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UNSCOM and the Iraqi Challenge

(December 17, 1998) The Monterey Institute of International Studies, Center for Nonproliferation Studies hosted a congressional luncheon briefing on December 3, 1998 with Ambassador Rolf Ekeus. Ambassador Ekeus, the former Executive Chairman of the U.N. Special Commission on Iraq from 1991 to 1997, discussed the challenges that UNSCOM faces in its dealings with Iraq.

The Iraqi Mindset

Ambassador Ekeus made clear his conviction that Iraqs enduring goal, despite UNSCOM inspections and years of sanctions, is to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and that it will continue to do so until it possesses them or the current regime falls. Two factors explain this quest. On the one hand, weapons of mass destruction make an important political statement and elevate the country to the status of a regional player that is able to operate and exert influence beyond its borders. On the other, the experience of war with Iran left a lasting impression on Iraqi thinking. When Iraq fought its neighbor it faced a nation of 60 million that used its larger population as a military weapon to overwhelm Iraq with human wave attacks. Ambassador Ekeus believed, based on his prolonged contact with senior Iraqi officials, that Iraq felt compelled to resort to the use of chemical weapons and to modify its Scud missiles in order to equalize the population imbalance and to let Iran know that the conflict could not be pursued without continuing to place its civilian population at great risk. Iraq sees itself as playing the crucial role of protector of the Arab nations against Iran, with whom other Arab countries also have security concerns. From Baghdads point of view, UNSCOM inspections violate its sovereign rights as a state and prevent Iraq from acquiring the weapons needed to fulfill its regional responsibility to continue to deter Iran.

UNSCOM Tactics

In order for UNSCOM to reach the point where its work effectively hindered the Iraqi WMD program, the organization had to adopt methods to thwart Iraqi concealment tactics. Soon after UNSCOM began operating in Iraq, it abandoned its initial policy of providing Iraq with a six-hour notice before visiting a site. According to Ambassador Ekeus, the switch to a no warning policy did not at first yield the expected results. By spying, eavesdropping, and searching through materials in hotel rooms while weapons inspectors were at dinner, Iraq was able to learn of the intended inspection sites in advance, allowing them to move documents and material from locations prior to a teams arrival. Further changes in methods were made, until UNSCOM reached the current practice whereby only three people on an inspection team know what sites will be subject to inspection. Despite such measures, Ambassador Ekeus acknowledged that the Iraqis still receive a short warning period. Iraqi officials have become familiar with the UNSCOM personnel and can identify whether a team is a chemical, biological, nuclear, or missile team by its composition, thus allowing them to narrow the range of sites likely to be visited. They also track the direction in which the inspection teams leave Baghdad, informing potential facilities that they may be the target of a surprise inspection.

UNSCOMs efforts consist of more than the highly visible inspection visits. With the help of a number of countries, UNSCOM monitors Iraqi attempts to acquire and import weapons components from outside its borders. Of key importance to UNSCOMs success in monitoring Iraqi activity and preventing acquisition of weapons related material, is the money trail that results from any transaction. Hesitant to share details about the system UNSCOM has established to monitor the movement of Iraqi funds outside of the country, Ambassador Ekeus emphasized the evolving effectiveness in identifying and preventing potential Iraqi acquisitions that this system provides.

With respect to Iraqs current capabilities, Ambassador Ekeus indicated that it is likely that Iraq maintains a small store of high quality chemical weapons. Citing a lack of detail in Iraqs accounts of its biological weapons program, he said one must also be suspicious about what elements of the biological weapons program might still be available to Iraq. Following the IAEA report, it is clear that Iraq has no nuclear weapons or fissile material. Iraq will, however, continue to seek to acquire nuclear weapons and there is some concern that highly enriched uranium might be imported, possibly from Russia.

Showdown Results

The latest showdown between inspectors and Iraq illustrates Saddam Husseins policy of testing UNSCOM and the backing UNSCOM has in the U.N. Security Council. While Iraqi leaders used the opportunity to analyze the response of the world community and identify weak points in support for UNSCOM, Ambassador Ekeus added that such confrontations between Iraq and the U.N. also serve to feed Iraqs love of attention. "It gives Hussein standing when the international community pays attention to him," Ambassador Ekeus said. He had little doubt that Saddam Hussein was satisfied with the results of the four month long crisis he provoked, which ended last month, just short of U.S. military action. In the end Iraq lost nothing and gained a substantial period of time without inspections, during which it certainly furthered efforts to conceal its weapons programs.

Related material: Iraq: Weapons of Mass Destruction Capabilities and Programs

For further information, go to the CNS Media Contacts on Iraq.


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