
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA)

Board of Governors

In accordance with the statute and the existing practice, the Board is responsible for approving safeguards procedures and safeguards agreements, and for the general supervision of the Agency's safeguards activities. The board generally meets five times a year: March, June, before and after the regular session of the General Conference in September, and immediately after the meeting of its Technical Assistance and Cooperation Committee in December. At its meetings, the board also examines and makes recommendations to the General Conference on the IAEA's accounts, program, and budget and considers applications for membership.

The Board of Governors has 35 members, of which 13 are designated by the board and 22 are elected by the General Conference.

The current elected Member States on the board for **2010-2011** are: Argentina, Australia, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Brazil, Cameroon, Canada, Czech Republic, Chile, China, Denmark, Ecuador, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, the Republic of Korea, Mongolia, the Netherlands, Niger, Pakistan, Peru, Portugal, Russian Federation, Singapore, South Africa, Tunisia, Ukraine, the United Arab Emirates, the UK, the USA, and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.

Developments within the Board include:

2011: The Chair of the Board of Governors for 2010-2011 is the Governor from Pakistan, Mr. Ansar Parvez. He succeeds Mr. Dato' Muhammad Shahrul Ikram Yaakob, Governor from Malaysia. The Ambassadors and Resident Representatives Mr. John Hartmann of Denmark and Ms. Olena Mykolaichuk of Ukraine were elected as Vice-Chairmen.

On 25 February, Director General Yukiya Amano issued two reports entitled

Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran and Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic.

The report on **Iran** details its recent nuclear activities, in particular ongoing enrichment efforts and IAEA verification efforts. Contrary to both the Board of Governors and United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions, Iran continues to produce low enriched uranium at the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) and the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) in Natanz. Since 18 October 2010 the FEP has produced 471kg of UF₆, bringing the total production amount to 3,606 kg. The PFEP has produced 25.1 kg of UF₆ enriched up to 20% as of September 2010.

The Director General noted the future of Iran's nuclear program remains uncertain. Iran has not provided further information regarding the Fardow Fuel Enrichment Plant outside of Qom nor its plans to develop 10 more enrichment facilities. Iran has also not provided clarification on its laser enrichment technology or third generation centrifuges. As a result, the Agency's knowledge of Iran's enrichment activities continues to diminish. The Agency has been able to verify that Iran is not engaged in reprocessing activities only at the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) and the Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production Facility (MIX). Iran has not suspended work on heavy water related projects, including the construction of the IR-40 heavy water moderated reactor, currently under Agency safeguards. It is planned to become operational by 2013. Iran objected to Agency requests for further access to the Heavy Water Production Plant, claiming that such requests go beyond its Safeguard Agreement.

The Agency restated its concerns about the possible existence of past or current undisclosed nuclear related activities of a military nature in

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Iran. Its requests for further information from Iran have not been met satisfactorily, if at all. Finally, the Director General reported that Iran is not implementing Additional Protocol, further contributing to international concern over its nuclear program.

The report on [Syria](#) highlights questions regarding the Dair Alzour site. Syria continues to maintain that the building was a “non-nuclear military installation.” Such claims are inconsistent with Agency information and Syrian Atomic Energy Commission activities, creating uncertainty regarding the facilities and Syria’s activities there. The IAEA has not received satisfactory explanations for the origins and presence of anthropogenic natural uranium found at the site. Since 2008, the Agency has repeatedly requested further cooperation from Syria regarding the Dair Alzour site; however, Syria maintains that such requests go beyond its Safeguards Agreement.

The Agency is also concerned about unidentified anthropogenic uranium particles found in 2009 in the Miniature Neutron Source Reactor (MNSR). Syria’s declarations are inconsistent with Agency findings that remain unresolved. The Director General urged Syria to bring into force an Additional Protocol and to expediently resolve outstanding questions regarding its nuclear activities.

On 7 March the Director General addressed the opening session of the Board of Governors. In his statements, Director General Yukiya Amano reminded the body of the 25th anniversary of the Chernobyl nuclear disaster and the need to strengthen nuclear safety. He also discussed future application of nuclear technology to water purification efforts and expressed some of the ongoing concerns with the nuclear programs of the DPRK, Iran, and Syria.

On 21 March the Board convened a special session with the Director General to discuss the ongoing nuclear emergency at the Fukushima Nuclear Reactors in Japan.

From 6 – 10 June, the Board convened its second scheduled session of meetings of the year. On 6 June, IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano opened the session with a [statement](#) addressing several issues, including the Fukushima Daiichi accident in Japan and several safeguards agreements and additional protocols. In particular, Amano addressed how the IAEA has

been unable to implement any safeguard measures in the DPRK, as well as limited measures in Iran and Syria.

On 9 June, the Board concluded its five-day meeting. It [found](#) that Syria “had not complied with its obligations under its Safeguards Agreements with the IAEA by failing to declare the construction of a nuclear reactor at Dair Alzour.” The Board voted and [reported](#) Syria to the UNSC for its non-compliance.

2010: The Chair of the Board of Governors for 2010-2011 is the Governor from Pakistan, Mr. Ansar Parvez. He succeeds Mr. Dato’ Muhammad Shahrul Ikram Yaakob, Governor from Malaysia. The Ambassadors and Resident Representatives Mr. John Hartmann of Denmark and Ms. Olena Mykolaichuk of Ukraine were elected as Vice-Chairmen.

On 18 February, the new Director General Yukiya Amano issued two reports entitled [Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 \(2006\), 1747 \(2007\), 1803 \(2008\) and 1835 \(2008\) in the Islamic Republic of Iran](#) and [Implementation of the NPT Safeguards in the Syrian Arab Republic](#).

The report on **Iran** details Iran’s continued enrichment activities and plans to enrich material up to 20% U-235 at Natanz. The results of Physical Inventory Verification (PIV) at the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) at Natanz and Iran’s estimates indicate that 2065kg of low enriched UF₆ has been produced as of 29 January 2010, with environmental samples verifying the level of enrichment to be 3.47% U-235. Nuclear material, installed cascades, and feed and withdrawal stations at FEP continue to be subject to IAEA containment and surveillance.

Iran submitted a revised version of the Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ) for the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) at Natanz that provides for the production of UF₆ enriched to up to 20%. On 8 February, Iran informed the Agency it intended to transfer low enriched UF₆ produced at the FEP to the feed station of PFEP on 9 February, and requested the Agency be present at the site. The Agency requested that no low enriched UF₆ be fed into the PFEP for enrichment to 20% until proper additional safeguards were in place under Article 45 of the Safeguards Agreement. According to the report, in spite of the Agency’s request, by 10 February

Iran had started feeding low enriched UF₆ into one cascade at PFEP. On 14 February, with Agency inspectors present, Iran moved 1950kg of low enriched UF₆ from FEP to the PFEP feed station, which the inspectors then sealed. Iran provided the Agency with mass spectrometry results indicating that “enrichment levels of up to 19.8% U-235 were obtained at PFEP between 9 and 11 February 2010.” Material and equipment at PFEP remain under the IAEA containment and surveillance, but the Agency also requested a meeting to discuss a revised safeguards approach in light of new enrichment levels.

The report also notes Iran’s failure to implement the Additional Protocol and other requirements contained in relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the UN Security Council. Iran’s failure to provide information and access to activities involving precision detonators, studies on the initiation of high explosives, missile re-entry body engineering, a project for the conversion of UO₂ to UF₄ and various procurement related activities have raised concerns “about the possible existence in Iran of past or current undisclosed activities related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile.” The Director General calls on Iran to fully cooperate with the Agency, clarify outstanding issues giving rise to concerns about a possible military dimension to Iran’s nuclear program, provide design information for all relevant facilities and to take steps towards implementing the Additional Protocol.

The report on **Syria** highlighted that since 2008, Syria has declined to have substantive discussions with the Agency about the Dair Alzour site, has not provided detailed information requested by the Agency and has not granted the Agency further access to the site or to three surrounding facilities of interest. The report also emphasized that Syria’s previous explanation of the origin of anthropogenic natural uranium particles found at the Miniature Neutron Source Reactor (MNSR) were not supported by the Agency’s analysis of samples, and a possible link to the particles found at the Dair Alzour site required further examination.

Syria has offered another explanation for the origin of particles at MNSR, suggesting they originated from other materials present at the site, such as yellowcake and uranyl. The report noted that environmental samples taken in November 2009 “confirmed the characteristics of

the material as declared by Syria, “but the Agency required further clarification regarding the presence and use of anthropogenic natural uranium at the MNSR. In addition, it was reported that Syria has not provided design information concerning irradiation of uranium at the MNSR or met its nuclear material reporting obligations under the Safeguards Agreement

On March 1, in his [introductory statement](#) to the Board, the Director General addressed various issues, including nuclear energy, Iran’s request for obtaining fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor, nuclear safety and security, cancer control, and nuclear verification including the application of safeguards in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, implementation of safeguards in the Islamic Republic of Iran and implementation of safeguards in the Syrian Arab Republic.

On 31 May, the Director General submitted two reports to the Board of Governors, entitled [Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 \(2006\), 1747 \(2007\), 1803 \(2008\) and 1835 \(2008\) in the Islamic Republic of Iran](#) and [Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic](#).

The **Iran** report indicates that since the last PIV at FEP, conducted on 22 November 2009, Iran produced an additional 619kg of low enriched UF₆, which puts total current production at 2427kg. As of March 2010, environmental samples confirmed that the maximum enrichment level of 5% had not been exceeded. At the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) in Natanz, Iran installed all centrifuges for a second 164-machine IR-1 cascade to connect to Cascade 1, but as of 25 May Iran had neither started to feed the cascade, nor connected it to the first cascade.

According to the report, the IAEA and Iran agreed on a revised safeguards approach to account for the enrichment levels of up to 20% U-235 and the installation of another cascade. New measures include two unannounced inspections per month, monthly DIV and interim inventory verification, application of additional seals, and other steps. The revised approach is being applied since 15 May 2010. Between 9 February and 21 May 2010 a total of about 172kg of low enriched UF₆ was fed into the first

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cascade at PFEP. On 7 April Iran withdrew 5.7kg of UF₆ from the first cascade declaring it had been enriched to 19.7% U-235 although non-destructive measurements by the agency indicated enrichment of 19.3% U-235.

The Director General also noted in the report that, after reiterating on 22 January 2010 a request for a complete Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ) for the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP), the Agency was still waiting for Iran to submit the DIQ. As of 26 May 2010, no centrifuges had been introduced to the facility. The report additionally noted that construction of the heavy water reactor in Arak was ongoing, and that satellite imagery shows the Heavy Water Production Plant to be in operation again.

The report also noted that in January 2010, the Agency, conducting a Design Information Verification (DIV), was informed by the facility operator that pyroprocessing R&D activities had been initiated at the Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Research Laboratory (JHL) in Tehran. Pyroprocessing can be conducted to study the electrochemical production of uranium metal, which enables the removal of uranium or plutonium from spent fuel. During a later DIV in April, Agency inspectors observed that the electrochemical cell had been removed.

The Report on **Syria** highlights Syria's persistent refusal to allow access to information concerning the Dair Alzour site including infrastructure, procurement efforts which Syria stated were related to civilian non-nuclear activities, technical documentation related to the construction of the destroyed building, and access to locations where debris from the destroyed building are now situated. A physical inventory verification (PIV) undertaken at the Miniature Neutron Source Reactor on 31 March 2010 provided the Agency with information involving the undeclared conversion of yellowcake to uranyl nitrate. Syria states the yellowcake's origin was Homs.

On 7 June 2010, the Director General made an introductory statement to the Board focusing on a range of nuclear issues including nuclear safety and security, technical cooperation, and verification of nuclear non-proliferation. Director General Yukiya Amano also expressed his satisfaction with the results of the 2010 NPT Review Conference and focused on the

application of Safeguards in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the Syrian Arab Republic.

On 6 September, the Director General submitted two reports to the Board of Governors: 1) *Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran* and 2) *Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic*.

In his report on **Iran**, the Director General noted that between 23 November 2009 and 6 August 2010 Iran had produced an additional 995kg of LEU, bringing its total stockpile to 2803kg. The report noted that there were a number of seals that had been broken at the FEP and that the Agency would be evaluating the consequences of these for safeguards during the next PIV scheduled for October 2010.

The report also indicated that enrichment levels of between 5.0% and 7.1% U-235 (which is higher than that stated in Iran's DIQ) were discovered in a small number of particles from recent environmental samples taken at FEP. The IAEA stated that Iran provided the Agency with a possible explanation for the presence of these particles and that Iran's explanation was not inconsistent with the Agency's findings.

The report also noted that from 9 February 2010 to 20 August 2010 Iran had produced 22kg of UF₆ enriched up to 20% U-235 from Cascade 1 at PFEP.

In addition, the report noted that Iran continues to deny the IAEA's request of providing further information regarding construction of FFEP.

The report further noted that Iran had begun transferring fresh fuel to the reactor containment building at the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP).

With respect to the designation of inspectors, the report indicated that Iran objected to two inspectors with experience in Iran's nuclear fuel cycle and facilities. The IAEA stated that the objection to these inspectors by Iran hampers the inspection process and detracts from the Agency's capability to implement effective and efficient safeguards in the country.

The report on **Syria** noted that Damascus had refused to increase its cooperation with the IAEA and to provide access to all relevant information

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and locations with regards to the Dair Alzour site as requested by the Agency. The Director General reported that the IAEA had not been able to resolve outstanding issues related to this matter.

The report also noted that the IAEA remained engaged with Syria on clarifying the discovery of anthropogenic uranium particles found at the MNSR. The IAEA provided Syria with results of the March 2010 PIV at MNSR and requested to have discussions concerning inconsistencies discovered by the results. The IAEA met with Syria on 3 September to discuss questions raised by the results and agreed on a plan of action for resolving this issue.

On 23 November, the Director General submitted two reports to the Board of Governors: 1) [Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran](#), and 2) [Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic](#).

In his report on **Iran**, the Director General noted that contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran has not suspended its enrichment related activities. As of 17 October, 34,737 kg of natural UF₆ had been fed into the cascades at the Fuel Enrichment Plant at Natanz, leading to the production of 3,183 kg of low enriched UF₆. The estimated enrichment level of Iran's UF₆ product is 3.37%.

The Director-General further reported that the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP), brought into operation in October 2003, accommodates six 164-centrifuge cascades designated to produce LEU enriched up to 20% U-235. Since 13 July 2010, Iran has been feeding low enriched UF₆ into the two interconnected cascades (Cascades 1 and 6). The IAEA conducted a PIV at PFEP on September 18-29 and confirmed that, as of 18 September 2010, 352 kg of low enriched UF₆ had been fed into the cascade(s) since 9 February 2010, and that a total of 25.1 kg of UF₆ enriched up to 20% U-235 had been produced. Iran declared that the enrichment level of the UF₆ product was 19.89%. According to the information provided by Iran, between 19 September 2010 and 19 November 2010, a total of 62.5 kg of UF₆ enriched at FEP was fed into the two interconnected cascades and that approximately 7.8 kg of UF₆ enriched up to 20%

U-235 was produced, resulting in a total of approximately 33 kg of UF₆ enriched up to 20% U- since the process began in February 2010.

On 26 September, Iran provided the IAEA with a revised DIQ for the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant in Qom, stating that the facility's purpose now includes R&D as well as the production of UF₆ enriched up to 5% U-235. The layout of the facility is now changed to a configuration consisting of 12 centrifuge cascades for production and 4 cascades for R&D. The IAEA has verified that the construction of this facility is ongoing. As of 14 November, no centrifuges had been introduced into the facility.

According to the report, the IAEA carried out an inspection and design information verification at the Tehran Research Reactor and the Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production (MIX) Facility on 7 November. The IAEA was able to confirm that there were no ongoing reprocessing related activities at these sites.

Iran has also continued the construction of the IR-40 reactor and other heavy water related activities. The Agency monitors the construction of IR-40 through the use of satellite imagery.

The IAEA remains concerned about past or current undisclosed nuclear related activities, including activities related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile.

The report on **Syria** notes that no progress has been made on issues related to the Dair Alzour site and the other three locations allegedly functionally related to it. As time passes, these sites are deteriorating and it is possible that much of the information the IAEA is seeking has been lost entirely. Concerning the Miniature Neutron Source Reactor (MNSR), the report notes that Syria's responses have not resolved previously identified inconsistencies.

On 2 December, IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano addressed the meeting of the Board of Governors. In his remarks, he highlighted the importance of international cooperation, verification issues in the DPRK, Syria, and Iran, the conclusion of an agreement with the Russian Federation that established a reserve of LEU, and the IAEA's Technical Cooperation Programme for 2011, as recommended by the Technical Assistance and Cooperation Committee.

On 3 December, the Board of Governors (BoG) voted to establish a global nuclear fuel bank to indiscriminately supply fuel to states that start a civilian nuclear program. Of the 35 Board members, 28 nations voted for the establishment of the facility, 6 – Venezuela, Tunisia, South Africa, Ecuador, Brazil and Argentina – abstained, while Pakistan formally announced it would not take part in the vote. Concerns that the fuel bank would undermine states' right to develop indigenous fuel cycle led some of the Board members to abstain.

In 2006, advisor to the NTI Board of Directors Warren Buffet challenged the IAEA to establish a fuel bank and have one or more countries contribute \$100 million, or the equivalent in reactor fuel, to be matched by his contribution of \$50 million towards the bank. In 2009 this goal was met with a \$10 million donation from Kuwait combined with contributions from the United States, the European Union, Norway and the United Arab Emirates totaling \$157 million. The location and plans for maintaining the bank's fuel supply are not yet decided. However, the president of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbaev previously announced his country's willingness to host the future IAEA fuel bank.

2009: The newly elected Member States on the board for **2008-2009** are: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Canada, China, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, India, Iraq, Ireland, Japan, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Philippines, Romania, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States of America, and Uruguay.

The ambassador and resident representative from Algeria, *Mrs. Taous Feroukhi*, was elected chair of the Board of Governors for 2008-2009. Elected vice-chairpersons for 2008-2009 were Ms. Kirsti Kauppi, the governor from Finland, and Mr. Cornel Ferută, the governor from Romania.

On 19 February, the Director General submitted two reports to the Board entitled, [Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 \(2006\), 1747 \(2007\), 1803 \(2008\) and 1835 \(2008\) in the Islamic Republic of Iran](#), and [Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic](#).

In his report on **Iran**, the Director General noted that Iran continues to produce and stockpile low enriched uranium (LEU). Physical inventory verification procedures conducted by the IAEA place the total amount of LEU produced (in the form of UF₆) at 1,010 kilograms. While Iran successfully installed hundreds of additional centrifuges at Natanz in recent months, it did not increase the number of operating centrifuges at its declared enrichment facility (the number remains under 4,000). The Director General reported that Iran has begun producing fuel rods for its heavy water IR-40 reactor and that the Agency's request to visit the reactor was denied. Finally, the Director General reported that Iran has made no additional attempts to resolve the Agency's concerns regarding the outstanding issues surrounding the Alleged Studies. Iran maintains that it has fulfilled all of its obligations under the IAEA work plan, and that IAEA safeguards activities in Iran should return to routine status.

In his report on **Syria**, the Director General focused primarily on the previously reported presence of anthropogenic natural uranium particles detected at the Al Kibar site through environmental sampling techniques employed by the Agency's network of analytical laboratories. He described requests for information and access that the Agency has made of Syria, noting that Syrian responses to date have not sufficiently resolved outstanding questions as to the origin of the uranium particles. Syria maintains that the uranium traces derive from munitions used to strike the site, but according to the report, Agency analysis found a "low probability that the uranium was introduced by the use of missiles." The Director General called on Syria, Israel, and other states with relevant information to cooperate more comprehensively with the ongoing investigation.

On 2 March, the U.S. Permanent Representative to the IAEA, Ambassador Gregory Schulte, delivered a [statement](#) to the Board of Governors on behalf of the new Obama Administration. Speaking ostensibly on the agenda item of Nuclear Safety, Ambassador Schulte delivered a wide-ranging statement that indicated U.S. policy shifts on issues of consequence for the Agency. Ambassador Schulte cited, for example, U.S. readiness for "direct engagement with Tehran" and "using dialogue with Syria." He asserted that the Obama Administration "seek[s] to strengthen the IAEA and to ensure that the

Agency gets the authority, information, people, and technology it needs to do its job,” and that the new administration “intends to renew America’s commitment to disarmament.”

On 5 June, the Director General submitted the following two reports to the Board: [Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic](#) and [Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 \(2006\), 1747 \(2007\), 1803 \(2008\) and 1835 \(2008\) in the Islamic Republic of Iran.](#)

On 15 June, in his introductory statement to the Board, the Director General [addressed](#) various issues including nuclear power, safety and security, and a proposal for a low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel bank. On the following day, 16 June, Dr. ElBaradei made a [statement](#) urging adoption of his submitted budget proposal to the Board of Governors. On 17 June, Dr. ElBaradei made a [statement](#) regarding the verification failures in the DPRK, renewed interest by Russian and American presidents for a world free of nuclear weapons, and the multinationalization of the fuel cycle.

On 2 July, at a special meeting, the Board of Governors appointed Ambassador Yukiya Amano of Japan as the new Director General, with the required two-thirds majority vote after six rounds of secret ballots.

On 30 July, the Director General released a report entitled [Application of Safeguards in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.](#) The report highlighted the Agency’s ceased implementation of ad hoc monitoring and verification arrangement at the behest of the DPRK. As a result the Agency has been unable to monitor or verify nuclear activities within the DPRK and therefore cannot provide any conclusions concerning the DPRK’s nuclear activities.

On 28 August, Director General Dr. ElBaradei submitted two reports to the Board of Governors on the [Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic](#) and [The Implementation of NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council Resolutions 1737 \(2006\), 1747 \(2007\), 1803 \(2008\), and 1835 \(2008\) in the Islamic Republic of Iran.](#)

The report on **Syria** states Syria was cooperating with the Agency in its verification activities at the Miniature Neutron Source Reactor in Damascus. Syria suggested that the accumulation of sample and reference materials used in neutron activation analysis accounted for the existence of uranium particles previously found at the site.

The report also notes that Syria has not provided necessary cooperation to permit the Agency to determine the origin of the uranium particles, the nature of the destroyed building at the Dair Alzour site (previously known as Al Kibar) and its relationship to three other locations near the site. Syria claims to be under no obligation to provide further information on the Dair Alzour site due to its allegedly non-nuclear military nature. Syria further refuses to recognize that uranium particles of anthropogenic nature found at the site constitute undeclared nuclear material. The report urges Syria to cooperate with the Agency in its verification activities in accordance with its mandate under Syria’s Safeguards Agreement to ensure safeguards are applied to all source and special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities.

In the Iran report, the Director General notes Iran was feeding UF₆ into the cascades at the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) at Natanz. Iran has estimated that between November 2009 and July 2009 7942kg of UF₆ was fed into the cascades producing 669kg of low enriched UF₆. Also, 37kg of UF₆ has also been fed into the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) at Natanz. Environmental samples from both plants verify they have been operating as declared, with enrichment levels below 5% U-235.

The report also confirmed the construction of the heavy water research reactor in Arak was still ongoing, particularly noting no reactor vessel was yet present at the site. The report urges Iran to implement the Additional Protocol and the modified text of its Subsidiary Arrangements General Part, Code 3.1 on the early provision of design information.

On 16 November the Director General submitted two reports to the Board of Governors: [Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 \(2006\), 1747 \(2007\), 1803 \(2008\) and 1835 \(2008\) in the Islamic Republic of Iran](#) and [Implementation of the NPT](#)

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[Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic.](#)

In his report on **Iran**, the Director General most significantly notes Iran's unveiling of a pilot production plant 20 km north of Qom, referred to as the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP). Iran provided its first DIQ for FFEP on 18 October 2009, and the Agency conducted design information verification (DIV) on 26-27 October. The Agency confirmed the plant corresponded with the design information provided by Iran and that the facility was at an advanced stage of construction, although no centrifuges had yet been introduced to the facility. On 25 and 28 October the Agency held two meetings in Tehran to review the DIQ and to discuss the chronology, status, purpose and design of the FFEP. During these meetings the Agency questioned Iran's explanation about the purpose of the facility and the chronology of its design and construction, requesting further clarification.

The report notes the Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material but that the failure to inform the agency about the construction of the new enrichment plant is "inconsistent with the Subsidiary Arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement" and does "not contribute to the building of confidence."

According to the report, Iran estimates that between 18 November 2008 and 30 October 2009, 10,395kg of UF₆ was fed into the Fuel Enrichment Plant cascades at Natanz, and 924kg of low enriched UF₆ was produced, to a total of 1,763kg of LEU since the start-up of FEP. At the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) in Natanz 53kg of UF₆ was fed into the cascade. Environmental samples at both FEP and PFEP indicate that the declared maximum enrichment level of less than 5% U-235 enrichment has not been exceeded at either site. The report also verified the continued construction of a heavy water research reactor in Arak and the observation of 600 50-litre drums of heavy water at the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) at Esfahan. The Agency requested confirmation on the number of drums, their contents and to provide the origin of the heavy water.

In the **Syria** report, the Director General noted that no progress had been made since the last report to clarify any of the outstanding issues relevant to the implementation of safeguards. He noted Syria's lack of cooperation had not

permitted the Agency to determine the origin of the anthropogenic natural uranium particles found in samples taken at the Dair Alzour site. Several Board of Governors members called upon all relevant States to cooperate with the IAEA, and to provide the Agency with all pertinent information in a timely, comprehensive and verifiable manner to facilitate the completion of the IAEA's assessment.

The report also noted the results of environmental sampling taken at the Miniature Neutron Source Reactor (MNSR) "confirmed the presence of anthropogenic natural uranium of a type not in Syria's declared inventory." The Agency intends to carry out an inspection at the MNSR on 17 November 2009.

On 27 November, the Board of Governors adopted a resolution entitled [Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 \(2006\), 1747 \(2007\), 1803 \(2008\) and 1835 \(2008\) in the Islamic Republic of Iran](#), the first Board resolution since 2006. This resolution urges Iran to comply fully with United Nations Security Council requirements and relevant Board of Governors resolutions: immediately suspend enrichment activities, including the construction at the Qom facility (Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant), and urges Iran to implement and ratify the Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement, as well as implement modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Agreement.

On 27 November, the Board of Governors also adopted a resolution entitled [Request by the Russian Federation regarding its Initiative to Establish a Reserve of Low Enriched Uranium \(LEU\) for the Supply of LEU to the IAEA for its Member States](#). The resolution authorizes the Director General to implement an Agreement with the Russian Federation to establish a reserve of LEU for supply to the IAEA for its Member States and also to implement future agreements with Member States for the supply of LEU by the IAEA when he/she considers the request fulfills the eligibility criteria included in the agreement with the Russian Federation.

On 1 December, new IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano assumed office after being confirmed for the post by the General Conference in September.

2008: The Ambassador and resident representative from Chile, *Mr. Milenko E.*

Skoknic, was elected chair of the Board of Governors for 2007 – 2008.

On 22 February, Director General Dr. ElBaradei submitted his report entitled [Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council Resolutions 1737 \(2006\) and 1747 \(2007\) in the Islamic Republic of Iran](#). Most significantly, the report details progress on the clarification of several outstanding issues tied to Iran's past nuclear work. Prior to the release of this report, the Agency had five issue areas on which it sought clarification from Iran to elucidate aspects of its past nuclear activities: uranium contamination at a university, experiments with polonium-210, activities at the Gchine uranium mine, procurement attempts for centrifuge components, a document regarding uranium metal, and the Alleged Studies. According to the report, only the Alleged Studies remain as an outstanding issue, with other issues having been explained by Iran in a manner "consistent with" or "not inconsistent with" the Agency's findings.

The Director General also reported that Iran had made some technical progress with work on its P-2 centrifuge design, but did not increase its enrichment capacity since the last director general report on Iran in November of 2007.

On 26 May, the Director General issued a report to the Board entitled [Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 \(2006\), 1747 \(2007\) and 1803 \(2008\) in the Islamic Republic of Iran](#). The report covers enrichment, reprocessing, heavy water reactor related projects, as well as "other implementation issues" and alleged military dimensions of Iran's nuclear work. The report notes that Iran has made substantial progress on the development and operation of its centrifuges, and contains additional details regarding ongoing Agency efforts to clarify issues raised by the Alleged Studies."

The Alleged Studies information, according to the report, appears to be "from multiple sources over different periods of time, is detailed in content, and appears to be generally consistent." The report notes that the Agency has not been authorized by those providing the information to release its full contents to Iran. The report concludes that "the alleged studies on the green salt project, high explosives testing and the missile re-entry vehicle project remain a matter

of serious concern.[...] Iran may have additional information, in particular on high explosives testing and missile related activities." The report contains annex lists documents shown to Iran and details the Agency's outstanding questions regarding these documents.

On 9 July, a [draft](#) of a Safeguards Agreement between the IAEA and India was circulated to the Board of Governors at India's request. The draft agreement outlined a system of facility-specific INFCIRC 66 Rev. 2- based safeguards on facilities that India would designate as civilian in nature. Board Approval of a safeguards agreement with India was widely viewed as one of three main hurdles for the controversial U.S.-India nuclear deal (the remaining two: approval by the NSG and passage of enabling legislation in the U.S. Congress.)

On 1 August, the Board of Governors approved by consensus [the Agreement between the Government of India and the IAEA for the Application of Safeguards to Civilian Nuclear Facilities](#). Described as an "umbrella" arrangement, the agreement allows India to designate some of its nuclear facilities as "civilian." Such facilities then become subject to INFCIRC 66 Rev. 2-type safeguards.

On 12 September, the Director General submitted a report to the Board entitled [Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya](#). Having achieved substantial cooperation with Libya regarding clarification of its past nuclear activities, the report details what is currently known about Libya's illicit nuclear work. The report concludes that the Agency now "considers that the issues that had been reported to the Board of Governors are no longer outstanding at this stage." It also stipulates that further safeguards activities in Libya will proceed in a routine manner.

On 15 September, the Director General issued a report entitled [Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 \(2006\), 1747 \(2007\) and 1803 \(2008\) in the Islamic Republic of Iran](#). The report covers enrichment, reprocessing, heavy water projects, implementation issues and the alleged military dimensions of Iran's nuclear program. The report affirms that Iran is making steady progress in its installation and operation of gas centrifuges for

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enrichment work, and is the first report to quantify the amount of low enriched uranium (LEU) Iran has produced: 480 kilograms.

The report refers to the possible involvement of “foreign expertise” in alleged Iranian work on the “symmetrical initiation of a hemispherical high explosive charge suitable for an implosion type nuclear device,” although no specifics are provided. Otherwise, the primary focus of the report states the lack of progress on the clarification of the Alleged Studies. The Agency continues, however, to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran.

On 19 November, the Director General submitted two reports to the Board, one concerning developments in the implementation of safeguards in Iran, and the other regarding Syria.

In [Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 \(2006\), 1747 \(2007\), 1803 \(2008\) and 1835 \(2008\) in the Islamic Republic of Iran](#), the Director General reports no additional progress on resolving issues tied to the Alleged Studies, the veracity of which Iran continues to dispute. According to the report, Iran succeeded in producing a total of 630 kilograms of low enriched uranium (LEU) and plans to significantly increase the number of operational centrifuges at its enrichment plant in Natanz. The report notes with concern that Iran did not permit a scheduled Agency visit to the heavy water reactor under construction in Arak. Finally, the report affirms the continued non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran.

In [Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic](#), the Director General reports on developments related to allegations that Syria was in the process of constructing an undeclared nuclear reactor at a site that was bombed by Israel in April of 2008. The report states that a “significant number” of natural uranium particles were detected via environmental sampling techniques during the Agency’s investigation of the Al Kibar site. Syria maintains that the building in question was a military installation and not a nuclear facility. The Director General notes that the IAEA’s investigation was “severely hampered” by Israel’s “unilateral use of force” and Syria’s subsequent demolition and construction activities at Al Kibar.

2007: The Ambassador and resident representative from Slovenia, *Mr. Ernest Petrič*, was elected chair of the Board of Governors for 2006-2007. Elected vice-chairpersons for 2006-07 were Mr. Thomas Stelzer, the Governor from Austria, and Mr. Milenko E. Skoknic, the Governor from Chile.

On 22 February, Dr. ElBaradei released a report entitled [Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolution 1737 \(2006\) in the Islamic Republic of Iran](#). The report covered such issues as: enrichment, reprocessing activities, heavy water projects, outstanding issues (including centrifuge technology, uranium metal, and plutonium experiments), and transparency measures. Essentially, the six-page report detailed Iran’s current stance on nuclear development. Major points include Iran’s discord with any transparency measures, its continuation of enrichment activities, and the operation of single machines. Encouragingly, the IAEA’s physical inventory of verification remains congruent with Iran’s inventory.

This report was issued in response by the UN Security Council’s adoption of Resolution 1737. The Resolution states that Iran should suspend all enrichment and reprocessing activities and work on heavy water related projects. Furthermore, Iran shall provide the IAEA with facility access in order to verify suspension. This compliance shall be reflected in the previously-mentioned report by the Director General.

On 23 May, Dr. ElBaradei submitted his report entitled [Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions \(1696, 1737, 1747\) in the Islamic Republic of Iran](#). This report was submitted in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1747 which requested the Director General to report on Iran’s compliance with Resolution 1737 and all other steps required by the Board of Governors.

The report addressed a number of core issues related to Iran’s nuclear program including enrichment and reprocessing activities, heavy water related projects, and a compilation of outstanding issues.

The Director General’s report indicated that Iran has not suspended its enrichment activities and has continued the operation of its pilot fuel enrichment plant while starting to feed cascades

with uranium hexafluoride at its fuel enrichment plant. Iran has also continued its heavy water related projects, along with the construction of its IR-40 reactor.

The report noted that in the absence of the information that Iran had previously provided to the IAEA, including information pertaining to the Additional Protocol, the IAEA's knowledge of certain aspects of Iran's nuclear activities has deteriorated over time.

The IAEA also reported that it remains unable to make further progress in verifying the scope and nature of the Iranian program. Despite this, the report stated that the IAEA has been able to verify that no materials have been diverted from Iran's declared nuclear program.

On 15 June, Director General Mohamed ElBaradei made an exceptional [intervention](#) at the conclusion of discussions regarding agenda item 5, Report of the program and budget committee. Noting that the Director General is not usually directly engaged in budget matters, he expressed deep dissatisfaction with the proposed budget, indicating that it did not meet "by any stretch of the imagination" the Agency's basic and essential requirements. He stressed that the lack of funds would jeopardize the Agency's ability to fulfill its mandates.

Dr. ElBaradei cited the continual erosion of the Agency's safeguards functions, the inadequacy of the Emergency Response Center implementation of the Notification and Assistance Conventions, and a 90% reliance on extra-budgetary contributions in the nuclear security area as possible consequences of insufficient budget growth. In conclusion, the Director General conveyed to the Board that the implications of their decisions would mean the difference between a mediocre or efficient and effective Agency, able to carry out the activities critical to the development of international peace and security.

On 30 August, Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei submitted his report entitled [Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran](#). The report was again submitted in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1747.

The report acknowledged significant cooperation from Iran, verified the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran, encouraged Iran to slow enrichment although Iran continues to test single

centrifuge machines and has not suspended the enrichment processes. The report declared that the Agency remained unable to verify certain aspects relevant to the scope and nature of Iran's nuclear program. The report stated that Iran was operating 2000 centrifuges, an amount significantly less than the 3000 alleged by Iran. The report also affirmed that the highest U-235 enrichment level measured by the Agency was 3.7%, not 4.8% enrichment, as stated by Iran.

Attached to the Report included a [Work Plan](#) negotiated by the IAEA in cooperation with Iran. Designed to allow Iran to cooperate with the IAEA, the Work Plan intends to resolve all outstanding verification issues.

In his [Introductory Statement to the Board of Governors](#), Dr. ElBaradei stressed the importance of full cooperation from Iran, while at the same time underlining the importance of a "time-out" of sanctions against Iran in order resume negotiations.

Though the US and EU delegations remained skeptical about the Work Plan, Russia and China welcomed the negotiated agreement.

On 15 November Dr. ElBaradei released a report entitled [Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 \(2006\) and 1747 \(2007\) in the Islamic Republic of Iran](#). The detailed report covered topics including the acquisition of fuel cycle facilities and technologies dating from 1972, the acquisition of P-1, P-2 and other centrifuge technologies, current enrichment related activities, reprocessing technologies, heavy water related projects, and uranium conversion.

In the report's summary, Dr. ElBaradei stated that "the Agency has been able to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear materials in Iran," but stressed that as Iran has not implemented the Additional Protocol, the Agency's knowledge concerning the current nuclear program is "diminishing". Dr. ElBaradei further reported that Iran has not suspended enrichment related activities and has continued the operation of its heavy water production plant. Iran's past and current centrifuge enrichment program continues to be a major issue; within the following weeks the Agency plans to address these concerns, along with subject of contaminated centrifuges. In conclusion, Dr. ElBaradei reiterated the importance of Iran's adherence to the Additional

Protocol so the Agency will then be able to provide credible assurances concerning the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran.

2006: The ambassador and resident representative from Slovenia, [Mr. Ernest Petrič](#), was elected chair of the Board of Governors from 2006-2007. Elected as vice-chairpersons for 2006-07 were Mr. Thomas Stelzer, the governor from Austria, and Mr. Milenko E. Skoknic, the governor from Chile.

On 3 January, the Director General informed the Board of Governors of a Note Verbale in which Iran notified the IAEA of its decision to resume “R&D activities on the peaceful nuclear energy programme which has been suspended as part of its expanded voluntary and non-legally binding suspension.”

On 2 February, the Board of Governors convened at a special meeting to discuss Iran’s nuclear program. During his briefing to the press, the Director General remarked that this meeting does not signal the end of diplomacy and that a window of opportunity still exists to resolve this issue through negotiations. He expressed hopes that Iran would “continue to cooperate with the Agency, to clarify remaining outstanding issues.”

On 4 February 2006, the Board of Governors adopted the resolution [Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran](#).

On 27 February 2006, Dr. ElBaradei released a report entitled [Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran](#). This report discussed the acquisition of P-2 Centrifuge technology, voluntary implementation of the Additional Protocol, transparency issues, uranium metal and plutonium experiments, and enrichment. Essentially, the report summarizes Iran’s development of the nuclear fuel cycle and any discords the nation may have with international and nuclear agreements. Overall, the report called attention to some states’ lack of confidence in Iran’s nuclear intentions and maintained that the Agency’s verification of the Iranian program remains an on-going process.

On 28 April 2006, the IAEA released Dr. ElBaradei’s report entitled [Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran](#). The report features a chronology of the Iranian nuclear program beginning in March 2006 and emphasized issues such as enrichment, contamination, uranium and plutonium, heavy water reactors, and general implementation issues. Furthermore, the report creates an overall account of Iran’s nuclear programs and intentions.

On 8 June, the [Report of the Director General](#) stated that on 6 June 2006, Iran “started feeding UF6 into the 164-machine cascade.” The report further stipulated that the IAEA is conducting ongoing investigations of the containment issue in regards to Iran’s enrichment program. Other investigation include: the acquisition of P-1 and P-2 centrifuge technology, information regarding uranium metal via foreign intermediaries, plutonium experiments and transparency visits to be conducted by the IAEA.

The 31 August [report](#) stated that Iran was showing no signs of freezing enrichment and that the feeding of UF6 into a 164-machine cascade resumed on 24 August. New traces of HEU particles have also been found at the Karaj Waste Storage Facility.

On 14 November, the IAEA released a [report](#) to the Board of Governors that revealed new details pertaining to the lab testing of enriched uranium samples, contained new information concerning the additional findings of plutonium particles from storage containers at the Karaj Waste Storage Facility, and confirmation that Iran was progressing steadily with uranium enrichment.

2005: On 14 June, the Director General, in a statement to the Board of Governors, noted a proposal by the United States which aimed to establish a committee to consider the ways and means to strengthen the Safeguards system. The Director General expressed his hope that the board will be in a position to act on this proposal at its June session.

On 11 August, the Board of Governors adopted resolution [GOV/2005/64](#) regarding the implementation of IAEA safeguards in Iran. The resolution expresses serious concern over Iran’s decision to resume conversion activities at the Uranium Conversion Facility in Isfahan. It urges Iran to re-establish full suspension of all

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enrichment-related activities on the same voluntary, non-legally binding basis as requested in previous board resolutions, and to permit the Director General to reinstate the seals that have been removed at the Uranium Conversion Facility in Esfahan.

On 2 September, the Director General [reported](#) to the Board of Governors on the developments related to the implementation of IAEA safeguards in Iran since November 2004. The report notes that IAEA analysis supports Iran's claim that HEU contamination on its centrifuges stems from Pakistan and further developments in four areas relating to the IAEA's verification of Iran's P-1 centrifuge enrichment program.

On 23 September, the Board of Governors agreed on modifications to the Small Quantities Protocol (SQP) to strengthen the safeguards system. The modifications require states to provide initial reports to the IAEA on all their nuclear material and early design information for any planned nuclear facilities, and reinstate the IAEA's right to conduct inspections in SQP states. The previous SQP text did not require states to report small amounts of nuclear material to the IAEA.

On 24 September, the Board of Governors adopted [Resolution Gov/2005/77](#) in order to facilitate cooperation and transparency measures with Iran. Major points include suspended enrichment, the reconsideration of heavy water reactors, the ratification of the Additional Protocol, and the discussion of dual use equipment.

On 18 November the Director General released a report entitled [Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran](#). The report is divided into two main segments: Developments since September 2005 and Current Overall Assessment. The first segment discusses contamination, enrichment programs, implementation issues (particularly those of the Additional Protocol) and program suspension. The second segment pertains to the continued investigation of Iran's nuclear programs and intentions.

On 24 November, the Director General [updated](#) the Board of Governors on the implementation of safeguards in the DPRK. The Director General stated that the agency has not performed any verification activities in the DPRK since December 2002 and therefore cannot provide

any assurance about DPRK's nuclear activities since that time.

2004: The chair of the Board of Governors for 2003-2004 was Ambassador and Resident Representative of Spain [Mr. Antonio Nunez Garcia-Sauco](#).

On 24 February, the Director General presented his report on the [Implementation of Safeguards in Iran](#). He emphasized the progress made by Iran as Tehran granted greater access to inspectors and suspended the reprocessing and uranium enrichment processes. He expressed concern that Iran's reporting had not contained any information on P2 centrifuges and asked for greater cooperation from Iran and from the countries that sold such equipment to Iran.

On 13 March, the Board of Governors met to approve draft resolution [GOV/2004/20](#) regarding the implementation of IAEA safeguards in Iran. During this meeting, the Iranian delegation claimed many of the previous outstanding issues resolved, pointed to the Director General's repeated statements describing the implementation of IAEA safeguards in Iran as a "work in progress," and praised Iran's "extensive active cooperation." Ultimately, the Board of Governors decided to adopt GOV/2004/20 without a vote. This resolution deferred Iran's degree of compliance with IAEA safeguards and the Board's response to a number of omissions from Iran's declarations until its June meeting. The resolution also welcomed Iran's voluntary suspension of enrichment activities and its signature of the Additional Protocol.

In March, the Board of Governors approved several measures to strengthen international cooperation in nuclear, radiation, and transport safety and waste management. These measures include the [Code of Conduct on the Safety of Research Reactors](#), which establishes guidelines for the licensing, construction, and operation of research reactors; the Action Plan for the Development and Application of IAEA Safety Standards, which covers thematic areas as well as activities and facilities; the [International Action Plan on the Radiation Protection of the Environment from the Effects of Ionizing Radiation](#); and the [Action Plan for the Safety of Transport of Radioactive Material](#), which provides direction for IAEA transport safety activities over the next five years. Action areas

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include review and revision of the Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material, refining of the review process, compliance and quality assurance considerations, the issue of denial of shipments, emergency response, liability, and communication.

The 1 June [Report of the Director General](#) on Iran found that “Iran repeatedly misstated details about its nuclear program and pursued uranium enrichment technology more aggressively than it initially admitted.”

On 18 June 2004, the Board of Governors adopted [Resolution Gov/2004/49](#). This resolution deplored Iran’s lack of full cooperation, stressed the importance of Additional Protocol ratification, suspended enrichment, and requested Iran to further develop program transparency.

On 30 August, the IAEA released the Director General’s report [GOV/2004/59](#) concerning Libya’s decision in late 2003 to abandon its nuclear program and the procedural issues conducted by the IAEA.

On 1 September 2004, the IAEA released the Director General’s report entitled [Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreements in the Islamic Republic of Iran](#). The 24 page report emphasized Iran’s nuclear chronology, outstanding issues (such as centrifuge technology, enrichment, plutonium experiments, hot cells, the Additional Protocol, and program suspension), and future progression. The Annex of the report included a discussion on verification activities, *inter alia*: uranium conversion and enrichment, irradiation and reprocessing experiments, heavy water reactor programs, and transparency and suspension prospects.

On 18 September, the Resolution [GOV/2004/79](#) of the Board of Governors called on Iran to suspend enrichment related activities along with the construction of the heavy water reactor at Arak.

On 24 September, the board’s resolution noted with concern DPRK’s numerous official statements declaring its intention to build up a nuclear deterrent force and its announcement that it reprocessed 800 spent fuel rods; the IAEA called on DPRK to completely and promptly dismantle any nuclear weapons program.

The 15 November [Report of the Director General on the Implementation of Safeguards in](#)

[Iran](#) reported unresolved issues, yet no evidence of diverted nuclear material.

On 29 November, the Resolution [GOV/2004/90](#) of the Board of Governors welcomed the [EU3-Iran agreement](#) on the suspension of enrichment related activities and acknowledged that the suspension was voluntary.

2003: On 12 February, the Board of Governors adopted a third resolution (GOV/2003/3) declaring that North Korea was “in further non-compliance with its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement pursuant to the NPT” and decided to report “to the United Nations General Assembly and the Security Council, North Korea’s continued non-compliance and the Agency’s inability to verify non-diversion of nuclear material that is subject to safeguards.”

On 16 June, the Board of Governors met for its second meeting of 2003. The agenda consisted of a broad range of issues, including the agency’s Annual Report for 2002, the Technical Co-operation Report for 2002, the report of the Program and Budget Committee, as well as nuclear verification and the prevention of nuclear terrorism. On 18 June, the meeting focused attention on Iran’s failure to comply with IAEA safeguards. The board considered an [agency report](#) following a series of visits to Iran by Director General Mohamed ElBaradei and other senior IAEA officials following allegations that Iran is completing two secret nuclear facilities—a uranium enrichment facility at Natanz and a heavy water production plant near Arak. The report indicated that Iran failed to meet its obligations under its IAEA Safeguards Agreement with respect to the reporting of nuclear material, the subsequent processing and use of that material, and the declaration of facilities where the material was stored. The chair of the board, Kuwaiti Ambassador Nabeela Al-Mulla, referred to the findings of the IAEA report on Iran in her [summary of the meeting](#), thereby reflecting the board’s concern that Iran failed to meet its obligations under its safeguards agreement (for further information, see Safeguards non-compliance, below,)

The primary issues addressed in the 2002 Annual Report were nuclear safety, nuclear security, compliance, nuclear terrorism, and the strengthening of safeguards. ElBaradei noted specifically the need for comprehensive

assurances and integrated safeguards for a more effective and efficient IAEA verification system. The draft Annual Report for 2002 summarizes the scope and results of agency activities throughout the year, with an introductory chapter that considers the agency's work within the context of overall nuclear developments and key related issues.

On 18 July, following intense consultations among Member States, the Program and Budget Committee (PBC) agreed upon the program and budget for 2004-2005. The proposed *budget*, approved by the General Conference on 18 September, marks the first significant increase in the agency's funding since the late 1980s. The current regular budget of \$245 million will see an initial increase of \$15 million, and will grow to \$25 million by 2007. The majority of the increase will go toward the verification program, which has increasingly had to rely on extra-budgetary funds to fulfill its growing number of mandates.

2002: On 19 March 2002, the IAEA Board of Governors approved in principle a plan of action to upgrade worldwide protection against acts of terrorism involving nuclear or radioactive materials. The action plan consists of eight activity areas: physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities; detection of malicious activities (such as illicit trafficking) involving nuclear and other radioactive materials; strengthening of State systems for nuclear material accountancy and control; security of radioactive sources; the assessment of safety and security related vulnerabilities at nuclear facilities; response to malicious acts or threats thereof; the adherence to international agreements and guidelines; and enhancement of program co-ordination and information management for nuclear security-related matters. In recognition that security measures are the responsibility of each State, IAEA activities are meant to complement the protection measures taken by the individual States. The extra budgetary Nuclear Security Fund will primarily fund activities which fall under the action plan.

On 18-22 March 2002, the Board of Governors also approved a "blueprint," known as "The Conceptual Framework for Integrated Safeguards." The blueprint represents a new approach to safeguards implementation, which integrates all the safeguards measures currently

available to the Agency in the most optimum way. This framework will guide the Secretariat in fulfilling its ongoing safeguards obligations and responsibilities.

2001: The Board of Governors held its meeting in Vienna on 11-14 June 2001 to review the implementation of IAEA safeguards in the year 2000. The Board concluded that in 2000 in the 140 States (and Taiwan or China), which had Safeguards Agreements in force, the Agency found no indication of diversion of nuclear material placed under safeguards or of misuse of facilities, equipment, or non-nuclear material placed under safeguards. For seven States, which have a comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and an Additional Protocol in force or provisionally applied, the Agency concluded that all nuclear material had been placed under safeguards and was used for peaceful purposes.

2000: On 5-8 June 2000, the Board of Governors reviewed the implementation of IAEA safeguards in the past year. In 1999, the IAEA concluded that in States with Safeguards Agreements in force, declared nuclear material and other items placed under safeguards remained in peaceful nuclear activities or otherwise adequately accounted for. The Secretariat found no indication that the nuclear material declared and placed under safeguards had been diverted for any military purpose or for purposes unknown, or misuse of facilities, equipment, and non-nuclear materials placed under safeguards.

1997: On 16 May 1997, the Board of Governors approved new strengthened measures for use by its inspectors who verify States' compliance regarding commitments not to produce nuclear weapons. The new measures are detailed in an agreed Protocol under which countries would accept stronger, more intrusive verifications on their territories. The key objective of the new measures enhances the IAEA's capability to detect possible clandestine nuclear activities in NNWS and thus to increase confidence that these States are abiding by their obligations. However, while the protocol remains part of a plan for strengthened and more efficient safeguards in NNWS, it also contains measures that could improve safeguards in other States, including

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nuclear-weapon States. These new measures provide enhanced access for inspectors, such as access to more information about States' nuclear programs, current and planned, and access to more locations on their territories. Inspectors will have access not only to nuclear sites but also to other locations that could contribute to a nuclear program, such as research or manufacturing facilities. The new measures include use of state-of-the-art technologies to trace nuclear activity through samples taken from the environment and remote operation surveillance and monitoring systems at key locations in the inspected State. States accepting the protocol will also be required to simplify the designation of inspectors and visa requirements for them, thus facilitating inspections at sites on short notice. Many of the new measures have undergone extensive field trials in cooperating Member States and build on reinforcing steps already implemented under the IAEA's existing legal authority.