

# DPRK

<b>INTERNATIONAL &amp; REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS</b>	<b>STATUS<sup>1</sup></b>
<a href="#">United Nations (UN)</a>	Member
<a href="#">Conference on Disarmament (CD)</a>	Member
<a href="#">International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)</a>	Member <sup>2</sup> ; violated Safeguards Agreement; announced withdrawal
<a href="#">Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons<sup>3</sup> (OPCW)</a>	-----
<a href="#">Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization Preparatory Commission</a>	-----
<a href="#">Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization<sup>4</sup> (KEDO)</a>	-----
<b>TREATIES &amp; AGREEMENTS</b>	
<i>Nuclear:</i>	
<a href="#">Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT)</a>	Violated Art. II obligations, announced withdrawal <sup>5</sup>
<a href="#">Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)</a>	----- <sup>6</sup>
<a href="#">Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT)</a>	-----
IAEA Safeguards Agreement	Yes ( <a href="#">INFCIRC 403</a> ) <sup>7</sup> ; violated
IAEA Additional Protocol	-----
<a href="#">Nuclear Safety Convention</a>	-----
<a href="#">Joint Spent Fuel Management Convention</a>	-----
<a href="#">Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material</a>	-----
Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (2005)	-----
1994 US-DPRK Agreed Framework	Signatory; abrogated <sup>8</sup>
<a href="#">Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula</a>	Signatory; abrogated <sup>9</sup>
<i>Chemical &amp; Biological:</i>	
<a href="#">Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)</a>	-----
<a href="#">Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC)</a>	State Party
BTWC Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) <sup>10</sup>	Not Submitted <sup>11</sup>
<a href="#">Geneva Protocol</a>	State Party <sup>12</sup>
<i>WMD delivery systems:</i>	
<a href="#">Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation</a>	-----
<i>Other:</i>	
<a href="#">Proliferation Security Initiative</a>	-----
<b>NONPROLIFERATION EXPORT CONTROLS</b>	
<a href="#">Zangger Committee</a>	-----
<a href="#">Nuclear Suppliers Group</a>	-----
<a href="#">Australia Group</a>	-----
<a href="#">Missile Technology Control Regime</a>	-----
<a href="#">Wassenaar Agreement</a>	-----
Security Council Resolution 1540 <sup>13</sup>	-----
<b>COUNTER-TERRORISM CONVENTIONS &amp; OBLIGATIONS</b>	
Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) <sup>14</sup>	<a href="#">Report submitted 05/30/2003</a>
Security Council resolution 1267 (1999) and 1455 (2003) <sup>15</sup>	<a href="#">Report submitted 03/31/2004</a>
<a href="#">Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism</a>	Signatory
<a href="#">Suppression of Terrorist Bombings</a>	-----

<a href="#">Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection</a>	-----
<a href="#">Against the Taking of Hostages</a>	State Party
<a href="#">Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft</a>	State Party
<a href="#">Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft</a>	State Party
<a href="#">Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation</a>	State Party
<a href="#">Protocol on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation</a>	State Party
<a href="#">Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation</a>	-----
<a href="#">Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf</a>	-----
<a href="#">Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents</a>	State Party
<a href="#">Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism</a>	-----

<sup>1</sup> The **Status** of a State's participation in treaties and organizations is defined in terms of its membership of and adherence to international organizations, treaties and agreements. A **State Party** fulfilled and implemented domestic legislative legal practices to bring about the legal application of the Treaty on the government and other entities to which the Treaty is applicable, such as formal approval by parliament or legislative bodies, and the Treaty is formally declared to be applicable on the State Party, and the required legal instrument of ratification has been duly deposited with the depositary. A **Signatory State** refers to a State whose competent authority or representative has affixed its signature to a Treaty text thus indicating acceptance of the Treaty and a commitment not to undertake any actions that would undermine the purpose of the Treaty, according to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, pending formal ratification.

<sup>2</sup> On 13 June 1994, the DPRK, which had been an IAEA Member State since 1974, announced its withdrawal from the Agency. Although the withdrawal did not affect the DPRK obligations under its Safeguards Agreement, which in the Agency's view remains binding and in force, the DPRK took the position that it was in a special position with regard to the Safeguards Agreement and that it was no longer obliged to allow the inspectors to carry out their work under the Safeguards Agreement.

In 2002, following revelations of North Korea's nuclear weapons program, the DPRK requested that the IAEA remove monitoring seals and cameras from its nuclear facilities; on 12 February, after the DPRK's announcement of its withdrawal from the NPT, the IAEA declared it in violation of its safeguards agreements.

<sup>3</sup> Membership requires ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention.

<sup>4</sup> Created in 1995 to implement the 1994 US-DPRK Agreed Framework.

<sup>5</sup> Announced its withdrawal from the NPT on January 10, 2003, stating then that its withdrawal "will come into force automatically and immediately" on the next day. Stated that it had suspended its 1994 withdrawal from the treaty on the last day of the required three-month notice period and thus did not need to give a further notice to other NPT parties and Security Council as required under Article X of the treaty. Although no statement to this effect has been issued by the NPT State Parties, the generally held view is that North Korea's withdrawal came into effect on 10 April 2003 when its three-month notice of withdrawal expired."

<sup>6</sup> The DPRK's signature and ratification, which have not yet occurred, are required for the CTBT to enter into force.

<sup>7</sup> The IAEA Board of Governors on 1 April 1993 concluded that the DPRK was in non-compliance with its Safeguards Agreement and, in line with Article XII.C of the IAEA Statute, referred this non-compliance to the UN Security Council.

On 6 January 2003, the Board of Governors adopted a resolution GOV/2003/3 calling on North Korea to comply with its safeguards Agreement and readmit inspectors, deploring in the strongest terms the DPRK's

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unilateral actions. The resolution also affirmed that unless North Korea fully cooperates with the Agency, the DPRK will be in further non-compliance with its Safeguards Agreement. Following North Korea's NPT withdrawal announcement on 10 January 2003, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a third resolution (GOV/2003/3) on 12 February 2003, declared that North Korea was "in further non-compliance with its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement pursuant to the NPT" and decided to report "to the United Nations General Assembly and the Security Council, North Korea's continued non-compliance and the Agency's inability to verify non-diversion of nuclear material that is subject to safeguards." In April 2003, following consultations, the UN Security Council expressed concern regarding the situation, and the Secretary-General appointed a special advisor to the issue.

<sup>8</sup> In acknowledging its uranium-enrichment program following U.S. officials' revelation of it in 2002, the DPRK violated the terms of the Agreed Framework, under which it had agreed to freeze its nuclear weapons program.

<sup>9</sup> The DPRK's acknowledgement of its uranium-enrichment program rendered it in violation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The DPRK later described the declaration as "nullified" and called it a "dead document", attributing this outcome to policies the United States had adopted towards North Korea.

<sup>10</sup> A set of voluntary confidence building measures agreed to at the Second Review Conference of the States party to the BTWC (1986) under Article V.

<sup>11</sup> The DPRK submitted information on BTWC CBM reports once, in 1990.

<sup>12</sup> A number of States, including the DPRK, declared upon their accession to the Protocol that it would cease to be binding on them if their enemies, or the allies of their enemies, failed to respect the prohibitions of the Protocol.

<sup>13</sup> Resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.

<sup>14</sup> Resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.

<sup>15</sup> Resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.