide the services and levels of funding described in section 70122(c).

    ``(2) INTERNATIONAL TRANSSHIPMENT SECURITY FEE.--The Secretary shall also assess and collect an international maritime transshipment security user fee for providing security services for shipments of cargo and transportation of passengers entering the United States as part of an international transportation movement by water through Canadian or Mexican ports at the same rates as the fee imposed under paragraph (1). The fee authorized by this paragraph shall not be assessed or collected on transshipments from--

    (A) Canada after the date on which the Secretary determines that an agreement between the United States and Canada, or

    (B) Mexico after the date on which the Secretary determines that an agreement between the United States and Mexico,

   has entered into force that will provide equivalent security regimes and international maritime security user fees of the United States and that country for transshipments between the countries.

    ``(b) SCHEDULE OF FEES.--In imposing fees under subsection (a), the Secretary shall ensure that the fees are reasonably related to the costs of providing services rendered and the value of the benefit derived from the continuation of secure international maritime transportation.

    ``(c) IMPOSITION OF FEE.--

    ``(1) IN GENERAL.--Notwithstanding section 9701 of title 31 and the procedural requirements of section 553 of title 5, the Secretary shall impose the fees under subsection (a) through the publication of notice in the Federal Register and begin collection of the fee within 60 days of the date of enactment of the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2004, or as soon as possible thereafter. No fee shall be assessed more than once, and no fee shall be assessed for international ferry voyages.

    ``(2) MEANS OF COLLECTION.--The Secretary shall prescribe procedures to collect fees under this section. The Secretary may use a department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States Government or of a State or local government to collect the fee and may reimburse the department, agency, or instrumentality a reasonable amount for its services.

    ``(3) SUBSEQUENT MODIFICATION OF FEE.--After imposing a fee under subsection (a), the Secretary may modify, from time to time through publication of notice in the Federal Register, the imposition or collection of such fee, or both. The Secretary shall evaluate the fee annually to determine whether it is necessary and appropriate to pay the cost of activities and services, and shall adjust the amount of the fee accordingly.

    ``(4) LIMITATION ON COLLECTION.--No fee may be collected under this section except to the extent that the expenditure of the fee to pay the costs of activities and services for which the fee is imposed is provided for in advance in an appropriations Act.

    ``(d) ADMINISTRATION OF FEES.--

    ``(1) FEES PAYABLE TO SECRETARY.--All fees imposed and amounts collected under this section are payable to the Secretary.

    ``(2) INFORMATION.--The Secretary may require the provision of such information as the Secretary decides is necessary to verify that fees have been collected and remitted at the proper times and in the proper amounts.

    ``(e) RECEIPTS CREDITED AS OFFSETTING COLLECTIONS.--Notwithstanding section 3302 of title 31, any fee collected under this section--

    ``(1) shall be credited as offsetting collections to the account that finances the activities and services for which the fee is imposed;

    ``(2) shall be available for expenditure only to pay the costs of activities and services for which the fee is imposed; and

    ``(3) shall remain available until expended.

    ``(f) REFUNDS.--The Secretary may refund any fee paid by mistake or any amount paid in excess of that required.

    ``(g) SUNSET.--The fees authorized by subsection (a) may not be assessed after September 31, 2009.''.

    (b) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.--The chapter analysis for chapter 701 of title 46, United States Code, as amended by section 2, is amended by adding at the end the following:

   ``70121. Security service fee''.

   SEC. 13. PORT SECURITY CAPITAL FUND.

    (a) IN GENERAL.--Chapter 701 of title 46, United States Code, as amended by section 11, is further amended by adding at the end the following:``§70122. Port security capital fund.

    ``(a) IN GENERAL.--There is established within the Department of Homeland Security a fund to be known as the Port Security Capital Fund. There are appropriated to the Fund such sums as may be derived from the fees authorized by section 70121(a).

    ``(b) PURPOSE.--Amounts in the Fund shall be available to the Secretary of Homeland Security--

    ``(1) to provide financial assistance to port authorities, facility operators, and State and local agencies required to provide security services to defray capital investment in transportation security at port facilities in accordance with the provisions of this chapter;

    ``(2) to provide financial assistance to those entities required to provide security services to help ensure compliance with Federal area maritime security plans; and

    ``(3) to help defray the costs of Federal port security programs.

    ``(c) ALLOCATION OF FUNDS.--

    ``(1) FUNDS DERIVED FROM SECURITY FEES.--From amounts in the Fund attributable to fees collected under section 70121(a)(1) and (2)--

    ``(A) no less than $400,000,000 (or such amount as may be appropriate to reflect any modification of the fees under section 70121(c)(3)) shall be made available each fiscal year for grants under section 70107 to help ensure compliance with facility security plans or to help implement Area Maritime Transportation Security Plans;

    ``(B) funds shall be made available to the Coast Guard for the costs of implementing sections 70114 and 70115 fully by the end of fiscal year 2006;

    ``(C) funds shall be made available to the Coast Guard for the costs of establishing command and control centers at United States ports to help coordinate port security law enforcement activities and implementing Area Maritime Security Plans, and may be transferred, as appropriate, to port authorities, facility operators, and State and local government agencies to help them defray costs associated with port security services;

    ``(D) funds shall be made available to the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Border and Transportation Security for the costs of implementing cargo security programs, including the costs of certifying secure systems of transportation under section 70116;

    ``(E) funds shall be made available to the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Border and Transportation Security for the costs of acquiring and operating nonintrusive screening equipment at United States ports; and

    ``(F) funds shall be made available to the Transportation Security Administration for the costs of implementing of section 70113 and the collection of commercial maritime intelligence (including the collection of commercial maritime transportation information from the private sector), of which a portion shall be made available to the Coast Guard and the Customs Service only for the purpose of coordinating the system of collecting and analyzing information on vessels, crew, passengers, cargo, and intermodal shipments.

    ``(2) TRANSSHIPMENT FEES.--Amounts in the Fund attributable to fees collected under section 70121(a)(3), shall be made available to the Secretary to defray the costs of providing international maritime transshipment security at the United States borders with Canada and Mexico.

    ``(d) UTILIZATION REPORTS.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall report annually to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation and the House of Representatives Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure on utilization of amounts received from the Fund.

    ``(e) LETTERS OF INTENT.--The Secretary of Homeland Security, or his delegate, may execute letters of intent to commit funding to port sponsors from the Fund.''.

    (f) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.--The chapter analysis for chapter 701 of title 46, United States Code, as amended by section 11, is amended by adding at the end the following:

   ``70122. Port security capital fund''.

4B) Iraq WMD Debate

   Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, I have listened to the debate that has been swirling around the country with respect to Iraq. The debate comes up again with respect to the commission which is currently meeting.

   I cannot respond to all of the specifics that come along. I am tempted to, but I will not because I want to spend the time that is allotted to me by setting the total record before those who might be listening so we can understand that many of the original statements or original positions with respect to Iraq that are being repeated over and over again are, in fact, false.

   I remember our colleague across the aisle, the late Senator Moynihan from New York, one of my dear friends and one of the Senators for whom I have the highest regard, quoted something. He probably didn't think of it himself, but it was more or less his mantra, as he said to me: ``Everyone is entitled to his own opinion but not to his own facts.''

   We keep hearing things said over and over again with respect to the war in Iraq as if they were fact. It is time to set the overall record straight.

   We heard one statement that there was absolutely no connection between 9/11 and Iraq. The other one we hear over and over again is the reason we went into Iraq is because we thought Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction. Some make it a little more stark than that.

   There was a group that marched on the Utah State Legislature wearing T-shirts that said, ``Bush Lied To Us. There Were No WMDs,'' as if the President of the United

   States George W. Bush himself alone was the only authority for the notion that there were weapons of mass destruction; and, once again repeating the false position that the only reason we went into Iraq is because we believed they had weapons of mass destruction.

   To quote another individual not nearly as well known as Pat Moynihan but my high school history teacher, she would always say to us, ``You cannot cut the seamless web of history.'' I want to take this opportunity to lay out the whole seamless web of the history of terrorism and do our best to understand it so we can realize the first statement that there was no connection between Iraq and 9/11 and the second statement that the only reason we went in is because Bush lied to us about weapons there, are not true. And I hope we can get the dialog back to the facts.

   I am distressed at what has happened to the dialog on this issue. I must comment. On television was the former Vice President of the United States with his hand with a clenched fist raised, the blood vessels standing out on his neck, screaming at the top of his voice, speaking of the President, ``He has betrayed this country.''

   To say the President has betrayed his country is to accuse him of treason, which is one of the crimes specifically listed in the Constitution as an impeachable offense. We have not heard that kind of rhetoric from a politician as highly placed as Al Gore since the 1950s. And the politician who used to speak like that was a member of this Chamber. His name was Joe McCarthy, and the President whom he accused of treason was Harry Truman.

   Let us step away from that kind of rhetoric in this debate and review the facts.

   I had the opportunity of attending the Kissinger Lecture at the Library of Congress which was given by George Shultz, former Secretary of State. It was one of the most cogent and lucid statements of where we are with respect to the war on terror I have ever heard. An update of that appeared in today's Wall Street Journal. I would like to quote from that those points which address the issues I have talked about, and ask unanimous consent that the entire piece be printed in the RECORD following my remarks.

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

   (See exhibit 1).

   Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, former Secretary of State George Shultz begins with this comment:

   We have struggled with terrorism for a long time. In the Reagan administration, I was a hawk on the subject. I said terrorism is a big problem, a different problem and we have to take forceful action against it. Fortunately, Ronald Reagan agreed with me but not many others did. [Don Rumsfeld was an outspoken exception.]

   Twenty-five years ago, it was on the radar screen of an American administration--in this case one headed by Ronald Reagan--that terrorism was a problem.

   Secretary Shultz goes on to discuss this and then makes this comment:

   Today, looking back on the past quarter century of terrorism, we can see that it is the method of choice of an extensive, internationally connected ideological movement dedicated to the destruction of our international system of cooperation and progress. We can see that the 1981 assassination of President Anwar Sadat, the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, the 2001 destruction of the Twin Towers, the bombs on the trains in Madrid, and scores of other terrorist attacks in between and in many countries, were carried out by one part or another of this movement. And the movement is connected to states that develop awesome weaponry, with some of it, or with expertise, for sale.

   Let me emphasize that last sentence again. Speaking of international terrorism that was involved in all of these things, going back to the assassination of Sadat in 1981, he says:

   And the movement is connected to states that develop awesome weaponry, with some of it, or with expertise, for sale.

   All right. Do we have an example of such a state that has developed awesome weaponry that may be for sale? Yes.

   Quoting again from Secretary Shultz, he speaks directly of Saddam Hussein and Iraq. He adds to this Kim Jong Il of North Korea, and then says:

   They seize control of state power and use that power to enhance their wealth, consolidate their rule and develop their weaponry. As they do this, and as they violate the laws and principles of the international system, they at the same time claim its privileges and immunities, such as the principle of non-intervention into the internal affairs of a legitimate sovereign state. For decades these thugs have gotten away with it. And the leading nations of the world have let them get away with it.

   Yes, we have heard much on this floor about America must not invade another sovereign state. That is precisely what Secretary Shultz is talking about when he says, these states that develop awesome weaponry and cooperate with terrorism for the purpose of

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upsetting the international order, then claim the immunities of the international order for themselves--as he says: ``such as the principle of non-intervention into the internal affairs of a legitimate sovereign state.''

   He goes on to summarize all that happened in Iraq. And again, those who will read the entire piece as it appears following my statement can get all of those details. But after he recites the details of what Saddam Hussein has done, he turns to David Kay, the man who is quoted again and again as the authority for the statement on the T-shirt that says: ``Bush Lied To Us.''

   Well, let's see what David Kay really said. I said in my previous statement David Kay told this Congress, testifying before the Armed Services Committee, that Saddam Hussein was, in fact, more dangerous than we thought when we started the war. But these are the portions of David Kay's position Secretary Shultz chooses to highlight, and I think they are the right ones to bring out.

   Quoting again:

   As Dr. David Kay put it in a Feb. 1 interview with Chris Wallace, ``We know there were terrorist groups in state still seeking WMD capability. Iraq, although I found no weapons, had tremendous capabilities in this area. A marketplace phenomena was about to occur, if it did not occur; sellers meeting buyers. And I think that would have been very dangerous if the war had not intervened.''

   Sellers of what? Buyers of what? Who would the sellers be? Who would the buyers be? The sellers, obviously, would be the Iraqis. The buyers would be the terrorists. And what are we talking about?

   Back to Secretary Shultz:

   When asked by Mr. Wallace what the sellers could have sold if they didn't have actual weapons, Mr. Kay said: ``The knowledge of how to make them, the knowledge of how to make small amounts, which is, after all, mostly what terrorists want. They don't want battlefield amounts of weapons. No, Iraq remained a very dangerous place in terms of WMD capabilities, even though we found no large stockpiles of weapons.''

   Just think about that for a second: the knowledge to make them.

   If I could give a very homely example, last week my wife and I were celebrity chefs at the March of Dimes gala, and we won a prize, and people all said: Is this an old family recipe? We had to admit, no, we called a chef in Salt Lake City at one of the finest restaurants there, who happens to work as a judge at these kinds of celebrity cook-ins, and he gave us a recipe he thought would win. We have been celebrity chefs four times. We have called him all four times. We have won three out of four.

   The capacity to tell somebody how to make something will produce that something just as much as having that something yourself. This chef did not participate, but his recipes participated, and his recipes won. All we had to do was be the willing buyers in the case; and he was the willing seller. I will add, just for the record, no money changed hands with respect to the recipe. But the example is there, and that is what David Kay is talking about.

   Going back to Secretary Shultz, he says:

   ..... in the long run, the most important aspect of the Iraq war will be what it means for the integrity of the international system and for the effort to deal effectively with terrorism. The stakes are huge and the terrorists know that as well as we do. That is the reason for their tactic of violence in Iraq. And that is why, for us and for our allies, failure is not an option. The message is that the U.S. and others in the world who recognize the need to sustain our international system will no longer quietly acquiesce in the take-over of states by lawless dictators who then carry on their depredations--including the development of awesome weapons for threats, use, or sale--behind the shield of protection that statehood provides. If you are one of these criminals in charge of a state, you no longer should expect to be allowed to be inside the system at the same time that you are a deadly enemy of it.

   Secretary Shultz concludes his piece with this comment:

   If we put this in terms of World War II, we are now sometime around 1937. In the 1930s, the world failed to do what it needed to do to head off a world war. Appeasement never works. Today we are in action. We must not flinch. With a powerful interplay of strength and diplomacy, we can win this war.

   Put it in context, put it in the historic pattern, and we realize this is all connected and that the action with respect to Iraq was a very proper, significant, indeed, essential part of the overall war on terrorism. If we had not moved ahead, we would have been irresponsible.

   The summary is in the callout that is put in the paper that says:

   The U.S. had no choice: We had to oust Saddam Hussein, or face the gravest threat.

   Mr. President, may I ask how much time I have remaining?

   The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 4 1/2 minutes.

   Mr. BENNETT. If I might use that 4 1/2 minutes, then, to address the fundamental question of the future nobody talks about. We are spending all of this time rehashing the past. Here is the fundamental question of the future: What happened to Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction? The assumption raised by the statement that ``Bush lied to us about the weapons'' is that the weapons never existed.

   Well, the first person to convince me the weapons existed was Madeleine Albright. The first President to tell me the weapons existed was William Jefferson Clinton.

   The first group that insisted weapons were there was working for the United Nations. This was not a partisan thing put together by George W. Bush. The weapons were clearly in Iraq, and the question is not why didn't Bush tell us the truth about them; the question is, what happened to them? That is the question we need to address. That is the question of the future we are ignoring in all of this debate about who said what at what point in the past.

   As I see it, there are four possibilities of what happened to the weapons Saddam Hussein had. No. 1, we got them all in the bombing in 1998. We must remember, as we try to truncate the history, the war in Iraq began in 1991. The U.N. resolution that called for the war was never suspended. It was renewed with acts of war in 1998. A heavy 4-day period of solid bombing is an act of war. President Clinton carried that out with the approval of this Congress. So the first possibility is that bombing destroyed all of the weapons of mass destruction.

   The second possibility, Saddam Hussein himself dismantled his stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction in an effort to convince the U.N. inspectors they were not there so the inspectors would leave him alone and he could go back to building them after the inspectors were gone. There is some suggestion that was in fact what happened, that he did not intend to disarm, as U.N. Resolution 1441 required he do. All he intended to do was deceive, and that is where the weapons went.

   Possibility No. 3, they were trucked over the border. Some of them got into Syria or other places and into the hands of others who still have them.

   And possibility No. 4, they are still in Iraq and we simply have not found them. When people ask me, which of these four possibilities do you think is the most likely, I say: All of the above. I believe we destroyed a good portion of his weapons in the 1998 bombing. I believe he himself dismantled others in a deliberate attempt to deceive the U.N. inspectors. I believe some of them did get out of the country and are in the hands of other bad actors somewhere. And I believe there are probably still some hidden away somewhere in the desert in Iraq.

   Unless the first answer is the only one that is correct and they were all destroyed in the bombing, they are still around somewhere. The capacity to build them was still around, as David Kay pointed out, before we went in and removed that.

   If there are some of them still around, why aren't we looking for them? Why aren't we paying attention to where they might be? I believe the American military is still on the alert for them. I believe the American intelligence community is still looking to where they might be. But in the debate we have here on the Senate floor, this question is never raised. It is never given any attention. Instead we spend all of our time looking backward and trying to assign blame instead of looking forward and trying to solve problems.

   I commend Secretary Shultz's presentation to all. It is a clear historic perspective over a quarter century from one of our senior statesmen that makes it clear the rhetoric surrounding this issue has been inappropriate and focused on the wrong thing.

   I yield the floor.

   Exhibit 1

[From the Asian Wall Street Journal, Mar. 29, 2004]

   An Essential War

(By George P. Shultz)

   We have struggled with terrorism for a long time. In the Reagan administration, I was a hawk on the subject. I said terrorism is a big problem, a different problem, and we have to take forceful action against it. Fortunately, Ronald Reagan agreed with me, but not many others did. (Don Rumsfeld was an outspoken exception).

   In those days we focused on how to defend against terrorism. We reinforced our embassies and increased out intelligence effort. We thought we made some progress. We established the legal basis for holding states responsible for using terrorists to attack Americans anywhere. Through intelligence, we did abort many potential terrorist acts. But we didn't really understand what motivated the terrorists or what they were out to do.

   In the 1990s, the problem began to appear even more menacing. Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda were well known, but the nature of the terror threat was not yet comprehended and our efforts to combat it were ineffective. Diplomacy without much force was tried. Terrorism was regarded as a law enforcement problem and terrorists as criminals. Some were arrested and put on trial. Early last year, a judge finally allowed the verdict to stand for one of those convicted in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. Ten years! Terrorism is not a matter that can be left to law enforcement, with its deliberative process, built-in delays, and safeguards that may let the prisoner go free on procedural grounds.

   Today, looking back on the past quarter century of terrorism, we can see that it is the method of choice of an extensive, internationally connected ideological movement dedicated to the destruction of our international system of cooperation and progress. We can see that the 1981 assassination of President Anwar Sadat, the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, the 2001 destruction of the Twin Towers, the bombs on the trains in Madrid, and scores of other terrorist attacks in between and in many countries, were carried out by one part or another of this movement. And the movement is c