Iran Special Collection
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February 10, 2006
China and Iran's Nuclear Activities: Caught in the Middle
Stephanie Lieggi
With pressure building to
stop Iran's suspected nuclear ambitions, China finds itself in a difficult
dilemma. Beijing and Tehran have significant economic ties, primarily in the
field of energy. Iran is China's second largest provider of oil and
provides an increasing amount of China's natural gas supplies. The
Sino-Iranian relationship has been a key link for Beijing in an important,
albeit volatile, part of the world. Sanctions or other forms of pressure aimed
at getting Iran to cooperate with the IAEA could hamper China's valuable
energy source, and Beijing's reaction to the situation will dictate the
future ties between Tehran and Beijing. At the same time, the United States and
the European Union--two of the loudest voices calling for tougher action
against Iran--are China's top two trading partners and two of
Beijing's most vital bilateral relationships.
China has stated a
clear preference for employing diplomacy over sanctions or other pressure
tactics in response to Iran's recent confrontational behavior and has
looked to Russia (and to some extent the EU) to take the lead in settling the
current standoff. Beijing has tended to avoid getting involved in international
rows of this scale. Following this pattern, Beijing has passively played a
supporting role to Russia. Beijing has backed a plan proposed by Moscow that
would bring Iran's uranium reprocessing to Russian soil--thus
removing from Iranian facilities this important step of the fuel cycle that can
be used to manufacture fissile material.
By taking a passive approach,
Beijing is looking to postpone any difficult choices for as long as possible in
hopes that an acceptable outcome may be reached. However, with military options
aimed at stopping Tehran's program still under consideration in Washington
and elsewhere, Beijing may not be able to remain passive for long. If the
conflict was to escalate, China's energy supplies, and its overall
economic security, could be severely damaged. Preventing this is Beijing's
highest priority.
In a key move to work together with the other
permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, Beijing joining the P-5/EU-3
agreement that called for the issue to be sent to the Security Council. Beijing
followed that by voting in favor of the related resolution at the IAEA Board of
Governors meeting on February 4, 2006. Despite these moves, Beijing remains
reluctant to impose significant sanctions on Iran.
The Bush
administration will want the Security Council to agree to tough action on Iran,
but Washington will need to convince both Beijing and Moscow to not use their
veto power to block these moves. Invoking its Security Council veto power in
this situation is not a comfortable option for Beijing. Although it may keep
relations with Tehran steady, a veto from Beijing would alienate the United
States and Europe. A veto might also push Washington closer towards taking even
more aggressive moves unilaterally. On another note, if Iran continues its
enrichment program in defiance of the international community's objection,
then China's use of veto at the UN would greatly tarnish its image as a
responsible power upholding the nuclear nonproliferation
principles.
China's need to assure its energy supplies with Tehran
run essentially counter to Beijing's other foreign and trade policy
aspirations. China is still hoping to convince the EU to lift an arms ban put in
place after the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown. Beijing has also made
substantial efforts to keep Sino-U.S. relations stable, including bowing to U.S.
pressure on a number of occasions with regards to Iran. In the mid-1990s, the
Clinton administration convinced China to stop nuclear related trade with
Iran--a step that has slowed Tehran's nuclear program. Since then,
China has made some progress towards stopping the flow of dual-use technology to
Iran from Chinese companies. Although many in Washington believe that
Beijing's actions up until now vis-à-vis Iran's WMD programs
have been far from sufficient, China agrees with the assessments of the other
P-5 states that an Iranian nuclear weapon program is detrimental to
international security (and thus detrimental to China's overall security.)
Although China's leadership has not appeared enthusiastic about
increasing its involvement in the Iranian nuclear issue, Beijing's
long-standing ties to Tehran arguably qualify China to play a more decisive role
in resolving the current standoff. The ability of European countries to broker a
deal is waning. The United States and Iran are not on speaking terms
diplomatically, and the rancor between these two countries has made
rapprochement an unlikely option. Of the remaining major powers, China and
Russia are the most likely options to broker a compromise. However,
Russia's own vested interests may conflict with those of China. As time
progresses, it may become less productive for Beijing to rely on Moscow's
leadership. Only with active participation in resolving this issue can China
assure its own strategic needs.
Beijing has shown that it is capable of
productive engagement when sufficiently prodded and when the outcome of a
situation is adequately vital to China's interests. The crisis that arose
over North Korea's nuclear program is a prime example of China's
ability to play an effective role in mitigating a deteriorating situation. While
the six-party talks dealing with North Korea's nuclear program has had a
rough history, the process and Beijing's leading role in it has kept the
state of affairs on the Korean peninsula relatively stable.
Iran is not
as dependent upon China as North Korea and therefore will be even less pliant to
China's influence. However, Tehran still considers Beijing to be a
friendly government--at least relative to the other larger world
powers--and will likely be responsive to attempted engagement coming from
China. By building upon this relationship and its experience with the six-party
talk's process, Beijing could nudge the current impasse to a more
agreeable resolution.
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