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Russian Perspectives on Iran's Nuclear Program

Cristina Chuen

Now that Moscow has agreed to report Iran to the U.N. Security Council, Russian diplomats have six weeks to find some new solutions to the Iranian nuclear crisis. Russia has stated that a nuclear-armed Iran is unacceptable. After all, any nuclear-armed missiles Tehran might develop will likely be able to reach Russian territory. At the same time, Russian officials largely agree that Iran has a right to nuclear power as a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The difficulty, for Russian diplomats, is to reconcile these two principles and negotiate a compromise.

Moscow is very concerned that Iran not withdraw from the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and openly commence a weapons program. Most Russian statements suggest that Moscow may worry Iran has a virtual weapons program (a program giving the country the knowledge and capabilities needed to build weapons), but that the decision to build actual weapons has yet to be made. Further, Russian analysts suggest that Iran is at least five years away from this latent capability, providing some breathing room to handle the issue.

However, it is clear that decision makers in the United States, EU3 countries, and Iran itself have pushed the issue onto a much more abbreviated calendar. As the positions of the EU3 and Tehran hardened, Russian officials have been put in an increasingly difficult position. With strong ties to Europe (and some 40% of Russian trade), Moscow does not want to veto a European push for sanctions. At the same time, in addition to the money Russia is making from the sale of a nuclear plant to Iran (some $1 billion), Russia is deeply involved in the Iranian energy market and views the country as politically critical to the stability of Russia's southern borderlands. Iranian influence in the Caucasus is quite strong.[1]

Russia's presidential statement on the peaceful use of nuclear energy notes that a global infrastructure should be developed "that will give all interested countries equal access to nuclear energy, while stressing reliable compliance with the requirements of the nonproliferation regime." While some Russian analysts agree with the general Western assessment that Iran has no need for nuclear energy, others do not. These dissenting voices argue--much as the Iranian government does--that some 70 percent of Iranian oil is currently used for domestic purposes, and that domestic energy needs are growing faster than increases in extraction.[2] Even Russian supporters of nuclear energy in Iran, however, have questioned the structure of the Iranian effort. Head of the Russia's nuclear power corporation TVEL, for instance, has noted that a serious commercial effort to create power plant fuel would not simply begin with uranium enrichment, but would involve far more than current Iranian plans. Thus, he too has suspicions regarding the program.[3] But he and other Russian experts suggest that until Iran clearly violates its NPT obligations, it has a right to develop its nuclear industry. Indeed, some experts in Russia see the EU3 negotiations as having gotten off on the wrong foot by trying to force Iran to give up an enrichment capacity, instead of requesting that Iran voluntary abstain from this right.[4] From their point of view, Iran has a right to the capacity, and trying to force it to give it up simply puts the country on the defensive, and has caused it to dig in its heels. This is quite dangerous, since they feel that Iran will be able to build a weapon if it makes the political decision to do so.[5] Yet another commonly heard Russian opinion is that the Western effort to restrain Iran's nuclear program is really aimed at preventing Russian from gaining a foothold in the Iranian market.[6]

However, it is far too late for the "request scenario," and another solution must now be found. Putin has suggested the development of an international nuclear fuel-cycle center under IAEA control on Russian soil, proposing that Iran, as a participant in the venture, send its uranium to Russia for enrichment. While Tehran snubbed the Russian idea when it was first mooted, in January Iran agreed to begin seriously discussing the proposal. In international discussions, Russia and its Western partners are considering whether to allow Iran to conduct small-scale experimental enrichment if Tehran agrees to move all industrial production abroad. However, some Russian scientists have argued that moving enrichment to Russia will not necessarily prevent Iran from making nuclear weapons. Indeed, in addition to uranium enrichment, Iran has been pursuing technologies related to the production of plutonium. In order to prevent Iran from reprocessing spent fuel from the Bushehr nuclear power plant, Moscow insisted upon and obtained an agreement from Iran for the return of all spent fuel to Russia. To date, however, there appears to have been little discussion of the fate of research reactor fuel, to say nothing of fuel derived from enriching Iranian uranium at the proposed international enrichment facility in Russia; this will likely be a critical point in the negotiations over the proposal during the next six weeks, along with questions of the size of the project and the degree to which Iranian engineers will be involved. Discussions among Russian, Iranian, and Chinese representatives on these issues will commence on February 16 in Moscow. Moscow hopes to come up with a new agreement by the March 6 board meeting of the IAEA, so that a solution can be presented to the Security Council when it takes up the Iranian issue.

Moscow has made clear that it still believes a compromise is possible. One Russian analyst has suggested that "the U.N. Security Council could decide not to place sanctions on Iran, but instead to broaden the capabilities and rights of the IAEA. In this case Iran would not have any basis for withdrawal from the nuclear nonproliferation treaty."[7] The idea that Iran might renounce the treaty is a fear of many Russian experts, who believe that were Iran to withdraw, it is capable of pursuing a weapons program should it make the decision to do so. Nevertheless, it is not clear that the decision to report Iran to the Security Council is unwelcome in Moscow. Most Russian observers note that Tehran is an extremely hard bargainer. They cite as an example the lengthy negotiations over the Russo-Iranian contract for the return of spent fuel from the Bushehr reactor--the signing of which was postponed multiple times, and finally occurred on the steps of the airplane returning the Russian negotiating team back to Moscow. Therefore, a deadline such as a Security Council meeting is probably necessary if Iran is to agree to the Russian international fuel cycle facility plan. Unfortunately, it is all too possible that the threat of sanctions is not enough to cause Iran to give up enough in a deal with Russia to assuage Western proliferation concerns, particularly since the potential profits involved and the hope of avoiding sanctions on Iran are likely to make the Russians a little too eager to come to a deal.


[1] Some Russian observers point to difficulties that Azerbaijan, in particular, would have in standing up to Iran in any fashion. While Azerbaijan has a population of just eight million, 20 million Azeris live in Iran. In addition, both nations share the Shiite faith.
[2] See, for instance, statements made by Vladimir Yevseyev, an expert at the Moscow Carnegie Center and senior research associate at the IMEMO Center for International Security. "Ekho Moskvy" radio interview, January 18, 2006.
[3] A.N. Nyago, as cited in Yaderny Kontrol No. 36 (October 6-13), 2004.
[4] See comments by Ivan Safranchuk, head of the Moscow office of the Center for Defense Information, "Ekho Moskvy" interview, January 5, 2006. Dr. Safranchuk notes, "I cannot imagine how the Security Council can put sanctions on a country for doing what it has a right to do under the nuclear nonproliferation treaty." (author's translation)
[5] As Radzhab Safarov, General Director of the Center for the Contemporary Study of Iran, puts it, "Iran cannot be frightened by any sanctions, even by the Security Council. ...it will become self-sufficient in nuclear technologies." "Ekho Moskvy" interview, January 5, 2006. (author's translation)
[6] This idea has been widely held within the Russian nuclear industry for years. The opinion apparently still holds some sway. As Safarov notes, "there is a suspicion, and therefore this country is banned from having these technologies, with Russian assistance. And this is a strike against Russian interests, by the way." "Ekho Moskvy" interview, January 5, 2006. (author's translation)
[7] Vladimir Yevseyev, "Ekho Moskvy" radio interview, January 18, 2006. (author's translation)


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