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In its latest resolution on Iran, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors strongly deplored Iran's past failures and breaches of its obligations to comply with the provisions of its Safeguards Agreement. It decided that should any "further serious failures come to light", it would meet immediately to consider "in the light of the circumstances and of advice from the Director General, all options at its disposal, in accordance with the IAEA Statute and Iran's Safeguards Agreement."[1] The Board requested the IAEA Director General, Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, to submit another report by mid-February 2004 for consideration by the March 2004 Board meeting. It is conceivable that the Board could at that stage decide to refer the matter to the Security Council for further action.

The resolution was however, not entirely negative. It welcomed Iran's offer to actively cooperate with the IAEA following the Board's last resolution on September 12, 2003 that set a deadline (October 31, 2003) for Iran to provide information on its past and present nuclear activities. The Board also recognized Iran's decisions to conclude an Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement - that would allow for more intrusive inspections and verification mechanisms - and to voluntarily suspend all enrichment and reprocessing activities. At the same time, it emphasized the importance for Iran to move "swiftly to ratification" of the Protocol and in the interim to act as if the Protocol were in force. It also requested Iran to continue to suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities in a "complete and verifiable manner."[2] The Board's resolution furthermore welcomed the 21 October 2003 Agreed Statement between the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom and the Secretary of the Iranian Supreme National Security Council. Iran agreed in the terms of this agreement to sign the Additional Protocol and to suspend its uranium enrichment activities.

Of further significance is the emphasis on the "urgent and close co-operation" of all third countries to clarify outstanding questions concerning Iran's nuclear program.[3] The need for "third countries" to cooperate relates to several references in the latest report (GOV.2003/75) by the IAEA Director General, which was distributed on 10 November in anticipation of the Board meeting. The report described at least nine instances of undeclared foreign assistance, including by entities from at least four countries that provided components, material, and information used in Iran's laser enrichment program.

The 10 November report was the third issued since allegations surfaced in August 2002 that Iran was actively pursuing a nuclear weapons capability, and provided both troubling and reassuring details on Iran's nuclear program to date. As was the case with the June and August 2003 reports, the latest report again does not provide conclusive evidence that Iran has been pursuing a nuclear weapons program. These reports, however, identified clearly that Iran has failed in a number of instances over an extended period of time to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with respect to the reporting of nuclear material and its processing and use, as well as the declaration of facilities where such material has been processed and stored. The latest report identifies a number of additional failures, including failures to report: testing of centrifuges at the Kalaye Electric Company in 1999 and 2002; the import of natural uranium in 1994 and its subsequent transfer for use in laser enrichment experiments (which included the production of enriched uranium); and the production and irradiation of uranium targets. It also shows that Iran failed to provide design information for facilities such as the centrifuge facility at the Kalaye Electric Company and the laser facilities at TNRC and Lashkar Ab'ad, and that through its efforts to conceal aspects of its nuclear program, Iran failed on many occasions to cooperate to facilitate the implementation of safeguards.[4]

This list of failures prompted the United States to push for a strict resolution that would include a trigger mechanism to send the Iranian case to the UN Security Council should further breaches be revealed. After a week of negotiations between capitals, Secretary of State Colin Powell expressed satisfaction with the subsequent resolution since it "notes that Iran has been in breach of obligations." Referring to operative paragraph 8, he stated that "there is one particular paragraph in the resolution which makes it very, very clear that if Iran does not now comply with obligations and the other agreements it's entered into, then this will be a matter that will be immediately referred to the IAEA board of governors for action, as appropriate under the various statutes." Iran's representative to the IAEA, Ambassador Salehi, noted his delegation's "mixed feelings" with regard to the resolution and the report upon which it was based. He stated that while the resolution offsets attempts "to create a crisis about Iran's peaceful nuclear program," the report focused "disproportionately on the past" and "did not fully and distinctly reflect the turn of policy and action in Iran on the 21st of October." Remarking on the adoption of the resolution, Dr. ElBaradei stated that the resolution marked "a good day for peace, multilateralism and non-proliferation," but noted too that much verification work remained to be done before assurances could be provided to the international community on the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program. Such assurances, which "could clearly help build confidence and could open the way for a new chapter of co-operation between Iran and the international community," would be dependent on receiving full and continuing cooperation and transparency from both Iran and from the relevant third party countries.[5]

For further analysis of the latest Board of Governors resolution and the report by the IAEA Director General on the implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, see http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/iran-and-the-iaea/.

[1] Resolution GOV/2003/81 adopted by the IAEA Board of Governors on the :Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran on 26 November 2003 (operative paragraphs 2 and 8)
[2] Ibid (operative paragraphs 1, 9 and 10)
[3] Ibid (operative paragraph 6)
[4] "Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Report by the Director General," GOV/2003/75, 10 November 2003
[5] Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, Opening Remarks at the Press Conference on the Outcome of the Board of Governors' Consideration of the Implementation of Safeguards in the Islamic Republic of Iran, 26 November 2003, http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/2003/ebsp2003n026.html

CNS Experts on the Iran Resolution:

• Jean Du Preez | Bio
  Director, International Organizations Nonproliferation Program (IONP)
  jean.dupreez@miis.edu

• Dr. William Potter | Bio
  Director of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS)
  wpotter@miis.edu

• Larry Scheinman | Bio
  Distinguished Professor, Washington, D.C. Office
  lscheinman@miis.edu

• Victor Mizin | Bio
  Diplomat-in-Residence; Senior Research Associate
  victor.mizin@miis.edu