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Mystery of the Sunken Gyros

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CNS Press Release:

"The Mystery of the Sunken Gyros"

Writing in the November 1998 edition of The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Dr. William Potter, Director of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies and Dr. Vladimir Orlov, Director of the PIR Center in Moscow, have pierced the veil of secrecy regarding at least one aspect of Iraqs attempts to acquire weapons technologies in the post-Gulf War period.

Drawing on a wide range of previously untapped sources and including details never before published, the authors closely examine Russias 1995 sale to Iraq of missile equipment, particularly strategic gyroscopes and other guidance instruments. The articles key findings include:

• Iraqs purchase of strategic guidance instruments was but one part of a much broader missile relationship between Baghdad and Moscow. Indeed, from 1993 and continuing at least through mid-1995, Iraqi missile engineers and their representatives were in Russia shopping for missile-related technologies and equipment, including those specifically for design and manufacture of guidance, propulsion, air frame and other key missile subsystems.
• A central figure in the broader Moscow-Baghdad missile axis was Mr. Wiam Gharbiya, a Palestinian-Jordanian businessman who has previously been identified as the middleman in the strategic gyroscope deal. Gharbiya arranged meetings between Iraqi engineers and senior officials and technicians from several well-known Russian missile establishments, including Energomash, Mars Rotor, Almaz and Graphit. These contacts resulted in negotiations over millions of dollars of draft contracts for missile technology transfer.
• The sale of strategic guidance instruments included more than 80 sets of SS-N-18 missile guidance systems, including 240 gyroscopes and 240 accelerometers. Given the number of instruments the UN Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) pulled out of the Tigris River, and the number of instruments intercepted in Jordan, some 180 gyroscopes and accelerometers enough for about 30 guidance systems are perhaps unaccounted for. Similarly, the disposition of certain assembly and manufacturing equipment for the guidance units that was to be included in the deal is unknown. One possibility is that Gharbiya sold the additional instruments and/or manufacturing equipment to a party other than Iraq.
• Russias official investigation into the case which resulted in no prosecutions, despite what appears to be a clear violation of Russian nonproliferation commitments and export control laws was severely circumscribed in terms of its scope and its narrow legal focus. One explanation may be the desire of powerful individuals or government agencies in Moscow who wish to conceal the true extent of Gharbiyas Russian contacts.
• The U.S. government chose not to challenge Russia forcefully on the Baghdad-Moscow missile front. Washington also readily accepted Moscows dubious explanation for not prosecuting the Russians involved in the missile technology exports.

Dr. Potter comments, "A great deal of attention has been paid to Iraq's attempts to acquire weapons of mass destruction prior to the Gulf War. It is widely known that Baghdad was operating a sophisticated, worldwide procurement network throughout the 1980s, shopping for technologies in pursuit of its weapon ambitions. However, much less understood and little acknowledged and perhaps of more immediate importance is Iraq's clandestine procurement efforts since the Gulf War.

In the midst of the recent crisis over inspections in Iraq, as well as increasing pressures on UNSCOM to move to the monitoring phase of its operations, the international community's awareness of and vigilance against Iraq's attempts to reconstitute its WMD procurement network is critically important. Unfortunately, if the strategic gyro case is any indication, that network is alive and well."

For further information, contact Dr. William C. Potter, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies at (831) 647-4154 or Dr. Vladimir Orlov, PIR Center at (011) 7-095-355-1955.