



Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) Database

14 June 2004 Board of Governors Meeting

14 June 2004 Meeting: GOV/OR.1100; GOV/OR.1102; GOV/OR.1103	
	Country Specific
Libya	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• (GOV/OR.1100 – Para 121) ...the Movement welcomed the statement made by the President of the United Nations Security Council on 22 April 2004 taking note of the fact that, in the resolution contained in document GOV/2004/18, the Agency's Board of Governors had recognized Libya's decision to abandon its WMD programmes as a step towards the realization of an Africa and a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction and at peace. It also welcomed the efforts to assist Libya and hoped that the steps taken by that country would facilitate and improve international cooperation and enhance its security.• (GOV/OR.1100 – Para 123) He noted that Libya had submitted the initial declarations required under its additional protocol, and nuclear material accounting reports, and had cooperated with the Agency by providing documents, granting prompt access to locations, making senior personnel available and taking corrective action to bring it into compliance with its safeguards agreement. The NAM encouraged Libya to cooperate further in connection with the matters referred to in paragraph 14 of the Director General's report.
Iran	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• (GOV/OR.1102–Para 13) ...expressed appreciation for the Director General's report contained in document GOV/2004/34. He noted that the robust verification system in place over the previous seven months had found nothing to contradict the Director General's finding in his November 2003 report to the Board (document GOV/2003/75) of no evidence of diversion of the Iranian nuclear programme for military purposes.• (GOV/OR.1102 – Para 14) NAM welcomed the steps taken by Iran in pursuance of its declared policy of full transparency, particularly that it had: cooperated in facilitating more than 600 person-days of Agency inspections since February 2003 and granted complementary access with two hours' notice, or less; agreed on an action plan to accelerate cooperation with the Agency on a number of outstanding matters with a view to achieving progress on their resolution prior to the June 2004 meeting of the Board, on which the Agency had reported that good progress had been made; provided the initial declarations pursuant to its additional protocol; provided information to help resolve the contamination issues; provided the Agency with information related to uranium conversion enabling Agency experts to conclude the validity of the Iranian statement on conversion; cooperated fully and provided all information enabling confirmation by the Agency of its statement regarding the production capability of laser enrichment activities; submitted revised design information and corrections to inventory change reports, material balance reports and

physical inventory listings as requested by the Agency; actively cooperated with the Agency in providing access to locations, including workshops situated at military sites, which the Agency had reported as a welcome development; and agreed to provide one-year multiple-entry visas to designated Agency inspectors.

- (GOV/OR.1102 – Para 15) Also, the Agency had been able to monitor and verify Iran's implementation of its voluntary decision to suspend enrichment and reprocessing related activities at the Tehran Nuclear Research Centre, Lashkar Ab'ad, Arak, the Kalaye Electric Company workshop, Natanz, and the Uranium Conversion Facility in Esfahan, and had not observed to date any activities inconsistent with Iran's commitments. Given that all Member States had a basic and inalienable right to develop atomic energy for peaceful purposes, Iran's gesture was a voluntary confidence-building measure, intended only to bring about prompt closure of the issue.
- (GOV/OR.1102 – Para 16) In monitoring Iran's voluntary suspension of its enrichment and reprocessing related activities the Agency was taking on a new role. The assurances that it could provide were different from those achievable hitherto, including with respect to the detection of the diversion of nuclear material. Any delays or variance in understanding the scope of the suspension should be viewed in that perspective.
- (GOV/OR.1102 – Para 17) Accelerated cooperation between Iran and the Agency and the progress made meant that there were now only two outstanding issues and no new revelation of any undeclared activities. With regard to the first, on the origin of HEU and LEU contamination, NAM urged all those concerned to continue making every effort to assist the Agency in resolving the matter. As to the second, the P-2 centrifuge programme, NAM hoped that the new information provided by Iran on 30 May 2004, as well as the recent five-day visit by inspectors and the clarification statement by the Secretariat the previous day would lead to early resolution.
- (GOV/OR.1102 – Para 18) Given continuing cooperation, it should be possible to achieve a state of normality with regard to implementation of Iran's safeguards agreement and additional protocol. Any outstanding issues should be resolved solely on technical grounds. In that connection, he emphasized the importance of reaching decisions in the Board through consensus. NAM encouraged positive engagement and dialogue between Member States with a view to prompt closure and removal of the item from the Board's agenda.
- (GOV/OR.1102 – Para 19) With regard to the resolution that had just been adopted, it was regrettable that some of NAM's principle concerns and positions had not been reflected. Operative paragraphs 7 and 8 addressed issues beyond the mandate of the Agency. They impinged on the inalienable right of States to develop and use atomic energy for peaceful purposes through technologies of their choice, and downgraded the importance and the role of safeguards. Mindful of the sovereign rights of States in undertaking further commitments, NAM did not believe that the Board could oblige States to ratify the additional protocol as called for in operative paragraph 6.

	NWFZ
NWFZ in the Middle East	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (GOV/OR.1100 – Para 121) ...the Movement welcomed the statement made by the President of the United Nations Security Council on 22 April 2004 taking note of the fact that, in the resolution contained in document GOV/2004/18, the Agency’s Board of Governors had recognized Libya’s decision to abandon its WMD programmes as a step towards the realization of an Africa and a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction and at peace. It also welcomed the efforts to assist Libya and hoped that the steps taken by that country would facilitate and improve international cooperation and enhance its security. • (GOV/OR.1100 – Para 122) The NAM supported the speedy establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the United Nations Security Council and the General Assembly. All parties concerned should take urgent practical steps to achieve that end. In particular, Israel should promptly place all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive Agency safeguards. The Movement greatly appreciated the continuing efforts of the Director General to implement relevant General Conference resolutions regarding the Middle East.
	Peaceful Uses
Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (GOV/OR.1102 – Para 19) They impinged on the inalienable right of States to develop and use atomic energy for peaceful purposes through technologies of their choice, and downgraded the importance and the role of safeguards. Mindful of the sovereign rights of States in undertaking further commitments, NAM did not believe that the Board could oblige States to ratify the additional protocol as called for in operative paragraph 6.
	Disarmament
Nonproliferation and Disarmament	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (GOV/OR.1103 – Para 38) The NAM States Party to the NPT felt strongly that the issue of nuclear disarmament, which formed one of the three pillars of the Treaty, had not been adequately addressed. That could weaken the other two pillars, thereby undermining the continued relevance of the Treaty to international peace and security. • (GOV/OR.1103 – Para 39) It was important to recall the fundamental bargain struck in the NPT, whereby non-nuclear weapon States Party were assured of their basic and inalienable right to develop atomic energy for peaceful purposes in exchange for forfeiting any right to nuclear arms. On the other hand, the nuclear weapon States Party to the Treaty were obliged to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the early cessation of the nuclear arms race, nuclear disarmament and a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. However, very little progress had been made. Deliberations in recent years, including at the Preparatory Committee, had often been more focused on increasing the verification responsibilities of non-nuclear-weapon States and attempting to place conditions on their rights of access to peaceful nuclear technology, without any commensurate increase in commitment to nuclear disarmament by the nuclear-

	<p>weapon States.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (GOV/OR.1103 – Para 40) NAM called on the nuclear-weapon States to fulfill the unequivocal commitment they had made at the 2000 NPT Review Conference to eliminate their nuclear arsenals with a view to nuclear disarmament. An accelerated process of negotiations and full implementation of the 13 steps for disarmament agreed upon at that Conference were needed to advance systematically and progressively towards a nuclear-weapon-free world. • (GOV/OR.1103 – Para 41) The success of the 2005 NPT Review Conference would depend not only on the spirit of cooperation and compromise among all States Party but also, and more importantly, on their strong commitment and political will towards ensuring full adherence to the NPT and the implementation of the recommendations and decisions made at past Review Conferences. All had implications on the Agency’s role. • (GOV/OR.1103 – Para 42) The NAM States Party to the NPT also welcomed the endorsement of Ambassador Sergio de Queiroz Duarte of Brazil as President of the 2005 Review Conference.
Safeguards	
Israel	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (GOV/OR.1100 – Para 122) The NAM supported the speedy establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the United Nations Security Council and the General Assembly. All parties concerned should take urgent practical steps to achieve that end. In particular, Israel should promptly place all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive Agency safeguards. The Movement greatly appreciated the continuing efforts of the Director General to implement relevant General Conference resolutions regarding the Middle East.
Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (GOV/OR.1100 – Para 57) ...noted that the Governments of Cameroon and the Kingdom of Morocco had decided to conclude additional protocols and welcomed the ratification by the Republic of Cuba of its safeguards agreement.
Institutional Issues	
Procedural Matters	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (GOV/OR.1103 – Para 37) ...speaking on behalf of NAM States Party to the NPT, said that those countries had endeavoured to give their fullest commitment and cooperation towards achieving a successful outcome of the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 NPT Review Conference. That meeting’s mandate was to produce a consensus report containing recommendations to the 2005 Review Conference, taking into account the deliberations and results of its previous sessions. In that spirit, the NAM States Party to the NPT had submitted substantive recommendations to the Preparatory Committee on the implementation and operation of the Treaty and on procedural matters.
Nonproliferation	
General Views on the NPT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (GOV/OR.1103 – Para 38) The NAM States Party to the NPT felt strongly that the issue of nuclear disarmament, which formed one of the three pillars of the Treaty, had not been adequately addressed. That could weaken the other two pillars, thereby undermining the

	<p>continued relevance of the Treaty to international peace and security.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• (GOV/OR.1103 – Para 39) It was important to recall the fundamental bargain struck in the NPT, whereby non-nuclear weapon States Party were assured of their basic and inalienable right to develop atomic energy for peaceful purposes in exchange for forfeiting any right to nuclear arms. On the other hand, the nuclear weapon States Party to the Treaty were obliged to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the early cessation of the nuclear arms race, nuclear disarmament and a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. However, very little progress had been made. Deliberations in recent years, including at the Preparatory Committee, had often been more focused on increasing the verification responsibilities of non-nuclear-weapon States and attempting to place conditions on their rights of access to peaceful nuclear technology, without any commensurate increase in commitment to nuclear disarmament by the nuclear-weapon States.• (GOV/OR.1103 – Para 41) The success of the 2005 NPT Review Conference would depend not only on the spirit of cooperation and compromise among all States Party but also, and more importantly, on their strong commitment and political will towards ensuring full adherence to the NPT and the implementation of the recommendations and decisions made at past Review Conferences. All had implications on the Agency’s role.•
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