Iran Special Collection
Return to the International Reaction to the Iranian Nuclear Crisis
February 10, 2006
Iran's View of the Nuclear Crisis
Sammy Salama
[Note: The following is Iran's view of the current nuclear crisis
as depicted by Iranian sources and articulated by the Iranian leadership since
2003.]
Iran's position in the current nuclear crisis is both
deep and complex; it can be described as a multi-pronged approach. First, Tehran
argues that Iran is allowed under international law to conduct research and work
on all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle. Second, Iranian leaders insist that
the country's nuclear aspirations and work are peaceful in nature and are
not meant as a threat to other countries. Third, Iran maintains that the nuclear
scientific progress is a popular national commitment with extensive domestic
support. Fourth, Tehran contends that this crisis is politically motivated and
directed by Iran's nemesis, the United States.
Iran has adamantly
stated that as a member of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), it is entitled to
research and mastery of the full nuclear fuel cycle including mining, milling,
conversion and enrichment. Tehran argues that as a sovereign nation, there is no
reason why Iran should give up this right, and it is not up to other nations to
dictate to Iran on this subject. According to its official position, Iran is
seeking to master nuclear enrichment technology in order to produce electricity
and become a producer and exporter of nuclear fuel, thereby relieving its
domestic demand for oil; Iran has publicly asserted that its program is not
meant for the creation of nuclear weapons.
In reiterating the peaceful
nature of its program, Tehran has noted that weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
are forbidden by Islam. As further proof, Tehran has pointed out that in spite
of many years of intrusive inspections by the IAEA; the UN nuclear watchdog has
failed to find a smoking gun pointing to a military nuclear program. To prove
its trustworthiness, Iran claims that it has been cooperative with the IAEA,
noting that it voluntarily agreed to sign and adhere to an additional protocol,
which includes an intrusive inspections regime.
While Iran has admitted
to procuring nuclear enrichment technology from the A.Q. Khan nuclear network,
Tehran has also noted that this was done because it was denied this technology
through other channels--despite the fact, according to Tehran, that such
acquisition is permitted by the NPT. Iran has continued to argue that it is not
a danger to its neighbors or any other country, unlike Iraq; Iran has not
invaded or occupied any other country in the region. It is also not in violation
of any United Nations resolutions.
Tehran contends that the United Stated
and allies have initiated this standoff to deprive Iran of its legal right to
domestically develop a full nuclear fuel cycle. Iran argues further that many
countries are going along with Washington due to significant diplomatic pressure
from the United States, and not because they view Iran as a threat to their
security or interest. In essence, Tehran argues that this whole affair as a
product of U.S. unilateralism, instigated after the United States decided to
forcefully enter the Middle East in 2002. Prior to the build-up to the Iraq war,
Tehran has argued, Iran's relations with the European countries had been
favorable.
Iranians also argue that Western powers have been
hypocritical in their tacit acceptance of the pursuit of Pakistan, India and
Israel of nuclear weapons outside the NPT. These countries have not joined the
treaty and do not adhere to any nuclear intrusive inspections. Tehran also
points out that the United States supports both Israel and Pakistan militarily
and financially, and Washington has just proposed a nuclear cooperation deal
with India. Moreover, Iranian leaders hold that Western powers hostile to Iran
will not be satisfied irregardless of any additional concessions from Tehran.
Iran's voluntary signing of the IAEA additional protocol and commitment to
the Paris Accord did not
sooth western hostility; on the contrary, such actions appear to Iranian leaders
to have emboldened anti-Tehran sentiments. Some in Iran even argue that the EU-3
(France, Germany and the United Kingdom) were using the Paris Accord and related
negotiations as delaying tactics aimed at hindering Iran's mastery of the
nuclear cycle.
One of the staples of Iran's policy is the
promotion of nuclear research as national responsibility. Most people in Iran of
all political and economic stripes view Iran's nuclear technology as a
sign of scientific progress and achievement, and a matter of considerable
national pride. Thus the Iranian government advocates that nuclear scientific
progress is a popular national duty which has extensive domestic support. For
that reason, Iran maintains that it will not be deterred from continuing to
pursue its nuclear work and research.
Another reason for the domestic
popularity of Iran's nuclear program is the overall sense of
victimization, namely resulting from Iran's considerable losses in the
Iran-Iraq war. This recent history plays a prominent role in shaping the
strategic mind-set of Iran's current leadership, many of whom were
veterans of the war with Iraq. Additionally, Iran's technological progress
is meant to serve as a deterrent for Iran's potential enemies. Iran cannot
rely on other countries or international treaties to safeguard its sovereignty.
The Iranian leadership and population are reminded of this when they look at the
1980s and the war with Iraq. Baghdad--which invaded Iran--was armed
and supplied by western powers. The Iran-Iraq war killed more than half a
million Iranians. It also saw extensive use of chemical weapons on Iranians,
killing up to 50,000. Iranian leaders have stated that "never again"
will the Iranian people be a target of such aggression and mass
slaughter.
When looking at the rhetoric used by the Iranian leadership to
defend their current nuclear program and decry international attempts to stop
their progress, getting Iran to compromise on the issue will be a significant
challenge. Following the IAEA Board decision to report Iran's file to the
UN Security Council, Iran has informed the IAEA that it will suspend voluntary
adherence to the additional protocol and snap inspections, and have ordered the
removal of surveillance measures from its facilities. However, Iran has yet to
follow through on its previous promise to end all voluntary suspension of
nuclear work and to resume enrichment. Such a move is likely approaching.
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