James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
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Iraq Special Collection

Biological Weapons Related Issues

Introduction

From 1991 to 1995, Iraq categorically denied it had a biological weapons programme. During that period it took active steps to conceal the program from the Special Commission which involved specific deception, fraudulent statements false and forged documents, and misrepresentation of people and facilities. Only in 1995 after pressed by UNSCOM with evidence that demonstrated that Iraq had a BW programme did Iraq reveal its offensive BW programme.

Subsequently, after acknowledging this program, Iraq provided only the minimum amount of information required. It continues to downplay and trivialize the programme. Even since August 1995, Iraq has provided altered documents and taken other measures to mislead the Commission.

In March 1997 an expert panel recommended the rejection of Iraq's June 1996 FFCD because of its overall inadequacies throughout the document. In September 1997 Iraq provided a new FFCD that contained essentially the same information, ignoring all advice provided to it by UNSCOM. As reported to the Council, international expert panels have reviewed Iraq's biological Full Final and Complete Disclosure (FFCD) on September 1997 and considered it to be deficient in most aspects. In March of this year, a biological Technical Evaluation Meeting (TEM) between UNSCOM international experts from 15 countries and Iraq was convened in Vienna dealing with all aspects of the biological FFCD submitted by Iraq. The TEM concluded the FFCD had substantial deficiencies in all areas and Iraq's account of its BW program could not be verified as being a full and complete disclosure as required by the Council. Thus on three occasions three expert panels have reviewed essentially the same information and all concluded the FFCDs were inadequate scientifically, technically, militarily and managerially.

To facilitate understanding of the current situation the various elements of the BW program described in the FFCD may be grouped as follows:

Key Elements

First and most important are time tangible core items. That is, acquisition of supplies, equipment and material for the program production of types and quantities of BW agents and production of munitions weapons; and agent and weapon destruction. Surrounding this core area of material balance are those elements that support the full understanding of the program. Finally, we have the more peripheral items that, while important for a complete perspective, are less critical in comparison with the material balance and structural groupings.

To establish substance and credibility of the assessment of the biological weapons program, the material balance data should be based on hard evidence fully supported by records, documents and physical evidence. It is difficult to accept data when it is based on soft estimates, guesses and recollections by Iraq's personnel: recollections that have been shown repeatedly to be faulty, misleading, misleading and sometimes plainly false. As this information is not reliable, more weight must be placed on a full account and understanding of the structure and organizational aspects of the program.

Unfortunately Iraq denies virtually all organizational aspects and minimizes all structural elements of the BW program. Establishment of a material balance and a determination of the structure and organization of the BW program is required for effective monitoring of Iraq's dual capable facilities.

{T]he TEM experts found the peripheral elements such as history of the program and site detail deficient as well. Iraq appears willing to supply additional information or explanations on those peripheral issues, but this is not and cannot be a substitute for solid evidence at the core of the matter.

Material Balance

The material balance is the core area of the biological weapons program. It is not adequately documented by Iraq and is only based on estimated figures which cannot be verified. The TEM experts concluded that without a complete accounting of all BW program acquisitions, bulk agents, munitions and weapons, the creation of a material balance is not possible. Iraq's biological FFCD is deficient in reporting the acquisition of supplies, material. microbiological strains, munitions and equipment.

Making Biological Weapons

Elements of material balance appear on both the input and output side of the program. On the input side we have the precursor materials such as microbial growth media used to produce bulk quantities of BW agent; we have the production of these agents and the production of munitions.

Filling of the agent into the munitions leads to the output of weapons.

In a simplified context, the elements of material balance in biology consist of:

1. growth media such as yeast extract, casein or thioglycollate
2. microorganisms
3. production of bulk BW agents microorganisms or their toxins
4. production of munitions
5. the union of bulk biological or toxin agents with munitions to make BW weapons
6. the destruction of unused bulk agents and munitions and
7. ultimately the use or destruction of the weapons

The Commission is unable to verify Iraq's declaration in all of these areas.

Aquisition of Media

Substantial quantities of microbial growth media are not reported and/or not included in the material balance. Iraq has not reported all of the purchases of growth media for the BW program imported by Iraq's main procurement agency for the BW program, the Technical and Scientific Materials Import Division (TSMID).

For example, the quantity of yeast extract known-to-UNSCOM imported for Iraq's BW program by TSMID and not reported by Iraq is sufficient for 3 to 4 times more anthrax production than declared by Iraq in the FFCD. On 29 May 1998, Iraq stated that this is due to confusion on the part of UNSCOM between media ordered for the Forensic Laboratory versus for the BW program. This is an unwarranted and untrue assumption by Iraq. Because the import has not been acknowledged, this media has not been accounted for by Iraq in its material balance calculations.

Even among the growth media reported by Iraq, there are unresolved discrepancies in accounting for consumed media, lost/stolen/discarded media and media remaining after bulk agent production ceased.

Growth media material balance is not supported by documentation.

Iraq asserts that it has provided all known procurement activities. No new information related to microbial growth media has been provided since the TEM.

Production

Iraq has not provided a credible accounting of bulk agent production. No production documents have been provided to support Iraq's statements on production of anthrax spores, botulinum toxin and spores, gas gangrene spores or aflatoxin. Iraq has stated that the production figures are only estimates. Explanations offered for not using fermenters at various time periods, or for relatively high production failure rates, or for fermenters being unused are not consistent with information available to the Commission.

The TEM concluded that there is an unexpected and unexplained discrepancy between production capability and stated agent production. Iraq maintained that it was difficult if not impossible to provide any verifiable account for bulk production of BW agents because relevant documents had been unilaterally destroyed rather than made available to UNSCOM. The FFCD does not adequately support the actual production quantities of the four BW agents acknowledged by Iraq to be intended for weaponization. Iraq claims that there was no strategic plan or coordinated effort for agent production. The TEM further concluded that there is low confidence in Iraq's account of the production of the BW weapons agents.

Since the TEM in April this year, Iraq has simply stated it has presented all the information it has regarding production. It claims that what has been presented is corroborated by solid evidence. No new information has been provided.

Al Hussein Warhead Production

Iraq asserts that only 25 Al Hussein special warheads were produced for filling with BW agents. This assertion can not be verified. Most of the BW warheads were indigenously produced by Iraq. As presented earlier today in the missile area, Iraq has not provided documents or credible explanations for the indigenous production of special warheads, including those for BW. Accounts have changed over time. Thus the quantity produced can not be determined.

R400 Bombs

Quality control acceptance documentation by the Air Force has been provided for the period June to September 1990. There is no evidence that production ended in September. Furthermore during June through September 1990, 1359 bombs were produced, but Iraq asserts that only 1242 were delivered to Muthanna State Establishment, Al Hakam, or to the Air Force. Iraq states that the remaining 117 bombs were melted in 1991 and not filled with CW or BW agents. However, this account can not be verified.

Other Munitions

Production of other munitions, including drop tanks, aerosol disseminating devices developed for helicopters, pilotless aircraft (drones), or slow moving fixed wing aircraft are not adequately documented. The information on the development and testing of the aerosol disseminating device was excluded from the September 1997 FFCD.

Iraq has recently stated that the activity related to this aerosol disseminating device was not mentioned in the 1997 declaration because the effort was primitive and inconsequential and that nothing has turned up to change that and no added credibility is gained by keeping the text in the 1997 FFCD.

These explanations provided by Iraq are not supported by documents. The modified drop tanks and the aerosol disseminating devices are judged by the experts to be the most serious development of BW munitions by Iraq.

Weapons

Iraq has not provided any evidence to support its account of what agents were filled into munitions, the quantity of agents consumed in the filling process, and the quantity and type of munitions filled with each agent. Interview information conflicts with and is inconsistent with official Iraqi accounts. Filling and deployment issues were not adequately addressed at the TEM because of Iraq's unwillingness to discuss these aspects of its BW weapons program.

Within the overall production figures of CW and BW R-400 bombs, it is not possible to determine how many weapons were filled with particular biological weapons agents. As Iraq can not adequately explain inconsistencies in this area, no confident assessment can be made of the number of BW filled bombs. This remains a major concern.

Iraq asserts that the number of R400 bombs filled with each agent declared by Iraq is an estimate of each type of agent that adds up to the total number of bombs stated by Iraq to be destroyed. Iraq's declaration on the distribution of the different biological agents among the filled warheads was based on a diary.

The number of warheads filled with different agents declared by Iraq is in fact based on one page given to UNSCOM to substantiate Iraq's claims. However a different page of this same diary contradicts Iraq's account of which agent was filled into which warhead. Iraq claims the rest of this diary was recently destroyed.

The quantity of each bulk biological weapons agent destroyed, the location of its destruction, and evidence of its destruction also remain unresolved.

Iraq has provided different written accounts and oral accounts concerning the destruction of the 25 BW agent filled warheads it has acknowledged having produced. The one document provided in support of the account of R400 aerial bomb destruction is not conclusive. Physical evidence, documents, and laboratory evidence does not support Iraq's account for filling and destruction of BW weapons.

Iraq refused to address the destruction of missile warheads for the delivery of BW agents during the biological TEM. Consequently, destruction of munitions, weapons and bulk agents were not addressed at the TEM.

Since the TEM Iraq has not provided any additional information to UNSCOM.

Interview testimony of those Iraqi personnel presented as having been directly involved in the destruction process differs from all the "official" Iraqi accounts. Also hard physical evidence presented by Iraq does not support their own accounts. The number of warheads, filled and unfilled, that must be accounted for are equally uncertain.

For the R400 bombs, Iraq has provided some evidence of destruction. Physical evidence supports Iraq's account that some BW agent filled R400 bombs were destroyed at a firing range called Azzizziyia. However, laboratory analysis of the contents of three bombs recovered does not support Iraq's account of their filling. One bomb that by Iraq's account should have contained aflatoxin instead tested positive for botulinum toxin and negative for aflatoxin. The only supporting evidence that 157 bombs were destroyed at the firing range is a diary.

Full recovery of bomb remnants at the firing range can not be accomplished due to the presence of unexploded munitions and only the destruction of 25 of the 157 can be verified. The remaining unverified gap is of concern.

The significance of the modified drop tank--a device to spray weapons-grade biological warfare agent from fighter aircraft--is greatly underplayed, taking into account that the assessment of the TEM is that this weapon appears to be the most efficient for the delivery of biological warfare agents produced by Iraq. Evidence that Iraq was investigating existing patents in this area several years before the claimed start of this phase of the weapons development is also of concern.

During the TEM Iraq recognized that this situation concerning unaccounted for biological weapons can only be rectified by the presentation of a full account backed-up by documents and physical evidence. Since the TEM Iraq has provided no new information to UNSCOM.

Structure

Structure and organization is the next most important area after the core area. Virtually all aspects of organization and structure is denied by Iraq. Research and development is minimized.

The TEM in general concluded that the interplay amongst acquisition, production and selection of weapons contradicts Iraq's assertion that there was no planning of the BW program.

The TEM experts concluded that the general lack of information concerning the organization from the highest levels down and their connections to functional organs, considerably hampers the ability of UNSCOM to understand the full scope of the BW program.

Since the TEM Iraq has not addressed this issue except to deny the existence of annual or five year plans indicating planning and interplay between the biological weapons development organizations and the Armed Forces.

The research program must be presented in its totality to make it possible to understand the overall extent and purpose of the BW program.

The selection of BW agents has not been fully explained. The rationale given by Iraq for the selection of the fungal and viral agents is not credible.

Iraq was unable to justify the weaponization of aflatoxin from the research data obtained from its own experimentation.

The down-playing of research in general and the absence of a rationale for genetic engineering and research into ricin, mycotoxin and viruses is disturbing.

Iraq's portrayal of the aerosol dissemination program for biological agents as immature, with no bearing on other components of the research program is contradicted by information supplied by Iraq.

Since the TEM Iraq has provided no new information. It contends that the FFCD depended basically on recollection and the lack of detail is to be expected. Iraq provided additional statements on germ (warfare) strains acquired and investigated for the BW program; some of those statements are known to be wrong.

Military Involvement/Concepts of Use

Iraq continues to deny virtually all military involvement in the program except in the most incidental ways. Without a realistic accounting of MoD input, including concepts of use for individual agents, particularly aflatoxin, and other organizational input to the BW program, BW weaponization issues can not be resolved.

The denial of any planning or military involvement in weapons selection, filling, deployment or destruction is not credible. The TEM concluded that this is unacceptable.

During the TEM Iraq denied any significant military involvement or the development of concepts of use. Since the TEM Iraq has not provided any additional statements.

To note: If we have a poor knowledge in the area dealing with organization and structure we do not know whether the whole program has been revealed or not.

Concealment

The TEM experts concluded that an elaborate effort was undertaken to conceal and preserve Iraq's BW program after April 1991. Iraq has acknowledged this concealment took place until 1995 but states that it has then terminated. The mechanisms by which this concealment was accomplished, the organizations and individuals involved have not yet been presented to the Special Commission. Many technical and military aspects are omitted, misrepresented or trivialized.

Iraq claims that the BW program was obliterated in 1991and says this is demonstrated by the unilateral destruction of the weapons deployed, the bulk agent and some documents associated with the BW program. Iraq, however, retained the facilities, growth media equipment and groupings of core technical personnel at Al Hakam, and continued to deny the existence of the BW program. Iraq altered documents to conceal the programme. Iraq's actions in concealing and denying the program including the planning and issuance of orders to individuals to take actions to hide the program from discovery raise serious doubts about Iraq's assertion that the BW program was truly obliterated in l991.

Since the TEM Iraq has provided more explanations but fundamentally no new information. Iraq's statement in response to the TEM is that Iraq in April 1991 decided to destroy and obliterate entirely all signs and materials of the BW production and weaponization.

Cross-references help in providing an overall perspective. These areas are of minor importance but are needed to provide a full understanding of Iraq's BW program.

Iraq has not provided an evolutionary account of the various aspects of the BW program so that an overall understanding can he gained. For example, Iraq belittles the importance of the Al Hazen institute where the offensive BW program was begun following the presidential decree that Iraq pursue this form of WMD. Iraq has been unable to provide UNSCOM with this latter document-clearly a fundamental pillar of the program.

With respect to the early part of the BW program, Iraq provided information on the Al Hazen Institute, originally in its June 1996 FFCD. This material was than intentionally omitted in the September 1997 version of the FFCD.

Iraq has not provided, in its FFCD, site and building plans for all areas involved in its BW program. The TEM experts asserted to Iraq that to enable full and proper analysis by experts, the FFCD should be a stand-alone and coherent document and therefore Iraq should provide a full and complete account of all sites including site diagrams and building plans.

After the TEM, Iraq has provided some additional explanations on some buildings and sites. Some site and building plans were also provided. Those accounts and site and building plans fall far short of that requested by the international experts.

Summary

Iraq's current declaration is not verifiable. The absence of detail in this presentation is consistent with the absence of detail declared by Iraq.

Iraq denied until 1995 any BW program. Even in its first two sets of declarations in May and June 1991 when it, at that time, still had all combat BW weapons in its possession, Iraq did not acknowledge an offensive BW program. Iraq declares its destruction of BW weapons for 9 July 1991, which again can not be supported by the evidence available to the Commission.

Furthermore, Iraq retained its production facilities, equipment and raw materials until 1996 when most were destroyed or rendered harmless under UNSCOM supervision. In addition, Iraq maintained its personnel group intact as a core.

On 1 July 1995, Iraq declared an offensive BW program to the Commission. This occurred only through evidence presented by the Commission to Iraq, i.e. growth media acquisition in large quantities suited for a BW program.

Before this acknowledgment by Iraq, it had given an ultimatum to the Commission to close the missile and chemical files. The declaration presented to UNSCOM again minimized the program and did not include weaponization of BW agents was only admitted after the departure of Hussein Kamel on 8 August 1995. The weaponization admitted included 25 BW filled missile warheads and 157 bombs. . . . .

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