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Dr. Elkhan Nuriyev is the Director of the Center for International Studies (CIS) and Associate Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at the University of the Caucasus in Baku, Republic of Azerbaijan. Prior to joining the Center, Dr. Nuriyev was a Fulbright Scholar and Research Associate at George Washington University and served as an expert in the Azerbaijan Foreign Ministry. He has also lectured in the United States and a number of European and Asian countries. Dr. Nuriyev is currently a Visiting Scholar at the Monterey Institute of International Studies in Monterey, California. On February 18, 1999, Dr. Nuriyev gave a public lecture on the ongoing geopolitical game in the Caucasus and the Caspian Basin.
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As an independent political scientist and concerned Azerbaijani citizen, I would like to provide you with an overview of some recent developments in Azerbaijan and in the surrounding region.
In the final years of the Soviet Union, the Caucasus gained wide recognition as the location of disputed territories and armed conflicts. The region's chronic instability was viewed by the world as a morass of ethnic conflicts and bloody power struggles. Despite the idea that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict triggered a chain of destabilizing events that led to the disintegration of the Soviet Union and accelerated the liberation of the former Soviet republics, in fact it was a distraction for the countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia. It distorted the struggle for sovereignty and independence from Moscow and totalitarian rule into a bloody war over patches of territory, and started a chain of wars and conflicts all over the territory of the former Soviet Union. Thus, democratic processes, market economy efforts, and constructive political and social developments were obstructed by the ethnic and territorial conflicts in the region.[1]
In the post-Soviet era, as leaders and the foreign policy elites in Moscow examine the real power situation in the international arena, the significance of the CIS territory (the so-called "near abroad") becomes abundantly clear to them.
The former satellite states in Eastern Europe are scrambling to become part of Western economic, democratic and security systems. Western Europe and the United States have maintained their strong strategic ties emanating from their membership in the European Economic Union and NATO.[2]
The only remaining region in which Russia wants to strengthen its strategic significance as a great power is its immediate neighborhood, the geopolitical setting of the CIS. The Kremlin knows full well that the security of Russia is inextricably linked to political developments in the former Soviet territories. In order to emerge as a great power, Russia wants to concentrate on building closer strategic ties with the former Soviet Republics. Russia insists that the newly independent states should not only retain but also strengthen security arrangements with Moscow. The main purpose of these arrangements is to make sure that these states do not develop security relations with NATO, Western democracies, and especially the United States.
Today, many have serious concerns about broader strategic issues in the Caucasus, including oil pipeline politics in the Caspian Basin, the military and political situation in Chechnya, the ongoing conflicts in the geopolitical setting of the Caucasus, the role of the Russian military, Russia's strategic relations with Iran, and of course, increasing US engagement in the region.
Since the end of the Cold War, the Caucasus has emerged as a pivotal geostrategic area, in which the United States, Russia, Iran, Turkey, and many other outside countries are competing for influence and power.
What is going in the Caucasus? What are difficulties and problems on the way to regional cooperation in the Caucasus and the Caspian Basin? What political future lies in store for this former Soviet territory? Will it be a region of peace, trust, and cooperation, or a zone of chronic conflicts, rivalry, and suspicion?
These questions are closely interrelated. The answers to them will determine the fate of these nascent states for the next several decades. I raised them because the ongoing geopolitical game remains a serious challenge for great and regional powers as well as the newly independent states and many other countries within the post-Soviet Caucasus region and in the Southern tier as a whole.
The Caucasus is a vital link and bridge between Asia and Europe, between East and West, and certainly deserves special attention in many respects. Most importantly, what here has implications for the whole region and the world?
The Caspian Sea, bordered by Russia, Azerbaijan, Iran, and the Central Asian states of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, has been a major oil-producing area since 1871. From the beginning, the region's oil industry has been dependent on foreign capital and technology. The Swedish Nobels and French Rothschilds built considerable fortunes drilling wells and constructing railroads to carry oil from the Azerbaijani capital, Baku, to Georgian ports on the Black Sea. At that time, large petroleum resources attracted many great and regional powers, resulting in a struggle for "black gold" in the Caucasus and Caspian Basin. The region has traditionally been volatile due to competition between Russia and Persia, China, or Great Britain. During World War I, after the collapse of the Russian Empire, the desire to control Baku's oilfields caused fierce competition among German, Turkish, and British forces. During World War II, the oil fields were a strategic objective in Nazi Germany's campaign against the Soviet Union.
Azerbaijan, as part of the Caucasus region and Central Asia, has over many centuries been a kind of arena for confrontation and was the object of disputes and wars between many powers, especially the three regional powers: Iran, Turkey, and Russia. Western players have always had an interest in the region; they came to the region for a short period of time and left it. Thus, analyzing the history of the region, one can say that an extremely complicated and problematic historical and political inheritance has made the Caucasus a highly unmanageable region, even during the age of the great empires. The Caucasus was a plaything of imperial powers early this century due to its large gas and crude oil reserves. Control over these energy resources and export routes out of the Eurasian hinterland is quickly becoming one of the central issues in post-Cold War politics. Similar to the “Great Game” of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, which pitted the British interests against those of the Russian Empire and the German Reich, a new geopolitical game in the Transcaucasus and Eurasia has emerged since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. This new version of the "Great Game" differs from the original 19th century version between Russia and Great Britain in that this version has more players, including Russia, Iran, Turkey, and the Western democracies. Today's struggle involves oil and geopolitics as well as many state and non-state actors. Consequently, the region is again in the news due to its unstable transition period following the break-up of the USSR and, most importantly, its abundant, unexplored natural resources.[3]
With the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the founding of the new independent states in the region, the three most powerful countries—Russia, Iran, and Turkey—gained vast opportunities for cooperation and partnership with their new neighbors, but at the same time faced new challenges, since several armed conflicts that erupted in the region have inevitably affected regional powers and the geopolitical situation in the CIS.
History has now given the countries of the Caucasus a chance to act as a bridge between North and South and as a major transportation and communication link between East and West. Whether these countries will succeed as independent forces will greatly depend on the capabilities and ingenuity of their leaders. Success will also depend on the roles that Russia, Turkey, and Iran play. If these powerful neighbors pursue constructive policies toward the region and contribute to its development, the countries of the Caucasus will have a good chance of success. If, however, traditional hegemonic policies predominate, the region may again succumb to domination by its powerful neighbors.
In the meantime, the ongoing regional conflicts in the Caucasus are threatening to deny Western access to the vital oil and gas reserves the world will need in the 21st century. Some analysts believe that the current potential conflicts in the Caucasus were started or exacerbated by the Russian military, and are tied to control over the pipeline routes. These violent conflicts blocked the transit routes to the West for Caspian and Central Asian oil. Consequently, regional conflicts in the geopolitical setting of the CIS are affecting oil politics and transit routes to the world market. Moreover, today's instability in the Caucasus has a direct impact on neighboring areas. These conflicts prevent the Caucasian states from engaging in mutually beneficial processes of interaction and economic cooperation.
For centuries the Caucasus was a frontier between Europe and Asia, and between Islam and Christendom. Russia, as a major power in the region, has protected its strategic interests in the Caucasus for three centuries. Long a hotbed of ethnic warfare, the Caucasus and Central Asia were ripe for Russia to find and exploit dissatisfied ethnic minorities, such as Karabakh Armenians, the Abkhaz, the Lezgin, and others. Since the dissolution of the USSR, however, the Kremlin has seen its position in the region progressively decline. Traditional geopolitical rivalries with Turkey and Iran, and Caspian oil were two of a number of compelling factors that focused Moscow's attention on re-establishing its dominance of the Caucasus and Central Asia. An analysis of the foreign policies of Azerbaijan and Georgia in the early 1990s demonstrates that from the very beginning of founding the CIS, Baku and Tbilisi took strict centrifugal positions and tried to leave the Russian sphere of influence. Although the main initial orientation in the foreign policies of Azerbaijan and Georgia was to the West, Baku and Tbilisi did not receive any political support from the Western democracies and were left alone in their struggle for independence. Unlike Armenia, which rapidly turned to Russia, its traditional historical ally, and has been striving to gain control over Karabakh from Azerbaijan, both Georgia and Azerbaijan suffered invasion by Soviet troops (1989 and 1990), whose aim was to oppress democratic movements and both countries suffered bloody wars with more powerful adversaries as well as several coups d'etat that repeatedly threatened to their sovereignty and territorial integrity. These factors and the ongoing conflict developments in Karabakh and Abkhazia have made the fates of Azerbaijan and Georgia very similar. Unlike Armenia, which became the most homogenous former Soviet Union republic after the Azeri minority fled in 1988-89, Georgia and Azerbaijan are ethnically diverse states that are easily vulnerable to Russian manipulation. Russia has worked toward weakening Azerbaijan and Georgia, undermining Turkish and Western influence in the region, and controlling access to Caspian oil. Gaining control over the long Black Sea coastline in Abkhazia, protecting the Russian port of Novorossiysk, and moving closer to the Georgian oil-exporting ports in Poti, Supsa, and Batumi perfectly suited Russian's plans. Additionally, the conflict in Chechnya, which is still an acute problem and a source of instability for Russia, and the southern border region of the Russian Federation increasingly resembles Lebanon or the former Yugoslavia, complete with hostages, refugees, and vendettas. Thus, in the absence of long-term stability and peace in the North Caucasus, the outlook for oil transportation through Chechnya is questionable. One of the main goals of the Russian occupation of Chechnya, and the Caucasus as a whole, is to ensure control of the pipeline that goes from Baku (via Grozny, the Chechen capital) to the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiysk, which is the terminal for both the Kazakhstani (Tengiz) and Azerbaijani pipelines.
In the meantime, Russia is benefiting from the state of "frozen instability" in the Caucasus, which hinders the development of viable and lucrative exporting routes for the oil consortia in the area. Moscow has gone beyond words in establishing its power in the Caucasus and is actively pursuing a policy of establishing military bases in the region in order to place itself in a position of exclusive control over all the future pipelines in the region.[4]
In 1995, Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze, who has been threatened with death on several occasions, permitted Moscow to establish four Russian bases on Georgian soil. A year earlier, in 1994, Russian peacekeeping forces were deployed in the conflict zone in Abkhazia with the agreement of the Georgian government and the Abkhaz separatists. Similarly, a Russian peacekeeping force has been in South Ossetia since 1992. Despite the presence of Russian peacekeepers in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia, internal conflicts in these areas remain unresolved. The Georgian government has no effective control over Abkhazia and much of South Ossetia.
Georgia has long been upset with Russia's unofficial support of the separatist province of Abkhazia. Georgia has not only hinted it will leave the CIS Collective Treaty, but has also pursued the withdrawal of Russian troops from two bases on Georgian soil. It has also urged replacement of Russian peacekeepers in Abkhazia with NATO troops.[5]
Unlike Georgia, Armenia voluntarily signed a military agreement with Russia in 1995, and has allowed Moscow to deploy at least 20,000 Russian 4th Army troops on its territory, concentrated around three major bases.[6] Azerbaijan has come under severe pressure from Moscow to allow Russian bases on its territory, but thus far has refused to do so. Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliyev has advocated conducting a foreign policy that is much more balanced between Russia, Iran, and Turkey. The Kremlin, however, considers Aliyev's foreign policy to be too independent and is attempting to prevent Azerbaijani leadership from moving out of the Russian orbit. By supporting the Karabakh Armenians, the Lezgin national movement in northern Azerbaijan, and the Talish movement in southern Azerbaijan, in addition to inciting pro-Russian factions such as the Abkhazians in Georgia, Armenians in Karabakh, and hard-line communist pro-Russian clans in Tajikistan, Russia tries to challenge the independence and territorial integrity of the newly independent states in the Caucasus and Central Asia region.
Another example of Russian military involvement in the Caucasus is the ten-year Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, which is situated on a potentially strategic oil route from the Caspian Sea to Turkey. Armenian forces along with the forces of the self-styled "Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh" continue to occupy 20 percent of Azerbaijani territory. A fragile cease-fire halted the fighting in 1994.[7] Since then, the peace process has continued. However, the conflict remains unresolved and peace talks are deadlocked. There are one million Azerbaijani refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) who cannot return to their homes. Ethnic Azeris from the part of Azerbaijan controlled by Armenian forces are prevented from returning to their homes by a heavily militarized ruling structure. This increasingly complicates the peace process and results in a situation of no war, yet no peace in the conflicting area. In addition, Yerevan has refused to recognize the Lisbon Protocol, sponsored by the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). In August 1995, OSCE members, including Azerbaijan, signed the Protocol, which is a declaration of principles for the peaceful settlement of the conflict. After the Lisbon summit, Armenia made further peace negotiations extremely difficult. The Armenian government currently demands that Azerbaijan recognize Karabakh's independence and deal with the leadership of the self-styled "Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh" directly as a full-fledged party to the conflict. Additionally, Yerevan refuses to recognize that the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan should be restored. Azerbaijan, in turn, strongly insists on preserving its sovereignty and territorial integrity.
The political temperature of the Caucasus has begun to shoot up with the recent reports of vast arms shipments from Russia to Armenia, which have focused international attention on the importance of peace and stability in the Caucasus. The scandal, comparable to the Iran-Contra affair, actually began in 1997, when Russia secretly shipped more than $1 billion worth of arms to Armenia, apparently to be used against Azerbaijan and to keep the Azerbaijanis and their strategic oil reserves within the Russian sphere of interest. The case was investigated during a closed session of the Russian Duma in April 1997, and a number of influential Russian officials, including former Defense Minister Igor Rodionov, acknowledged that during 1996-97, Moscow had supplied Armenia with 84 T-72 battle tanks, 72 heavy howitzers, 24 Scud missiles with eight launchers, 50 armored personnel carriers, 1,000 hand-fired Strela-2 and Strela-3 anti-aircraft missiles and millions of rounds of ammunition, which were transported by ship across the Caspian Sea, then sent overland through Iran to Armenia, free of charge.[8] Nevertheless, in 1997 and 1998 several top Armenian officials strongly denied Russian media reports that Moscow has been providing Yerevan with large-scale military assistance. However, Armenian Defense Minister Vazgen Sarkisian, speaking at Yerevan State University, specifically noted that Armenia's defense capability had been "doubled" in the past two years "at no cost to the budget."[9]
Azerbaijan has repeatedly protested continuing shipments of Russian arms to Armenia and initially demanded that all weapons supplied in the recent years be returned. As Moscow ignored Azerbaijan's protests, Baku officially demanded that the countries that signed the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty investigate alleged illegal arms supplies from Russia to Armenia.
Azerbaijan, an oil-rich republic, remains very concerned about Russian-Armenian military cooperation. The Azerbaijanis fear that the Armenians are preparing to attack them with support from Russia. The recent arms transfers played a crucial role in Armenia's seizure of large areas of Azerbaijan, resulting in a million refugees, more than from any other armed conflict in Europe since World War II.
The tremendous imbalance created by the illegal arms shipments is an extremely destabilizing development that actually threatens not only Azerbaijan but other neighboring countries as well.
Azerbaijan has already suggested it might invite NATO to set up bases near Baku, and has threatened to shut down Russia's early warning radar on Azerbaijani soil.[10] Some top Azerbaijani officials said that Azerbaijan "does not deny the possibility that a Turkish, US, or NATO military base will be built on the Azerbaijani territory." They also made it clear that "Armenia is trying to dictate its terms to Azerbaijan, seeking to preserve the results of its aggression against Azerbaijan." In particular, Azerbaijani Defense Minister Safar Abiyev noted that a large number of arms that remain at the Russian military bases in the Transcaucasus "will certainly be used in Nagorno-Karabakh, if Armenia resumes combat actions against Azerbaijan." He also said that Nagorno-Karabakh is a place where "terrorists and saboteurs are trained." About 200 Kurdish terrorists are being trained in the Lachin region of Nagorno-Karabakh and another 457 Kurdish militants are being trained in Armenia in order to infiltrate and destabilize Turkey, according to Abiyev.[11]
Although Russia's military support for Armenia in its long conflict with Azerbaijan has been well known, the extent of arms shipments and Kurdish terrorist training groups is surprising.
For that reason, it is quite clear that behind the calls for peaceful resolution, the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict remains part of Russia's ruthless attempt to keep the Caucasus weak, unstable and divided--and to prevent an oil route from materializing. With Russian links to Armenia getting stronger and with growing military cooperation between Moscow and Yerevan, it is highly doubtful that this tragic conflict will be settled anytime soon.
In the meantime, the recent proposal of some Azerbaijani officials for presence of US and NATO forces in Baku has set off a wave of reactions and debates.
The issue raises a simple question that may be of interest from regional standpoint: are NATO interests limited to Central Europe, or we can also talk about possible NATO enlargement towards NIS territory in the future?
Many representatives from various NATO structures have visited the Transcaucasus region in recent years, including Secretary-General Javier Solana. In this respect, there is a certain inequality in the preparedness of the three Transcaucasian states to cooperate with NATO. Unlike Georgia and Armenia, which basically advocate broadening their ties with NATO within the framework of the Partnership for Peace Program, Azerbaijan seeks a special partnership with NATO and is eager to promote cooperation with the alliance. US Ambassador to NATO Robert Hunter, who visited Baku in 1997, specifically noted that "NATO has a big stake in broadening contacts with Azerbaijan."[12]
Russia and Iran, powerful players in the Caucasus region, have strongly criticized Azerbaijan's invitation to the Western powers and have also cited negative consequences of moving NATO bases to Azerbaijan.
Moscow, in particular, criticized Azerbaijan's attempt to involve US military forces in the Caspian Sea region, stating "Baku had nothing to fear from Russian troops' presence in the Caucasus."[13]
Thus, while Azerbaijan is seeking outside help from both the United States and Turkey in order to offset Russia's bases and weapons in Armenia, Moscow is hardening its line and attempting to decrease pro-Western activity by Azerbaijani authorities.
Meanwhile, Iran recently warned Azerbaijan to drop any plans to welcome US and NATO bases on its territory to counter alleged Russian support for its rival, Armenia. Former Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani, who is now a top aide to Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has already warned Azerbaijan against allowing NATO forces on its soil, saying that "it will pay a high price" if the forces reach the Caucasus and the Caspian Basin region.[14]
As a hedge, Baku is proceeding with talks with Ankara about military cooperation between Azerbaijan and Turkey. Azerbaijani Defense Minister Safar Abiyev recently visited Ankara where he discussed a potential military pact with neighboring Turkey. After a meeting in Turkey with high-ranking officials, Abiyev said, "among other things, we worked on the possibility of creating a military alliance between Baku and Ankara, similar to the Russian-Armenian military agreement".[15]
In Azerbaijan, many are concerned that the recent vast arms shipments could further destabilize the situation in the region, possibly leading to a new large-scale war in the Caucasus. It is possible that the war over Nagorno-Karabakh will be renewed, which could complicate the general situation not only in Azerbaijan but also in the Caucasus region as a whole. In this respect, in the absence of a settlement, the risk of renewed fighting will likely increase in spring or summer, as this issue is becoming particularly serious and acute. In a worst-case scenario, Baku expects Armenia to renew hostilities against Azerbaijan, possibly in the region where the borders of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia meet, near the cities of Yevlakh and Kazakh. In this respect, Azerbaijan may face a new threat to its territorial integrity. Such a move would cut off the route for the East-West Caspian oil pipeline (from Baku to Supsa on Georgia’s Black Sea coast or from Baku to Ceyhan on Turkey's Mediterranean coast) and force Azerbaijan to export oil by way of Russia or Iran. If this takes place, Moscow will continue to influence Azerbaijan, and there will be severe pressure to bring Russian troops back to Azerbaijan. Even if this does not happen, if no agreement on Karabakh is reached by the end of 1999, Western governments and US businesses engaged in the Caucasus will likely begin to reconsider their plans regarding oil deals in Azerbaijan and the pipeline system for the whole region.
The signing of the oil agreement known as the 'contract of the century' opened the doors for Azerbaijan to join the international community, and made foreign investment possible. Since 1994, Azerbaijan and foreign oil companies have signed contracts worth $40 billion in potential investment. Almost all of the US oil companies are either investing now or seek to do so in the near future. Several major international consortia have been established in the past several years to explore for oil and gas in the Azerbaijani sector of the Caspian Sea.
At present, the key question for many oil businesses and politicians is “What is the real future of pipeline politics in Azerbaijan, the Caucasus and in Eurasia?” The Western participants in Azerbaijani and Kazakhstani pipeline projects frequently raise an interesting, yet sensitive question: will Russia dominate the development of Eurasian oil and its exports in an alliance with the radical regime of Iran, or will Russia be an equal and fair player in the region, together with Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Georgia, Turkmenistan, and possibly, in the future, Iran? Another issue has gained the attention of the major US companies working in Azerbaijan under the oil consortia, namely, which route across the Caucasus can ensure a reliable flow of oil to world petroleum markets?
The question of the routes and relative centrality of various existing and future oil pipelines for transporting Caspian oil thus has emerged as one of the hottest issues in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Since the Azerbaijani government faces some geopolitical obstacles, and considering that security issues are crucial in the region, Baku has proposed that a system of several pipelines be used in the region. In other words, it is much better to have an alternative not depending on one single route.
Three pipeline routes are currently under consideration: Baku to Novorossiysk on Russia's Black Sea coast, Baku to Supsa on the Georgian Black Sea coast, and Baku to Ceyhan on Turkey's Mediterranean coast.
The Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline, also referred to as the northern pipeline, goes through Russian territory to Novorossiysk via Chechnya, which is quite unsafe because of the absence of stability and peace in the North and South Caucasus. This pipeline has been in operation since October 1997, and the first Azerbaijani oil is now flowing north. In 1999, the Azerbaijan International Operating Company (AIOC) and its partners plan to export between 3 and 4 million tons of oil through Russia to the global market. The other portion of the early oil (some 7 million tons) is to be exported via Baku to Supsa on the Georgian coast. The preliminary construction of the western line (Baku-Supsa) is estimated at around $250 million. This line is scheduled to be in operation by April 1999.
Nevertheless, the Azerbaijani government would prefer to export Caspian oil via Georgia to the Turkish port of Ceyhan, which is the main oil pipeline route supported by the US government. The United States has pushed oil companies to conclude a deal to build a pipeline from the Caspian Sea to the Turkish port of Ceyhan. According to US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, "there are advantages to multiple pipelines" for the shipment of oil out of the Caspian Basin, but the Baku-Ceyhan pipe "should be one of them" because "it makes economic sense."[16] The issue of the principal pipeline route is in the process of negotiation and the 11-member AIOC is expected to make a decision on the route by the end of 1999. However, various power centers are trying to settle the question according to their own interests. Azerbaijani and Turkish negotiators agreed to a set tariff of $3 per barrel for the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, which both sides agreed would not exceed $2.4 billion to construct. Azerbaijani officials claim that the Baku-Ceyhan route will be built with or without foreign investment. There is some hesitation on the part of US officials, who are concerned that the Azerbaijani fields in the Caspian Sea, while they show great promise, might not have the confirmed resources to justify a commitment by the oil companies to develop the Baku-Ceyhan route. Azerbaijan has been attempting to persuade its Central Asian neighbors, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, to commit to cross-Caspian pipelines that will join the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, thus making it more economically beneficial and efficient. If this takes place, Azerbaijan's geopolitical position and geostrategic importance will increase even further.
I will focus on Azerbaijan and its relationship with the immediate regional and great powers involved in the "Great Game" within the Caucasus and in the geopolitical setting of the CIS.
Although Azerbaijan is a relatively small country, its strategic location, abundant natural resources, and political circumstances ensure that it will be at the center of international politics for years to come. Azerbaijan has endeavored to maintain its independence by maneuvering among regional powers such as Russia, Turkey, and Iran, while securing harmonious relationships with both the East and West. Oil has increased Azerbaijan’s importance in the eyes of the world, including Western oil corporations, and has intensified the competition over Azerbaijan as part of a sphere of influence.
Clearly, Russia sees Azerbaijan as her legitimate sphere of influence. Throughout its history, Russia has tended to compare itself to other nations and compete with other powerful countries, both East and West. It seems that this tendency is still part of Russian policy-making. Russia is trying to restore its hegemony, and is actively, yet subtly, competing for influence over its neighbors. Russia has concerns about security on her southern border and the potential alliance of Turkey and the Caucasian states; of particular concern is the possible spread of Islamic fundamentalism in Central Asia. Regarding the economic claims of the Caspian Sea, Russia desperately wants the pipelines to go through Russian territory. Events in Russia will have a significant impact on Azerbaijan as well as in the region, but which way will Russia go? Russia’s fate currently depends upon how internal politics play out and shape its future. Russia is presently at a crossroads, and has to make a historic choice as to whether it will become a European democracy or an “evil empire” again. Russia and Azerbaijan currently have a cold relationship, because Azerbaijan is truly an independent state, keenly aware of its strategic importance and oil resources, especially relative to other parts of the region such as Central Asia. Ignoring Russian interests will have dire consequences for Azerbaijan, for Russia could easily manipulate ethnic factions within Azerbaijan and use its leverage over Armenia to start a war between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Russia might also join forces with Iran to impede natural resource development in Azerbaijan.
Turkey is another important regional player, since much of the Caspian oil will have to go through the Bosporus Straits. Turkey wants the pipeline to go through the Transcaucasus to its port of Ceyhan. Although it has strong linguistic and cultural ties to the Caucasus and Central Asia, and it sees Azerbaijan and the Central Asian countries as natural allies in a loose confederation of secular Muslim republics, Turkey will have less impact in the region than other powers. Turkey is grappling with its own internal economic and political problems. Nevertheless, its geopolitical position gives Turkey a significant advantage over other players in the region. The lure of the oil potential in the region and the need for transportation to Western markets provide added incentive for involvement. However, Turkey's influence both in the Caucasus and Central Asia is limited by its inability to provide significant support needed by the newly independent states.
Iran, another historic player in the “Great Game,” has economic and ideological interests throughout the Caucasus and Central Asia. Iran is in a geostrategically sensitive and significant position between Central Asia, the Indian Ocean, the Transcaucasus, and Turkey. Iran sees itself in a competitive position with Turkey. Iran also has great concerns about what happens in Azerbaijan and in the Caspian Basin region. A strong, politically independent, secular, pro-Western and pro-American Azerbaijan is not in Iran’s interest. Iran’s territorial integrity could indeed be threatened if the 20 million Azeris living in Iran find a developed Azerbaijan increasingly attractive. Yet by developing its energy resources and emerging as a strong petroleum-producing country, Azerbaijan will enter into competition with Iran. Azerbaijani ties with the United States, Turkey, and Israel will decrease Iran’s influence in the region; nevertheless, Azerbaijan must make a concerted effort not to isolate Iran, lest Iran and Russia cultivate a strategic alliance that could threaten Azerbaijan’s status as an independent republic. Isolation could also bring about enhanced rapprochement between Iran and Armenia, which has been taking place in the last few years. Therefore, Azerbaijan should pursue limited cooperation with Iran.
The United States also has an interest in Azerbaijan’s oil and natural gas resources, especially since the United States imports over 40 percent of the oil it needs. While Russian companies will be able to bid on contracts, the West wants to ensure that the Caucasus and Central Asia remain independent, secular, Muslim countries. It is the tensions between the United States and Russia, and the United States and Iran, that are forcing political alignments in the Caucasus.
The United States has become more active in the Caucasus and Central Asia over the past several years. Azerbaijan considers the United States one of its main partners in the international system, and has firmly aligned itself with the West. There is a growing chorus of support in the United States to cement the alliance, since political and economic relations between the United States and Azerbaijan are important not only for the parties involved but are also important from the regional security standpoint.[17] Baku believes that US objectives in the region will promote political and economic independence and ensure that Caspian oil does not come under the sole control of Russia. Moreover, Azerbaijan’s ability to survive as an independent state, and to build democratic institutions, will largely depend upon the presence of the West and the support of the United States in Azerbaijan. The United States should therefore reinforce support for the independence of Azerbaijan, and this support should be at the very center of the US strategy toward the Caucasus region.
The United States’ recent activity in Azerbaijan has focused on strengthening regional economic mechanisms, developing East-West energy and transportation processes, and supporting conflict resolution efforts. However, I believe that there is little understanding on the part of the United States of the various reasons for conflict in the region. Although the United States is one of the biggest players in the region, it is still quite uninformed about basic issues within the Caucasus and in the geopolitical setting of the CIS. The United States is attempting to play a more assertive role in the resolution of the armed conflicts, but it has a difficult task, since Russia considers the Caucasus to be within its sphere of influence. Although the Clinton administration has made the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict a top foreign policy priority, US policy towards Russia's behavior in the Caucasus is still vague. Competition between Russia and the West over mediation of the regional conflicts creates serious geopolitical difficulties and obstacles to the long-term stability and development of the Caucasus. Russia does not want to see the United States as a major arbitrator in the region. Russia does not want to leave the Caucasus, and therefore is manipulating many of the armed conflicts in the region to prevent the young states from moving out of Russia’s orbit. A weak, unstable, and divided Caucasus is currently in Russia's interest, and Moscow wants to prove to the world community that the nations in this region are not capable of self-rule. Thus, a solution of the regional conflicts depends not only on the warring parties but also on whether the great powers can resolve contradictions between themselves. It would be a mistake, however, to believe that the Kremlin will work closely with United States, OSCE, and the United Nations to bring about lasting peace and stability in the region, which are absolutely essential for the Caucasus and Central Asia.
Although Russia’s reasonable interests are completely understandable and should, of course, be respected, the United States needs to ensure free and fair access for all interested parties to the oil fields of the Caucasus and Central Asia. The United States should strongly support security, free-market reforms, and democracy in the Caucasus. The United States should start thinking of how to secure its priorities and maintain peace, long-term stability, and security in the Caucasus and the Caspian Basin. It is in the interest of the United States to support its allies in the Caucasus. In light of Russian efforts to snuff out democratic forces and to control the Caspian Sea's lucrative oil reserves, the United States needs to devise a new strategy about how to protect its own interests in the region. It will undoubtedly allow the United States to protect its vital future multi-billion-dollar investments in energy resources.
The Caucasus, with its large natural resources and a huge market of more than 200 million people, could develop into a region of peace and prosperity. It could also become a huge area of economic, social and political instability, which would negatively affect the future of this region and the world. Therefore, the Western democracies and regional powers should work more closely to create a balanced interplay of international competition in the Caucasus and in the CIS territory as a whole.[18]
Compromise must replace competition in the pipeline interests; otherwise a more provoked Caucasus will bring poverty and bloodshed to everyone in the region, with no clear winner. The resolution of the conflicts in the Caucasus will depend on how successfully great powers seek to end the competition for primacy and control in the region. The great powers should foster cooperation instead of maintaining competition in the region. The Caucasus, too, should choose conciliation over confrontation. All parties should think of what can be done to prevent history from repeating itself for the second time in the 20th century. We are talking here about the future of the region and the character of the next century's international relations. We are talking here about the ongoing geopolitical game, which is quickly becoming a paramount challenge for the US policy-making toward the year 2000 and beyond.
In the last decade, both Russia and the United States have experienced the breakdown of a bipolar system. As these two great powers approach the 21st century, they are faced with new geopolitical challenges in a multipolar world. With political changes brought by the end of the Cold War, the need for the United States and Russia to work together is greater than ever before. It is therefore vital that both Russia and the United States, along with their friends and allies, make significant contributions to reducing geopolitical tensions, resolving regional conflicts, and building a lasting world peace.
Now is the time for clearer and faster policy solutions. The United States, Russia and other key players should make the appropriate decisions without delay. Tomorrow may be too late.
[1] Elkhan Nuriyev, Sovremennaya Mezhdunarodnaya Politika: Problemy i Voprosy (Baku, Azerbaijan: Western University Press, July 1997), pp.47-78 (in Russian).
[2] "Itogi" broadcast, NTV Russian television network, 4 October 1998.
[3] Elkhan Nuriyev, "Regional Conflicts and The New Geopolitics of NATO Expansion: The Cases of the Caucasus," Turkistan-Newsletter, Volume 98: 2-004, 8 January 1998.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Habarlar-L Digest 669, 12 February 1999. See also Simon Saradzhyan, "Baku Wants Out of CIS Defense Treaty," Moscow Times, 13 February 1999, Section: No. 1643.
[6] “ORT News Review,” ORT Russian television network, 15 November 1997.
[7] Tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan escalated in 1988 and full-scale war broke out in 1992. The 1994 truce ended the war, which was the first serious ethnic conflict on former Soviet territory, and in which over 20,000 people were killed.
[8] “Daily News Review,”Azerbaijani television network, 5 May 1998.
[9] Turkistan-Newsletter, Volume 98: 2-004, 8 January 1998.
[10] Habarlar-L Digest 669, 12 February 1999. See also Simon Saradzhyan, "Baku Wants Out of CIS Defense Treaty," Moscow Times, 13 February 1999, Section: No. 1643.
[11] Habarlar-L Digest 669, 12 February 1999. See also Elmira Akhundova, "Azerbaijan - Waiting for NATO," Obshchaya gazeta, 12 February 1999, pp.1, 5.
[12] Interfax Daily News, 18 October 1997.
[13] Agence France Presse, 12 February 1999.
[14] United Press International, 12 February 1999.
[15] Agence France Presse, 12 February 1999.
[16] Richard Gross, "U.S. Oil Czar to Press Pipeline in Turkey," Washington Times, 15 October 1998, p. A-12.
[17] Interview with Zbigniew Brzezinski, Counselor, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Washington, DC, 20 December 1996.
[18] Elkhan Nuriyev, "The Caucasus Region and The New Geopolitics of
Great Powers: The Struggle for Caspian Oil." Public lecture at the Kennan
Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, The Woodrow Wilson International
Center for Scholars, Washington, DC, 6 October, 1998.
© Copyright, Elkhan Nuriyev, 1999. All rights reserved.
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