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Brief History of the Comprehensive Review

30 January 1999

UNSCOM's submission of a detailed status report on disarmament and monitoring issues comes after a protracted struggle over the scope and meaning of a "comprehensive review" of Iraq's relationship with the United Nations. The disarmament body's 25 January report was initially intended to be a major aspect of that review, but a succession of crises in the months leading up to Desert Fox derailed the process, and the Comprehensive Review was never formally initiated. In its place, the Security Council has just agreed to convene "assessment panels" that will cover the same or similar subjects as those intended for the review: disarmament compliance, the condition of the Iraqi populace living under sanctions and an accounting of missing Kuwaitis and Kuwaiti property. This report should therefore be seen as a "shot across-the bow" in the forthcoming assessment panel process, for it has no formal relationship to the process itself. Perhaps more importantly, it should be viewed as the Special Commission's epitaph, as the introduction of the various panels effectively means -- in the minds of many inspectors -- the death of UNSCOM.

Proposals for a comprehensive review were first aired publicly on 7 August 1998 by Secretary General Kofi Anan, two days after Iraq announced that it would cease all cooperation with disarmament inspections; it seems apparent that the announcement preceded considerable and perhaps lengthy discussion of the issue among the Secretary General's advisors. While he denounced Iraq's decision, Anan offered Baghdad the "carrot" of a comprehensive review as a means to provide Iraq hope that sanctions relief was in sight. The review, Anan noted, "would engage the Iraqis more closely" than had been the case in the past. Critics argued that the survey of Iraq's relations with the UN would turn UNSCOM from the party doing the inspections to the one being inspected. For its part, Iraq had long been pushing for such a review, particularly because Baghdad felt it would delegitimize UNSCOM and significantly diminish Butler's role as the most important figure determining Iraq's compliance with weapons-related obligations.

In its 9 September 1998 resolution (S/RES/1194) the Council signaled its willingness to proceed with the review. While the resolution condemned Iraq's 5 August decision and suspended the Council's 60 day sanctions review, it expressed "a readiness to consider, in a comprehensive review, Iraq's compliance with all relevant resolutions once Iraq has rescinded its above-mentioned decision and demonstrated that it is preparing to fulfill all its obligations." The Council stated that it welcomed the Secretary General's proposal for the review and called on Anan to submit his views on its substance.

Iraq quickly seized on the proposal and began two weeks of discussions with Anan regarding the scope and character of the exercise. Baghdad, however, strongly resented the conditional nature of the "carrot" -- that Iraq had to rescind the 5 August decision before the review would take place. Indeed, on 28 September, Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz said that it was up to the Council to make the first move adding "the idea that Iraq should do this or that concession before the comprehensive review takes place is not legal." Despite such statements, by early October it appeared that Iraq was moving closer to rescinding its policy of non-cooperation.

Following his meetings with the Iraqis, on 5 October the Secretary General submitted his concept paper for the Review to the Security Council. It appears that 10 days after the submission of this paper, Iraq presented Anan with a list of 9 "clarifications" which effectively amounted to demands on how the review should be conducted, adding that Iraq fully expected the review to conclude that Baghdad was in the clear on major arms questions. After this list was passed to the Council, Washington and London put heavy pressure on the Council to avert what was termed a "pre-determined" study.

The US and UK pressure paid off, for these views were incorporated in the Council's 31 October letter to the Secretary General agreeing to his proposals and laying out the guidelines for the review. The letter made no explicit promises for sanctions relief and pointedly noted that the Council "could not prejudge the outcome" until evidence was collected.

Following release of the letter, Iraq severed all relations with UNSCOM and the IAEA. Nizar Hamdoon, Iraq's ambassador to the UN, said that while Baghdad still wanted the comprehensive review, it must contain the prospect that economic sanctions be eased or lifted, something that the Security Council letter did not explicitly mention.

As tensions in the Gulf escalated and with American and British aircraft poised to attack, France, China and Russia urged Anan to intervene in the crisis and to send Iraq a letter reiterating the Security Council's offer of a comprehensive review. Against apparent US objections, Anan did so, stating in his letter (S/1998/1077) to Saddam Hussein that, "As I have said repeatedly, the only way to achieve this [sanctions relief] is for Iraq to fully cooperate with the UN Security Council. The Security Council has agreed a way forward on a comprehensive review. I firmly believe that this offers Iraq genuine opportunity."

Iraq's response -- in a letter to the Secretary General from Tariq Aziz -- contained a formal nullification of the 5 August and 31 October decisions, temporarily averting armed conflict. However, that response contained a controversial 9-point annex that the UK and US understood to add conditions to the nullification. Nizar Hamdoon argued that the annex implied no conditions to Iraq's decision, but rather covered the "views and preferences of the Iraqi government with regard to the substance of the comprehensive review. These views are not linked to the clear and unconditional decision to…resume cooperation with UNSCOM and IAEA." It is not clear the extent to which this nine point annex corresponded with the nine "clarifications" Iraq sent to Anan in mid-October.

Regardless, Tariq Aziz's letter states that the "goal sought by Iraq from its decisions of 5 August and 31 October was not to sever relationship with UNSCOM and the IAEA and to cease implementing its 687 obligations. The objective of Iraq is to end the suffering of its embargoed people and to see the implementation of paragraph 22 [a paragraph in the cease-fire resolution 687 linking disarmament obligations to the oil embargo] as a first step for lifting the other sanctions."

In its entirety, the annex reads:

FIRST, the goal sought by Iraq was not to sever the relationship with Unscom and the IAEA.

SECOND, the objective of Iraq is to end the suffering of its embargoed people.

THIRD, Iraq expressed its readiness to engage in the comprehensive review which had been proposed by the secretary-general. But, as a result of American pressure, the results brought about by the consultations of the council do not ensure an honest and objective review.

FOURTH, the position of Iraq on the comprehensive review is:

1. The comprehensive review be carried out within a very short time (seven days, for example), after the resumption of Unscom and the IAEA of their normal duties. This is to be without conditions.

2. The comprehensive review fundamentally concentrates on paragraph 3 of the concept paper of the secretary-general of October 5.

3. The council be ready to implement paragraph 22 if the fulfillment of the requirements of Section C is established.

4. If the council sees, through an objective study, that there are matters which need to be done, a short period be determined for their completion. Until that completion is reached, the council implements measures for lifting or reducing sanctions in proportion of what has been fulfilled. Thereafter, the commencement with the implementation of paragraph 22 immediately.

5. The council assures the legal interpretation of Section C and that none of its members should impose additional conditions.

FIFTH, the second phase of the review commences after completing the conclusions of the first phase.

SIXTH, the second phase only encompasses the obligations determined by clear provisions of the resolutions and no matters be raised contrary to the legal interpretation of the resolutions.

SEVENTH, the members of the council and specially the permanent members abide by international law and the relevant resolutions of the council in respect of all matters pertaining to Iraq.

EIGHTH, the question of (Unscom chairman Richard) Butler and the structure of Unscom and its practices are important matters. The council is to consider them seriously to ensure a good relationship in the future. We hope that this will be done as soon as possible.

NINTH, it is necessary that these assurances be communicated directly to the leadership in Baghdad either by the secretary-general or by a delegation from the council.

Following the exchange of letters, inspectors returned to Iraq and began day-to-day monitoring activities and, subsequently, a series of instrusive "challenge" inspections. By the first week in December, Washington appeared willing to go along with the Council's consensus and grant the comprehensive review, even if Baghdad had not shown full cooperation with inspectors. The generally held perception was that the decision to authorize the review would come within one week, shortly after Chairman Butler's submission of a scheduled report to Anan concerning Iraq's cooperation with recent inspections. The Secretary General confirmed this feeling by noting that, barring "a hitch," the Review would begin in early January.

Of course Butler submitted his report on 15 December, charging Iraq with non-compliance. The air attacks of Desert Fox followed some 24 hours after the report was received.

The post-attack atmosphere appeared, at least initially, to harden the US and UK position on the review. On 21 December, UK Foreign Office minister Derek Fatchett said it would now be more difficult to embark on the comprehensive review as there should be "no easy rewards" for Iraq's defiance of UN resolutions. One day later, US Undersecretary of State Thomas Pickering reiterated Washington's long held position that Iraq would have to cooperate fully with inspectors before the comprehensive review took place.

Despite these statements, and in the midst of the Council's inability to come to a decision about what to do with Iraq, the US and UK began to soften their stance. By 27 January, the US had agreed to support a Canadian plan establishing the aforementioned "assessment panels."

Perhaps seeing the writing on the wall, Butler submitted his report two days before the US agreement on the assessment panels.


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