



Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) Database

08 March 2006 Board of Governors Meeting

8 May 2006 Advisory Committee on Safeguards and Verification within the IAEA Statute Meeting: GOV/COM.25/OR.5; GOV/COM.25/OR.6	
	Safeguards
Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• (GOV/COM.25/OR.5 – Para 7) ...[NAM] called upon the Secretariat to pursue cost efficiency and to optimize the use of existing resources within Major Programme 4 in order to improve the safeguards system.• (GOV/COM.25/OR.5 – Para 8) NAM took note from paragraph 23 of document 2006/Note 23 that as of March 2006 there were 75 States with additional protocols in force and that a majority of those States submitted their declarations on time and in conformity with their obligations. NAM encouraged all States to fulfill their safeguards obligations. It was imperative to make a clear distinction between the legal obligations of Member States in that regard and their voluntary commitments, and to ensure that voluntary commitments were not turned into legal safeguards obligations. Member States should not be penalized for not adhering to their voluntary commitments.• (GOV/COM.25/OR.5 – Para 10) The Agency, in using unannounced inspections, should make every effort to minimize any practical difficulties to facility operators and States, in conformity with the provisions of the comprehensive safeguards agreement.• (GOV/COM.25/OR.5 – Para 15) NAM commended the Agency for its effort to offer guidance and training on SSACs, particularly to States with small nuclear programmes that lacked financial or human resources, and for recently beginning to provide SSAC assessment services to those States. It looked forward to receiving additional information on the types of SSAC cooperation with the Agency.• (GOV/COM.25/OR.5 – Para 16) With regard to paragraph 61, NAM requested more information from the Secretariat on the progress of and lessons learned by the Agency from the implementation of integrated safeguards in ten Member States.• (GOV/COM.25/OR.6 – Para 47) ... [NAM] thanked the Secretariat for the Information Note contained in document 2006/Note 22. With regard to the implementation of the Plan of Action to Promote the Conclusion of Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols, NAM noted the various efforts made by the Secretariat to facilitate the conclusion of safeguards agreements and additional protocols and looked forward to receiving more information on the progress of the Agency's Medium Term Strategy for 2006–2011. NAM encouraged those States which had not yet concluded comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency to do so as soon as possible.• (GOV/COM.25/OR.6 – Para 48) Turning to paragraph 8 on the requests for technical and legislative assistance related to the conclusion of safeguards agreements and additional protocols through the technical

	<p>cooperation programme, NAM stressed that such activities should not in any way detract from the established priorities of the programme. Technical cooperation played an essential role as the promotional pillar of the Statue, and its primary objectives were to accelerate and enhance the contribution that nuclear energy made to peace, health and prosperity in Member States by facilitating their free access to R&D, the transfer of nuclear technology and mutual cooperation.</p>
<p>General Views on Safeguards</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (GOV/COM.25/OR.5 – Para 9) Some Member States were providing relevant information to the Agency on a voluntary basis, which improved its knowledge of nuclear procurement and supply activities. The Agency was also using information obtained from a variety of sources, including non-safeguards databases of the Agency, open sources and third parties, as well as in-house and commercial satellite imagery, to strengthen safeguards. Due consideration should be given to the reliability of sources of information. The Secretariat should not use information from open sources or third parties — whether solicited or otherwise — to draw safeguards conclusions unless such information could be corroborated independently by the Agency in consultation with the State concerned. • (GOV/COM.25/OR.5 – Para 17) NAM requested that the Secretariat provide the Committee with information on the gaps existing in the current safeguards system and on the implementation status of the various Board resolutions and decisions relating to strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards system, as well as the resolutions and decisions of the General Conference on safeguards and verification, including information on any obstacles that were preventing their full implementation. • (GOV/COM.25/OR.5 – Para 18) Full implementation of those resolutions and decisions was key to overall improvement of the effectiveness and efficiency of the safeguards system and NAM continued to attach high priority to a review of their implementation status. NAM would need more time to examine closely the legal, administrative and financial implications of the recommendations contained in document 2006/Note 23 before the Committee took a decision on them. It was premature to consider assuming additional obligations without evaluating the practical impact of previous measures that had been proposed for strengthening the safeguards system and before assessing whether those measures had contributed to enhancing the Agency's capability to fulfill its mandate. • (GOV/COM.25/OR.5 – Para 19) NAM reiterated its principled position that efforts aimed at non-proliferation, including safeguards and verification, should go hand in hand with efforts aimed at nuclear disarmament. It remained deeply concerned over the slow pace of progress towards nuclear disarmament, which remained NAM's highest priority. In that context, it was also concerned about the lack of progress by the nuclear-weapon States toward eliminating their nuclear arsenals.
<p>Verification</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (GOV/COM.25/OR.5 – Para 11) With regard to visa requirements and especially multiple entry visas for inspectors, administrative and technical obstacles should not necessarily be interpreted by the Secretariat as a lack of cooperation on the part of Member States since the amendment of national legislation and immigration procedures could take a considerable amount of time.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (GOV/COM.25/OR.5 – Para 12) Regarding complementary access under the additional protocol, NAM noted that the Agency, in most cases, had not encountered any major difficulties and had received good cooperation from State authorities and facility operators. Even though the purpose of complementary access was to determine the absence of undeclared material and activities, the protection of proprietary, commercially sensitive and national security information of Member States had to be taken duly into consideration. NAM stressed that Member States, in requesting managed access, were exercising their full rights in accordance with the provisions of relevant instruments. • (GOV/COM.25/OR.6 – Para 64) ...[NAM] noted that the Agency was making use of satellite imagery to help confirm declarations, monitor nuclear activities and investigate indications of possible undeclared nuclear activities and planning for inspection. NAM asked for additional information from the Agency on measures to be taken to ensure the confidentiality of information obtained through satellite imagery, and he said that other dimensions still needed to be considered.
<p>Technical and Procedural Issues</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (GOV/COM.25/OR.5 – Para 11) With regard to visa requirements and especially multiple entry visas for inspectors, administrative and technical obstacles should not necessarily be interpreted by the Secretariat as a lack of cooperation on the part of Member States since the amendment of national legislation and immigration procedures could take a considerable amount of time. • (GOV/COM.25/OR.5 – Para 12) Regarding complementary access under the additional protocol, NAM noted that the Agency, in most cases, had not encountered any major difficulties and had received good cooperation from State authorities and facility operators. Even though the purpose of complementary access was to determine the absence of undeclared material and activities, the protection of proprietary, commercially sensitive and national security information of Member States had to be taken duly into consideration. NAM stressed that Member States, in requesting managed access, were exercising their full rights in accordance with the provisions of relevant instruments. • (GOV/COM.25/OR.5 – Para 13) The present environmental sampling technique had proven to be one of the most effective measures for detecting undeclared nuclear material and activities. NAM urged the Agency to assist interested Member States, in particular developing countries, to develop capabilities in environmental sample analysis technologies. That was a capacity-building measure which could contribute to expanding the Agency's analytical capabilities and lead to an increase in the number of qualified laboratories in the NWAL. • (GOV/COM.25/OR.5 – Para 14) NAM noted the Secretariat's view, stated in paragraph 55, that additional technical measures needed to be developed to better address the detection of undeclared nuclear material and activities. It also noted that, of the 60 proposals submitted by Member States, 6 tasks for the development of equipment using novel detection techniques had been recommended for immediate development and evaluation. NAM requested the Secretariat to circulate more information on those 6 tasks to Member States, including the technical assessment and financial implications of the equipment and technical services required.

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