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U.S. Perspectives on Iran's Nuclear Program

Scott Parrish

The 27-3 vote of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors on February 4, 2006, gives the United States what it has been seeking since fall of 2003--a referral of the Iranian nuclear issue to the UN Security Council. On the surface, the vote appears to vindicate the long-standing U.S. efforts to bring Iran to the Security Council. While the results of the vote at the IAEA do represent a small victory for U.S. diplomacy, it remains unclear what further steps the United States should pursue to block what it views as Iran's determined pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability. Just because the Iran issue will be reported to the Security Council does not mean that body will take any action. North Korea, after all, was referred to the Security Council in February 2003, but the council has yet to address the problem.

The emphasis placed by the United States on moving the Iranian nuclear issue to the Security Council reflects a shift in U.S. nonproliferation policy away from the "Bush Doctrine." Enunciated in President George W. Bush's January 2002 State of the Union Address, and expanded upon in the September 2002 National Security Strategy, the Bush Doctrine prescribed the use of preemptive force rather than negotiations to address the threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and "rogue states" seeking to acquire them.[1] This doctrine was a primary rationale for the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The failure to uncover WMD after the invasion, together with the increasingly costly insurgency and reconstruction campaign in Iraq, however, have stripped this strategy of its former appeal. Since Condoleezza Rice took over as Secretary of State in January 2005, the Bush administration has swung back toward negotiation as the primary tool to combat proliferation, as reflected not just in U.S. lobbying on the Iran issue at the IAEA, but also in the reinvigoration of the six-party talks on North Korea during 2005.

But the new emphasis on negotiation does not guarantee effective action to blunt Iran's nuclear program. U.S. officials appear to recognize this problem, although they have yet to devise an adequate "end game" strategy to resolve it. Bush administration officials have publicly stated that they do not expect the UN Security Council to take punitive action against Iran, such as adopting sanctions. Stephen Rademaker, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation, told an audience at the American Enterprise Institute on February 2, 2006, that the referral to the Security Council "does not mean that diplomacy has come to an end." He added, "We fully expect the Security Council to call upon Iran to cooperate with the IAEA."[2] This is a very modest program of Security Council action, considering that most of the key members of the Security Council are on the IAEA Board of Governors, and have already called on Iran to cooperate in that venue.

The Bush administration contends that the additional weight of the Security Council may induce Iran to be more cooperative with the IAEA, resume suspension of its uranium enrichment activities and resolve outstanding questions about its nuclear program. In a statement made to the special February session of the IAEA Board, U.S. Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte said that the United States seeks to "support the ongoing efforts of the IAEA with the weight of the Security Council's authority," and suggested that "such an approach might persuade the Iranian leadership to change course."[3] While it is probably reasonable to expect the Security Council to issue a call for renewed Iranian cooperation, Iran may well ignore it, since it has not heeded earlier calls by the IAEA itself.

Acting Assistant Secretary Rademaker has also suggested that the Security Council could "decide to enhance the IAEA's legal authority to investigate all aspects of Iran's nuclear program."[4] This comment may reflect Washington's hope that the Security Council will use its powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to authorize the IAEA to conduct a broader range of inspections than it can under its standard safeguards authority. The other permanent members of the Security Council, however, may not be prepared to endorse such a step. Both China and Russia, for example, might regard such an action by the Security Council as excessive, although some Russian analysts have expressed support for the idea.[5]

Even if China and Russia did endorse a move to authorize more extensive inspections, Iran appears unwilling to compromise on the issue of IAEA access. On February 6, 2006, Iran informed the IAEA of its withdrawal from the expanded safeguards regime known as the Additional Protocol, which Tehran had signed, but not yet ratified.[6] In response to a future Security Council decision authorizing additional inspections, Iran could simply refuse to allow the IAEA access, calculating that the Security Council would be unable to agree on an effective response to its intransigence. Iranian officials have repeatedly expressed confidence that sanctions and/or military action are unlikely.[7] As a result, moving the issue to the Security Council does not clearly promote a resolution of the Iranian nuclear issue.

U.S. policymakers continue to insist that it would be unacceptable for Iran to develop nuclear weapons capability. After the IAEA vote, President Bush reiterated this point, stating that "the world will not permit the Iranian regime to develop nuclear weapons."[8] But the diplomatic strategy of moving the Iranian nuclear issue to the United Nations, as analyzed above, does not appear to offer a clear path to halting the Iranian nuclear weapons program. If the Iranians continue their current defiance, the United States may soon need to consider just how high a price it is willing to pay to stop the Iranian nuclear program. Since other major powers seem unwilling to consider full-scale confrontation with Iran, partly because of its role in the global oil market, the United States may have a tough time convincing additional countries to go beyond urging Iran to cooperate with the IAEA.

At that point, the Bush administration will have to decide whether to tacitly accept Iranian progress, as it has done in North Korea, or to adopt a new approach. Other available options will include direct U.S.-Iranian negotiations, which would be politically unpalatable for the Bush administration, and military action, which is widely viewed as of limited effectiveness and bringing with it high risks. While none of these choices is particularly appealing, the administration should begin considering them now, rather than hoping that the Security Council referral will move the issue toward resolution.


[1] Office of the President, "National Security Strategy of the United States of America," September 2002, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf>.
[2] U.S Department of State, International Information Programs, "U.S. Official Says Diplomatic Efforts with Iran Not Finished," 2 February 2006, <http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=washfile-english&y=2006&m=February&x=20060202170353dmslahrellek0.1741297&t=is/is-latest.html>
[3] U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Vienna, "U.S. Statement on Iran, IAEA Board of Governors Meeting," February 2006, <http://www.usun-vienna.rpo.at/>.
[4] U.S Department of State, International Information Programs, "U.S. Official Says Diplomatic Efforts with Iran Not Finished."
[5] Vladimir Yevseyev, "Ekho Moskvy" radio interview, January 18, 2006. (CNS translation)
[6] "Iran, Defying Atomic Agency, Says it Will Resume Nuclear Work," New York Times, February 7, 2006.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Adam Sanger, "Behind the Urgent Diplomacy, A Sense that Iranians Will Get the Bomb," New York Times, February 6, 2006.


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