



## Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) Database

### 11 June 2007 Board of Governors Meeting

11 June 2007 Meeting: GOV/OR.1185; GOV/OR.1186; GOV/OR.1187	
	Safeguards
General Views on Safeguards	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• (GOV/OR.1185 – Para 69) Cuba, speaking on behalf of NAM, emphasized that the SIR should concentrate, in a balanced and non-discriminatory manner, on the implementation of safeguards in States under their respective safeguards agreements.</li><li>• (GOV/OR.1185 – Para 70) Considering that SSACs were fundamental for the effective and efficient implementation of safeguards, NAM welcomed the action taken by the Secretariat in 2006 to assist Member States in strengthening their SSACs and called on the Secretariat to continue its efforts in that area.</li><li>• (GOV/OR.1185 – Para 71) With regard to section C.3 of the SIR for 2006, she reiterated NAM's view that, in elaborating safeguards approaches, the Secretariat should consult with Member States in order to address their concerns and ensure the efficiency of safeguards activities.</li><li>• (GOV/OR.1187 – Para 53) Cuba, speaking on behalf of NAM, said that its position regarding the Iranian nuclear issue was reflected in the following statement adopted at its 14th summit, held in Havana, Cuba, on 15–16 September 2006:<p>“The Heads of State or Government emphasised the fundamental distinction between the legal obligations of States to their respective safeguards agreements and any confidence building measures voluntarily undertaken to resolve difficult issues, and believed that such voluntary undertakings are not legal safeguards obligations.</p><p>“The Heads of State or Government strongly believed that all issues on safeguards and verification, including those of Iran, should be resolved within the IAEA framework, and be based on technical and legal grounds. They further emphasised that the Agency should continue its work to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue within its mandate under the Statute of the IAEA.</p><p>“The Heads of State or Government recognised the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as the sole competent authority for verification of the respective safeguards obligations of Member States and stressed that there should be no undue pressure or interference in the Agency's activities, especially its verification process, which would jeopardise the efficiency and credibility of the Agency.</p></li><li>• (GOV/OR.1187 – Para 56) In addition, NAM took note of the information, contained in paragraph 4 of the Director General's report, that Iran had agreed to a modified safeguards approach for its Fuel Enrichment Plant which included, “in addition to a monthly interim inspection and design information verification visit, a combination of, inter alia, unannounced inspections and containment and surveillance measures” and that the first unannounced inspection had been carried out on 13 May 2007. In that connection, NAM considered that a rightful</li></ul>

	<p>nuclear activity subject to the Agency's safeguards did not constitute a cause for concern.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (GOV/OR.1187 – Para 58) NAM, which still had full confidence in the impartiality and professionalism of the Secretariat and the Director General, was strongly opposed to all pressuring of the Agency and to interference in its activities, especially its verification activities, as that might jeopardize its efficiency and credibility.</li> </ul>
Verification	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (GOV/OR.1187 – Para 56) In addition, NAM took note of the information, contained in paragraph 4 of the Director General's report, that Iran had agreed to a modified safeguards approach for its Fuel Enrichment Plant which included, "in addition to a monthly interim inspection and design information verification visit, a combination of, inter alia, unannounced inspections and containment and surveillance measures" and that the first unannounced inspection had been carried out on 13 May 2007. In that connection, NAM considered that a rightful nuclear activity subject to the Agency's safeguards did not constitute a cause for concern.</li> </ul>
Technical and Procedural Issues	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (GOV/OR.1185 – Para 72) Referring to the difficulties associated with the analysis of environmental samples, she said that NAM continued to believe that the Agency should help interested Member States, and particularly interested developing Member States, to develop environmental sample analysis capabilities of their own. That could lead to an expansion of the Network of Analytical Laboratories and thus to more efficient analysis.</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1185 – Para 73) In order to resolve the difficulty in recruiting suitably qualified staff for the analytical laboratories mentioned in paragraph 168 of the SIR, the Secretariat might provide specific training for experts from developing countries with a view to their possible recruitment.</li> </ul>
<b>Country Specific</b>	
Iran	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (GOV/OR.1187 – Para 53) Cuba, speaking on behalf of NAM, said that its position regarding the Iranian nuclear issue was reflected in the following statement adopted at its 14th summit, held in Havana, Cuba, on 15–16 September 2006:</li> <li>• "The Heads of State or Government welcomed the cooperation extended by the Islamic Republic of Iran to the IAEA including those voluntary confidence-building measures undertaken, with a view to resolve the remaining issues. They noted the assessment of the IAEA Director-General that all nuclear material declared by Iran had been accounted for. They noted, at the same time, that the process for drawing a conclusion with regard to the absence of undeclared material and activities in Iran is an ongoing and time-consuming process. In this regard, the Heads of State or Government encouraged Iran to urgently continue to cooperate actively and fully with the IAEA within the Agency's mandate to resolve outstanding issues in order to promote confidence and a peaceful resolution of the issue.</li> <li>• "The Heads of State or Government strongly believed that all issues on safeguards and verification, including those of Iran, should be resolved within the IAEA framework, and be based on technical and legal grounds. They further emphasised that the Agency should continue its work to</li> </ul>

	<p>resolve the Iranian nuclear issue within its mandate under the Statute of the IAEA.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (GOV/OR.1187 – Para 54) NAM noted that in the report contained in document GOV/2007/22 the Director General stated once again that the Agency had found no evidence of diversion of nuclear material and activities to prohibited purposes, that all declared nuclear material had been accounted for and that the Agency was able to verify the non-diversion of declared material in Iran.</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1187 – Para 55) NAM also noted that the Director General had reported that there were no indications of ongoing reprocessing activities.</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1187 – Para 56) In addition, NAM took note of the information, contained in paragraph 4 of the Director General’s report, that Iran had agreed to a modified safeguards approach for its Fuel Enrichment Plant which included, “in addition to a monthly interim inspection and design information verification visit, a combination of, inter alia, unannounced inspections and containment and surveillance measures” and that the first unannounced inspection had been carried out on 13 May 2007. In that connection, NAM considered that a rightful nuclear activity subject to the Agency’s safeguards did not constitute a cause for concern.</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1187 – Para 57) NAM took note of the meetings that had just been held between high-level representatives of Iran and the European Union. The parties concerned should avoid hasty decisions and give serious consideration to all proposals, with a view to finding common ground through negotiation, without preconditions, and to achieving a peaceful and mutually acceptable solution.</li> </ul>
DPRK	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (GOV/OR.1186 – Para 201) Cuba, speaking on behalf of NAM, said that NAM’s position of principle continued to be that all issues should be resolved through dialogue and negotiation. NAM had therefore welcomed the agreement reached on 13 February 2007 in Beijing and hoped that it would be implemented expeditiously. In that connection, NAM was encouraged by the positive results of the Director General’s visit to the DPRK in March 2007.</li> </ul>
Israel	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (GOV/OR.1187 – Para 53) Cuba, speaking on behalf of NAM, said that its position regarding the Iranian nuclear issue was reflected in the following statement adopted at its 14th summit, held in Havana, Cuba, on 15–16 September 2006:</li> <li>• “The Heads of State or Government considered the establishment of nuclear-weapons-free zones (NWFZs) as a positive step towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament and reiterated the support for the establishment in the Middle East of a nuclear-weapon-free zone, in accordance with relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions. Pending the establishment of such a zone, they demanded Israel to accede to the NPT without delay and place promptly all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards.</li> </ul>
<b>Disarmament</b>	
Nonproliferation and Disarmament	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (GOV/OR.1185 – Para 74) The international community’s efforts aimed at nuclear disarmament should be commensurate with those directed towards nuclear non-proliferation. In that regard, NAM recalled objective C.2 of the Medium-Term Strategy 2006-2011: to contribute as appropriate</li> </ul>

	to effective verification of nuclear arms control and reduction agreements, including nuclear disarmament.
Israel	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (GOV/OR.1187 – Para 53) Cuba, speaking on behalf of NAM, said that its position regarding the Iranian nuclear issue was reflected in the following statement adopted at its 14th summit, held in Havana, Cuba, on 15–16 September 2006:</li> <li>• “The Heads of State or Government considered the establishment of nuclear-weapons-free zones (NWFZs) as a positive step towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament and reiterated the support for the establishment in the Middle East of a nuclear-weapon-free zone, in accordance with relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions. Pending the establishment of such a zone, they demanded Israel to accede to the NPT without delay and place promptly all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards.</li> </ul>
<b>Nonproliferation</b>	
Nonproliferation and Disarmament	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (GOV/OR.1185 – Para 74) The international community’s efforts aimed at nuclear disarmament should be commensurate with those directed towards nuclear non-proliferation. In that regard, NAM recalled objective C.2 of the Medium-Term Strategy 2006-2011: to contribute as appropriate to effective verification of nuclear arms control and reduction agreements, including nuclear disarmament.</li> </ul>
<b>Peaceful Uses</b>	
Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (GOV/OR.1187 – Para 53) Cuba, speaking on behalf of NAM, said that its position regarding the Iranian nuclear issue was reflected in the following statement adopted at its 14th summit, held in Havana, Cuba, on 15–16 September 2006:  “The Heads of State or Government reaffirmed the basic and inalienable right of all States, to develop research, production and use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, without any discrimination and in conformity with their respective legal obligations. Therefore, nothing should be interpreted in a way as inhibiting or restricting this right of States to develop atomic energy for peaceful purposes. They furthermore reaffirmed that States’ choices and decisions in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear technology and its fuel cycle policies must be respected.  “The Heads of State or Government reaffirmed the inviolability of peaceful nuclear activities and that any attack or threat of attack against peaceful nuclear facilities -operational or under construction- poses a great danger to human beings and the environment, and constitutes a grave violation of international law, principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and regulations of the IAEA. They recognised the need for a comprehensive multilaterally negotiated instrument, prohibiting attacks, or threat of attacks on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful uses of nuclear energy</li> </ul>
<b>Security Assurances</b>	
Attack or Threat of Attack Against Peaceful Nuclear Facilities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (GOV/OR.1187 – Para 53) Cuba, speaking on behalf of NAM, said that its position regarding the Iranian nuclear issue was reflected in the following statement adopted at its 14th summit, held in Havana, Cuba, on 15–16 September 2006:  “The Heads of State or Government reaffirmed the inviolability of peaceful nuclear activities and that any attack or threat of attack against</li> </ul>

	<p>peaceful nuclear facilities -operational or under construction- poses a great danger to human beings and the environment, and constitutes a grave violation of international law, principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and regulations of the IAEA. They recognised the need for a comprehensive multilaterally negotiated instrument, prohibiting attacks, or threat of attacks on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful uses of nuclear energy.</p>
	<b>NWFZ</b>
NWFZ ME	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (GOV/OR.1187 – Para 53) Cuba, speaking on behalf of NAM, said that its position regarding the Iranian nuclear issue was reflected in the following statement adopted at its 14th summit, held in Havana, Cuba, on 15–16 September 2006: “The Heads of State or Government considered the establishment of nuclear-weapons-free zones (NWFZs) as a positive step towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament and reiterated the support for the establishment in the Middle East of a nuclear-weapon-free zone, in accordance with relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions. Pending the establishment of such a zone, they demanded Israel to accede to the NPT without delay and place promptly all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards.</li> </ul>
Israel	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (GOV/OR.1187 – Para 53) Cuba, speaking on behalf of NAM, said that its position regarding the Iranian nuclear issue was reflected in the following statement adopted at its 14th summit, held in Havana, Cuba, on 15–16 September 2006: “The Heads of State or Government considered the establishment of nuclear-weapons-free zones (NWFZs) as a positive step towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament and reiterated the support for the establishment in the Middle East of a nuclear-weapon-free zone, in accordance with relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions. Pending the establishment of such a zone, they demanded Israel to accede to the NPT without delay and place promptly all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards.</li> </ul>
	<b>Institutional Issues</b>
Procedural Matters	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (GOV/OR.1186 – Para 128) Cuba, speaking on behalf of NAM, said that it had greatly appreciated the efforts of the Chairperson of the Advisory Committee and the assistance provided by the Secretariat to the Committee.</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1186 – Para 129) NAM had participated very actively in the Committee’s work, in keeping with its readiness to support all efforts to strengthen all activities of the Agency falling within the scope of its statutory responsibilities and legal authority.</li> <li>• (GOV/OR.1186 – Para 130) The Advisory Committee had not submitted any recommendations to the Board, which had in June 2005 given it a mandate of two years. That mandate had now expired, and NAM was of the view that it should not be extended.</li> </ul>