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## TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON MEASURES FOR THE FURTHER REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS (NEW START)

**Signed:** 8 April 2010

**Entered into Force:** 5 February 2011

**Duration:** 10 year duration with option to extend for no more than 5 years

**Parties:** United States, Russian Federation

### Treaty Text

**Treaty Overview:** The New START Treaty is composed of three tiers of increasing levels of detail: the Treaty text, the Protocol to the Treaty, and the Technical Annexes. All three tiers will be legally binding. The Treaty Text and Protocol contain the basic rights and obligations of the Treaty. The Treaty also includes a standard withdrawal clause that states each Party has the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. Upon entry into force of the New START Treaty, the [2002 Moscow Treaty](#) will be terminated.

**Treaty Obligations:** The aggregate limits of the Treaty restrict the United States and Russia to 1,550 deployed strategic warheads each. Warheads actually deployed on ICBMs and SLBMs count toward this limit while each deployed heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments whether with gravity bombs or ALCMs counts as one warhead. The Treaty also includes an aggregate limit of 800 deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments. Within that limit, the number of deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers cannot exceed 700. The United States and Russia must implement the necessary reductions to reach these limits no later than seven years after the Treaty's entry into force. Within the aggregate limits, each State has the flexibility to determine the structure of its strategic forces.

The Treaty does not place any constraints on the testing, development or deployment of current or planned U.S. missile defense programs or U.S. long-range conventional strike capabilities.

In order to promote the objectives and implementation of the Treaty's provisions, the Parties will establish the Bilateral Consultative Commission, which will meet no less than twice a year in Geneva.

**Protocol to the Treaty:** The Protocol to the Treaty is organized into ten parts: Terms and Their Definitions, Categories of Data Pertaining to Strategic Offensive Arms, Conversion or Elimination Procedures, Notifications, Inspection Activities, Bilateral Consultative Commission, Telemetric Information, Provisional Application, Agreed Statements, and Final Provisions.

**Technical Annexes to the Protocol:** The Protocol contains three technical annexes. These include an [Annex on Inspection Activities](#), [Annex on Notifications](#), and [Annex on Telemetric Information](#).

**Verification and Compliance:** Verification measures for New START are based on the [1991 START I Treaty](#) and were modified for the purposes of the new Treaty. These measures include national technical means (e.g. satellites), on-site inspections and exhibitions, data exchanges and notifications related to strategic offensive arms and facilities covered by the Treaty, and provisions to facilitate the use of national technical means for treaty monitoring. To increase transparency and confidence, the Treaty also provides for the annual exchange of telemetry data on a parity basis, for up to five ICBM and SLBM launches per year.

The Treaty provides for 18 on-site inspections per year. These inspections are divided into two types. Type One inspections focus on sites with deployed

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and non-deployed strategic systems; Type Two inspections focus on sites with only non-deployed strategic systems. Each Party is allowed to conduct ten Type One inspections and eight Type Two inspections annually.

In Type One Inspections, each Party will have the right to count the number of reentry vehicles actually deployed on one ICBM or SLBM, rather than attribute a set number of warheads to each type of missile. If the inspected Party covers its reentry vehicles, each must have its own cover.

There will be no continuous perimeter and portal monitoring at missile production facilities, but Parties must provide notification within 48 hours of any treaty-limited item leaving a production facility.

An article by article analysis of the Treaty and its Protocol and annexes is available [here](#).

### Developments:

**2011:** On 12 January the Russian State Duma voted in favor of New START in the second of three required readings. The Duma adopted a resolution of ratification with 349 votes in favor, 57 against and 2 abstentions. The resolution contains 6 articles outlining the exclusive rights of the Russian executive and legislative branches for implementation of the treaty. Article 2 contains 9 conditions necessary for implementation of the treaty. Conditions 1-3 stipulate that the Russian Federation will maintain its capacity of strategic forces and their combat readiness, while preserving, funding and developing the necessary research and development base and production capabilities. Condition 5 mandates taking into account the interrelationship between strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms. Article 4 stipulates extraordinary circumstances under which Russia will be allowed to withdraw from the New START treaty. Article 4 clause 2 refers to the deployment of missile defense systems capable of reducing the effectiveness of the Russian Federation's strategic nuclear forces as constituting a strategic risk to the Russian Federation. According to the Russian interpretation of the Treaty, U.S. strategic conventional forces deployed without permission from the Bilateral Consultative Commission could also constitute a breach of the agreement.

The Russian State Duma completed the third reading and approved New START on 25 January by a vote of 350-96, with one abstention. On 26 January, the Council of Federation voted unanimously in favor of New START. On 28 January President Dmitry

Medvedev signed a bill of ratification of the New START agreement. The Russian bill states that the New START agreement can only be fulfilled if planned U.S. missile defense systems don't diminish the Russian nuclear deterrent.

On 2 February President Obama issued a series of assurances to the U.S. Senate regarding implementation of the New START agreement. He affirmed that the U.S. is technically capable of implementing the treaty's monitoring terms, that modernization of the U.S. nuclear triad will remain a top priority in the coming years, and that the agreement will not require the United States to share flight data from satellite liftoffs or tests of missile interceptors and target missiles. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Defense Secretary Robert Gates affirmed the need to begin talks on tactical nuclear weapons reductions within one year of the entry into force of the New START pact.

During the annual Munich Security Conference which took place from 4-6 February, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov expressed dissatisfaction that Russia had persistently been denied equal participation in the discussion of planned U.S. anti-missile systems. He asserted that development of the future ABM system without Moscow would force his country to review its participation in the treaty. Nonetheless, Foreign Minister Lavrov addressed the possibility of beginning talks on reductions of tactical nuclear weapons in the future.

The New START entered into force on 5 February, when Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov exchanged the instruments of ratification..

On 7 February, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov reaffirmed that a buildup of U.S. missile defense capability would prompt Moscow to re-consider its obligations under the New START treaty. In addition, he urged the United States to return its tactical nuclear weapons from Europe to U.S. national territory, and to dismantle related infrastructure in the interest of ensuring greater transparency and predictability.

On 22 March, it was reported that Russia and the United States started exchanging data as stipulated by the Treaty's provisions. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller said that on 19-20 March the U.S. Nuclear Risk Reduction Center transmitted to Russia the U.S. database, which includes data on the parties' missiles, launchers, heavy bombers, and warheads subject to the treaty.

The United States and Russia have also hosted special exhibitions, with Russians viewing B-1B heavy bombers and Americans viewing the RS-24 Yars ICBM.

On 10 March U.S. delegates met in Moscow with their Russian counterparts for discussion of military and political issues related to the observation of the New START arms control treaty. Key issues on the agenda included missile defense, the practical implementation of the New START treaty, and the modernization of the European conventional weapons control regime. Under the auspices of the Arms Control and International Security Working Group of the U.S.-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov and U.S. Undersecretary of State Ellen Tauscher presided over the talks.

U.S. Vice President Joe Biden met with President Dmitry Medvedev on 9 March and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin on 10 March to hold discussions on the achievements of the “reset” in relations. Maintaining the momentum of the reset and implementing deeper cuts in Russian and American strategic arsenals will be difficult without addressing the obstacle of missile defense. Moscow has warned that without Russia playing a role in European missile defense or limits on a Western missile shield, a renewed arms race may be unavoidable. Russia and NATO are exploring different alternatives for collaborative missile defense and favor different approaches. The establishment of two separate but coordinated antimissile systems is NATO’s preference, while Moscow advocates each side assuming responsibility for intercepting missiles traveling across a specific geographic sector.

On 13 April, the State Department announced that a team of U.S. inspectors had arrived in Russia for the first on-site inspections of the country’s nuclear facilities.

From 19 October - 2 November, the second session of the [Bilateral Consultative Commission](#) was held in Geneva, Switzerland. The United States and Russia discussed issues related to the implementation of the Treaty during these consultations.

On 1 December, the State Department [announced](#) that the United States made available the unclassified U.S. data for the most recent data exchange, effective 1 September 2011.

As of 1 September 2011 as drawn from the [data exchange by the Parties](#), the United States had 822 Deployed ICBMs, Deployed SLBMs, and Deployed Heavy Bombers; 1790 Warheads on Deployed IC-

BMs, on Deployed SLBMs, and Nuclear Warheads Counted for Deployed Heavy Bombers; and, 1043 Deployed and Non-deployed Launchers of ICBMs, Deployed and Non-deployed Launchers of SLBMs, and Deployed and Non-deployed Heavy Bombers. The Russian Federation had 516 Deployed ICBMs, Deployed SLBMs, and Deployed Heavy Bombers; 1566 Warheads on Deployed ICBMs, on Deployed SLBMs, and Nuclear Warheads Counted for Deployed Heavy Bombers; and, 871 Deployed and Non-deployed Launchers of ICBMs, Deployed and Non-deployed Launchers of SLBMs, and Deployed and Non-deployed Heavy Bombers.

**2010:** On 26 March, U.S. President Obama and Russian President Medvedev formally announced they had reached agreement on the New START Treaty.

On 7 April, the Russian Federation released a [unilateral statement on missile defense](#), in which it stated its view that the Treaty “may be effective and viable only in conditions where there is no qualitative and quantitative build-up in the missile defense system capabilities of the United States of America.” In response, the United States issued a [unilateral statement on missile defense](#) stating the position that U.S. missile defense systems are not intended to affect the strategic balance with Russia. The United States also issued a [unilateral statement on Trident I SLBMs](#) declaring that Trident I SLBMs are not SLBMs of an existing type for purposes of the Treaty. These three unilateral statements are not integral parts of the Treaty, nor are they legally binding.

On 8 April, President Obama and President Medvedev met in Prague to sign the New START Treaty.

On 29 April, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee began a series of hearings with current and former administration officials. Two former U.S. Secretaries of Defense James R. Schlesinger and William J. Perry made statements during the [initial hearing](#).

On 13 May, President Obama submitted the New START Treaty to the Senate for ratification. The package submitted to the Senate included a letter of transmittal from the President to the Senate, a letter of submittal from the Secretary of State to the President, the Text of the Treaty, Protocol, Annexes to the Protocol, a detailed report prepared by Department of State analyzing each provision of the Treaty, Protocol and Annexes, and unilateral statements issued by the United States and the Russian Federation at the time of signature (these are provided to the Senate for its information and are not subject to advice and consent).

On 13 May, the United States and the Russian Federation issued a [joint statement](#) declaring the early ratification of the Treaty a priority for both Parties.

On 18 May, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee heard [statements](#) from U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen on the Treaty. On 25 May, a further [statement](#) was delivered to the committee by former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.

On 28 May, President Medvedev submitted the New START Treaty to the Duma for ratification. This submission included a request that ratification occur simultaneously with the United States in order to ensure that Russia does not commit to a Treaty that is not able to gain support in the U.S. Senate.

On 10 June, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee heard [statements](#) from former U.S. National Security Advisors Brent Scowcroft and Stephen J. Hadley on the effects of the Treaty on U.S. national security. On 15 June, further [statements](#) were made to the committee by Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Verification and Compliance Rose Gottemoeller and Secretary of Defense Representative to Post-START Negotiations Edward L. Warner. On 16 June, officials from the Department of Defense, including Principal Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy James N. Miller, Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command General Kevin P. Chilton, and Lieutenant General Patrick J. O'Reilly, made [statements](#) to the committee concerning the impact of the Treaty on the U.S. military. On 24 June, the committee heard statements from Director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) and U.S. Strategic Command's Center for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction, Kenneth A. Myers; former Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, Robert G. Joseph; Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Eric S. Edelman; Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress and director of U.S. Advocacy for the Open Society Institute, Morton H. Halperin; and Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy James N. Miller that examined the benefits and risks of the Treaty to the United States. On 15 July the committee further assessed the ability of the United States to maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal under the Treaty and heard [statements](#) from Director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory and President of the Los Alamos National Security LLC, Michael R. Anastasio; Director of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory George H. Miller, and President and Director of Sandia National Labor-

atories, Paul J. Hommert. Two additional classified hearings were conducted alongside.

On 4 August, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman John Kerry announced that the committee vote on the Treaty would be delayed until later in the year instead of taking place on 9 August as announced in July to allow time for Treaty supporters to garner additional Republican support. At the time of the announcement, Senator Richard Lugar of Indiana was the only Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee who openly supported the Treaty. The announcement to delay the vote was accompanied by a statement by President Obama that the administration remained optimistic about the agreement being able to pass through the Senate by the end of the year.

On 3 September, Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman John Kerry circulated an initial draft resolution to ratify the New START. Senator Lugar submitted a substitute resolution on 16 September modifying Senator Kerry's language and adding more than 15 amendments, in the hope of securing the votes of additional Republican senators.

On 16 September, by a vote of 14 to 4 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved a resolution of ratification of the New START based on a draft by Senator Lugar. All Democratic Senators along with Republican Senators Richard Lugar (IN), Bob Corker (TN), and Johnny Isakson (GA) voted in favor of the New START.

On 22 December, by a vote of 71 to 26 the Senate consented to the ratification of New START. The U.S. Administration brought the treaty to the vote despite the objections of Republican Senator John Kyl (AZ), the minority whip, who voiced opposition to considering the treaty during the "lame duck" session of the Senate. Thirteen republican senators and all democratic senators supported the treaty..

The [Resolution](#) of advice and consent to Ratification contains 14 conditions, 3 understandings and 12 declarations, which are not amendments to the Treaty, but clarify the position of the U.S. Senate on a number of issues.

The first Declaration states that it is the policy of the United States to deploy national missile defense systems as soon as technologically possible. Condition 5 of the resolution stipulates that New START does not impose any limitations on the deployment of missile defenses other than the requirements of paragraph 3 of Article V of the treaty. Condition 14, on the effectiveness and viability of the New START treaty and U.S. missile defenses, stipulates that continued im-

provement and deployment of US missile defense systems do not constitute a basis for questioning the viability of the treaty. Additionally, the first understanding states that there be no limits on deployment of U.S. missile defense systems.

Condition 12 states that no later than one year after the entry into force of the New START Treaty the United States will seek to initiate negotiations with the Russian Federation on an agreement to address the disparity between the non-strategic (tactical) nuclear weapon stockpiles of the Russian Federation and the United States. Condition 9 states the U.S. commitment to ensuring the safety, reliability, and performance of its nuclear arsenal at New START Treaty levels. Declaration 12 stipulates the U.S. commitment to maintaining and modernizing its nuclear weapons production capabilities and capacities, and its right to ensuring the safety, reliability, and performance of the U.S. nuclear triad. Declaration 6, on conventional prompt global strike, outlines the intent to further develop conventionally armed strategic-range weapon systems.

On 24 December, the Russian State Duma, the lower house of the Russian parliament, endorsed New START in the first of three readings, required for the ratification, with 350 votes in favor and 58 votes against.

**2009:** On 6 February, Russia's First Deputy Prime Minister Ivanov stated at the Munich Security Conference that Moscow was committed to continuing the START negotiations process but maintained concerns regarding uploading procedures and the U.S. planned missile defense system in Europe. At the same conference, U.S. Vice President Biden stated that Russia and the U.S. should cooperate "to renew the verification procedures in the START treaty."

On 7 March, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and her Russian counterpart, Sergey Lavrov met in Geneva where both committed to a "reset" of bilateral relations, which had cooled in recent years. They noted that as part of their effort to rebuild the relationship, the United States and Russia would try to reach an agreement on a new strategic arms reduction treaty by the end of 2009.

On 1 April, at the G-20 meeting in London, Presidents Obama and Medvedev emphasized the need for lower levels of strategic offensive arms, including delivery vehicles and warheads, than those determined by the SORT agreement, and including verification measures "drawn from the experience of the Parties in implementing the START Treaty." Both leaders underlined their plan to conclude the agree-

ment before the START I expiration date in December 2009.

The U.S. and Russian negotiating teams, headed by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller and Ambassador Anatoly Antonov, Director of the Russian Foreign Ministry's Security and Disarmament Department, held their first "very productive" meeting in Rome on 24 April. The first round of negotiations followed in Moscow 18-20 May.

Both the second and the third round of negotiations took place in Geneva 1-3 and 22-24 June. On 6 July, during a bilateral meeting in Moscow, Presidents Obama and Medvedev signed a [Joint Understanding](#) to guide the negotiations, committing their countries to ranges of 1,500-1,675 for strategic warheads and 500-1,100 for strategic delivery vehicles, and a treaty including effective verification measures drawn from the experience gained under START I.

At the same 6-7 July summit, the two Presidents underlined their plans to continue the discussions regarding cooperative approaches in response to missile proliferation. They noted that U.S. and Russian experts were "intensifying dialogue on establishing the Joint Data Exchange Center, which is to become the basis for a multilateral missile-launch notification regime."

The fourth round of negotiations took place in Geneva 22-24 July. The fifth round of negotiations took place in Geneva from 31 August - 2 September. The sixth round of negotiations took place in Geneva from 21 September - 2 October. The seventh round of negotiations took place in Geneva 19-30 October.

On 28 and 29 October, U.S. National Security Advisor General James Jones met with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Secretary of the Security Council Nikolai Patrushev in Moscow. They discussed the START follow-on and agreed to make every effort to fulfill their Presidents' pledge to conclude the new treaty by December.

The eighth round of negotiations took place in Geneva from 9 November to 19 December.

On 4 December, after a phone call, both Presidents released a [Joint Statement](#) expressing their commitment to work together in the spirit of the START treaty following its expiration the next day and to ensure that a new treaty enters into force at the earliest possible date.

[START I](#) expired on 5 December, and negotiations on a [new START Treaty](#) continued into 2010.

**2008:** In October of 2008, the United States and Russia, along with representatives from Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan met in the Joint Compliance and Implementation Commission (JCIC), but did not reach any agreement on extending START I.